POLITICAL LAW

Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

Bar Review Lecturer
Academicus, UP Law Cente, rLex Patriae, Suprema Legis, Villasis Law Center, Great Minds,
PhilJust. Magnificus Juris, CPRS, MLQU, Lex, Powerhaus, Premiere, SLU BarCom

Constitutional Amendments and Revisions

01. What are the substantial and procedural requisites in changing the Constitution through people’s
initiative upon a petition?

ANSWER: The following are the requisites:

(1) A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to amendments of the Constitution and not to
revisions to Constitution. Only Congress or a Constitutional Convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. Where the intent of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose
revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a bicameral presidential to
unicameral parliamentary system, involving abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. (Lambino vs. COMELEC, 505
SCRA 160)
(2) People’s initiative as a mode of changing the Constitution requires at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters therein, should directly sign the entire proposal.
(3) The draft of the proposed amendment must be embodied in the petition. (Lambino, supra]

National Territory
02. a) What do you understand by the Archipelago Doctrine?
b) How does the Doctrine, as embodied in Article I of the Philippine Constitution, differ from the
version of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea?
ANSWERS:
a) The archipelagic doctrine emphasizes the unity of the land and waters by defining an archipelago either as a
group of islands and islets or body of waters studded with islands. For this purpose, it requires that
baselines be drawn by connecting the appropriate points of the outermost islands to encircle the islands
within the archipelago. The waters on the landward side of the baselines regardless of breadth or dimension
are considered merely internal waters.
b) Article I of the Philippine Constitution treats the vast areas of water between islands as internal waters and
therefore not subject to the right of innocent passage. The 1982 UNCLOS version calls such areas
“archipelagic waters” and are subject to the right of innocent passage through passages designated by the
archipelago concerned. But, where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Article 4 of
the UNCLOS has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered as
part of the territorial sea or of the high seas (referred to as archipelagic waters), the right of innocent
passage shall exist in those waters, through passages designated by the archipelago concerned.

03. What is the new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines? What is its implications, if any, upon
the Philippine territorial claims over Sabah and the Kalayaan Islands Group?
ANSWER: The new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines is embodied in RA 9522 which effectively amended
Section 1 of RA 3046, entitled “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines,” as amended
by Section 1 of RA 5446. RA 9522 adopts the “regime of islands” formula in dealing with our claim over Spratlys. The
new law would operate as a repeal of the Sabah provision of the previous baseline law, RA 5446 (the only legislative
re-affirmation of Philippine sovereignty over Sabah), resulting in the derogation of the other territories clause of the
Constitution. (Merlin M. Magallona, “A Framework for the Study of National Territory: A Statement of the Problem”
IBP Journal, September 2008.)
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04. What is the Regime of Islands Doctrine enunciated in RA 9522, or the new archipelagic baseline law
of the Philippines?
ANSWER: The Regime of Islands Doctrine as embodied in the new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines
modifies the Archipelagic Principle by excluding two disputed territories, namely, the Kalayaan Islands Group and the
Scarborough Shoal from the country’s archipelagic baseline but they remain as parts of Philippine territory and
considered as regime of islands consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS). It adopts a mix formula that combines archipelagic baselines for the main archipelago, and “regime of
islands” for the disputed islands with the option to fix normal baselines in the islands we claim in the disputed Spratly
islands group. Under the “regime of islands” principle, baselines will be drawn on an island-to-island basis rather than
a package deal-type “archipelago.”
\

05. The New Baseline Law, RA 9522 was enacted by Congress to comply with the terms of the UNCLOS
which the Philippines ratified in 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline and optimized the
location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territorries
such as Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands” whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zone. Is RA 9522 unconstitutional for converting internal
waters into archipelagic waters and exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazard?
ANSWER: NO. The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines because an
archipelagic state has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baseline, regardless
of their depth or distance from the coast. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS III which grants innocent passage
rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, thus, the right of innocent passage, being a customary
international law is automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. The compliance to UNCLOS III
through RA 9522 will not expose Philippine waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. If the Philippines did not
comply with the baseline law, it will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of
its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured and which will produce two-fronted disasters: (1) open invitation
to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around the
archipelago and (2) it shall weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
(Magallona v. Ermita, GR No. 187167, July 16, 2011)
06. When is a suit against a public official deemed to be a suit against the State?
ANSWER: While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it
is also applicable to complaints filed against public officials for acts allegedly done in the performance of their official
duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the State where the satisfaction of the judgment
against the public official concerned will require the State to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the
amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is clearly being sued for acts that are unlawful and injurious
to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from the acts
committed in bad faith…Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity
but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public
position.
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction
and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a
party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity does not apply in causes of action
which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State. (Lansang vs. CA, 326 SCRA 259 and
DOH vs. Pharmawealth, Inc., GR No. 169304, March 13, 2007)
Citizenship
07. Who can elect Filipino citizenship under Article IV Section 1(3) of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and
Section 1 of CA No. 625?
ANSWER: The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children and not to one who was concededly an illegitimate child, as her Chinese father and Filipino mother
were never married. Being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent is a Filipino since birth, without having
to elect Filipino citizenship when she reaches the age of majority. (Republic vs. Lim, 420 SCRA 123, GR No.
153883, January 13, 2004)
08. What is naturalization? Name the three modes of acquiring Filipino citizenship through
naturalization.
