Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950

SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners,

vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.

Antonio Barredo for petitioners.

Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon
Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days
old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of
Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract.
After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez,
attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara
received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from
whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.

On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the
annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of land covered by certificates of title
Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores,
Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter two being, respectively, the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara
appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is
not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution, and accordingly sentenced
Sia Suan to pay to Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his
share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara
an undivided one-fourth interest in the lot originally covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of
the suit. From this judgment Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari.

It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3, 1931, showed that he,
like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. It is not pretend and there is nothing to indicate that the
appellants did not believe and rely on such recital of fact. This conclusion is decisive and very obvious in the decision
of the Court of Appeals It is true that in the resolution on the for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals remarked that
"The fact that when informed of appellant's minority, the appellees too no steps for nine years to protect their interest
beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale while still a minor, strongly indicates that the
appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was executed." But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently negative
by the following positive pronouncements of the Court of Appeals as well in said resolution as in the decision.

As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say that the appellees were informed of
his minority within one (1) month after the transaction was completed. (Resolution.)

Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect their interest form and after
August 27, 1931, when they were notified in writing of appellant's minority. (Resolution.)

. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that appellant was a minor, through the
letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing appellees of his client's desire to disaffirm the contract . . .
(Decision.)

The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after the contract was made, the delay
in bringing the action of annulment will not serve to bar it unless the period fixed by the statute of limitations
expired before the filing of the complaint. . . . (Decision.)

In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for the appellants invokes the
decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein this court held:
 The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to
valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the
sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)

The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the appellants did not actually pay any
amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being
stipulated that the consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino Alcantara. We
are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred. In the first place, in the case cited, the consideration for sale
consisted in greater part of pre-existing obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who
represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the
contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and
in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its full force and
effect in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale
is null and void on any ground other than the appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a
contract executed by parties with full legal capacity.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appellants of his
minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing
the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference that the appellants in fact did not know that the
appellee was a minor on the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in
mind that no sooner had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the appellants
the sum of P500.

Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the real age of the appellee
because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The suggestion, while perhaps practicable, is
conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the point, because the findings of the Court of Appeals do not show that the
appellants knew or could suspected appellee's minority.

The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the appellee informing the appellants of his
minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of the sale, and that although the choice to disaffirm will not by itself
avoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice shielded the appellee from laches
and consequent estoppel. This position is untenable since the effect of estoppel in proper cases is unaffected by the
promptness with which a notice to disaffirm is made.

The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants absolved from the complaint,
with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So ordered.

Ozaeta, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the result not upon the grounds stated in the majority opinion but for the following reasons: The deed of
sale executed by Ramon Alcantara on 3 August 1931 conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land is null and void
insofar as the interest, share, or participation of Ramon Alcantara in two parcels of land is concerned, because on the
date of sale he was 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old only. Consent being one of the essential requisites for the
execution of a valid contract, a minor, such as Ramon Alcantara was, could not give his consent thereof. The only
misrepresentation as to his age, if any, was the statement appearing in the instrument that he was of age. On 27
August 1931, or 24 days after the deed was executed, Gaw Chiao, the husband of the vendee Sia Suan, was advised
by Atty. Francisco Alfonso of the fact that his client Ramon Alcantara was a minor. The fact that the latter, for and in
consideration of P500, executed an affidavit, whereby he ratified the deed of sale, is of no moment. He was still minor.
The majority opinion invokes the rule laid down in the case of Mercado et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215. The rule laid
down by this Court in that case is based on three judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Spain on 27 April
1960, 11 July 1868, and 1 March 1875. In these decisions the Supreme Court of Spain applied Law 6, Title 19, of the
6th Partida which expressly provides:
 "Diziendo o ortogando el que fuese menor, que era mayor de XXV años, si ouiesse persona que paresciesse
de tal tiempo, si lo faze enganosamente, valdria el pleyto que assi fuere fecho con el e non deue ser
desatado despues, como quier que non era de edad quando lo fizo: esto es, porque las leyes ayudan a los
enganados, e non a los enganadores. . . ." (Alcubilla, Codigos Antigous de España, p. 613.)

