Elective Local Officials

A. Qualifications and Disqualifications

1. Maquiling vs. COMELEC, April 16, 2013 - Cerfranz Boniel
FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US
Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14
April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November
2009. Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010.
Petition was not answered upon by Arnado until the 2010 elections came where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and
was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It is only after the election
that Arnado submitted his answer on the petition.
COMELEC First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen. Arnado filed MR at COMELEC en banc.
Here, petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of first division
and declared that by renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine
citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: 1) Whether Arnado is qualified to run for public office. Particularly, whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
2) Whether the succession of the Vice Mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order.
RULING:
1) NO. Arnado is not qualified to run for public office. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced
his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself
subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport
to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
By representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying
for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of
his US passport.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from
holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
2) NO. Macquiling should be declared the elected Mayor
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not
even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections,
his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but
necessarily affects his right to hold public office.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of
failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office. The ballot cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election. The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast
in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will
not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February
2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for
any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections. SO ORDERED.

2. Alterajos vs. COMELEC, November 10, 2004- Kwin Cabahug

Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national
and local elections.

 On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San
Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that [he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign
country.
 Private respondents alleged that based on a letter [1] from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001,
petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507
issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3,
1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.[2]
 On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer [3] stating, among others, that he did not commit false
representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already
issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for
repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already
restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of
the petition.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed
their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period. [4] Petitioner, however, filed a Reply
Memorandum[5] subsequently.
 Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that
petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004
national and local elections. He found, thus:

Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have
acquired the right to reside abroad.

In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United States of
America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and
Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division,
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner
ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997,
this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically
provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.

It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of the above-
quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not
submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has
registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June
2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent
did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have
already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in
favor of the State and against the applicant

 not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of
the United States, it is clear that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false representation in his certificate
of candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship

respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto

SO NI FILE SIYA UG MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ( Mao nani iyang case)

 n March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to prove that he
had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz:
(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;
(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004;
(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of
Allegiance of petitioner was received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18, 2004;
(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and
Deportation
(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar COMELEC en
banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion
for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.[8]
 The Comelec en banc held, thus:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for
reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties
which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the
evidence of the petitioners.

When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the respondents only evidence was his
Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not
enough to controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner
Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of the even date respondent is a holder of permanent resident
visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that the name of the
respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in
order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner.

 Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of evidence,
which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex 2 Oath
of Allegiance; b) Annex 3 Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex 4 Certification of the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex 5 Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate by Aurora
P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex 6 Letter addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization.

Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we cancel his certificate of candidacy
for his act of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not yet
perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.]
8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation

with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?

HELD: YES.

The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered
with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on
March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy
for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.

 it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED
to the date of the filing of his application.

SO FINAL NA NI: HE WAS ALLOWED TO RUN ,,,Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying
petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
3. Mitra vs. COMELEC, July 02, 2010- Alleah JC
Facts:

Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City,
and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.

Before the end of Mitra's second term as Representative, Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and
thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the
ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter's
Registration Record from Puerto Princesa City, to Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC
for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra's COC. They essentially argued that Mitra
remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run
for Governor of Palawan. They anchor their cause of action on the alleged falsity of Mitra's statement in his COC that he is a
resident of Aborlan. Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has successfully abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his domicile of
origin, and has established a new domicile in Aborlan since 2008.

The COMELEC First Division granted the respondents' petition to cancel Mitra's COC.

The COMELEC en banc - subsequently denied Mitra's motion to reconsider the First Division ruling under the following outlined
reasons.

First, registration as a voter of Aborlan is not sufficient evidence that Mitra has successfully abandoned his domicile of origin.
[33]

Second, mere intent cannot supplant the express requirement of the law; the "physical presence" required to establish domicile
connotes actual, factual and bona fide residence in a given locality.

Third, the First Division's Resolution was based on a careful and judicious examination and consideration of all evidence
submitted by the parties. The summary nature of the proceedings is not necessarily offensive to a party's right to due process.

Hence this petition. This petition also asks for ancillary injunctive relief. And the Supreme Court granted the application for
injunctive relief by issuing a status quo ante order, allowing Mitra to be voted upon in the May 10, 2010 elections.

In the recently concluded elections of May 10, 2010, Mitra obtained the most number of votes for Governor and was accordingly
proclaimed winner of the Palawan gubernatorial contest.

Issue:

Whether or not Mitra did not deliberately misrepresented in his COC that his residence is in Aborlan to deceive and mislead the
people of the Province of Palawan; thus he is qualified to run for the position of governor.

Ruling:

Yes. Mitra is qualified to run for the position of Governor of Palawan. The SC ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and
that met the residency requirement as mandated by the constitution.

From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan to comply with the
residence requirement of a candidate for an elective provincial office. Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, does not abhor this intended transfer of residence, as its Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to
be a resident of the local government unit where he intends to run for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election. In other words, the law itself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposes only
the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of course, as a continuing requirement or qualification,
the elected official must remain a resident there for the rest of his term.

Residency can readily be appreciated as a requirement that goes into the heart of our democratic system; it directly supports the
purpose of representation - electing those who can best serve the community because of their knowledge and sensitivity to its
needs. It likewise adds meaning and substance to the voters' freedom of choice in the electoral exercise that characterizes every
democracy.

Mitra's domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor - in light of the relatively recent
change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for
provincial officials - he had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local government unit where he
intended to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC
correctly invoked, requires the following:

(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;

(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves
he had made to carry it out. From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan
decidedly tilts in Mitra's favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the level of an
equipoise, i.e., when weighed, Mitra's evidence of transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents'
evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. Under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot
conclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.

By law, this residency can be anywhere within the Province of Palawan, except for Puerto Princesa City because of its
reclassification as a highly urbanized city. Thus, residency in Aborlan is completely consistent with the purpose of the law, as
Mitra thereby declared and proved his required physical presence in the Province of Palawan.

