TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No.
78164; 31 July 1987] addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
FACTS:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its
functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized
college of medicine;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants
the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of
the Board of Medical Education;”
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools:
"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has
not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree
in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from
the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by
two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing
in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in
admissible.”
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance
of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The
NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to
improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every
year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the
other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall
serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for
admission into the medical colleges.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An
important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and
well-being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs
some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling
that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for
medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular,
in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improving the quality of medical
education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area.
That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to
treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
LIM VS. PACQUING [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]

FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A.
No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to
regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board
(GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless
passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow
And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And
Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And
For Other Purposes.”
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s
franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not
being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since
only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting
ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot
be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents.
(Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President
Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local
Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or
Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other
Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises
and permits issued by local governments.

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai.

The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked
Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local
governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-
impairment clauses of the Constitution.

HELD:

NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

RATIO:

Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or

even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any
subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised
legislative powers).
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO G.R. No. 105371; November 11, 1993
FACTS:
The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35
of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs
and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is
alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking
privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of
the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC,
National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter
that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in
accordance with the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
HELD:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the
Constitution to provide for a more specific guarantee against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification.
SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that
if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies
is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which
is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207,
PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or
House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee
Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The
petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that
an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among
the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution
providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-
controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the
benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public
functions.
SISON V ANCHETA G.R. No. L-59431. July 25, 1984.
FACTS:
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135.
It amended
Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates
of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net
income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits
and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust
fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the
net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income.
Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly discriminated against by
the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his
profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried
individual taxpayers." He characterizes the above section as arbitrary amounting to
class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character.
For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in
taxation.
The OSG prayed for dismissal of the petition due to lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from
business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm.
(WON there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation)
HELD:
No. Petition dismissed
RATIO:
The need for more revenues is rationalized by the government's role to fill the gap
not done by public enterprise in order to meet the needs of the times. It is better
equipped to administer for the public welfare.
The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the
performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds.
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and the strongest power of the
government. There are restrictions, however, diversely affecting as it does property
rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses may properly be invoked,
as petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. If it were
otherwise, taxation would be a destructive power.
The petitioner failed to prove that the statute ran counter to the Constitution. He
used arbitrariness as basis without a factual foundation. This is merely to adhere to
the authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal protection clauses
are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards,
there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a
conclusion.
It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute
is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is
where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property. That would be a
clear abuse of power.
It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction
of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so
harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds.
For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine whether this was denied
in the exercise of police power or eminent domain was the presence of the purpose
of hostility or unreasonable discrimination.
It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looks upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.
The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of
approximating the ideal of the laws's benefits being available to all and the affairs
of men being governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very
essence of the idea of law.
The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on
equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal protection of the laws,' the basis of gross income.
and laws are not abstract propositions. They do not relate to abstract units A, B and
There was a lack of a factual foundation, the forcer of doctrines on due process and
C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to the
equal protection, and the reasonableness of the distinction between compensation
attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does
and taxable net income of professionals and businessmen not being a dubious
not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
classification.
though they were the same.

Lutz v Araneta- it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result
from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.

Petitioner- kindred concept of uniformity- Court- Philippine Trust Company- The

rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because
this is hardly attainable

Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation

There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is
required is that the tax "applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations
placed in similar situation"

There was a difference between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal
objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible
items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.

The discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the

application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers
within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. As
there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make
deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or
less.

Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class.

On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and
businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce
their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.
V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998 Petitioner’s allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to
provide free airtime is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92.
FACTS:
ISSUE#2:
Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:
Is Section 92 of BP. Blg. 881 violative of the due process clause and unlawful taking
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to
of private property for public use without just compensation?
be known as “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially
among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television HELD#2:
stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
NO.
stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of
charge, during the period of the campaign. Petitioners’ argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to
television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners
amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any
claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or
sale of airtime to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free
repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.”
airtime is to authorize a taking which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the
GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1) hour
every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and
Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year’s elections, it stands
to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television
stations provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.

ISSUE#1:

Does GMA Network, Inc. have the standing to bring the constitutional question on
the assailed provision?

HELD#1:

YES.

[W]e have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines
affected by the enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television
broadcast companies to provide free airtime to the COMELEC for the use of
candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it
suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and

TIU V CA; G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law
RA 7227. This was for the conversion of former military bases into industrial and
commercial uses. Subic was one of these areas. It was made into a special economic
zone.
In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized. There were
also tax incentives and duty free importation policies under this law.
On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO
97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. It said that
On Import Taxes and Duties. — Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to
raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into
the SSEZ
On All Other Taxes. — In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and
duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified
in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A
(EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was
operative.
Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ.
Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the
Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and
consumer items tax and duty-free.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative
of their right to equal protection of the laws. This was due to the limitation of tax
incentives to Subic and not to the entire area of Olongapo. The case was referred to
the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim
that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of
RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the
coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to include the "entire Olongapo
City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law.
Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining the application of
R.A. 7227 within the secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside
of the secured area is discriminatory or not owing to a violation of the equal
protection clause.
HELD:
No. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the
City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area
formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, they claimed that the E.O.
narrowed the application to the naval base only.
OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.
Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of
the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Ichong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane
to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into
productive uses. This was really limited to the military bases as the law's intent
provides. Moreover, the law tasked the BCDA to specifically develop the areas the
bases occupied.
Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2)
tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business
enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized
regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status to certain
investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers. The target
of the law was the big investor who can pour in capital.

Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area"
are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to
turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine
economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to extend the tax incentives in RA
7227.

It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial

uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between
territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause.

Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their capital into it.

RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial,

financial and investment center”. There will really be differences between it and the
outside zone of Olongapo.

The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and businesses in
the zone. They are similarly treated to contribute to the end goal of the law.
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 128096; 20 JAN 1999]
FACTS:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an
organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in
the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution
and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate
the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein
petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as
accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations
before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including
Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any
court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due
process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions
seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong
Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which
is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s
or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
HELD:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their
right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration.
Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who
challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members
of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a) of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain
public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending
in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision
does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides
retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law
on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or
those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters,
has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute,
one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds
can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate
relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim
by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that
the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter
while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
SORIANO v. CA; G.R. No. 123936
FACTS:
Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on
December 7, 1993. His application for probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and
among the terms and conditions imposed by the trial court were the following:
7. He shall meet his family responsibilities.
8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change
employment without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a
prescribed secular study or vocational training.
11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount of
P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court.
On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to cancel
petitioners probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the
victim, and a supplemental motion alleging petitioners commission of another
crime for which at that time he was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and
Probation Office filed a comment recommending that petitioner be allowed to
continue with his probation and that he be required instead to submit a program of
payment of his civil liability.
On June 20, 1994, the trial court denied the prosecutors motion and directed
petitioner to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him.
Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received information that
petitioners father, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed
Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as insurance payment. This amount was not turned
over to the heirs of Daluyong and Da Maycong considered this a violation of the
terms and conditions of the probation. She submitted a manifestation to the trial
court praying that petitioner be made to explain his non-compliance with the courts
order of June 20, 1994, or that he be cited for contempt for such non-compliance.
Da Maycong also asked that petitioner be made to submit a program of payment as
soon as possible. The trial court granted her prayers in an order dated August 15,
1994. Petitioner was once again ordered to submit his program of payment.
Petitioner instead filed a motion for reconsideration explaining that he did not
receive any notice of the order dated June 20, 1994. His counsel received a copy of
said order on June 23, 1994 but failed to notify petitioner. Thus, the latter failed to
comply with said order.
On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt
of court for his failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15,
1994. The court likewise revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered
that he be arrested to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. According
to the trial court, among the violations committed by petitioner as regards his
probation are his failure to (1) meet his responsibilities to his family, (2) engage in a
specific employment, and (3) cooperate with his program of supervision.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. He
claimed that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of, or in excess of, jurisdiction in holding petitioner in contempt and revoking
his probation. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that petitioners
stubborn unwillingness to comply with the orders of the trial court shows his refusal
to reform himself and to correct a wrong.
According to the Court of Appeals:
Where probation was approved and probationer has proven to be unrepentant and
disrespectful and even showed clear defiance to two lawful court orders, as in the
case of herein petitioner, the court is not barred from revoking the same.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review, in which petitioner makes the following assignment
of errors:
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was deliberate refusal on
the part of petitioner to comply with his orders dated June 20, 1994 and August 15,
1994 and subsequently declaring petitioner in contempt.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he earlier
issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that petitioner failed to satisfy the award
of civil indemnity for the heirs of the accident victim.
3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he earlier
issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that the latter violated the conditions of
his probation three times.
 General argues that petitioner has committed violations, thus justifying the trial
courts revocation of the grant of probation. He further points out that our ruling in
Petitioner asserts that he had no intention to ignore the orders of the trial court.
Salgado is inapplicable to the case of petitioner since what was involved in Salgado
The courts order of June 20, 1994 was received by his counsel who, however, did
was a program of payment already imposed upon petitioner therein. In this case,
not notify petitioner. Petitioner says that his former counsels irresponsible delay (in
however, it is petitioner who is being asked to submit his own program of payment
informing him of the order) should not prejudice him.
and he had not submitted any such program.
He explains that his non-compliance with the order to submit a program of
The only issue for us to resolve in this case is whether or not the revocation of
payment of his civil liability is, ultimately, due to his poor financial condition. He
petitioners probation is lawful and proper.
only relies on his parents for support. He claims that it is impossible for him to
formulate a payment program because, in the first place, he is in no position to Petitioner asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court
comply with the same. requiring him to submit a program of payment was not deliberate. To our mind, his
refusal to comply with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice
Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order to continue to
of both orders, although the notice of the order of June 20, 1994 came belatedly.
avail of the benefits of probation is to violate the constitutional proscription against
He has, up to this point, refused to comply with the trial courts directive, by
