UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA

Facts: Sometime in 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) entered into two successive loan agreement with the
respondents’ father which Edmund and his father Ephraim were signatory to a promissory note in favor of the FCCC for the
purchase of (3) three Agricultural All-Purposed Diesel tractors. The second one having a Continuing Guaranty Agreement.

Sometime in February 1981, respondents’ father died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City appointing Edmund, as one of the heirs, as the special administrator of the
estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.

Sometime in 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters were sent by the petitioner to Edmund for the settlement of his account with the petitioner but Edmund failed
to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the
respondents, before the RTC of Makati City and summons were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

In her answer Florence Ariola alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering
that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.

The RTC in its decision favoring the respondents stated that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate
court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an
obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs,
Edmund and Florence, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering
that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been probated.
Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action
against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.

On its appeal to the CA, petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article
774 of the Civil Code, there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned
the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. The petitioner also points out that the
holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was
beyond the ambit of the said will.

The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory
notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no
need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs
are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.

The CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court thus the petitioner filed an appeal before the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can hold the respondents’ liable on the obligation of their deceased father being the
successor of the property, rights and obligation of the decedent without probate of a will of the decedent?

Held: The Court held that, in testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication
of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

The Court also stressed that, it is well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties
of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate and to
avoid prejudice to other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The Court in perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption of
liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective
share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the
heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and
effect.

The Court in determining whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding without a probate
proceeding, the Court ruled in the negative. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The SC denied the petition.

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and
JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES

Facts: Aniceto Yanes, respondents’ ascendants, left a parcel of land intestate known as Lot 773 and 823 of the cadastral survey
of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Aniceto was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents were
grandchildren of Aniceto. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the
two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also
cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as
a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the
parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein,
he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.

Lot 773 was subdivided into Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. The said lots was then sold to Monico Fuentebella Jr. After Fuentebella's
death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special
Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and
773-B. By virtue of a court order granting said motion, on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for
P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.

Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus,
filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella,
Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823.
They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the
defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them,
and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees.

During the pendency in court of said case, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
On February 21, 1968 the Yaneses filed an action for the recovery of real property with damages. Named defendants therein
were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
Respondents pray for the return/delivery of possession of Lot 773 and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance
of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00.

In its decision, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was
then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses
were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to
protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of
the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval.

Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable as to the extent of the value of their inheritance?
Held: The Court held, such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code (Arts. 774 and 776)

Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable
beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction,
which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment
because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have
ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

MARIA USON vs. MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO
NEBREDA, Jr.

Facts: Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation.
Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in
1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.

In her defense, defendant claims that petitioner lost her property rights over the land in dispute when she and her husband
executed in public document, during their separation, relinquishing her of her rights over the land in dispute.

Issue: Whether or not a written agreement between husband and wife conditioned upon their separation can relinquish ones
property rights?

Held: The Court held, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time
passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson. As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to
the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly
renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they
had entered into, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can
it be renounced.

The decision appealed from is affirmed.

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO
DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees, vs. TASIANA VDA.
DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja

Facts: The property in dispute in this particular case is a parcel of land which is the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion located in Nueva
Ecija which was registered in the name of Francisco de Borja. Francisco was married to Josefa Tangco who had a son Jose de
Borja. Upon the death of Josefa, Francisco filed an action for an intestate proceeding and to assign him as the administrator of
the estate of Josefa. Afterward Jose file a motion to the probate court for him to be declared as co-administrator of the estate of
Josefa which the court granted. Years have passed and Francisco was remarried to Tasiana. Years later Francisco died and
Tasiana move for the intestate proceeding of Francisco’s estate and that she be declared as its administrator which the court
granted.

