VICENTE vs.
ECC that from all available indications, it appears that the petitioner’s
FACTS:
[P]etitioner was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the
Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City. At the age of
forty-five, and after having rendered more than twenty-five years of
government service, he applied for optional retirement under the
provisions of Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 1616, giving as reason
therefore his inability to continue working as a result of his physical
disability. The petitioner likewise filed with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) an application for “income benefits claim
for payment” under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended.
Both applications were accompanied by the necessary supporting
papers, among them being a “Physician’s Certification” issued by the
petitioner’s attending doctor. The petitioner’s application for income
benefits claim payment was granted but only for permanent partial
disability (PPD) compensation or for a period of nineteen months
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner suffers from permanent total
disability.
HELD:
YES. The decision of the respondent Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC) was set aside.
RATIO:
[T]he petitioner’s permanent total disability is established beyond
doubt by several factors and circumstances. Noteworthy is the fact
application for optional retirement on the basis of his ailments had
been approved. Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years
old when he retired and still entitled, under good behavior, to 20
more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement
application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his
employment. For optional retirement is allowed only upon proof
that the employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to
render sound and efficient service.
PHIL. TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC vs NLRC
FACTS:
Private respondent, Carlos Nietes filed a complaint against
Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. (PTC) for payment of disability
benefit, sickness wages, refund of medical expenses and attorney’s
fees. POEA Adjudication Office issued its decision in favor of the
private respondent awarding disability benefit.
Petitioner admits that private respondent suffered illness which
rendered him unfit for work. However, it points out that private
respondent did not submit proof of the extent of his disability as
required by Section C (4) [b] and [c] of the POEA Standard Contract
for Seamen. Without this proof, petitioner argues that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the findings of the
POEA Adjudication Office.
ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming with
modification, the judgment of the POEA Adjudication Office.
HELD:
NO. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation.
In NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 486,
494 (1997), we said:
Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable
in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Private
respondent having substantially established the causative
circumstances leading to his permanent total disability to have
transpired during his employment, we find the NLRC to have acted
in the exercise of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total
disability benefits to private respondent. Probability and not the
ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings.
The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed
primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the
pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its
provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly,
reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent
provisions be fully carried into effect.
Petition is DISMISSED.
VERGARA vs HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES
In Jesus Vergara v Hammonia Martimes Services Inc (8 October
2008) the Court modified the rulings in the now famous Crystal
Shipping and Remigio cases, Labour Code provisions have been
reconciled with the POEA standard contract and the period for
determining a crewmember’s degree of disability has been
extended to up to 240 days, depending on the current medical
circumstances.
In effect, instead of being automatically declared totally and
permanently disabled after 120 days, the prevailing rule is now that
if the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no declaration is made
with respect to disability or fitness because the crewmember
requires further medical treatment, then treatment should continue
up to a maximum of 240 days. The crewmember may be declared fit
or disabled at any time within the 240 days as justified by his
medical condition.
This new principle is a step in the right direction as 240 days (8
months) should be adequate to treat most illnesses or at least to
determine the proper disability grading of the crew member.
MASANGCAY vs TRANSGLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY
Supreme Court decision denies disability claim based on 120 day
Crystal Shipping ruling; rules compensation must be determined by
seafarer’s POEA employment contract
(Author’s Note: The Supreme Court, for the second time, has
rejected the 120 day Crystal Shipping decision. In this case, the
Court ruled that it is the seafarer’s contract that should determine
seafarer’s right to compensation. Seafarer’s contract is the 2000
POEA contract which required work-relation as a condition of
compensation. As seafarer failed to prove work relation on his
illness, disability compensation was denied. The Court ruled Crystal
Shipping is not applicable as the factual circumstances are different
and the issue in Crystal Shipping is the degree of disability whereas
in this case the issue is whether seafarer is fit to work and whether
his illness is work-related and/or work-aggravated. The Court also
did not follow the Brion Vergara decision of 240 days but used the
POEA contract itself as basis for denial of the claim.)
On 2 September 2002, seafarer Masangcay was employed under the
amended 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract. He was on
board for twenty one days when his urine had a reddish
discoloration and he had lower abdominal pain. He was repatriated
on 7 October 2002 due to renal stones and renal disease. He was
treated by the company physician. His treatment lasted from 3
October 2002 to 3 February 2003. The company-designated
physician eventually declared him fit to work. He reapplied for work