ANSWER: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under existing laws, there are three modes by which an alien may
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization: (1) administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139; (2) judicial
naturalization pursuant to CA 437; and (3) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress granting
Philippine citizenship to an alien (So, vs. Republic, GR No.170603, January 29, 2007)
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09. Who are eligible to apply for naturalization under RA No. 9139, the Administrative Naturalization
Law? State the rationale for the enactment of the law.
ANSWER: RA 9139 is an act providing for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship for 1) aliens born in the
Philippines and 2) residing therein since birth by administrative naturalization subject to certain requirements
dictated by national security and interest. RA 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the
process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It also addresses the
concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus
promoting "brain drain for the Philippines. (So vs. Republic, supra)
10. Are the qualifications prescribed under Act 473 applicable to RA 9139?
ANSWER: NO. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in
Sections 2 and 4 of CA 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of RA 9139 provide for the qualifications and
disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. First, CA 473 and RA 9139 are separate and
distinct laws- the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here
in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who
have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to customs and traditions. Second, if the
qualifications prescribed in RA 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law
would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native-born. Third, applying the provisions
of RA 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization
procedure in the country. (Ibid.)
11. Are minor children of naturalized Filipino citizens under LOI 270 also granted Philippine
citizenship?
ANSWER: Yes, pursuant to the principle of derivative naturalization. Section 15 of CA 437, which extends the grant
of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder should be similarly applied to the minor
children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270. The following are requisites to be entitled to Philippine citizenship:
(1) they are legitimate children of petitioner (2) they were born in the Philippines and (3) they were still minors
when petitioner was naturalized as Filipino citizen. (Tan Co vs. Civil Register of Manila, 423 SCRA 665)
12. Distinguish dual citizenship from dual allegiance.
ANSWER: Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive acts, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is voluntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition. (Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 29, 1999)
13. Who may validly avail of repatriation under RA No. 8171? Does this mode require a judicial
proceeding?
ANSWER: RA No. 8171, which lapse into law on October 23, 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, including their minor children.
(Angat vs. Republic, GR No. 132244, September 14, 1999) Included in the second group are minor children at the
time of repatriation and does not include one who is no longer minor at the time of his repatriation or one who lost his
Philippine citizenship by operation of law. The loss of Philippine citizenship must be on account of political or
economic necessity and not by operation of law such as derivative naturalization, or for the purpose of avoiding
deportation and prosecution in the US. (Tabasa vs. CA, 500 SCRA 9)
Repatriation as a mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship does not require the filing of a petition in court.
All that an applicant had to do is to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said
oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. (Angat, supra.) In
addition thereto, registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting the repatriation of a citizen. (Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655) But in Tabasa, supra, the Supreme
Court ruled that petition for repatriation shall be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN) which was
designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to AO 285 dated August 22, 2006.

14. Under the Repatriation Law, what kind of citizenship is reacquired by the repatriate?
ANSWER: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino. (Bengson III vs. HRET, et. al. GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001)

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15. What are the salient features of RA 9225, The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,
or the so-called Dual Citizenship Law?
ANSWER: It allows former natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to reacquire Filipino citizenship. It also allows Filipino citizens to retain
their Filipino citizenship even if they acquire another citizenship in a foreign country. Retention or reacquisition is
accomplished by simply taking the oath of allegiance as prescribed by RA 9225. The required oath of allegiance does
not contain the usual renunciation of allegiance to any and all other states, thereby impliedly allowing continued
allegiance to the adopted state. The usual absolute renunciation is, however, required from those seeking public
elective office or appointed to public office in the Philippines. Likewise, under the principle of derivative citizenship,
the unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of RA 9225, shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
Separation of Church and State
16. What do you understand by the Doctrine of BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY or ACCOMMODATION?
ANSWER: The doctrine believes that the wall of separation that divides the church and the state is meant to protect
the church from the state. The principle recognizes that the state is not hostile to religion because it plays an
important role in public life. It believes that the wall of separation does not require the state to be adversary, rather,
the state must be neutral in its relations with groups or religious believers and non-believers. Under the doctrine,
accommodation of religion may be allowed not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Thus, the Philippine Constitution provides for tax
exemption of church properties, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools. The adoption of the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach does not mean
that the Court ought to grant exemption every time a free exercise claim comes before it. (Estrada vs. Escritor, 492
SCRA 1)
17. Can the courts, in the performance of their judicial functions, exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions?
ANSWER: NO. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution or organization is a matter best
left to the discretion of the officials, and laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts
to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. In
disputes involving religious institution or organization, there is one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal
and disciplinary matters. The amendments of the constitution, re-statement of articles of religion and abandonment of
faith or abjuration alleged by the appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical
law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly
unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of civil courts.
(Taruc vs. Cruz, 453 SCRA 123)
Party-list System
18. Explain briefly the four parameters of the Philippine party-list system.
ANSWER: The Four Parameters of the Filipino Party-List System
(1) the twenty percent allocation – the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
(20) percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under party
list;
The Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, a formulation which means that any increase in the
number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding
increase in the number of party-list seats.
In Veterans, the Court considered the 20 percent share merely as a ceiling and not a mandatory
prescription. In the BANAT decision, however, it considered the 20-percent share as mandatory, hence, all
the available seats must be filled up..