unequal protection of the law. He says only moneyed probationers will be able to
questioning instead the constitutionality of the requirement imposed and harping
benefit from probation if satisfaction of civil liability is made a condition.
on his alleged poverty as the reason for his failure to comply.
Petitioner contends that his enjoyment of probation should not be made to depend
Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the equal protection
on the satisfaction of his civil liability. He invokes the separate opinion of Justice
clause of the Constitution. Note that payment of the civil liability is not made a
Isagani A. Cruz in Salgado v. Court of Appeals,[8] particularly Justice Cruz
condition precedent to probation. If it were, then perhaps there might be some
reservation about the validity of imposing satisfaction of civil liability as a condition
basis to petitioners assertion that only moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits
for probation. Based on this opinion, petitioner claims that such an imposition is in
of probation. In this case, however, petitioners application for probation had
the nature of an amendment of the decision of the trial court in the criminal case
already been granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement
against him, which cannot be allowed since the decision is already final and
before he could avail of probation, but was a condition for his continued enjoyment
executory. He further invokes the majority decision in Salgado and asserts that any
of the same.
program of payment of civil liability must take into consideration the needs and
capacity of petitioner. The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as
a condition for probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary imposition
Petitioner claims that his failure to meet his responsibilities to his family and to
but one required by law. It is a consequence of petitioners having been convicted of
engage in gainful employment is not deliberate but is due to his poverty. He adds
a crime,[12] and petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether
that his being unskilled, with a criminal record to his name, does not exactly
or not he is placed under probation.
enhance his chances for employment.
We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial
Finally, petitioner cites our decision in Baclayon v. Mutia:
court with a program of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but
x x x Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each this is precisely the reason why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own
case should be judged on its own merits -- on the basis of the problems, needs and program of payment. Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position
capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be made to formulate a program of payment that fits his needs and capacity.
a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.
Petitioner blames his former counsels irresponsible delay in informing him of the
In his comment, the Solicitor General asks for the dismissal of the petition. The only trial courts order to come up with a program of payment for his failure to make
issue to be resolved according to him is whether or not petitioner has violated the such a program. Petitioner wants to take exception to the rule that notice to
terms and conditions of his probation as to warrant its revocation. The Solicitor counsel is notice to client.
We find no reason to make an exception in this case. Petitioners counsel has not
been shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioners
rights.[13] Moreover, we note that petitioner later on discovered that such a court
order was received by his counsel. He could have endeavored to comply with the
order then. In the June 20, 1994 order, he was given 10 days from receipt of the
order within which to comply. The same period was given him in the order of
August 15, 1994. Petitioner does not claim that he failed to receive notice of the
latter order. In fact, he submitted a motion for reconsideration of said order, but
still without the required program of payment.
No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders.
The trial court could not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to
comply with its orders. Nor did it abuse gravely its discretion in issuing said orders.
Hence, we are in full agreement with respondent appellate courts decision as well.
Moreover, petitioners continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along
with his prayer for the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from
his probation order, creates the impression that he wants to completely avoid
paying his civil liability. This he cannot do. He cannot escape payment of his civil
liability, with or without a program of payment.
Petitioners reliance on Salgado is misplaced. In that case, the trial court itself
formulated the manner by which Salgado was to satisfy his civil liability. He was
able to comply for a few months. When he started skipping his payments, his victim
sought the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce full payment of the civil
liability. The trial court granted this motion and it was sustained by the Court of
Appeals which ruled that the program of payment amounted to an amendment of
the decision of the trial court ordering payment of civil liability but without a
program of payment. Since the trial courts decision had already become final, it can
no longer be amended by imposing a program of payment, in installments, of the
civil liability.
We held in Salgado that the program of payment is not an amendment of the
decision of the trial court because it does not increase or decrease the liability and
the obligation to pay is to be fulfilled during the period of probation.
Unlike in Salgado, herein petitioner was being asked to make a program of
payment. But he failed to do so. Hence, in this case, there is yet no program of
payment to speak of, because of petitioners stubborn refusal and delay as well as
failure to abide by the trial courts orders.
Petitioners reliance on Baclayon is likewise misplaced. In that case, what was being
assailed as an unrealistic condition was the trial courts requirement that petitioner
therein, a teacher convicted of Serious Oral Defamation, refrain from exercising her
profession. This condition was deemed unreasonable because teaching was the
only profession she knew and it appeared that she excelled in teaching. No
unrealistic condition similar to the one in Baclayon has been imposed upon
petitioner herein.
As regards the other violations committed by petitioner, the question of whether or
not petitioner has, indeed, violated the terms and conditions of his probation is
evidently a factual one which had already been passed upon by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that findings of fact
of the trial court are entitled to great weight, more so when they are affirmed by
the Court of Appeals,[14] as in this case.
Besides, petitioner himself admits in his petition that he is unemployed and only
depends on his parents for support. He can barely support his family.[15] Petitioner
ought to be reminded of what is incumbent on a probationer, including those
requirements that the trial court may set.
As Section 10 of the Probation Law states:
SEC. 10. Conditions of Probation. -- xxx
The court may also require the probationer to:
(a) Cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) Meet his family responsibilities;
(c) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment
without the prior written approval of the probation officer;
(e) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
Clearly, these conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid
down by statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered
to impose and the petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by
satisfying these conditions may the purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include
promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for the reformation of a
penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence.16a Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting
probation, pursuant to the Probation Law:
SEC. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. -- A probation order shall take effect upon
its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences
thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the conditions
prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the
penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.16b
(Emphasis supplied.)

Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the
discretion of the trial court.[17] Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions
that may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper
case and under appropriate circumstances.

Moreover, having admittedly violated the terms and conditions of his probation,
petitioner cannot now assail the revocation of his probation. Regrettably, he has
squandered the opportunity granted him by the trial court to remain outside prison
bars, and must now suffer the consequences of those aforecited violations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 35550 is AFFIRMED.
TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN ( G.R. No.
133676)
FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the
Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have
administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino,
Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the
mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where
proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the
automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem
to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine.
After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by
misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots.
They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the
printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines
failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of
the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections.
Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent
Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting
discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals.
There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et
al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was
not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)
municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were
Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had
the wrong sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the
COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual
count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute
Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of
Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750
approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its
implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution
No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-
1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC
resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a
manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC
when it ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or
not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are
dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its
discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-
1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but
one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire
nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and
the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations
to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on
automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section
2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all
the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read
correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To
Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in
hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and
a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would
will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The
have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate
records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of
error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their
hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election
levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this
when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of
Court.
an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to
be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count
the result of an election.

It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post
election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had
to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by
the delay in the counting of votes

(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino
memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the
manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later
submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of
the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers
observed the manual count from beginning to end.

3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is
completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or

other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a
ISAE (INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS) V. QUISIMBING; G.R.
No. 128845. June 1, 2000
FACTS:
The ISM (International School Manila), under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that
they got compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the
School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants
foreign-hires certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation,
and 25% more pay than locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and
(b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving his home country, the second
was on the lack of tenure when he returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the
parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied
the union’s mfr.
He said, “The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its
claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee
of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants
based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on
substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a
substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying
only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have
to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the
teaching faculty of the School.”
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were
paid local salaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause
HELD:
Yes, Petition granted
RATIO:
Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity…”
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights. The latter promises “Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any kind.”
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed
in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more
reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term “equal pay for equal work”, pertaining to
persons being paid with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions.
There was no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or
effectively than the local-hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor
and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good.[

For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure
also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation
factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by
certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School

to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an
invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.

OBITER:

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective
bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. The housing and other benefits accorded foreign hires were not given to
local hires, thereby such admixture will not assure any group the power to exercise
bargaining rights.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will
of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC
GR No. 129118. July 19, 2000
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the
validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The
Voters Registration Act of 1996".
SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who,
either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for
at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be
reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
district.
Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a
policy of all or none".
This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It
may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are
exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this
case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law
would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption
than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA
8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the
COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of
such officials, large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be
carried out.
The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.

Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to
different stations by the COMELEC.

Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the
equal protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out
the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding
office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain
that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials,
and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision
of law under attack.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:

No.

The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their
place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
DIMAPORO V. HRET election results in all municipalities but SND Significantly, the results of the
technical examination of the election records of SND are determinative of the final
FACTS:
outcome of the election protest against Dimaporo. The same cannot be said of the
This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking to nullify the twin precincts subject of Dimaporo’s motion.
Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion for Technical Evaluation of the
It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for technical examination is
Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in the Voters Registration Records and Motion
subject to the sound discretion of the HRET. In this case, the Tribunal deemed it
for Reconsideration of Resolution Denying the Motion for Technical Examination of
useful in the conduct of the revision proceedings to grant Mangotara’s motion for
Voting Records. Pursuant to the 1998 HRET Rules Congressional candidate
technical examination. Conversely, it found Dimaporo’s motion unpersuasive and
Mangotara Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking the technical examination of
accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the bounds
the signatures and thumb the protested precincts of the municipality of Sultan Naga
of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all, the Constitution confers full
Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged that the massive substitution of voters and
authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and the Senate
other electoral irregularities perpetrated by Dimaporo’s supporters will be
as the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
uncovered and proven. From this and other premises, he concluded that he is the
of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.
duly-elected representative of the 2ndDistrict of Lanao del Norte. Noting that “the
Tribunal cannot evaluate the questioned ballots because there are no ballots but 2. Anent Dimaporo’s contention that the assailed
only election documents to consider” HRET granted Mangotara's motion and
Resolutions
permitted the latter to engage an expert to assist him in prosecution of the case,
NBI conducted the technical examination. denied him the right to procedural due process and to present evidence to
substantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in the counter-
ISSUE:
protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself may ascertain the validity
1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection when the latter denied of Dimaporo’s allegations without resort to technical examination. To this end, the
his motion for technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of procedural Tribunal declared that the ballots, election documents and other election
due process or the right to present scientific evidence to show the massive paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutiny in the appreciation of evidence. It
substitute voting committed in counter protested precincts. should be noted that the records are replete with evidence, documentary and
testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporo’s allegation of denial of due process
RULING:
is an indefensible pretense. The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protection clause. Equal protection simply
means that all persons and things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to
the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. It follows that the existence of a
valid andsubstantial distinction justifies divergent treatment.

According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of hispetition and that of
Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, hismotion, like Mangotara’s, should
be granted. The argument fails to take into account the distinctions extant in
Mangotara’s protest vis-à-vis Dimaporo’s counter-protest which validate the grant
of Mangotara’s motion and the denial of Dimaporo’s.

First.

