TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]

Justifying vs Exempting Circumstances:. Burden of proof – should be proved by the defendant to the
satisfaction of the court.
Justifying Exempting Presumption – always in favor of sanity
Acts: There is nothing The act is not
unlawful in the act justified, but the (Guevara) One who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
as well as in the actor is not circumstances commits a crime, although by the complete
intention of the criminally liable absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or
actor. voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arise.
Crime: There is neither a There is a crime
crime nor a but no criminal
criminal liability Paragraph 1: Imbecile & Insanity
Civil liabilities: There is no civil There is civil Basis: complete absence of intelligence.
liability, except in liability, except in It is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
par. 4 pars. 4 and 7 intelligence while committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that he acts without the least
discernment; or that there be a total deprivation of freedom
Absolutory causes - are those where the act committed is a of the will. Mere abnormality of mental faculties is not
crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness
no penalty imposed. (A11-12) of his acts.

Imbecile - exempt in all cases from criminal liability

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability. - the following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter
has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in
one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under
fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in
which case, such minor shall be proceeded against
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this
Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally
irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the
provisions of this and the preceding paragraph,
shall commit him to the care and custody of his
family who shall be charged with his surveillance
and education otherwise, he shall be committed to
the care of some institution or person mentioned in
said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act
with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of
irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required
by law, when prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause.
- one who is deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime.
- has a mental development comparable to that of
children between 2-7 y/o
Insane – exempted unless it is proven that the accused had
acted during a lucid interval (the insane acts with
intelligence)
- To constitute insanity, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence or that there be a total
deprivation of the freedom of the will.
Procedure when the imbecile/insane committed a felony:
1. Court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums
2. Will not be permitted to leave without the courts
permission
3. The court must first obtain the opinion of the Director of
Health that he may be released without danger
Discernment - is the mental capacity to understand between
right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial.
- An exception to the exemption from criminal liability of
a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law
- May be shown by:
(1) The manner the crime was committed
(2) The conduct of the offender after its commission.
- allegation of "with intent to kill" in the information is
sufficient allegation of discernment