(2) the two percent threshold – only political parties who obtained a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast
for party-list shall be “qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives and entitled to party-list
representation.
In Veterans, only those who obtained at least 2-percent of the total votes cast could participate in
the proportional distribution under the fourth element below. In the BANAT decision, the Court upheld the 2-
percent threshold ushered by the “first clause” of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 insofar as it allowed the grant of an
initial one seat to a party-list that garnered, to quote the law, “at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system.” However, it struck down as unconstitutional the “second clause” of the same section
that states, “those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes” because this clause “makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the number of available party-list seats
exceeds 50.” With that decision, the 20-percent could all be filled. To fill up the additional seats, the Court
awarded slots to those that secured less than two percent of the total votes cast.
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(3) the three seat limit – obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per party
limit so that each qualified party, regardless of number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats, one “qualifying” and two additional slots; and
(4) proportional representation – the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in
proportion to their total number of votes.”
In ARARO v. COMELEC, GR No. 192803, December 10, 2013, the Supreme Court further
modified the formula used and interpreted in BANAT v. COMELEC. Thus, the formula to determine the
proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be:
Number of votes of party list
_______________________ = Proportion or percentage of votes garnered by party-list
Total number of valid votes
for party-list candidates
The divisor, thus, helps to determine the correct percentage of representation of party-list groups as intended by
law. This part of the index of proportionality of the representation of a party-list to the House of Representatives.
19. What are the new parameters in the screening of party-list participants?
ANSWER: In Paglaum v. COMELEC, GR No. 203766, April 2, 2013, the Supreme Court prescribed new parameters
that the COMELEC shall adhere to for screening party-list participants, particularly in the qualifications of national,
regional and sectoral parties: (1)Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (i) national parties or
organizations, (ii) regional parties or organizations, and (iii) sectoral parties or organizations. (2)For purposes of
registration under the party-list system, national and regional parties or organization need not represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only
required of sectoral organizations that represent sectors stated under Section 5 of RA 7941 that are, by their nature,
economically marginalized and underrepresented. (Abang Lingkod Party List v. COMELEC, GR No. 206852,
October 22, 2013) (3) Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented’ include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lacked “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women and the youth.
Legislative Inquiry
20. Distinguish Question Hour of Sec. 22, from Legislative Investigation of Sec. 21, both of Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution.
ANSWER:
As to purpose
QH: directed merely to congressional oversight over the implementation of laws,
in line with the principle of checks and balances
LIn: to illicit information that may be used in aid of legislation
As to persons who may appear
QH: only a department head/cabinet member’s appearance may be requested
LIn: any person, and the appearance is mandatory, unless a valid claim of executive privilege is made by a
department head
As to who conducts inquiry
QH: entire body, either Senate or House of Representatives
LIn: committees
As to subject matter
QH: matters related to the department only
LIn: any matter for the purpose of legislation
As to the requisite of President’s permission
QH: President’s permission for cabinet members to appear required
LIn: President’s permission for cabinet members to appear not required
As to the use of compulsory process
QH: Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials
LIn: Congress can compel executive officials to appear (except when a valid claim of executive privilege is invoked)
21. The President issued EO 464, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of which prohibit Cabinet Members and
other officials from appearing before congressional investigations without securing her prior consent to
ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege
and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. The Senate assailed
the validity and constitutionality of the EO on the following grounds: (1) the EO contravenes the power
of inquiry vested in Congress, (2) the EO violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, and (3) there was grave abuse of discretion in implementing the EO prior to its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Decide.
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ANSWER: In Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006, the Supreme Court issued the
following ruling: (1) Section 3 and Section 2 (b) must be invalidated. The assailed EO severely frustrates the power
of inquiry of Congress. In the conduct of congressional inquiry in aid of legislation, any person, including Cabinet
Members and other public officials may be required by either House of Congress to appear before congressional
investigations under pain of contempt without prior permission of the President. The requirement of securing prior
consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress applies only to Cabinet Members and
not to other public officials and only when either House of Congress conducts a Question Hour and not in cases of
inquiries in aid of legislation as the latter should be untrammelled because it is co-extensive with the power to
legislate.
(2) Any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily
deprives the people of information, which are presumably a matter of public concern.
(3) While EO 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the
need for publication. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it
was implemented.
However, in Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006, the Supreme Court en banc clarified the
above ruling and upheld the President’s constitutional authority over the military and to stop the two officers from
attending the Senate hearing by virtue of her power as Commander in Chief, and that as a consequence, a military
officer who defies such an injunction was liable under the military justice. In the same case, the Supreme Court also
ruled that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of
the President, has adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial
orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. But the
Supreme Court said that the two officers could have been allowed to testify before the Senate without having to defy
their Commander in Chief and superior officers. And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the
shoulder of the President, as Commander in Chief, to authorize the appearance of military officials before Congress.
22. Can the Senate require members or staff of the PCGG to testify or produce evidence concerning
matters within its official cognizance?
ANSWER: YES. Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution grants Congress and any of its committee the power of
legislative inquiry notwithstanding the exemption granted by Section 4 (b) of EO NO.1, which is deemed repealed by
the aforementioned constitutional provision. The power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch. The operation of the government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation and the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Furthermore, Section 4 (b) is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on accountability of public officers and the State’s policy of
transparency and full public disclosure of its transactions involving public interest. (Sabio vs. Gordon, GR 174340,
October 17, 2006)
23. Is the Senate barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan?
ANSWER: NO. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or
pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a
legislative purpose. So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by the Senate Committees, it
is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The
unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. (Sabio vs. Gordon,
supra.)
In Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, GR
167173, December 27, 2007, it was held that the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before court
or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative
inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
24. What are the limitations on the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation?
ANSWER: The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition
that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce
it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the
Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries be respected. (Neri vs. Senate Committees, supra)
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25. Explain briefly the following doctrines:
1) Doctrine of Automatic Re-appropriation 4) a Principle of the Public Fisc
2) Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision 5) a Principle of Appropriations Control
3) Doctrine of Augmentation and three (3) requisites 6) No-amendment Rule
ANSWERS:
(1) Under the Doctrine of Automatic Re-appropriation, if by the end of any fiscal year, Congress shall have
failed to pass the General Appropriation bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and in effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by Congress.
(2) A general appropriation bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to special sums of money
dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to amend another
law is considered “inappropriate provision.” (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736) It is a provision
which does not relate to any particular item or which extends its operations beyond an item in an appropriations law
which can be vetoed by the President separately from the item.
(3) Under the Doctrine of Augmentation, no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriation;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court and the Heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
The transfer of appropriated funds to be valid must be made upon concurrence of the following requisites,
namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer
funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino III, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
(4) “a Principle of the Public Fisc asserts that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the
government are public funds.
(5) “a Principle of Appropriations Control prohibits expenditure of any public fund money without legislative
authorization
(6) The “no-amendment rule” in law-making refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of
Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other
house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further
changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of
Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Section
26(2), Article VI of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference
Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both
houses of Congress is prohibited. (ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita, GR No. 168056, September 1, 2005)
26. What government agency is vested with emergency powers?
ANSWER: Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an
aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that "the State may during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
(David vs. Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
27. During a period of national emergency, Congress may grant emergency powers to the President.
State the conditions under which such a vesture is allowed.
ANSWER: Under Section 23(2), Article VI of the Constitution, Congress may grant the President emergency powers
subject to the following conditions:
1. There is war or other national emergency;
2. The grant of emergency powers must be for a limited period;
3. The grant of emergency powers is subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe; and
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a declared national policy.
28. Is the Pork Barrel System under the Priority Development Assistance Fund constitutional?
ANSWER: In Belgica v. Executive Secretary, GR Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19 , 2013, the
Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules
within which it operates. Insofar as it allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-
enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system violated the principle of separation of powers;
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insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds
from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items
are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the
process, denied the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability; insifar as it has authorized
legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable
local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the
President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may
deem fit as well as other funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects,” it has
once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
Executive/Judicial Departments
29. What is the nature of the president's power to appoint? Can the President validly issue an acting
appointment for cabinet members?
ANSWER: The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary [1996]) Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. (Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 459) The
scope of the legislature's interference in the executive's power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person
to an office. (Flores vs. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568) Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of
Congress, the exercise of its power is executive and not legislative. It is independent of Congress. Its powers do not
come from Congress but emanate directly from the Constitution. The Commission on Appointment does not legislate
when it exercises the power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointment.
YES. EO 292, The Administrative Code of 1987, allows the President to make acting appointment by
temporarily designating an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch, including cabinet members.
30. What do you understand by an “ad interim” appointment? Is the President prohibited to issue this
kind of appointment to the three Constitutional Commissions? How can an “ad interim appointment
be terminated?
ANSWERS: An “ad interim” appointment as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked anytime. It is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and the individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his functions without loss of time. The
same can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an “ad interim” appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm “ad interim” appointees
before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make “ad interim” appointment.
(Matibag vs. COMELEC, 380 SCRA 49)
NO. The Constitution does not prohibit the President from making “ad interim” appointment to the three
independent constitutional commissions. An appointment or designation in temporary or acting capacity is the kind of
appointment that the constitution prohibits. While an “ad interim” appointment is permanent and irrevocable, except
as provided by law, an appointment or temporary appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can
be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy
any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. (Ibid)
An “ad interim” appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution –first, by the
disapproval of his “ad interim” appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and second, by the adjournment of
Congress without the Commission on Appointment acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory
conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all “ad interim” appointments. (Ibid.)
31. Distinguish "ad interim appointment" from appointments in an acting capacity.
ANSWER: Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended anytime there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.(Bernas, supra) In Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587, it was held that there was
no abuse in the President's appointment of cabinet members in acting capacity. The absence of abuse is readily
apparent from her issuance of ad interim appointment to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way
before the lapse of one year. (8)
32. The President issued a permanent promotional appointments to A, B C and D as Rear Admiral, Vice
Admiral, Commodore and Naval Captain in the Philippine Coast Guard, respectively. The promoted
officers subsequently assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
under the 1987 Constitution. S filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and
legality of the appointment made by the President. Decide.
ANSWER: The petition must be denied. Their assumption of office without the confirmation is valid and legal. While
the Philippine Coast Guard used to be a subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy, a major branch of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, EO 475 transferred the same to the Office of the President, then transferred again to the
Department of Transportation and Communications. Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the
Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of the respondent officers
of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the
CA. (Soriano vs. Lista, GR No. 153881, March 4, 2003)
33. Pardoning Power of the President
PARE, the City Mayor of Kati was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder. Incumbent President
ANGELA subsequently granted PARE an executive clemency. The text of the pardon partly reads:
“[w]hereas, PARE has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,”
xxx
"(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights."