but his re-employment was denied. On 16 October 2003, seafarer
consulted his own private physician who declared him with Grade 3
disability (US$39,180). He filed a complaint for disability benefits.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC awarded seafarer disability benefits
of US$39,180.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and this was upheld by
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court rejected seafarer’s argument that since he was
unable to work for more than 120 days, he is entitled to total and
permanent disability.
The Court ruled the seafarers’ employment must be governed by the
terms and conditions of his contract which is the 2000 POEA
Standard Employment Contract. Under said contract, seafarer’s
illness must be work-related or at least aggravated by employment
to be compensable. Seafarer did not present any proof that his
kidney illness was work-related or work-aggravated. Thus, his illness
is not compensable.
The ruling in Crystal Shipping is not applicable in this case as under
Crystal Shipping, the issue was the degree of disability of the
seafarer. In that case both the company doctor and the seafarer’s
doctor agreed that the seafarer was disabled and the issue was the
degree of disability. In this case, the issue is not the degree of
disability but whether the seafarer’s illness is work-related. In this
case, no proof of work-relation was presented and thus seafarer’s
illness is not compensable.
Marciano Masangcay vs. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and
Ventnor Navigation, Inc., G.R. No. 172800, Third Division, October
17, 2008, Supreme Court Associate Justice Minita Chico-Nazario,
Ponente.
(Attys. Catherine Mangahas and Herbert Tria of Del Rosario & Del
Rosario handled for vessel interests)
We quote a pertinent portion of the decision in relation to the use
of the POEA contract in determining compensation:
As with all other kinds of worker, the terms and conditions of a
seafarer’s employment is governed by the provisions of the contract
he signs at the time he is hired. But unlike that of others, deemed
written in the seafarer’s contract is a set of standard provisions set
and implemented by the POEA, called the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on
Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which are considered to be the
minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the
employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going
vessels.
The issue of whether Masangcay can legally demand and claim
disability benefits from Trans-Global and Ventnor for an illness that
became apparent during his contract of employment with the
shipping company, is governed by the provisions of the POEA
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels; hence, it is said
standard terms and conditions which are relevant and need to be
construed in the present case.
Considering that Masangcay was employed on 3 September 2002, it
is the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-
Going Vessels that is considered appended in his contract of
employment and is controlling for purposes of resolving the issue at
hand and not the 1996 POEA Revised Amended Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on
Board Ocean-Going Vessels as alluded by Masangcay.
We further quote a portion of the decision disputing the argument
of Crystal Shipping’s 120 day decision:
Masancay (seafarer) asserts that by virtue of our pronouncement in
Crystal Shipping, Inv. v. Natividad that “in disability compensation, it
is not the injury which is compensated but rather it is the incapacity
to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity,” he is
entitled to disability benefits under his contract of employment.
We are not persuaded. Masangcay cannot invoke a single line
declared by this Court in another case under a totally different
factual context.
The only similarity between the two cases, Crystal Shipping and the
present petition is the fact that the seafarers in both have the same
personal physician, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, a cardiologist, who declared
them permanently disabled to return to work. Other than that, the
factual circumstances of Crystal Shipping case are poles apart from
that attendant to the case at bar. In the former, there was no
question as whether or not the seafarer is entitled to disability
benefits as in fact Crystal Shipping, et. al., offered to pay disability
benefits. The only issue therein referred to the degree of disability
and impediment grade to which the seafarer was to be classified; or
put simply, how much disability benefit was he entitled to. The
seafarer in said case has been employed as a Chief Mate of an
ocean-going vessel when he complained of coughing and
hoarseness and was later diagnosed with thyroid cancer. The
company-designated physician and seafarer’s physician were both in
agreement that the seafarer had been rendered disabled by his
illness; they only differed in their assessments of the degree and
the impediment grade of such disability in accordance with the
schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffered and
diseases including occupational diseases or illnesses contracted
under Sec. 32 of the 1996 POEA Revised Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on
Board Ocean-Going Vessels. In contrast, Trans-Global and Ventnor
are contesting the right of Masangcay to claim disability benefits as
the company-designated physicians have certified the latter fit to
return to work, not to mention the fact that he was not suffering
from a work-related and/or work-aggravated illness.
CRYSTAL SHIPPING INC. vs NATIVIDAD
Crystal Shipping, Inc., and/or A/S Stein Line Bergen vs. Deo P.
Natividad, G.R. No. 154798, October 20,2005, First Division (120-day
principle)
The seafarer was diagnosed with cancer and was assessed by the
company-designated physician as suffering from Grade 9 disability
while his private doctor issued a Grade 1 disability.
The Court ruled that permanent disability is the inability of the
worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As seafarer
was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at
the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment, he
was awarded full disability benefits.
While the seafarer was able to work again as Chief Mate in March
2001, this does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, the
seafarer was unable to work as a Chief Mate for almost three years.
It is of no consequence that seafarer was cured after a couple of
years. What is important is that he was unable to perform his
customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes
permanent total disability.
Note: The Supreme Court clarified this ruling 12 February 2007
holding that seafarer’s disability should not be measured in terms of
number of days but by gradings only. However, this clarification was
never applied or cited by the Supreme Court in any of the
subsequent cases that they rendered.
AUSTRIA vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner... was employed as bag piler at Central Azucarera de Tarlac
from
June 1, 1977 to July 20, 1997.
In 1994, petitioner began to feel severe back pain.
underwent an MRI which revealed a small disc protrusion... x-ray...
photographs taken... revealed osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine.
petitioner filed with the SSS a claim for compensation benefits
under PD 626 as amended. The claim was granted and petitioner
was awarded permanent partial disability benefits for eight (8)
months starting September 1, 1995, a second release... for seven (7)
months starting May 10, 1996, and a third release for fifteen (15)
months starting April 1, 1997.
Requested the SSS for conversion of his permanent partial disability
benefit to permanent total disability benefit.
SSS denied the request.
It reasoned:
Based on clinical records submitted, there is no progression of your
illness which was already granted under previous EC disability.
Granting of extension on your claim cannot be based solely on the
findings on your lumbo-sacral X-ray hence they are not related to
each other... or of different disease entity."
On appeal, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS... held that
considering the degree of his disability at the time he was separated
from the service, petitioner has already availed of the maximum
benefits to which he is entitled on account of his... osteoarthritis.
Court of Appeals
The appellate court dismissed the petition, ruling that the law does
not allow the conversion of permanent partial disability to
permanent total disability.
Issues:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the
claim for additional benefits in favor of the petitioner and not
allowing the conversion of his (petitioner) permanent partial
disability to permanent total disability."
Ruling:
PD 626 as amended provides three types of disability benefits to
qualified employees: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent
total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. In the case at
bar, petitioner was granted by the SSS, as affirmed by the ECC,
permanent... partial disability benefit, but he seeks to avail of
permanent total disability benefit. Under Section 2 Rule VII of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, a disability is total
and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee
is unable to perform any... gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days; and a disability is partial and permanent
if as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee suffers a
permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body.
e find petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefit under
the law. Petitioner has been employed as bag piler for twenty (20)
years at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac. His duties require him to
carry heavy loads of refined sugar... and to perform other manual
work. Since his work obviously taxes so much on his back, his illness
which affects his lumbar spine renders him incapable of doing his
usual work as bag piler. Hence, his disability to perform his regular
duties may be considered total and... permanent.
Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in
the law... that prohibits the conversion of permanent partial
disability benefit to permanent total disability benefit if it is shown
that the employee's ailment qualifies as such.
Furthermore, the grant of permanent total disability benefit to an
employee who was initially compensated for permanent partial
disability but is found to be suffering from permanent total disability
would not be prejudicial to the government to give it reason to deny
the claim.
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT vs TAOK
In C.F. Sharp Crew Management v. Taok (13 August 2012), the
Supreme Court dismissed a claim for disability benefits on the
ground that at the time the complaint was filed, the seaman had still
no cause of action. In said case, the complaint was filed before 120
days. We believe that the Supreme Court should have also
dismissed the claim for disability benefits considering that when the
complaint here was filed, seaman was only under treatment for 32
days.
AGUJA vs GSIS
FACTS: Aguja was hit with muriatic acid on the right eye when he
was cleaning the toilet in the office of the municipal treasurer in
Libmanan, Camarines Sur on April 1979. Aguja then claimed for
benefits to GSIS. GSIS gave him temporary total disability benefits
and was granted permanent partial disability benefits for 25
months. Aguja then claimed for permanent total disability since he
was losing vision in his left eye as well. GSIS denied the claim stating
that Aguja already received the maximum amount that could be
given to him by law. GSIS also stated that Aguja's left eye is allegedly
normal and, therefore he cannot be granted with permanent total
disability benefit.
HELD: SC ruled that, to be entitled to an income benefit for
permanent total disability, the following conditions must be
satisfied:

“Section 1. Condition of entitlement. (a) An employee shall be

entitled to an income benefit for

permanent total disability if all the following conditions are

satisfied:1) He has been duly reported to the System; 2) He sustains
the permanent total disability as a result of the injury or sickness;
and 3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness
which caused his disability. (Sec. 1(a) Rule XI, Amended Rules o

n Employees’ Compensation). Aguja's left eye was found to be

burned and therefore such injury can be traced back to the accident
that in April 1979. the acid blinded the right eye and compromised
the left eye. the injury to the left eye is then considered to be work
related. with the loss of his vision to the left eye it is impossible for
Aguja to be gainfully employed. total disability is the disablement of
an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or a work of
similar nature that he was used to. to deny petitioner of the
permanent total disability benefits would be contrary to the liberal
construction of compassionate spirit of the law in labor code.