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 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]
Intent - refers to the desired act of the person
Schizophrenia – formerly, dementia praecox.
- a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
- Symptoms: odd and bizarre behavior apparent in
aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and
immature and exaggerated emotionality, often
ambivalently directed.
Kleptomania - abnormal, persistent impulse or tendency to
steal
- irresistible impulse, even to take another's
property, should be considered as covered by the term
"insanity."
Epilepsy - chronic nervous disease characterized by fits,
occurring at intervals, attended by convulsive motions of the
muscles and loss of consciousness.
Feeblemindedness – lacking mental strength
- not imbecility/insanity
Pedophilia - a sexual disorder wherein the subject has strong,
recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and physical
fantasies about children.
- not imbecility/insanity
Amnesia - is not proof of mental condition of the accused
unless it is shown by competent proof that the accused
did not know the nature and quality of his action and
that it was wrong.
Other cases of lack of intelligence:
1. Committing a crime while in a dream.
2. Somnambulism or sleepwalking
3. Hypnotism.
4. Committing a crime while suffering from malignant
Malaria - because such illness affects the nervous system and
causes among others such complication as acute
melancholia and insanity at times.
Uncontrollable fear - for this exempting circumstance to be
invoked successfully, the following requisites must
concur:
1) Existence of an uncontrollable fear;
2) The fear must be real and imminent;
3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to
that committed
Entrapment – not an absolutory cause
- the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and
capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan.
- the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal;
the idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from
him. Occurs when law officers employ ruses and schemes
2
to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the
actual commission of the crime.
Instigation – an absolutory cause
- practically induces the would-be defendant into
committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-
principal
- occurs when the accused is induced/forced to commit
the crime. The law officer conceives the commission of
the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution.
- Basis: A sound public policy requires that the courts
shall condemn this practice (instigation) by directing the
acquittal of the accused.
Paragraph 2: Person under nine years of age (or less)
Basis: complete absence of intelligence.
Republic Act No. 9344 otherwise known as "Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006" raised the age of absolute
irresponsibility from nine (9) to fifteen (15) years of age.
Under Section 6 of the said law, a child fifteen (15) years of
age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subject to an intervention program as
provided under Section 20 of the same law.
Paragraph 3: Person over nine years of age and under fifteen,
unless he has acted with discernment, in which case,
such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code.
Basis: complete absence of intelligence
- impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 9344:
"Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.
— A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subject to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subject to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforce in accordance with existing laws."
*It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that a minor
who is over 15 but under 18 years of age has acted with
discernment, in order for the minor not to be entitled to this
exempting circumstance.
(1) The age of absolute irresponsibility — 9 years and
below (infancy).
(2) The age of conditional responsibility — between
9 and 15 years.
(3) The age of full responsibility — 18 or over
(adolescence) to 70 (maturity).
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]
(4) The age of mitigated responsibility — over 9 and
under 15, offender acting with discernment; 15 or
over but less than 18; over 70 years of age.
Senility - age over 70 years, is only a mitigated responsibility.
Paragraph 4. — Any person who, while performing a lawful
act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
Basis: lack of negligence and intent. Under this circumstance,
a person does not commit either an intentional felony or a
culpable felony.
Elements:
1. A person is performing a lawful act (must do so with due
care, without fault or negligence.)
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
Accident - is something that happens outside the sway of our
will, and although it comes about through some act of
our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences.
- If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a
case of negligence.
- presupposes lack of intention to commit the wrong
done.
Negligence - on the other hand, is the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand without which such other
person suffers injury.
Paragraph 5. — Any person who acts under the compulsion of
an irresistible force.
- It must consist of an extraneous force coming from a
third person.
- Passion or obfuscation cannot be irresistible force
Basis: complete absence of freedom
Presupposes: that a person is compelled by means of force or
violence to commit a crime.
Elements:
1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force.
2. That the physical force must be irresistible.
3. That the physical force must come from a third person.
Paragraph 6. — Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
- compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat.
- Speculative, fanciful and remote fear is not
uncontrollable fear.
Basis: complete absence of freedom.
3
Presupposes: a person is compelled to commit a crime by
another, but the compulsion is by means of intimidation
or threat, not force or violence.
Elements:
1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil greater
than or at least equal to, that which he is required to
commit;
2. That it promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that
the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.
Duress - as a valid defense should be based on real,
imminent, or reasonable fear for one's life or limb and
should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear
Irresistible force (par. 5) - the offender uses violence or
physical force to compel another person to commit a
crime.
Uncontrollable fear (par. 6) - the offender employs
intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a
crime..
Par.agraph 7. — Any person who fails to perform an act
required by law, when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause
Basis: Acts are acts without intent
Elements:
1. That an act is required by law to be done;
2. That a person fails to perform such act;
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful
or insuperable cause.
Complete defenses in criminal cases.
1. Any of the essential elements of the crime charged is not
proved by the prosecution and the elements proved do
not constitute any crime.
2. The act of the accused falls under any of the justifying
circumstances. (Art. 11)
3. The case of the accused falls under any of the exempting
circumstances. (Art. 12)
4. The case is covered by any of the absolutory causes:
a. Spontaneous desistance during attempted stage (Art.
6), and no crime under another provision of the Code or
other penal law is committed.
b. Light felony is only attempted or frustrated, and is not
against persons or property. (Art. 7)
c. The accessory is a relative of the principal. (Art. 20)
d. Legal grounds for arbitrary detention. (Art. 124)
e. Legal grounds for trespass. (Art. 280)
f. The crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief is
committed against a relative. (Art. 332)
g. When only slight or less serious physical injuries are
inflicted by the person who surprised his spouse or
daughter in the act of sexual intercourse with another
person. (Art. 247)
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]

