THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINO BLANCO, Defendant-Appellant.
We have no doubt, however, that a court of a justice of the peace may, and should, take judicial notice
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; JUDICIAL NOTICE. — Municipal courts and the courts of the
justices of the peace may, and should, take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in the
municipality in which they sit.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Courts of First Instance will not, ordinarily, and in the absence of express statutory
authority, take judicial notice of ordinances of municipal corporations within their jurisdiction; such
ordinances on appeal from a judgment of a municipal court or a court of a justice of the peace, in any case
wherein the inferior court took judicial notice thereof.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — To that end, the Court of First Instance may adopt the findings and conclusions of the
justice of the peace touching the existence of such ordinances, in the absence of affirmative proof that
such findings and conclusions are erroneous.
4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; ORDINANCES; PROVISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. — The repeal of
the Municipal Code by the enactment of the Administrative Code did not have the effect of repealing or
abrogating municipal ordinances enacted under authority of the provisions of the Municipal Code, it
appearing that the power to enact and maintain such ordinances is conferred upon, and confirmed to, the
municipality under the Administrative Code in substantially the same language as that found in the
Municipal Code.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. — Section 3 of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the provisions of that Code
incorporating prior laws shall be deemed to be made in continuation thereof, and to be in the nature of
amendments thereto, without prejudice to any right already accrued.
DECISION
The defendant and appellant was convicted originally in the court of the justice of the peace of the
municipality of Castillejos, Province of Zambales, and fined P25 on a charge of violation of an ordinance
of that municipality prohibiting and penalizing the obstruction of the public highways. On appeal to the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Zambales, the accused was again convicted and fined P25. The
case is before us on appeal from the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance.
Having in mind the provisions of Act No. 2677 enacted since this appeal was perfected, expressly
authorizing appeals in cases of this kind, we do not stop to consider the contentions of the parties as to
the merely procedural question touching the proper disposition of this appeal under the law in force
prior to the enactment of that statute.
On this appeal counsel relies wholly upon this contentions —
First. That a doubt arises as to whether the ordinance is question was in force at the date of its alleged
violation. Section 9 of the ordinance reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" Esta ordenanza entrara en vigor desde su aprobacion por la honorable Junta Provincial. (This ordinance
will take effect from the date of its approval by the honorable provincial board.)"
Counsel contends that since no affirmative proof was offered in the court below as to the date of
approval of the ordinance, the court had no evidence before it on which to base a finding that the
ordinance was in force at the date of its alleged violation.
of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality wherein it sits; and we are furthermore of
opinion that in an appeal from a judgment of a court of the justice of the peace the appellate courts may
take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in the municipality wherein the case originated, and
to that end may adopt the findings and conclusions of the court of the justice of the peace in that regard
as developed by the record, in the absence of affirmative proof that such findings and conclusions are
erroneous. (U.S. v. Herniated, 31 Phil. Rep., 342; Cf. sec. 51, Manila Charter.)
The doctrine is well stated by Judge McQuillin in the following citation from his work on Municipal
Corporations, and we are of opinion that under the judicial system in force in these Islands, the rule
which should be adopted is that set forth in the last paragraph of the citation as the "better view" with
regard to the matter dealt therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Par. 849. Courts will judicially notice the charter or incorporating act of a municipal corporation without
being specially pleaded, not only when it is declared to be a public statute, but when it is public or
general in its nature or purposes. But state courts will not take judicial notice of ordinances of municipal
corporations; hence, as mentioned, they must be pleaded with as much certainty of description as to
their subject-matter as a contract or other private paper.
"Courts of the state take judicial notice of public laws of the state. Ordinances when legally enacted
operate throughout the limits of the city in like manner as public laws operate within the state limits.
The city or municipal courts bear the same relation to ordinances of the city as the state courts do to the
public laws of the state. Hence, on principle, the municipal courts may for like reason take judicial notice
of all city ordinances of a general nature, or those having a general obligatory force throughout the city.
And the rule that courts will not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances does not apply to police
courts and city courts, which have jurisdiction of complaints for the enforcement of ordinances, without
allegation or proof of their existence.
"Par. 861. While, as we have seen, municipal or city courts will take judicial notice of the ordinances and
resolutions passed and in force within the jurisdiction of the court, without being pleaded and proved, in
many jurisdictions it is held, and the weight of authority seems to be that, on appeal from such courts to
a state court the latter will not take judicial notice of ordinances unless they have been pleaded in the
municipal or city court and set out in the record. But the better view appears to be that where an action
for the violation of an ordinance has been commenced in a municipal or police court and the case is
appealed, the latter court, whether state or municipal, will take judicial notice of the incorporation of the
city and of the existence or substance of its ordinances."
It has been suggested that the doctrine thus stated should not be followed in this jurisdiction, because
our statutes providing for appeals from municipal courts to Courts of First Instance, contemplate and
prescribe trials de novo.
We think that the following citations of authority sufficiently dispose of this contention, having in mind
the provisions of our statute which in both civil and criminal cases authorize the trial de novo of cases
appealed to a Court of First Instance to proceed on the complaint submitted in the court of the justice of
the peace or the municipal court wherein the case originated. (Art. 112, Code of Civ. Proc.)
"Municipal courts, and the circuit courts on trials de novo on appeal from them, will take judicial notice
not only of the ordinances of a city, but of such journals and records of the common council as affect
their validity, meaning, and construction, just as state courts take official notice of the public statutes of
the State and the journals of the legislature." (Portland v. Yick, 44 Ore., 439.)
"When the case was taken on appeal from the police court to the district court, it was not only within the
power, but it was the duty of the district court to try the case in the same manner that it should be tried
before the police court. The district court was in fact substituted for the time being for the police court,
and whatever the police court could have taken judicial notice of while the case was in that court, the
district court could and should have taken judicial notice of after the removal of the case to the district
court." (Smith v. City of Emporia, 27 Kan., 528, 530.)
"Where an action for the violation of a city ordinance is commercial and prosecuted to conviction and
sentence before the police judge of such city, and the case is then taken by the defendant on appeal to
the district court, the district court should, with reference to such case, take judicial notice of the
incorporation of such city, and of the existence and substance of its ordinances." (City of Solomon v.
Hughes, 24 Kan., 154.)
As shedding some light upon the contentions raised by counsel in this connection, we insert here a
citation from Dillon on Municipal Corporations, which, read together with the citations the notes
appended by the author, indicates quite clearly the line of reasoning upon which the courts in the United
States have proceeded in cases of this kind:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Mode of pleading ordinances. — The courts, unless they are the courts of the municipality, do not
judicially notice the ordinances of a municipal corporation, unless directed by charter or statute to do so.
Therefore, such ordinances, when sought to be enforced by action, or when set up by the defendant as a
protection, should be set out or stated in substance in the pleading. It has been sometimes decided that
it is not sufficient that they be referred to generally by the title or section. It is, however, believed to be
sufficient, in the absence of special legislative provision prescribing the manner of pleading, to set forth
the legal substance of that part of the ordinance alleged to have been violated, it being advisable, for
purposes of identification, to refer also to the title, date and section. The liberal rules of pleading and
practice which characterize modern judicial proceedings should extend to, and doubtless would be held
to embrace, suits and prosecutions to enforce the by-laws or ordinances of municipal corporations."
(Dillon on Corporations, sec. 413 (346).)
Second. It is contended further, that the ordinance having been enacted under authority of the
provisions of article 39, subsection (j) of Act No. 82 (The Municipal Code), and that Code having been
repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code, the ordinance should be deemed to have been
abrogated at the same time. It is sufficient answer to this contention to indicate that the Administrative
Code, while it repealed the Municipal Code, conferred upon and confirmed to all duly organized
municipalities the power to enact and maintain ordinances such as that now under consideration, in
substantially the same language as that found in the Municipal Code. (Cf. Administrative Code, sec. 2242,
subsets. (e) and (h).
Section 3 of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the provisions of that Code incorporating
prior laws shall be deemed to be made in continuation thereof, and to be in the nature of amendments
thereto, without prejudice to any right already accrued.
It follows that the enactment of the Administrative Code did not have the effect of abrogating or
repealing a municipal ordinance enacted and maintained in the exercise of a power confirmed to the
municipality by the code itself.
We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused; and conclude that the
judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.
Torres, Johnson, and Avanceña, JJ., did not sit in the case.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J.,
I concur. I am glad to note that this decision has the effect of nullifying the obiter dicta to be found in the
United States v. Ong Yec So ([1915] 31 Phil., 202) to the effect that "from the express terms of the
statute it is clear that the penalty prescribed in case of recidivism can be imposed only in those cases
wherein there has been a previous conviction under this statute, and that a former conviction under the
old law is not sufficient for that purpose."
Just as the Administrative Code is a "continuation" of the Municipal Code, so is the present Opium Law a
"continuation" of the anterior Opium Law.
G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES @
"Ross", defendants-appellants.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the Circuit Criminal Court
1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost proportionately.
There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970, three men barged at
the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The
gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun
at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds were
inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the abdominal region. Elino Bana did
not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away
from their house. The victim's wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded man was no
longer at home for he was already brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his
son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he was
brought to the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was
the fatal shot, and that appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at the time.
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and saw the appellant
Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at a distance of 1
1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo Madem
as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres were then with Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented the dying, declaration of
the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal Building took only about
thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon who was
fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting incident.
Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would have to take
down his written statement regarding the shooting incident, and the latter agreed. The latter was then in
agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and
the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Patrolman Feliciano that while
they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that he could not identify the persons
who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator in the police force since 1964. He should have
asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the Municipal Building why he said earlier
that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only
Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful
execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the identities of the appellants
to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against
their credibility. There is no evidence on record that they were asked by their relatives about the identity
of the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed appellants' identities as they did
to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident, during
a formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of Police when and where they executed their
respective sworn statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and sworn on the same date
before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana categorically stated that Elino Bana was
shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their house. He testified on direct
examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On cross examination, he said that he slept inside
their house. That does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on further questioning, he
said that the balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he heard the shots,
he jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The falsity of this statement has not
been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently show that there was no such
opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall grasses could obscure the back portion of the house
where the kitchen door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of gunfire. But that would
not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.
An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would otherwise have observed.
Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a keen edge. In some other
cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident to the impending peril may not be the
kind of excitement which confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize. the circumstance of
the threatened danger in order to avoid it.2
The appellants asserted in their briefs3 that "the evidence on record does not show that there was a moon
shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then
"a moonless night;" hence, Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized the appellants. This
position is untenable. Why?
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"4 and, under this rule, of the time when the moon
rises or sets on a particular day.5 This not withstanding and for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get
a certification from the Weather Bureau6 which shows that the moon was bright at the time of the
shooting incident. It reads:
To whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following astronomical data for
Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April 20, at 4:27 A.M.;
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees above the western horizon
with bearing of South 73 degrees West;
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon having occurred at 00.21
A.M. on April 22,1970.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez, Associate Justice, Supreme Court,
Manila.
For the Administrator:
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants for there is no doubt
as to their identities.
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI, appellant Raymundo Madera
was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that, the paraffin test having been
conducted fourteen days after the incident, the test could have given a negative result even if the appellant
had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have been washed
off by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400
meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana.
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres
because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter fired shots at
Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any
conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help Madera. Their
mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as co-principals or
accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, We held:
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or
agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a circumstance, it is not enough that the persons
supposedly engaged or connected with the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must
be established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators,
evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between and among the latter, such as by their overt
acts committed in pursuance of a common design. Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal
conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding
of its presence that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
offense itself.
The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an accomplice,
it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which may be
demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid
thereto whether physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It is an essential condition to the
existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal
and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid
in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way." ... From our view of the evidence it has not been
convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally,
through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest
intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. Such circumstances being
absent, his mere passive presence at the scene of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-
principal or an accomplice in the commission of the offense.7
This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of criminal cases that the
prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His finest hour is
still when, overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and
pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute
only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly
recommended the acquittal of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the appellant Raymundo
Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is hereby reversed as regards
appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of
the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is hereby
ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC
NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007 departing
from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an
action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating
petitioner's position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA)
breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith."
On appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there was a breach of contract on respondent
TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the
Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased
three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New
York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of
75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations
for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than
the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who
had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared
as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two."
Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los
Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked
lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among
the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed
to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied
boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his
daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated
because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two
tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract
of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower
court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision 1 dated January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion of which
states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:
(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets bought
by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York
City;
(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of Suthira Zalamea's
ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50, Philippine Currency,
representing the price of Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007,
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral damages for all the
plaintiffs'
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees; and
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter
of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States
and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud
nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked
and that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation on an overbooked
flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or negligence cannot under the circumstances be
considered to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-eight
(48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over discounted tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 3 dated October 25, 1991 states as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED in that the award
of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs is eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:
(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of Suthira
Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of Cesar Zalamea's
ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
(4) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari and alleged
the following errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
I.
IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT
HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.
II.
IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET AND PAYMENT FOR THE AMERICAN
AIRLINESTICKETS.
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to
board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.6 Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that
such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in
her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as
evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at
bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where
the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. 8 Since the tickets
were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers
concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals,9 where passengers with
confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues
a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and
the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not,
then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately
overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would
show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the
last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private respondent was not allowed to
board the plane because her seat had already been given to another passenger even before the allowable
period for passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed ticket and she had
arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating private respondent's
rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to
bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 11 where a would-be
passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from immigration all clearly and
unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was
denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to affirm the lower court's finding
awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 12 This is so, for a contract of
carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty to provide public service and convenience
to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the
switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 because there were only 138 confirmed
economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller planes, thereby sacrificing
the comfort of its first class passengers for the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention
and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration entitles the
passenger to an award of moral damages. 13
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not
informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have
confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on
overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the
latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written the name
of the passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained such a notice. An examination of
Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not offered for the purpose of showing the
existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first class of June
11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving
less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held
confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before departure
time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted tickets. The other two
petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding
priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue
raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were
incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that
there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that
petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of
boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the
assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented
confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could
easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute
amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners
under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA
liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future,
we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana Zalamea's ticket
because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the respondent court. Petitioners had
not shown with certainty that the act of respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her
daughter was due to inadvertence or deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did
not accede to said agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners and respondent
TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines tickets
purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and
Liana were constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they "opted not to
use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but because respondent TWA could not accommodate them
either on the next TWA flight which was also fully booked. 14 The purchase of the American Airlines tickets
by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA's unjustifiable breach of its
contracts of carriage with petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA
should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of its obligation. In the previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this
Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy
for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA
tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On this
score, we differ from the trial court's ruling which ordered not only the reimbursement of the American
Airlines tickets but also the refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have
enabled petitioners to fly from New York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code which
allows recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to incur
expenses to protect his interest. However, the award for moral damages and exemplary damages by the
trial court is excessive in the light of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped
off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and another P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice
under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to
petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets bought
by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York
City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a
premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered
essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after
midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly
learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to
know the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in
the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the
legal principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from
beginning to end. 2
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and
Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as
Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors
(members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for
Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation
to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues
of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by
the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and
the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting of foreign
exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national circulation had the effect of
repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court
contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven
cases aforementioned "for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no
more jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or
Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his
Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of
the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and
in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary
Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending
criminal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously
issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice purportedly as a matter
of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had announced the lifting of foreign
exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and
misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially released by
the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be effective shows his precipitate action
in utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which the People is also entitled to and
exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet come into
force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published and ascertained to be the
basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave
Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the comment of the
prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending
cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned from
the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates
set in the order of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11,
1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning,
in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard,
and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting for a motion
to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his
comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB)
circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange
controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only
on the basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the
President that the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs.
Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18,
1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the
President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment
by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the
consequence of their failures to respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements
of the President which had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No.
1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No.
1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the
accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that
assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have
been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake
committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can
reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were
reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how
much more for the lower courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as
he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat'
(to use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged
by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic)
does not affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB
Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him
to take judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that
the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of
dismissal on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the
President announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in
the future, because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends
to lift," foreign exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice,
violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first
instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the newspapers the filing
of the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately
resolve a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for
speedy disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section
16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section
111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular, in
turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353,
pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it
is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the
opportunity to file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against accused
Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In
effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report and
recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A.
Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in
CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently the other accused in
some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that the government has
lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said
that the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992
and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full confidence and credit to the
reported announcement of the Executive Department, specially from the highest official of that
department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, without
introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least the two newspapers cited above which are
reputable and of national circulation.
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56
Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was
held that the repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the
offense committed under the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal law fails to penalize the acts
which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it
the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violations
of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and
not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The Central
Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law
because violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic
Act 265, which penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the
Supreme Court decisions and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction,
this Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to do so
opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed
to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the petition, private respondent was
ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ
of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-
101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the accused,
without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper
reports announcing that the President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can become
effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1,
Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing
Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the
Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No.
1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he
was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos
is charged, was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the regulations on non-
trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision that with respect to violations
of former regulations that are the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by
the regulations existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost
jurisdiction over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss
by the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his resolution
would have been the result of deliberation, not speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he
is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the
basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and
so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account
which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the
supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of
common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation
which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial
notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not
yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of
a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order
of dismissal was issued.
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign
exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade
transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318
insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full
force and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which
has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending
actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations
are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318,
whereas the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists,
Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is not covered by the saving
clause in the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore
warrant a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on
non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations
of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as
such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions
or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms
of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the
accused in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations
of Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect.
Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the
existence of Circular No. 1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars
involved, he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially
similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including amendments
thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other
existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that
regulations, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall be considered
repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to
such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued
shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular
No. 960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which
were then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular
No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing
it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that
a judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as
to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should
possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more
important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have
confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor
is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that
belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should
show their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence
in their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should
be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government
of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he
seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the
general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond
the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction
of the law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the task of dispensing justice
and we see no reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the
reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation
lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is
beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be
well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect. It is
inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an
established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his
indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times
human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises,
this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity
to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial
of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license
for abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a
deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law. 26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to
dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution
inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how
carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result
of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or
prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived
the prosecution of its right to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent
was not sure of the effects and implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission he
was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from
requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can
but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through
his hat' and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB
Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give
the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might
not be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the
conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge." 29 At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright
dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially
affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy,
considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused.
This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not
for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction,
double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the
same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial
court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people
in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due
process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of
their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue
. . . which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or
an answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy
invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly
unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a
record of influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal
order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice
which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding
or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial
argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual,
or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no
explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and
cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent unedited
excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order dismissing the eleven
(11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of
the letter complaint without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a
Central Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was announced by the President of the
Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the government
has lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the
same date "The government yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only the President made the announcement
but also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the Monetary
Board arrived at the decision after noting how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, there was
no need to await the publication of the repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring
publication of laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as to how they will
conduct their affairs and how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In this particular case, with the
total lifting of the controls, there is no need to await publication. It would have been different if the circular
that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the accused was charged in the cases
dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed the cases but it
should be noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the President's announcement
of the lifting of controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other
words, it has already been lifted; the announcement did not say that the government INTENDS to lift all
foreign exchange restrictions but instead says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange
controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday lifted the last
remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the last remaining exchange
regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign exchange
regulations. The President has within his control directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines,
the Secretary of Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the policies of the
Central Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10, published the
following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do not apply to cases already
pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after report of said order
was published) and after the President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18,
1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules have nullified government cases against Imelda R. Marcos,
telling reporters that the charges against the widow of former President Marcos "have become moot and
academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note,
parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report
continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had
"corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice
Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases
pending in court and such a position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in August 11, 1992,
newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on the Presidential
announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his
financial and legal advisers, because no one bothered to advise the President to correct his
announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President had made another
announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered moot and academic. The
President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer.
It therefore behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters
of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange controls, designed, among
others to encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from
embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, these advisers have
chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to me, who only acted on the basis of
announcements of their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order,
or continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bidin, is on official leave.

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed
with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in Separate Opinions
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is,
accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that DISSENTING OPINION
respondent judge would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency
BELLOSILLO, J.:
thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto.
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB
discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases
Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a
has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous as to raise
plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law
doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision
and benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount
itself is insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial
seized, on the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent
independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement,
judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance
might become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the
of the law. 33
inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that -
ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an
accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating . . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to exercise his judgment
judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34 or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith, that in the
absence of malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held administratively responsible . . .
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and
for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying
infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference
decision he renders . . . would be nothing short of harassment or would make his position unbearable. 2
to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He
agencies or instrumentalities. 35 cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision
rendered by him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
the law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the
such acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general principle of the highest importance to proper administration of
name of the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36
justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity
the accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of
of malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of the judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it to the instant case.
gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November
rendering an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37
1986 as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel A product of the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum
T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to laude, and placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for
dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors
against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after
President Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all
foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him
the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority
on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been reversed by the appellate court,
which reversal has now become final for failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage
has been caused except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as
adverted to, the overturned order alone does not necessarily make respondent judge liable
administratively, much more civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be
gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. 8Plainly said, fault in this regard may exist only
when the error appears to be deliberate or in bad faith. 9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that "there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in
several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without
qualification, and immediately effective," 10 and, second, for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal
cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some
interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well
understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he
insists that there really is no need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely
shows that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to await publication. Whether his belief
is erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not
inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of
the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary
principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of
jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the
crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action
should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to respondent judge. Good
faith means that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was in fact what the actor ascribes to
it, that is, that what he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that
the bases for the criminal charges against accused have been eliminated and thus strikes down the
information and consequently dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or
even administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses
protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from
being held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise that no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. 17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the prosecution, even if the accused
invoked the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very much available. Precisely,
as has been pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when the
prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct
indiscretions of lower court judges - which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if
respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be
heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would
have been proper and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this
Court affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that "[w]hen a person
seeks administrative sanction against a judge simply because he has committed an error in deciding the
case against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher court for review and correction, the
action of such person can only be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before the appellate court, and
consequently invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order, 19 may be
indulging in needless speculation. And to imply that the influence of the accused who is a prominent public
figure brought about the dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered as grossly erroneous to merit
his dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal of his decision
by the appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as even the President of the Republic, with his
learned legal advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed by his administration against the
accused, was quoted as saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign exchange
deregulation policy of his administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex
deregulation applies to everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs. Marcos,
numbering about 11 out of 90 have become moot and academic because of the new regulations that have
come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her advantage." 21 Where the conclusions of the judge in
his decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so.