The contract of sale involved in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu, supra, was executed by the minors on 17 May 1910.
The Law in force on this last-mentioned date was not Las Siete Partidas, 1 which was the in force at the time the
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Spain referred to, but the Civil Code which took effect in the Philippines on 8
December 1889. As already stated, the Civil Code requires the consent of both parties for the valid execution of a
contract (art. 1261, Civil Code). As a minor cannot give his consent, the contract made or executed by him has no
validity and legal effect. There is no provision in the Civil Code similar to that of Law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida
which is equivalent to the common law principle of estoppel. If there be an express provision in the Civil Code similar
law 6, Title 19, of the 6th Partida, I would agree to the reasoning of the majority. The absence of such provision in the
Civil Code is fatal to the validity of the contract executed by a minor. It would be illogical to uphold the validity of a
contract on the ground of estoppel, because if the contract executed by a minor is null and void for lack of consent and
produces no legal effect, how could such a minor be bound by misrepresentation about his age? If he could not be
bound by a direct act, such as the execution of a deed of sale, how could he be bound by an indirect act, such as
misrepresentation as to his age? The rule laid down in Young vs. Tecson, 39 O. G. 953, in my opinion, is the correct
one.

Nevertheless, as the action in this case was brought on 8 August 1940, the same was barred, because it was not
brought within four (4) years after the minor had become of age, pursuant to article 1301 of the Civil Code. Ramon
Alcantara became of age sometime in September 1934.

Moran, C.J. and Bengzon, J., concur.

PABLO, M., disidente:

No creo que Ramon Alcantara este en estoppel al querer recuperar su participacion en los lotes que el cedio a Sia
Suan en la escritura de 3 de Agosto de 1931. Las circunstancias que concurrieron en su otorgamiento demostraran
que es insostenible esa conclusion. La acreedora era Sia Suan, y el deudor, Rufino Alcantara por transactiones que
tuvo con ella en el negocio de copra. Al fallecimiento de la esposa de Rufino, alguien se habra percatado de la
dificultad de cobrar el credito porque Rufino no tenia mas que tres lotes de su exclusiva propiedad y dos lotes, como
bienes gananciales. Ramon, uno de los herederos, era un menor de edad. Por eso, se procuro el otorgamiento de tal
escritura, vendiendo el padre (Rufino) y sus dos hijos (Damaso y Ramon) cinco lotes amillarados en P19,592.85 por
P2,500; que en realidad no fue mas que una dacion en pago de la deuda. Si no se otorgaba tal escritura, la acreedora
tenia necesidad de utilizar un proceso largo de abintestato para obtener el pago de la deuda en cuanto afecte, si
podia afectar, los bienes gananciales de Rufino Alcantara y su difunta esposa, o de tutela para que alguien actue en
lugar del menor Ramon. El procedimiento mas corto y menos costoso entonces era hacer que el menos apareciera
como con edad competente para otorgar la escritura de venta. Y asi sucedio: se otorgo la escritura. El menor no
recibio ni un solo centimo. Con la herencia que habia de recibier de su difunta madre, pago la deuda de su padre.

Despues de notificada Sia Suan de la reclamacion de nulidad del documento, por gestion de Gaw Chiao, Ramon
Alcantara siendo menor de edad aun, firmo un affidavit ratificando la venta en la oficina del abogado de Gaw Chiao.
Esta actuacion de Gar Chiao, marido de Sia Suan, denuncia que no fue Ramon el que les hacia creer que era mayor
de edad y que oficiosa y voluntariamente haya solicitado el otorgamiento de la escritura de venta. Si Gaw Chiao,
marido de Sia Suan, fue el que gestiono el otorgamientodel affidavit de ratificacion, ?por que no debemos concluir
que el fue quien gestiono a indicacion tal vez de algun abogado, que Ramon Alcantara estampara su firma en la
escritura de 3 de agosto de 1931? Pero la firma de un menor no vale nada; debia aparecer entonces que Ramon era
de mayor edad. ¿Por que habia de interesarse el menor en otorgar una escritura de venta de tales terrenos? ¿No es
mas probable que la acreedora o su marido o algun agente haya sido el que se intereso por que Ramon tomara parte
en el otorgamiento de la escritura?

Que beneficio obtuvo el menor en el otorgamiento de la escritura? Nada; en cambio, la acreedora consiguio ser
duena de los cinco lotes a cambio de su credito. ¿Quedaba favorecido el menor al firmas su affidavit de ratificacion?
Tampoco; con todo, Sia Suan reclama que el menor fue quien la indujo a error. Si alguien engano al alguien, no
habra sido Ramon. Tenia que ser la acreedora o alguien que ayudaba a ella en conseguir el pago del credito; pero no
fue, no podia ser el menor.

Teniendo en cuenta todas estas circunstancias, no podemos concluir que Ramon Alcantara haya inducido a error a
Sia Suan. No es aplicable, por tanto, la decision de este Tribunal en Mercado y Mercado contra Espiritu (37 Jur. Fil.,
227); ni la del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, pues en tales casos, el menor fingio e hizo creer a los compradores que
era mayor de edad: no era justo que el que indujo a los compradores a comprar un terreno desprendiendosedel
precio de compra, sea permitido despues alegar su minoria de edad para anular la actuacion hecha por el. Eso es
verdadero estoppel; pero en el caso presente no lo hay.

Laches es el otro fundamento sobre que descansa la mayoria para revocar la decision apelada. Laches es medida de
equidad, y no es aplicable al caso presente. Solamente debe admitirse como defensa cuando la aplicacion y hay
necesidad de hacer uso de la equidad. No debe aplicarse para fomentar una injusticia sino para minimizar sus
efectos y solamente debe ser utilizada como defensa cuando en la aplicacion de una ley se comete verdadera
injusticia (30 C. J. S., 531). En el caso presente Ramon Alcantara tiene diez anos de plazo a contar del 3 de Agosto
de 1931, dentro del cual puede pedir la anulacion de la venta. Y la demanda que inicio esta causa se presento dentro
de ese plazo; no esta prescrita pues aun la accion (art. 43, Cod. Proc. Civ.).

Suponiendo que Ramon Alcantara hubiera presentado su demanda antes de la venta de un lote a Nicolas Azores que
sentencia se hubiera dictado? El otorgamiento de una escritura de traspaso de una cuarta parte de los dos lotes; pero
despues de vendido un lote, se ordenaria, como decidio el Tribunal de Apelacion, el traspaso de la cuarta parte del
lote restante y el pago de la cuarta parte del importe en venta del lote vendido a Ramon. En uno y otro caso no se
hace ningun dano a Sia Suan, solamente se le obliga a traspasar a Ramon la parte que, en herencia de los bienes
gananciales dejados por su difunta madre, le corresponde. No hay daño desproporcionado que en equidad autorica a
Sia Suan a invocar la defensa de laches. Si Sia Suan antes de la presentacion de la demanda, hubiera construido
edificios en los lotes por valor de P3,000,000, demos por caso, tal vez seria de equidad para Sia Suan invocar la
defensa de laches, pues por el silencio de Ramon Alcantara, ella ha hecho mejoras de mucho valor que con una
decision semejante seria perjudicada. El trasparo a Ramon Alcantara de una cuarta parte de cada uno de los dos
lotes pondria a ella en la alternativa de comprar esa cuarta parte de los lotes con precio excesivo o derribar parte de
los edificios construidos. En el caso presente no se le ha puesto en esa dificil situacion; al contrario, ella estuvo
disfrutando de esos dos lotes sin hacer mejoras extraordinarias, y despues de vendido el segundo lote, utilizo el
dinero recibido, y no hay pruebas de que se haya causado a ella dano por no presentarse la demanda mas temprano.

Voto por la confirmacion de la decision del Tribunal de Apalacion.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959

ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.

Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.

R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.

BENGZON, J.:

Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the Court of Appeal's decision
whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from
October 30, 1944.

The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944 P70,000 in Japanese war
notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two
years after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the
Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.

Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.

In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have received P40,000 only — instead
of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the
promissory note Exhibit A. After hearing the parties and their evidence, said court rendered judgment, which the
appellate court affirmed, in the terms above described.

There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because the minority of her consigners
note release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the minors. However, such defense will benefit her to
the extent of the shares for which such minors may be responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the
time of signing Exhibit A, Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of
Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:

. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were not yet of legal age.
If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their incapacity, and if the former, in
spite of the information relative to their age, parted with his money, then he should be contended with the
consequence of his act. But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much
needed money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing the legal impediment
with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, in
fact they were not, they will not later on be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis
Ours.]

We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the same promissory note
they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no
juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact, according to Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;

. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a contract as part of the
contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in tort. Other authorities hold that such
misrepresentation may be the basis of such an action, on the theory that such misrepresentation is not a part
of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the enforcement of liability for such misrepresentation as tort
does not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability on the contract. In order to hold infant liable, however, the
fraud must be actual and not constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as
to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of decit. (Emphasis Ours.)
 The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief that he is of full age
must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient. (27
American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)

The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document signed therein by the
minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained no such statement. In other words, in the Mercado
case, the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we
doubt it is of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment in favor of limiting the
scope of the application of the Mercado ruling, what with the consideration that the very minority which incapacitated
from contracting should likewise exempt them from the results of misrepresentation.

We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally bound by their
signatures in Exhibit A.

It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed only in 1951, and inasmuch
as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too late to invoke it because more than 4 years had elapsed
after he had become emancipated upon reaching the age of majority. The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code
are quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the
minor has reached majority age. The parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however,
that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be held that in October 1947, he was
21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this defense was interposed in June 1951, four
years had not yet completely elapsed from October 1947.

Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code
where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors asking for any positive relief from the
contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an action for annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse
from liability.

Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In accordance with the
provisions of Civil Code, even if their written contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution
to the extent that they have profited by the money they received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds
delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it
is but fair to hold that they had profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively
established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of
current Philippine money.

Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should now return P1,166.67. 3Their
promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not be enforced, as already stated, since they were
minors incapable of binding themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently declared without regard of said Exhibit A,
but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.

Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza shall pay 1/3 of P10,000
i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly5 to the
same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed.
No costs in this instance.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Mercado vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.

2It would be observed in this connection, that the new Civil Code does not govern the contract executed in
1944.

3 P46,666.00 divided by 40.

4 She says peso for peso, in view of the terms of Exhibit A. She is, indeed, willing to pay as much.

5Arts. 1137, 1138, Civil Code. Debtors presumed to be bound jointly — not severally. Un Pak Leung vs.
Negora, 9 Phil., 381; Flaviano vs. Delgado, 11 Phil., 154; Compania General vs. Obed, 13 Phil., 391
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.

Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.

Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is alleged that Isidro
Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole
and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the
fundamental question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question to the
defendants.

The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17, 1922. The
plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother
Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence
on this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the
extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor,
which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question.

What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband Vicente Lagera,
having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which, according to Exhibit
3, was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later
that the land within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the
plaintiff's father, of which the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.

At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites prescribed by law
for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496, bind the land and would only
be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper
registration, inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of
the document Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken into
consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215),
wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not
applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to
the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment
of the document.

In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in 1992 as the
price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given by the defendants to the alleged
vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which appears in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at,
approximately, by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at
the rate of 50 per cent annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of
Exhibit 1.

The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula Prado was the
only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who,
moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the
record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without any express
findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21015 March 24, 1924

MIGUELA CARRILLO, for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of ADRIANA CARRILLO,
deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUSTINIANO JAOJOCO and MARCOS JAOJOCO, defendants-appellees.

Crispin Oben and Gibbs & McDonough for appellant.

Salinas & Salinas for appellees.

AVANCEÑA, J.:

On the evening of December 9, 1918, Adriana Carrillo executed a document of sale of eleven parcels of land, with
one-half of the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona, Province of
Cavite, containing an area of 330,409 square meters, in favor of Marcos Jaojoco for the price of P4,000 which the
seller admitted having received. Nine days afterwards Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the
Court of First Instance and later on died; and proceeding having been instituted for the administrator and settlement of
her estate, her sister Miguela Carrillo was appointed judicial administratrix of said estate. In her capacity as such
administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now brings this action for the annulment of said contract of sale executed by Adriana
Carrillo on December 9, 1918, against Marcos Jaojoco, the purchaser, and his father Justiniano Jaojoco. The
defendants were absolved from the complaint, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff has attempted to prove that prior to the year 1918 and specially in the year 1917, Adriana Carrillo
performed acts which indicated that she was mentally deranged. We have made a thorough examination of the
character of those acts, and believe that they do not necessarily show that Adriana Carrillo was mentally insane. The
same thing can be said as to her having entered the "Hospital de San Lazaro" and the "Hospicio de San Jose," in the
absence of an affirmative showing to her motive for entering said institutions, for while it is true that insane persons
are confined in those institutions, yet there also enter persons who are not insane. Against the inference that from said
acts the plaintiff pretends to draw, in order to assert the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo in that time, there is in
the record evidence of acts while more clearly and more convincingly show that she must not have been mentally
incapacitated before the execution of the document sought to be annulled in this action. In January, 1917, her
husband having died, she was appointed judicial administratrix of the latter's estate, and to his end she took the oath
of office, gave the proper bond discharged her functions in the same manner and with the same diligence as any other
person of knowingly sound mind would have done. Documents, were introduced which show complex and numerous
acts of administration performed personally by said Adriana Carrillo, such as the disposition of various and
considerable amounts of money in transactions made with different persons, the correctness of said acts never having
been, nor can it be, put in question. We have given special attention to the fact of Adriana Carrillo having executed
contracts of lease, appeared in court in the testate proceeding in which she was administratrix, and in fact continued
acting as such administratrix of the estate of her husband until August, 1917, when for the purpose of taking vacation,
she requested to be relieved from the office. On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo entered the "Hospital de San
Juan de Dios" by reason of having had an access of cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia, and there she was
attended by Doctor Ocampo until she left on the 18th of December of the same year very much better off although not
completely cured. Asked about the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo during her treatment, Doctor Ocampo
answered that he did not pay attention to it, but that he could affirm that the answers she gave him were responsive to
the questions put to her, and that the hemiplegia did not affect her head but only one-half of the body. After leaving the
"Hospital de San Juan de Dios" on December 8, 1918, Adriana Carrillo called at the office of the notary public, Mr.
Ramos Salinas, and there executed the contract of sale in question on the 9th of that month. The notary, Mr. Salinas,
who authorized the document, testified that on that day he has been for some time with Adriana Carrillo, waiting for
one of the witnesses to the document, and he did not notice anything abnormal in her countenance, which on the
contrary, appeared to him dignified, answering correctly all the questions he made to her without inconsistencies or
failure of memory, for which reason, says this witness, he was surprised when afterwards he learned that the mental
capacity of Adriana Carrillo was in question.

It must be noted that the principal witness for the plaintiff and the most interested party in the case, being the plaintiff
herself, was the surety of Adriana Carrillo when the latter was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her
husband in 1917. It cannot be understood, if Adriana Carrillo was in that time mentally incapacitated, why Miguela
Carrillo, the plaintiff, who knew it, consented to be a surety for her. It must likewise be noted that the other witnesses
of the plaintiff, who testified to the incapacity of Adriana Carrillo, also made transactions with her precisely at the time,
when according to them, she was mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which is proven by documents and the
testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in the case, it cannot be held that on December 9, 1918, when
Adriana Carrillo signed the document, she was mentally incapacitated.

The fact that nine days after the execution of the contract, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the
trial court does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract. After all, this can perfectly be explained by
saying that her disease became aggravated subsequently.

Our conclusion is that prior to the execution of the document in question the usual state of Adriana Carrillo was that of
being mentally capable, and consequently the burden of proof that she was mentally incapacitated at a specified time
is upon him who affirms said incapacity. If no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, her capacity must be
presumed.

Attention is also called to the disproportion between the price of the sale and the real value of the land sold. The
evidence, however, rather shows that the price of P4,000 paid for the land, which contained an area of 33 hectares,
represents it real value, for its is little more than P100 per hectare, which is approximately the value of other lands of
the same nature in the vicinity. But even supposing that there is such a disproportion, it alone is not sufficient to justify
the conclusion that Adriana Carrillo was mentally incapacitated for having made the sale under such conditions.
Marcos Jaojoco is a nephew of Adriana Carrillo, and Justiniano Jaojoco her brother-in-law, and both defendants, who
are father and son, had Adriana Carrillo in charge, took her to the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios," and cared for her
during the time she was there, and for such acts they may have won her gratitude. Under these circumstances there is
nothing illegal, or even reprehensible, and much less strange in Adriana Carrillo's having taken into account those
services rendered her by the defendants and reciprocated thereof by a favorable transaction. Having no ascendants
and descendents, she could, in consideration of all the these circumstances, have even given as a donation, or left by
will, these lands to the defendants.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her
abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence
adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to
pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a
special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a
separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On
February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again
repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the
defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty
pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for
the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-
Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is
easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished
from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from
its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the
death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep.
242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life
and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that
was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award
of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that
the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion,
the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record,
was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his
wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that
his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member
rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the
administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action
for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of
the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
denying amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was
averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said
child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who
would legally represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it
is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la
moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30,
no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de
un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly
in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by
her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-
named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as
damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize
Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the
amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant,
the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay
maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this
judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them,
and the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.

At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years, and
an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His
brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go
for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was
taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations
resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The
defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931,
he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was
as follows:

Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931

Rev. FATHER,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

CESAR SYQUIA

The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and
Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the
situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the
baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time
expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr.
Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint
Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.

When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551
Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses,
including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated
and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to
another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant,
who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of
Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.

The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the
letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the
meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the
acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived,
becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not
different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific
name. Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral
evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not legally
sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The
words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then
conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby
came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the
child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the
letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which
Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with
good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth
of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.

It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the
acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or
may be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point
we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one
document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the
case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other letters suffice to connect
that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the
writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.

The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had
been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco,
under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the
conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case
that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts
found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a
home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year,
and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and
the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that
he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in
subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever, but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.

What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the
plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco,
for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action
for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain
such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the
trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court
of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will
require.

The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia has expressly
acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and secondly, that said child
has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son of said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia,
justified by his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.

The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.

Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as follows:

Sabado, 1.30 p. m. — 14 febrero, 1931

Rev. PADRE:

La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.

(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA

Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-appellee
Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:

Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo manches. A
cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."

Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."

Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. ... ."

Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."

Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.

Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article, says:

Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de si es posible admitir por otro
medio la prueba de la paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el articulo es terminante y la intencion
de la ley mas terminante aun. Se establecio en la base 5.a que "no se admitira investigacion de la paternidad
sino en los casos de delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que conste su voluntad indubitada de
reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion de estado", y
esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.

No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo natural, aunque
solo se limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho por escrito, en
la posesion constante de estado de hijo natural o en sentencia firme recaida en causa por de delito violacin,
estupro o rapto. El escrito y la sentencia habran de acompañarse a la demandada, y no puede admitirse otra
prueba que la conducente a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente del padre que en el reconozca su
paternidad, o la relativa a los actos directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que demuestren la posesion
 continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de estos dos hechos podran utilizarse todos los medios que permite
la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el juez rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija a la
investigacion de la paternidad.

xxx xxx xxx

En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase presente que no basta hacerlo por
incidencia; es indespensable que se consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del
padre, de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con este fin, como se ordena an la base 5.a
antes citada, de las aprobadas por la Ley de 11 de mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque contenga
otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objecto el reconocimiento deliberado y
expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que incidentalmente haga el padre de
ser hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una persona el titulo y tratamiento
de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso decidiran los un modo suficientemente expresivo la
paternidad, servira de base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la posesion contante del estado del hijo
a los efectos de este articulo, y con arreglo a su numero 2.º

Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs. Municipality of Panay, 42
Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are those established in
article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of which is that the father may be compelled to acknowledge his
paternity, "When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his paternity." The writing that
is required by said provision must be complete in itself and by itself, and must contain all the statements that are
necessary to constitute a full and clear acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in order that it may
serve as a basis for compelling him to acknowledge said child should be afterwards deny his paternity. If several
writings put together, each not being complete in itself, should be necessary in order to obtain a full and complete
expression of acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity
would be violated.

By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein plaintiff-appellee,
Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June", which the defendant-
appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to the priest is his, nor who is the "junior" that he
recommends to said Antonia L. de Jesus to take good care of, as there is nothing in anyone of said letters from which
it may be inferred that Antonia L. de Jesus was enciente at the time, that the "junior" was the being she was carrying
in her womb, and that it was the "creature that is coming in June." To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove
that Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such relations the woman
became pregnant, and that she gave birth to a boy in June 1931. All this certainly constitutes an investigation of the
paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child outside of the documents, which is prohibited by law.

Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insufficient to constitute a
"indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco," as
required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.

As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant
father, justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family.

The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the following facts,
as found by the lower court in its decision:

Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado Cesar Syquia llamo a su
comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en la Ciudad de
Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus
acompañado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de
1931 asistida por dicho Dr. Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.

Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con este y con la
demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila, entregando a dicha
demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo firmado
el contrato para el suministro del fluido electrico en dicha casa.
Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco has enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date to the birth of said child they can
not be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing possession of the status of natural child, as no human being
can enjoy such possession until he be born with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil.,
738; Granados vs. Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).

It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given to the child Ismael when it was
baptized, so that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.

The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of the witnesses during the trial,
are not sufficient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural child of said
Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:

In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:

. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don Telesforo, we find that he visited
the mother of the plaintiff; that he paid money for her support; that he paid money for the support of the
plaintiff; that he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son; that the plaintiff called him "Papa," and that
Don Telesforo answered to this designation; that when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he kissed his hand;
that Don Telesforo wrote letters to him; that he paid his fees for instruction in school, and secured him a
position in a commercial house.

xxx xxx xxx

All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff possesses continuously the status of a
natural child. They may have a tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child, but that it is
not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the child as his. By the express terms of article 135
that recognition must appear either in writing, made by the father, or it must appear in acts which show that
the son has possessed continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition by the father of the child
which comes short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must appear that it was the
intention of the father to recognize the child as to give him that status, and that the acts performed by him
were done with that intention.

Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain says:

En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la posesion de estado de hijo natural se
requiere que los actos sean de tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la paternidad, la
voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no
accidentalmente, sino continuedamente, porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo valor que el
reconocimiento expreso.lawphil.net

En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el hecho de que dos
nodrizas criaron a otros tantos niños, sufragando el gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa de la
demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los mismos el mayor cuidado; el de que
subvenia a las necesidades de la madre y de los seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se
llamaba como el padre; y el de que los porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el finado visitaba
a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha familia que tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como padre de los
menores, no son suficientes para fundar la declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal confundir actos que
puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o convencimiento en que una persona este de su paternidad con
relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren su proposito de poner a estos hijos en la posesion de tal
estado.

It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the herein defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia
cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there exists not an
indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of said child, and because the said child
has not enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.

The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.

Avanceña, C.J. and Imperial, J., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA
NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 27
February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming
the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño
(Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the
death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member
of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines
for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in
case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the
following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the
employee or his family in the following manner:

xxxx

4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). 4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature
delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. 5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death
dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. 7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death
benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held,
the parties still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital
Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for
voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit
their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA.
The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel
Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in
similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also
prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. 15 Dugan’s child
was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks
in the womb and only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as
Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective
employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the
Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of
an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality
could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the
same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A
fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties
qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by
both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA
– the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits –
bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and
other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution17 ruling that
Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as
provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is
"death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII,
Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death";
(b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.18

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The
fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely
on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during
the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their
dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel]
to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing
his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing
death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 19 under Section 1,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay and
other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever
stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel
pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate
dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and
other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20
November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails
to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave
and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that
such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA
provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a
legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a
legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share
this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the
expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the
latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality
upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only
sadly misses this crucial point.20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution
dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21

In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration23 of Continental
Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the
literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never
acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate
relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII,
Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child
of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear
and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought
to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines
when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons,
must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality,
which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be
lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as
a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement
leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s
death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil
Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies
as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid
of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child
could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse,
or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality,
as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v.
Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful
union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."
(Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now,
there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were
validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.1avvphi1

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s
claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but
died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that
in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of
labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v.
National Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of
judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While
petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it
insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What
petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection
and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence
of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged
worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay
and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Sesinando
E. Villon concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.

2 Id. at 42.

3 Penned by Atty. Allan S. Montaño, Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator; records, pp. 381-392.

4 CA rollo, p. 26.

5 Rollo, pp. 84-92.

6 Id. at 93.

7 Id. at 86.

8 Id. at 33.

9 CA rollo, p. 60.
10 Id. at 67.

11 Id. at 46.

12 Id. at 25.

13 Id. at 62-65.

14 Id at 66-72.

15 Records, pp. 46-53.

16Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

17 CA rollo, pp. 24-34.

18 Id. at 32.

19 Id. at 2-18.

Art. 262-A of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Section 7, Rule XIX of Department Order No. 40-03
series of 2003 provides that the decision, order, resolution or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties and
that it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration.

20 Rollo, pp. 38-39.

21 Id. at 39.

22 Id. at 153.

23 Id. at 136-143.

24 Black’s Law Dictionary

25 Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution reads in full:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

26As opposed to the more limited or precise definition of a dependent child for income tax purposes, which
means "a legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted child chiefly dependent upon and living with the taxpayer if
such dependent is not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or if
such dependent, regardless of age, is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical defect."

27 G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA 363, 369.

28 483 Phil. 483, 491 (2004).

29Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164060, 15
June 2007, 524 SCRA 709, 716.