The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotara’s protest. The
opposite is true with regard to Dimaporo’s counter-protest as he contested the
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. BSP (2004) G.R. No. 148208, 446
SCRA 299, December 15, 2004
DOCTRINES:
Elements of valid class legislation: (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
Relative Constitutionality. The fact that a statute is constitutional at first does not
mean it is constitutional forever. The subsequent changes in the original
circumstance surrounding the law would affect its validity.
FACTS:
The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the creation of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. Other Governmental Financial Institutions (GFIs) also amended
their charters. After almost 8 years following the amendment of the GFIs’ charters,
BSP’s employees, through petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against the BSP
and the Executive Secretary to restrain the respondents from further implementing
the last proviso in Sec. 15, Art. II of the New Central Bank Act (i.e., the exemption
from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees with salary grade of 19
and the non-exemption of those having a salary grade under 19). They alleged its
constitutionality for being an invalid “class legislation”.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
The said proviso violates equal protection clause because only the officers of the
BSP (those holding the salary grade of 19 and up) are exempted from the SSL.
Those belonging from 19 and up and those 19 below do not really differ from one
other in terms of the nature of work and expertise.
Other GFIs, which are the same as the BSP, exempt all their rank-and-file personnel
from SSL without any distinction.
BSP’s contention:
The proviso is not unconstitutional as it can stand the constitutional test, provided
it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as the
mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish professionalism and excellence at all
levels in accordance with sound principles of management.”
Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary:
The proviso is not unconstitutional as the classification is based on actual and real
differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of the new SB Act to
establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws
and policies of the national government.
ISSUE:
WON the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.
HELD:
YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause.
Equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes
of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate – so long as the
classification is not unreasonable. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons themselves, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of
officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not
intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file and the resulting discrimination
or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary
in the legislative sense. However, in the subsequent passages of the amendment on
the charters of other GFI, the surrounding circumstances of the case changed.
The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express authorization
to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, and explicit
exemption – without distinction as to salary grade or position – all employees of the
GFI from the SSL) resulted to the oppressive results of Congress’ inconsistent and
unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFI. In
the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL,
there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so
as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to
mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not
only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued
denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the exemption from SSL breached the
latter’s right to equal protection.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC. GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment
for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus
$700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a
monthly salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents
that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence,
Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines
on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to
February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral
and exemplary damages.
The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770,
representing his salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's
fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for
damages as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50,
representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential
and 10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042,
which was made into law on July 15, 1995.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042,
which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary
rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly
interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and
the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have
only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected;
however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts
and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10,
Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way
derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the
execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in
1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause,
impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties
executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated
into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause,
for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate
a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of
OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being
of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the
State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts
but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the
superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.
On the second issue. The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor
sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights
and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should
be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations
should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of
the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to
incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however,
to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on
substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not
limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the
class.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of
a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in
which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in
which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to
serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification
which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries
for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A.
No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs
with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have
since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month
cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term
employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that,
in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of
other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the
Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny,
and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least
restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards,
or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling
state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence
of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the
discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to
protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement
agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can
never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the
burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially
when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection
no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can
be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability
of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms
already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on
the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of
Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative
disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual
obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary
measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The
POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of
Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary
measures against erring foreign employers.
susceptible of judicial determination; (2) that the constitutional question is raised
by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional
question is the very lis mota of the case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case
or decide the same on some other ground.
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.
Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent
should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the
fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious
matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or
to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the
Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance
of its illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code
of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain
time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause,
before the fulfillment of the contract.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means

of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign
principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Note:

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of
its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain:
(1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights
DIMAYUGA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
Petitioners Maria Chona Dimayuga, Noel Inumerable and Felipe Aguinaldo were
employees of the Traffic Regulatory Board (TRB) of [the] Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH). Petitioner Dimayuga used to be the TRB's executive
director.
In June 1992, an anonymous complaint was filed against petitioners concerning
certain transactions of the TRB from 1989 to May 1992. Consequently, a special
audit was conducted by the Special Audit Office (SAO) of the Commission on Audit
(COA).
The SAO report, detailing the audit of selected transactions of the TRB was finalized
on November 4, 1994. As a consequence of said report, certain irregularities were
uncovered, in which petitioners were implicated. It therefore recommended
appropriate action against petitioners.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said report on February 28, 1995.
The COA Chairman, however, denied the same on August 30, 1995. Undaunted,
petitioners then filed a Notice of Appeal with a corresponding Motion for Extension
of Time to File Memorandum on Appeal before the COA Chairman. In a letter
addressed to petitioner Dimayuga, the COA Chairman acknowledged receipt of said
documents and granted petitioners' request for extension of time to file their
Memorandum on Appeal. Petitioners filed said Memorandum on Appeal on
November 20, 1995.
Meanwhile, the audit report was forwarded to the DPWH Secretary, who then
indorsed the same to respondent Ombudsman for appropriate action on February
16, 1995. Accordingly, petitioners were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law
or Republic Act 3019, docketed as OMB 0-95-0430. On June 15, 1995, respondent
Ombudsman required state auditors Eleanor M. Tejada and Jose Rey Binamira of
the COA's Special Action Team to submit their sworn complaint on the basis of their
report for purposes of initiating the preliminary investigation, which was set on
June 28, 1995. In view of this, petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension of
Preliminary Investigation on June 26, 1996 with the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau of respondent. In said motion, petitioners argue that the SAO
report was not yet final, considering that their appeal with the Commission had not
yet been resolved.
Respondent, however, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on June 27,
1996 . . . .
Unsatisfied with the said Order, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration" dated June 27, 1996, reiterating as ground therefor, the pendency
of their appeal before the Commission. In arguing for the suspension of the
preliminary investigation before respondent, petitioners cited the supposedly
similar case of COA v. Gabor, OMB-0-93-0718. The COA on the other hand, through
the Special Audit Office, filed a Manifestation with Motion dated September 9,
1996, concurring with the position of respondent Ombudsman, denying the
previous Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners.
Subsequent to these Motions, petitioners likewise filed a "Letter-Appeal" dated
December 5, 1996, addressed to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, based on the same
grounds stated in previous motions. Respondent denied said "Letter-Appeal" in an
Order dated March 13, 1997 . . . . 4
On May 27, 1997, petitioners filed this petition. This Court issued a temporary
restraining order on August 20, 1997 enjoining respondent from conducting a
preliminary investigation and any further proceedings in OMB 0-95-0430.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES IN THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY THE SAO-COA AGAINST PETITIONERS IS PREMATURE
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN VIOLATED PETITIONERS'
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS,
GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE II OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN
NOT AFFORDING PETITIONERS THE SAME RELIEF IT AFFORDED TO THE
PUBLIC OFFICIAL INVOLVED IN COA V. GABOR
RULING:
As to the first issue: In deference to the virtually unlimited investigatory and
prosecutorial powers granted to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and by law,
the Court has maintained a policy of non-interference with such powers. Sections
12 and 13, Article XI of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and results thereof.
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
government, the investigation of such cases;
It is thus the practice of this Court to uphold the constitutionally conferred
investigatory and prosecutorial independence of the Ombudsman. It is precisely
this independence that allows the Office of the Ombudsman to achieve its
constitutional purpose and objective. IDCScA
Furthermore, although the Commission on Audit (COA) report may aid the Office of
the Ombudsman in conducting its preliminary investigation, such report is not a
prerequisite. Both the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state that the
Office of the Ombudsman may undertake an investigation on complaint or on its
own initiative. Therefore, with or without the report from COA, the Ombudsman
can conduct a preliminary investigation. This Court has declared that the findings in
a COA report or the finality or lack of finality of such report is irrelevant to the
investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of probable
cause. In Cabrera v. Marcelo, 12 this Court declared:
Petitioners cannot fault the Ombudsman for relying on the COA Audit Report,
notwithstanding that it had not yet attained finality. The initial basis for the
Ombudsman's investigation was not the COA Audit Report, but the complaints filed
by Casanova. While the allegations in the complaint happened to be similar with
those contained in the COA Audit Report, the Ombudsman could very well conduct
an independent investigation based on the complaints for the purpose of whether
criminal charges should be filed against the petitioners. The Ombudsman is reposed
with broad investigatory powers in the pursuit and of its constitutional mandate as
protector of the people and investigator of complaints filed against public officials.
It is even empowered to request from any government agency such as the COA, the
information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents.
It should be borne in mind that the interest of the COA is solely administrative, and
that its investigation does not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority to investigate
and determine whether there is a crime to be prosecuted for which a public official
is answerable. In Ramos v. Aquino, the Court ruled that the fact that petitioners'
accounts and vouchers had passed in audit is not a ground for enjoining the
provincial fiscal from conducting a preliminary investigation for the purpose of
determining the criminal liability of petitioners for malversation. Clearly then, a
finding of probable cause does not derive its veracity from the findings of the COA,
but from the independent determination of the Ombudsman.
Regarding the second issue:
As stated, the Office of the Ombudsman has been granted virtually plenary
investigatory powers by the Constitution and by law. Thus, as a rule, the Office of
the Ombudsman may, for every particular investigation, whether instigated by a
complaint or on its own initiative, decide how best to pursue each investigation.
This power gives the Office of the Ombudsman the discretion to dismiss without
prejudice a preliminary investigation if it finds that the final decision of COA is
necessary for its investigation and the future prosecution of the case. In another
case with similar factual antecedents, it may pursue the investigation because it
realizes that the decision of COA is irrelevant or unnecessary to the investigation
and prosecution of the case. Since the Office of the Ombudsman is granted such
latitude, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself be
considered a violation of any of the parties' rights to the equal protection of the
laws.
Thus, petitioners have not shown that respondent committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying their motions to
dismiss the case or to suspend the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued through the resolution
dated August 20, 1997 is LIFTED and respondent Office of the Ombudsman may
proceed with the preliminary investigation and/or any further proceedings in OMB
0-95-0430 entitled Commission on Audit v. Chona Dimayuga, et al.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
Constitutional law; unsolicited commercial communications, also known as “spam”
is entitled to protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission
of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is
constitutional. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a
new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already
punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation
constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. But the Court’s acquiescence goes
only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or
article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code
provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is
distinct from that of print.
Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes “aiding or abetting”
libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on
the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the
petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and
their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications,
and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette
Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek
to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the
“Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected
under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively,
from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications
Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’
constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal
protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions
against double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right
against unreasonable searches and seizure;
• Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for
imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the
petitioners’ right against Double Jeopardy;
• Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due
cause” to engage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the
intervention of a judge, violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy
of communications;
• Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of
DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the
same violates the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority,
infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and violates the Petitioners’
Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and
• Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law
increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period
of 6 years to 10 years, infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also
restricts the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the
Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at service providers to block access to
the said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175
infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of
the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous
materials can be removed from access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon possibility that an accused will be punished twice for the same offense in violation
protected speech. of the Constitution;