In the 2013 elections, PARE filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection as City Mayor.
MARELIM , a member of the political opposition, sought to disqualify PARE contending that the Presidential
pardon granted him merely extended a conditional pardon. Decide.
ANSWER: When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency
extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence
that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, from the text of the pardon
that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the
pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former
President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. A preamble is
really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be
the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. Hence if the pardon was
intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since it did
not make an integral part of the decree of pardon, the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended. (Risos-Vidal and Lim v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21,
2015, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
34. President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 43 creating the Presidential Commission on
Constitutional Reforms and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the
purpose of which is to study and recommend proposed amendments to the 1987 Constitution. Under Section
7 of the Executive Order, the amount of PhP 3 M is earmarked for its operational expenses to be sourced
from the funds of the Office of the President. RAG, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assailed the
constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR contending that it is a public office which only the legislature
can create by way of a law. He likewise sought to enjoin the COA from passing in audit expenditure of the
PCCR. (1) Does RAG have the standing to raise the constitutional issue?
(2) Would your answer be the same if the petitioner in the case is Senator Pimentel Jr.?
(3) Can the President validly authorize the release of PhP 3 M taken from funds intended for the
office of the President for the operational expense of the PCCR?
ANSWERS:
(1). NO. Petitioner has sustained no direct or even any indirect injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or
privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as
a result of the PCCR’s activities. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or Constitution. The
appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President by the President not by Congress in the exercise of
the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25 (5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. In fact there
was no appropriation at all. Thus, a taxpayer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise of Congress
of its taxing or spending power. (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, et. al., GR No. 140835, August 14, 2000)
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(2) NO. Congress can claim injury in this case since the act of the President infringed on their prerogatives as
legislators by encroaching upon the legislators’ power to create a public office and to propose amendments to
the charter by forming the PCCR. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141)
(3) YES. Under the Doctrine of Augmentation, the President may transfer funds from one agency to another within
the same department from savings in other items of their respective appropriation pursuant to Sec. 25 (5) of Art.
VI of the Constitution.
35. The President issued Letter of Instruction ordering the deployment of members of the Philippine Marines
in the metropolis to conduct joint visibility patrols with members of the Philippine National Police in
various shopping malls. The IBP filed a petition before the SC questioning the validity of the order.
(1) Does the IBP have the legal standing to file the petition?
(2) Does the President’s order constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution?
(3) Can the same order be the subject of judicial review?
ANSWERS:
(1) NO. The IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi apart from its declaration of its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. It has failed to present a specific and substantial interest
in the resolution of the case. Moreover, the IBP has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer
by virtue of the questioned governmental act.
(2) NO. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which provides the
metes and bounds of the Marine’s authority. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. It is the local police forces that are the ones in charge of the
visibility patrols at all times, with the Metro Manila Police Chief as the overall leader. Under the LOI, the police forces
are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. It is their duty to provide logistical support to these soldiers.
(3) NO. It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent
or suppress lawlessness, violence, invasion or rebellion. The exercise of this discretionary power is solely vested in
him. The Court, thus cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. Unless it can be
shown that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President’s exercise of judgment deserves to be
accorded respect from this Court. (IBP vs. Hon. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000)
36. What is the power of impoundment of the President? What are its principal sources?
ANSWERS:
Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA
506, August 9, 1994) Impoundment under the GAA means the retention or deduction of appropriation. Section 38,
Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the President, whenever in his judgment and upon
notice to the head of office concerned, to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditures of funds allotted for any
agency, or any expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations
used for permanent officials and employees. The General Appropriations Act of 2011 also authorized impoundment
only in case of unmanageable National Government deficit. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the
Disbursement Acceleration Program should not be regarded as impoundment because it entailed only the transfer of
funds, not the retention of appropriations. (Araullo v. Aquino, July 1, 2014)
37. Who has been vested with the power to ratify a treaty?
ANSWER: In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. (BAYAN vs. Zamora, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000)
Residual Powers
38. Can the President validly issue an executive order deactivating the function of a particular office in
the executive branch? Does he have the power to reorganize the executive department?
ANSWER: YES. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. Except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence. However, as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
is concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the function of a particular office, or
certain law may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The Economic Investigation and
Intelligence Bureau is a bureau attached to the DOF. It falls under the office of the President. Hence, it is subject to
the President’s continuing authority to organize. (Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718) The
President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers. (MEWAP vs.
Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007)
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Calling-out Power
39. Can the President validly declare a state of rebellion? What about a state of national emergency?
Give the distinction between the two powers.
ANSWER: YES. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with
Executive powers. The President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18 of Article VII. For the purpose of exercising the
calling out power, the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of state of rebellion, and the
concurrence of the following conditions are NOT required: (1) an actual invasion or rebellion and (b) public safety
requires the exercise of such power. The concurrence of the foregoing conditions are required only in the exercise
of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. The
declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987. (Sanlakas vs. Executive
Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004)
In David vs. GM-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006, upheld the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 which declared a state of national emergency and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress
lawless violence. The Proclamation was based on the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief to call out the
armed forces to suppress lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion. But the Court clarified that the provision she
relied upon did not give her “emergency powers” or any new or additional power. She had merely described a
situation to deal with which she could call on the Armed Forces to help the civilian national police. However, in the
same case, the Court struck down for being unconstitutional the warrantless arrest of protesters, the break-up of
rallies, the raid on a newspaper office carried out by security forces, and the imposition of standards on mass media,
or any form of prior restraint on the press. Likewise, the provision in the proclamation empowering the President to
exercise legislative powers through the issuance of the presidential decree is declared unconstitutional as the same
can be exercised only when martial law is proclaimed.