h. Marriage of the offender with the offended party when the
crime committed is rape, abduction, seduction, or acts of
lasciviousness. (Art. 344)
i. Instigation.
5. Guilt of the accused not established beyond reasonable
doubt.
6. Prescription of crimes. (Art. 89)
7. Pardon by the offended party before the institution of
criminal action in crime against chastity. (Art. 344)
------------------------------------CASES--------------------------------------
ARTICLE 12
People v Sisracon (Minority)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. JOMAR
SISRACON y RUPISAN, MARK VALDERAMA y RUPISAN, ROBERTO
CORTEZ y BADILLA, LUIS PADUA y MITRA and ADONIS MOTIL y
GOLONDRINA, Accused-Appellant
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of nine (9) counts of
Qualified Rape.
Aggravated by the circumstances of Treachery,
Evident Premeditation, Abuse of Superior Strength
and Nighttime.
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify [the] victim
[AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages;
and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as exemplary
damages.

CA: Affirmed with modification

Roberto Cortez y Badilla is hereby sentence[d] to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each
criminal case he was found guilty of. Appellants
Jomar Sisracon y Rupisan, Mark Valderama y
Rupisan, Luis Padua y Mitra and Adonis Motil y
Golondrina are hereby sentence[d] to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as the maximum period for each
criminal case they are hereby found guilty.

SC: Affirmed with Modification that appellants are guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the same crime on two (2) counts
only.

Victim: 15 y/o
Facts:
Around 11 o'clock in the evening of February 29, 2004.
AAA was about to go home when she passed by the basketball
court.
Appellant Roberto called AAA and asked her to approach them
because they wanted to ask her about the organization that
they recently joined. AAA agreed and discussed with them the
mission and vision of the organization. Thereafter, AAA told the
group that she wanted to go home, but the latter asked her to
stay longer as they were about to have a drinking spree. The
group insisted that she stay long and finally, AAA told them that
she could stay but only until 11:30 in the evening. The group
then told AAA to go with them at the apartment of Ranil's aunt
which is just a street away from where they were.
Pita was known in their place as mentally deranged. Pita
eventually joined the group.

The group arrived at the apartment and upon entering, Ranil lit
a candle and Adonis closed the door. Ranil then opened a bottle

4
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]
ofEmperador Brandy and took a glass from which each of them
had their "tagay". AAA sat beside Jomar and since she was not
used to drinking liquor, she forced herself to swallow. At 11:30
p.m., AAA told the group that she must go home. Pita also told
AAA that it's time for them to go home. Since Pita insisted that
he and AAA should both go home, he was forced to go home
alone because the group started to hurt him by striking him in
the nape ("binabatuk-batukan"). AAA also tried to leave the
apartment but appellants Jomar and Adonis blocked her way.
Adonis even proceeded to guard the door of the apartment.
AAA was then threatened by the group that they would hurt her
older brother ("Kuya"), BBB, if she insisted on leaving, thus, she
decided to return to her seat. Shortly, the group opened a
second bottle of Emperador Brandy and resumed drinking. AAA
had a shot of the liquor that was poured by Ranil and was given
to her by Jomar. After five to ten minutes from drinking the
liquor, AAA felt her legs and body turning numb, her vision
turning blurry and she started feeling dizzy. As she was closing
her eyes, AAA felt that she was being carried by Jomar. AAA was
familiar with the voice of Jomar and it was the latter who said,
"Dito na, dito na." AAA was then placed in a ''papag" where
Jomar proceeded to lower her shorts. AAA tried to resist by
bringing up her shorts but to no avail due to her weakness.
After successfully lowering AAA's shorts, Jomar went on top of
her and inserted his penis into her vagina causing her pain.
After performing the deed, Jomar invited the others to take
their turns by saying, "Sino ang susunod?" A person of heavier
weight went on top of AAA and it was then that the latter lost
her consciousness. When AAA regained her consciousness, she
felt that somebody was putting on her dress and heard shouts
that he was coming ("Si BBB, si BBB andyan na?"). She then
heard footsteps and a commotion ensuing. When she
awakened, AAA was already inside a mobile unit with her
brother and her mother on their way to a clinic in Camp Crame.
From Camp Crame, they proceeded to the Municipal Hall of x x
x, Rizal and were brought to the Office of the Prosecutor at
around 1 o'clock of March 1, 2004. Thereafter, BBB was told to
identify the suspects and pointed at five (5) persons, namely,
appellants Adonis, Jomar, Luis, Mark and Roberto. During her
identification of the suspects, the parents of the accused, AAA's
mother and brother, and the fiscal were present.
Prosecution evidences----
Testimonies of: (1) Dr. Mamerto Bernabe, a medico-legal officer
assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory, (2)BBB, AAA's brother (3)
CCC, a barangay tanod
(2-3)
BBB, AAA's brother, testified that he was at the meat shop from
1 a.m. to 1 :30 a.m. on the day of the incident when a certain
Rommel arrived and the latter talked to BBB's lady companions,
Angie and Weng. Rommel told Angie and Weng that BBB's sister
was at the apartment of appellant Ranil's aunt. After learning
what Rommel told to his companions, BBB asked a certain
Delfin and a certain Johnrey to accompany him to the said
apartment. When they reached the place, BBB noticed that
there was no light in the house and saw Randy Mulog at the
5
back of the door and as soon as the latter saw BBB, he went
inside the house and closed the door. BBB then entered the
house and noticed that there were men inside who were in the
act of dressing up. BBB also saw Ramil Camaymayan and Rex
Dandan hurriedly coming out from a room while fixing their
clothes. BBB proceeded to the room and noticed that it reeked
of alcohol and saw Luis Padua fixing his shorts. BBB then saw his
sister, AAA, lying sideways on the bed with her underwear
lowered down .and her blouse raised up. BBB asked them why
they did that to his sister but the men ran away. Johnrey, BBB's
companion, chased and caught up with John Andrew
Valderama. Thereafter, they went to the barangay hall where
BBB reported the incident. After thirty minutes, a barangay
tanod arrived accosting appellants Mark, Luis, Adonis, Jomar
and John Andrew Valderama. They all then proceeded to the
municipal hall and while thereat, BBB, his mother, AAA, and his
aunt were told to go to Camp Crame to have AAA examined by
a medico-legal officer. After going to Camp Crame, they
returned to the municipal hall and gave their statements.
Medical Findings----
March 1, 2004, he conducted a physical and genital examination
over the person of AAA and that the physical examination
showed an injury on the left breast of AAA akin to a suction
injury also known as "kiss mark." As to the genital examination,
Dr. Bernabe found that on the hymen, there was a shallow
healing laceration which means that there was forcible entry,
Concluded that AAA is in non-virgin state physically and that the
findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.
Witness credibility----People v. Malana:
The determination of the credibility of the offended party's
testimony is a most basic consideration in every prosecution for
rape, for the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is
sufficient to sustain the verdict of conviction. When the issue is
one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally
not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the
latter is in· a better position to decide the question as it heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during trial. The exceptions to the rule are
when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstance of weight and substance which could affect the
result of the case.
All of these accused on trial could not ascribe any ill motive on
the part of [AAA] that might have implied her to institute the
present action. [AAA] was detailed in her narration and
remained consistent even on rigid cross-examination.
Corroborated by medical findings
Conspiracy---- The commission of the crime of rape was
accomplished by appellants, in conspiracy with each other.
Appellants appear to have consented in all the acts of their co-
accused taking turns in raping [AAA] considering none of them
prevented the commission of the crime, but rather participated
in aiding one another in their dastardly acts.
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]
Circumstancial evidence----
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can
be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
Proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by
direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also
sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt.
Supreme Court-----
Based on the testimony of AAA, that she recognized appellant
Jomar as the first person who raped her followed by another
person of heavier built before she passed out, it is more
appropriate to convict the appellants with just two (2) instead
of nine (9) counts of rape as earlier ruled by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA.
On the basis of the medico-legal officer's findings, one can even
surmise that the victim should have incurred far greater injuries
if she had been raped nine times in a span of a little more than
one hour. As such, there is the existence of doubt on the other
seven counts of rape charged against the appellants.
The other seven counts of rape have not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The findings of the medico-legal officer also
cast doubt as to the possibility that the victim was raped nine
times.
It is indisputable and proven in court that the appellants, except
appellant Roberto, are all minors when the crime was
committed. Jomar was then 17 years and 4 months old, Mark
was 17 years and 10 months old, Adonis was 15 years and 11
months old, and Luis was 16 years and 11 months old. Section 6
of R.A. No. 9344 provides:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
According to the above provision, the minor appellants herein,
all above 15 but below 18 years of age, shall only be exempt
6
from criminal liability if they did not act with discernment. In
Madali, et al. v. People,25 this Court held that discernment is
that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In
this particular case, the prosecution was able to prove the
presence of discernment.
Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and
under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC,
reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion
perpetua to death.
The court agrees to the presence of aggravating circumstances.
RTC and the CA erred---- to not have applied Section 38 of R.A.
9344. Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child
below 18 years of age who committed a crime and was found
guilty, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence even if such child has reached 18
years or more at the time of judgment. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even
if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in
conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the
time the judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such
suspension is only until the minor reaches the maximum age of
21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No. 9344, to wit:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures
imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been
fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed
to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]
this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Necessarily, herein minor appellants shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344, which
extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was
still a child, and provides for the confinement of convicted
children.
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities. -A child in conflict with the
law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made
to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Dispositive---
Appeal of Jomar Sisracon y Rupisan, Mark Valderama y Rupisan,
Roberto Cortez y Badilla, Luis Padua y Mitra and Adonis Motil y
Golondrina is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the
Decision of the CA affirming the Decision RTC finding each
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape as
defined and penalized under Article 266-A and Article 266-B,
par. 1, in relation to Article 266-B, 2nd par. of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and in further
relation to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellants are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the same crime on two (2) counts only.
Ty v People (Irresistible force/Uncontrollable Fear)
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent
RTC – guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law.
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts
of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid
obligation, which turned unfounded on their
respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven
(7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of
forty-two (42) months.
CA – affirmed with modification to set aside the penalty of
imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty
thousand pesos (₱60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount
of the check, in each case."
SC – Affirmed with modifications
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31
July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of
violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is
7
ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the
amount of each dishonored check subject of the
seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay
private complainant, Manila Doctors’ Hospital, the
amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱210,000.00) representing the total amount of the
dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
FACTS:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty’s mother Chua
Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors’ Hospital
(hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the
patient’s daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of
Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated
30 October 1990. As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account
shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of
₱657,182.40. Ty’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the
hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital
bills in the amount of ₱418,410.55. The total hospital bills of the
two patients amounted to ₱1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty
executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of
the obligation in installments. To assure payment of the
obligation, she drew several postdated checks against
Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each
covering the amount of ₱30,000.00, were all deposited on their
due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank
and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of
funds, with the "Account Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the
complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered
mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed
the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant case.
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because
of "an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury." She averred that
she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her
mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and
would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She
alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as
the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and
subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the
telephone line, late delivery of her mother’s food and refusal to
change the latter’s gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the
hospital’s suspending medical treatment of her mother. The
"debasing treatment," she pointed out, so affected her
mother’s mental, psychological and physical health that the
latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from
the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply
with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a
promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue
the checks to effect her mother’s immediate discharge.
CA rationale----Vaca v. Court of Appeals:
CA declared that in determining the penalty imposed for
violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e.,
redeeming valuable human material and preventing
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order
OSG---- contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt,
though not intended to be presented for payment, has the
same effect as an ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit
of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment, the
drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of
whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The
mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.
ISSUE:
Is the defense of uncontrollable fear or avoidance of a greater
evil or injury tenable to warrant Ty's exemption from criminal
liability?
SC----
Uncontrollable fear - for this exempting circumstance to be
invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur:
1) Existence of an uncontrollable fear;
2) The fear must be real and imminent;
3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal
to that committed
The fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty
claims that she was compelled to issue the checks a condition
the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother
could be discharged for fear that her mothers health might
deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated
by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness
was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the
hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would
induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it
is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her
mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she
invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of
all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will,
moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with
no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of
the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing
one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or
security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And
if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank
and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the
scene to avoid involvement.
8
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is
merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future,
this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of
an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own
admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of
security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing,
the greater injury feared should not have been brought about
by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction
of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks
was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers
hospital bills.
People v Feliciano (Entrapment vs Instegation)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO
FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER
SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN
ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
RTC – finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr.,
Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan
were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted
murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court, however,
acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert
Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag. The case
against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court
until his apprehension.
CA – Affirmed (3v1)
SC – Affirmed with Modification (finding the accused also Guilty
of Attempted Murder)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is
AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher
Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133
with the MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-
61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
FACTS: Sigma Rho (injured) v Scintilla Juri(attackers)
Dead: Derinis Venturina
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to
1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near
the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries
that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina,
died from his injuries.
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]
Leandro Lachica: recognized one of the attackers as Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off. Lachica tried to
parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and
contusions. He was, however, able to run to the nearby College
of Education. Just before reaching it, he looked back and saw
Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes
and standing where the commotion was.16 Both of them did
not have their masks on. He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan,
and Medalla because he often saw them in the College of Social
Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his
friend. The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five (45)
seconds.
Peter Corvera, told him that he received information that
members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the
Main Library and were regrouping in SM North. Lachica and his
group then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and
identify their attackers. When they arrived in SM North,
pillboxes and stones were thrown at them. Lachica saw Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo
Taparan. They had no choice but to get away from the mall and
proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity
members held a meeting.
Mervin Natalicio: While he was parrying the blows, he
recognized two (2) of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and
Christopher L. Soliva since they were not wearing any masks.
After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him. He
was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another
group of four (4) to five (5) men coming toward him, led by
Benedict Guerrero. This group also beat him up.
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.: While running and parrying the blows,
he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo
Jolette Fajardo because their masks fell off. He successfully
evaded his attackers and ran to the Main Library. He then
decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and
turned back toward Beach House. There, he saw Venturina lying
on the ground. Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up
with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit
Venturina. When they saw him, they went toward his direction.
They were about to hit him when somebody shouted that
policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away.
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.: One struck him with a heavy pipe while
the other stabbed him with a bladed instrument. He was able to
parry most of the blows from the lead pipe, but he sustained
stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm. He was able
to run away. When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he
looked back to Beach House Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano,
Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano. He decided to go
back to the canteen to help his fraternity brothers. When he
arrived, he did not see any of his fraternity brothers but only
saw the ones who attacked them. He ended up going to their
hang-out instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers.
They then proceeded to the College of Law where the rest of
the fraternity was already discussing the incident.
Amel Fortes: also ran when he saw the group of attackers
