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Bourdieu y g98 - Bellon2 - 2013 PDF
Bourdieu y g98 - Bellon2 - 2013 PDF
1
Pierre Bourdieu, Méditations pascaliennes (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997).
philosophical minefield, is underpinned by social structures. The task
of the researcher is one of self-analysis, of his/her own social
conditions of possibility. Many of the problems of Althusserian
Marxism, for instance, can only be illuminated by taking into account
the specificity of the French intellectual field in the postwar period
and the changes it underwent in the 1960s.2
My interest in the notion developed from research into the
contemporary Spanish novel in Castilian, where one of the main
analytical tools was based on Bourdieu’s theoretical framework and
findings. To Bourdieu’s theories I added a number of other approaches
to literature, creating a somewhat unstable balance between feminism
(Nancy Armstrong, Toril Moi), Marxism (Althusser, Balibar Eagleton,
Juan Carlos Rodríguez) and psychoanalysis (Žižek, Lacan). The
intention was, ultimately, to explore the operational capacity of the
different theoretical lenses in order to confront them with the theory (or
theories) developed by the novels themselves. This would allow
comparison of theory as interpretation with the interpretation of theory
that resulted from the process. Of course, all literary artefacts contain in
their very texture a particular conception of their own process of
production and, hence, of the language in which they are written. My
project was not, in other words, a practical application of a series of
theories forced into mutual dialogue, but a self-reflexive application of
theory to the theoretical process, as if the object demanded its own rights
and refused to submit to the supposedly impartial analysis of pure
criticism. For the object is not simply invaded or negated by theory but
sets out its own traps, seductive as the sirens in its own particular
odyssey, pervading all interpretation.
The reasons for my examination of a series of schools in analytical
practice were of a scientific and philosophical nature: no one system or
methodology held all the answers to the various waves of questions
posed by the texts, and there remained a suspicion that each theory
generated its own question marks, by virtue of the way in which it
imposed the limits of the playing field, establishing its own problems
2
See Pierre Bourdieu & Jean-Claude Passeron, ‘Sociology and Philosophy in
France since 1945: Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without a Subject’,
Social Research 34.1 (1967): 161–212.
without seeing others. Using terms borrowed from Bourdieu, this could
be described as an effect of the circularity in the chain of signifiers in the
field. In Althusserian terms, it would be explained from the perspective
of his theory of vision: each ideological horizon creates its own
problems and is only capable of seeing (from) its own problems,
negating that which it cannot see or is hidden from view by its
ideological unconscious.3 Whilst we could proceed to consider what
these theories see and un-see in their field of vision, this is not to be the
aim of the chapter. Instead, we will focus on one of the most careful and
searching theories used, that of Bourdieu, in its self-interrogation about
the possibilities of intellectual production. The intellectual is him/herself
produced as an intellectual, who is authorized and legitimized, provided
with a voice by the institution, in which social myths are both set up and
rooted. There is no room here to consider fully the lacunae in Bourdieu,
above all his lack of attention to the birth and evolution of the ideology
of the subject.4
The field explored in my original project was that of
contemporary Spanish literature in Castilian. Yet the majority of
works by Bourdieu on art, literature and philosophy are on French
society, with the exception of that incredible book The Political
Ontology of Martin Heidegger and the analysis of Faulkner in The
Rules of Art.5 My reservations and doubts about the concept of field
were confirmed by Derek Robbins: ‘It seemed to me that Bourdieu’s
approach to literature has developed mainly in the context of the French
literary tradition with which he feels an affinity’.6 Although it may seem
to be stating the obvious, it is important to take this statement seriously.
3
Louis Althusser & Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital (London: NLB, 1970).
4
This has been amply addressed by Professor Juan Carlos Rodríguez in La
norma literaria (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1994 [1984]) and
Teoría e historia de la producción ideológica (Madrid: Akal, 1990 [1975])
(trans. Read).
5
Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1991); The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary
Field (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp.327 onwards.
6
Derek Robbins, ‘The English intellectual field in the 1790s and the creative project
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: an application of Bourdieu’s cultural analysis’, in
Bridget Fowler (ed.), Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 2000): p.197.
Any research using the notions developed by Bourdieu runs the risk of
essentialising his theoretical apparatus whilst forgetting the peculiarities
of the particular literary field under study, which always possesses its
own logic, its own theory. As Robbins insists: ‘We must guard against
the possibility that the concepts developed by Bourdieu become
components of an arbitrary culture that is imposed unreflexively on
others’.7 It is for this reason that I found it necessary to examine the
concept of field not only from Bourdieu’s but from other perspectives,
including those afforded by the particular dynamics and conditions of
possibility of the analysed (and analysing) texts, through the
metaliterary mechanisms incorporated within them.
To follow my argument it is necessary to consider what Bourdieu
understands by literary field and by cultural field. He defines field as
an autonomous social space that possesses its own rules:
There is a political space, there is a religious space, etc.: I call each of these a
field, that is, an autonomous universe, a kind of arena in which people play a
game which has certain rules, rules which are different from those of the game
that is played in the adjacent space. The people who are involved in the game
have, as such, specific interests, interests which are not defined by their
mandators.8
Agents (or individuals) do not move, live and act in a vacuum, but
rather in concrete social situations ruled by a series of objective social
relations. Bourdieu developed the concept of field in order to account
for these situations or contexts. Certain practices and perceptions are
not the product of what he calls habitus, or familiarity with the rules
of the game, but of the relationship between this and the fields (the
7
Indeed, Robbins reminds us, in relation to Bourdieu’s famous essay on Flaubert,
that the sociologist positions himself within his own intellectual field: ‘His analyses
of Flaubert are elements of a confused position-taking in relation to Sartre –
confused because, I think, Bourdieu remained sympathetic to Sartre’s early view
of the status of texts expressed in What is Literature? but hostile to the attempt
made by Sartre to reconcile his existentialism with Marxism in the Critique of
Dialectical Reason and subsequently, to operationalize that reconciliation in
literary biographies, such as that of Flaubert’. Ibid., p.197.
8 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Polity Press, 1992), p.215.
game) in which they take part. However, the habitus is not always
consistent with or fully adapted to the rules of the game, the two
cannot always be articulated without complication: there may be a
quixoticisation of dispositions.9
The field is, then, a competitive system of social relations that
functions in accordance with its own internal logic, which is itself
formed and moulded by institutions or individuals (agents) who
develop different strategies in the struggle for domination, recognition
and status. Hence, the field is a space structured by positions in which
all the positions and the interrelations between them (the real is
interrelational for Bourdieu) are determined by the distribution of
different forms of resources or capital (understood here as
accumulated human work, whether economic or symbolic, that is the
accumulation of recognition and authority). Within the academic field,
for instance, there is invisible capital in the literary Canon.
In the case of literature, Bourdieu developed the concept of
literary field, which should be understood in relation to the
philosophical, cultural and intellectual fields. As can be seen from this
list, the lines between the different fields are not particularly clear, for
the notion of cultural field or intellectual field seems to cover all of
the fields, and it is difficult to tell where one field ends and another
begins. The Althusserian notion of overdetermination provides an
epistemological anchor here, as it seems evident that it is almost
impossible to study the rules of the different fields without taking into
account the way in which they, and the different determinant factors
within them, overlap. What Bourdieu does is add nuance to
Althusserian overdetermination.10 If we think of the relationships
between cinema, literature, criticism and the academy, things become
even more complex. In any case, the hermeneutically fertile
invocation of the concept of overdetermination does not remove the
vagueness of the notions of ‘cultural field’ and ‘intellectual field’.
So far, then, the question of the nature of the literary field, its
specificity and difference with respect to other cultural fields, remains
The literary field is the economic world reversed; that is, the fundamental law
of this specific universe, that of disinterestedness, which establishes a negative
correlation between temporal (notably financial) success and properly artistic
value, is the inverse of the law of economic exchange. The artistic field is a
universe of belief. Cultural production distinguishes itself from the production
of the most common objects in that it must produce not only the object in its
materiality, but also the value of this object, that is, the recognition of artistic
legitimacy. This is inseparable from the production of the artist or the writer as
artist or writer, in other words, as a creator of value. A reflection on the
meaning of the artist’s signature would thus be in order.12
This field is neither vague nor even a milieu artistique like a universe of
personal relation between artists and writers (perspectives adopted by those
11 But he attempts to reformulate this in other works like Practical Reason (1998),
Language and Symbolic Power (1992), Distinction (1984) and The Political
Ontology of Martin Heidegger (1991).
12 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1993), p.164.
who study ‘influences’). It is a veritable social universe where, in accordance
with its particular laws, there accumulates a particular form of capital, and
where relations of force of a particular type are exerted. This universe is the
place of entirely specific struggles, notably concerning the question of knowing
who is part of the universe, who is a real writer and who is not. The important
fact, for the interpretation of works, is that this autonomous social universe
functions somewhat like a prism which refracts every external determination:
demographic, economic or political events are always retranslated according to
the specific logic of the field, and it is by this intermediary that they act on the
logic of the development of works.13
13 Ibid, p.164.
14 Derek Robbins, Bourdieu and Culture (London: Sage Publications, 2000),
pp.29 and 187, respectively.
representations constructed by critics and academics, as well as the
very effects of these appropriations on writers through the operation of
educational institutions. The self-reflexivity of academic production
will help to reduce the effects of specialisation as well as the tendency
to philosophize without a scientific basis.
The publishing market and its accompanying ideological
apparatus, such as marketing, is of key importance, as are the
phenomenon of literary prizes, which are especially important in
Spain in the canonisation process. As far as the publishing market is
concerned, one need only remember the case of the Latin-American
‘Boom’ novel, and the effect this had on the proliferation of the term
‘magic realism’ beyond literature written in Castilian.
As can be seen, the factors to be taken into account in the course
of a sociological or socio-historical study are multiple and complex:
another cliché that is rarely taken as seriously as it ought to be.
Accustomed in the academic field to excessively broad periodisation
and generalisations alike, whatever the analytical lens chosen
(speaking of the ‘spirit of the baroque’, for instance, or ‘the two
Spains’; reducing a decade of Spanish poetry to a single sentence) to
pause and think in the terms proposed by Bourdieu is quite a challenge
scientifically. None the less if the aim is to understand the social and
historical conditions of possibility of literary artefacts and how these
read the world which produces them, the traditional voyeuristic
comforts of an academicism ‘for all seasons’ are undoubtedly an
obstacle: it is almost impossible here not to think of Harold Bloom,
notwithstanding his excellent work on poetry. The indiscriminate use
of notions like habitus, hexis and field outside the contexts we have
analysed, lend themselves unproblematically to this academicism of
broad brushstrokes, as little more than a flirtation with philospohical
discourse and its totalising effects rather than the elaboration of a
sociological study proper. By contrast, Bourdieu and Passeron’s
article on ‘Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945: Death and
Resurrection of a Philosophy without a Subject’ is a good example of
sociological rigour and epistemological profundity.
The internal or immanent reading of literary works, which is the
modus operandi of many literary specialists, is obviously necessary
and fertile; however, it encloses analysis in the dangerous circle
created by the notion of ‘representation’, leading to potential
entrapment by the stratagems laid out by the text itself (as in the case
of numerous readings of the ‘nueva novela’ or nouveau roman).
Bourdieu’s analysis of Flaubert’s Éducation sentimentale, in which he
performs an internal reading from his own sociology, provides a
number of useful clues to understand how the (French) literary field
functions.15 None the less, however operative it may be, internal
reading can be little more than a mouse-trap.
‘Ya don Quijote, por otra parte, hubo de expiar el error de imaginar que la
caballería andante era igualmente compatible con todas las formas
económicas de la sociedad’.
(Karl Marx, Capital, I, p.100).
15 Flaubert’s novel ‘supplies all the tools necessary for its own sociological
analysis: the structure of the book, which a strictly internal reading brings to
light, that is, the structure of the social space in which the adventures of
Frédéric unfold, proves to be at the same time the structure of the social space
in which its author himself was situated’. Bourdieu, The Rules of Art, p.3.
with the problems of Spain and a special sensibility about life. Today
their ideas are somewhat like fossils that speak of a remote past;
fossils or myths of stone, hard and persistent like gods of marble, but
discoloured by time.