We also consider that even before his transfer of residence, he already had intimate knowledge of the Province of Palawan,
particularly of the whole 2nd legislative district that he represented for three terms. For that matter, even the respondents
themselves impliedly acknowledged that the Mitras, as a family, have been identified with elective public service and politics in
the Province of Palawan.[78] This means to us that Mitra grew up in the politics of Palawan.

We can reasonably conclude from all these that Mitra is not oblivious to the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potential for growth
and development, and all matters vital to the common welfare of the constituency he intends to serve. Mitra who is no stranger to
Palawan has merely been compelled - after serving three terms as representative of the congressional district that includes Puerto
Princesa City and Aborlan - by legal developments to transfer his residence to Aborlan to qualify as a Province of Palawan voter.
To put it differently, were it not for the reclassification of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city,
Mitra would not have encountered any legal obstacle to his intended gubernatorial bid based on his knowledge of and sensitivity
to the needs of the Palawan electorate.

We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given
fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.[83] Thus, we have
held that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions, requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people.

We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the clarification that COC defects beyond
matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory
requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken.

With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal
to the primacy of the electorate's will. We cannot deny, however, that the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where
residency qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitra's qualifications.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and ANNUL the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. We DENY the respondents' petition
to cancel Abraham Kahlil Mitra's Certificate of Candidacy.

4. Japzon vs. COMELEC, January 19,2009- MaryGrace Durana

Facts:
 Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
 On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or
cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation- averred in his Petition that Ty was a
former natural-born Filipino, Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen
thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March
2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any
foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately
preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty
continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January
2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to
comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign
citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty
from running for public office and the cancellation of the latters Certificate of Candidacy.
 In his Answer, Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became
a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of
Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the
following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty
filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty
applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini
St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Tys application was approved and he was issued on 26
October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007
again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty
executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Given the aforementioned facts, Ty
argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a
resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May
2007 elections.
 Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers in SPA No. 07-568, the 14 May
2007 elections were already held.
 Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.
 the COMELEC First Division rendered its Resolution dated 31 July 2007 in favor of Ty.
 Japzon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.On 28 September
2007, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution denying Japzons Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the
assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,
 Failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition
for Certiorari

Issue: Whether Ty complied with the one-year residency requirement for running for public office
Held: yes
There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October
2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi
T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225. At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March
2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the
natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run
for public office.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American
citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the qualifications required by the Constitution and
existing laws.
Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide, among other
things, for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, Section 39 of
which lays down the following qualifications for local elective officials:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must
be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
The challenge against Tys qualification to run as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, centers on his purported failure to meet the one-year residency requirement in the said
municipality.
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to
domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).[18]
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues
until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla,[19] the Court already
acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself
admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.
Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice . The length
of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the
time of his birth.
How then could it be established that Ty indeed established a new domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines?
In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[20] the Court provided a summation of the different principles and concepts in
jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of
the ratio in Papandayan are reproduced below:

The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to the place
where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an abandonment of his former
residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders
of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondents immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile
and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988,
respondent was held to be disqualified under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his
election against claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,Northern Samar. In sustaining the
ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept ofanimus revertendi or intent to return, stating that
his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant in
Manila or his registration as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The
fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag revealed that he always had animus
revertendi.
In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections, it was explained that the determination of a
persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be inferred from his acts, activities, and
utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections
of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack
of residence and registration qualifications, not being a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled
that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to
qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof that she considered herself a resident
of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence
in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor
of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she and her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she
at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did
not signify an intention to continue her residence after leaving that place.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence,
as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his
residence during the early 1980s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the country of
petitioner, because of the EDSA Peoples Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable
conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in
order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.

As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency requirement for running for public office is a
question of fact. Its determination requires the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence presently before this Court, found that Ty
was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections. It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have acquired expertise
in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined
to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process, considering that the
COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain.

Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a
Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax
jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said
municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar . Thereafter,
Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, since his
arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections.
Japzon maintains that Tys trips abroad during said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand(from 14 to 18 July 2006), and to
the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that Ty had no intention to permanently reside in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. The COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as this
Court, however, view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be
considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.
[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if
length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support
and is only consistent with Tys avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Finally, when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victors right to the
office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate,
the will of the voters.[26] To successfully challenge Tys disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Tys
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby
giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon
failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines.
5. Torayno, Sr. vs. COMELEC, August 09, 2000- Myrna Joy Japs
Facts:
During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It
was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence
was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
While still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City
(geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence.
On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding
two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
On May 15, 1998 Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents of Cagayan de
Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the
ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requiremenPrior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec
proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor.
Thus, on May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto,[3] in which they sought
(1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the
next highest number of votes.
Ruling of the Comelec
As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the findings and conclusions of the First Division, holding that "[t]he
records clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time necessary to
qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly established by the respondent having a house in the city which has been
existing therein since 1973 and where his family has been living since then."
Additionally, it ruled:
"There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or registering as a voter in a highly
urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote for and be elected to a position in the province embracing such
highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the requirements prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.

Issue:
(1) whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the May 11,
1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof; and
(2) if not, whether Erasmo Damasing, the candidate who had received the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed
mayor of the city.

Ruling:
Yes.
The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, [18] which provides for
the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:
"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the
Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs
of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community.
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was
governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located.
In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that
Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office
therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot
participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of
parity in representation. The classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent component city, for that matter, does
not completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from the entire province -- and vice versa --
especially when the city is located at the very heart of the province itself, as in this case.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the
province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a
consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting
acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and
consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the
last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence.

Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent remained a resident of the
province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus,
private respondent could not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental.
Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to constitute a change of domicile: having a house in
Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's office as governor (the city being the seat of government of the
province), securing a residence certificate and registering as voter therein.
Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in Cagayan de Oro City while serving
as provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial government was located at the heart of that
city.
Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest him of his position as
provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official from transferring residence while in office. Second, an
elective official's transfer of residence does not prevent the performance of that official's duties, especially in private respondent's
case in which the seat of government became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled in Frivaldo v. Comelec,[14] the loss of
any of the required qualifications for election merely renders the official's title or right to office open to challenge. In Emano's
case, no one challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro
City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he filed his candidacy for mayor in March 1998.
Significantly, the Court declared in Mamba-Perez that "although private respondent declared in his certificates of
candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a
resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since
July 1990. His claim that he ha[s] been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor
from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of
the province of Cagayan."
Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while
discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together with his
family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution
and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor thereof.
Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate

He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes. [24] Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the
people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate
In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v. Comelec[27] that "election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections."
Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on Second Placer
With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is obvious that the second one posited by petitioners has become
academic and need not be ruled upon

Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners

Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the petitioners was deliberated upon by the Court. We note that
petitioners pray, among others, for judgment "declaring Atty. Erasmo B. Damasing as entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor
in the May 11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro City."[8] And yet, Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition for Certiorari
Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by (1) the solicitor general or (2) a public prosecutor or (3)
a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. [9] A reading of
the Rules shows that petitioners, none of whom qualify under any of the above three categories, are without legal standing to
bring this suit.
However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate cases filed before the Comelec: (1) SPC 98-298 for
disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our election laws and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any
voter may file a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law, [10] or to contest the election of a city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic.[11] The petitioners herein, being "duly-registered voters" of Cagayan de Oro
City, therefore satisfy the requirement of said laws and rules. [12]

6. Bautista vs. COMELEC, October 23, 2003- Anthony Yap

FACTS:
 This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to nullify
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc. Resolution No. 5404 ordered the deletion of
Raymundo A. Bautistas (Bautista) name from the official list of candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas (Lumbangan) in the 15 July 2002 elections. Resolution No. 5584 provided
for the policy of the COMELEC regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters
in the place where they ran for office.
 Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay
elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo (Election Officer Jareo) refused to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy
because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan.

 Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch
14 (trial court). The trial court ordered Election Officer Jareo to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy and to include
his name in the certified list of candidates for PunongBarangay.

The trial court ruled that Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 [4] mandates Election Officer Jareo to include
the name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise. [5] In compliance with the
trial courts order, Election Officer Jareo included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. At
the same time, Election Officer Jareo referred the matter of Bautistas inclusion in the certified list of candidates with
the COMELEC Law Department.

 On 11 July 2002, the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of candidacy
since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law
Departments recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002.

 During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza (Alcoreza) were
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719)
while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers
(Board of Canvassers)[7] proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay[8] on 15 July 2002. Bautista took his oath
of office.

 Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on 23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584 on 10 August
2002(COMELEC Resolutions). In Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautistas
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc directed the Election Officer to delete Bautistas name from the
official list of candidates. Resolution No. 5584 expressed COMELECs policy regarding proclaimed candidates found
to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place of their election, thus:
(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course to or cancelled by virtue of a
Resolution of the Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution did not arrive on time.
1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement the resolution of the Commission deleting the name of the
candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course;
2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from
assuming the positionto which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court;
and
3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and
correcting the Certificate ofCanvass of Proclamation.
(b) For a proclaimed candidate who is subsequently declared disqualified by the Commission in the disqualification
case filed against him prior to his proclamation.
1. To DIRECT the proclaimed disqualified candidate to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from
assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court;
and
2. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and
correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation.
(c) For a proclaimed candidate who is found to be ineligible only after his proclamation (i.e., There is no Resolution
denying due course to or canceling his certificate of candidacy and there is no petition for disqualification pending
against him before his proclamation.)
1. To DISMISS any and all cases questioning the eligibility of such candidate for LACK OF JURISDICTION, the
proper remedy being a quo warranto case before the metropolitan or municipal trial court.
 COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed Election Officer Jareo to (1) delete the name of Bautista
from the official list of candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan; (2) order the Board of Canvassers of
Lumbangan to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the elected Punong Barangay with due notice to all candidates
concerned; and (3) direct the proclaimed disqualified candidate Bautista to cease and desist from taking his oath of
office or from assuming the position which he won in the elections, citing COMELEC Resolution Nos. 5404 and
5584.Consequently, Election Officer Jareo issued on 20 August 2002 an Order[10] deleting the name of Bautista from
the list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The Order also prohibited Bautista from assuming the position and
discharging the functions of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan pursuant to the COMELEC Resolutions. The Board of
Canvassers reconvened on 23 August 2002 and after making the necessary corrections in the Certificate of Canvass of
 Votes, proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning Punong Barangay. [11] Alcoreza thus assumed the post
of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan.

 Bautista wrote a letter to COMELEC requesting the latter for reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolutions. While his
letter for reconsideration was still pending with the COMELEC, Bautista filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584;
2. Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos.
5404 and 5584; and
3. Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of the
winning candidate Bautista.

HELD:
Preliminary issue:
WON MR is a prerequisite to file petition for certiorari and prohinition

Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling
of a division. However, Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibits a motion to reconsider
a resolution of the COMELEC en banc except in cases involving election offenses.
What Pleadings are Not Allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:
.. . .
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases;
As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution was
not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For him
to wait until the COMELEC denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing a petition
for certiorari with this Court to run and expire.
The instant controversy involves resolutions issued by the COMELEC en banc which do not pertain to election
offenses.Hence, a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy [15] in accordance with Section 2, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65 except as hereinafter
provided.

MAIN ISSUE 1:
A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction
when it ordered the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary
hearing.
The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to the administrative functions of the
COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions.
The Court discussed the difference between administrative and quasi-judicial functions in Villarosa v. Commission on Elections:
[19]
In the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez, 56 SCRA 148, he noted that
(t)he term administrative connotes, or pertains, to administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting,
directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to
be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.
While a quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis supplied)
In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases
first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc.[20] In Baytan v. COMELEC,[21] the Court
expounded on the administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC. The Court explained:

Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial
powers. The COMELECs administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The
1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in
division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative powers in the Commission on Elections, while providing
that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions.Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling
within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.

On the other hand, the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory, and not appealable.
The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly requires that all
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for
reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC
is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC
exercises its quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the
quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this case where the
cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification
of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without
a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.