But the cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes suspicion especially from the successful
appellant who feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to a particular
instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of
justice under such system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a
particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have
detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must interpret the books, and not
unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and established jurisprudence, his own
personality, character, convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and
unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no more and no less human, his own beliefs,
perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on
his eventual choice. Thus, Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States once wrote of
judges: "We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with
any eyes except our own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the Court of
Appeals and this Court, have continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly conforming with
what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from
this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective dispensers of everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt, that respondent judge issued
the assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment proceedings
before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to
be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate
Justice of this Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to
defer the basic concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings
of this character being in their nature highly penal, the charge must, therefore, be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. To paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such an exacting standard has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the one challenging the same to
prove want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required, complainant-prosecutors in the
instant case failed to prove the absence of good faith on the part of the respondent judge. Consequently,
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge
Dizon, 29respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of Customs
without any relief against the accused, the former likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00 to the
accused. Thus, respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross ignorance of the law, but also of gross
incompetence, and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was
consequently dismissed from the service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier administrative case,
respondent judge, after his reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4)
different cases of illegal possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly
demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge is either grossly incompetent
or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike former
Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is being administratively charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found respondent guilty of "serious misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an accused
who was charged with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral intervention in brokering a compromise
of the criminal cases" against the accused, and thereafter for granting the motion to dismiss the rape case
on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly,
the actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are far worse than the complained indiscretions
of herein respondent Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he was charged with a litany of administrative cases,
six (6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While
not all the charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly
elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant
for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, (and)
exhibits indifference to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically,
capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed, "[t]he different
acts of misconduct proven against respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and to
continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of the
extreme sanction of dismissal from the service." There is nothing in the records of the instant case which
shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant and unaccepted theories
which breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent aggravated her ignorance of the law by her refusal to
abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open
defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not only found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but
also of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge
who entertained the petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding
unrefuted allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the
appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other case, 35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on
respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued a
warrant of arrest and set the case for arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent ruled that a judge cannot be
condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith
or that he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T.
Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus
his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records that the respondent's
assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a
misjudgment, but not a deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent
judge from the service is not proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence of judges
and send the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office without fear of reprisal,
merely for expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain eventual justice
only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but these are necessary evils
which must be endured to some extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing
down his decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while this Court may
slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession,
it must also step forward and take the lead to defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to
shame and disgrace not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As champion —
at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the
judiciary of unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which
serve no other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court must be
circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent judgments handed
down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience shows, are no
longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with creditable
distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith and then
shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the ultimate dream of
every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or
discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases
has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous as to raise
doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision
itself is insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial
independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement,
might become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the
inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that -
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to exercise his judgment
or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith, that in the
absence of malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held administratively responsible . . .
for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders . . . would be nothing short of harassment or would make his position unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He
cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision
rendered by him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general principle of the highest importance to proper administration of
justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity
rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of
the judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November
1986 as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino.
A product of the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum
laude, and placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for
dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors
against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after
President Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all
foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him
the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority
on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been reversed by the appellate court,
which reversal has now become final for failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage
has been caused except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as
adverted to, the overturned order alone does not necessarily make respondent judge liable
administratively, much more civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be
gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. 8Plainly said, fault in this regard may exist only
when the error appears to be deliberate or in bad faith. 9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that "there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in
several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without
qualification, and immediately effective," 10 and, second, for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal
cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some
interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well
understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he
insists that there really is no need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely
shows that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to await publication. Whether his belief
is erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not
inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of
the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary
principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of
jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the
crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action
should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to respondent judge. Good
faith means that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was in fact what the actor ascribes to
it, that is, that what he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that
the bases for the criminal charges against accused have been eliminated and thus strikes down the
information and consequently dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or
even administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses
protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from
being held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise that no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. 17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the prosecution, even if the accused
invoked the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very much available. Precisely,
as has been pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when the
prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct
indiscretions of lower court judges - which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if
respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be
heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would
have been proper and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this
Court affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that "[w]hen a person
seeks administrative sanction against a judge simply because he has committed an error in deciding the
case against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher court for review and correction, the
action of such person can only be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before the appellate court, and
consequently invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order, 19 may be
indulging in needless speculation. And to imply that the influence of the accused who is a prominent public
figure brought about the dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered as grossly erroneous to merit
his dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal of his decision
by the appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as even the President of the Republic, with his
learned legal advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed by his administration against the
accused, was quoted as saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign exchange
deregulation policy of his administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex
deregulation applies to everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs. Marcos,
numbering about 11 out of 90 have become moot and academic because of the new regulations that have
come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her advantage." 21 Where the conclusions of the judge in
his decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so.
But the cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes suspicion especially from the successful
appellant who feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to a particular
instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of
justice under such system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a
particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have
detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must interpret the books, and not
unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and established jurisprudence, his own
personality, character, convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and
unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no more and no less human, his own beliefs,
perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on
his eventual choice. Thus, Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States once wrote of
judges: "We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with
any eyes except our own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the Court of
Appeals and this Court, have continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly conforming with
what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from
this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective dispensers of everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt, that respondent judge issued
the assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment proceedings
before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to
be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate
Justice of this Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to
defer the basic concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings
of this character being in their nature highly penal, the charge must, therefore, be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. To paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such an exacting standard has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the one challenging the same to
prove want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required, complainant-prosecutors in the
instant case failed to prove the absence of good faith on the part of the respondent judge. Consequently,
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge
Dizon, 29respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of Customs
without any relief against the accused, the former likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00 to the
accused. Thus, respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross ignorance of the law, but also of gross
incompetence, and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was
consequently dismissed from the service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier administrative case,
respondent judge, after his reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4)
different cases of illegal possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly
demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge is either grossly incompetent
or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike former
Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is being administratively charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found respondent guilty of "serious misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an accused
who was charged with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral intervention in brokering a compromise
of the criminal cases" against the accused, and thereafter for granting the motion to dismiss the rape case
on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly,
the actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are far worse than the complained indiscretions
of herein respondent Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he was charged with a litany of administrative cases,
six (6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While
not all the charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly
elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant
for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, (and)
exhibits indifference to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically,
capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed, "[t]he different
acts of misconduct proven against respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and to
continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of the
extreme sanction of dismissal from the service." There is nothing in the records of the instant case which
shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant and unaccepted theories
which breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent aggravated her ignorance of the law by her refusal to
abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open
defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not only found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but
also of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge
who entertained the petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding
unrefuted allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the
appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other case, 35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on
respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued a
warrant of arrest and set the case for arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent ruled that a judge cannot be
condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith
or that he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T.
Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus
his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records that the respondent's
assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a
misjudgment, but not a deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent
judge from the service is not proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence of judges
and send the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office without fear of reprisal,
merely for expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain eventual justice
only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but these are necessary evils
which must be endured to some extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing
down his decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while this Court may
slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession,
it must also step forward and take the lead to defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to
shame and disgrace not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As champion —
at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the
judiciary of unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which
serve no other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court must be
circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent judgments handed
down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience shows, are no
longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with creditable
distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith and then
shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the ultimate dream of
every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
THE HEIRS OF FELICIDAD CANQUE namely: SURVIVING SPOUSE MARCELINO and children MARIANO,
LEONILO, PERFECTA, MEXIQUELA, EMILIO, MARCELINO JR., ALEJANDRO, the Heirs of JESUS and
ADRIANO, all surnamed CANQUE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE RURAL BANK OF MATANAO
(DAVAO DEL SUR), INC, and/or CONRADO ANTONIO, respondents.
DECISION
In deciding this appeal, this Court reiterates the dictum that the mortgagor of titled real estate acquired
under the Public Land Act but foreclosed by a rural bank, may redeem said property within two (2) years
from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale; and if the said mortgagor fails to exercise such right,
he or his heirs may still repurchase the land within five years from the expiration of the two-year
redemption period. It also finds occasion to remind lower courts to keep abreast of decisions of this Court
and apply them in resolving identical cases before them.
Statement of the Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking annulment of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] promulgated on August 25, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 39807, reversing the trial
courts[3] decision.[4] The latter tribunal disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the court hereby decrees: amending in part the partial
judgment:
1.) Allowing the plaintiff to redeem the mortgaged properties by paying the amount of the purchase price
with interest thereon at the rate of one per centum per month up to the date of her deposit of the
redemption price and ordering the defendant to accept payment from the plaintiff;
2.) Dismissing[5] all the claims and counterclaims that the parties may have against each other in
connection with this case.
SO ORDERED.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts as found by the Respondent Court of Appeals appear undisputed. They are as follows:
Spouses Marcelino Canque and Felicidad Canque were the registered owners of a parcel of land under
Original Certificate of Title No. P-(20559)-3409, of the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur issued by virtue
of Free Patent No. 40336, with an area of 2 hectares, 43 ares, and 58 centares. On May 21, 1976, said
spouses sold a portion of the parcel of land to the Iglesia ni Kristo Church to the extent of 750 square
meters. A new Transfer of Title No. T-8730 was issued to said spouses by the Register of Deeds of Davao
del Sur. On October 12, 1977, said spouses obtained a loan of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) from
defendant bank secured by a real estate mortgage over the parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-8730 with an area of 23, 608 square meters.
The spouses loan of P15,000.00 with the defendant bank was duly paid.
On February 2, 1980, Felicidad Canque passed away. More than a month later, on March 7, 1980, widower
Marcelino Canque obtained by himself, another loan with defendant bank in the amount of P25,000.00
with the same conjugal property under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8730 as collateral. The defendant
bank allegedly considered this second loan as an extension of the first loan as the real estate mortgage of
the first loan had remained uncancelled, despite the earlier payment of the first loan by the said spouses.
For failure of Marcelino Canque to pay the second loan, defendant bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real
estate mortgage and sold the property to itself as the highest bidder in a public sale.
On September 9, 1983, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered. On October 18, 1985, defendants
executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. On December 23, 1985,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357 was issued in the name of defendant bank by the Register of Deeds
of Davao del Sur.
After seven years from the registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, plaintiffs Marcelino Canque and
his children offered to redeem the property in question but defendant bank refused. Hence, the complaint
filed before the lower court on September 7, 1990.
After hearing on the merits, the lower court first issued a partial judgment on January 8, 1992, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, partial judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the real estate mortgage between the plaintiffs and defendants valid; and
2. Allowing the plaintiffs to exercise their right of redemption and/or repurchase pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 119, of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
(p. 5, Partial Dec.;p. 74, Orig. Rec.)
On August 24, 1992, the lower court issued the earlier stated amended decision.
Dissatisfied with the verdict of the lower court plaintiffs appealed to the Court [of Appeals].
The principal issue posed in this appeal is whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that plaintiff Mario
Canques right of redemption as well as that of the other plaintiffs-appellees, heirs of Felicidad Canque, has
not prescribed.
In the case of Achuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434, the Supreme Court reiterated the express provision of law as
follows:
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 states:
Every reconveyance of land acquired under the free patent homestead provisions, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the
date of conveyance.
In the case of Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 619, the Supreme Court made the
following pronouncement:
In the case of Reyes vs. Noblejas and Santos (G.R. No. L-23691, November 25, 1967, 21 SCRA 1027 at pp.
1029-1030) the Supreme Court upheld the contention of the Land Registration Commission, as follows:
x x x Section 6 of Act 3135 should be applied to the present case together with: (1) Sections 30 to 35 of
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court with regard to redemption; (2) Section 27, Rule 39 of the said Rules
and Section 71 of Act 496 with regard to the filing (registration) of the sheriffs certificate of sale; and (3)
Section 50 of Act 496, with regard to the registration of the certificate of sale so as to consider the land
conveyed and affected under the Land Registration Act.
and that:
x x x. Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the certificate of sale executed by the
sheriff in a public auction sale must be filed (registered) in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
province where the land is situated. This is mandatory requirement. Failure to register the certificate of
sale violates the said provision of law and, construed in relation with Section 50 of the Land Registration
Law (Act 496), shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land covered by a torrens title because the
act of registration is the operative act to convey and effect the land. So the redemption period, for
purposes of determining the time when a final deed of sale may be executed or issued and the ownership
of the registered land consolidated in the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act 3135,
should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the office of the register of
deeds concerned and not from the date of the public auction sale. x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)[6]
The respondent appellate court disagreed with the trial courts decision, viz.:
Clearly, the lower court erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellees redemption period commenced on October
18, 1985, date of defendants-appellants execution of an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed
of absolute sale. The correct date to reckon with the start of the plaintiffs-appellees prescriptive period of
five years is September 9, 1983, the date of the registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale.Plaintiffs-
appellees instant suit to compel defendants-appellees to allow them to redeem the property was only
filed on September 7, 1990, or almost seven (7) years from the registration of the Sheriffs certificate of
sale, or beyond the five-year prescriptive period as provided under Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act
141. Thus, plaintiffs-appellees right of redemption had already prescribed.
All is not lost, however for the plaintiffs-appellees as heirs of Felicidad Canque for the lost right of
redemption of the parcel of land in question only applies to the conjugal share of 50% of plaintiff Marcelino
Canque considering that at the time the second loan of P25,000.00 was entered by said plaintiff with
defendant bank, his spouse Felicidad Canque, who had a share of the other 50% of the conjugal property,
had already passed away (Art. 185, New Civil Code). Thus, when plaintiff Mario Canque entered into the
said loan agreement with defendant bank giving the parcel of land in question as security in the form of
real estate mortgage, it was only valid insofar as his 50% of the conjugal property share from the said
parcel of land is concerned. Defendant-appellant bank had acquired, therefore, no right over the other
50% of the conjugal property pertaining to the late Felicidad Canque which share of 50% automatically
passed to her heirs, herein plaintiffs-appellees from the moment of her (Felicidad Canque) death (Art. 777,
New Civil Code).[7]
Hence, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 2688 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered by the Court as follows:
1. Plaintiff-appellee Mario Canques right of redemption insofar as 50% of the property in question has
already prescribed, and defendant-appellant banks title and ownership of the said 50% of the property are
declared incontrovertible by the Court (of Appeals).
2. Declaring the second deed of real estate mortgage over the parcel of land in question insofar as 50% of
it is concerned as void as it pertained to the conjugal share of the late Felicidad Canque which share of
50% should rightfully pass to her heirs, herein plaintiffs-appellees.
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the province of Davao Del Sur to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-18357 and to issue two new Transfer Certificates of Title, one to plaintiffs-appellees under the name
Heirs of Felicidad Canque, and another one to the Rural Bank of Matanao, Inc. at 50% each of the property
in question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357.
4. Dismissing all claims and counterclaims of the parties against each other in this case.
5. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[8]
Not satisfied with the above, petitioner filed this recourse to this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners submit the following assignment of errors:
I --The Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in holding that the period to repurchase of
foreclosed lands issued thru free patent by Rural Banks is only five (5) years.
II --The Court of Appeals erred in not passing upon the issue of whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage
is a continuing mortgage so as to also secure future loans by the husband after the death of the wife.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Prescriptive Period to Repurchase
In Rural Bank of Davao City vs. Court of Appeals,[10] this Court, through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
explicitly and cogently ruled:
x x x If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under R. A. No. 720, as amended, the mortgagor may redeem
the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure or from the registration of the sheriffs
certificate of sale at such foreclosure if the property is not covered or is covered, respectively, by a Torrens
title. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within
five (5) years from the expiration of the two (2) year redemption period pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public
Land Act (C.A. No. 141). If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may
redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No.
3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the
expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act.
In the case at bar, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered on September 9, 1983. Thus, based on the
foregoing dictum, the petitioners, whose land was mortgaged to and foreclosed by a rural bank, had a
period of two years or until September 9, 1985 to exercise their right of redemption. And in line with the
mandate of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, they had an additional period of five years from the latter date
or until September 9, 1990 to exercise their right to repurchase. Thus, the petitioners right to redeem their
land had not expired on September 7, 1990 when they filed suit against private respondent to compel the
latter to allow the former to repurchase their land.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error because it palpably failed to consider in its
August 25, 1994 Decision the aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court promulgated twenty months
earlier on January 27, 1993. Unfortunately, this is not the first time for this Court to come upon such a
slip. Peltan Development vs. Court of Appeals[11] ruled that every court must take cognizance of decisions
this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice xxx [and] more
importantly form part of the legal system. We stress that members of the bench have a responsibility to
know and to apply the latest holdings of the Supreme Court. The nature of their calling requires no less.
Second Issue: Factual Finding of Continuing Mortgage
Whether the mortgage which the Canque spouses contracted with private respondent bank was intended
by the parties to be a continuing one, a factual issue passed upon sub-silencioby the Court of Appeals, had
been threshed out by the trial court. Finding that the parties did contemplate a continuing credit
arrangement, the trial court aptly reasoned:
If it were not indeed the intention of the parties that (the property) mortgaged shall serve as a continuing
security not only for the first loan of P15,000.00 but also for subsequent loans, the natural thing for the
mortgagor to have done under the premises was to ask for the return of the title covering the property
mortgaged to the defendant and consequently ask for the discharge and/or cancellation of the annotation
on the title.
These the plaintiff did not do, as then, it was their intention to avail of subsequent loans from
defendants. Besides, the alleged full payment of the first loan of P15,000.00 was not clearly shown to have
caused the discharge and/or cancellation of the real estate mortgage constituted therefor. The (trial court)
believes that the full payment alleged is a situation obtaining in a continuing credit secured by mortgage
whereby the payment on a particular day equalled the amount of the mortgage. In such a situation, the
mortgage is not discharged as long as subsequent loans and/or advancements may be demanded, as
plaintiff actually did in this case by obtaining the second loan of P25,000.00.
The argument of plaintiffs that the surviving spouse, Marcelino Canque cannot mortgage the property to
secure the loan of P25,000.00 because his wife had died and therefore he was not the absolute owner of
the mortgaged property, must fall as it was not convincingly shown that the defendants had knowledge of
the wifes death at the time the loan of P25,000.00 was obtained.
Lastly, it is indeed absurd for the defendant bank, considering the nature of its business, not to require
collateral for the loan of P25,000.00 when it did for the lesser loan of P15,000.00.
The fact is, and this the (trial court) believes, plaintiffs and defendants had agreed to have a continuing
credit arrangement secured by a real estate mortgage. With this arrangement, plaintiffs first secured the
loan of P15,000.00 and after liquidation thereof, they obtained another loan of P25,000.00 with the same
property as collateral.[12]
In this issue, we defer to the well entrenched doctrine that factual findings of the trial court shall not be
disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked or ignored some fact or circumstance of sufficient
weight or significance which, if considered, would alter the situation.[13] After a thorough review of this
case, the Court finds both lower courts did not overlook any such fact or circumstance. Hence, their factual
finding as to the parties intention in entering into a real mortgage under a continuing credit/mortgage
arrangement is binding upon this Court.In any event, this issue is really academic in view of our holding on
the first question.
In sum, we rule that the disposition of the Regional Trial Court allowing the redemption is correct although
for a different reason, and that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to add the two-year redemption period
to the five-year repurchase right granted by the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 2688 allowing petitioner to redeem the subject property
is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO DUMANON y DUMANACAL and RICARDO
LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias RIC-RIC, accused-appellants.
DECISION
Accused-appellants Mario Dumanon y Dumanacal (hereafter MARIO) and Ricardo Labrador y Suacillo
(hereafter RICARDO) appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, in
Criminal Case No. 4247, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the complainant Anacurita Anib (hereafter
ANACURITA) the amount of P20,000 as moral damages and the costs of the suit.
On 3 December 1993, Dominga Anib filed a complaint for rape[2] against MARIO and RICARDO on behalf of
her mentally retarded daughter ANACURITA before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tagana-an-
Sison, Surigao del Norte. The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 993, alleged that ANACURITA is a
retardate and the crime was committed at midnight of 2 December 1993. Submitted in support of the
complaint was a medical certificate[3] issued by the Surigao Provincial Hospital and the affidavits[4]of
Dominga Anib, Eduardo Diaz and Anita Lisondra.
After conducting a preliminary examination, the MCTC found a prima facie case for rape, confirmed the
arrest and detention of MARIO and RICARDO without bail, and required them to submit their counter-
affidavits. Instead of filing their counter-affidavits, MARIO and RICARDO filed a joint motion to dismiss the
case on the grounds that the crime of rape cannot be prosecuted de oficio and the complaint was not
signed by the offended party, there being no proof that the latter was incapacitated.
In its resolution[5] of 10 January 1994, the MCTC ruled that the complaint was properly filed by the mother
of ANACURITA since the latter is a retarded woman and stated that by merely looking upon the victim, the
Court finds that indeed Anacurita Anib is a retarded woman. It also found probable cause that MARIO and
RICARDO committed the crime charged and forwarded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing
of the information.
On 24 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Surigao del Norte filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Surigao del Norte a complaint[6] for rape, bearing the thumb mark of ANACURITA and approved
by the Provincial Prosecutor. The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4247 and assigned to Branch
30 thereof, alleges as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of December 1993, at 12:00 oclock [sic] midnight, more or less, at Barangay
Aurora, Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused with full freedom and intelligence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by
means of violence and intimidation, and taking advantage of nighttime drag MISS ANACURITA ANIB y
DUMANACAL inside the vacant house of Jaime Batac and have carnal knowledge of herein complainant
against her will.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and in an uninhabited place.
MARIO and RICARDO sought for a reinvestigation of the case. They questioned the unsigned complaint for
rape and alleged that ANACURITAs filing of the complaint belied her mental incapacity. Moreover, she
never gave a categorical statement that she was raped. The defense further asserted as hearsay the
statement of Dominga Anib and Anita Lisondra in their affidavits that ANACURITA confessed to them that
she was raped. They also assailed the prosecution for its failure to present any eyewitness. Finally, they
maintained that they were deprived of their right to submit their counter-affidavits.
The prosecution opposed the motion for reinvestigation. It claimed that MARIO and RICARDO were
actually required but failed to submit their counter-affidavits. Moreover, since it was already resolved that
ANACURITA is a retardate, thus mentally incapacitated, the law recognizes the right of her mother to file
the complaint on her behalf. However, as stated in the decision of the trial court, MARIO and RICARDO
abandoned the motion and instead proceeded with the arraignment wherein they separately entered a
plea of not guilty.[7]
Trial on the merits started only on 2 June 1994 and was completed on 22 November 1994. In its decision
the trial court attributed the delay to postponements at the instance of both the prosecution and the
defense, especially that the parties, being related, manifested for a possible settlement of the case. The
prosecution presented as witnesses ANACURITA, Dominga Anib, Eduardo Dizon and Dr. Gregoria Beberino-
Comelon.
ANACURITA testified in court seven months after she was raped. She was then thirty-eight years
old. According to her she knew MARIO and RICARDO as they were her friends and townmates. In the early
evening of 2 December 1993, she was in the municipal gymnasium of Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte,
watching a parade of gays. At about 11:00 p.m. she left and headed for her home in barangay Aurora,
Tagana-an. As she was walking, she passed by RICARDO who was then sitting on a bench, apparently
drunk. Suddenly, RICARDO blocked her way. She tried to break free but he continued to obstruct her
way. Then he pulled her and brought her to the deserted house of Jaime Batac, which was just about nine
meters away from her home. Inside the house, RICARDO stripped off his clothes and immediately removed
her underwear. He then placed his penis inside her vagina. After satisfying his lust, RICARDO ran
away. Then she put on her underwear. After a few minutes, MARIO, who was likewise drunk, entered
Jaimes house, pulled her down and undressed her. Mario inserted his penis inside her vagina and just like
RICARDO ran away after the sexual intercourse. ANACURITA went home and told her mother what had
happened.[8]
Dominga Anib testified that MARIO and RICARDO are her neighbors and that the former is even her
relative. In the evening of 2 December 1993, ANACURITA was out watching a show at the municipal
gymnasium. At about midnight she was awakened by her husband who told her that ANACURITA had not
yet arrived. When she turned on the light, she heard the protesting voice of her daughter coming from the
house of Jaime Batac. She went to the house and dragged ANACURITA home. ANACURITA was holding her
underwear and her hair and dress were soiled. She asked ANACURITA if any man did anything to
her. ANACURITA told her that she had just been raped by RICARDO and MARIO inside Jaimes
house. Accompanied by Eduardo Diaz, Dominga immediately reported the incident to the barangay
captain and then later, to the police. On 4 December 1993, Dominga brought ANACURITA to the Provincial
Hospital of Surigao del Norte for examination. The turn of events caused Dominga to suffer shame and
embarrassment.[9]
According to Eduardo Diaz, he knew MARIO and RICARDO. MARIO is a close friend and relative. He, MARIO
and RICARDO and the Anibs reside along the same street. On 2 December 1993, Eduardo was in the
municipal gymnasium to watch a show. He left for home at 10:00 p.m. Along the way he saw MARIO and
RICARDO. When he arrived home, he learned that there was no more kerosene for the lamps. He went
out to buy kerosene and a cigarette at the store next door. He saw MARIO at the store who asked a
cigarette from him. He obliged and then went back home. He wanted to eat; but when he found out that
there was no more food, he decided to request some viand from MARIO. On the road he saw MARIO going
inside the house of Jaime Batac. So, he returned home. Later, he heard the voice of Dominga Anib from
her house berating her weeping daughter ANACURITA. He overheard that ANACURITA came from the
house of Jaime Batac, which was near the house of the Anibs. Dominga ordered ANACURITA to stay
upstairs while she went out of their house. It was about midnight.