The concept of ‘generation’ is incredibly problematic, but given
that there are always problems of periodisation in literary history, it
appeared as a necessary concept in order to classify and pigeonhole a
series of writers.16 At least, it appeared necessary for essentialist
criticism, with its tendency to consider men and women as a uniform
whole, only separated by time, and independently of their social
origin, education, sex and the accompanying social expectations and
world view these endowed, thus eliding the biting problem of social
class. It is well known that the concept of generation was devised by
Julius Petersen in the 1930s and imported into Spain by Ortega in
1933, to be applied to the ‘men of 1898’ by Pedro Salinas in 1935.
Indeed, a German Hispanist, Hans Jeschke, wrote an earlier book on
Die Generation von 1898 in 1934. The term, nowadays often modified
by the word ‘group’, has enjoyed enormous fortune in literary
criticism, in large part due to the enormous of influence of Laín
Entralgo and his La generación del 98.17 Laín tried to include Ganivet
(who died in 1898) in the group, together with Unamuno, Benavente,
Machado and Ramiro de Maeztu and Valle-Inclán. Indeed, as
Gregorio Morán observes, Laín’s was to remain the ‘official’ vision of
the Generation of 1898 until our time.18 Let it be remembered that
Francoist historiography was keen, if not ‘anxious’ (in the Bloomian
sense of ‘anxiety of influence’) to erase the Republican political past
of forty years of literary production, an elision that was mirrored in
the invention of the 1927 Generation by Dámaso Alonso. The use of
1927 conveniently associated the group with the dictatorship of
16 For the origin of the concept of ‘generation’ in Spanish literary history, see
Julius Petersen, ‘Die literischen Generationen’ (1930), Henri Peyre, Les
Générations littéraires (1948), Wilhelm Pinder, Das Problem der Generation
(1926) and Eduard Wechssler, Die Generation als Jugendreihe (1930).
17 Pedro Laín Entralgo, La generación del 98 (Madrid: 1945).
18 ‘... el “98” por antonmasia hasta nuestros días’, in El maestro en el erial
(Barcelona: Tusquets, 1998), p.106-111.
Miguel Primo de Rivera rather than the Second Republic, with which
many of the writers would have preferred to identify themselves.
As an alternative to ‘generationalism’, the concept of field
captures more completely the radical historicity of symbolic
production. In reality, the label ‘1898 Generation’ or ‘Group of 1898’
may be little more than the intuition of a particular literary field. One
hypothesis would be to approach the ‘1898 Generation’ as being
primarily a sign of the entry into the Spanish literary field of an
avantgarde or of a certain heterodoxy in the struggles for power within
it. Furthermore, the theories of the ‘1898’ intellectuals might be seen
as their way of giving literary-philosophical form to Spain’s entry into
the chain of international capitalism: hence their insistence on the
traditional Spain, of casticismo and milenarism, in contrast with
modernity. As a metaphor, we might think of the steel boats of the
USA versus the wooden ones of the Armada.19 In addition, we must
add to this the centralism of these writers’ concerns. Their focus on
Castile, and that of the critics who were to canonize them, led to the
effacement of relations with the other literary fields in the Iberian
Peninsula, particularly those literatures produced in other languages.
Here we intend to focus on the question of ‘identities’, but first it is
necessary to provide a brief sketch of the literary field.
The group of writers who burst on to the literary scene at the
beginning of the twentieth century present a reaction against Realism
and Naturalism, and like all ‘ground-breaking’ heterodoxies they
formulate this with a manifesto: the 1901 Manifesto of the ‘group of
three’, comprised of Azorín, Maeztu and Baroja. In art and literature,
the end of the nineteenth century appears to shatter the scientific
illusions of the different forms of realism. There is a complete change
in perspective. On the one hand, reality is no longer considered to be
fully reflectible, as the mirror of the eye is now considered incapable
of reflecting it in all its complexity; on the other, there is a
reaffirmation of individual liberty, creativity and the imagination. The
specular conception of realism is no longer accepted, because its
19 On 3rd July 1898 the battle of Santiago de Cuba took place, on which Admiral
Cervera faced the superior fleet of William Thomas Simpson, four times the
size of his own. Cervera’s fleet was destroyed within four hours.
objectivity threatens one of the underlying myths of the dominant
unconscious matrix: the liberty of the subject. Note that the problem
here is not the impossibility of representation of the object, the
position is blind to its own limits, but that the object cannot be
reflected because it is a splitting of the subject. It is as if, on the one
hand, the cultural world was reclaiming its rights and saying no to
scientific determinism and to the market, but on the other this
perspective is a reaffirmation of individual subjectivity, of the I
created by the dominant ideology since the eighteenth century. The
contradictions are inescapable: at the same time as reaffirming its
autonomy with respect to the economic and political fields, the
cultural field is fomenting a new model of relations between the
intellectual and politics.20 Yet it is also the period in which culture is
subsumed into the market, into exchange value, and subjected to
market forces. One need look no further than Baudelaire’s ‘Albatross’
to find the expression of the artist’s separation from the world, the
perspective taken by the cultural field regarding society.21
Of course, things are never quite so simple. In Spain, literary
naturalism itself had innoculated itself against scientific determinism,
in the interests of its own ‘creativity’. Emilia Pardo Bazán shows us
how this is done in chapter 2 of La cuestión palpitante, where she
considers how to read Zola:
Puede y debe el arte apoyarse en las ciencias auxiliares; un escultor tiene que
saber muy bien anatomía, para aspirar a hacer algo más que modelos
anatómicos. Aquel sentimiento inefable que en nosotros produce la beeleza, sea
él lo que fuere y consista en lo que consista, es patrimonio exclusivo del arte.
Here [In Spain], as in Italy too, European integration represents upwards, not
downward, national mobility – an opportunity to rise above traditional identity,
rather than a potential threat to it.29
However, this has not always been the case, above all for the
conservative traditionalist bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie, the main
contingency for writers in the Iberian literary fields, with the
exception perhaps of the Catalan field. Once more, let us consider
Unamuno, whose position on Europe went through two phases. In the
first phase (1902) he justifies the Europeanisation of Spain as follows:
Is this not the world view we find in that stylized rural world of
Unamuno’s San Manuel Bueno, mártir? Of course, Stern’s comments
refer to some of the exponents of the conservative revolution in fin de
siècle Germany, and the passage concludes with the observation that
‘[t]he villain usually was the Jew, who more and more frequently
came to be depicted as the very incarnation of modernity’.34 Yet, this
too can be read in the following passage from Baroja:
33 Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair – A Study in the Rise of the
Germanic Ideology (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1961), p.xviii. See also Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins.
The German Academic Community, 1898-1933 (Cambridge (Massachussetts):
Harvard UP, 1969).
34 Ibid.
35 Pío Baroja, El árbol de la ciencia (Madrid: Caro Raggio/Cátedra, 1996), p.66.
cantidad de placeres obtenibles por una cantidad de dinero. [...] Miraba los
bienes de la tierra con ojos de tasador judío.36
36 Ibid, pp.66–7.
37 Juan Carlos Rodríguez, ‘Estructura y superestructura en Pío Baroja’, in La
norma literaria, p.349.
the score, nor as the analysis of a pure bubble. And we say this with
all the respect we owe Hispanists like Donald Shaw, for their insights
into de 1898 Generation. ‘The question – according to Spinoza- is not
to laugh, deplore nor detest, but to understand’. And to understand
means the creation of a language. In this chapter I have simply tried to
show how use of a sociological toolkit that does not take into account
the specificity of the social world that produce the artefact and its own
theory (the text is analysed but also analysing), as well as the
indiscriminate and pseudo-sociological use of a series of notions leads
to a paradox: in trying to avoid traditional textual exegesis, one
continues to do the same in the name of a false heterodoxy. In this
sense, it would be preferable to continue with the Heideggerian ritual
of the text in-itself and for-itself.
Works Cited