MAIN ISSUE 2:
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing
is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and
hearing. The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court during a formal hearing.
[25]
There is due process when a party is able to present evidence in the form of pleadings.

However, the COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution
Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing.

We cannot ignore the importance of prior notice and hearing. Severe consequences attach to the COMELEC Resolutions which
not only ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Bautista but also the annulment of his proclamation as Punong
Barangay. What is involved here is not just the right to be voted for public office but the right to hold public office.

The fact that Bautista was able to file a letter with the COMELEC en banc requesting for reconsideration of the Resolutions is
beside the point. To reiterate, the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibit a motion for reconsideration of a COMELEC en
banc resolution except in cases involving election offenses.

Respondents likewise submit that there was no need for presentation and evaluation of evidence since the issue of whether
Bautista was a registered voter is easily resolved by looking at the COMELEC registration records. [28] This reasoning fails to
consider the instances where a voter may be excluded through inadvertence or registered with an erroneous or misspelled name.
[29]
Indeed, if it was just a simple matter of looking at the record of registered voters, then the COMELEC would not have
included Section 7 (g)[30] in its Resolution No. 4801. This Section allows candidates who are not registered voters to be included
in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise.

Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the twin requirements of prior notice and hearing, as follows:
Rule 23 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
Section 1. Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. A petition to deny due course to or cancel, a certificate of candidacy
for any elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered
political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained
therein as required by law is false.
Sec. 2. Period to File Petition. The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy.
Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
Sec. 4. Delegation of Reception of Evidence. The Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the
Philippine Bar to hear the case and receive evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC could do away with the requirements of notice and hearing. The
COMELEC should have at least given notice to Bautista to give him the chance to adduce evidence to explain his side in the
cancellation proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista of procedural due process of law when it approved the report
and recommendation of the Law Department without notice and hearing. [31]

MAIN ISSUE 3:
A candidate for an elective municipal office did not have to be a registered voter in the municipality to qualify to run for an
elective municipal office. A qualified elector meant a person who had all the qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not
a person registered in the electoral list. In the same vein, the term qualified when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that
a person must be a registered voter.

Under the Local Government Code of 1991, [38] which took effect on 1 January 1992, an elective local official, including a Punong
Barangay, must not only be a qualified elector or a qualified voter, he must also be a registered voter. [39]Section 39 of the Local
Government Code provides:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filpino or any other local language or dialect.
xxx
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen
(18) years of age on election day.
xxx
These qualifications were reiterated in Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23 May 2002 which prescribed the
guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the 15 July 2002 elections. Section 2 reads:
Sec. 2. Qualifications. (a) Candidates for Punong Barangay and Sangguniang Barangay Kagawad must be:
(1) Filipino citizens;
(2) At least 18 years old on election day;
(3) Able to read and write Pilipino or any local language or dialect; and
(4) Registered voters of the barangay where they intend to run for office and residents thereof for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 likewise requires the Election Officer to verify whether the candidates are
registered voters and possess all the qualifications of a candidate. Thus, Section 7 (f) and (g) read:
(f) Before the preparation of the certified lists of candidates it shall be the duty of the Election Officer to: (1) verify whether
all candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan positions are registered voters of the barangay where they file their
certificates of candidacy; and (2) examine the entries of the certificates of candidacy and determine on the basis of said entries
whether the candidate concerned possesses all the qualifications of a candidate.
(g) If there are candidates who are not registered voters in the barangay where they run for barangay or sangguniang
kabataan positions or do not possess all the other qualifications of a candidate, he shall make the corresponding report by
REGISTERED MAIL and by RUSH TELEGRAM to the Law Department of the Commission within three (3) days from the
last day for filing the certificates of candidacy, copy furnished the Provincial Election Supervisor and the Regional Election
Director. The names of said candidates, however, shall still be included in the certified lists of candidates until the
Commission directs otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)

It is thus clear that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of the barangay
where he intends to run for office.
Bautista admitted in his affidavit[40] dated 24 August 2002 that he was not a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan

According to Bautistas affidavit, he was practically out of the country from 1995 until 2001. When the certified list of voters
ceased to be effective and operative after the barangay elections in 1997, qualified voters had to register again to vote in any
election. Apparently, Bautista failed to register during the general registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC in 1997
since he was still out of the country during that time. Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voters Registration Act of 1996) provides for a
system of continuing registration of voters. Thus, Bautista should have registered anew in the office of the Election Officer when
he came back to the Philippines in 2001 and learned that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters.

It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right to vote and to be voted for public office. As early as 2001,
he was already aware that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista chose not to register
anew that year despite his knowledge that he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of
Punong Barangay.

Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the
qualifications that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a misrepresentation of a
material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered voter in Barangay
Lumbangan.[42] An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral
process by falsely representing himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral
process.[43] Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy
is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section
78 refers to qualifications for elective office. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if
elected, from serving, or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. [44]

Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that the peoples choice expressed in the local elections deserves
respect. Bautistas invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws is unavailing. The electorate cannot amend or waive the
qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility.[46] The fact that Bautista, a non-registered voter, was elected to the office of Punong Barangay does not erase the fact
that he lacks one of the qualifications for Punong Barangay.

As to the proclamation of Alcoreza. It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who
obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified. [48]The exception to this
well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections [49] and reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC.[50] However,
the facts warranting the exception to the rule do not obtain in the present case.

Although the COMELEC Law Department recommended to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Bautista
on 11 July 2002, the COMELEC en banc failed to act on it before the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. It was only on 23 July
2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5404, adopting the recommendation of the COMELEC Law
Department and directing the Election Officer to delete Bautistas name from the official list of candidates.

Thus, when the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he was
qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautistas
disqualification.[51] The Court cannot adhere to the theory of respondent Alcoreza that the votes cast in favor of Bautista are stray
votes.[52] A subsequent finding by the COMELEC en banc that Bautista is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as
to invalidate the votes cast for him.

The Local Government Code provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in the Office of the Punong Barangay, thus:
SEC. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor,
or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in the case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may
be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay member, the highest ranking
sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately
preceding local election. (Emphasis supplied)
Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the
case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay. [55]

7. Aratea vs. COMELEC, October 09, 2012- Makjaz Veloso

FACTS:
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4)
consecutive terms.
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during said elections.
Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively.
 Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor.
Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified Lonzanida from running for Mayor based on two grounds: (1),
Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been
convicted by final judgment of ten counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor because Lonzanida ceased to be a
candidate when the COMELEC Division ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name
from the list of official candidates.
Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. He reasoned that since Lonzanida’s
disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s
subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor
was mandated to succeed as Mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of
the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor in this case.

RULING:
The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held that Antipolo, the "second
placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was
never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes
for the position.
Qualifications and Disqualifications
The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code. Section 40
expressly provides, among others:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
xxx
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
xxx
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material
representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the certificate of candidacy. This included among others a statement that
the person filing it is eligible for said office.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from
holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality
of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión
mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person
suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation
if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
 Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the judgment of
conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23
October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the OEC because this accessory
penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that
Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections, the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate
of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he
clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as the
violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office despite the possession of
all the qualifications under Section 39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the
law.
Legal Duty of COMELEC
to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification
Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering
from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of
conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and
second, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification. In other words, on election
day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida
was never a candidate for the position, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor
Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.

DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for the cancellation of a CoC. It is an appropriate ground
for disqualification; thus, Dr. Rodolfo should be deemed to have filed a petition for disqualification, not a petition for the
cancellation of Lonzanida’s CoC.
A resulting disqualification based on a violation of the three-term limit rule cannot begin to operate until after the
elections, where the three-term official emerged as victorious. The prohibition against Lonzanida only took place after his
election for his fourth consecutive term. With Lonzanida ineligible to assume office, the Vice-Mayor takes over by succession.

DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J.:
The violation of the three-term limit cannot be a ground for cancellation of COC. To emphasize, this remedy can only
be pursued in cases of material misrepresentation in the CoC, which are limited to the details that must be stated therein.
Antipolo’s contention that Lonzanida should be deemed to have made a misrepresentation in his COC when he stated that he was
eligible to run when in fact he was not is inconsistent with the basic rule in statutory construction that provisions of a law should
be construed as a whole and not as a series of disconnected articles and phrases.
Considering that the number of terms for which a local candidate had served is not required to be stated in the CoC, it
cannot be a ground for a petition to cancel a CoC.
The petition filed by Dra. Rodolfo against Lonzanida should be considered a petition for disqualification and not a
petition to cancel a CoC.
In the event that a vacancy is created in the office of the mayor, it is the duly-elected vice-mayor, petitioner Aratea in this case,
who shall succeed as mayor.

B. Term of Office, include the Three (3)-Term Limit Rule

1. Abundo, Sr. vs. COMELEC, January 08, 2013- Cerfranz Boniel
FACTS: For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo
vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed
as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby,
however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006
until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to
run, the corresponding petition, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First
Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly
proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto action to unseat Abundo on
essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify. RTC ruled that Abundo have already served three
consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth,
consecutive term. Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, where the RTC order has been affirmed. MR at COMELEC
en banc was denied. Hence, this instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes assumed the posts of
mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, replacing
ISSUES: Whether Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year
and one month of the second term as a result of an election protest.
RULING: NO. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and
occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
(Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. — x x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory
provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
It is true that Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the
incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. The
qualification is “voluntary” interruption as distinguished from “involuntary” interruption which may be brought about by certain
events or causes.
Situations based on jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were considered or not considered as having been
"involuntarily interrupted or broken.":
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently
left vacant due to any of the following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.
It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. (see Borja case)
(2) Recall Election
Socrates case: Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms. Obviously
aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which
Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election
held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term
limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:
“After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002
when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.

The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term and,
hence, any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered.”
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
The conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of
service. The Latasa case: “This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor,
he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida case, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time,
stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never
ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three
terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator
of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint
one since no vacancy exists. (see Aldovino case)
(5) Election Protest
Court here have differing ruling in Lonzanida case and in Ong case. Court illuminates why such difference in the ruling in this
wise:
“The difference between Ong and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was
declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as
mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an
effective interruption of the continuity of service.” (see Ong case)
Summary of Rules:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as
one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the
application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the
higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or
interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be
his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt
the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this
period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses
in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired
portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a
full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term
for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term
from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
Back to the case:
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent,
Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit
of the three-term limit rule.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his
favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little
over one year and one month. Consequently, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007
term to which he was otherwise entitled.
An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.
While the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired
portion of the term and here Abundo was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s
full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual
involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while
Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his
constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not
possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress
against the injustices it may bring.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed against the
people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We
bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want" and hence, should, as much as
possible, "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it
overreaches itself." For democracy draws strength from the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise
bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to
which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said
position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-
Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor,
respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.

Interruption vs Renunciation: To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak
of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively
cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word
"renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or
resign. Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the
office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.

2. Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, December 23, 2009- Cabahug

Interruption of the three term limit

Facts:

 Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007.
 In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension
against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo
resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
 In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
 The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny
due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for
three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160

Issue:

Whether Asilo’s preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term?

Held:

The “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less
than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of
time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of
law, being involuntary, is an effve interruption of service within a term. On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
 interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding
office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law. Preventive suspension – whether under the Local Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act – is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have
been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential
for eventual guilt or liability. Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to
his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. This was what
exactly happened to Asilo.
Hence, the preventive suspension of public officials (Asilo) does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule
under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted
the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

Issue:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code)?

Ruling:
General requisites for the application of the three term limit
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms

Construction of the three term limit

Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation because of the
constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it
guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of
limitation rather than its exception.

Construction of the word “interruption”

The “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short,
for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
“voluntary renunciation” as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Nature of preventive suspension

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and
does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only
results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Ruling of the Court in the case at bar

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an
interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the
absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

3. COMELEC vs. Cruz, November 20, 2009- Castor

4. Montebon vs. COMELEC, April 08, 2008- Durana
DOCTRINE:
Succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office.
QUICK FACTS:
Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor
of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy againas municipal
councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule.
FACTS:
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of
Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections.
On April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification against respondent
with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it
would be his fourth consecutive term.
In his answer, respondent argues that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3 term limit rule because his second term was
interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the retirement of elected vice-mayor Petronilo Mendoza.
Petitioners maintain that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an
interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They
argued that, according to the law (constitution and LGC), voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected.
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that respondent's assumption of
office as vice-mayor should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His second term having been
involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on
the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor.
ISSUE:
WON the private respondents’ assumption of the vice-mayor office, by virtue of succession, can be considered as an effective
disruption in his full service of his second term as councilor.
HELD:
YES. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
2) that he has FULLY served three consecutive terms.
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not
enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same
position.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, ‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.’ The clear intent
of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and
at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is
deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.
Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, respondent's
assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor,
resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary
renunciation because it was by operation of law.
We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that –
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local
Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest- ‐ ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does
the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as
permanent inability within the contemplation of law.
Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a
public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal
charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
rather than voluntary. (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180444. April 9, 2008)
● The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of
service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an
involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume
office as vicemayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his
position as councilor.

5. Ong vs. Alegre, January 23, 2006-Japos

FACTS:
Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside certain issuances of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc.

Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed certificates
of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.

On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy[3] of Francis. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis
having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as
mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.

On May 1998 both Alegre and Francis opposed each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte,
with Francis being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest,[4]albeit the decision came
out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve
the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.

COMELEC Decision: the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the
said petition of Alegre, rationalizing as follows: Herein, one of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is
not present. Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to
2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected
thereto. He merely assumed office as a presumptive winner; which presumption was later overturned when [the RTC]
decided with finality that [he] lost in the May 1998 elections.

Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration: On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution reversing the
March 31, 2004 resolution of the COMELECs First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis as disqualified to run for mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of candidates;
and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.

Francis immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as substitute candidate. Rommel then filed
his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis.

On May 10, 2004, Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV and V, issued a
Memorandum which partly stated:

“which he quote your stand, "that substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted
candidacy is denied due course. In the Resolution of the Commission En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of
Francis Ong was denied due course," and elaborated further that:

In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute certificate of

candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be denied due course; and 2) the
election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates.

There can no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by

disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy."

Francis filed before the Court a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order
dismissing private respondent Alegres Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for
being moot and academic.

ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner Francis is disqualified to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections.

2. WON Rommel’s certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis be
denied.

HELD:
ISSUE 1.YES

The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of
the consecutive three-term limit rule.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and
(2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis
from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.

There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and
again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full.

The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for
mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a
proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, service for the full term, and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra,
barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.

It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis opponent (Alegre)
who won in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente.

However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated
after the term of the contested office has expired.

Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under
protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.

The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre
would under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest
ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
 In, Lonzanida vs. Comelec,] citing Borja vs. Comelec, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive
terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May
1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor.
Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections,
Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually
granted. There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the
Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to
vacate [and in fact vacated] his post before the expiration of the term.

The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the
mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of failure of election, and, as a consequence thereof, the
proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another,
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal
processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.

On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here, there
was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike
Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.

The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified
Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente and denying due course to his
certificate of candidacy by force of the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local
elective official cannot be sustained. What the COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution commends itself
for concurrence:

Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not then Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano overstepped his
discretion when he issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004
COMELEC en banc resolution even before its finality[20] is now of little moment and need not detain us any longer.

Just as unmeritorious as Francis petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he (Rommel)
challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his name as a substitute candidate in the official list of candidates for the May
10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing COMELEC policy [21] provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates
in the certified list of candidates pending approval of the substitution.

ISSUE 2. YES

Not to be overlooked is the Courts holding in Miranda vs. Abaya,[22] that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the
former, thus:

While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party
may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause , this does not
include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied
due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate
may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing
rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of
the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose
certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of
the Code.

xxx xxx xxx

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
 xxx xxx xxx

After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood
why in Bautista [Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with
a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that
Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited
party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate
of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.

In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were already pass, Rommel Ongs petition in G.R. No. 163354
is already moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the
COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.

6. Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, September 03, 1998- Perez

TOPIC: Scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving
more than three consecutive terms
FACTS:
 Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On
May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995,
he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, private respondent
Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections.

 Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

 The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent
Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. [2] However, on motion of private respondent, the
COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11,
1998 elections.[3] The majority stated in its decision:
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office
for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not
elected. In the case before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of mayor in the
January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the
unexpired term of his predecessor.Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1) term
for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code.
 Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes
and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

ISSUE: Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD:
Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in
question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office
regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to
disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power.

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion
of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second
is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be
preserved.

It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials
concerned were serving by reason of reelection. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission
concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress.

Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to
govern them.[11] To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of
succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.

Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X,
8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term
of office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second
sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The
purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may
serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official
he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of
office prior to its expiration.

Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the House of
Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve
the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed. [12]

This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a query of Commissioner
Suarez: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired
portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a
term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the
meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President? Commissioner Davide said: Yes, because we speak of term and
if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the
Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House. [13]

There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who
succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship
by operation of law.[14] On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. [15] In a real sense, therefore, such
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be
elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we
believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another
confirms the theory.

Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case
of vacancy in that office. After stating that The President shall not be eligible for any reelection, this provision says that No
person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term
as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term.

The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the
Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The
absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It
underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the
three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years
is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters
death, permanent disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely
dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the
Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in
the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a
full term.

This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and
he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in
the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. [16] It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event
of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in
the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the
application of any term limit.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations:

Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next
election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election.
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full
term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8,
voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the
term is one for which he was elected. Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was
elected. A cannot be considered to have completed one term.His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If
he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has
fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms
notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the
second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur
for the purpose of applying Art. X 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death , of the deceased mayor.

To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would
be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the
vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if,
on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the
third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while
the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their
freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

C. Holdover Principle
1. Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, October 18, 2011-Veloso
I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections
for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same
date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC
had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide
with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the
ARMM elections.
 2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through
three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify
the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with
the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on
who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in
the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last
also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
 Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed
by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term –
is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would
effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all
laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,
Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule
that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within
the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special
elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date
for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act
of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to
ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call
special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
 decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and
is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress
itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is
what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is
achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the
President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the
only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
 Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials
that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153
is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative
of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law
leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA
No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge
for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on
the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153
should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

2. Sambarani vs. COMELEC, September 15, 2004- Boniel

D. Substitution, Vacancies and Succession
1. Talaga vs. COMELEC, October 09, 2012- Cabahug
2. Jalosjos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, October 09, 2012-Castor
3. Damasen vs. Tumamao, February 17, 2010-Durana
Facts:
A permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the Vice Mayor of San Isidro, Isabella when incumbent Vice Mayor
Nelia Tumamao died (December 2, 2004), and in the Sangguniang Bayan when Ligaya Alonzo, who was the highest ranking
member of the Sangguniang Bayan (having garnered the highest number of votes for that office in the May 2004 elections), was
appointed vice mayor pursuant to Secs. 44 and 45 of the Local Government Code. Sec. 44 of the LGC provides:

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. - xxx If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member xxx shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be.
Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined herein.
xxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of
the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in
the immediately preceding local election.
Under Sec. 45 of the LGC, vacancies in the Sanggunian Bayan are filled in the following manner:

Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. -

(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession provided above do not apply shall be filled by
appointment in the following manner: xxx
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang
bayan; xx
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sanggunian
member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last
vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from
the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term
of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of the
appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any
appointment without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for
administrative action against the official responsible therefore.

Upon recommendation of Mayor Abraham Lim, Governor Maria Gracia Cielo Padaca appointed Oscar Tumamao as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Tumamao was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the same political
party to which Alonzo belonged. He was nominated to fill the vacancy by Senator Edgardo Angara, the Party Chairman and the
highest official of the LDP, as much as he was a member in good standing. Tumamao thus took his oath (April 15, 2005),
assumed the position, and attended the council’s regular sessions (April 26 and May 3, 2005).

Subsequently, however, Attorney Lucky Damasen was appointed for the same vacancy in the municipal council (May
12, 2005). He had a Certificate of Membership from and the nomination of LDP Provincial Chairman Benita Balauag, before
whom he took his oath of affiliation to the LDP only on May 5. Because of Tumamao’s previous appointment and despite taking
the oath of office by Damasen before Gov. Padaca, Damasen’s presence in the May 17 session of the municipal council was not
recognized. Aggrieved, he filed a Petition for Quo Warranto against Tumamao before RTC of Santiago City, seeking to be
declared the rightful member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

As part of his defense, Tumamao presented a Letter dated June 14, 2005 (addressed to Gov. Padaca) by and the
testimony of LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag that confirmed Tumamao’s nomination and revoked the nomination of Damasen.
Balauag testified that she nominated Damasen believing him to be unaffiliated and not knowing that the latter was a still member
of the Lakas CMD Party; Tumamao has not yet resigned from Lakas and was even a mayoralty candidate under Lakas in the past
election. His membership is thus contrary to LDP’s By-Laws (Sec. 2, Art. IV) especially where he joined LDP “because he just
wanted to.” Tumamao also presented the Letter dated June 16, 2005 (addressed to Gov. Padaca also) by LDP Deputy Secretary
Counsel Demaree Raval that Damasen was not a bona fide member of the LDP.

The RTC, however, ruled in favor of Damasen. It found that Damasen had fully complied with the requirements of
Sec. 45 and that the subsequent revocation of nomination of Damasen by LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag cannot undo the act
of appointment of Governor Padaca. The Court of Appeals reversed such findings.

Before the Supreme Court, Damasen contended that he obtained membership in and nomination of LDP without
misrepresentation: (a) LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag could have not known that he ran for mayor under Laban because
Balauag was also a candidate for mayor in the adjoining town of Echague, Isabela; and (b) Philippine politicians change political
affiliation more often than not. He also stressed that he was already appointed by Gov. Padaca previous to the revocation of his
nomination. Thus, the latter has no legal effect as to his appointment.

The Supreme Court upheld the CA.

Issue/s: Whether an appointed party member can be disqualified from office by a subsequent revocation of his nomination by his
party – Yes.

Held: Damasen is disqualified and Tumamao is entitled to office.

1. Previous appointment does not bar contests against it on the basis of failure to comply with the legal requirements for
succession.
 The SC ruled that “while the revocation of Damasen’s nomination came after the fact of his appointment by Gov.
Padaca, the same should not serve to bar any contest on said appointment as the primordial issue to be determined is whether or
not Damasen has complied with the requirements of Sec. 45 of the LGC,” which are sine qua non requirements of the law.

2. The following are the Rules on Succession in the Sangguniang Bayan.

Under Sec. 45 of the LGC, succession in the Sangguniang Bayan operates upon compliance with two sine qua non
conditions: (1) the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the
vacancy; and (2) the appointee must have the a nomination and a Certificate of Membership from the highest official of the
political party concerned. The rationale behind the law was stated in Navarro v. CA: to maintain and preserve party
representation as willed by the people in the election.

3. Damasen is not qualified to fill the vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because he failed to comply with the two
conditions abovestated.

Damasen is not a member of the LDP, the party of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. The Letter of
LDP Deputy Secretary Counsel Raval to Gov. Padaca categorically stated that Damasen was not a bona fide member of the LDP;
while he was issued a Certificate of Membership by Provincial Chairman Balauag, his membership has not yet been endorsed to
the LDP National Council for approval. According to the LDP, issuance of Certificate merely starts the process of membership
and it does not mean automatic membership thereto. Such procedural requirements cannot be questioned by the Court because
acceptance of members is discretionary with the political party as a matter of right for being purely internal. Also, Damasen
himself admitted that he was a member of Lakas-CMD and was the mayoralty candidate for the election of May 2004; he also
admitted that he had not resigned from Lakas-CMD when he joined LDP and he changed parties just because he wanted to, and
not because of party ideals. Given such admission, his appointment would diminish party representation rather than strengthen it.

Damasen was not nominated by the highest official of LDP. His nomination was simply from Provincial Chairman
Balauag, who was even misled into accepting his membership and nominating him for the municipal council.

4. Tumamao is entitled to fill the vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan.

Tumamao was undeniably a member of the LDP and was nominated for the vacancy by Party Chairman Angara, the
highest official of the LDP. He was also a member in good standing.

4. Navarro vs. CA, March 28, 2001- Japos

FACTS:
In the May 11, 1997 local elections, the following officials were elected to office in the Municipality of Mapandan,
Pangasinan:
Cesar M. Calimlim - Mayor - Lakas NUCD-KAMPI
Baltazar Aquino - Vice-Mayor - Lakas NUCD-KAMPI

Elected as members of the Sangguniang Bayan ranked according to the highest number of votes obtained were the
following councilors:
Political Party
1. Danny B. Tamayo REFORMA-LM
2. Rolando S. Soriano REFORMA-LM
3. Leopoldo C. Biagtan REFORMA-LM
4. Florentino Z. Lalas REFORMA-LM
5. Mamerto Eden, Jr. REFORMA-LM
6. Victorio C. Lalangan LAKAS-NUCD-KAMPI
7. Judy A. Pascual REFORMA-LM
8. Rolando Lalas LAKAS-NUCD-KAMPI

On March 25, 1999, Mayor Cesar Calimlim died. A vacancy was thus created in the Office of the Mayor so by operation
of law, Section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, then Vice-Mayor Baltazar
Aquino succeeded him.

Accordingly, the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan, i.e. the one who garnered the highest number of
votes, was elevated to the position of the Vice-Mayor, pursuant to the same law. This was petitioner Danny B. Tamayo who
belonged to the REFORMA-LM political party.
 Since a vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation of petitioner Tamayo to the office of the Vice-Mayor,
Governor Victor Agbayani of Pangasinan appointed herein petitioner Purto J. Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. Navarro belonged to the same political party as that of petitioner Tamayo.

Private respondents filed Civil Case No. 99-12958-D to nullify the appointment of petitioner Navarro before the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 presided by Judge Crispin Laron.
RTC decision: denied, private respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court.

In a Resolution dated August 25, 1999, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals due to the hierarchy of courts.
Private respondents argued before the Court of Appeals that it was the former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the
mayor, who created the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the
Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayor's political party, in this case, the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who was the highest-ranking
member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the Vice-Mayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy in the
Sanggunian Bayan.

Pursuant to Section 45 (b) of RA 7160, the person to be appointed to the position vacated by him should come from
the same political party affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo. Hence, the appointment extended by Governor Agbayani to
petitioner Navarro, who was a member of and recommended by the REFORMA-LM, is valid.

The Court of Appeals: resolved the petition in favor of private respondents but for the reason different from that posited
by private respondents.

According to the appellate court, the vacancy which resulted from the death of the mayor created a series of vacancies and
successions by operation of law. By this interpretation, petitioner Tamayo's former position as the highest-ranking member of the
Sanggunian Bayan was filled up by the second highest-ranking member and that vacated by the second highest-ranking member
was succeeded by the third highest-ranking member, and so forth.

And the last vacancy created was the position of the lowest ranking-member of the Sanggunian, that is, the eighth position
occupied by Rolando Lalas. The Court of Appeals then concluded that it was the appointment of the eighth councilor, who was
Rolando Lalas to the number seven position which created the "last vacancy;" therefore, the person to be appointed to the
vacant position should come form the same political party to which Rolando Lalas belonged, which was the Lakas-
NUCD-Kampi.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners brought the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the person to be appointed to the vacant position should come from the same political party to which
Rolando Lalas belonged, which was the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi, and NOT from the same political party affiliation as that of
petitioner Tamayo. .

HELD: NO.
The appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and
shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy
occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner
Tamayo.

Sections 44 and 45 of RA 7160 governing vacancies and succession are quoted hereunder:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. -- If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. If a permanent vacancy in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, the highest
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest-ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said
office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein:

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay members or, in
case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately
preceding local election.

Sec. 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. - (a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions
provided above do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panglunsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay
concerned;
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sanggunian member concerned
had been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the
sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.

In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of
the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shall be
null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official responsible therefor.
(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political party, the local chief
executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled
automatically by the official next in rank of the organization concerned.

Under Section 44, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office.
What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45 (b) providing that "xxx only the nominee of the political party under
which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank
created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. THE APPOINTEE
SHALL COME FROM THE POLITICAL PARTY AS THAT OF THE SANGGUNIAN MEMBER WHO CAUSED THE
VACANCY xxx."

The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the
Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.

With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy
occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner
Tamayo.

Otherwise, REFORMA-LM's representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. To argue that the vacancy created
was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the increase of that party's
representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of the REFORMA-LM.

This interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law and thus violative of a fundamental rule in statutory
construction which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the law. [3] As earlier pointed out, the reason behind
par. (b), section 44 of the Local Government Code is the maintenance party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with
the will of the electorate.
The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member formerly occupying the next
higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes already enumerated.

The term "last vacancy" is thus used in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. The term
by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with the election of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position
in the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in absurdity.

Petitioners also allege that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition because the verification is
defective. It is argued that the affidavit merely stated that the allegations therein are "true and correct to the best of my own
knowledge and information" whereas Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court specifically requires that the allegations be "true
and correct of his knowledge and belief."
The contention is without merit. Verification based on the affiant's own knowledge and information is sufficient under the
circumstances. Verification is merely a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite which does not affect the validity or efficacy of
the pleading, or the jurisdiction of the court. [4] Therefore, a defective verification, as in the present case, does not render the
pleading or the petition invalid and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54675 dated
October 7, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appointment of petitioner Purto J. Navarro to the Sanggunian Bayan of
Mapandan, Pangasinan is hereby AFFIRMED as valid and legal.
SO ORDERED.