Under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution, the President can validly declare the existence of a state
of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers,
such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest requires a delegation
from Congress.
40. Can the President, through Administrative Order No. 308, validly establish a national computerized
identification reference system? Would your answer be the same if the order is issued through EO
420 directing entities under the executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection format?
ANSWER: NO. In Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional AO No. 308 as it
did not merely implement the Administrative Code. It established a national computerized identification reference
system which requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies, the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy against dossier-gathering by the government, and choices of policies. It deals with a subject that
should be covered by law.
NO. In Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director General of NEDA, GR No. 167798, April 19, 2006, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of EO No. 420. It ruled that it is within the constitutional powers of the President to
direct entities under the executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection format. Article VII, Section 17
of the Constitution states that the President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. The President did not make, alter or repeal any law when it issued EO 420 and
that she merely made use of existing law. EO 420 reduces costs as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility
and user-friendliness in the implementation of the current ID system of the government entities under existing laws.
Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. EO 420 is limited only to the executive
branch and does not apply to the judicial and other independent constitutional commissions. EO 420 limited the
information to be collected to 14 special items only.
Alter Ego Doctrine
41. What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency? Is the doctrine applicable to the relationship
between the Office of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor?
ANSWER: The acts of a subordinate bears the implied approval of his superior, unless actually disapproved by the
latter. Taken with the powers of control and supervision, the acts of Department Secretaries in the performance of
their duties are presumed to be the act of the President, unless and until the President alters, modifies, or nullifies the
same.
NO. The quantity of work in the hands of the Ombudsman does not measure up to the workload of the
Office of the President as to necessitate having the Special Prosecutor as an alter ego of the Ombudsman. While the
Office of the Ombudsman could very well make a general delegation of powers to the Special Prosecutor, an
examination of the office orders issued by the Ombudsman, however, reveal that there had been no such intention to
make a general delegation. (Perez vs. People, GR No. 166062, September 26, 2006)
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42. Can the exercise of the President’s foreign borrowing power be exercised by the Secretary of
Finance?
ANSWER: YES. The Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the foreign borrowing power “subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.” Said presidential prerogative may be exercised by the President’s alter
ego who in this case is the Secretary of Finance. Section 1 of RA 9245 empowers the Secretary of Finance with the
approval of the President and after consultation with the Monetary Board “ to borrow from time to time on the credit of
the Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as his judgment may be necessary, and to issue therefore
evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government.(Constantino v. Cuisia, GR No. 106064, Oct. 13, 2005)
43. EO No. 125 was issued by the President Aquino in the exercise of legislative powers. It mandates
the now DOTC to make plans, policies, coordinate, implement and regulate the promotion,
development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and
communication system. Despite such delegation, may the President directly perform such
functions or mandates conferred upon the DOTC?
ANSWER: YES. Such authority springs from the President’s power of control over all executive departments as well
as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision in echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code defines the
President's power of supervision and control over the executive departments which provides that supervision and
control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate. Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to subordinate, the President may
act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. (Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534 and MMDA vs. Viron
Transit Co. Inc. GR No. 170656, August 15, 2007)
Executive Privilege
44. What is the so-called executive privilege? Who may invoke and how the privilege is invoked?
ANSWER: Executive privilege is the right of the President and high level officials authorized by her to withhold
information from Congress, from the courts, and ultimately from the public. The privilege is a function of separation
of powers. Among the types of information which have been judicially recognized as privileged are state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. Certain information in the possession of the
executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress, such as Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings. (Chavez vs. PEA, 384 SCRA 152)
Since the privilege belongs to the President, only the President can invoke it. The Supreme Court ruling
limited to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may also authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke
the privilege on her behalf, in which case, the Executive Secretary must state that the Act is “By order of the
President,” which means that he personally consulted with the President such matter of concern. The privilege being
an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. (Senate of the
Philippines vs. Ermita, supra)
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered
by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with
fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of
that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer
bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal
means to compel his appearance. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, supra)
The claim of privilege must be specific, e.g., whether the information sought to be withheld involves military
or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an
obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted. Congress has the right to know why the executive
considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an
authorized head of office, has determined that it is so. If the President and Congress cannot agree on whether the
matter is privileged or not, then the Court must come in to determine the validity of the claim of privilege. (Senate of
the Philippines vs. Ermita, supra)
45. What are the elements of presidential communications privilege?
In Neri vs. Senate Committees, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008, the Court ruled that the claim of executive
privilege was properly invoked by Secretary Neri, specifically under what is called “presidential communication
privilege.” The elements of presidential communications privilege are: (1) The protected communication must relate
to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” (2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and
received” by a close advisor of the President or by the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be
in “operational proximity” with the President. (3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Neri had been asked three explosive questions: (a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project; (b)
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Whether the President directed him to prioritize the ZTE: and (c) Whether the President said to go ahead and
approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe. It was held that the claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communication elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decisions-making process” and,
that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China.