2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that • Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes “by, through or with the
this Petition is therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under Article VIII, use” of ICTs in violation of the equal protection clause
Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the Right
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure:
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
• No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; the
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech: authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of
Investigation to collect data is not bounded by any reasonable standard except “due
• imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based libel; single act of
cause” which presumably, the PNP and NBI will determine for itself;
online libel will result in two convictions penalized separately under the RP and the
Cybercrime Act; • While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human Security Act, are
protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals before surveillance
online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of the accused
operations are conducted, the privacy of all citizens may be infringed without
and for a much longer period. Such changes will result in a chilling effect upon the
judicial participation in the Cybercrime Act;
freedom of speech;
• Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into the right to
• with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto III’s earlier threat
privacy;
to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet users who were critical of his
alleged plagiarism of online materials for use in his speech against the Reproductive No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully collect traffic
Health Bill became real; threat of criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to data at all times without interruption;
preclude people such as Petitioners from posting social commentaries online, thus
• No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into the privacy of
creating a “chilling effect” upon the freedom of expression;
citizens
• gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block access to content
4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the
whether authored by private citizens or the organized press sans any hearing of any
Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation of Legislative
kind but merely upon a mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article
Authority
constitutes online libel;
• The DOJ Secretary’s overwhelming powers to order the restriction or blocking of
• respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare under strict
access to certain content upon a mere prima facie finding without any need for a
scrutiny
judicial determination is in clear violation of petitioners’ Constitutionally protected
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal right to due process;
Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
• The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary will be
• Persons who commit crimes using information and communication technologies “judge, jury and executioner” of all cybercrime-related complaints;
(ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more than double the imprisonment
To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are cybercrimes under
laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by the passage of the Cybercrime Act;
Section 6, it • follows that:
• the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are absolutely
identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special laws which raises the
1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may be acted upon the
Respondent DOJ Secretary to block access to websites and content upon a mere
prima facie showing of an infringement;
2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to Philippine citizens
may be blocked for violating the Retail Trade Law;
3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked from offering voice
services without securing a license from the National Telecommunications
Communication;
4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the IP Code.
• The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court in Abakada Guro
Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test
1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Act’s declaration of policy does it lay down the
legislative policy with respect to the blocking of content. No limits upon the
takedown power of the respondent DOJ Secretary;
2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ Secretary from exercising
infinite discretion and becoming the supreme authority in the Philippine Internet
landscape.
PRAYER:
1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19
of RA 10175;
2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of
RA 10175;
3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7,
12 and 19 of RA 10175; and
4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises.
5. The Supreme Court on Tuesday, February 18, upheld as constitutional most
provisions of Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime Law, including online libel –
subject to one condition.
6. The High Court also struck down a provision of the law that gives the state the
power to take down online content without a court warrant.
7. Seeking to strike a balance between fundamental freedoms and government
control, the High Court decided on the constitutionality of Republic Act 10175 a
little over a year afteroral arguments were heard on Jan 15, 2013.
8. Among the hotly-debated issues during the oral arguments was the law's
provision on online libel. (READ: 'Libel gone is best-case scenario for SC cybercime
ruling')
9. The Supreme Court decision, penned by Justice Roberto Abad, ruled online libel
to be constitutional but with an exception – that is, in cases where it covers persons
other than the original author. Recipients of, and netizens who react to a potentially
defamatory post, will not be covered by online libel.
Unconstitutional provisions
Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:
• Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications
• Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data
• Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data
The SC decided that Section 19 – granting power to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence –
was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is
found in Section 19 of the cybercrime law.
Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the SC
that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final
restraint on speech without prior judicial determination."
Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to
collect or record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time.
Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic
communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or
offer for sale products and services are prohibited" unless certain conditions – such
as prior affirmative consent from the recipient – are met. This was ruled
unconstitutional.
A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest
of the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held
invalid.
Nuances in other provisions

Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but they will
not apply in certain cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is online
libel, which is constitutional as far as the original author is concerned.

Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime and

to the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional only in the
following cases: child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications (or
spam), and online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other cybercrimes outlined in the
law.

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald Aguto

explained to Rappler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the
prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime."

Aiding and abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added, might unduly cover
certain players in the online industry.

Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber-criminal under other laws, was

declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: online libel and child
pornography.

The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being punished more than
once for the same offense – a guarantee outlined in the Constitution – in deciding
on Section 7.

Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child
pornography is punishable by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.

A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once, under
the coverage of a single law.
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties.
All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
“Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E.
O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In
private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides
that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of
the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through
the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
GARCIA VS. J. DRILON AND GARCIA, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and
of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application
for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and
extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not
be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being
“an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the
trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is
filed.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to
the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the
state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erred in declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
RULING:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised
in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it
may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only;
and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a
valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte
cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s
contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State
to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution
cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall
not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is
not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive
power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.
The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

SECTION 2 – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
VALMONTE V. DE VILLA, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa
and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the
people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket
authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in
violation of the Constitution.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other
areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and
order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In
this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and
their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation
to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.

ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?

RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes
a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990] erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of
clear facts no permanent relief can be given.
FACTS:
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that
court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses.
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged
Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.
that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search
warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian
clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely
rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The
residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were
ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks.
The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their
belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings,
spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental
and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The
respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the
Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning
were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have
intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that
local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human

rights.

HELD:

It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the
procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based
on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to
securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or
individuals

roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to
be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the
squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should
not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one
violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no
PEOPLE v. ANDRE MARTI, GR No. 81561, 1991-01-18
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision[*] rendered by the Special Criminal Court of
Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of a
violation of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
"On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila, Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift-wrapped... packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.
The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,...
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland"
"Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of
appellant's representation,... Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box
one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of
the packages before the box was sealed with masking... tape, thus making the box
ready for shipment
"Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (propietor and husband of Anita Reyes), following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened
appellant's box, a peculiar odor... emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
the opening of one of the gloves.
He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of
the contents thereof
"Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job
Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.
Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the
Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila
"Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in
the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and
took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves
were found to have been... contained inside the cellophane wrappers
"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects
On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his... mail at the Central Post Office,
was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried
leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried
leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It... Turned
out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist.
ISSUES:
Whether the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3. Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues
that the same... should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 [2], Art. III).
RULING:
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so
obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State
authorities. Under the... circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated?
Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked... against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]):
"1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included an which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition
that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited
merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietor of the forwarding... agency, who made search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on
the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7,... 1987, pp. 15-18;
pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he
took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of
business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels containing the rest of the shipment
and entrusted the care and... custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI
agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that... which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint... against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and... private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against... unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not
govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that
the modifications introduced... in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to
the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the
responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof... alleged violations against
unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with
appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of... the Rights
should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED.
Principles:
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except... upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
"(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
BACHE & CO INC VS. RUIZ GR L-32409, 27 February 1971
FACTS:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of
Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio,
went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the
following papers: Vera’s letter-request; an application for search warrant already
filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De
Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by
him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still
unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means
of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon
and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had
already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he
could be charged for perjury.
The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s
deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly
issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the
corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Rizal.
The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal
complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents
nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents.
On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or
recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued,
that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon,
et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally,
damages and attorney’s fees.
After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition
for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total
sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.
The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of
documents from its office.
HELD:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et
al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly
recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and
seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever,
the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the
former case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices
documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners;
while in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and
whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner.
On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the
corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch
as First, there was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the
complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio).
The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could
possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause
against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited
to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning
against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination.

Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The
search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The
first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of income
tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53
(withholding of income taxes at source).

The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or

occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return
of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the
tax due thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2
different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while
Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).

Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights,
i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-
embracing as to include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized,
could possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null
and void.
STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550); June 19, 1967
FACTS:
Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent)
issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill
et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the
petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to
seize and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the
offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or
intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which is described in
the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the
prosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any
copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For
being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not
mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash
money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.
In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid
and issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by
petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the
irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
However by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and
things seized from the offices of the corporations.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of
search warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers.
2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general
search warrants.
3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the
illegality of its seizure.
HELD:
I
Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were
seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Officers of certain corporations cannot validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of
said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.
II
The Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice
or passion of peace officers.
To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners
persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be
particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the
elimination of general warrants.
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The
only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing
evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other
effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made
permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that
the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-
nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

III

Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against
the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
PROBABLE CAUSE
ALVAREZ v. CFI
FACTS:
On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented
to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable
information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as
a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath, the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him
from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search
warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or
night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such
to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock in the evening and seized and took
possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner.
The petitioner asks that the warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day or
night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his
residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date,
authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be
declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned
to him.
ISSUES:
1.) What is the nature of searches and seizures as contemplated in the law?
2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of search warrant?
3.) What is the purpose of the disposition in addition to the affidavit?
4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be serve at night?
5.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is
constitutional?
6.) Whether or not there was a waiver of constitutional guarantees?
HELD:
As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is
one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties
should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the
individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the
rights secured by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel,
231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general
rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be
strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d],
353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional
guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not
defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no
fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in
general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful
ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search,
the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed.,
[2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert
vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed.
Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative
necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant
or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in
requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit
of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of
other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient
because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the
duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose
of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge
is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the
facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued
is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading
personal knowledge of the facts. the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no
such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of
Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night
compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it referred but to the
when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or
institution of criminal proceedings for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver
in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient
would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily
and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the
consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not
contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at
the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest
night.
in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.
The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was
as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-
lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into
consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so
made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law
who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify
the articles, which he did.

At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly
appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-
Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in
question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed
against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for
the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in
whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the
warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy
Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S.,
299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll
vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the
documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence
against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation
against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the
documents should be returned to him.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now
question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to
the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a
BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP [133 SCRA 800; G.R. NO. 64261; 26 DEC 1984]
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under
which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units
C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched,
and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of
the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further
result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said
warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same
before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure
or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it).
Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some
of the documents seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the
validity of the search warrants.
Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:
1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former
abovementioned address.
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants
were only directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
4. Real properties were seized.
5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued,
from the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be
validly issued in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground
that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as
amended, which authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in
subversive activities against the government in accordance with implementing rules
and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed.
HELD:
In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to
the lower court, this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the
public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The
existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent
power to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners
gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial efforts
to remedy the situation, negating the presumption that they have abandoned their
right to the possession of the seized property.
On the enumerated reasons:
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination
had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to
search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent
judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place.
3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to
be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him.
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure
under a search warrant.

5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions
of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a
grave error for respondent judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question are too general.

With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any

implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos himself denies the request of military
authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners. The closure of the
premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as
guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.
SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
Immunity from Suit, Political Law Case Digests, Warrant of Arrest
● While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from
instituting suit. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the President's behalf.
● Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
● What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
FACTS:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues
that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by
virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable
for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to
allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel
were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.
HELD:
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is
negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a
"Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the
respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also
demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President
is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative.
It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to
rule on the “chilling effect” point. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November
14, 1988)
SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE [203 SCRA 140; G.R. No. 81756; 21 Oct 1991] Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
FACTS:
under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally
Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with their
"application for search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner affidavits.
Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of
RTC of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for
violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972. Such warrant states that there
is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama Silva has the possession and control of
marijuana dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt. Villamor to
make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva at the
residence of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets,
cartons and containers to look for said illegal drugs. In the course of the search, the
officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it was
issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to personally examine
the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their
authority in seizing the money of Antonieta Silva.

HELD:

Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the
witness in the form of searching questions and answers. The questions asked were
leading as they are answerable by mere yes or no. Such questions are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The questions were already
mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks
provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the
motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her money.

The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority
when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the
seizure of money but only for marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No.
1 is declared null and void.

*** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court

LIM V. FELIX G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991
FACTS:
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr., together with his security escorts were attacked
and killed by a lone assassin at the airport vicinity in Masbate.
Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
Herein petitioners were alleged to be behind the crime of multiple murder and
frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order finding
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of herein petitioners.
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and
recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each
of the accused.
Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case
containing 261 pages.
Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case
against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled
that ". . . all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With
Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four
victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of
Dante Siblante."
MR’s of the petitioner’s Lim was also denied.
Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate
information of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of
no bail.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for
change of venue and was granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (from Masbate
to Makati RTC)
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest because it was not
personally determined by the judge as he relied solely on the certification or
recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists.
RTC dismissed their petition upholding the validity of the arrest warrants.
ISSUE:
WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD:
NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case
where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not
personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge
commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of
Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the
respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was
no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination
regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the
respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records
on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent
Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
Hence, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation
report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the
case so require.
Petition granted.
MATA VS. BAYONA G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984 and the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge
FACTS:
must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore,
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo
U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC
Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect;
and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that
the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.
Mata’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he
came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others,
that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to
comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all
the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case,
or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:

WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him?

HELD:

YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant