G.R. No.

210164, August 18, 2015

ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE

CAPITAN, Respondents.

PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE: Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office. The use of a foreign passport amounts to
repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation.

FACTS: Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
was naturalized as citizen of the USA.

Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied
for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA.

He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an
Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009,
Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.

Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to disqualify Petitioner Arnado and/or to cancel his
CoC on the ground that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for
entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.

While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate.

On October 5, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued held that Arnado's continued use of his US
passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run
for public office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The COMELEC First Division
accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should be followed.

In the meantime, Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the COMELEC First Division erred in applying the rule on
succession.

The COMELEC En Banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC First Division. It held that Arnado's use
of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship; that he continued to use his US
passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine passport at the time of the
relevant foreign trips; and that, after receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his
subsequent trips.
Maquiling then appealed to the SC. While Maquiling’s petition was pending, the period for the filing of
CoCs for local elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1, 2012,
Petitioner Arnado filed his CoC for the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the
mayoralty post of Kauswagan.

Before the May 2013 elections, the SC ruled on the Maquiling petition. It set aside the COMELEC en
banc’s resolution and disqualified Petitioner Arnado from running for elective position, and declared
Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 2010 elections and that
the subsequent use of his US passport, Petitioner Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. The issuance of the Maquiling Decision sets the stage for the present
controversy.

Shortly after the Maquiling Decision, Petitioner Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C.
Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009.”

Private Respondent Capitpan, Petitioner Arnado’s lone rival in the May 2013 elections, filed a Petition
seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC
based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling.

Arguments:

Petitioner: That the Maquiling case is not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition
was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be
cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who
expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the
Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as eligible
to run for mayor of Kauswagan. Petitioner Arnado avers that his former counsel, revealed that he
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time
he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any
other country and, therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections.

Respondent COMELEC: It disqualified Petitioner Arnado from running in the May 2013 elections. That
at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement of RA
9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. While he executed
the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he
subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in Maquiling case.

Issue: Whether Petitioner Arnado is qualified to run

Held: No. The Petition is devoid of merit. COMELEC’s decision is affirmed.

Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from
running for any elective local position. The phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance.''

RA 9225 allowed natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political
rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the
Philippines provided that they:

(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and,

(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.

In this case, Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite because, as held in Maquiling v.
Commission on Elections, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he
used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October
1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second
requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013,
affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been
belatedly executed.

It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public office during the 2010
elections — being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines -
still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc
merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of
discretion had it departed therefrom.

The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Arnado's
use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run
for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the
2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on
and applicable to this case.

G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., Respondents.

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:

DOCTRINE: The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Private respondent filed a Petition to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was
eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non- resident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was not
properly served with a copy of the petition and the petition was served by registered mail not in his
address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition during the
conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private respondent's
substantial allegations in his petition.

Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September
13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his
Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on
October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. He claimed that he did not lose his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan
temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his
vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.

On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a
material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu,
Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election.

Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns showed that petitioner won
over private respondent. Private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.

On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes. On May 16, 2013, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution
issued by the COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.

On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation. Then on November 6, 2013,
the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN
HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP,
TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS
PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
LAW ON RESIDENCY.

Held: No. Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides,
among others, for the qualifications of an elective local official. Section 39 thereof states:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected;
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

In Coquilla v. COMELEC we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment
of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada
is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.

Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile
of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

In Japzon v. COMELEC, wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
and run for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in
issue, we had the occasion to state, thus:

[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not
necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty
merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein
shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice and it shall not retroact to the time of
his birth.

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make
him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen
on September 13, 2012, he had re-established Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is
reckoned from the time he made it as such.

The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was able to re-
establish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on
September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan,
Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to re-
establish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even
less than the one year residency required by law.

G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondent.

PONENTE: Reyes, J.
DOCTRINE: The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in
any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a
particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for a candidate is likewise part of the
fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince others
to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.

FACTS: On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the
rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda,
pertinently provides:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is unlawful:

xxxx

(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.

(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:

xxxx

5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether
motorized or not;

6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks,
piers, train stations, and the like.

The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public
utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal
liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n)
of these Rules.

Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the applicationof REsolution No. 9615
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public
utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to
reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.

The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the petitioner’s request to
reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 are constitutional.
HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints
on speech

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly
infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the
freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their
preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to
agree with them.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during
an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public
utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport
terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain
of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral

regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.

A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech,
or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is
constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following
requisites concur:

1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;

2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;

3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and

4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the

furtherance of that interest.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they
merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is
still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral
regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the
constitutionally delegatedpower of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals.

The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the ownership per se
of PUVs and transport terminals.

In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization
“of all franchises or permits for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The
COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit
to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for
public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of
ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under the captive-
audience doctrine.

The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from
intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The “captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a
listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the
communication cannot be avoided.

A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than
others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the
home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure.

Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive
speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not
justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the
election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining
to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert
their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.

Lehman’s case not applicable

The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election campaign materials on
PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which prohibits political advertisements on
government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
advertising space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement space on
government-run buses, “although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part of
commercial venture.” In the same way that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of
advertising from the general public, the city’s transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising
that may be displayed on its vehicles.

In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city government; the city
government, as owner of the buses, had the right to decide which type of advertisements would be placed
on its buses.

Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in
choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties.

Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political advertisements on
their buses. Considering that what were involved were facilities owned by the city government,
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and
transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by
proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their properties.

Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials
violates the equal protection clause.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause, but
also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is
that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not
limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and is
not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and
private vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure
from the government either a franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier,
the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the
ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner
affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.

As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals
and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and
transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If owners of private
vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting
election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same
preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction
between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is
merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not
substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly,
any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by
many people. However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus,
there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting
of election campaign materials.

On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a
significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a
violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

PONENTE: Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE: Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental
Law. "[F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to
be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy." The aggregate- based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constraints the ability of the candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.

FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes
and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as
their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth
coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per
station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval
for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out
and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-
based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so
in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are
also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a
national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the
people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would
greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political
speech.

G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014

ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B.

JULIA, Respondents.

PONENTE: REYES, J.:

DOCTRINE: The constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. The “limitation” under this first branch
of the provision is expressed in the negative—“no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.” This formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command
suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule.

FACTS:

From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.

On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the
legislative districts in Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District
to form the present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns,
Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.

In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He
served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.

Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. He filed
before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC of Naval. Julia posited
that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member
of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. Allowing Naval to run as a
Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the
Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.

Naval alleges: First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but
are composed of new sets of municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other
eight towns which used to comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative District are
no longer the same ones as those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.

OSG contends: Seeking the denial of the instant petition, OSG contends that Naval had been elected and
had fully served the same local elective post for three consecutive terms. Naval thus violated Section 78
of the OEC when he filed his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility.

COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution: Cancelled Naval’s COC on grounds:

When a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the elective posts he seeks,
while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary requirements for eligibility, he commits a false
material misrepresentation cognizable under Section 78 of the OEC.

The new Third District where Naval was elected and has served is composed of the same municipalities
comprising the previous Second District, absent the towns Gainza and Milaor. The territorial jurisdiction
Naval seeks to serve for the term 2013-2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously
served. The electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 is the same electorate who shall vote for
him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of voters who elected him into office for
three consecutive terms.

COMELEC en banc’s Resolution: Denied Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration to the above. The
COMELEC pointed out that absent the verification required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, Naval’s motion was instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, according to the COMELEC,
it is clear that the position to which Naval has filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 elections is the
same position for which he had been elected and had served for the past nine (9) years. The enactment of
R.A. No. 9716 did not convert Naval’s post into one different from what he previously had.

ISSUE:

WON Naval’s, a provincial board member, election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but
now in representation of the renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule.

RULING:
YES. With 26 in favor and 17 against, the Constitutional Commission approved that there is no
immediate reelection after three successive terms. For the Body believed that the imposition of term limits
would be tantamount to squandering the experience of seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the
power of the citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in the office.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. The “limitation” under this first branch of
the provision is expressed in the negative—“no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms.” This formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule. This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a
high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be
defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth.
In Naval’s case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second District is to be created,
but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers mean what they say.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of
representation among the districts.The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and
voting power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province and not the number of registered voters therein. It is with this mindset that the Court should
consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and
2013.

Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in

population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.”
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the
right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed
Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another
eligible person.
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court to
declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution
and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a
result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier exemptions or
exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically
allow him to hold the same office for 15 years.
The Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real sovereign, so to speak.
However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be
bound by our Constitution and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.

The drafters of the Constitution recognized the propensity of public officers to perpetuate themselves in
power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a guarantee of every citizen’s equal access to public service.
These are the restrictions statesmen should observe for they are intended to help ensure the continued
vitality of our republican institutions.

Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the COMELEC are AFFIRMED.