Judicial Review
46. What are the requisites for the exercise of judicial review?
ANSWER: A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act of statute must show “not only that the law is invalid,
but also that he has sustained some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way.” (Dimasangcop vs. Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203)
The requisites for the exercise of judicial review are:
1. There must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review;
2. The question before the court must be ripe for adjudication;
3. The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge;
4. The question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and
5. The issue of constitutionality musts be the lis mota of the case. (Ibid.)
47. What is the Operative Fact Doctrine? Is the Doctrine applicable to executive acts?
ANSWERS: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
Doctrine of Operative Facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are
not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. (Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, April 2013))
An unconstitutional law is void, but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such is presumed
constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.
(Belgica v. Executive Secretary, GR 208566, November 19, 2013)
The doctrine merely reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. (CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, GR No.
187485, October 8, 2013)
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot be erased, ignored or
disregarded. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
(Araullo v. Aquino III, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
The Operative Fact Doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful,
as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. (HLI v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,
GR No.171101, November 22, 2011) The doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive
act. The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. The adoption and implementation of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) and its related issuances were executive acts. (Araullo, supra)
48. What do you understand by the principle of moot and academic case? Name exceptions hereto, if any.
ANSWER: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRAS 736) so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value. (Banco Filipino vs. Tuazon, 425 SCRA 129. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case, (Royal Cargo Corporation vs CAB, 421 SCRA 21) or dismiss it on ground of mootness. (Lacson vs. Perez, 357
SCRA 756)
However, courts will decide case, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, supra); second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved(Lacson vs. Perez, supra); third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. (Sanlakas vs. Execcutive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656)
49. What is the Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality?
ANSWER: A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a
statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. (Central Bank Employees
Association vs. BSP, 446 SCRA 299)
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50. What is the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts? State its rationale and the effect of non-compliance
thereto?
ANSWER: This doctrine applies to cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of trial courts and appellate courts
involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to refer to the trial courts at the first
instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of evidence of the parties.
Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they
are not triers of facts. When cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a
strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary. (Agan, Jr. vs. PIATCO, 420 SCRA 575, GR No.
155001, January 21, 2004)
The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from the Supreme Court must be put to halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of the Supreme Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise,
in the adjudication of cases. (LBPS Commercial vs. Amila, 544 SCRA 199) The disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts warrants the outright dismissal of the petition. (Flaminiano vs vs. Adriano, 543 SCRA 605)
51. What is the direct injury test in the determination of locus standi in public suits? Name exceptions
to the rules on standing to sue and hierarchy of courts?
ANSWERS: The direct injury test postulates that for a private individual to invoke judicial power to determine the
validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that
action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. The person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result.
However, taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met: (1) the case involves constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be
a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must
be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must
be a showing that the issues raised constitute exceptional or compelling circumstances or the issues are of
paramount public interests or the issues are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;. (La Bugal-
B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. GR No. 127882, January 27, 2004) or other legal issues with far reaching economic
and social implications are embedded in the case (Agan, Jr. vs. PIATCO, 420 SCRA 575, GR No. 155001, January
21, 2004); and legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators. (Ople vs. Torres, supra)
52. How many seat is Congress entitled to in the Judicial and Bar Council?
ANSWER: In opting to use the singular letter “a” to describe representative of Congress,” the Filipino people through
the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions. In the JBC, any
member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to
represent the entire Congress. From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is
entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2),
between the two representatives of Congress To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly
a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. (Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, April
2013)
53. What are the effects of clustering of nominees in the Sandiganbayan by the Judicial and Bar
Council? Can the President appoint a nominee from other divisions?
ANSWER: The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the Judicial and Bar Council
impaired the President’s power to appoint members of the judiciary and to determine the seniority of newly appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Clustering can be used as a device to favour or prejudice a qualified nominee.
There are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar
Council. The designation by the Judicial and Bar Council of members to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
posts encroached on the President’s power to determine the seniority of the Justices appointed to the said court.
Accordingly, the President can appoint nominees from other divisions. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, GR. No. 224302,
February 21, 2017)
National Economy and Patrimony
54. Give two cases in which aliens may be allowed to acquire entity in a business but cannot participate
in the management thereof.
ANSWER: Under the Constitution, aliens may acquire entity but cannot participate in the management of business
entities engaged in the following activities: (A) public utilities - Section 11, Art. XII (b) education – Section 4(2), Art.
XIV, and (c) advertising – Section 11(2), Art. XVI
55. A corporation, 60% of its capital stock is owned by Filipinos, proposes to publish a weekly magazine
for general circulation in Metro Manila which will feature the lifestyle of the rich and famous. May
this be done? Cite the constitutional provision in point.
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ANSWER: No, the corporation cannot publish a weekly magazine since it is engaged in the operation of a mass
medium and is not wholly owned by Philippine citizens. Section 11(1) of Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations,
cooperatives or association wholly owned and managed by such citizens.”
56. MAGANDA, natural-born Filipino citizen, went to the US in 1965 to work as a nurse. With her savings
she bought a parcel of land consisting of 1,000 square meters in a residential subdivision in
MetroManila. She had the said property titled in her name 1970. In July 1972, MAGANDA acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. Two months later, she married her Canadian boyfriend.
(1) Can MAGANDA validly sell this parcel of land to the younger sister of her husband who is also a
Canadian citizen?