coming toward them. When he looked back, he saw Danilo
Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina. He was also able to see Warren
Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.
9
Medical opinion----
Dr. Rolando Victoria: found that Venturina had "several
contusions located at the back of the upper left arm and
hematoma on the back of both hands," "two (2) lacerated
wounds at the back of the head, generalized hematoma on the
skull," "several fractures on the head," and "inter-cranial
hemorrhage." The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could have
been caused by a hard blunt object. Dr. Victoria concluded that
Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.
ISSUE:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were
violated when the information against them contained the
aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell
off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that accused-
appellants were sufficiently identified.
SC----
On #1:
the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise" in the information does not violate their
constitutional rights. It should be remembered that every
aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even
if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was,
therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the
aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial
court.
Disguise - is an aggravating circumstance because, like
nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and
unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence
that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the
masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as
an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging
disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a
concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of
disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the
offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal
their identity.
On #2:
General rule - the findings of fact by the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight and
credence on review. Factual findings of the trial court, especially
on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood
Exceptions - where such findings are clearly arbitrary or
erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are
so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were reached without
the careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize a
judicial decision.
Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his
fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not one testified
against all of them. (RTC, agreed by SC)
(People v. Benjamin Peteluna) Defense of alibi cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the victim.
Chang v People (Entrapment vs Instigation)
ROBERTO E. CHANG and PACIFICO D. SAN MATEO, petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Sandiganbayan - guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Roberto E. Chang and Pacifico D. San Mateo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of
sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and are hereby sentenced to
each suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) month
as minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum and to
each suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office.
Anent accused Edgar L. Feraren, judgment is hereby
rendered finding him NOT GUILTY for the violation of
sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 for failure of the Prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and is
hereby ACQUITTED. Consequently, the personal bail
bond posted by accused Edgar L. Ferraren is hereby
ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure Order
issued against the same accused is hereby revoked
and declared functus officio.
SC – Affirmed
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged
Sandiganbayan decision is AFFIRMED.
FACTS:
Petitioner Roberto Estanislao Chang (Chang) was the Municipal
Treasurer of Makati who was tasked to, among other things,
examine or investigate tax returns of private corporations or
companies operating within Makati, and determine the
sufficiency or insufficiency of Income Tax assessed on them and
collect payments therefor.
Petitioner Pacifico D. San Mateo (San Mateo) was the Chief of
Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division,
Makati Treasurer's Office.
10
Edgar Leoncito Feraren (Feraren), a Driver-Clerk also of the
Makati Treasurer's Office
By virtue of Letter-Authority No. M-90-245 dated June 18, 1990
issued by the Office of the District Treasurer (District IV), Makati
Treasurer's Office examiners Vivian Susan C. Yu and Leonila T.
Azevedo conducted an examination of the books of accounts
and other pertinent records of GDI covering the period from
January 1985 to December 1989 in order to verify the true and
correct amount of tax due from its business operations.3
The examiners found that GDI incurred a tax deficiency inclusive
of penalty in the total amount of P494,601.11. The Office of the
Treasurer thus issued an Initial Assessment Notice dated
January 25, 1991 to GDI for it to pay the tax deficiency within
four days from receipt.
No word having been received by the Office of the Treasurer
from GDI, it issued a Second Assessment Notice6 dated
February 14, 1991, reminding GDI to settle the amount due
within three days from receipt.
The assessment notices were personally received by Mario
Magat (Magat), Chief Operating Officer of GDI, in April 1991.
Magat thereupon referred the matter to the Accounting
Department which informed him that the computations and
worksheets requested from the municipal auditors to enable it
to validate the assessment7 had not been received.
Magat was later able to talk via telephone to San Mateo who
had been calling GDI's Accounting Department and requesting
for someone with whom he could talk to regarding the
assessment.
On May 15, 1991, Magat and San Mateo met for lunch at the
Makati Sports Club.8 Chang later joined the two, and the three
agreed that if GDI could pay P125,000 by the end of May 1991,
the assessment would be "resolved."
On May 29, 1991, San Mateo went to Magat's office at GDI to
pick up the check for the settlement of GDI's deficient tax
liability. When Magat handed over to San Mateo Interbank
Manager's Check No. 30171560310 in the amount of P125,000
dated May 29, 1991 payable to the Municipal Treasurer of
Makati, San Mateo refused to accept the same, he uttering that
Magat may have misunderstood their agreement as the money
would not be going to the Municipality. Magat thereupon asked
if Chang knew about the matter and San Mateo replied that
that was the agreement as understood by Chang. Magat then
informed San Mateo that he still had to consult with the top
management of GDI because what he understood was that GDI
was settling the correct amount of taxes to the Municipality.
After consultation with the management of GDI, Magat
repaired on May 30, 1991 to the offices of San Mateo and
Chang at the Makati Treasurer's Office during which he was told
that the payment was to absolve GDI from its tax liability and if
no payment is made, they would find ways to close GDI.
On June 6, 1991, Magat met again for lunch with San Mateo
and Chang at the Makati Sports Club. Magat tried to convince
 TEP NOTES 2019 [CRIMINAL LAW 1]

the two that GDI wanted to pay the correct amount of tax to ISSUE: Whether or not the incident can be counted as
the Municipality. He was advised by San Mateo and Chang, instigation and not entrapment operation.
however, that GDI had only two options: pay the P494,601.11
to the Municipality or P125,000 to them. Magat thus consulted SC----
with Victor Puyat, president of GDI. Referral of the matter to There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was considered. schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in
On June 12, 1991, Magat met with then NBI Deputy Director the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when
Epimaco Velasco who advised him to file a complaint with the the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in
NBI. On even date, Magat thus gave a sworn statement15 the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
before the NBI. After the lapse of several days, Magat contacted entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
San Mateo and asked him if their position was still the same to criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes
which the latter replied in the affirmative, he adding that if no from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the
payment was made, GDI would be closed. Magat thereafter told commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
San Mateo that he would deliver the P125,000 on June 19, 1991 adopts the idea and carries it into execution. From the evidence
at the Makati Sports Club. for the prosecution, it was clearly established that the criminal
On the morning of June 19, 1991, Magat informed the NBI that intent originated from the minds of Chang et al. Even before the
the payment was to be made that day around lunchtime. The June 19, 1991 meeting took place, Chang et al. already made
NBI immediately formed a team to conduct an entrapment. On known to Magat that GDI only had two options to prevent the
the request of the NBI, Magat brought hundred peso bills to be closure of the company, either to pay the assessed amount of
added to the boodle money to be used in the entrapment P494,601.11 to the Municipality, or pay the amount of
operation. The genuine as well as the boodle money and the P125,000 to them.
brown envelope where the money was placed were then laced
with fluorescent powder.
A few minutes before 11:30 a.m. of June 19, 1991, Magat
together with some NBI operatives, arrived at the Makati Sports
Club. Two of the NBI agents went with Magat to the restaurant
and pretended to play billiards while Magat occupied one of the
tables.
At 11:30 a.m., San Mateo arrived and joined Magat at his table.
The two took lunch after which San Mateo stood up and
watched those playing billiards. At 12:00 noon, Chang and his
driver Feraren arrived and joined Magat at the table. After
Chang and Feraren were through with their lunch, Magat told
Chang and San Mateo that GDI was ready to pay and asked
them if they could give him the Certificate of Examination
showing that GDI had no more tax liability to the municipality.
Chang thereupon handed to Magat the Certificate of
Examination19 issued to GDI with an annotation reading "NO
TAX LIABILITY INVOLVED," following which Magat gave Chang
the brown envelope. Chang then passed the brown envelope on
to his driver Feraren who in turn passed it on to San Mateo who
opened it and peeped at its contents. At that instant, the NBI
agents announced that they were being arrested.
After their arrest, Chang, San Mateo and Feraren were brought
to the NBI headquarters where their respective hands were
tested and found positive for fluorescent powder.

petitioners proffer that what transpired was not an entrapment

but an instigation, which is an absolutory cause in criminal
prosecution. They point out that when Magat went to the NBI
on June 12, 1991, "no date, time or place was as yet known to
them for purposes of the planned entrapment, leading to no
other conclusion except that all the activities on . . . June 19,
1991, the day of the supposed pay-off in the amount of
P125,000, were all orchestrated by . . . Magat so as not to lose
face with the NBI.

11