In a series of court litigation involving the estate of Jose and Francisco one of the issue to be resolve by the court was whether
the Hacienda Jalajala belong to the conjugal partnership of Josefa and Francisco or was it an exclusive property of Francisco.
During these proceedings an agreement had been made between Jose and Tasiana regarding the sale of the estate of Francisco
to Jose and his siblings and to be paid to Tasiana. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly
to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de
Borja. But after awhile Tasiana oppose the sharing of the sale alleging that the said property is an exclusive property of Francisco
and her being the sole heir to the estate of Francisco should be given the whole profit of the sale.

Issue: Whether or not the validity of a sale of a hereditary estate is conditioned upon the succession that occurs at the time of
death of the decedent?

Held: The Cout held, as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the
death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to
be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors
vs. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN
TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra

Facts: Sometime in March 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano
Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.

In August 1975, the defendants filed motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and,
therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff
confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners
herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party
in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

Counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation
praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court
denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court but the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not rights are transmissible to his heir upon the death of the decedent?

Held: The Court held, Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even
before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.

When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished by her death
but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became
parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties
in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes
of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the
property and rights of property affected being incidental. Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff
which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property
rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death.
Vitug v. CA

FACTS: Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of Dolores Vitug’s (deceased) estate. Rowena Corona was the
executrix. Romarico, the deceased’s husband, filed a motion with the probate court asking for authority to sell certain shares of
stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover alleged advances to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds.
The advances were used to pay estate taxes.

Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came from a savings account which formed part of the conjugal
partnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus, there was no ground for reimbursement. Romarico claims that the funds
are his exclusive property, having been acquired through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.

The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the spouses, the savings account shall belong to and be the sole
property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor.

The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted the motion to sell. CA reversed stating that the survivorship
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was
a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation (donation between spouses).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the survivorship agreement was valid.

HELD:

YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free
act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after
his death. The bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.

In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of conjugal funds. Since it was not shown that the funds belonged
exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.

It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect after the death of one party. It is also not a donation between
spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other.

It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of the deceased’s assets because it is the separate property of
Romarico. Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.

A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares
or complies with duties to take effect after his death.

Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its operation or effect must not be violative of the law (i.e. used
as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property in fraud of creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir).

Nenita de Vera SUROZA vs. Judge Reynaldo P. HONRADO and Evangeline YUIPCO

A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981

Facts: Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the US Army (Philippine Scouts) married Marcelina Salvador but they
were childless. However, they reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considred them as parents
as shown in his marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. When Mauro died, Marcelina, as a veteran’s widow, became a pensioner
of the Federal Government. Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia and afterwards, Agapito also became a soldier.
However, he was disabled and his wife was appointed as his guardian when he was declared an incompetent. In connection to
this, a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girlfriend of Agapito) wanted also to be his guardian however the court
confirmed Nenita’s appointment as guardian of Agapito.

The spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who was delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza
who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn used the surname Suroza and stayed
with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito.

Marcelina, being a veteran’s widow accumulated some cash in two banks. She executed a notarial will which is in English and
was thumbmarked by her for she was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to Marilyn. After her death,
Marina Paje (alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will) filed a petition for probate of Marcelina’s
alleged will. As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratix and subsequently, issued two orders
directing the two banks to allow Marina to withdraw from the savings of Marcelina and Marilyn Suroza and requiring the
custodian of the passbooks to deliver them to Marina. Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order instructing
the sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix’ house among whom was Nenita and to place Marina in possession thereof.

Nenita was then alerted to the existence of the testamentary proceeding hence, she and other occupants filed a motion to set
aside the order ejecting them, alleging that the decedent’s son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased; that he has a daughter
named Lilia; that Nenita was Agapito’s guardian; and that Marilyn was not Agapito’s daughter nor the decedent’s granddaughter.
Later, they questioned the probate court’s jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order. In spite of such fact, Judge Honrado issued
on order probating Marcelina’s supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress. Nenita filed in the testate case an
omnibus petition “to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter petition for administration and preliminary
injunction” reiterating that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina; that the will was not duly executed and attested; and that the
thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.

Further, that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to
act as executrix. Not contented with her motions, Nenita filed an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition
which was however, dismissed. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings which was also
dismissed. Hence, this complaint.

Issue: Whether or not a will written in a language unknown to the testator is valid

Ruling: (We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate
case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the
void win should have inherited the decedent's estate.)

In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an
obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in
its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16,
Record of testate case). That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and,
therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void
and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador
Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".

Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but
also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her
supposed father who was still alive.

Payad vs. Tolentino

FACTS – Victorio Payad filed a petition for the probate of the will of the decedent Leoncia Tolentino. This was opposed by
Aquilina Tolentino, averring that said Will was made only after the death of the testatrix. The lower court denied the probate of
the will on the ground that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the requirements of the law since it was not stated
therein that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express direction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE – Was it necessary that the attestation clause state that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express
direction?

HELD - The evidence of record establishes the fact the Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark
on each and every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her name to indicate the place where she
placed said thumb mark. In other words Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed by placing her thumb mark
on each and every page thereof. "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's
mark." (Quoted by this court from 28 R. C. L., p. 117; De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 108.) It is clear, therefore, that
it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign
her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.

In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO

ROSARIO GARCIA vs. JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL.

Facts: Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood
by the testator. The will also contained an attestation clause which is signed by three witnesses. The attestation clause states:

“We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado was signed by himself and
also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the
continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and
it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them were signed in the presence of the
testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.”

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed below by "A
ruego del testador" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged also to have written a cross immediately after
his name.

Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid.

Ruling: No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to
write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When the
testator expressly caused another to sign the former’s name, this fact must be recited in the attestation clause. Otherwise, the
will is fatally defective.

Moreover, the cross appearing on the will is not the usual signature of Antero Mercado nor is it even one of the ways by which
he signed his name. After mature reflection, the Court is not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and
the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark. Thus, the cross cannot be
considered a valid signature.

Icasiano v. Icasiano

FACTS: Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for
his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition
thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he
then filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in duplicate and with all the
legal requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and
Enrique filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the
oppositors.

Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the
testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver
that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure
because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit
from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and
the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as
attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to
look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the
portion of free disposal.

ISSUE: Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations of forgery of the
testator’s signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and pressure?

Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its validity?

HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its duplicate are valid in all respects.

On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:

The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert
trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s signature failed to convince the Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by
another expert but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering
the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing fatigue.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable,
considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting
power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor’s expert is insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two
instrumental witnesses as to the will’s execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial.

Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of
neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die
intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the
distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to prove fraud or undue
influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often
results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are
valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually
repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the
validity of the will.

On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate:

The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not
contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached
to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages
instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.

The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as
by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty.
Natividad’s failure to sign page 3 of the original through mere inadvertence does not affect the will’s validity.

Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the
defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was
ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix
on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation
existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where
the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament,
with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated
(Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the
failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents
exemplify the Court’s policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but
without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate.
Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-
appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed
carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed
duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission
of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.

FACTS: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner
opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence.
He further alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that
it was not executed in accordance with law.

One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the
lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having
at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.

ISSUE: Can the notary public be considered as the third attesting witness?

HELD: No. The probate of the Last will and Testament of Cruz is declared not valid and set aside.

1. The notary public cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. If the third witness is the notary public
himself, he would have to avow, assent or admit as his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because
he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making
of the will.

2. The function of a notary public is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. That would be defeated if he
was also the attesting witness. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will, as it directly involves himself and
the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which
is to minimize fraud.

3. American jurisprudence cannot be used here for we are in Philippine jurisdiction. In the U.S., the notary public and
witnesses referred to in several jurisprudence merely acted as instrumental, subscribing or attesting witnesses and not as
acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also as acknowledging witness.

4. In allowing the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witness, would have the
effect of only two attesting witnesses to the will which is violative of Art. 805 requiring at least 3 witnesses and Art. 806 which
requires the testator and the required number of witnesses to appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will.