Dominga saw Eduardo and sought his help. Eduardo accompanied Dominga to the barangay captain, Mr.
Jaime Pelarco.[10] The latter looked for RICARDO and MARIO, who were eventually arrested and detained.
Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon physically examined ANACURITA on 4 December 1993 and issued the
corresponding medical certificate.[11] She noted a fresh hymenal laceration at 6 oclock and a hematoma
on the thigh. The laceration could have been caused by an erect male penis while the hematoma was
probably inflicted by a fist blow. She also found a vaginal discharge of yellowish and whitish substance. She
had the specimen brought to the laboratory for examination for the presence of sperms. However, she
was not informed of the results of the examination.[12]
Only MARIO testified for the defense while RICARDO opted not to take the witness stand.
MARIO claimed that he and ANACURITA, his distant cousin, were lovers. On the evening of 2 December
1993 he was also at the municipal gymnasium to watch a coronation event. At about 10:15 p.m. he decided
to go home and along the way, he saw ANACURITA and they talked by the fence of Jaime Batacs house. He
confessed his love for her and he suggested if it was possible for them to have sexual
intercourse. ANACURITA nodded her head in consent and replied that she had yearned to bear a child at
her age. They talked for ten minutes.ANACURITA invited him inside the abandoned house of Jaime so that
they would not be seen by her mother. Inside Jaimes house, he asked her again if he could have sexual
intercourse with her. She consented. ANACURITA had no reaction at all during their sexual intimacy. After
they were done, he escorted her to her house and then he walked toward his house. He immediately heard
Dominga Anib scold ANACURITA. Dominga demanded to know where she came from and why she arrived
late. In the early morning of the following day the police arrested and detained him.[13]
After the defense rested its case the trial court required both parties to submit their respective
memoranda. The parties waived the submission thereof.
The trial court rendered its decision of 21 June 1995. It specifically noted therein the trial judges personal
impression which he entered in his personal notes that ANACURITA is a mongoloid (physically) and
mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions. While conceding that ANACURITAs
narration of how she was sexually abused by the accused-appellants was not detailed, it nevertheless
concluded that it was candidly told by one who is mentally deficient. She was able to show and convince
the Court that she, in fact, was taken advantage of by the two drunken neighbors. It gave full credence to
her testimony, which was supported by the medical findings. It held that MARIO and RICARDO, especially
the former, who is her cousin, knew of ANACURITAs mental condition. It ruled that (e)vidently, Anacurita
Anib, in her retarded understanding, was overcome with shock, fear and, otherwise, intimidated by her
two drunken neighbors, who accosted her.
The trial court characterized MARIOs version as simply out of this world, and even assuming that it was
what has happened, it only manifests that the victim is, in fact, abnormal, not capacitated to give a valid
consent.
The trial court also considered RICARDOs silence as an admission of the charge against him. The trial court
then decreed:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, MARIO DUMANON Y DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR Y
SUACILLO, alias Ric-Ric, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized in
Article 355, of the Revised Penal Code, and metes out the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify
complainant-victim Anacurita Anib the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos moral damages,
jointly and severally, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the accessory
penalties, provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
On 13 July 1995, MARIO and RICARDO seasonably appealed from the decision, which the Court accepted
on 23 September 1995. However, there was an undue delay in the filing of the Appellants Brief, and
counsel for accused-appellants had to be fined before he finally filed the Appellants Brief on 19 July 1999.
In their Appellants Brief, MARIO and RICARDO allege that:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
COMMITTED ON A MENTAL RETARDATE WHEN THE INFORMATION ACCUSES THEM OF RAPE COMMITTED
ON A WOMAN WITH THE USE OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS A MENTAL RETARDATE IN THE
ABSENCE OF CLEAR MEDICAL OR EXPERT EVIDENCE SHOWING SUCH ABNORMAL PHYSICAL AND MENTAL
CONDITION.
3. NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION ATTENDED THE SEX ACT BETWEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND THE
COMPLAINANT.
MARIO and RICARDO underscore the fact that the complaint filed with the court below alleges that the
rape was committed with the use of force and intimidation and hence they cannot be held guilty of rape
committed on a mental retardate since this circumstance was never alleged in the Complaint. Neither can
they be liable for rape committed with the use of force and intimidation since the same was not sufficiently
proven by the evidence for the prosecution.
MARIO and RICARDO emphasize that their conviction was based on the trial courts conclusion that
ANACURITA is a mental retardate. Such a conclusion has no basis since no medical or expert opinion
categorically affirming such condition was offered by the prosecution. Accordingly, they pray for their
acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) refutes the errors raised by MARIO and
RICARDO. It counters that the trial court did not convict MARIO and RICARDO of rape of a mental retardate
deprived of reason, but of simple rape through force and intimidation, although not necessarily employed
with immense measure but one that was sufficient for the victim not to resist. The force contemplated by
law in the commission of rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. The only
requirement is that force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had
in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.
The OSG asserts that in this case the trial court found that ANACURITA was mentally deficient, as revealed
by its personal notes quoted in its decision, its forbearance in allowing the prosecution to proceed with
leading questions during her direct examination due to her difficulty in comprehending and responsively
answering the questions, and in acknowledging the observation of the MCTC judge in his Resolution that
ANACURITA was different from or less than those of a fully functioning adult. Hence, the degree of force
needed to overwhelm her is less. The force which may not be sufficient for the rape of a normal person,
may be more than enough when employed in the rape of a mentally deficient person, like ANACURITA.
The OSG further asseverates that rape committed against a feeble-minded victim does not require the use
of physical force since the commission of the sexual act constitutes the force itself. There was thus no
need to establish that ANACURITA is a mental retardate since her rape was attendant with force and
intimidation. It also points out that the attempt of MARIO and RICARDO to settle the case was an implied
admission of their guilt.
Finally, the OSG seeks an award of civil indemnity to ANACURITA in the amount of P50,000 and an increase
of the award of moral damages from P20,000 to P50,000.
We sustain the conviction of MARIO and RICARDO.
On the issue of whether or not ANACURITA is a retardate, as correctly pointed out by the defense, no
expert testimony was offered to prove that, indeed ANACURITA is a retardate.But, this matter gains
importance if, in fact, the trial courts conviction for rape was based on a finding that her retardation was
of such an extent that she was deprived of reason or that she had mental age of a child of less than 12
years old. As will be shown later, such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar, for we agree with
the trial courts finding that MARIO and RICARDO are guilty of rape by the use of force and intimidation.
It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical evidence.[14] Thus,
it is our considered opinion that for purposes of determining whether ANACURITA is mentally normal or
does not have the mental capacity of a normal person, the personal observation of the trial judge would
suffice as a measure of determining the impact on her of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO and
RICARDO vis-a-vis the legal requirement to prove the commission of the crime of rape.
The original complaint,[15] filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte
by Dominga Anib on behalf of ANACURITA, alleged that ANACURITA is a retardate. The translation of the
affidavit[16] of Dominga Anib, which was submitted in support of the original complaint, alleged that
ANACURITA is not mentally normal. During the preliminary examination Dominga testified that
ANACURITA is mentally retarded.[17] The Resolution[18]of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-
Sison, Surigao del Norte categorically declared that by merely looking upon the victim, ANACURITA is
indeed a retarded woman.
The transcript of stenographic notes is also replete with particulars on ANACURITAs mental A No, also sir.
condition. When she first testified, the trial court ordered to make it on record the physical appearance of
the witness [ANACURITA] having [a] hard time in understanding the question of the interpreter, and that Q There was not even an attempt on your part to free your hand?
she is mentally deficient. As she continued with her testimony, it further observed that she had difficulty
A I struggle [sic], sir.
answering the questions and, under the circumstances, it allowed leading questions during her direct
examination.[19] Q How did you attempt to free your hand?
The appealed decision likewise bears the trial courts personal impression that ANACURITA appears to be A (Witness indicating her answer by pulling her hand towards the right side of her body reaching as far as
mongoloid (physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions. [20] We his palm as her palm towards her right side).
often call a person who is suffering from mongolism as a mongoloid. Mongolism is a condition
characterized by a small, anteroposteriorly flattened skull, short, flat-bridged nose, epicanthus, short- Q But you were not able to free your hand?
phalanges, and widened space between the first and second digits of hands and feet, with moderate to
severe mental retardation and associated with a chromosomal abnormality.[21] It is known A I was able to free my hand.
as mongolism because its physiognomic features are suggestive of those normally exhibited by the
Q So when you succeeded in freeing your hand from the grabs [sic] of Ricardo Labrador you did not make
Mongolian race.[22] It is also known as Downs Syndrome.[23] Hence, the courts can take judicial notice of the
an attempt to run away?
appearance and features of those suffering from mongolism and based thereon, conclude that a victim,
like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid. A I was not able to run, it did not occur to my mind.
Having established that ANACURITA is a retardate even in the absence of an expert opinion thereon, we Q Even if you were able to free your hand from the grab of Ric-Ric still you went with Ric-Ric towards the
shall now determine if MARIO and RICARDO were properly charged with rape by means of force and house of Jaime?
intimidation. A thorough review of the assailed decision supports the findings and conclusion of the trial
court that ANACURITA was indeed raped by means of force and intimidation. ANACURITA in her testimony A I try [sic] to run away but he blocked my way.
declared that while she was on her way home, RICARDO, then drunk, blocked her way, pulled her toward
the uninhabited house of Jaime Batac and once inside the house he undressed her and took off her panty xxx
and inserted his penis into her vagina.[24] After he was through, RICARDO ran away. Then later MARIO
Q And when Mario Dumanon arrived, did he say anything to you?
arrived.MARIO pulled ANACURITA and also inserted his penis into her vagina.[25]
A None.
The blocking, the holding of the hand, the pulling towards an uninhabited house, the removal of the panty
and the fact that both MARIO and RICARDO were in a state of drunkenness, were enough force and Q Without talking to you Mario Dumanon removed his pants?
intimidation considering the mental state of ANACURITA.
A Yes, sir.
The use of force or intimidation was further shown in the cross-examination of ANACURITA by defense
counsel, Atty. Medina, thus: xxx

xxx Q As a matter of fact when he removed your pantie [sic] you did not resist by telling him not to do that to
me?
Q Lets go to that testimony of yours that Ricardo Labrador grab [sic] you to the house of Jaime Batac, how
did Ricardo Labrador grab you? A He was also drunk.

A He pulled me. Q And when he pulled you to lie down with him because he was already lying down, you did not pushed
[sic] him away?
xxx
A He was drunk.
Q So you went [sic] to tell the Court that Ric-Ric was just leading you towards the house of Jaime and not
dragging you with the used [sic] of one hand? Q You could have run away by pushing his hands but you did not, is it not a fact of the situation?

A He pulled me, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q You did not shout when Ric-Ric Labrador was pulling you towards the house of Jaime? Q Although you knew that you could have run away yet you did not run away?

A No, sir. A The door is too small.

Q You did not also pulled [sic] back your hand to free it from the hand of Ricardo Labrador? Q Whether the door is small or not yet there is [sic] no attempt on your part to run away?
A No, sir.
Q You did not even shout for help?
A No, sir.[26]
Furthermore, the hematoma found on the victims left thigh as shown by the medical certificate issued by
the examining physician[27] is physical evidence of the use of force in the consummation of the beastly act.
It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. In
the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. When the victim is a retardate the
force required to overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used against a normal adult.[28] Thus, the
degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when
employed against an imbecile.[29]
With the foregoing disquisition, MARIO and RICARDO were correctly convicted of rape under the first
circumstance of Article 335, i.e. by the use of force or intimidation. Once the elements of force and
intimidation were properly alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial, as in this case, the
conviction becomes a matter of course. As correctly assessed by the OSG, the conviction for rape decreed
by the trial court was not based on the fact that ANACURITA is a mental retardate, but on the use of force
and intimidation. The mental retardation of ANACURITA was only a circumstance which the trial court
considered in evaluating the degree and extent of the force and intimidation.
We also take note of the trial courts pronouncement[30] that accused-appellants manifested a possible
settlement of the case. The offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[31]
Finally, as regards the civil aspects in this case, in accordance with current jurisprudence[32] we grant the
award of P50,000 as civil indemnity for the rape of ANACURITA, and the increase of moral damages
from P20,000 to P50,000 even without proof thereof.[33]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao City, Branch 30, finding accused-appellants
MARIO DUMANON y DUMANCAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias RIC-RIC, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification
that they are further ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 to the complainant
ANACURITA ANIB, and the amount of moral damages awarded to the latter is increased from P20,000
to P50,000.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
HERNANDO GENER, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DE LEON and ZENAIDA FAUSTINO, respondents.
DECISION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 1997
in CA-G.R. SP No. 37346 reversing the Decision[2] dated April 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11 in Civil Case No. 370-M-93 which set aside the Decision[3] dated February 19, 1993 of
the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan in a forcible entry case filed by respondents spouses
Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino against petitioner Hernando Gener.
The forcible entry case was initiated on April 30, 1990 before the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray,
Bulacan. The respondents, as plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the original claimants and actual
possessors in good faith under a bona fide claim of ownership of a parcel of agricultural land situated at
Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of approximately Four Thousand Four Hundred Four (4,404)
square meters. The said parcel of land and the adjoining lots on the north and south thereof were originally
part of the course or bed of the Angat River which was formerly adjacent thereto and the boundary on the
east or north-east of Lot No. 1050, Cad-350, plan Ap-03-003056, covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-1208 (M) of respondent Gregorio de Leon.[4]
During the big flood in 1978, the Angat River allegedly changed its course by moving more than one
hundred (100) meters far to the east or north-east, leaving its former course or bed along the eastern or
north-eastern boundary of Lot No. 1050 which is elevated so that the said lot dried up. Then, the
respondents extended their occupation and cultivation to this elevated and dried up land, planting and
cultivating thereon coconuts, bananas and vegetables until May 8, 1989 when petitioner allegedly through
force, threat and intimidation, unlawfully entered the property and deprived respondents of the
possession thereof, removing the barbed wire fence placed by respondents on the northern boundary of
the land in dispute and transferred it to the eastern boundary. Since demands to vacate fell on deaf ears
and subsequent efforts toward amicably settling the dispute through the Barangay Justice System proved
futile, respondents instituted the complaint for forcible entry against the petitioner.[5]
Petitioner, as defendant in the ejectment case, denied the material allegations of the complaint. Instead,
he alleged that he is the real owner and lawful and actual possessor of the land in dispute evidenced by a
notarized deed of sale executed on October 10, 1988 by Benjamin Joaquin, heir of the previous owner,
Proceso Joaquin. Upon acquisition of the land in dispute, he immediately caused the declaration of the
land for taxation purposes in the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Norzagaray, Bulacan and paid realty
taxes thereon. Further, he claimed that the land is a private land which was previously owned by Proceso
Joaquin and that the said fact is admitted and recognized by Gorgonio de Leon, the late father and
predecessor-in-interest of respondent Gregorio de Leon, in an affidavit he executed on November 13, 1961
in which he mentioned Proceso Joaquin as a neighboring landowner in the east of his land.
Petitioner further averred that it was respondents who forcibly entered his lot in question as evidenced
by two (2) criminal cases which petitioner filed, namely, (a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for malicious mischief
against Rosendo Buen and Ignacio Cadungcol alias Lolong, two (2) alleged helpers of the land of Gregorio
de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on October 24, 1988 and destroyed coconut trees,
papaya and langka trees which belonged to petitioner, and (b) Criminal Case No. 4043 against Hugo de
Leon and Rolly de Leon, brothers of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on March
12, 1989 and destroyed mango trees and other plants belonging to the petitioner Gener. Thus, considering
that his occupation of the land in dispute allegedly started on October 10, 1988, the Municipal Trial Court
has no jurisdiction over the action since the forcible entry suit filed by respondents was filed beyond the
one year period.[6]
Thereafter, trial ensued with Ignacio Cadungol, Teodoro Mendoza, Andres Palad, Balagtas P. San Pedro,
Marcelino Samson, Norman Maclang and respondent Zenaida Faustino testifying for the plaintiffs
(respondents herein) in the ejectment case, while petitioner Gener was the sole witness for his
defense. The Municipal Trial Court condensed their respective testimonies in this manner:[7]
xxx xxx xxx
For the plaintiffs, Ignacio Cadungol testified that he is a helper, caretaker and overseer of plaintiffs in their
lot in Sitio Pulo, Barangay Tabtab, Norzagaray, Bulacan, for the last twenty (20) years; that the lot he is
working on as an overseer is bounded on the western portion previously by a river, the northern portion
by Andres Palad, southern portion by the property of Miguel Sarmiento and on the eastern portion by
Uyong Sison; he does not know a person by the name of Proceso nor Benjamin Joaquin but knows
defendant Hernando Gener as the one who is occupying a neighboring lot having planted his lot with
coconut, langka, mango trees and who has a house in his occupied lot consisting of galvanized iron and
hollow blocks, a fact he knew they being neighbors for five (5) years; the lot of Hernando Gener is fifty (50)
meters away from the farm of which he is an overseer; he started occupancy of the lot even during the
lifetime of Gorgonio de Leon, father of Gregorio de Leon, one of the plaintiffs; that the western portion
subject matter of this case prior to the time it submerged was previously occupied by Sendo a relative of
Gorgonio de Leon and after the big flood occasioned by typhoon Dading in 1978 re-surfaced and was
continued to be possessed by Gregorio de Leon and is now declared for taxation purposes in his name but
which is now and since 1989 being physically possessed by Hernando Gener and had planted langka trees
which are now four (4) feet in height; that Hernando Gener destroyed the banana trees which he planted
by Rolly Gener running them over with his jeep on the pretext that he would just pass by but had instead
caused them to be planted with banana trees and other improvements which fact he reported to the
owner Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino and for which he had been scolded.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, in the meanwhile, in the absence of the defendant who is still abroad, the parties through
counsels agreed to present another plaintiffs witness in the person of Teodoro Mendoza, who in brief
testified knowing plaintiffs and defendant, the latter being the husband of his grand-daughter; that he
farmed a tomana near the tomana being then farmed by Gorgonio de Leon during his lifetime even before
Pre-War and upon his death, Gregorio de Leon took possession by introducing improvements like coconut
and mango trees; that he saw Hernando Gener in the lot being litigated only in the year 1990.
Likewise for the plaintiffs, Andres Palad, 70 years of age, testified merely to corroborate Teodoro
Mendozas testimonies that the De Leon father and son had long been in occupation of Lot No. 1050 and
that Hernando Geners lot is adjacent only to that of Gorgonio de Leon.
Zenaida Faustino de Leon, plaintiff, testified that she and her husband had actually been in possession of
the land subject matter of this case since she got married to Gregorio de Leon in 1950 as well as their titled
lot; that she has a Sketch Plan as surveyed by Delfin Bumanglag, Geodetic Engineer (Exh. C) where they
introduced improvements like banana, coconut trees, kaimito, papaya and langka trees; that they were
informed by their overseer Ignacio Cadungol in Marikina, Metro Manila that Rolly Gener, son of the
defendant and who is even her cousin, destroyed the banana plants and that Rolly Gener would replace
them with new ones but claimed ownership instead and fenced the premises; that the land is declared in
their name under Tax Declaration No. 13621 (Exh. K) and under Property Index No. 020-13-001-04-037
(Exh.I) and had paid taxes therefor (Exh. J)..
Another witness, Balagtas P. San Pedro, Tax Mapper Supervisor of the Provincial Assessors Office, Malolos,
Bulacan, testified that per their record and in accordance with their Sketch Plan (Exh. M) prepared by the
Municipal Assessors Office prepared by their personnel, the property adjoining Lot No. 1050 with an area
of 4,404 square meters is owned by plaintiffs Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino.
On cross examination, witness admitted that she is not in a position to know who is the actual possessor
of the property but issued that only to determine the tax due and assessment thereon; that she is not
involved in the issuance and preparation of the tax declaration.
Marcelino Samson, Municipal Draftsman of the Municipal Assessors Office and Norma Maclang, Local
Assessment Officer IV, Malolos Bulacan, dwelt mainly on the circumstances that are in amplification of
how the tax declaration and sketch plan were prepared.
For his defense, Hernando Gener declared that he did not forcibly enter plaintiffs lot on October 10, 1988
as alleged in the complaint but it is the plaintiffs who forcibly entered his lot which he bought from
Benjamin Joaquin, son of Proceso Joaquin, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed before Judge Filomeno
Pascual (Exh. I) after which he cleared (hinawan) and planted mangoes, bananas, camias and other plants;
that the land he bought had not been possessed by Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino as they are
residing at Santos St., Norzagaray, Bulacan, which is five hundred (500) meters away from the lot he
bought. After buying the property, Ignacio Cadungol together with others entered the property so he filed
Criminal Case No. 4043 also before this Court (Exh. E). Thereafter, he caused the land to be declared under
Tax Declaration No. 13400 (Exh. 2) and paid taxes for the same (Exh. 3): that Tax Declaration No. 1512 (Exh.
5) for Gorgonio de Leon which he secured at the Municipal Assessors Office even showed Proceso Joaquin,
father of Benjamin Joaquin, as boundary owner of the small portion on the east and abutting to that of
Agapito Gener and Sinforosa Torres. For the current year, he had paid taxes under Official Receipt No.
0023591 (Exh. 3-B). That in fact, in the Salaysay dated November 13, 1961 executed before Atty.
Raymundo R. Cruz, (Exh. 8) Gorgonio de Leon, father of the plaintiffs, admitted Joaquin as one of his
boundary owners; that for the filing of this case, he suffered damages and other ordeals of litigation as
well as attorneys fees.
xxx xxx xxx
After weighing the conflicting evidence, the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan rendered
judgment[8] dated February 19, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant,
ordering:
1. the defendant and/or all persons claiming right under him to vacate the portion described in Tax
Declaration No. ARP-4675 and described in the Sketch Plan marked as Exhibit M;
2. the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P1,000.00 as litigation expenses;
3. the defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as attorneys fees;
All other plaintiffs claim are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, on April 3, 1995, the said court rendered
a decision reversing the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, and thereby dismissed herein
respondents complaint for forcible entry.[9] In its decision, the Regional Trial Court sustained petitioners
claim of ownership of the property in dispute by virtue of having bought such property from the heir of
the former owner thereof. The Regional Trial Court also declared that petitioner has been in possession of
the disputed property since October 10, 1988.
Insisting on the validity of their cause, respondents interposed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court.[10] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution promulgated on September 16, 1997.[11] Hence, the instant petition for review before this Court
anchored on twelve (12) assignment of errors, to wit:[12]
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING THE
CASE IN VIEW OF THE FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENTS TO ALLEGE IN THE COMPLAINT PRIOR POSSESSION
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY FILED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
NORZAGARAY, BULACAN (ANNEX K) WAS FILED BEYOND THE ONE-YEAR REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF LACHES
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE CASE WAS FILED WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING AND/OR MISAPPREHENDING FACTS OF VALUE AND SUBSTANCE WHICH IF
CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE RESULT OF ITS JUDGMENT, SUCH AS (1) THE FILING OF CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF AGAINST ROSENDO BUEN AND IGNACION CADUNGOL FOR
HAVING ENTERED THE LAND OWNED AND POSSESSED BY THE PETITIONER AND DESTROYED PLANTS
THEREIN ON OCTOBER 24, 1988 NEGATING RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT PETITIONER ENTERED THE SAME
ON MAY 8, 1989 THROUGH FORCE, THREAT AND INTIMIDATION; (2) THE ENTRY INTO THE LAND FOR THE
SECOND TIME AND DESTRUCTION OF THE BARBED WIRE AND PLANTS BY HUGO AND ROLLY DE LEON,
BROTHERS OF RESPONDENT GREGORIO DE LEON AND IGNACIO CADUNGOL AND OTHERS, ON MARCH 12,
1989 AT 2:00 OCLOCK P.M.
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION DISREGARDING THE
JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF ADRIANO DE GUZMAN, GORGONIO DE LEON, AND GREGORIO SISON DECLARING AND
RECOGNIZING PROCESO JOAQUIN AS A BOUNDARY OWNER ON THE SOUTH ALONG WITH GORGONIO DE
LEON, OF THE LAND WHICH ADRIANO DE GUZMAN SOLD TO PETITIONER, AS A DECLARATION AGAINST
INTEREST UNDER SEC. 28 OF RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND BINDING UPON RESPONDENTS AS
ADMISSION BY PRIVIES UNDER SEC. 31 OF THE SAME RULE.
6. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE DISPUTED PROPERTY FORMED PART OF THE PURCHASE PACKAGE,
MEANING THE SALE OF ADRIANO DE GUZMANS LAND TO PETITIONER HERNANDO GENER, WHICH FINDING
IS OBVIOUSLY GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES NECESSITATING
THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF REVIEW BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
7. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT THE INITIAL OCCUPANT OF THE CONTESTED LOT, THE SAME BEING THEN IN THE
POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS (NOW RESPONDENTS) WHOSE PRESENCE THEREAT DATES BACK TO 1978,
WITHOUT CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THEY ARE BASED. AGAIN, SAID FINDING IS BASED
ON CONJECTURES AND SURMISES.
8. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER FORCIBLY EXCLUDED RESPONDENTS FROM THE LOT IN QUESTION WITH THE OUSTING FORCE
COMING IN THE FORM OF MAN AND MACHINE. PETITIONERS SON ROLLY GENER AND HIS RAMMING JEEP,
WHICH FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
9. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AGAIN ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN, BRANCH 11 TREATED THIS CASE AS AN ACCION PUBLICIANA TO
DETERMINE WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD THE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION WHICH HOLDING IS
ERRONEOUS AS THE RTC OF BULACAN MERELY HELD THAT PETITIONER HAD SHOWN BY CLEAR AND
CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY SINCE OCTOBER 10, 1988.
10. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING PREPONDERANTLY THAT PETITIONER DID IN FACT AND IN TRUTH
START OCCUPYING THE LOT IN QUESTION ON OCTOBER 10, 1988 BY ENCLOSING IT WITH BARBED WIRE
AND PLANTING THE SAME TO COCONUTS, MANGOES, LANGKA, BANANAS, ETC.
11. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN DATED APRIL 3, 1995, AND UPHOLDING THE
QUESTIONABLE DECISION RENDERED ON FEBRUARY 19, 1993 BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT PRESIDED
BY JUDGE BASA.
12. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
NORZAGARAY, BULACAN SHOULD HAVE TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PENDENCY OF CRIMINAL CASE
NUMBER 3998 FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF AGAINST ROSENDO BUEN AND IGNACIO CADUNGOL FILED BY
P/SGT. JOSE S. SISON, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE NORZAGARAY POLICE STATION FOR ENTERING THE LOT
IN QUESTION ON OCTOBER 24, 1988 AT 9:00 P.M. AND DESTROYED THE BARBED WIRE FENCE AND SOME
OF THE PLANTS BELONGING TO PETITIONER HERNANDO P. GENER (EXHIBIT 6).
All the foregoing issues raised by the petitioner essentially question the factual findings of the appellate
court as appearing in its assailed decision, contending that such findings do not have any factual
moorings. He avers that the appellate court disregarded evidence showing his prior possession of the
disputed property which negate the alleged cause of action of the respondents for petitioners ejectment.
In petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from
the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law.[13] For a question to be one of law, it must
involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them.[14] Thus, the findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court which is not
a trier of facts. Although if said factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record, this Court will
not hesitate to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts. [15] In the instant case, we find
sufficient basis to deviate from the rule since the extant evidence and prevailing law support a finding
different from the conclusion of the appellate court.
It bears stress that in ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of
the party-litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself.[16] Ejectment does not depend on title for relief; the criterion is the right to
possession.[17] Thus, priority in time should be the pivotal point in resolving the issue of possession.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court[18] requires that in actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is
allegedly deprived of the possession of land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth
and that the action shall be filed within one year from the time of such unlawful deprivation of
possession. This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the defendant is unlawful
from the beginning as he acquired possession thereof by unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege and
prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof
by the defendant. The one year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry by the defendant on the land.[19]
To support their allegation of prior possession, herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the ejectment case,
primarily relied upon the testimonies of Ignacio Cadungol, Teodoro Mendoza, Andres Palad, Balagtas P.
San Pedro, Marcelino Samson, Norman Maclang and respondent Zenaida Faustino. The appellate court
made much of the testimony that it was petitioner who forcibly excluded respondents from possession of
the land on May 8, 1989. In the words of the appellate court, the ousting force came in the form of man
and machine: [petitioners] son Rolly Gener and his ramming jeep.
However, the Municipal Trial Court and Court of Appeals totally overlooked the fact that while petitioner
was his own sole witness, his testimony of prior possession was substantiated by several documentary
evidence,[20] which were quite damaging to the existence of respondents alleged cause of action for
forcible entry. This Court noted that there were two (2) incidents that occurred on October 24, 1988 and
March 12, 1989 which resulted in the institution by herein petitioner of criminal complaints for malicious
mischief.
These two (2) incidents, are the subject of: (a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for malicious mischief against
Rosendo Buen and Ignacio Cadungol alias Lolong, two (2) alleged helpers of the land of respondent
Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on October 24, 1988 and destroyed coconut
trees, papaya and langka trees which allegedly belonged to the petitioner, and (b) Criminal Case No. 4043
against Hugo de Leon and Rolly de Leon, brothers of respondent Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered
the disputed land on March 12, 1989 and destroyed mango trees and other plants which allegedly
belonged to the petitioner. These twin incidents, evidenced by Sinumpaang Salaysay and
Complaint[21] show that prior to May 8, 1989, the alleged date of forcible entry of petitioner, petitioner
was already in possession of the disputed land.
As against the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents that they were forcibly ejected from
the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989, the documentary evidence of petitioners prior possession, more
particularly the evidence of the two (2) incidents of October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989, must
prevail. Oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written
or documentary evidence,[22] especially when said documentary evidence is not opposed. As Judge Limkin
of Georgia once said, I would rather trust the smallest slip of paper for truth than the strongest and most
retentive memory ever bestowed on mortal man.[23]
The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have taken judicial notice of the said criminal cases
involving the subject parcel of land and pending in its docket. While, as a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge,[24] this rule is subject to the exception that "in the
absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any
part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before
it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated."[25] Respondents did not impugn nor object to
the evidence of petitioner on the existence of the said criminal cases of malicious mischief that sprung
from the alleged forcible entry of petitioners alleged property. Thus, the said Municipal Trial Court should
have taken judicial notice of these facts in resolving the issue of prior possession.
In view of the evidence on the possession of petitioner prior to May 8, 1989, as shown by the incidents on
October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989, the cause of action of respondents for forcible entry against the
petitioner has already prescribed when they filed the complaint for ejectment on April 30, 1990. Because
forcible entry cases must be filed within one year from the date of actual entry on the land.[26] Forcible
entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar to the ejectment suit is in pursuance of the summary
nature of the action.[27] After the lapse of the one year period, the remedies of the party dispossessed of
a parcel of land is to file either an accion publiciana which is a plenary action to recover the right of
possession or an accion reinvindicatoria which is an action to recover ownership as well as for the recovery
of possession.[28] Consequently, since respondents cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed, the
Municipal Trial Court was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject ejectment case.
In view of the conclusions we have thus reached, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in
the petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37346 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for forcible entry
is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SIENA REALTY CORPORATION, as represented by LYDIA CO HAO and LILIBETH MANLUGON, petitioner,
vs. HON. LOLITA GAL-LANG, as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch 44; ANITA CO NG in trust
for ROCKEFELLER NG; and the COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL 13TH DIVISION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court is the
September 13, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 59096, Siena Realty
Corporation, as represented by Lydia Co Hao and Lilibeth Manlugon v. Hon. Lolita O. Gal-lang, as Presiding
Judge of Br. 44 of the RTC of Manila, and Anita Co Ng in trust for Rockefeller Ng.
Since the petition attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in the issuance
of subject resolution, what should have been filed was one for certiorari under Rule 65. On this score
alone, the petition must be denied due course.
But even if technicality were set aside, just the same the petition fails.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on June 7, 2000 or allegedly on the
60th day from their receipt of the March 23, 2000 Order of Branch 44 of the Manila Regional Trial
Court denying their motion for Reconsideration of said courts Order dismissing, on motion of private
respondent, their complaint.
The Court of Appeals, by Resolution[1] of June 20, 2000, dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari,
however, for being filed out of time, it holding that:
Per records, it appears that petitioners had only until May 29, 2000 within which to file the Petition for
Certiorari considering the following:
1. Petitioners received a copy of the October 20, 1999 Order denying their [counsels] Notice of Withdrawal
[and likewise denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dismissing their complaint] on
November 8, 1999;
2. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 20, 1999 Order on November 17, 1999; and
that
3. Petitioners received a copy of the March 23, 2000 Order denying their motion for reconsideration on
April 8, 2000.
The instant petition was filed on June 7, 2000 or nine (9) days late.
Thus, for being belatedly filed, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioners thereupon filed (on July 10, 2000) a motion for reconsideration[2] of the above-said June 20,
2000 Order of the appellate court.
In the meantime, this Court issued in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Reglamentary Period to File Petitions for
Certiorari and Petition for Review on Certiorari) a Resolution dated August 1, 2000 approving the
amendment to the following provision of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order, resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of
a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment, order or
resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The amendment to Sec. 4, Rule 65, which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads:
SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law
or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of its Order of June 20, 2000,
denied, by Resolution of September 13, 2000,[3] said motion in this wise:
xxx
From the argument espoused by petitioners counsel, it appears that he overlooked the provision of second
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended per Supreme Court Circular
dated July 21, 1998, which provides as follows:
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment, order or
resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Verily, the sixty (60) day period within which to file a Petition for Certiorari is not counted from the date
of the receipt of the denial of Motion for Reconsideration, but from the date of the receipt of the
questioned order or decision, except that such 60-day period is interrupted upon the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, for reason above-stated, the instant motion is DENIED. Consequently, the present Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED with finality. (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar, petitioners challenging the September 13, 2000 Resolution of the appellant
court as having been
. . . ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS IT WAS MADE WITHOUT TAKING PRIOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF SUPREME COURT A.M. NO. 00-2 - 03 SC WHICH RESOLUTION TOOK EFFECT ON SEPTEMBER 1,
2000, AND WHICH AMENDED THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.[4] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners argument is well-taken.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration before it, the
Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of this Courts resolution in A.M. Matter No.
00-02-03 SC. The resolution did not have to specify that it had retroactive effect as it pertains to a
procedural matter. Contrary to private respondents allegation that the matter was no longer pending and
undetermined, the issue of whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed was still pending
reconsideration when the amendment took effect on September 1, 2000, hence, covered by the its
retroactive application.
The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, petitioners petition fails as stated early on. The order
of the trial court granting private respondents Motion to Dismiss the complaint was a final, not
interlocutory, order and as such, it was subject to appeal,[5] not a petition for certiorari. At the time
petitioners filed before the appellate court their petition for certiorari on the 60th day following their
receipt of the October 20, 1999 Order of the trial court denying their Motion for Reconsideration of its
dismissal order, the said October 20, 1999 Order had become final and executory after the 15 th day
following petitioners receipt thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCELINA L. SERO, ET AL.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the May 12, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159, which
reversed the June 14, 2001 and August 10, 2001 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 8, in Civil Case No. CEB-24012. Also assailed is the September 12, 2006 Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 6, 1999, respondents, through their attorney-in-fact Anecito Invento, filed a complaint against
several defendants for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of several Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs), four of which are registered in the names of the petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) and the Republic. They alleged that the subject properties were owned by their
predecessor Ysabel Limbaga, but the Original Certificates of Title were lost during the Second World War.
Respondents alleged that the mother of therein defendants Ricardo Inocian, Emilia I. Bacalla, Olympia I.
Esteves and Restituta I. Montana pretended to be "Isabel Limbaga" and fraudulently succeeded in
reconstituting the titles over the subject properties to her name and in selling some of them to the other
defendants.2
It will be recalled that the subject properties were acquired by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
through expropriation proceedings for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport,3 which was
granted by the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. R-1881, on December
29, 1961. Subsequently, however, Lahug airport was ordered closed on November 29, 1989,4 and all its
functions and operations were transferred to petitioner MCIAA 5 after its creation in 1990 pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, otherwise known as the Charter of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority.
In its Answer, petitioner denied the allegations in the complaint and by way of special and affirmative
defenses moved for the dismissal of the complaint. Likewise, defendants Ricardo Inocian, Haide Sun and
spouses Victor Arcinas and Marilyn Dueñas filed their separate motions to dismiss.
On June 14, 2001, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the respondents had no cause of
action, and that the action was barred by prescription and laches.6 Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied; hence, they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed
the Orders of the RTC. The appellate court held that the complaint alleged "ultimate facts" constituting
respondents' cause of action; that the respondents cannot be faulted for not including therein "evidentiary
facts," thus causing confusion or doubt as to the existence of a cause of action; and assuming the complaint
lacked some definitive statements, the proper remedy for the petitioner and other defendants should
have been a motion for bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss. Further, the determination of whether
respondents have a right to recover the ownership of the subject properties, or whether their action is
barred by prescription or laches requires evidentiary proof which can be threshed out, not in a motion to
dismiss, but in a full-blown trial.7 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders dated 14 June 2001 and 10 August 2001, both issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 in Civil Case No. CEB-24012, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. We are also directing the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 8 to REINSTATE the case, and to conduct a TRIAL ON THE MERITS and thereafter
render a decision.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, it was denied in a Resolution dated September 12,
2006.9 Hence, this petition for review based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST PETITIONER IN CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-24012.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES AND THAT THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION, IF ANY, HAS PRESCRIBED. 10
Respondents argue that the properties which were expropriated in connection with the operation of the
Lahug Airport should be reconveyed to the real owners considering that the purpose for which the
properties were expropriated is no longer relevant in view of the closure of the Lahug Airport.11
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its elements
are the following: (1) the legal right of plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.12 The existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint.13 Thus, in the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in
cases like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts
alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally
partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations made
in a complaint.14
However, while a trial court focuses on the factual allegations in a complaint, it cannot disregard statutes
and decisions material and relevant to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a
motion to dismiss, every court must take judicial notice of decisions this Court has rendered as provided
by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,15 to wit:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction
of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.
In reversing the Orders of the RTC, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the decision of this Court
in Mactan-Cebu International Airport v. Court of Appeals,16 rendered on November 27, 2000, which settled
the issue of whether the properties expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881 will be reconveyed to the
original owners if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was
to be used other than the expansion or improvement of the Lahug airport.
In said case, the Court held that the terms of the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 were clear and
unequivocal. It granted title over the expropriated land to the Republic of the Philippines in fee simple
without any condition that it would be returned to the owners or that the owners had a right to repurchase
the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be
used other than as the Lahug airport.17 When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.18
Had the appellate court considered the import of the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport v. Court
of Appeals, it would have found that respondents can invoke no right against the petitioner since the
subject lands were acquired by the State in fee simple. Thus, the first element of a cause of action, i.e.,
plaintiff's legal right, is not present in the instant case.
We are not unaware of the ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority,19concerning still another set of owners of lands which were declared expropriated in the
judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881, but were ordered by the Court to be reconveyed to their previous
owners because there was preponderant proof of the existence of the right of repurchase. However, we
qualified our Decision in that case, thus:
We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and
do not overrule them. Nonetheless the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as regards the
properties of respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, must be
commensurate to the facts that were established therein as distinguished from those extant in the case at
bar. Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and inconclusive evidence, while in the instant case we have
preponderant proof as found by the trial court of the existence of the right of repurchase in favor of
petitioners.20 (Emphasis provided)
Thus, the determination of the rights and obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated
but the public purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsist, must rest on the
character by which the titles thereof were acquired by the government. If the land is expropriated for a
particular purpose with the condition that it will be returned to its former owner once that purpose is
ended or abandoned, then the property shall be reconveyed to its former owner when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned. If, on the contrary, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple
title, as in this case, then the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator. Non-use of the
property for the purpose by which it was acquired does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired
in the expropriation proceedings.21
Even assuming that respondents have a right to the subject properties being the heirs of the alleged real
owner Ysabel Limbaga, they still do not have a cause of action against the petitioner because such right
has been foreclosed by prescription, if not by laches. Respondents failed to take the necessary steps within
a reasonable period to recover the properties from the parties who caused the alleged fraudulent
reconstitution of titles.
Respondents' action in the court below is one for reconveyance based on fraud committed by Isabel
Limbaga in reconstituting the titles to her name. It was filed on July 6, 1999, or 38 years after the trial court
in Civil Case No. R-1881 granted the expropriation, or even longer if we reckon from the time of the
fraudulent reconstitution of titles, which date is not stated in the complaint but presumably before the
complaint for expropriation was filed by CAA on April 16, 1952.22
An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another's name.23 However, such action must be filed within 10 years from
the issuance of the title since the issuance operates as a constructive notice.24 Thus, the cause of action
which respondents may have against the petitioner is definitely barred by prescription.
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence
on record that the action is already barred by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Further, contrary to respondents' claim that a complaint may not be dismissed based on prescription
without trial, an allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss when the
complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has prescribed25 at the time it was filed.
Thus, in Gicano v. Gegato:26
We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it
may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative
defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration;
or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings,
or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent
on the record: either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the
evidence.27 (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, although the complaint did not state the date when the alleged fraud in the
reconstitution of titles was perpetuated, it is however clear from the allegations in the complaint that the
properties sought to be recovered were acquired by the petitioner in Civil Case No. R-1881 which was
granted by the trial court on December 29, 1961. Clearly, the filing of the action in 1999 is way beyond the
ten 10 year prescriptive period.
Further, while it is by express provision of law that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule
that even a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue
of laches.28 The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned it or declined to assert it also casts doubt on the
validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a
bar in a court of equity.29
Respondents' inaction for a period of 38 years to vindicate their alleged rights had converted their claim
into a stale demand. The allegation that petitioner employed threat or intimidation is an afterthought
belatedly raised only in the Court of Appeals. As such it deserves scant attention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The May 12, 2006 Decision and
September 12, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 dated June 14, 2001 and August 10,
2001 in Civil Case No. CEB-24012, dismissing respondent's complaint for reconveyance on grounds of lack
of cause of action, prescription and laches and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively,
are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPLICO VS NEDA
RESOLUTION
Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion[1] dated October 26, 2007 of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which states:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an Indorsement dated October 24, 2007,
the Legal Service of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it of the
Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project (see
attachment[2]). That said, there is no more justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to
resolve. WHEREFORE, public respondents respectfully pray that the present petitions be DISMISSED.
On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSGs manifestation and motion and required petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 178830, 179317, and 179613 to comment.
On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in G.R. No. 178830, filed his Consolidated Reply and
Opposition,[3] opposing the aforequoted OSG Manifestation and Motion, arguing that:
66. Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and Chinese President Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26 October 2007
Manifestation and Motion thus depriving petitioners of the opportunity to comment thereon a mere
verbally requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal
has been permanently scrapped.
67. Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving, especially without the Notes of the
Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao to support its
allegations or other proof of the supposed decision to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal. Public respondents
can certainly do better than that.[4]
Petitioner Suplico further argues that:
79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of the present Petition have been rendered moot (which is
vehemently denied), this Honorable Court, consistent with well-entrenched jurisprudence, may still take
cognizance thereof.[5]
Petitioner Suplico cites this Courts rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,[6] Rufino v. Endriga,[7] and Alunan III v.
Mirasol[8] that despite their mootness, the Court nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on
the merits due to the Courts symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by formulating guiding
and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and rules.
On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) and Nathaniel Sauz, petitioners in G.R. No. 179317,
also filed their comment expressing their sentiments, thus:
3. First of all, the present administration has never been known for candor. The present
administration has a very nasty habit of not keeping its word. It says one thing, but does another.
4. This being the case, herein petitioners are unable to bring themselves to feel even a bit reassured that
the government, in the event that the above-captioned cases are dismissed, will not backtrack, re-transact,
or even resurrect the now infamous NBN-ZTE transaction. This is especially relevant since what was
attached to the OSGs Manifestation and Motion was a mere one (1) page written communication sent by
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to the OSG, allegedly relaying that the
Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the NBN project x x x due to several reasons and
constraints.
Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues
raised in the petition, which among others, included the Presidents use of the power to borrow, i.e., to
enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent
mootness.
On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to file respondents reply to petitioners comments on its
manifestation and motion.
On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents reply, reiterating their position that for a court to exercise its
power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot
or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.[9]
Respondents also insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice the
government or public interest. Explaining the nature of the NBN Project as an executive agreement,
respondents stress that it remained in the negotiation stage. The conditions precedent[10] for the
agreement to become effective have not yet been complied with.
Respondents further oppose petitioners claim of the right to information, which they contend is not an
absolute right. They contend that the matters raised concern executive policy, a political question which
the judicial branch of government would generally hesitate to pass upon.
On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. Appended to it is the Highlights
from the Notes of Meeting between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao,
held in XI Jiao Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on October 2, 2007. In the Notes of Meeting, the Philippine
Government conveyed its decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project due
to several constraints. The same Notes likewise contained President Hu Jintaos expression of
understanding of the Philippine Government decision.
We resolve to grant the motion.
Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The individual
prayers in each of the three (3) consolidated petitions are:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:
1. Upon the filing of this Petition, pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, issue forthwith an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining respondents, their subordinates,
agents, representatives and any and all persons acting on their behalf from pursuing, entering into
indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal;
2. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed
upon with ZTE Corporation;
3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the
revised Rules of Court; and,
4. Annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal, and compel public respondents
to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts
and public bidding for the NBN contract.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz respectfully pray as follows:
A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and conditioned upon the posting of a bond in such
amount as the Honorable Court may fix, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued directing the Department of Transportation and Communication, the Commission on
Information and Communications Technology, all other government agencies and instrumentalities, their
officers, employees, and/or other persons acting for and on their behalf to desist during the pendency of
the instant Petition for Mandamus from entering into any other agreements and from commencing with
any kind, sort, or specie of activity in connection with the National Broadband Network Project;
B. the instant Petition for Mandamus be given due course; and,
C. after due consideration of all relevant issues, judgment be rendered directing respondents to
allow herein petitioners access to all agreements entered into with the Government of China, the ZTE
Corporation, and/or other entities, government instrumentalities, and/or individuals with regard to the
National Broadband Network Project.[12](Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:
1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed
upon with ZTE Corporation;
2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
3. Annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE
Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the
execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy;
4. Compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement
of government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to undertake the
constructon of the national broadband network.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO[14] in G.R. No. 178830, enjoining the parties from pursuing,
entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and
Project as prayed for. Pertinent parts of the said Order read:
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 September 2007, adopted a resolution in the above-entitled case, to
wit:
G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National Economic and Development Authority, represented by NEDA
Secretary Romulo L. Neri, and the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee, Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), represented by DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, including
the Commission on Information and Communications Technology, headed by its Chairman, Ramon P.
Sales, The Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications Technology
Committee (ICT), headed by DOTC Assistant Secretary Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and The Technical
Working Group for ICT, and DOTC Assistant Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and All Other Operating Units of
the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, and ZTE Corporation, Amsterdam Holdings,
Inc., and ARESCOM, Inc.Acting on the instant petition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to
xxxx
(d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, enjoining the (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment
Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on
Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for
Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and
all other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE
Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on
their behalf from pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC
Broadband Deal and Project as prayed for.
NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondents (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination
Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on Information and
Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and
Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other
Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation; (vii)
Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf are
hereby ENJOINED from pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-
DOTC Broadband Deal and Project as prayed for.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be furnished certified true copies of the contract
or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation. It appears that during one
of the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies of the supply contract[16] were readily made available to
petitioners.[17] Evidently, the said prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held
on October 2, 2007 in China, informed Chinas President Hu Jintao that the Philippine Government had
decided not to continue with the ZTE-National Broadband Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due to several
reasons and constraints, there is no doubt that all the other principal prayers in the three petitions (to
annul, set aside, and enjoin the implementation of the ZTE-NBN Project) had also become moot.
Contrary to petitioners contentions that these declarations made by officials belonging to the executive
branch on the Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving,
hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this official act of the
President of the Philippines.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official
acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further
provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without
introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the
proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in Chinaas
an official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without
need of evidence.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[18] We took judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the
President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.
In Estrada v. Desierto,[19] the Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the
petition.
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the
executive officials[20] of informing this Court of the governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-
NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. Other than
petitioner AHIs unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard
this disputable presumption in the present instance.
Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciarys role
of strengthening political stability indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on
issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm than good
to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic
issues, as petitioners want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be further discussed, the
legal issues raised cannot be resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual
justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or
make any pronouncement.
Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado.
In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,[21] the lone issue tackled by the Court of
Appeals (CA) was whether the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) en banc committed reversible error in issuing and upholding, respectively, the
writ of preliminary injunction. The writ enjoined the execution of the questioned agreements between
Qualcomm, Inc. and Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The implementation of the
agreements was restrained through the assailed orders of the SICD and the SEC en banc which, however,
were nullified by the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this Court praying for the
reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction of the SICD and the SEC en banc. However, before the
matter was finally resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the negotiating table. Its withdrawal had
thwarted the execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the resolution of whether the
implementation of said agreements should be enjoined became no longer necessary.
Equally applicable to the present case is the Court ruling in the above-cited Republic
Telecommunications. There We held, thus:
Indeed, the instant petition, insofar as it assails the Court of Appeals Decision nullifying the orders of
the SEC en banc and the SICD, has been rendered moot and academic. To rule, one way or the other, on
the correctness of the questioned orders of the SEC en banc and the SICD will be indulging in a theoretical
exercise that has no practical worth in view of the supervening event.
The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case
or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioners are seeking the reinstatement of the writ of injunction to prevent the
concerned parties from pushing through with transactions with Qualcomm, Inc. Given that Qualcomm,
Inc. is no longer interested in pursuing the contracts, there is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
The Court likewise finds it unnecessary to rule whether the assailed Court of Appeals Decision had the
effect of overruling the Courts Resolution dated 29 January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued by the
appellate court.
A ruling on the matter practically partakes of a mere advisory opinion, which falls beyond the realm of
judicial review. The exercise of the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies.
Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems.
While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had
rendered those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In
those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and
bar.
In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent the
implementation of the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar
only to the transactions and parties involved in this controversy. Except for the determination of whether
petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction which is now moot, the issues raised in this
petition do not call for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory
provision.[22]
Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the foregoing considerations and brush
aside mootness, the Court cannot completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the
three petitions involves settling factual issues which definitely requires reception of evidence. There is not
an iota of doubt that this may not be done by this Court in the first instance because, as has been stated
often enough, this Court is not a trier of facts.
Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan ng paglilitis na hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.
Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No. 178830,[23] correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico
filed his petition directly with this Court, without prior factual findings made by any lower court, a
determination of pertinent and relevant facts is needed. ZTE enumerated some of these factual issues, to
wit:
(1) Whether an executive agreement has been reached between the Philippine and Chinese
governments over the NBN Project;
(2) Whether the ZTE Supply Contract was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the DOTC, and ZTE International pursuant to, and as an integral part of, the executive agreement;
(3) Whether a loan agreement for the NBN Project has actually been executed;
(4) Whether the Philippine government required that the NBN Project be completed under a Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Scheme;
(5) Whether the AHI proposal complied with the requirements for an unsolicited proposal under
the BOT Law;
(6) Whether the Philippine government has actually earmarked public finds for disbursement
under the ZTE Supply Contract; and
(7) Whether the coverage of the NBN Project to be supplied under the ZTE Supply Contract is more
extensive than that under the AHI proposal or such other proposal submitted therefor.[24]
Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in both G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 require prior
determination of facts before pertinent legal issues could be resolved and specific reliefs granted.
In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal
and compel public respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding
procurement of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.
In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the Court annul and set aside the award of the contract for
the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as
well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution,
to law and to public policy. They also ask the Court to compel public respondent to forthwith comply with
pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects, including public
bidding for said contract to undertake the construction of the national broadband network.
It is simply impossible for this Court to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband
Deal without any evidence to support a prior factual finding pointing to any violation of law that could lead
to such annulment order. For sure, the Supreme Court is not the proper venue for this factual matter to
be threshed out.
Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this Court order public respondents
to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts
and public bidding for the NBN contract.[25] It would be too presumptuous on the part of the Court to
summarily compel public respondents to comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement
of government infrastructure projects without any factual basis or prior determination of very particular
violations committed by specific government officials of the executive branch. For the Court to do so would
amount to a breach of the norms of comity among co-equal branches of government. A perceived error
cannot be corrected by committing another error. Without proper evidence, the Court cannot just
presume that the executive did not comply with procurement laws. Should the Court allow itself to fall
into this trap, it would plainly commit grave error itself.
Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga pinipetisyon na tumalima sa batas sa
pangongontrata ng pamahalaan kung wala pang pagtitiyak o angkop na ebidensiya ng nagawang
paglabag dito.
Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision
which requires a judicial finding of facts.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National Broadband Network Project should be declared
null and void. The foregoing threefold reasons would suffice to address the concern of Our esteemed
colleague.
The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them due course because of
mootness and because their resolution requires reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original
petition brought before the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on September 11,
2007 is DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., vs MALAYAN INSURANCE G.R. No. 171406
DECISION
Once the insurer pays the insured, equity demands reimbursement as no one should benefit at the expense of another.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 14, 2005 Decision[2] and
the February 14, 2006 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 61798.
Factual Antecedents
On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinlian I 60,000 plastic bags
of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila.[4] The shipment, with an invoice value of
US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-
21430, and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the
consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.
On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila,[6] the stevedores of petitioner Asian
Terminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring
services,[7] unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of
petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the
consignee.[8] When the unloading of the bags was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in
bad order condition.
On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for
transport and delivery to the consignee.[10] On December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses
of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the
contents.[11]
On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount
of P643,600.25.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 35, a Complaint[13] for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker
MEC Customs Brokerage.[14]
After the filing of the Answers,[15] trial ensued.
On June 26, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision[16] finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment
but absolving the other defendants. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of
petitioners stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel.[17] The RTC emphasized that despite
the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving
and picking-up the bags, petitioners stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and caused the
spillage.[18] The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and omissions of its stevedores under
Articles 2176[19] and 2180 paragraph (4)[20] of the Civil Code.[21] Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Asian Terminal, Inc. to pay plaintiff Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. the sum of P643,600.25 plus interest thereon at legal rate computed from November 20, 1996, the date
the Complaint was filed, until the principal obligation is fully paid, and the costs.
The complaint of the plaintiff against defendants Inchcape Shipping Services and MEC Customs Brokerage, and the
counterclaims of said defendants against the plaintiff are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[23] to the CA but the appeal was denied. In its July 14, 2005 Decision, the CA agreed with
the RTC that the damage/loss was caused by the negligence of petitioners stevedores in handling and storing the subject
shipment.[24] The CA likewise rejected petitioners assertion that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition
as this was belied by Marine Cargo Surveyors Redentor Antonio and Edgar Liceralde, who both testified that the actual
counting of bad order bags was done only after all the bags were unloaded from the vessel and that the Turn Over Survey
of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC) upon which petitioner anchors its defense was prepared only on November 28, 1995 or
after the unloading of the bags was completed.[25] Thus, the CA disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 96-80945 is herebyAFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[27] but the CA denied the same in a Resolution[28] dated February 14, 2006 for lack
of merit.
Issues
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner contending that:
1. RESPONDENT-INSURER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF GRANTED AS IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH ITS CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER SINCE, AS THE ALLEGED SUBROGEE, IT NEVER PRESENTED ANY
VALID, EXISTING, ENFORCEABLE INSURANCE POLICY OR ANY COPY THEREOF IN COURT.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE TOSBOC & RESBOC WERE
ADOPTED AS COMMON EXHIBITS BY BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT.
3. CONTRARY TO TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD, VARIOUS DOCUMENTATIONS WOULD POINT TO THE VESSELS
LIABILITY AS THERE IS, IN THIS INSTANT CASE, AN OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE
DAMAGE IN QUESTION WERE SUSTAINED WHEN THE SHIPMENT WAS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE VESSEL.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ADJUDGED HEREIN DEFENDANT LIABLE DUE TO [THE] FACT
THAT THE TURN OVER SURVEY OF BAD ORDER CARGOES (TOSBOC) WAS PREPARED ONLY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF
THE DISCHARGING OPERATIONS OR ON NOVEMBER 28, 1995. THUS, CONCLUDING THAT DAMAGE TO THE CARGOES
WAS DUE TO THE IMPROPER HANDLING THEREOF BY ATI STEVEDORES.
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE CONTRACT FOR CARGO
HANDLING SERVICES BETWEEN PPA AND ATI AND APPLYING THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS THEREOF AS REGARDS ATIS
LIABILITY.[29]
In sum, the issues are: (1) whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondents cause
of action; (2) whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of petitioners
stevedores; and (3) whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners liability.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner contends that respondent has no cause of action because it failed to present the insurance contract or policy
covering the subject shipment.[30] Petitioner argues that the Subrogation Receipt presented by respondent is not
sufficient to prove that the subject shipment was insured and that respondent was validly subrogated to the rights of the
consignee.[31]Thus, petitioner submits that without proof of a valid subrogation, respondent is not entitled to any
reimbursement.[32]
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, that the proximate cause of the
damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of petitioners stevedores.[33] Petitioner avers that such finding is
contrary to the documentary evidence, i.e., the TOSBOC, the Request for Bad Order Survey (RESBOC) and the Report of
Survey.[34]According to petitioner, these documents prove that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition
and that no additional damage was sustained by the subject shipment under its custody.[35] Petitioner asserts that
although the TOSBOC was prepared only after all the bags were unloaded by petitioners stevedores, this does not mean
that the damage/loss was caused by its stevedores.[36]
Petitioner also claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00, pursuant to its Management
Contract for cargo handling services with the PPA.[37] Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of
the said contract since it is an official act of an executive department subject to judicial cognizance.[38]
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not raised in
the trial court. Thus, it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[39] Respondent likewise contends that under prevailing
jurisprudence, presentation of the insurance policy is not indispensable.[40] Moreover, with or without the insurance
contract or policy, respondent claims that it should be allowed to recover under Article 1236[41] of the Civil
Code.[42] Respondent further avers that the right of subrogation has its roots in equity - it is designed to promote and to
accomplish justice and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice,
equity and good conscience ought to pay.[43]
Respondent likewise maintains that the RTC and the CA correctly found that the damage/loss sustained by the subject
shipment was caused by the negligent acts of petitioners stevedores.[44] Such factual findings of the RTC, affirmed by the
CA, are conclusive and should no longer be disturbed.[45] In fact, under Section 1[46] of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.[47]
As to the Management Contract for cargo handling services, respondent contends that this is outside the operation of
judicial notice.[48] And even if it is not, petitioners liability cannot be limited by it since it is a contract of adhesion.[49]
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case
Petitioner claims that respondents non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy between the respondent and
the consignee is fatal to its cause of action.
We do not agree.
First of all, this was never raised as an issue before the RTC. In fact, it is not among the issues agreed upon by the parties
to be resolved during the pre-trial.[50] As we have said, the determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars
the consideration of other questions, whether during trial or on appeal.[51] Thus, [t]he parties must disclose during pre-
trial all issues they intend to raise during the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters. x x x The basis
of the rule is simple. Petitioners are bound by the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves
agreed to the same.[52]
Neither was this issue raised on appeal.[53] Basic is the rule that issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on
review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play,
justice and due process.[54]
Besides, non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not
necessarily fatal.[55] In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[56] we ruled that:
Anent the second issue, it is our view and so hold that the presentation in evidence of the marine insurance policy is not
indispensable in this case before the insurer may recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in
the exercise of its subrogatory right. The subrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the relationship
of herein private respondent as insurer and Caltex, as the assured shipper of the lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but also
the amount paid to settle the insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the insurance
company of the insurance claim.
The presentation of the insurance policy was necessary in the case of Home Insurance Corporation v. CA (a case cited by
petitioner) because the shipment therein (hydraulic engines) passed through several stages with different parties
involved in each stage. First, from the shipper to the port of departure; second, from the port of departure to the M/S
Oriental Statesman; third, from the M/S Oriental Statesman to the M/S Pacific Conveyor; fourth, from the M/S Pacific
Conveyor to the port of arrival; fifth, from the port of arrival to the arrastre operator; sixth, from the arrastre operator to
the hauler, Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc. (private respondent therein); and lastly, from the hauler to the consignee. We
emphasized in that case that in the absence of proof of stipulations to the contrary, the hauler can be liable only for any
damage that occurred from the time it received the cargo until it finally delivered it to the consignee. Ordinarily, it cannot
be held responsible for the handling of the cargo before it actually received it. The insurance contract, which was not
presented in evidence in that case would have indicated the scope of the insurers liability, if any, since no evidence was
adduced indicating at what stage in the handling process the damage to the cargo was sustained.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)
In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation,[58] we used the same line of reasoning in
upholding the Decision of the CA finding the arrastre contractor liable for the lost shipment despite the failure of the
insurance company to offer in evidence the insurance contract or policy. We explained:
Indeed, jurisprudence has it that the marine insurance policy needs to be presented in evidence before the trial court or
even belatedly before the appellate court. In Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Regis Brokerage Corp., the Court stated that
the presentation of the marine insurance policy was necessary, as the issues raised therein arose from the very existence
of an insurance contract between Malayan Insurance and its consignee, ABB Koppel, even prior to the loss of the
shipment. In Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the Court ruled that the
insurance contract must be presented in evidence in order to determine the extent of the coverage. This was also the
ruling of the Court in Home Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
However, as in every general rule, there are admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Court stated that the presentation of the insurance policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly
occurred while on board the petitioners vessel, unlike in Home Insurance in which the cargo passed through several
stages with different parties and it could not be determined when the damage to the cargo occurred, such that the
insurer should be liable for it.
As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the cargo in the present case occurred while in petitioners custody.
Moreover, there is no issue as regards the provisions of Marine Open Policy No. MOP-12763, such that the presentation
of the contract itself is necessary for perusal, not to mention that its existence was already admitted by petitioner in open
court. And even though it was not offered in evidence, it still can be considered by the court as long as they have been
properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.[59]
Similarly, in this case, the presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not necessary. Although petitioner
objected to the admission of the Subrogation Receipt in its Comment to respondents formal offer of evidence on the
ground that respondent failed to present the insurance contract or policy,[60] a perusal of petitioners Answer[61] and Pre-
Trial Brief[62] shows that petitioner never questioned respondents right to subrogation, nor did it dispute the coverage of
the insurance contract or policy. Since there was no issue regarding the validity of the insurance contract or policy, or any
provision thereof, respondent had no reason to present the insurance contract or policy as evidence during the trial.
Factual findings of the CA, affirming the RTC, are conclusive and binding
Petitioners attempt to absolve itself from liability must likewise fail.
Only questions of law are allowed in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, it is not
our duty to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh all over again the probative value of the evidence
presented,[63] especially where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide on the matter.[64] As
we have often said, factual findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding, except in the
following cases: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the [CA] is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the [CA], in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and (8) when the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[65] None of these are availing in the present case.
Both the RTC and the CA found the negligence of petitioners stevedores to be the proximate cause of the damage/loss
to the shipment. In disregarding the contention of petitioner that such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence,
the CA had this to say:
ATI, however, contends that the finding of the trial court was contrary to the documentary evidence of record,
particularly, the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes dated November 28, 1995, which was executed prior to the turn-
over of the cargo by the carrier to the arrastre operator ATI, and which showed that the shipment already contained
2,702 damaged bags.
We are not persuaded.
Contrary to ATIs assertion, witness Redentor Antonio, marine cargo surveyor of Inchcape for the vessel Jinlian I which
arrived on November 21, 1995 and up to completion of discharging on November 28, 1995, testified that it was only after
all the bags were unloaded from the vessel that the actual counting of bad order bags was made, thus:
xxxx
The above testimony of Redentor Antonio was corroborated by Edgar Liceralde, marine cargo surveyor connected with
SMS Average Surveyors and Adjusters, Inc., the company requested by consignee Chemphil Albright and Wilson
Corporation to provide superintendence, report the condition and determine the final outturn of quantity/weight of the
subject shipment. x x x
xxxx
Defendant-appellant ATI, for its part, presented its claim officer as witness who testified that a survey was conducted by
the shipping company and ATI before the shipment was turned over to the possession of ATI and that the Turn Over
Survey of Bad Order Cargoes was prepared by ATIs Bad Order (BO) Inspector.
Considering that the shipment arrived on November 21, 1998 and the unloading operation commenced on said date
and was completed on November 26, 1998, while the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes, reflecting a figure of 2,702
damaged bags, was prepared and signed on November 28, 1998 by ATIs BO Inspector and co-signed by a representative
of the shipping company, the trial courts finding that the damage to the cargoes was due to the improper handling
thereof by ATIs stevedores cannot be said to be without substantial support from the records.
We thus see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court that ATI should be made liable for the 2,702
bags of damaged shipment. Needless to state, it is hornbook doctrine that the assessment of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct
or attitude of the witnesses. The findings of the trial court on this point are accorded great respect and will not be reversed
on appeal, unless it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially affect the result
of the case.
We also find ATI liable for the additional 179 damaged bags discovered upon delivery of the shipment at the consignees
warehouse in Pasig. The final Report of Survey executed by SMS Average Surveyors & Adjusters, Inc., and independent
surveyor hired by the consignee, shows that the subject shipment incurred a total of 2881 damaged bags.
The Report states that the withdrawal and delivery of the shipment took about ninety-five (95) trips from November 29,
1995 to December 28, 1995 and it was upon completion of the delivery to consignees warehouse where the final count
of 2881 damaged bags was made. The damage consisted of torn/bad order condition of the bags due to spillages and
caked/hardened portions.
We agree with the trial court that the damage to the shipment was caused by the negligence of ATIs stevedores and for
which ATI is liable under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code. The proximate cause of the damage (i.e., torn bags,
spillage of contents and caked/hardened portions of the contents) was the improper handling of the cargoes by ATIs
stevedores, x x x
xxxx
ATI has not satisfactorily rebutted plaintiff-appellees evidence on the negligence of ATIs stevedores in the handling and
safekeeping of the cargoes. x x x
xxxx
We find no reason to disagree with the trial courts conclusion. Indeed, from the nature of the [damage] caused to the
shipment, i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or caked portions of the contents, it is not difficult to see that
the damage caused was due to the negligence of ATIs stevedores who used steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the
higher portions of the piles thereby piercing the bags and spilling their contents, and who piled the bags in the open
storage area of ATI with insufficient cover thereby exposing them to the elements and [causing] the contents to cake or
harden.[66]
Clearly, the finding of negligence on the part of petitioners stevedores is supported by both testimonial and documentary
evidence. Hence, we see no reason to disturb the same.
Judicial notice does not apply
Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01,[67] Article VII of the Management Contract for cargo
handling services it entered with the PPA, which limits petitioners liability to P5,000.00 per package.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature,
the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can
take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended,[68] is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of
administering the ports in the country.[69] Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered
into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed July 14, 2005 Decision and the February 14, 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61798 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Before us is the petition for certiorari[1] filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set aside the
February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution)[2] of the Sandiganbayan[3] denying the petitioners Motion to
Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).
THE ANTECEDENTS
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H.
Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and
Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution,
and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally
manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel
Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially
for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[4]
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late
Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009.[5]
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,[6] among them, Civil Case No. 0130.[7] The present
respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.
I. Civil Case No. 0130
In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors
was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein
another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were
elected.[8]
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking
to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:
[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on the
sequestered shares in the special stockholders meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing
himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in
the management of ETPI.[9]
During the pendency of Africas petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of
ETPI,[10] especially in the election of the members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance
of an order for the calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourts
control and supervision and prescribed guidelines.[11]
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africas motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholder meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held on Friday,
November 27, 1992, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room, Telecoms Plaza,
7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting shall be conducted
under the supervision and control of this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the
registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding
shares.
incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the two-tiered test. On such
determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the stockholders meeting of March 17,
1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with no other choice but to remand these
questions to it for proper determination.
xxxx

WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final judicial evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares in
resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a proper case the question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them in
underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.][12] a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors and to amend the ETPI Articles of Incorporation
for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock of ETPI.
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
107789[13] (PCGGs petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution
alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote. [14] In our November 26, and in conformity herewith.
1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.
II. Civil Case No. 0009
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and March 17,
Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the former
1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.[25]
merely an incident.[15]
In its Pre-Trial Brief[26] dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following witnesses:
During the pendency of PCGGs petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a Very Urgent
Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs]
Authorized Capital Stock (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition
to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate resolution.[16] The Sandiganbayan included WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES
the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.[17]
(1) Maurice V. Bane representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI was organized.
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director
and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the petitioners instance and after serving notice of the xxxx
deposition-taking on the respondents[18] on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral
(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto x x x
examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London,
England. (3) Ms. Evelyn Singson x x x
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose (4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. x x x
Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the
notice stated that [t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth (5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x
in his affidavit[19] x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish
the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent (6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque x x x
Petition].[20] The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition in evidence in the main
(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x
case of Civil Case No. 0009.[21] On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-
examined Bane. II a. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition
On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the PCGG At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion[27] (1st motion), stating that
(i) to cause the holding of a special stockholders meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPIs
authorized capital stock and (ii) to vote therein the sequestered Class A shares of stock.[22] Thus, a special 1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130,
stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and the increase in ETPIs 0146[28] the following witnesses were presented therein:
authorized capital stock was unanimously approved.[23] From this ruling, Africa went to this Court via a
petition for certiorari[24] docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africas petition). a. Cesar O.V. Parlade

We jointly resolved the PCGGs and Africas petitions, and ruled: b. Maurice Bane

This Court notes that, like in Africas motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of directors), c. Evelyn Singson
the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGGs petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend the articles of
d. Leonorio Martinez On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution[35] (2000 resolution) denying the
petitioners 2nd motion:
e. Ricardo Castro; and
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled What Need Not Be Proved. Apparently, this provision
f. Rolando Gapud refers to the Courts duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of
the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the documentary
cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the
exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and the said documentary exhibits are
Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as the same
very relevant to prove the case of the [petitioner] in [Civil Case No. 0009].
is considered redundant.
3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-examine them.
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of
The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;[29] in turn, the petitioner filed a exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law.
Common Reply[30] to these Oppositions. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan[31] promulgated a resolution[32] (1998 resolution) denying the On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their respective
petitioners 1st motion, as follows: demurrers to evidence.[36] On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 2000
resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its April 3, 2001 resolution[37] (2001 resolution).
Wherefore, the [petitioners] Motion x x x is
IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of

Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral
deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the
reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross-examination in this
Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case, insofar as
plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio
Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident
Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following conditions :
1. xxx
2. xxx
3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be cross-examined on their
particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by the respondents].
II b. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of
Evidence on December 14, 1999.[33] Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its
offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial
Notice[34] (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that:
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of the Bane
deposition.[38] On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents demurrers to evidence),[39] the
Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution,[40] denying the petitioners 3rd motion. The
Sandiganbayan ruled:
But in the courts view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested its case as
to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the non-appearing
defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to qualify the admission of
the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell on these matters in
view of this Courts Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which already denied the introduction in evidence
of Banes deposition and which has become finalin view of plaintiffs failure to file any motion for
reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands
and for this court to grant plaintiffs motion at this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiffs disregard
for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years and it was only in February
of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to
introduce and offer Banes deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to take
judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. But how can such a motion be granted when it has been
resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained finality and its effect cannot
be undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be a novel motion, is in
reality a motion for reconsideration of this courts 1998 ruling. [emphases ours]

1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiffs case and setting the same for trial any The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and limited only to the marking
and offering of the [Bane deposition] which already forms part of the records and used in Civil Case No.
0130 x x x;
THE PETITION
2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts established by
The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis ours]
discretion:

I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME FINAL.
II.
x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION WHICH WAS ALREADY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE
IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) AS PART OF PETITIONERS EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE
(CIVIL CASE NO. 0009).
III.
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.
The petitioner[41] argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory order;
thus, the petitioners failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have given it a character of finality
so long as the main case remains pending.[42] On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the
Sandiganbayans denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
On the issue of the Sandiganbayans refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial notice of or to
admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case No. 0130 (where
the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a child of the parent
case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the children
cases should be considered as evidence in the parent case.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan
should not have denied its admission on flimsy grounds, considering that:
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would be
used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the parties concerned, they
must accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the witness when they failed to
show up.
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its allegation
that the respondents interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the government.
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioners formal offer of evidence was
obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed and the
voluminous records that the present case has generated.[43]
THE RESPONDENTS COMMENTS
and THE PETITIONERS REPLY
In the respondents Comments[44] (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 2002[45]), they claim
that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary period prescribed
under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[46] This assertion proceeds from the view that the petitioners
3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner, likewise simply assails
the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit that the petitioners 3rd motion
actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998
resolution.[47] They likewise assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in
character, that the petitioners failure to contest the resolution by way of certiorari within the proper
period gave the 1998 resolution a character of finality.
The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a supplemental offer
of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial court; the Sandiganbayan
simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case since the evidence sought to be
admitted was within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and available to [it] before [it] rested its case.[48] The
respondents also advert to the belated filing of the petitioners 3rd motion i.e., after the respondents had
filed their respective demurrers to evidence.
On the petitioners claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right to cross-
examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution and the petitioner
never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be
a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The respondents lastly submit that
the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites
for admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In its Reply,[49] the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party may
opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayans
2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be done through the
ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the petitioners
3rdmotion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the dictates
of substantial justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of evidence.
A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he formally offered;
before then, he still has the opportunity to present further evidence to substantiate his theory of the case
should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence.
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is
sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is not an ordinary
witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and his
advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Section 47, Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their respective
comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their comments, we resolve
to dispense with the filing of these comments and to consider this petition submitted for decision.
THE ISSUES
On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:
1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;
 ii. In holding that the petitioners 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion
for reconsideration;
iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane
deposition to the petitioners cause; and
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -
i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; and
ii. The principle of judicial notice.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
I. Preliminary Considerations
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order,
resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends
to assail.[51] In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998 resolution is final or
interlocutory in nature.
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory
one on the basis of the disposition made.[52] A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes
of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case,
the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is
interlocutory[53] and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence
pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be adjudicated upon. The term final judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order
which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future
determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings
yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the
parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is
basically provisional in its application.[54] (emphasis supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The
Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time when the
petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did
not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.
We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is finally
resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds
shown at any time before final judgment.[55] In this light, the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution which merely
denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 could not have
attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order resolving the case on the merits does) despite
the petitioners failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal.[56]
I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third (actually
second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed
against a judgment or final order. Although a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order
can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of the arguments already passed upon and resolved
by the court, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a
prohibited motion.
I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment or final
order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court declares to be
appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is
afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, resolution,
or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that the 60-day
period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioners notice of the
Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long been rendered by the court,
the petitioners subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt to resuscitate the long-
denied admission of the Bane deposition.
We do not find the respondents submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory
order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim that the
1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally
correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory
ruling.[58] For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among
others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is
available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorarimay issue notwithstanding
the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving
the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.[59]
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet concluded the
presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the case, the
prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to question the admission of the Bane
deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy available to the petitioner was
to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission of the Bane
deposition. The petitioner could introduce[60] anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its
formal offer[61] as the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the denial of the
1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a petition.
II. The Sandiganbayans ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but did not
constitute grave abuse of discretion
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of
law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence
of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise
of jurisdiction.[62]Without this showing, the Sandiganbayans erroneous legal conclusion was only an error
of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one. For this reason alone, the petition
should be dismissed.
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the unique
circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing of the remedy
at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed with public interest
and has become a matter of public concern.[63] In other words, we opt to resolve the petition on the merits
to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in the course of completely resolving the
merits of Civil Case No. 0009.
Although the word rested nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has inferred it
from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order of presentation
of a partys evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,[64] both of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging
the burden of proof,[65] he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only.[66] Whether a party has rested his case in some measure depends on his manifestation in
court on whether he has concluded his presentation of evidence.[67]
In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that due to oversight, [the
petitioner] closed and rested its case;[68] and that it had terminated the presentation of its evidence in x x
x Civil Case No. 0009.[69] In the face of these categorical judicial admissions,[70] the petitioner cannot
suddenly make an about-face and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary
to the petitioners assertion, the resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of
the evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence
subject of this present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of
evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the petitioner
had firmly denied having rested its case.[71] Before then, the petitioner never found it appropriate to
question on certiorari the Sandiganbayans denial of its 2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for
the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioners case.
Although the denial of the petitioners first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse to the
corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of action. The
petitioners non-observance of the proper procedure for the admission of the Bane deposition, while
seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its first attempt to
have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without seeking reconsideration of the
denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually rested its case. This time, the
petitioner forgot about the Bane deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal
offer of evidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its case. In
resolving the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 2000 resolution, the
Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has become part and parcel of Civil Case No. 0009.
This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition as evidence (considering that,
earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioners attempt to adopt the Bane deposition as
evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the
Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioners motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted the
resting of its case, the petitioner should have already questioned the denial of its 2 nd motion by way
of certiorari, since the denial of its attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available
to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the
60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file
its 3rd motion.
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having rested its case
and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the petitioner filed the
present petition, inviting our attention to the Sandiganbayans resolutions,[72] which allegedly gave it mixed
signals.[73] By pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized that they
were then already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was that its
2ndmotion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence consisting of
the Bane deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been
prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the resolutions.
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioners motion to reopen
its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party
from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any
such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional evidence is already
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of the exercise of this discretion that
the Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing, marking and offering
additional evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the
purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Sec. 5. Order of trial. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special
reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall
proceed as follows:
xxxx
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons
and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case[.] [emphases
ours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence
he relies upon[74] and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.[75] The obvious rationale of the
requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the
administration of justice.[76]
A partys declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from introducing
further evidence;[77] but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose
from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other;[78] or where the evidence sought
to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,[79] the partys right to introduce further
evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the courts discretion[80] under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules of
Court depends on the attendant facts i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a good reason and be
in furtherance of the interest of justice. For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower courts
exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower courts action was attended by grave abuse
of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the
law.[81] Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported imputation of caprice,
whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment[82] or mere
abuse of discretion.[83]
In Lopez v. Liboro,[84] we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:
After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence
only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to
offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no
abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered,
or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is
to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of
Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted;
emphases ours)
Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,[85] we ruled:
The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of
the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion,
it has been said by an eminent author, is, that material testimony should not be excluded because offered
by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a
trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously.
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly recognized, the
Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge for special reasons, to change the order of the trial, and "for
good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties to offer evidence upon their original case.
These exceptions are made stronger when one considers the character of registration proceedings and
the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with
precise legal rules should not always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formul, an opportunity
should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if
the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer
evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion appears,
Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed where it was
withheld deliberately and without justification.[86]
The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.[87]
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to reopen
the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioners 2ndmotion to avoid any uncertainty on the
evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayans action actually left the petitioners concern
in limbo by considering the petitioners motion redundant. This is tantamount to a refusal to undertake a
positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the contemplation of
law.
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents
had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been
prejudiced by allowing the petitioners introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted
through oversight.[88] The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is another consideration that
cannot be taken lightly.[89]
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied Section 5, Rule
30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioners request to reopen the case for the submission of the Bane
deposition.
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The state of the
parties submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case No. 0009, however,
dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the parties have more than extensively argued
for or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration case
that is now crying out for complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been
raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after remand.[90] We are thus left with no choice
but to resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.
IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the usual
requisites of admissibility
In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence
without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [91] The petitioner claims
that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others,[92] the
former case or proceeding that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.
Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court[93] the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130 were
consolidated provided that:
Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.[94] (emphases ours)
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are
to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial
of several cases in the courts docket, or the consolidation of issues within those cases.[95]
A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31 is completely
silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the causes of action
involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives the court
the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions consolidated, jurisprudence
will show that the term consolidation is used generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial
of several causes.[96] In fact, the title consolidation of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of
consolidation, as discussed below.
These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is basically a function
given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself (given the nature of the cases,
the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and the courts capability and resources vis--vis
all the official business pending before it, among other things) what consolidation will bring, bearing in
mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and convenient
premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation is to beg
the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure and the dearth of applicable case law on
the effectof consolidation that strongly compel this Court to determine the kind of consolidation effected
to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.
In the context of legal procedure, the term consolidation is used in three different senses:[97]
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment
in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such.
(quasi-consolidation)[98]
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are
pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one
complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character
and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a
single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)[100]
Considering that the Sandiganbayans order[101] to consolidate several incident cases does not at all provide
a hint on the extent of the courts exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the consolidation it ordered
in view of the function of this procedural device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its official
business we are compelled to look deeper into the voluminous records of the proceedings conducted
below. We note that there is nothing that would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a
merger of causes of action, parties and evidence.[102] To be sure, there would have been no need for a
motion to adopt (which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger
actually resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take
judicial notice of the same.
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a consolidation for
trial.[103] Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to the Sandiganbayans
1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioners 1st Motion on the ground that the witnesses, whose
testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, are not available for cross-examination in the
Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses again in the main case, so that the respondents can
cross-examine them.
These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayans order of consolidation had
actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with the main case, in the sense of actual
consolidation, and that the parties in these consolidated cases had (at least constructively) been aware of
and had allowed actual consolidation without objection.[104]
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and the fact
that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for reconveyance,
accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by
an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in
fact intended an actual consolidation and, together with the parties affected,[105] acted towards that end -
where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one another and where the evidence appreciated
in one action is also appreciated in another action must find support in the proceedings held below. This
is particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to impose
upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the provisions
of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence,[106] and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself and
despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioners right to
due process. We reach this conclusion especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply
a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another
jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on evidence.
We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993 (that
is, before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order[107]issued by the Sandiganbayan in
1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal or substantive, to Civil Case No.
0130.[108] Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996,[109] the petitioner even made a
representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under Section 47, Rule 130
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit incidental, case, the
admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the requirements of Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court the rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different
proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule
24)[110] must, at any rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130[111] of the same Rules.
At the outset, we note that when the petitioners motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the incident
cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to the Sandiganbayan
its willingness to comply with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,[112] and, in fact,
again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioners about-face two years thereafter even contributed
to the Sandiganbayans own inconsistency on how to treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on Deposition Pending Action (deposition de bene esse) provides
for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding.
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any
part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any one of the following provisions:
xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the
court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred
(100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or
testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice,
that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioners position that the Bane
deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires,
as a condition for admissibility, compliance with the rules on evidence. Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the
deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that
the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on
evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.[113] In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition,
therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must
be considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not
simply refer to a witness testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the
same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for the
purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual
basis during the preparation for trial.[114] Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as
a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral
examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[115]
Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall
be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay
rule i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that
his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the
deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a
party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing
of a case.[116] However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to
the witness stand.[117]
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or
deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or
deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded.[118] A fundamental characteristic of
hearsay evidence is the adverse partys lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.
However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or
deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the
deponent in the prior proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination[119] afforded an adverse
party in usual trials regarding matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith. Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or
a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of issues in the former case or
proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the
same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was - or would have been -
sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so.[120] (The requirement of similarity
though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be the same.[121] Although some
issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which
is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.[122])
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore
should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In
other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions,
the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes
of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner establishedand what the Sandiganbayan found, for
purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule
23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct
rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or
proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as
compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the
requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether the petitioner
complied with the latter rule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a
testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.[123]
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.[124] However, before the former testimony or
deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
predicate therefor,[125] i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in
the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court simply
requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be deceased or unable to testify. On the other hand, in
using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual testimony of the deponent in open
court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the deponents inability to attend or testify, as follows:
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment[.]
[emphases ours][12]
The phrase unable to testify appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a
physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony.[127] Hence notwithstanding the
deletion of the phrase out of the Philippines, which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction[128] - the petitioners excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in
open court - may still constitute inability to testify under the same rule. This is not to say, however, that
resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the deposition is taken
not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in
evidence.[129]
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding between the
parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The witness
himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were testifying de novo since his testimony given
at the former trial is mere hearsay.[130] The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also inadmissible
for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayans reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is an
argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of the present case (Civil Case
No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis to presume, and neither can or should we,
that the previous condition, which previously allowed the use of the deposition, remains and would
thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another case or proceeding, even if the other case or
proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle,
being necessity,[131] the burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of
the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the previous condition or
conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the deponent in court.[132]
IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of parties; and
identity of subject matter
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on direct
examination.[133] The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an essential safeguard of the
accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute, and is
not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness may be called.[134] This right is available, of course,
at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal
justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded
the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an
essential safeguard[135]against falsehoods and frauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been satisfied,
we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the admission of the
Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is imputed may not after all be
the same adverse party who actually had such opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first proceeding
must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however, is not required;
substantial identity[136] or identity of interests[137] suffices, as where the subsequent proceeding is between
persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in blood, or in estate. The term
privity denotes mutual or successive relationships to the same rights of property.[138]
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or privity
between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While Africa is the son
of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should be admissible only against him as an
ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as
successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the respondents are all ETPI
stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any privity between them for purposes of binding
the latter to the acts or omissions of the former respecting the cross-examination of the deponent. The
sequestration of their shares does not result in the integration of their rights and obligations as
stockholders which remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-vis other stockholders.[139]
IV (d1). The respondents notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine the
deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to
them.[140]
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996,[141] the petitioner
originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to specify in the notice
the purpose for taking Mr. Banes deposition, the petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice to Take
Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it likewise moved the scheduled
deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended deposition
of Maurice Bane.[142] On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent Enrile appears to have
filed an Opposition[143] to the petitioners first notice, where he squarely raised the issue of reasonability of
the petitioners nineteen-day first notice. While the Sandiganbayan denied Africas motion for protective
orders,[144] it strikes us that no ruling was ever handed down on respondent Enriles Opposition.[145]
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral examination is
not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound thereby. In Northwest
Airlines v. Cruz, [146] we ruled that -
The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken
connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion conferred by law is
not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see to it that the safeguards for the
protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection against abuses
that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said: "Any
discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate
aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this reason, courts are given ample
powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or
oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enriles Opposition (which is
equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the bare minimum safeguards for
the protection of, (more so) non-parties,[147] and to ensure that these safeguards are firmly maintained.
Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioners assertion (that the taking of Bane deposition is
a matter of right) and treated the lingering concerns e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non-party
status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the
Bane deposition was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioners reliance on the prior notice on the
respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of the
respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 the effect of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they
cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be bound by the taking of the Bane
deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of cross-examination.[148] Opportunity for
cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence, cannot be singled out as basis for the admissibility of
a former testimony or deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of
parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case
No. 0130, its action was premised on Africas status as a party in that case where the Bane deposition was
taken.
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section 5 which
provides:
Effect of substitution of parties. Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions
previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and another action involving the same subject
is afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or successors in interest, all
depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken
therefor. [italics and underscoring ours]
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioners claim that the respondents waived their right to
cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition. Incidentally, the
respondents vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine the deponent speaks loudly that they
never intended any waiver of this right.
Interestingly, the petitioners notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Section
15 of this rule reads:
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. A party desiring to take the deposition of any
person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. The
notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person
to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or
the particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served,
the court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the individual
notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the then opponents
(Africas) cross-examination since, to begin with, they were not even parties to the action. Additionally, we
observe that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously absent was any indication sufficient to
forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition taking would
amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination, without prejudice to the right of the respondents
to raise their objections at the appropriate time.[149] We would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed
were we to hold that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of
interest with any of the parties in the same action, can be bound by the action or omission of the latter,
by the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant waiver from the respondents
mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite notice sent by the petitioner.
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil Case No. 0009
the principal action where it was sought to be introduced while Bane was still here in the Philippines. We
note in this regard that the Philippines was no longer under the Marcos administration and had returned
to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No. 0009 was filed. In fact, the petitioners notice itself
states that the purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and testify on the facts set
forth in his Affidavit, which Mr. Bane had long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila.[150] Clearly, a
deposition could then have been taken - without compromising the respondents right to cross-examine a
witness against them - considering that the principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a mode of
discovery. These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to the deficient handling of the
present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the handling of Civil Case No. 0009.
After failing to take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case,
the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and
proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion,
where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the respondents cannot avoid a resultant waiver
of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear at the deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness
dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to Civil
Case No. 0130, they likewise have no interest in Africas certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI
stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioners flip-flopping on its own representations,[151] this Court can only express
dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippinesbefore taking his deposition despite
having knowledge already of the substance of what he would testify on. Considering that the testimony of
Bane is allegedly a vital cog in the petitioners case against the respondents, the Court is left to wonder
why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a time when
it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.
V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and
admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane
deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them.[152] Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact
without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and
expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute
and are not bona fide disputed.[153]
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or
notoria) non indigent probatione.[154] The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense with
the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it would not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129 either
requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of the official acts of the x x x judicial departments of
the Philippines,[155] or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions.[156] On the other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to
take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of
taking judicial notice of the matter involved.[157] In the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent
Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard through their corresponding
oppositions.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge.[158] This rule though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose,
by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original
record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction,
at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending.[159]
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists
in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.[160]
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice;
neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather,
the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating
whatever evidence offered in any of the children cases Civil Case 0130 as evidence in the parent case Civil
Case 0009 - or of the whole family of cases.[161] To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases
warrants the taking of judicial notice.
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases[162] the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because
these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from
taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases.[163] Second, the petitioners proposition
is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case
has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the
logic of the petitioners argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing
the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another
case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant,
to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of
imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the petitioners attention to our prefatory pronouncement
in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:[164]
Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge in
trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case, except
those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head
is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence
the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioners argument that we should take
judicial notice of the Bane deposition.
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 3rd motion the Motion to
Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) was a legal error that did not
amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case at the petitioners
instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3) notwithstanding the grave abuse of
discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not admissible under the rules of
evidence.[165]
VII. Refutation of Justice Carpios Last Minute Modified Dissent
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His covering
note states:
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the public will
understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)
In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.
First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at issue in this
case i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned with the
competence and relevance[166] of the evidence, whose admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at
length the Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the Bane deposition (or,
to adopt the dissents characterization, whether Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness) is not an issue here
unless it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a competent evidence.
Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that in Philippine Jurisprudence, the
consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are adjudicated
in a single judgment, citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the
following in response to the dissents position, which we will restate here for emphasis:
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Franciscos Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions consolidated into a
single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of actions involved had originally been joined
in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding
upon all the parties to the different actions until it is vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there
can be no further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation
discontinued and superseded by a single action, which should be entitled in such manner as the court may
direct, and all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a
single action (1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris Secundum, the
following caveat appears:
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are combined into
one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered;
second, where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several actions are ordered to be tried together but
each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. The failure to distinguish
between these methods of procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not
being consolidation, a fact which has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in
the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).
In defining the term consolidation of actions, Francisco provided a colatilla that the term consolidation is
used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p.
348).
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Franciscos statement out of context.
As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled matter that requires
the approach we did in the majoritys discussion on consolidation.[167]
Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of
consolidation to expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases and the
simplification of the proceedings. It argues that this can only be achieved if the repetition of the same
evidence is dispensed with.
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is primarily
addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in keeping with
the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what consolidation would actually
bring[168] (especially where several cases are involved which have become relatively complex). In the
present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the
parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond joint hearing
or trial. Why should this Court which is not a trial court impose a purported effect that has no factual or
legal grounds?
Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only resulted in
a joint hearing or trial, the respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition considering that they were
given notice of the deposition-taking. The issue here boils down to one of due process the fundamental
reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the rigor of cross-examination) is generally excluded in
the realm of admissible evidence especially when read in light of the general rule that depositions
are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.
Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning the
reasonableness thereof an issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the Sandiganbayan failed
to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayans omission worse, the Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the
petitioners assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter of right and, thus, failed to address the
consequences and/or issues that may arise from the apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner
(that it intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not
Africa, are the parties).[169] There is simply the absence of due in due process.
Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayans Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the
Sandiganbayan granted the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the Sandiganbayan did not
grant the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that the deposition-taking was a matter of
right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that these consolidated cases have
reached. Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature, the most minimum of fairness demands
upon the petitioner to movefor the taking of the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a
ruling thereon (including the opposition filed by respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-
respondents). The burgeoning omission and failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured by
this Court without itself being guilty of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary to the
petitioners claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure involve technicality,
to which we have applied the liberality that technical rules deserve. But the resolution of the issues raised
goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding discussions show. They involve issues of due
process and basic unfairness to the respondents, particularly to respondent Enrile, who is portrayed in the
Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these shares should be deemed to be those
of the Marcoses. They involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are founded and which
we cannot disregard without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking
the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of their evolution.
In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a conclusive decision
because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote resulted in the re-voting
of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is deemed sustained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
B. WHEN DISCRETIONARY (RULE 129,sec 2)
G.R. No. 90342 May 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARIO MACASLING, JR. y COLOCADO, accused-appellant.
Hilario Macasling, Jr. appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which sentenced him to suffer
life imprisonment, to pay a fine and costs of litigation.
Appellant Macasling was charged with violation of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6425, as amended, in an
information which reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Hilario Macasling, Jr. y Colocado for violation of Section 21(b) in relation to
Section IV, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 (Sale,
Administration, Delivery, Transportation & Distribution), committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of August 1988, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport fifty (50) grams of shabu,
knowing fully well that said shabu [is] a prohibited drug, in violation of the above-mentioned provision of
law.1
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment and the case proceeded to trial. After trial, on 18
August 1989, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Hilario Macasling, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of transporting and/or attempting to deliver 50 grams of shabu in violation of Section
21(b), Article IV in relation to Section 15, Article III, in relation to No. 2(e), Section 2, Article I of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The 50 grams of shabu contained in the wrapped package marked Happy Days (Exh. H and series) being
the subject of the crime, is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State and referred to
the Dangerous Drugs Board for immediate destruction.
The accused Hilario Macasling, Jr. being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
So Ordered.2
The evidence of record discloses that on 19 August 1988, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Lt. Manuel
Obrera, Chief of the Narcotics and Intelligence Division, Integrated National Police ("INP"), Baguio City,
received a telephone call from the Chief of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom"), First Regional Unit, INP.
The latter sought the assistance of Lt. Obrera in the apprehension of appellant, who according to the
Narcom Chief, would be delivering shabu at Room No. 77 of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio City, on
that same afternoon. Lt. Obrera quickly formed a team which include Pat. Ramoncito Bueno, Pat. Martel
Nillo and himself and hastily left for the hotel. There they were met by the Narcom Chief who informed
them that appellant Macasling had previously agreed with a Chinese businessman in Las Pinas, Metro
Manila, that appellant would deliver about 250 grams of shabu at Room 77 of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel.
Accordingly, Lt. Obrera and his companions waited inside Room No. 77 of the hotel, for appellant to show
up. Appellant, however, did not arrive that afternoon. Instead, he arrived at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel at
about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of the following day, together with one Editha Gagarin and a third
person who was an undercover Narcom agent. Lt. Obrera opened the door of Room No. 77 to let appellant
and his party in, upon noticing that the Narcom agent was combing his hair, which was pre-arranged signal
meaning that appellant had the shabu in his possession. When appellant and his party were inside Room
No. 77, Lt. Obrera and his companions identified themselves to appellant and asked him about the shabu.
Appellant handed over a small package with a wrapper marked "Happy Days" which, upon being opened
by arresting officers, was found to contain about 50 grams of crystalline granules.3 Appellant and Editha
Gagarin were brought to Camp Bado, Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, where the fact of their arrest was
officially recorded. They were later transferred to the Baguio City Jail as detention prisoners. The
crystalline granules were forwarded to the INP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
examination. The Forensic Chemist in charge of the examination subjected the granules to four (4)
different tests, namely, the color test, the melting point test, the thin layer chromatography test, and the
spectro-infra red test. All the test showed the presence of metamphetamine hydrochloride, the scientific
name of the substance popularly called shabu.4
The investigation by the City Prosecutor of Baguio City initially included Editha Gagarin. However, upon
the basis of a letter written by appellant Macasling admitting sole responsibility for the acts charged in the
information, Editha was excluded from the information. In that letter, appellant stated that Editha was
completely innocent, and that she had merely come along with appellant at his invitation, to Baguio City.
Appellant Macasling made the following assignment of errors in his Brief:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that since the arresting officers were not armed with a search
warrant of arrest, the arrest and consequent confiscation of the package with a wrapper marked 'Happy
Days' contain[ing] 50 grams of shabu (Exh. H and series) are illegal and unlawful, hence are inadmissible in
evidence.
2. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused on the ground that 'shabu' is not of those mentioned
in R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
3. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused on the ground that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.5
We shall consider the above alleged errors though not in the order submitted by appellant.
We consider first appellant's argument that he cannot be convicted of the offense charged in the
information considering that shabu — the term in the information — is not a dangerous drug, since it is
not one of those enumerated as such in R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act).
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, distinguishes between "prohibited drugs" and "regulated drugs." Article I,
Section 2 (e) defines the term "dangerous drugs" as referring either to "prohibited drugs" or to "regulated
drugs" in the following manner:
(e) "Dangerous drugs" — refers to either:
(1) "Prohibited drug" which includes opium and its active components and derivatives, such as heroin and
morphine; coca leaf and its derivativeness; principally cocaine; alpha and beta eucaine, hallucinogenic
drugs, such as mescaline, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and other substances producing similar effects;
Indian hemp and its derivatives; all preparations made from any of the foregoing; and other drugs and
chemical preparations, whether natural or synthetic, with the physiological effects of a narcotic or a
hallucinogenic drug; or (As amended by B.P. Blg. 179, March 12, 1982.)
(2) "Regulated drug" which includes self-inducing sedatives, such as secobarbital, phenobarbital,
pentobarbital, barbital, amobarbital and any other drug which contains a salt or derivative of a salt of
barbituric acid; and salt, isomer or salt of an isomer, of amphetamine, such as benzedrine or dexedrine,
or any drug which produces a physiological action similar to amphetamine; and hypnotic drugs, such as
methaqualone, nitrazepam or any other compound producing similar physiological effects (as amended
by P.D. No. 1683, March 14, 1980.)
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The statute penalizes the sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of both "prohibited
drugs" and "regulated drugs:"
Article II
Prohibited Drugs
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed. (As amended by P.D. No. 1675, February 17, 1980.)
xxx xxx xxx
Article III
Regulated Drugs
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated
Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
regulated drug involved in any offense under this section be the proximate cause of the death of the victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. (As amended by P.D. No. 1683, March
14, 1980.)
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court after noting the above-quoted provisions of the statute, went on to say that:
From the above provisions of law, it is clear that shabu which is the street name of metamphetamine
hydrochloride, is not among those enumerated as prohibited drugs under No. 1 (e), Section 2, Article I on
Definition of Terms of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
Obviously, metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is a derivative of amphetamine or a compound
thereof, meaning to say, amphetamine in combination with other drugs or elements which, if one looks
closer, is actually enumerated among the regulated drugs under No. 2(e), Section 2, Article I on Definition
of Terms of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
Note that the law says when it defines regulated drugs as those "which includes self inducing sedatives
such as . . . of amphetamine such as benzedrine or dexedrine, or any other drug which produces a
physiological action similar to amphetamine, and hypnotic drugs, such as methaqualone or any other
compound producing similar physiological effect." Since shabu is actually metamphetamine hydrochloride,
it would then be obvious that its component parts would be the compound of amphetamine with other
elements to form metamphetamine hydrochloride. In other words, among the elements contained in
metamphetamine hydrochloride is amphetamine, a regulated drug.
xxx xxx xxx6
(Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the above ruling of the trial court. This Court has in fact taken judicial notice that shabu is
a "street name" for metamphetamine hydrochloride (or "methyl amphetamine
hydrochloride").7 Considering the chemical composition of shabu, the Court has declared that shabu is a
derivative of a regulated drug,8 the possession, sale, transportation, etc. of which is subject to the
provisions of R.A. No. 6425 as amended. It remains only to point out that, in the case at bar, the laboratory
examination conducted on the crystalline granules recovered from appellant in fact yielded the compound
metamphetamine hydrochloride. The use in the criminal information of the casual or vulgar
term shabu rather than the scientific term metamphetamine hydrochloride, does not affect the legal
responsibility of appellant under the relevant provisions of R.A. No. 6425 as amended.
It is true, as pointed out by the trial court, that the preambular portion of the criminal information in this
case referred to violation of "Section 21 (b) in relation to Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179." Section 21 (b) of the statute reads as follows:
Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. — The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the commission of the
offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to commit the same in the following case:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Sale, Administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous drugs;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4, Article II of the statute deals with "sale, administration, distribution and transportation
of prohibited drugs." Upon the other hand, Section 15 of the statute is concerned with the "sale,
administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation and distribution of regulated drugs." It will be
recalled that the term "dangerous drugs" as used in the statute covers both "prohibited drugs" and
"regulated drugs." Thus, again as pointed out by the trial court, the opening clause of the information
should, more precisely, have referred to Section 15 which deals with "regulated drugs" rather than to
Section 4 which refers to "prohibited drugs." This imprecision in the specification of the appropriate
section of R.A. No. 6425 as amended has, however, no consequences in the case at bar. For it is the
character of the acts charged in the criminal information and proven at the trial that is important, rather
than the correctness of the designation of the section and article of the statute violated. It should also not
escape notice that the penalty provided in Section 4: "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00," is exactly the same penalty imposed in Section 15 of the statute.
In much the same way, appellant's contention that he had been deprived of his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, is bereft of merit. The acts with which he was charged are
quite plainly set out in the operative portion of the criminal information: that appellant "did — willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, distributed, dispatch in transit or transport 50 grams of
shabu, knowing fully well that said shabu [is] a prohibited drug . . .". We agree with the trial court that the
use of the term "prohibited drug" was merely a conclusion of law, something which is for the Court to
determine; in the circumstances of this case, the inaccurate use of the term "prohibited drug" was also
merely a falsa descriptio. The trial court said:
The Court stressed this point as in the body of the Information what is alleged as the offense committed
is that the accused unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport 50
grams of shabu knowing fully well that said shabu is a prohibited durg in violation of the law.
It can readily be seen that the subject matter of the offense, as recited in the body of the Information, is
the transport or sale or delivery of the 50 grams of shabu. This is the allegation of fact in respect to the
acts consituting the offense. This is the offense that would need to be proved. However, the allegationthat
shabu is a prohibited drug is a conclusion of law. Apparently, the prosecutor, who filed the
Inforamtion considered shabu a prohibited drug. Thus, the prosecutor designated the offense as a
violation of Section 21 (b) in relation to Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The
Court pointed this out as should shabu, which really is the street name of metamphetamine
hydrochloride be, in fact, a regulated drug, the the designation of the offense should have been Violation
of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425, as amended. But
note, despite the mistaken designation of he offense for as recited in the body of the Information, what is
charged is still the sale, transport or delivery of 50 grams of shabu. That is the one important. Only the
designation of the offense was a mistake from regulated drug to prohibited drug which is a conclusion of
law.
This would not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accuasation against him. As in fact, the accused is still informed of the offense charged, that is, the
unlawful, transport, sale or delivery of 50 grams of shabu.
xxx xxx xxx9
(Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
Appellant's next contention is that because he was not lawfully arrested, the package with a "Happy Days"
wrapper containing 50 grams of shabu, taken from him was inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's claim
that he was unlawfully arrested is anchored on the fact that the arresting officers had neither warrant of
arrest nor a search warrant.
The basic difficulty with appellant's contention is that it totally disregards the antecedents of the arrest of
the appellant inside Room No. 77 of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel. It will be recalled that the arresting officers
had been informed by the Chief of the Narcom Regional Office that a transaction had been agreed upon
by appellant in Las Pinas, Metro Manila, involving delivery of shabu, which delivery was, however, to take
place in Room No. 77 at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio City. Only appellant with Editha Gagarin and
the undercover Narcom agent showed up at Room No. 77 at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel and the Narcom
undercover agent had signalled that appellant had with him the shabu. The reception prepared by the
arresting officers for appellant inside Room No. 77 was in fact an entrapment operation. The sale of
the shabu (understood as the meeting of the minds of seller and buyer) did not, of course, take place in
the presence of the arresting officers. The delivery or attempted delivery of the subject matter did,
however, take place in their presence. The trial court explained:
The situation at hand is no different from a buy bust operation and is in fact part of a buy bust operation.
It must be stressed that the sale was transacted and closed in Las Pinas, Metro Manila by a Chinese
businessman but the delivery was directed to be made in Room 77, Hyatt Terraces, Baguio. And instead of
the Chinese businessman being inside Room 77 to receive the delivery, the Narcom elements took his
place to entrap the party that will deliver.
Normally, the buy bust operation may take the form of both the negotiation for the sale and delivery being
made in the same place between the seller and the poseur buyer. And when the sale is agreed upon, on
the same occasion the drug is delivered upon the payment being given. And it is at this juncture that the
police or the Narcom elements close in to arrest the offender in the act of selling and delivering. This is
the classic case of a "buy-bust" operation, to bust drug pushing.
But surely, there are variations of a "buy-bust" operation, where the sale is agreed upon in one place like
on the street and then the delivery is to be made in another place as when the buyer and the seller proceed
to the house where the drug is stored for the delivery. And upon the delivery of the drug by the seller to
the buyer, the police elements will arrest the seller in the act of delivering.
And in the case at bar, the situation is but an extension of the second variation above illustrated where
the sale is agreed upon in one place but the delivery is to be made in another place. As here the sale was
agreed upon in Las Pinas but the delivery is to be made in a far away place, in Hyatt Terraces, Baguio City.
Surely, the above is still part and parcel of a buy bust operation although as we said it is more a "buy the
delivery" operation.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that the Narcom got to know beforehand the delivery to be made thru their intelligence sources
must be given credence by the Court. Like any other organization fighting the crime on drugs, the Narcom
must have intelligence sources or it cannot perform its functions well and fulfill its mission.
Thus, to wait for the delivery, the Narcom elements deployed themselves inside Room 77 in place of the
Chinese businessman to entrap the party who will appear to deliver the shabu which they would be in his
possession thru a pre-arranged signal of their undercover agent. Whosoever comes and appear at Room
77 would be it. All other persons are unexpected (sic) to come to Room 77 and have no business appearing
there except to deliver the shabu unless explained. And ultimately their waiting paid off as accused Hilario
Macasling, Jr. appeared in Room 77 to deliver the shabu and from whom it was taken by the Narcom. The
lack of warrant of arrest is not fatal as this would be covered by the situation provided for warrantless
arrests under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court where an offender is arrested while actually
committing and offense or attempting to commit the offense in the presence of a peace officer.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court must stressed that the situation in the case at bar is very different from a situation where the
law enforcing agents or elements will simply accost people at random on the road, street, boat, plane or
bus without any pre-arranged transaction and without warrant of arrest or search warrant and by chance
find drugs in the possession of a passerby. This latter situation is clearly not permissible and would be in
violation of the constitutional rights of a person against unreasonable searches and seizures. This would
be a fishing expedition. You search first, and if you find anything unlawful you arrest.
But here it is not at random. There was a previous unlawful transaction. There is a designated place for
delivery, Room 77 and a specified time frame, that very day of August 19, 1988 or thereabouts, and limited
to a particular person, in the sense that whoever would appear thereat would be it. Those who don't knock
at Room 77 and don't go inside Room 77 will not certainly be arrested. But those who will there at that
time and in that place will surely be arrested because of the advance information, thru the intelligence
sources, on the delivery and the prior transaction made. This makes a lot of difference.
xxx xxx xxx
But in the case at bar, accused Hilario Macasling, Jr., at the time of his arrest, was actually in the act of
committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the peace officers as he appeared
there in Room 77 to deliver 50 grams of shabu, a regulated drug, which was previously bought but directed
to be delivered thereat.
The accused had no reason to be at Room 77, knocking therein, and going inside, if he was not the party
to deliver the shabu, and indeed he was. And the Narcom elements have the right to pounce on him
immediately lest he gets away, or is tipped off, or can sense something is amiss or wrong. Unless, of course,
accused can explain then and there that he knocked on the door and went inside Room 77 by mistake like
being an innocent hotel boy, room boy or hotel employee who is going inside the room to fix the room. Or
that accused is a hotel guest who committed a mistake as to his correct room. but this is not the situation
at hand as no such explanation was immediately made by the accused. On the contrary, accused went
inside the room when let in indicating beyond reasonable doubt that he was the party to deliver, and
indeed he was, as the shabu was taken from his person after the pre-arranged signal was given by the
undercover agent. These circumstances speak for themselves. Res Ipsa Loquitor. The accused was caught
in flagrante delicto.
xxx xxx xxx10
(Emphasis supplied)
We consider that under the total circumstances of this case, the warrantless arrest of appellant inside
Room No. 77 was merely the culmination of an entrapment operation and that the taking of shabu from
appellant was either done immediately before, or was an incident of, a lawful arrest.11
As his principal factual defense, appellant denied knowledge of the fact that the package bearing the
"Happy Days" wrapper contained a quantity of a dangerous drug, claiming that he has merely been
instructed by his employer, Mr. Ben Diqueros, to bring the package to Baguio City as a gift for Mrs.
Diqueros. Appellant sought to explain his trip to Baguio by insisting that he has been asked by Mr. Diqueros
to drive the latter's Toyota Celica car to the Diqueros Residence in Tranco Ville, Baguio City, as Mrs.
Diqueros was planning to sell the car. Macasling had in turn invited Editha Gagarin, together with the
latter's children and mother, to join him in Baguio City. They reached Baguio City later in the evening of 19
August 1988 and stayed temporarily at the Castilla Monte. Appellant contended that he had left the
Castilla Monte to see Mrs. Diqueros at their residence in Tranco Ville but was informed by one Mario and
a domestic helper that Mrs. Diqueros was at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel. Appellant then had Mario
accompany him to the hotel where they found Mrs. Diqueros playing in the casino. Appellant, however,
decided not to bother Mrs. Diqueros and so returned to the Castilla Monte.
While at the Castilla Monte, appellant continued, he received a telephone call from Mario informing him
that Mrs. Diqueros had finished playing at the casino. Although it was then midnight, appellant together
with Editha Gagarin proceeded to the Hyatt Terraces Hotel. There they were met at the hotel lobby by
Mario who informed them that Mrs. Diqueros was at Room. No. 77. Appellant claimed that he was, in
Room No. 77, searched at gunpoint and that the package he was carrying for Mrs. Diqueros was seized.
Unknown to him , he insisted, the gift package contained "shabu."12
The trial court was not persuaded by appellant's elaborate disclaimer of knowledge about the shabu,
finding such disclaimer as contrived and improbable and not worthy of credence.13 The rule, of course, is
that testimony to be believed must not only originate from a credible witness, but must also itself be
credible.14 We see no reason, and we have been pointed to none, why the Court should overturn the
appraisal of the trial court of the credibility (or rather lack of credibility) of the long story offered by the
appellant. We find no basis for departing from the basic rule that the appraisal by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses who appeared before it is entitled to great respect from appellate courts who do
not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a written record.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 5936-R is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CLARA BEEGAN, complainant, vs. TEOTIMO BORJA, Clerk of Court and ARNULFO BALANO, Clerk II,
Municipal Trial Court, Leyte, respondents.
[A.M. No. 8733-Ret. September 6, 1996]
RE: DISABILITY RETIREMENT OF TEOTIMO D. BORJA, Clerk of Court II, MTC, Tanauan, Leyte.
RESOLUTION
In these consolidated cases the only issue is the propriety of respondents act of allowing a party to an
election case to machine copy certain ballots subject of the case which was being heard in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Tanauan, Leyte.
The pertinent facts as culled from the records are simple and undisputed:
In May, 1994, after barangay elections were conducted in Bislig, Tanauan, Leyte, an election contest,
docketed as Barangay Election Protest No. 18, was filed with the MTC of Tanauan, Leyte, by Arnulfo
Santillano, as Protestant, against Juan Egonio, as Protestee, with complainant Clara Beegan as Intervenor.
The election case required the revision of three (3) ballot boxes, for which reason a Revision Committee
was appointed, composed of respondent Arnulfo Balano, as Chairman, and Mr. Prudente Torres and Atty.
Luz Polistico, as Members. Mr. Torres represented the Protestant and the Intervenor, while Atty. Polistico
represented the Protestee.
It is important to emphasize that revision involving the aforesaid three ballot boxes was completed in
October, 1994, and the Revision Committee presented its report to the Court on November 3, 1994[1]
On November 25, 1994, a letter-complaint was submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas,
docketed as Omb-Vis-Adm-94-0381, wherein complainant Beegan charged that respondents, Clerk of
Court Teotimo Borja and Clerk II Arnulfo Balano, allowed the reopening of the ballot boxes subject of the
revision case on November 17, 1994 by one party without leave of court in order to machine-copy the
questioned ballots.[2]
The letter-complaint was indorsed by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to the Office of the Court
Administrator which docketed the same as A.M. No. P-95-1171.
On February 24, 1995, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis referred Beegan's complaint to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban, Leyte for investigation, report and
recommendation.
After hearing, the Investigating Judge absolved the respondents inasmuch as the complainant was not
prejudiced in any manner by the xeroxing of the questioned ballots. However, both respondents were
admonished by him to be more circumspect in the future in the performance of their duties in order to
avoid sanctions from the Court.[3]
The Investigating Judge based his recommendation on the following findings of facts: (a) on November 17,
1994, Atty. Polistico requested respondent Balano as Chairman of the Revision Committee to reopen the
ballot boxes subject of the Revision in order that she can xerox the questioned ballots so that, as the new
counsel for the protestee, she could prepare her client's case; (b) when the request was referred to
respondent Borja, Clerk of Court of MTC, Tanauan, Leyte, respondent Borja told respondent Balano to
determine whether or not the request was proper; (c) respondent Balano asked Mr. Torres, complainants
revisor, who was then at the court's lobby to accompany them to and from Tacloban City where the
questioned ballots were to be xeroxed so that the protestant could be duly represented as respondent
Balano acted favorably on Atty. Polisticos request; (d) all three appointed Chairman and Members of the
Revision Committee were present from the time the questioned ballots were taken out of the ballot boxes;
they were likewise present during the copying thereof in Tacloban City and when the said ballots were
returned to their respective boxes at MTC, Tanauan, Leyte.[4]
On December 1, 1995, Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis, after studying the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Judge, decided differently, he having found respondents to have
violated the rules. He recommended that the respondents be reprimanded for misconduct, with the
warning that the commission of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with a stiffer penalty.[5]
The Office of the Court Administrator viewed the acts of the respondents in effecting the reopening of the
ballot boxes and the copying of the questioned ballots to be tantamount to misconduct in office and stated
thus:
Undoubtedly, misconduct in office was committed by both respondents no matter how well-meaning their
intention was. They cannot justify their actuations by pointing out that complainants' revisor, a law
graduate was present, for while he (complainant's revisor) was present, her counsel, the one duly
authorized to make concessions in her behalf, was not. The presiding judge was likewise not around. It is
to be noted that the rules and the mandate of propriety cannot be dispensed with on account of
expediency.[6]
While the OCAs recommendation was being considered by this Court, respondent Borja, on December 28,
1995, applied for disability benefits under RA 1616, as amended by RA 4968. This matter was docketed as
A.M. No. 8733-Ret.
In our Resolution, dated February 13, 1996, we approved respondent Borja's application for disability
retirement effective on July 1, 1995 as per Report and Recommendation of our Clinic Services indorsed to
OCA.[7] However, we further directed the Fiscal Management and Budget Officer of this Court to hold in
abeyance the retirement benefits of respondent Borja pending resolution of A.M. No. P-95-1171.
The result of our re-evaluation of the administrative complaint against the respondent Clerk II and
appointed Chairman of the Revision Committee and The Clerk of Court of MTC, Tanauan, Leyte whose
application for disability retirement merited our approval discloses a far incongruous approach from the
OCA and the Investigating Judge's Report and Recommendation.
