SECTION 16 – RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
People
CASES
Padua v. Hon. Ericta
G.R. No. L-38570, May 24, 1988
FACTS: Padua was litigating in forma pauperis. He
sought to recover damages for the injuries suffered
by his daughter, Luzviminda, caused by her being hit
by a truck driven by the respondents. The trial was
cancelled twice as the defendant's' attorney sought
and obtained cancellation of trial settings. For the
next hearing scheduled on March 6, 1974, Padua's
counsel had filed a written motion for
postponement five days prior to the hearing sought
to be transferred, and this was the very first such
motion filed by him. The counsel of Padua had a
case in the Tarlac Court scheduled on the same day
which had been pending since 1964 and which the
Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to
terminate, hence, the ground for cancellation is not
entirely without merit. However, the judge denied
the application and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge erred in the
dismissal of the case as it violates the right to
speedy disposition of trial
HELD: Yes. the Respondent Judge erred in dismissing
the case. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of
cases should not, if at all possible, result in the
precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence
and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the
defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex
parte judgment. Court should not allow undue delays
but postponements of trials and hearings upon
meritorious grounds are allowed; and the grant or
refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of
the Judge. Unwarranted dismissal of a case is deemed
an abuse of the Court's discretion. The facts of the
case shows that the plaintiff's plea for cancellation
was not entirely without merit. Further, no
opposition was presented by defendants, which was
not surprising considering that their counsel had
himself already obtained two postponements. The
judge did not considered the valid clause of plea for
cancellation and other circumstances of the case.
Thus, the judge's action was unreasonable, capricious
and oppressive.
Flores vs.
G.R. No. L-25769. December 10, 1974
Facts: The accusation for robbery against petitioners
Flores and Angel was filed on December 31, 1951. The
decision rendered on November 29, 1955 found
them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of
appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. For a period of
three years, no action was taken by the Court of
Appeals until February 10, 1958. A resolution for
rehearing was made that day and was amended on
August 5, 1959, which granted the defendants, now
petitioners to present new facts as evidence for the
defense. Accordingly, the case was returned to the
lower court with the former decision set aside so that
the trial could be had but nothing was done for about
a year because the offended party failed to appear
notwithstanding the six or seven dates set for such
hearing. Further, the witness' testimony was far from
satisfactory as he could no longer remember the
details of the crime and also failed to identify the
two accused. Instead of rendering a new decision, the
lower court merely sent back the records to the
appellate tribunal. At that stage, five more years
having elapsed without anything being done,
petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against
them due to such inordinate delay in their disposition,
which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to May
10, 1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they
invoke their constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Issue: Whether or not their right to a speedy
disposition of cases is violated
Held: Yes, Like the right to speedy trial, this right is
violated when the proceedings is attended with
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays row hem
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Although the
right to speedy trial is limited only to the accused in
the criminal proceedings, right to speedy disposition
of cases extends to all parties in all cases, including
civil and administrative cases and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. The
Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy
trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for
crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It
does not exclude from its operation cases commenced
by private individuals. Where once a person is
prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the
manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.
((Thus, looking in the facts of the case, petitioners can
invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial
should be speedy. In the absence of any valid decision,
the stage of trial has not been completed. As of May
10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of
Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they
had not been accorded their right to be tried as
promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the
pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that
should be deemed material, it is at times unavoidable
that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due
diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What
is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous
decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959,
petitioners could validly premise their plea for
dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. The criminal
case against petitioners are ordered dismissed.))
SECTION 17 – RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
United States vs. Tan Teng
[G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912]
Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a
seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the
house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered
herhome and threw the victim on the floor and place
his private parts over hers. Several days later, Olivia
Pacomio’s sister discovered that the victim was
suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio
told her sister about what had happened and reported
it to the police. Tan Teng was called to appear in a
police line-up and the victim identified him. He was
then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a
policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms
of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the
substance emitting from the body of the defendant
and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The
results showed that the defendant was suffering from
gonorrhea. The lower court held that the results show
that the disease that the victim had acquired came
from the defendant herein. Such disease was
transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by
the latter. The defendant alleged that the said
evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken
in violation of his right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination
conducted was a violation of the defendant’s rights
against self-incrimination.
Held: The court held that the taking of a substance
from his body was not a violation of the said right. He
was neither compelled to make any admissions or to
answer any questions. The substance was taken from
his body without his objection and was examined by
competent medical authority. What is contained in
section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Now Article 3, Section
17 of 1987 Constitution) that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission
of his guilt.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of
Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, and
not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may
be material. It would be the same as if the offender
apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him
may be used as evidence against him.
EMETERIA VILLAFLOR vs. RICARDO SUMMERS
G.R. No. 16444. September 8, 1920
Facts: Petitioner has been charged with the crime of
adultery and upon the petition of the assistant fiscal,
the court ordered the petitioner to submit her body
to the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused
refused to obey the order on the ground that such
examination was a violation of her constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Issue: WON compelling of a woman to permit her
body to be examined by physicians to determine if she
is pregnant violates the right against self-
incrimination.
Held: No it does not. The prohibition of compelling a
man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material. The protection is limited to testimonial self-
incrimination which is a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Beltran vs. Samson
[G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929]
Facts: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition,
wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent
judge ordered him to appear before the provincial
fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from
the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the
purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting
and determining whether or not it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified. The
respondents contend that the petitioner is not
entitled to the remedy applied for. The fiscal under
section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the
proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of any
crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional
rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in
refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks
refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the
Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58
which reads: "Nor shall he be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." As to
its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to
testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence.
Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation
by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the
latter's handwriting and determining whether he
wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope
and meaning of the constitutional provision under
examination.
Held: Yes. Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his
case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may or
may not, on cross-examination, write in open court
in order that the jury may be able to compare his
handwriting with the one in question. Here the
witness is compelled to write and create, by means of
the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and
which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to
obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is
not granted, the crime would go unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter
for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to
obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to
the means complained, that is not reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons. In the case of People
vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the
defendants and other witnesses were questioned by
the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse
to answer, they must be understood to have waived
their constitutional privilege. “The privilege not to give
self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when
claimed, may be waived by any one entitled to invoke
it." The writ of prohibition was GRANTED and it is
ordered that the respondents and those under their
orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in
his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the
latter for comparison.
Chavez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968
FACTS: Chavez was charged of qualified theft of a
motor vehicle, one Thunderbird car, with accessories.
Chavez made an appointment with Lee for the sale of
Thunderbird with Sumilang, a movie actor, as the
buyer. As payment was made to Eugene’s restaurant in
Quezon City, Chavez and Sumilang, pretending to get
the money for the perfection of sale of the
Thunderbird car, left Johnson Lee and his brother
alone and took the car. Nevertheless, the Thunderbird
was impounded however, it was already been
repainted. During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia presented
Chavez as a witness. Chavez said that he will not
testify as he know that it is incriminating, however,
the Court still continued the proceeding stating that
the prosecution has the right to ask anybody to act as
witness on the witness-stand including the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right against self-
incrimination of the petitioner was violated
HELD: Yes. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case.
It must be noted that an ordinary witness may be
compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege only to questions requiring an incriminating
answer, however an accused, like in the case, may
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse
to answer any and all questions as it would be to
incriminate him. Further, the accused already invoked
the privilege of self-incrimination. However, the
judge still compelled the petitioner to take the
stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create
evidence against himself. The rule prohibits an
inhuman procedure of compelling a person to furnish
evidence necessary for his conviction. Thus, in the
case, the damaging facts forged in the decision were
drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as the
prosecution witness. Chavez' testimony established
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt making him a self-
confessed culprit. He was forced to testify to
incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional
right to remain silent. |
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR. vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS
G.R. No. L-25018. May 26, 1969
Facts: Petitioner was charged with malpractice and FACTS: Petitioners Mapa and Vergara were charged
an administrative case was then proceeded against with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
him. At the initial hearing, the counsel for Practices Act. The petitioners were requested to
complainants announced that petitioner would be testify by the Presidential Commission on Good
their first witness to which the latter objected. The Government (PCGG) in the RICO cases against the
Board of Medical Examiners took note of the plea Marcoses. They were promised immunity from
stating that at the next scheduled hearing, petitioner further prosecution, in return. The petitioners
would be called upon to testify unless he could secure complied with their respective undertaking. They
a restraining order from a competent authority hence travelled to New York to testify against the Marcoses
an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary but the US prosecutors decided not to call them to
injunction was filed. the witness stand. Now, the respondent Court
denied the motion to dismiss of the PCGG for the
While the petitioner objects to testify on the ground criminal cases of the petitioners. The petitioners
that such violates his right against self-incrimination, invoked their immunity and charged the Court for
complainants contend that such right can only be grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
invoked once an incriminating question has been dismiss.
asked and that the right is not applicable to an
administrative hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can invoke
Issue: WON the contention of the complainant is immunity granted to a witness
correct.
HELD: Yes. The petitioners can. There are two types
Held: No it is incorrect. As previously held in Cabal vs.
of statutory immunity granted to a witness. The
Kapunan, the right to self-incrimination applies even
first it the transactional immunity which is broader
in administrative charges as there is still an
in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness
imposition of penalty, meaning, even if the
can no longer be prosecuted for any offense
proceeding is administrative in character, it still
whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
possesses a criminal or penal aspect. In the case at
The second, by the grant of use- and-derivative-use
hand, petitioner would be disadvantaged as he will
immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her
suffer revocation of his license as medical practitioner
particular testimony and evidence derived from it
which, for some, can be an even greater deprivation.
will not be used against him or her in a subsequent
prosecution. Those given the privilege of immunity
Also, the constitutional guarantee against self-
paid a high price for it, the surrender of their
incrimination protects as well the right to silence
precious right to be silent. In the case, it involves
hence the defendant has the right to forego
the exclusive power of PCGG under section 5, E.O.
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
no. 14 to grant immunity to witnesses. Due to the
the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise
cooperation of the petitioners with the prosecution,
of his own free genuine will. This is in accordance with
they were extended immunity from further
the belief that while crime should not go unpunished
prosecution of their criminal cases. The failure of
and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
petitioners to testify because of the prohibition of
objectives should not be accomplished according to
US prosecutors cannot nullify their immunity. They
means or methods offensive to the high sense of
have satisfied the requirements both of the law and
respect accorded the human personality.
the parties' implementing agreements. Thus, the
***Just in case tanungin, the right to self-
respondent court committed grave abuse of
incrimination is also identified with the right to
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to
privacy. According to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
dismiss based on a claim of immunity granted by the
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables
PCGG.
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force to surrender to his
detriment." So 2 rights ang protected nya, right to
privacy and the right to remain silent.

Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan SECTION 18 – RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY

G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994 SERVITUDE
PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY WORKERS' UNION
(CLO), petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE REFINING
CO., respondent. G.R. No. L-1668 March 29,
1948
Severino P. Izon for petitioner.
DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for respondent
Philippine Refining Co., Inc.
HILADO, J.:
On September 26, 1946, Case No. 32-V, Philippine
Refining Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Refining
Company Worker's Union (CLO), was scheduled for
hearing before the Court of Industrial Relations. Upon
that date, said court renewed its efforts to effect a
temporary settlement of the case before going on the
merits of the petition. A series of conferences with
both parties was held by the court, assisted by Atty.
Paciano Villavieja of the Division of Investigation.
Thereafter, considering the circumstances and facts of
the case at that stage of the proceedings, the Court of
Industrial Relations came to the conclusion that, "for
the welfare of everybody concerned, for the interest
of the public," and because the court might not be
able to decide the case promptly, in view of the issues
involved, the striking laborers should be directed to
return and resume their work in the Philippine
Refining Company on September 27, 1946, at 7:00
o'clock in the morning, and the management of the
respondent company should accept them beginning
that date; and it was so ordered by the court (Order
Annex A, dated Sept. 26, 1946).
The order contained the following injunction:
The striking laborers, pending the final
determination of this case, are enjoined not to
stage any strike or walk out from their
employment without authority from and
without first submitting the grievances to the
Court. The Petitioning Company is likewise
enjoined not to lay-off, dismiss, discharge, or
admit any new employees or laborers in its
employment during the pendency of this case,
without beforehand notifying and obtaining
the authority of the Court. The controversial
points involved in the petition will be heard by
this Court at the opportune time. (P. 2.)
In Case No. 32-V (7), Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs.
Philippine Refining Company Workers' Union (CLO), of
the same court, under date of May 2, 1947, pending
final determination of the case, the petitioning
company filed with the court an urgent report to the
effect that a strike was declared by the union at the
plant of the company in Manila starting 7:00 o'clock in
the morning of April 30, 1947. In view of this
development and of the other facts and
considerations set forth in the lower court's order of
July 24, 1947 (Annex D), it ruled that the strike staged
by the union or by the workers of the company
therein mentioned on April 30, 1947, "is
contemptuous and illegal because it is a violation of
the law and the order of the court. Consequently, as
prayed for in the said report submitted by the
company, the court authorizes the said company to
hire such of the striking laborers and employees and
new labor force, as in its discretion it may see fit." And
pursuant to section 6 of the Commonwealth Act No.
103, Atty. Juan Maralit of the court was thereby
designated to take charge of the contempt
proceedings and to present such action as might be
warranted therein against the party or parties who
might be responsible for the violation of the law and
the order of the court dated September 26, 1946. The
court dismissed the answer and counter-petition for
contempt filed by the union against the company.
The court's resolutions of August 16 and September
15, 1947, denied petitioners motions for
reconsideration of the foregoing orders, and these
orders and resolutions are sought to be vacated and
reversed by the instant petition.
The crux of the instant petitioner's contention is
stated in three propositions submitted in the petition
under the heading "Reasons for Allowance of the
Writ," thus:
I. That the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 26, 1946,
enjoining the workers not to stage a strike
pending the final determination of the case,
was issued without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and powers, for the same had not
been issued in accordance with section 19,
Commonwealth Act 103, which is the only
source of its authority, if it has ever any such
powers, in issuing such kind of orders.
II. That the said order dated September 26,
1946, which is the basis of the subsequent
order dated July 24, 1947, is null, void and
invalid for it is an infringement of the
constitutional rights and liberties of the
workers and is moreover repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition prohibiting
involuntary servitude in any form.
III. That the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated July 24, 1947, as well as the
resolutions of the Court denying the motions
 for reconsideration, are also invalid and
contrary to law for they were issued in
violation of the due process clause of the
constitution. There was no legal and fair
hearing made by the Court of industrial
Relations on the issues arbitrarily disposed of
and decided in said order of July 24, 1947.
(page 6.)
The question thus raised are substantially the same as
those raised in G.R. No. L-1573, Kaisahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw
Mill, wherein judgment went against the petitioning
union. There the court's order for the striking workers
to return to their work was made after hearing.
Likewise in the instant case. And as appears from the
court's order of September 26, 1946 (Annex A), the
order enjoining a strike or walk out without authority
from and without first submitting the grievances to
the court, was made after hearing consisting of a
series of conferences with both parties "held by the
court"; and that said injunction was required by the
public interest is categorically stated in the same
order.
In our decision in G.R. No. L-1573, supra, we ruled;
. . . moreover, section 19 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing for
an order of the court for the return of striking
workers, authorizes such order, among other
cases, 'when the dispute can not, in its
opinion, be promptly decided or settled'. The
provision says: "... and if he has already done
so (struck or walked out), that he shall
forthwith return to it, upon order of the court,
which shall be issued only after hearing when
public interest so requires or when the
dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly
decided or settled" (Emphasis supplied). In
other words, the order to return, if the
dispute can be promptly decided or settled,
may be issued 'only after hearing when public
interest so requires', but if in the court's
opinion the dispute can be promptly decided
or settled, then it is also authorized after
hearing to issue the order: we construe the
provision to mean that the very impossibility
of prompt decision or settlement of the
dispute confers upon the court the power to
issue the order for the reason that the public
has an interest in preventing undue stoppage
or paralyzation of the wheels of industry . . . .
In the order of September 26, 1946, the Court of
Industrial relations, among others, based its decree
upon the ground that "the court may not be able to
decide this case promptly, in view of the issues
involved".
The power conferred upon the Court of Industrial
Relations by section 19 of its organic law to enjoin,
under the circumstances therein required, a strike or
walk out, or to order the return of the striking workers
and to correspondingly enjoin the employer to refrain
from accepting other employees, unless with the
express authority of the court, and to permit the
continuation in the service of his employees under the
last terms and conditions existing before the dispute
arose, is one of the most important virtues of this
capital-labor legislation. It seems that in this respect
our law has achieved an advance not attained by the
capital-labor legislation of other countries. And
considering that this progressive is evidently aimed at
preventing in the public interest an undue stoppage or
paralyzation of the wheels of industry, the general
welfare requires that it be upheld and enforced.
As to the contention that section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 is unconstitutional, we
held in G.R. No. L-1573, Kaisahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw
Mill, supra, that it is unconstitutional. We said:
. . . It does not offend against the
constitutional inhibition proscribing
involuntary servitude. An employee entering
into a contract of employment after said law
went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among
other conditions, those prescribed in said
section 19, among which is the "implied
condition that when any dispute between the
employer or landlord and the employee,
tenant or laborer has been submitted to the
Court of Industrial relations for settlement or
arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, and pending award or decision by it, the
employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or
walk out of his employment when so enjoined
by the court after hearing and when public
interest so requires, and if he has already
done so, that he shall forthwith return to it,
upon order of the court, which shall be issued
only after hearing when public interest so
requires or when the dispute can not, in its
opinion, be promptly decided or settled. ..."
(Emphasis supplied.) The voluntariness of the
employee's entering into such a contract of
employment — he has a free choice between
entering into it or not — with such an implied
condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing. . . .
Regarding the facts, this Court is not authorized to
review them as found by the Court of Industrial
Relations. (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15, as
amended by Commonwealth Act 559, section 2; Rule
44, Rules of Court; National Labor Union vs. Phil.
Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp. p. 134, Bardwell
Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz., 1032;
Pasumil Worker's Union vs. Court of Industrial
relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Supp. p. 71.)
However, Mr Justice Briones thinks that we should
expressly reserve our opinion on the constitutionality
of the above statutory and reglementary provisions
should it, in the future, become necessary to decide it.
Wherefore, the orders and resolutions of the Court of
Industrial Relations assailed by the instant petition are
hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners. So
ordered.
Aclaracion vs Gatmaitan 64 SCRA 131, 135 (May 26
1975)
Topic: Non-detention by reason of political beliefs or
aspirations/Involuntary Servitude.
Facts: Petitioner was assigned as a temporary
stenographer in the Gapan branch of the CFI Nueva
Ecija. After said appointment, he was employed in the
Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division of
the Insurance Commission. After he had ceased to be
a court stenographer, the CA required him to
transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases decided
by Gapan Court which had been appealed. Because of
his failure to comply with the resolutions of the CA, he
was declared in contempt of the court. Arrested and
incarcerated until he could submit a complete
transcript of his notes in the said cases. Petitioner
contends that to compel him to transcribe his
stenographic notes after he ceased to be a court
stenographer would transgress the rule against
involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as
a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights,
1972 Constitution). He was averse to being subjected
"to involuntary servitude sans compensation". He
desired to be released from the obligation of
transcribing his notes. (He filed his petition informa
pauperis).
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s contention
is tenable?
Held: No. Involuntary Servitude denotes a condition of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the
condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion,
or imprisonment and against his will, to labor for
another, whether he is paid or not. That situation does
not obtain in this case. The traditional mode of
exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the
recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of
court if he does not comply with the order for the
transcription of his notes and imprison him until he
obeys the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of
Court).Another sanction to compel the transcription is
to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion,
resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he
completes the transcription of his notes. This is
provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary of
Justice. In the instant case, Aclaracion transcribed his
notes in the Muncal and Paderes cases while he was
an employee of the Insurance Commission. During the
time that he made the transcription, he received his
salary as such employee.
SECTION 19 – PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT
People v. Estoista
G.R. No. L-5793 | August 27, 1953
Facts: Estoista was for acquitted for homicide through
reckless imprudence and convicted for illegal
possession of firearm under one information by the
CFI of Lanao. The firearm with which the appellant
was charged with having in his possession was a rifle
and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held
a legal permit for it. Father and son live & in the same
house, a little distance from a 27 hectare estate
belonging to the family which was partly covered with
cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees.
From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from
the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild
rooster and hit Diragon Dima, a laborer of the family
who was setting a trap for wild chickens and whose
presence was not perceived by the accused. Estoista is
assailing his conviction saying that the 5-10 years
penalty for the illegal possession of firearms is cruel
and excessive.
Issue: WoN the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal
possession of firearms is excessive.
Held: It is of the court’s opinion that confinement
from 5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm is
not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the
prevalent conditions which the law proposes to
suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against
property, person, and even the very security of the
Government, directly traceable in large measure to
promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons,
justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances
might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10
years is out of proportion to the present case in view
of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality
of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the
light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for
which the heavy net was not spread are, like small
fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a
situation as this that courts are advised to make a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency
or reduction of the penalty.
People v. Esparas (1996)
Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165) for importing 20kg of
shabu. After arraignment and pleading not guilty, she
escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. She was
found guilty and was sentenced to death. She remains
at large at present. This is the issue.
Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to
automatically review Esparas’s death sentence despite
her absence.
Held: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that
its power to review a decision imposing the death
penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by
the courts. There, the Court said, mainly, that the
judgment of conviction (capital punishment of death)
entered on trial is not final, cannot be executed, and is
wholly without force or effect until the cause has
been passed upon by the Supreme Court. TC acts as a
commissioner who takes the testimony and reports
the same to the Court with its recommendation. A
decision of TC does not become final unless and until
it has been reviewed by the Court. An accused who
was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled
under the law to have the sentence and all the facts
and circumstances upon which it is founded placed
before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land,
to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly
and conclusively determined. Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither
the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a
positive provision of the law that brooks no
interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court
here applied Sec. 50, Gen. Orders No. 58.)
A little history on the matter: The 1935 Constitution
did not prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty. Section 2(4) of Art. VIII provided for review
by the Court of death penalty cases. Both the Rules
of Court of 1940 and 1964 require the transmission to
the Court of the records of all cases in which the
death penalty was imposed by TC, whether the
defendant has appealed or not, for review and
judgment. These rules were taken from the General
Orders itself. The 1973 Constitution did not also
prohibit death penalty. Sec. 9, Rule 122 provided the
procedure for review of death penalty cases by the
Court. Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure even reenacted said procedure of review
and even expressly used the term "automatic review
and judgment" by the Court.
So in People v. Villanueva (1953), the Court held that
the withdrawal of appeal by a death convict does not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction to review his
conviction. In People v. Cornelio (1971), which
involved the escape of a death convict, the Court held
that said escape does not relieve the Court of its duty
of reviewing his conviction. In People v. Daban (1972),
the Court said, speaking about convictions by TC of
death penalty on the defendant, that until after the
Court has spoken en consulta, no finality could be
attached to said decision. This automatic review
cannot be waived by the accused nor by the courts.
The mere fact of escape of the accused cannot be a
bar at all. In People v. Saliling (1976), the Court said
that it is not precluded from reviewing the death
sentence of an accused who is at large. In People v.
Buynay (1984), the Court reiterated the rule that
escape of a death convict will not automatically
result in the dismissal of his appeal.
But finally, the 1987 Constitution was enacted. It
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes as
determined by Congress. On December 13, 1993,
Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases
involving the commission of heinous crimes. This
revived the procedure by which the Court reviews
death penalty cases per the Rules. It remains
automatic, does not depend on the whims of the
death convict, continues to be mandatory, and leaves
the Court without any option.
Sec. 8, Rule 124, authorizing the dismissal of an
appeal when the appellant jumps bail, does not
apply to cases where the death penalty is
imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is
mandatory. This is the text and tone of Sec. 10, Rule
122, which is the more applicable rule. There is more
wisdom in mandating the review by the Court
of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of
the convict and regardless of the will of the
Court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court
decision authorizing the State to take life must be as
error-free as possible. An appellant may withdraw his
appeal not because he is guilty but because of his
wrong perception of the law, or because he may want
to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon, or
because of his frustration and misapprehension that
he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor
should the Court be influenced by the seeming
repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict
escapes. The Court has the duty to review all death
penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power
which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is
more of a sacred duty which the Court has to
discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a
citizen is the main concern especially in crimes that
that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be
diluted.
An accused does not cease to have rights just because
of his conviction. This principle is implicit in the
Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be
right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no
right to be wrong.
COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED IS GIVEN A NEW PERIOD
OF 30 DAYS FROM NOTICE HEREOF TO FILE THE BRIEF
OF ESPARAS.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO vs. THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
FACTS: On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for
the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old
daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time
the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty
Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the
crime of rape. The motions were denied with the
court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional
and pronouncing Congress compliant with the
requirements for its imposition.
Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as
amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of
execution was changed from electrocution to lethal
injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the
rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and
directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to
prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction
and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and
Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the
execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void.
The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later
impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of
execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to
comment and mandated the parties to mantain status
quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify
status quo and to request for TRO until resolution of
the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition
dismissing the claim that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing arguments in support
of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae
alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading
citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how
other countries have abolished the death penalty and
how some have become abolitionists in practice .
Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is
cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
ISSUE : WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules
are violative of the unconstitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment,
violative of international treaty and obligations ,
discriminatory and an undue delegation of legislative
powers.
RULING :
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING
OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION
19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or
inhuman" punishment. This is the challenge
thrown at RA 8177 and its implementing rules
and regulations.
The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal
injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within
the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited
sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give
pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain
or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. The Constitution, however,
does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished."
II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW
DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY
OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death
penalty law violates the International Covenant on
Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December
16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines on
December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986,
respectively.
Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an
individual’s right to life, it also particularly recognizes
that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on
the right to life, subject to the limitation that it be
imposed for the "most serious crimes".
The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the
Second Optional Protocol has gone astray since dates
and circumstances related to its adoption prove that
the Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document.
SECTION 20 – NON – IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG
[67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT
1975]
Facts: Plaintiff(Avelina Serafin) failed to pay a simple
indebtedness for P1500 to Carmelito Mendoza, then
municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza
and therefore an estafa case was filed against her.
Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant
filed a case against respondent Judge for not
dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as
it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness,
since elements of estafa are not present. Further she
contended that no person should be imprisoned for
non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two
months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case.
(Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. Even if
complainant desisted case was pursued.)
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation
committed by the judge when it ordered the
imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt?
Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense
as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by
her friends to her. There is no collateral or security
because complainant was an old friend of the spouses
who lent the money and that when they wrote her a
letter of demand she promised to pay them and said
that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get
her valuable things at her home. Under the
Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in
admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly
civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and
the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same
day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless
finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the
crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform
his duties properly.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. THE HONORABLE
ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986
Facts: B.P. Blg. 22, popularly known as the Bouncing
Check Law punishes a person "who makes or draws
and issues any check knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment hence it is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
The consolidated petitions arose from cases involving
prosecution of offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 where the
defendants moved to quash the information against
them on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense as the said statute is
unconstitutional as it offends the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt, it
impairs freedom of contract, it contravenes the equal
protection clause, it unduly delegates legislative and
executive powers and, its enactment is flawed in that
during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the
constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a
bill on Third Reading.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 transgressed the
constitutional inhibition against imprison ment for
debt.
RULING: BP 22 does not conflict with the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22
is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment . It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. Checks have become widely accepted as
a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be
perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in
commercial and financial transactions. The basis or
found action of such perception is confidence. If such
confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as
currency substitutes would be greatly diminished. Any
practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence
should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless
checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the
banking community.
SECTION 21 – DOUBLE JEOPARDY
JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR v. MARIA ROWENA
MODESTO- SAN PEDRO, GR No. 172716, 2010-11-17
Facts: Jason got involved in a vehicular collision and
was charged with two separate offenses with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, Branch
71, for (1) reckless imprudence resulting to slight
physical injuries of one victim (First Criminal Case),
and (2) reckless imprudence resulting to homicide of
the other victim and damage to property (Second
Criminal Case).
He pleaded guilty on the First Criminal Case and was
penalized with public censure. By this conviction, he
asked for the quashal of the Second Criminal Case on
the ground of double jeopardy, but was refused by the
lower court. He elevated this matter to the Regional
Trial Court in a special civil action (SCA Case), and then
sought suspension of the Second Criminal Case
invoking the SCA Case as a prejudicial question.
The MeTC did not act on the suspension motion but
proceeded with the arraignment of the Second
Criminal Case, which Jason failed to attend. Because
of his non-appearance his bail was cancelled and he
was arrested.
At the other side, the respondent victim filed a motion
to dismiss the SCA Case on the ground that Jason lost
his standing to maintain the suit. Because of this so-
called forfeiture of standing due to non-appearance,
the RTC dismissed Jason’s SCA Case. After a motion
for reconsideration became unsuccessful, Jason filed a
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court on questions of law, particularly on the issue of
double jeopardy.
Issue:
1. Did Jason forfeit his standing to seek relief in the
SCA Case when the MeTC ordered his arrest after not
appearing at the arraignment in the Second Criminal
Case?
2. If Jason did forfeit his standing, is his constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in the Second Criminal Case?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Jason’s non-
appearance at the arraignment in the Second Criminal
Case did not divest him of personality to maintain the
SCA Case, and that his conviction of the First Criminal
Case prohibited the prosecution of the Second
Criminal Case by virtue of the double jeopardy
principle.
The High Court explained that the defendant's
absence only makes his bondsman potentially liable
on its bond, and that it could be revoked in the event
the bondsman fails to present the accused within 30
days. The accused retained his standing and, in case
of non-attendance (without explanation), will be tried
in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
(Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
According to the Supreme Court, the MeTC is
mistaken in finding that the two cases of reckless
imprudence are entirely separate offenses using the
basis that the Second Criminal Case required proof of
an additional fact which the First Criminal Case does
not.
The High Court reasoned that reckless imprudence is a
single crime, its consequences on persons and
property are material only to determine the penalty.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article
365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of
its various resulting acts.
Among several jurisprudences cited is the case of
People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968). A
portion from the decision in this case reads as:
"[O]nce convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of
an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions."
Tests to determine double jeopardy:
1. Whether or not the second offense charged
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
2. Whether the evidence which proves one would
prove the other that is to say whether the facts
alleged in the first if proven, would have been
 sufficient to support the second charge and vice
versa; or whether the crime is an ingredient of the
other
People vs. Obsania
[G.R. No. L-24447, June 29, 1968]
Facts: Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and
her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta,
filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan
a complaint for rape with robbery, alleging "That on
or about 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00
to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio
Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of
Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by
means of violence and intimidation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have
carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda
Dollente, against her will and on the roadside in the
ricefields at the abovementioned place while she was
alone on her way to barrio of San Raymundo." After
the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant
provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against
the accused, embodying the allegations of the
complaint, with an additional averment that the
offense was committed "with lewd designs". Obsania
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith
with his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case
contending that the complaint was fatally defective
for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the
subsequent information filed by the fiscal which
averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional
infirmity. On 8 January 1965, the trial court granted
the motion and ordered dismissal of the action,
ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the
offended party to allege that the acts committed by
the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give
this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this
order, the fiscal appealed.
Issue: Whether the appeal of the Government
constitutes double jeopardy.
Held: An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case
is not available if the defendant would thereby be
placed in double jeopardy. Correlatively, Section 9,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
"When a defendant shall have been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information."
In order that the accused may invoke double
jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained
in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b)
competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to
the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was
ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's
motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy”
as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to with when the
case is dismissed with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because his action
in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver
of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason
that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding
to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent of the
accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there
can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if
the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
RAMON S. PAULIN vs. HON. CELSO M. GIMENEZ
G.R. No. 103323. January 21, 1993
Facts: Brgy. Captain Mabuyo was investigating some
problems of his constituents when petitioner Paulin
and their companion Bacho pointed guns at them
following an earlier incident between the 2 parties.
The Brgy. tanods called the police who brought the
petitioners to the station. 2 cases were then filed
against them: Case# 5204 for grave threats and Case#
5213 for grave threats and oral defamation.
During the joint trial of the cases, the MTC dismissed
the case upon the motion of the petitioners to which
Mabuyo filed for a motion to reconsider which was
granted hence an appeal to the RTC was made. The
latter issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the
petitioners which was lifted by Judge Gimenez when
the case was re-raffled to his branch. Not satisfied
with the lifting of the injunction and continuation of
the trial, the petitioners elevated the case to the SC
contending that:
The dismissal of the case by the MTC amounted to an
acquittal which means setting aside such order
amounted to a violation on double jeopardy.
The lifting of the RTC of the preliminary injunction
previously issued under a different branch ignored
petitioner's right against double jeopardy.
Issue: WON the contention of the petitioners are
correct.
Held: No it is not. First, for double jeopardy to be
validly invoked by petitioners, the following requisites
must be present:
1. A valid complaint or information
2. A competent court
3. Defendant had pleaded to the charge
4. Defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent
In the case at bar, the dismissal by the MTC was
ordered upon the motion of the petitioners which is
considered a waiver of the right to double jeopardy
and also, it creates an absence of the 4th requirement
for such right to attach because there was already
consent given.
As per jurisprudence, an appeal by the prosecution
from the order of dismissal by the trial court shall not
constitute double jeopardy if:
1.The dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent of the defendant
2.The dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the
case
3.The question to be passed upon by the appellate
court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be
found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Second, the dismissal of the case did not amount to
an acquittal as there is a difference between the two
as held in People vs. Salico: Acquittal is always based
on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's
guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does
not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissals terminate the
proceedings, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show
that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc.
Third, in the case at bar, the reason for the dismissal
was because of the wrong information filed as the
charge should have been "Disturbance of Public
Performance" under Article 153 of the RPC instead of
"Grave Threats" under Article 282. Petitioners' motion
to dismiss premised on procedural grounds cannot be
considered a demurrer to evidence nor was the
dismissal sought by them predicated on the denial of
their right to speedy trial which are the 2 exceptional
instances when the dismissal may be held to be final,
disposing of the case once and for all even if the
dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself.
The petition was dismissed by the SC and the decision
of the RTC was affirmed.
Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan
[GR 95642, 28 May 1992]
Facts: Romana Magbago filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Icasiano for grave abuse of
authority, manifest partiality and incompetence. The
case arose from two orders of detention issued by the
Judge against Magbago for her refusal to comply with
fifth writ of execution However, Supreme Court
dismissed this administrative case.
Meanwhile, Magbago also filed in the Ombudsman
against Judge Icasiano for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (docketed as TBP 924). Special
Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case
for lack of merit. Such recommendation was approved
by the Tanodbayan. The resolution was released on
April 1988.
However, Office of Tanodbayan received another
complaint from Magbago which no was docketed as
TBP 546. The date of filing is not shown but the case
was among those transmitted to the newly created
Sandiganbayan; and unfortunately, these records
didn’t contain the records of the dismissal of TBP
924.
Prosecutor Cruz was assigned to investigate TBP 546
and he recommended filing of information in January
1990. Special Prosecution Officer adopted
recommendation. Hence, an information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Crim. Case
14563.
Icasiano filed a motion for reinvestigation on the
ground that he has already been exonerated in
Admin. Matter No. MTJ-87-81. Hence, the court
ordered the prosecutor to look into administrative
matter. Special Prosecutor Querubin responded that
there were no records of such administrative matter.
Hence, Sandiganbayan denied motion for
reinvestigation because seeing that the special
prosecutor had no record, petitioner failed to present
documents regarding the administrative matter.
Icasiano then moved to quash the information on the
grounds, among others, that the accused shall be
placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution
of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case RTJ-
87-81. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to
quash. A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Icasiano filed the petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the resolution of the administrative
proceeding in the Supreme Court bars the
subsequent filing of a criminal case against the
accused in the Sandiganbayan.
Held: After a closer look at the records of the case, the
Court is of the view that the distinction between
administrative and criminal proceedings must be
upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to
the other. It is, therefore, correct for the
Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does not
apply in the present controversy because the
Supreme Court case (against Judge Icasiano) was
administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan
case also against Judge Icasiano is criminal in nature.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against
judges or any of the personnel under its supervision
and control, it acts as personnel administrator,
imposing discipline and not as a court judging
justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure
need not strictly adhere to technical rules.
Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain
conviction. Criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may
involve the same acts subject of the administrative
case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is
fundamental that the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a competent court;
(c) a valid arraignment;
(d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. All these
elements do not apply visa-vis the administrative
case, which should take care of Judge Icasiano's
contention that said administrative case against him
before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed,
entitled him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in
the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. The charge
against Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for
grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and
incompetence in having issued 2 orders of detention
against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily,
complainant's available remedy was to appeal said
orders of detention in accordance with the Rules. It is
only when an appellate court reverses the lower court
issuing the questioned orders can abuse, partiality or
incompetence be imputed to the judge. Here no
appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing
judge (Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and
criminal cases were filed against the judge for issuing
the orders. It is precisely for this reason, among other,
that the administrative case against Judge Icasiano
was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit;
and yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that Judge
Icasiano is not criminally liable under RA 3019, par.
3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. In
fact, the Ombudsman has found a prima facie case
which led to the filing of the information. In any case,
the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint
cannot bar the present prosecution, since double
jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al.
vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a
preliminary investigation (assuming one had been
conducted in TBP-87-00924) is not a trial to which
double jeopardy attaches.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AURELIO
BALISACAN
G.R. No. L-26376. August 31, 1966
Facts: Respondent was charged with homicide and
entered a plea of guilty. Upon presentation of
evidence to prove mitigating circumstances, he
testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-
defense as the latter was strangling him and that he
voluntarily surrendered afterwards. The court
acquitted the accused hence an appeal was taken to
the CA who forwarded it to the SC with the contention
that trial court erred in acquittal due to the guilty plea
of the accused.
Issue: WON the appeal of the People of the
Philippines when the defendant has already been
acquitted placed the latter in double jeopardy.
Held: No it did not. The testimony of the accused had
the effect of vacating his plea of guilty hence there
was no standing plea at the time the court rendered
the decision. The court should have then required the
accused to plead anew on the charge, or at least
direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him.
Furthermore, the court decided the case upon the
merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity
to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony
of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without
due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental
prerequisite its action is null and void. The acquittal,
therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is
no acquittal at all, and thus cannot constitute a
proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy. The case
was remanded to the lower court.
People vs. City Court of Silay
G.R. No. L-43790. December 9, 1976|||
Facts: On January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio,
Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then
scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company,
weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded
with sugar canes which were placed in
tarjetas(weight report cards). Apparently, it was
proven and shown that there was padding of the
weight of the sugar canes and that the information
on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to
be heavier than its actual weight. The three
accused then were charged with “Falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified document”.
After the prosecution had presented evindence, the
respondent moved to dismiss the charge against
them on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Acting on the motion, respondent court dismissed
the case on the ground that the acts committed by
the accused do not constituted the crime of
falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised
penal code. People through the prosecutors filed a
petition for review and asserts that the plea of
double jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as the
case was dismissed upon motion of the accused,
and the dismissal having been made with their
consent, they waived their defense of double
jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the accused the defense of
double jeopardy is available to the accused
Held: Yes. It is true that the criminal case was
dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this
was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested
its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal
of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused. To grant the present
petition would place said respondents in double
jeopardy. However, erroneous the order of
respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of
justice resulted from said order, such error cannot
now be righted because of the timely plea of double
jeopardy.||| |.
Generoso Esmeña and Alberto Alba V. Judge Julian B.
Pogoy
G.R. No. L-54110. February 20, 1981
Facts: Petitioner and three others were charged with
grave coercion for having allegedly forced Reverend
Father Tomas Tibudan to withdraw the sum of five
thousand pesos from the bank and to give that
amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a
game of cards.. After three resettings of the hearing at
the instance of the prosecution, the fiscal moved for a
fourth transfer of the scheduled trial on the ground
that the complainant was sick. The accused opposed
the motion and, invoking their constitutional right to
a speedy trial, insisted on the hearing of the case,
stating that otherwise, the case should be dismissed.
Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as
to the four accused who were present. The case was
continued as to the fifth accused who did not appear
at the hearing. Twenty-seven days later, the fiscal
filed a motion for the revival of the case. The fiscal
cited the ruling that a provisional dismissal with the
conformity of the accused lacks the impress of finality
and, therefore, the case could be revived without the
filing of a new information. The accused did not
oppose the motion. Respondent judge granted it. On
October 24, 1979, Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
They pointed out that they did not consent to the
provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the
provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which
placed them in jeopardy. Its revival would place them
in double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the revival of the case would
place the accused in double jeopardy since the
provisional dismissal of the case without their consent
was in effect an acquittal
Held: Yes. — In order that legal jeopardy may exist,
there should be (a) a valid complaint or information
(b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c)
the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to
the complaint or information. When these three
conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of
the accused or the dismissal or termination of the
case without his express consent constitutes res
judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or its included therein. On this case, the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case against
petitioners has placed them in jeopardy, because it is
not very clear that they consented to such dismissal.
The petitioners were insisting on a trial, They relied on
their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The
fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in
court. Respondent judge on his own volition
provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did
not expressly manifest their conformity to the
provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed
them in jeopardy.
People vs. Pineda
[G.R. No. L-44205, February 16, 1993]
Facts: The accused executed a document entitled
“Application For Registration” for parcels of land
located at Taytay, Rizal, to the effect that She is the
exclusive owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal with Psu-248206 and that she “does not know of
any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever
affecting said land or that any person has estate or
interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession
remainder, reversion or expectancy”, as a result of
which the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972
declared the herein accused the true and absolute
owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and
encumbrances of any nature, when in truth and in
fact the herein accused has already sold and
encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano.
Consolacion Naval, the herein private respondent,
was separately accused of having committed the
crime of estafa and of falsification, she sought the
quashal of the latter charge on the supposition that
she is in danger of being convicted for the same
felony. Her first attempt in this respect did not spell
success but the Honorable Gregorio G. Pineda,
Presiding Judge of Branch 21 was persuaded to the
contrary thereafter on the belief that the alleged
falsification was a necessary means of committing
estafa.
Issue: Whether or not the court may in its discretion
entertain at any time before judgment a motion to
quash on the ground of jeopardy?
Held: According to a long line of cases, in order that a
defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it
is necessary that he had previously been (1)
convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being
convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the
former case against him for the same offense has
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge.
Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging
the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the
invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy
has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal
or termination of the case without the consent of the
accused
Legal jeopardy attaches only:
(a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered, and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUIS TAMPAL
G.R. No. 102485. May 22, 1995
Facts: Respondent and 6 other accused were charged
with the crime of "Robbery with Homicide and
Multiple Physical Serious Injuries" to which they
pleaded not guilty to upon arraignment. The case was
set for hearing on July 26, 1991 but was postponed
until September 20 upon motion of the prosecution
for failure to contact their material witnesses. On the
said date, the prosecution was not present hence the
case was dismissed by the court. The prosecution
moved for reconsideration stating the absence of the
counsel was justifiable as the date of the trial was a
Muslim holiday to which the judge contended that
the dismissal rights of the accused was based on the
right to speedy trial and against double jeopardy.
Issue: WON reinstating the dismissed case placed the
accused in double jeopardy granting that the reason
for dismissal is due to the alleged violation of the right
to a speedy trial.
Held: No it does not. In the first place there was no
violation of the right to speedy trial as the case was
only postponed twice and for a period of less than 2
months: first without contention from the defense
and second justified pursuant to the memorandum
circular on the Muslim holiday. Given that the right to
a speedy trial was not violated, consequently, the first
jeopardy did not attach hence the requisites to
invoke double jeopardy have not been fulfilled.
Requisites are as follows:
 A first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second.
 The first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated.
 The second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first.
Melo v. People
G.R. No. L-3580, March 22, 1950
FACTS: Petitioner Conrado Melo was first charged
with frustrated homicide. Melo then pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged, later the same day,
the victim died from his wounds. After the evidence
of death was brought to prosecution, an amended
information was filed charging the accused with
consummated homicide. The accused filed a
motion to quash the amended information alleging
double jeopardy. The motion was denied by the
respondent court; hence, the instant petition for
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from
further entertaining the amended information.
entered a plea of not guilty. Later on, complainant
Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal
of Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and
herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious
physical injuries arising from the same incident. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, the fiscal filed
serious physical injuries against Fama, Jr. only for
serious physical injuries. Fama Jr. filed an urgent
motion to defer proceedings in the later case claiming
that since he was already charged and pleaded not
guilty in the case of slight physical injury he would be
in double jeopardy, if that case were to be prosecuted.

Issue: Whether or not there was a double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the amended
information placed the accused in double jeopardy Held: None. This case gives light to the doctrine of
supervening events. In People vs. Yorac it states that
"Stated differently, if after the first prosecution 'a new
HELD: No. According to Rule 106, section 13, it was
fact supervenes' on which defendant may be held
proper for the court to dismiss the first information
liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime
and order the filing of a new one for the reason that
and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the
the proper offense was not charged in the former
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
and the latter did not place the accused in a second
indicted for the new offense.'" In brief, what
jeopardy for the same or identical offense. There is
happened here was that when the case of slight
identity between two offenses not only when the
physical injuries was filed in the inferior court, the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, but
charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical
also when the second offense is an attempt to
injuries only, because according to the certification of
commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it
the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offended party Viajar, would require medical
offense charged in the first information. This rule of
attendance from 5 to 9 days only "barring
identity does not apply, however, when the second
complications." Indeed, when the complaint was filed
offense was not in existence at the time of the first
on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
the incident in which the injuries were sustained took
case there is no possibility for the accused, during
place, and there were yet no indications of a graver
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended
that was then inexistent. Where after the first
party. Evidently, it was only later, after the serious
prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
physical injuries had already been filed and the
defendant is responsible, which changes the
wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that
character of the offense and, together with the facts
the alleged deformity became apparent.
existing at the time, constitute a new and distinct
offense. Thus, in the case where the accused was
charged with frustrated homicide and later the
injured person dies, the charge for consummated
homicide against the same accused does not put
him twice in jeopardy.

People vs. Relova

People of the Philippines vs. Honorable Midpantao L.
Adil
G.R. No. L-41863. April 22, 1977
Facts: Margarito Fama, Jr was charged of slight
physical injuries against Miguel Viajar. The accused
[G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987]
Facts: Respondent herein is the judge who rendered
the decision dismissing the petition of the prosecutor
to charge Manuel Opulencia in violation of Municipal
ordinance S1 of 1974 for illegal installation of electric
wire do reduce electric consumption for his factory –
Opulencia Ice Plant. An information however was filed
after almost 9 months. The respondent herein then
moved to quash the charges for grounds of
prescription, that since the violation is classified as
light felony, only two months is given for
prescription.
The lower court granted the motion to quash. The
prosecutor then, after the motion was granted, filed
another charge against the respondent company
owner, on ground of theft. That according to the
prosecutor, illegal installation which is punishable
under the municipal ordinance and theft of electricity
punishable under the RPC are different.
Issue: Whether under the information in case 16443,
Opulencia could — if he failed to plead double
jeopardy, be convicted of the same act charged in case
16054, in which he has already been acquitted?
Held: The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be
based upon the same act or set of facts. But the
protection against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of facts.
The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense, whereas the
second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment
for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may
be twice put to jeopardy provided that he is charged
with different offenses, or the offense charges is not
included or does not include, the crime charged in
the other case. The second sentence applies even if
the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the
fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the other a violation of the statues. If two
charges are based on one and the same act,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution under other. In the case at
bar, the Supreme held that the theft of electric
current contended by the prosecutor is indeed part
of the offense charged under the municipal ordinance
of ZBatangas, which is the illegal or unauthorized
installation of electrical wiring because immediate
physical effect of the installation is the inward flow of
electric current into Opulencia’s ice plant.
Merencillo vs People | 521 scra 31 March 02, 2013
Facts: Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of
Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct bribery. Petitioner
demanded from private complainant Ma. Angeles
Ramasola Cesar P20,000.00 in exchange for the
approval of the Certificate Authorizing Registration
(CAR). Due to the repeated demand of the petitioner
and delaying the release of CAR, private complainant
seek the help of the authorities. As a result, petitioner
was caught in the entrapment instituted by the police.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Sandiganbayan
which was denied affirming the RTC decision. Hence,
this petition for review of certiorari, contending that
he was twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for
violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and for direct
bribery.
Issue: WON the petitioner was placed in double
jeopardy.
Held: No. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 begins with the
following statement: Sec.3 In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following acts shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
unlawful: XXX XXX
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA
3019 in addition to a felony under the RPC for the
same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or
subsequent to being charged with a felony under the
RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is
charged simultaneously of successively for violation of
the Sec.3 of RA 3019 and the RPC. The rule against
double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The test
is whether one offense is identical with the other or is
an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or
whether one offense necessarily includes or os
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Sec.7
of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged
necessarily includes that which is proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint, constitute the latter; and
an offense charged is necessarily included in an
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting
the latter.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct
bribery defined and punished under RPC and those
violation of Sec.3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is
neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the
two offenses although the two charges against the
petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the
same act gave rise to two separate and distinct
offense.

SEC. 22 – EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF
ATTAINDER
US vs Diaz-Conde, GR no. L-18208, February 4, 1922
Topics: Ex Post Facto Law
It is an elementary rule of contracts that the laws in
force at the time it was made must govern its
interpretation and application.
Facts:
 December 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome
Oliveros and Engracia Lianco entered into a
contract with the defendants concerning a
debt of P300. Oliveros and co. were obligated
to pay five percent interest per month within
the first ten days of every month.
 February 24,1916, Act No. 2655: AN ACT
FIXING RATES OF INTEREST UPON LOANS AND
DECLARING THE EFFECT OF RECEIVING OR
TAKING USURIOUS RATES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES was enacted.
 On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and
Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with
violating the Usury Law in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. They were
found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120
and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in accordance with the
provisions of law. The court stated that at the
time of the execution and delivery of said
contract there was no law in force in the
Philippine Islands punishing usury; but,
inasmuch as the defendants had collected a
usurious rate of interest after the adoption of
the Usury Law, they were guilty of a violation
of that law and should be punished in
accordance with its provisions.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants commit a crime
under Act No. 2655: Usury Law?
Held: The defendants did not commit a crime under
Usury Law. The law is well established that when a
contract contains an obligation to pay interest, the
interest thereby becomes part of the principal and is
included within the promise to pay. The obligation to
pay interest on money due under a contract is a part
of the obligation of the contract. Laws adopted after
the execution of a contract, changing or altering the
rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such
contract without violating the provisions of the
constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law
"impairing the obligation of contract." The obligation
of the contract is the law which binds the parties to
perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law
of the land, morals or public order. That law must
govern and control the contract in every aspect in
which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect
its validity, its construction or discharge. Any law
which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes
the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the
contract itself. It is an elementary rule of contracts
that the laws in force at the time it was made must
govern its interpretation and application.
Ruling: The acts complained of by the defendants did
not constitute a crime at the time they were
committed, and therefore the sentence of the lower
court is hereby revoked; and it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that the
defendants be discharged from the custody of the law,
with costs de oficio. So ordered.
DOMINGA CONCEPCION vs. GREGOBIO GARCIA
FACTS: This is an original petition presented in this
court by Dominga Concepcion wherein she seeks to
obtain a peremptory order of mandamus directed to
the respondent, Gregorio Garcia, as special deputy
sheriff in civil case No. 35867, in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, requiring him to
surrender the possession of certain personal property
claimed by the petitioner, as third-party claimant in an
attachment issued in the civil case mentioned, with
general relief and with costs. The case has now been
submitted upon answer of the respondent.
It appears that on August 9, 1929, the Government of
the Philippine Islands instituted a civil action (No.
35867) in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila, against Florencio Reyes, former chief of the
stamp division in the Bureau of Posts, for the purpose
of recovering the sum of P212,349.42, the value of
stamps alleged to have been misappropriated by him.
In connection with the complaint in said case the
Government obtained an attachment against the
defendant, by virtue whereof the respondent, in the
capacity of deputy sheriff, levied upon certain
household effects as the property of the defendant.
On September 20, 1929, the present petitioner,
Dominga Concepcion, the wife of Reyes, presented in
writing to the sheriff a third-party claim asserting
ownership in the household effects which had been
taken upon attachment, all pursuant to section 442 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Upon receiving this claim
the respondent Garcia demanded that the
Government should give bond to secure him against
liability from said claim; and inasmuch as the
estimated value of the property was in the amount of
P5,500, the respondent demanded an indemnity bond
in the amount of P11,000. At the request of the
Attorney-General the period for the giving of this bond
was extended until October 10, 1929, and before this
date arrived the Legislature enacted a statute (Act No.
3531) adding an amendment, in the form of a proviso,
to both sections 442 and 451 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. This proviso has the same wording in the
additions to each of the provisions mentioned, to the
following effect:
"Provided, however, That when the plaintiff, or the
person in whose favor the writ of attachment runs, is
the Insular Government, or any officer duly
representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be
required, and in case the sheriff or attaching officer is
sued for damages as a result of the attachment, he
shall be represented by1 the Attorney-General and if
held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by
the court shall be paid by the Insular Treasurer out of
such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose."
This Act was approved on September 28, 1929, and it
was therefore in full effect upon October 10,1929,
when the period expired within which the bond
demanded by the sheriff should have been given.
However, under the authority of the amendment
above mentioned, the respondent deputy sheriff
maintained the attachment, and he now admittedly
has the attached property in his possession.
The present petition seeks to compel the respondent,
by mandamus, to surrender the property, consisting of
the household effects described in the petitioner's
third-party claim; and the theory underlying the
petition is that Act No. 3531 is not applicable to the
situation described, and that, if the Act should be
interpreted as applicable thereto, it should be held
unconstitutional. In this connection it is claimed that,
if the Act be interpreted as applicable to the subject
matter of the aforesaid attachment, it would thereby
be given an ex post facto effect inconsistently with
that portion of section 3 of our organic law which
prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws.
The criticism directed to the statute is not well
founded. Act No. 3581 is an Act dealing exclusively
with remedies and modes of procedure. Such an Act is
repugnant to no constitutional provision, and its
legality is beyond question. A person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure. Statutes making changes
in the remedy or procedure are laws within the
discretion of the lawmaking power, and are valid so
long as they do not deprive the accused of any
substantial right, or conflict with specific and
applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution (6 R.
C. L., p. 294). Moreover, the term "ex post facto" as
applied to statutes, in section 3 of our organic law, is a
technical term, used only in connection with crimes
and penalties. The term is never used to indicate the
obnoxious character of statutes dealing retroactively
with civil rights. Of course retroactive statutes dealing
with civil rights may also be unconstitutional if they
impair the obligations of contracts or deprive a person
of a vested right, but this remedial Act is not subject
to criticism on this ground. As was said in Roman
Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal (38
Phil., 367, 377), "The Act in question is not an ex post
facto law, as it is not penal in its nature. It has long
been settled that the phrase 'ex post facto laws', Is not
applicable to civil laws, but to penal and criminal laws
which punish a party for acts antecedently done which
were not punishable at all, or not punishable to the
extent or in the manner prescribed. In short ex post
facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings,
which impose punishment or forfeitures, and not to
civil proceedings, which affect private rights
retrospectively."
What has been said is sufficient to dispose of the
petition, but, as pointed out in the memorandum of
the Attorney-General, there is an additional obstacle
to the granting of the writ of mandamus in this case.
This is found in the circumstance that, under section
442 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the sheriff is not
under legal duty to surrender attached property when
no bond is given. On the contrary, said section leaves
the officer entirely free to hold the property or not,
and merely leaves him at liberty, iii the ordinary case
where the Government is not a party, to surrender the
property if the bond indicated in that section be not
given. It results that the sheriff is under no legal duty
to surrender the property, and the enactment with
respect to the giving of bond was made exclusively for
his protection. In the case before us the sheriff is
content to hold the property in reliance upon the-
protection given by the amendment.
The petition, in our opinion, is without legal merit,
and the same is hereby dismissed, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.
NASI-VILLAR v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 176169, 14 November 2008 TINGA, J.:
FACTS: On or about the month of January 1993,
Rosario Nasi-Villar, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another through
fraudulent representation and deceitful machination,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit Nila Panilag for employment abroad, demand
and receive the amount of PhP6,500.00 as placement
fee, the said accused being a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority to engage in the recruitment of
workers abroad to the damage and prejudice of the
herein offended party.
On 3 July 2002, After due trial, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) found the evidence presented by the
prosecution to be more credible than that presented
by the defense and thus held petitioner liable for the
offense of Illegal Recruitment under the Republic Act
No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995).
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
raising as sole issue the alleged error by the trial court
in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis
of the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The appellate court
affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC,
declaring that petitioner should have been charged
under the Labor Code and not under R.A. No. 8042.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration under an
Information that erroneously designated the offense
as covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body
acts which are punishable under the Labor Code, but
was denied by the CA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the CA erred in failing to
consider that R.A. No. 8042 cannot be given
retroactive effect and the decision of the RTC
constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto law.
RULING: No. the CA’s conviction of petitioner under
the Labor Code is correct. There is no violation of the
prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive
application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by petitioner.
Effectivity of Labor Code of the Philippines and R.A.
No. 8042, reads:
Article 2. Date of effectivity. — This Code shall take
effect six months after its promulgation. (1 November
1974, supplied)
Section 43. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation whichever comes
earlier. (15 July 1995, supplied)
In this case, what was applicable in 1993 is the Labor
Code, where under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 39, the
violation of the Code is penalized with imprisonment
of not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8)
years or a ne of not less than P20,000.00 and not
more than P100,000.00 or both. On the other hand,
Sec. 7(c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal recruitment
with a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12)
years and a ne not less than P200,000.00 nor more
than P500,000.00.
The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable
under the law in force at the time of its commission.
Since R.A. No. 8042, a special penal law, did not yet
exist in January 1993 when the crime was allegedly
committed, the law cannot be used as the basis of
fling a criminal action for illegal recruitment, unless it
is in favor of the accused. However, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in the Labor Code was raised
or increased by R.A. No. 8042. Therefore, the Supreme
Court held that as it was proven that petitioner had
committed the acts she was charged with, she was
properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not
under R.A. No. 8042.
SALVADOR vs. MAPA
FACTS: On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans. Behest loans are loans granted by
government banks or GOCC at the behest, command,
or urging by previous government officials to the
disadvantage of the Philippine government. The
Committee was tasked to inventory all behest loans
and determine the courses of action that the
government should take to recover these loans.
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9,
1992, the functions of the Committee were expanded
to include all non-performing loans which shall
embrace behest and non-behest loans. Said
Memorandum also named criteria to be utilized as a
frame of reference in determining a behest loan
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee
for investigation, including the loan transactions
between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now
Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The
Committee determined that they bore the
characteristics of behest loans, as defined under
Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders
and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then
President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-
collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the
time the loan was granted.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of
the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the
PCGG, filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint
for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act
No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
against the respondents Mapa, Jr. et. al.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription. It stressed that Section 11 of
R.A. No. 3019 as originally enacted, provides that the
prescriptive period for violations of the said Act (R.A.
3019) is ten (10) years. Moreover, the computation of
the prescriptive period of a crime violating a special
law like R.A. 3019 is governed by Act No. 3326 which
provides that prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of the judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of
People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp., 50, ruled
that when there is nothing which was concealed or
needed to be discovered because the entire series of
transactions were by public instruments, the period of
prescription commenced to run from the date the said
instrument were executed.
In the case at bar, the loans were entered into by
virtue of public documents (e.g., notarized contracts,
board resolutions, approved letter-request) during the
period of 1978 to 1981. Records show that the
complaint was referred and filed with the
Ombudsman on October 4, 1996 or after the lapse of
more than fifteen years from the violation of the law.
Therefore, the offenses charged had already
prescribed.
Also pointed out was that the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans was created on October
8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13.
Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated
November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to
be utilized as a frame of reference in determining
behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be
considered the bases of charging respondents for
alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post
facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution.
The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998.
ISSUE 2: WON THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC.
3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED
DECISION: No
RATIO: It is well-nigh impossible for the State
to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019
at the time the questioned transactions were
made because the public officials concerned
connived or conspired with the beneficiaries
of the loans. Thus, the prescriptive period
should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of
such commission.
ISSUE 3: WON ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 61 ARE
EX-POST FACTO LAW[S].
DECISION: No.
RATIO: The SC did not sustain the Ombudsman’s
declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition
against ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting
punishment upon a person for an act done prior to
their issuance and which was innocent when done.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
or arguable implication. Furthermore, the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions
on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman,
therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative
and memorandum orders.
In any event, the SC held that Administrative Order
No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex
post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a)
which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime
or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c)
which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the defendant. This Court
added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful; or (f) that which
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post
facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of
penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment. The
subject administrative and memorandum orders
clearly do not come within the shadow of this
definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, and provides for its composition and functions.
It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting
behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely
provides a frame of reference for determining behest
loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No.
13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be
characterized as ex post facto laws.