(2) Supposing MAGANDA’s husband dies and she decides to reside in the Philippines permanently, can
MAGANDA buy the parcel of land consisting of another 1,000 square meters neighboring her own?
(3) Supposing the area where her lot is situated has been reclassified as commercial district by virtue
of a zoning ordinance, can MAGANDA use the lot for commercial purposes?
ANSWERS:
(1) No. Under Sec. 7, Art. XII of the Constitution, as a general rule, aliens cannot acquire private lands since
pursuant to Sec. 2 in relation to Sec 3 of said Article, they are not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Under Sec. 7, an alien can acquire public lands only by hereditary succession. Under Sec.
8, a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private land. The
younger sister of her husband is not acquiring the private land by hereditary succession but by sale. Neither
is she a former natural-born Philippine citizen who lost her Philippine citizenship. Consequently, neither of
the exception found in the above-mentioned provisions is applicable to her.
(2) Yes. Under RA 8179, which amended BP 185, a natural-born Philippine citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship may now acquire a maximum of 5,000 square meters of private urban land.
(3) Yes. Under the same amendatory law, such land may now be used for business and for other lawful
purposes.
57. The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. Name the four modes though
which the State may undertake these activities.
ANSWER: The State may undertake these activities through four modes:
(1) The State may directly undertake such activities;
(2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens
or entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens;
(3) Congress may, by law, allow small scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens (RA 7006 –
People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and other pertinent laws); and
(4) For the large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial
assistance, (RA 79 42 ) subject to the following limitations: a) As to Parties. Only the President, in behalf of
the State, may enter into these agreements, and only with corporations. b) As to Size of the Activities. Only
large scale exploration, development and utilization is allowed, i.e., very capital - intensive activities. c) The
natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the
intent being to limit service contracts to those areas where Filipino capital may not be sufficient. d)
Consistency with the Provisions of Statute. The FTAA must be in accordance with the terms and conditions
provided by law. e) The FTAA must be based on real contributions to economic growth and general welfare
of the country. f) The FTAA must contain rudimentary stipulations for the promotions of the development
and use of local scientific and technical resources. G) Notification Requirement. The President shall notify
Congress of every FTAA entered into within 30 days from its execution. H) Scope of the FTAA. Only for
agreements involving either financial or technical assistance and does not include “service contracts” and
“management or other forms of assistance.” (La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc., GR No. 127882,
January 27, 2004)
58. Can a private corporation acquire any kind of alienable land of the public domain?
ANSWER: NO. The 1987 Constitution adopts the policy of banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable lands of the public domain. However, it allows private corporation to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case because the “land… was already
private property at the time it was acquired… by Acme.” In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997
from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open,
continuous and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired
the land from Porting, the land was not yet a private property. (Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., GR 154953, June
26, 2008)
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59. Are aliens allowed to acquire private lands?
ANSWER: NO. The primary purpose of the constitutional prohibition disqualifying aliens from acquiring lands of the
public domain and private lands is the conservation of the national economy and patrimony. A German citizen
married to a Filipino woman and eventually separated and filed a petition for separation of properties and prayed for
the reimbursement of the amount the foreign husband advanced for the purchase of the parcel of land, is disqualified
from owning lands in the Philippines. Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute, no trust can
result in favor of the guilty party. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit him to enjoy the fruits of the property
which he is not allowed to own. The sale of land as to him is null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity
or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that he is merely
exercising the prerogative of the husband in respect to conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit
indirect contravention of the constitutional prohibition. (Muller vs. Muller, GR 149615, August 29,2006)
In Ting Ho, Jr. vs. Teng Gui 558 SCRA 421, a Chinese citizen acquired a parcel of land, together with the
improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs claimed the properties as part of the estate of their deceased father,
and sought the partition of said properties among themselves. The Court, however, excluded the land and
improvements thereon from the estate precisely because he never became the owner thereof in the light of the
constitutional prohibition.
In Matthews vs. Taylor, GR No. 164584, June 22, 2009, the Court upheld the validity of an Agreement of
Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. Being an alien,
the husband is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines even if he claims that
he provided funds for such acquisition. He had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease
of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien
husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
In Borromeo vs. Descalar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling that
if land is validly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the
flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
60. What do you understand by the Regalian Doctrine?
ANSWER: The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that
have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain. (Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap, GR 167707, October 8, 2008)
61. Can private claimants of Boracay island have the right to secure titles over their occupied portion in
the island? Who has the authority to classify land of the public domain?
ANSWER: NO. Except or lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1604. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD 705, hence,
inalienable. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such
as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public lands into disposable land for agricultural and other
purposes. The fact that the island has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments does not negate its character as public forest. The mere continued possession and considerable
investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay and, therefore, they are
ineligible to apply for judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in the island. Presidential Proclamation
1801 did not convert the whole Boracay into an agricultural land. It merely classified Boracay as a tourist zone. It was
Proclamation No. 1064 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened to private ownership.
Section 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands. Is issuing Proclamation 1604, the President merely exercised the authority granted to her to
classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested right. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive department, through the Office of the President. (Sec. of DENR vs. Yap, GR
No167707, Oct.8, 2008)
62. When may a public land become alienable and disposable?
ANSWER: To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act
or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. A certification of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be
within the alienable and disposable site in a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real
character of the land subject of the application. (Republic vs. Candymaker, Inc. GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006)
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