As regards respondent Borja, it bears stressing at this point that the Clerk of Court, both in Single Sala
Courts and Multi-Sala Courts, is the administrative officer of the Court, subject to the control and
supervision of the Presiding Judge and/or Executive Judge as the case maybe. As such, he or she has
control and supervision over all court records, exhibits, documents, properties and supplies.[8]
Moreover, it is clearly provided under the Comelec Rules and Procedure that election documents and
paraphernalia involved in election contests before courts of general jurisdiction shall be kept and held
secure in a place to be designated by the Court in the care and custody of the Clerk of Court.[9]
We are not unaware of the common practice in the courts with respect to the photocopying or xeroxing
of portions of case records as long as the same are not confidential or disallowed by the rules to be
reproduced. The judge need not be bothered as long as the permission of the Clerk of Court has been
sought and as long as a duly authorized representative of the court takes charge of the reproduction within
the court premises if warranted or if not, the said court representative must bring along the case records
where reproduction takes place and return the same intact to the Clerk of Court.
In the instant case of respondents Balano and Borja, the above practice was evident. Although, initially,
the request for xeroxing of the questioned ballots was directed to respondent Balano as Chairman of the
Revision Committee, Atty. Polistico and Mr. Balano referred the matter to the respondent Clerk of Court
who, together with respondent Balano, found the request proper.
On his part, respondent Balano allowed the xeroxing of the questioned ballots in the honest belief that it
was well within his authority as the duly appointed Chairman of the Revision Committee. After all, Atty.
Polistico presented a valid ground for making the request, i.e., to prepare the objections to the protestants
ballots and the manifestations necessary for the ballots being claimed by the protestee, her client.
Respondent Balano made sure that the other party was duly represented by asking Mr. Torres, revisor for
the protestant and intervenor to accompany him and Atty. Polistico to Tacloban City where the xeroxing
was to be done.
Anyway, the revision of the ballots had already been completed. The task of the Revision Committee in
the instant case, did not end after actual revision of the ballots concerned. The term of the Revision
Committee shall end only after its Revision Report shall have been duly submitted for the courts approval
simultaneous with the submission of the padlocked ballot boxes to the Presiding Judge.[10] The records of
this case clearly show that when the request for xeroxing was made on November 17, 1994, the required
Revision Report was yet to be formally submitted the following day, November 18, 1994, the scheduled
hearing date for purposes of identification and authentication of the said report by the Revision
Committee so appointed by the Court.[11]
We are in accord with the Investigating Judge in absolving both the accused in the absence of any prejudice
on the part of the complainant caused by the respondents' acts of effecting the photocopying of the
questioned ballots. It is this Court's observation that the presiding judge before whom the election contest
was assigned found nothing highly irregular in the photocopying of the questioned ballots inasmuch as no
drastic measures were taken against the respondents after the said judge learned about the said xeroxing.
This reinforces our earlier discussion on the matter of procedure in most courts with respect to the
reproduction of court records when so allowed by the rules. Thus, as long as no tampering or alteration
was manifest in the xeroxing/photocopying of court records, no liability attaches to anyone.
We cannot, however, adopt the Investigating Judges recommendation for admonition considering that the
circumstances of the case at bar do not warrant that the respondents be admonished inasmuch as we find
them to have regularly performed their duties.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the respondents Clerk II and Clerk of Court of MTC, Tanauan, Leyte
in A.M. No. P-95-1171 are hereby EXONERATED. Accordingly, the RELEASE of the DISABILITY RETIREMENT
BENEFITS of Mr. Teotimo D. Borja in A.M. No. 8733-Ret. is hereby ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BONFILO MARTINEZ y DE LA ROSA, JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE, Accused, BONFILO MARTINEZ y DE LA ROSA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
In an information filed before Branch 121 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City on March 8,
1994, Accused-appellant Bonfilo Martinez and two other unidentified persons were charged with the
special complex crime of robbery with rape allegedly committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
That on or about the 28th of December, 1991 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with (sic)
one another, with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation employed upon the persons
of MICHAEL BUENVINIDA Y SOLMAYOR, POL BONGGAT, SHERWIN SOLMAYOR, JONATHAN BONGGAT,
JUNIOR SOLMAYOR, GLORIA SOLMAYOR and GLORIVIC BANDAYANON Y QUIAJO while the aforesaid
persons were inside the house of ERNESTO BUENVINIDA viewing television program, said accused, all
armed with guns of unknown caliber, tied the hands of the occupants of the house, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles belonging to ERNESTO
BUENVINIDA. to wit: y
1. Radio Cassette Recorder worth P3,000.00
2. Assorted imported perfumes 30,000.00
3. Assorted imported canned goods 5,000.00
4. Cash money amounting to 8,000.00
5. Cash money in U.S. Dollar $1,000.00
that in the course of said robbery, said accused, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with one GLORIVIC
BANDAYANON Y QUIAJO, against the latter’s will and without her consent. 1
Although the two Does remained unknown and at large, appellant was arrested on March 3, 1994 for
soliciting funds for a fictitious volleyball competition. 2 After his arrest, he was confined at the Bagong
Silang Sub-station detention cell for an hour and was later transferred to the Caloocan City Jail. 3
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-46704 (94) on March
21, 1994. 4
As collated from the transcripts of the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Glorivic Bandayanon 5
and Michael Buenvinida, 6 the indicated coverage of which yield the particular facts hereunder narrated,
the circumstances attendant to the crime charged are detailed in the paragraphs that follow.
Michael Buenvinida, Michelle Buenvinida, Gloria Solmayor, Sherwin Solmayor, Junior (JR) Solmayor, Paul
Bonggat, Jonathan Bonggat and Glorivic Bandayanon were in Ernesto and Cornelia Buenvinida’s house
situated at Lot 25, Block 20, Wallnut St., Rainbow Village, Caloocan City when the crime was committed
on December 28, 1991.
Michael and Michelle are the children of Ernesto and Cornelia. Gloria is a sister-in-law of Cornelia who
was in the house for a visit, while Sherwin, Junior, Paul and Jonathan are Cornelia’s nephews. Glorivic is a
friend of Cornelia who volunteered to look after the latter’s children while she is in Sweden. Ernesto was
at the office at the time of the commission of the crime.
While the occupants of the house were watching a television show in the living room at around 6:30
P.M., Michael noticed a man wearing short pants and holding a handgun jump over the low fence of
their house. The man entered the house through its unlocked front door and introduced himself to the
surprised group as a policeman. The intruder then told them that Michael’s father got involved in a
stabbing incident in the local basketball court. As if on cue, two men followed the first man in entering
the house and promptly thereafter covered their faces with handkerchiefs. These two were wearing long
pants and also carried handguns. The first man who entered the house did not cover his face.
With guns pointed at them, the occupants of the house were brought to the master’s bedroom where
they were tied and detained by the three intruders.
Later, one of the armed men, identified by Michael as herein appellant, untied Michael and ordered him
to pull out the plugs of the appliances in the house, such as the television set, the V.H.S. player and the
radio cassette recorder. Appellant and the other masked man then began to search the house for
valuables in the living room and in the kitchen.
Meanwhile, the first man remained in the master’s bedroom and found cash money, in pesos and
dollars, and bottles of perfume. The men then placed in a big bag the radio cassette player, canned
goods, money and perfumes that they had found inside the house.
Thereafter, the first intruder, whom Glorivic referred to as the mastermind of the group, returned to the
master’s bedroom and asked the terrified group for jewelries. Unable to get any jewelry, he brought
Glorivic to the children’s (Michael and Michelle’s) bedroom opposite the master’s bedroom. Upon
entering the room, the man turned on the lights there. In the meanwhile, his two masked companions
continued looking around the house for other valuables.
Inside the bedroom, the ostensible leader of the gang untied Glorivic and ordered her to search the
room for jewelries. After Glorivic failed to find any, the man directed her to remove her clothes and
pointed his gun at Glorivic’s head. Despite her pleas and cries, the man removed the shirt, long pants and
underwear of Glorivic while keeping the gun leveled at her. Shortly after, the man put the gun on top of
the ironing board beside the bed, then pushed Glorivic towards the bed and lay on top of her. Glorivic’s
resistance proved to be futile as the man was able to violate her chastity.
Before the first man could leave the room, another member of the group entered and pushed Glorivic
again to the bed when she was just about to put on her dress. Upon entering the room, the second
man’s cloth cover tied around his face fell and hang around his neck. After threatening to kill her, the
man put a pillow on her face, forcibly spread Glorivic’ s legs and had sexual congress with her. Glorivic
would later point to appellant during the trial as this second man.
After the second man was through, the third man came in. While Glorivic was still sitting on the bed and
crying, the third man took the bed sheet and covered her face with it. Just like what his companions did
before him, the third man had sexual intercourse with Glorivic through force and intimidation, but not
without first removing the handkerchief tied over his face.
Michael was able to see the three malefactors enter and leave the room one after the other as the door
of the master’s bedroom was left open. He was also able to hear Glorivic crying and her imploration to
her tormentors in the opposite room.
After the consummation of the odious act, the third man told Glorivic to dress up. Glorivic felt blood
flowing down her thighs as she put on her clothes. Thereafter, the third man tied her up and brought her
back to the company of the other occupants of the house. Michael saw Glorivic with disheveled hair and
wearing her pants turned inside out, with blood on the lower parts.
The felons left after intimating to the group by way of a threat that they were going to explode a hand
grenade. Around five minutes later, after ascertaining that the culprits had left, Michael and the others
untied each other. Thereafter, they went to the house of his father’s friend located two blocks away and,
from there, they proceeded to the Urduja police detachment.
Glorivic met appellant again on March 7, 1994. Policemen came to her place of work and asked her to
come with them as they had a person in custody who they suspected to be herein appellant. At the
Caloocan City Jail, Glorivic was made to face eight detainees. She was able to readily recognize appellant
among the group because of the mole on his right cheek. Before she picked him out from the other men,
she carefully saw to it that the one she pointed out was really Appellant.
On the part of Michael, he stated that he was fetched by policemen on March 7, 1994 at his school to
make an identification at the Dagat-Dagatan police station. Appellant was with six other inmates when
they arrived at the station. Michael pointed to appellant as one of the robbers who entered their house,
after readily remembering that he was the one who ordered him to unplug the appliances. Michael could
never be mistaken in appellant’s identity because he could not forget the prominent mole and its
location on appellant’s right cheek. Testifying at the trial, 7 appellant denied any participation in the
robbery with rape committed in the Buenvinida residence. Appellant claimed that it was only on March
7, 1994 that he first met Glorivic Bandayanon and insisted that he does not know Michael Buenvinida.
He claimed that he was in his house in Wawa, Parañaque together with his wife and children the whole
day of December 28, 1991. He moved to Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in 1993 after he was able to find
work as a mason under his brother who lives in the same district. On cross-examination, appellant
denied having visited his brother at Bagong Silang from 1991 to 1992. However, upon further
questioning by the public prosecutor, appellant admitted that he made several visits to his brother in
1991. Moreover, he explained that it usually took him three hours to travel to Caloocan City from
Parañaque by public utility bus.
Giving credence to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and rejecting appellant’s defense
of alibi, the trial court 8 found appellant guilty of the composite crime of robbery with rape. Although
the proper imposable penalty is death, 9 considering the lower court’s finding of two aggravating
circumstances of nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon, appellant was sentenced to reclusion
perpetuain observance of the then constitutional prohibition against the imposition of capital
punishment. With regard to his civil liabilities, appellant was ordered to indemnify Ernesto Buenvinida in
the sum of P73,000.00 as the value of his stolen and unrecovered personal properties, and to pay
Glorivic Bandayanon P30,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus the costs of suit. 10
In this present appellate review, appellant inceptively faults the lower court for convicting him despite
the supposedly undependable and untrustworthy identification made by the eyewitnesses. He claims
that Glorivic Bandayanon and Michael Buenvinida could have been mistaken in their identification 11
because (1) of the long interval of time before they were able to confront him; (2) his face was covered
with a handkerchief as they themselves narrated in court; and (3) they could have been so gravely
terrified by the criminal act as to have their mental faculties impaired.
When an accused assails the identification made by witnesses, he is in effect attacking the credibility of
those witnesses who referred to him as the perpetrator of the crime alleged to have been committed. 12
The case then turns on the question of credibility.
It has long been a well-entrenched rule of evidence and procedure that the issue of credibility of
witnesses is almost invariably within the exclusive province of a trial court to determine, under the
principle that the findings of trial courts deserve respect from appellate tribunals. 13 The foregoing rule
notwithstanding, we expended considerable time and effort to thoroughly examine the records and
objectively assay the evidence before us, considering the gravity of the offense charged. However, we
find no compelling reasons to overturn the lower court’s conclusion on the accuracy and correctness of
the witnesses’ identification of appellant as one of the persons who robbed the house of the Buenvinidas
and raped Glorivic.
The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the prosecution were not only consistent with and
corroborative of each other. The transcripts of stenographic notes which we have conscientiously
reviewed, further reveal that their narrations before the lower court were delivered in a clear, coherent
and unequivocal manner.
There was no perceptible hesitation or uncertainty on the part of Glorivic and Michael when they
unerringly identified appellant during the trial. The unhurried, studious and deliberate manner in which
appellant was identified by them in court added strength to their credibility 14 and immeasurably
fortified the case of the prosecution.
The records also show that the memory of these witnesses were not in any way affected by the passage
of two years and three months since the tragedy. Glorivic categorically stated on the witness stand that
the lapse of those years did not impair her memory and she could still identify those who raped her. 15
Michael asserted that he could still positively identify appellant because of the latter’s mole, as well as
the several opportunities of the former to take a good look at appellant’s face during the robbery, 16 and
the same is true with Glorivic. Appellant’s mole on his right cheek provided a distinctive mark for
recollection and which, coupled with the emotional atmosphere during the incident, would be
perpetually etched in the minds of the witnesses.
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of
their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and
body movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victim’s minds which cannot be
easily erased from their memory. 17
While appellant claims that his face was covered during the commission of the crime, there were
providential points in time when the two witnesses were able to freely see his face and scan his facial
features closely to as to enable them to identify him later on.
Although appellant placed a pillow on her face. Glorivic declared that when the latter two offenders
raped her, their faces were no longer covered. In the case of appellant, the handkerchief on his face fell
upon his entering the room and he left it that way while he raped Glorivic. 18 And when the latter two
transgressors entered the house, their faces were then exposed and it was only when they were already
inside the house that they covered their faces with handkerchiefs. 19 These circumstances gave Michael
and Glorivic sufficient time and unimpeded opportunity to recognize and identify Appellant.
There is no evidence to show that the two eyewitnesses were so petrified with fear as to result in
subnormal sensory functions on their part. Contrarily, in a recently decided case, we held that fear for
one’s life may even cause the witness to be more observant of his surroundings. 20 The ample
opportunity to observe and the compelling reason to identify the wrongdoer are invaluable
physiognomical and psychological factors for accuracy in such identification.
The records do not disclose any improper motive on the part of the witnesses to falsely point to
appellant as one of the robber-rapists. Appellant even admitted that he did not know Glorivic and
Michael prior to the commission of the crime. It is doctrinally settled that in the absence of evidence
showing that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, their identification of the
accused as the assailant should be given full faith and credit. 21
Where conditions of visibility are favorable, as those obtaining in the Buenvinida residence when the
crimes were committed, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertions as to the identity
of the malefactor should be accepted as trustworthy. 22
For his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court should not have ordered
him to pay the value of the unrecovered personalities to Ernesto Buenvinida, damages to Glorivic
Bandayanon, and the costs of suit because he is not criminally liable as shown by the failure of the
witnesses to properly identify him.
We find speciosity in this second contention of appellant because such argument flows from the premise
that he is not guilty. As the trial court found, and with which we resolutely agree as already explained,
appellant is culpable beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime of robbery with rape
committed in the early evening of December 28, 1991 at Caloocan City.
However, we deem worthy of elucidation the matter of the value of the items established to have been
stolen from the house of the Buenvinidas. Incidentally, appellant claims in his brief that the amounts
alleged in the information as the bases of his civil liability for robbery were just concocted and founded
on speculation and conjectures. 23
To prove the value of the burglarized properties, the prosecution presented an affidavit executed by
Ernesto Buenvinida 24 on March 7, 1994, containing a list of the stolen movables and with their
corresponding values, as now found in the information. This affidavit was identified and marked as
Exhibit H 25 for the prosecution during the testimony of SPO4 Abner Castro, 26 the police officer who
conducted an investigation of the incident on December 28, 1991. In addition to testifying on the arrest
and investigation of appellant, Castro repeated in open court the respective values of the personal
properties as explained to him by Ernesto Buenvinida and how he helped Ernesto in the preparation
thereof. 27 The same was formally offered in evidence 28 to prove, among others, the facts and amounts
contained therein and as testified to by witness Castro. Although objected to by appellant as self-serving,
29 the lower court admitted said document for the purpose for which it was offered and as part of the
testimony of said witness. 30
It may be theorized, and in fact appellant in effect so postulates, that the prosecution has failed to prove
the value of the stolen properties and, for lack of evidence thereon, the civil liability therefor as adjudged
by the court below may not be sustained. It is true that the evidence presented thereon consisted of the
testimony of the investigator, Abner Castro, who based his evaluation on the report to him by Ernesto
Buenvinida. These are legal aspects worth discussing for future guidance.
While it is claimed that hearsay testimony was involved, it is actually and not necessarily so. The rule that
hearsay evidence has no probative value does not apply here, since SPO4 Abner Castro was presented as
a witness and testified on two occasions, during which he explained how the value of the stolen
properties was arrived at for purposes of the criminal prosecution. During his testimony on his
investigation report and the affidavit of Ernesto Buenvinida on the amounts involved, appellant had all
the opportunity to cross-examine him on the correctness thereof; and it was this opportunity to cross-
examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by the witness are hearsay. And, said
documents having been admitted as part of testimony of the policeman, they shall accordingly be given
the same weight as that to which his testimony may be entitled.
Again, even under the rule on opinions of ordinary witnesses, the value of the stolen items was
established. It is a standing doctrine that the opinion of a witness is admissible in evidence on ordinary
matters known to all men of common perception, such as the value of ordinary household articles. 31
Here, the witness is not just an ordinary witness, but virtually an expert, since his work as an investigator
of crimes against property has given him both the exposure to and experience in fixing the current value
of such ordinary articles subject of the crime at bar. Incidentally, it is significant that appellant never
dared to cross-examine on the points involved, which opportunity to cross-examine takes the testimony
of Castro out of the hearsay rule, while the lack of objection to the value placed by Castro bolsters his
testimony under the cited exception to the opinion rule.
Also not to be overlooked is the fact that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice, in this case
of the value of the stolen goods, because these are matter of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. 32 The lower court may, as it obviously did, take such judicial notice
motu proprio. 33 Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience,
displace evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to
achieve. 34 Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume (especially since
the trial court was presided by a lady judge) are undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable
of unquestionable demonstration.
Finally, as a matter of law and not on the excuse that after all appellant cannot satisfy his civil liability,
the real value of the asported properties would nonetheless be irrelevant to the criminal liability of
appellant. Insofar as the component crime of robbery is concerned, the same was committed through
violence against or intimidation of persons, and not through force upon things, hence the value of the
property subject of the crime is immaterial. 35 The special complex crime of robbery with rape has,
therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts of rape on
that occasion being integrated in one composite crime. The value of the objects of the apoderamiento
relates only to the civil aspect, which we have already resolved.
One final complementary disposition is called for. Victim Glorivic Bandayanon was subjected by
appellant and his co-conspirators to multiple rape, and under humiliating circumstances equivalent to
augmented ignominy since she was abused by the three accused successively and virtually in the
presence of one after the other. The award of P30,000.00 for moral damages made by the court below
should accordingly be amended.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in full, with the sole
MODIFICATION that the damages awarded to the offended party, Glorivic Bandayanon, is hereby
increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal
Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape
and sentencing him to death twice.
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutors
Office two separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No.
DU-6186, alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY
ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY
ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape charges
against him since he and his daughter, had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for going out
whenever he was not at home.[3]
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said
accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217
and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of
the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said
accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217
and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of
the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private
complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an
IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with her father, the herein accused, at
Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was in the house together with her
father. But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while herself (sic) just
lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside him. However, when she was already sleeping,
she noticed that her father who was already undressed was beside her and was embracing her.Then, he
undressed her which she resisted but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she
shouts and after that, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone.In
effect, his penis penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time asking by
saying (sic) : Does it feel good? And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a woman
who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her when she contradicted his
statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt intense
pain that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out
when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to heaven if she
did not get married, her father just stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father was just
smoking and squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her
father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her, she placed a stool between them but
he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to take her womanhood again by using a very
sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place and went to her neighbor by the
name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the
matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen, she went to the Southern Islands
Hospital where she was examined and after her medical examination, she was brought back by the police
and was investigated by them.[5]
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which
found him twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending
that:[6]
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE
HIM OF THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September
5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home
tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In
his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents
allegedly transpired, he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to
do such wrongdoings.[7]
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the trial courts
decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to
conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the penalty of
death imposed in each of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its review of the
records, including the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest
on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.[8] But here we find no room to disturb the trial courts
judgment concerning appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty
ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private
complainant who testified on affirmative matters,[9] such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is
an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the
victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.[10] Indeed, we find that private complainant was
unequivocal in charging appellant with ravishing her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was
straightforward, detailed, and consistent.[11] Her testimony never wavered even after it had been
explained to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.[12]
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single most important issue. [13] The
determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale for
this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first hand the demeanor of the witnesses
on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate impression and
conclusion.[14] Absent any showing that certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if
considered could affect the result of the case, or that the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the
conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed.[15]
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is corroborated by medical findings that
lacerations were present in her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the private
complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: do
Fourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Gram staining of vaginal disc.[16]
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants private parts
meant a history of sexual congress on her part.[17] According to her, the lacerations may have been caused
by the entry of an erect male organ into complainants genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed
out that previous coitus may be inferred from complainants U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of
a female who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.[18] While Dr. Acebes conceded under
cross-examination, that the existence of the datum U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and
absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation
of fingers or other things,[19] nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private
complainants claim that she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had
quarreled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did not
rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private complainant. He urges us to
consider the charges filed against him as the result of his frequent castigation of her delinquent
behavior.[20]
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous
rape is of such a nature that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously.It goes against human
experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime
of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. [21] More so, where
her charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to
him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for.This argument, however,
is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the
only child who lived with him.[22] As pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was thus free to do as
he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter.[23]
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of
76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant
raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges
against her own father, as shown by the following testimony of the victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be sentenced to
death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case your father
would be found guilty, two death sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.[24]
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,[25] penalizes rape of a
minor daughter by her father as qualified rape[26] and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the
prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force
or without her consent[27] and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional
elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a
parent of the victim.[28]
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victims father.[29] But the
victims age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was
thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she
was born because her mother did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise with
her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - [30]
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for judicial
notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof
because they already know them.[31] Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or
discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial
notice of facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction
of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts
- victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape. The prosecution failed to present either the
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not
always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape
can and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are
occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is
sharing with the accuseds sister.[32]
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy
in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.[33]
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of
professional and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,[34] the trial court took judicial
notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as
premature since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be
facts which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were
received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court
can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
which requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of
a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission,
thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters
such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of
the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof,
upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence
sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape
committed was statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and
so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was
presented because the victims birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was duly
presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal
certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of
simple rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the
birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no showing that the said documents were lost
or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were
hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside
from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,[35] we stressed that the
prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not contested by
the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. In People v. Cula,[36] we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty
the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of
the death penalty. Since the record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as
the victims duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainants age, appellant
could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso,[37] the victim was alleged to have
been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that
the prosecution failed to prove the victims age other than through the testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.
7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent, that the
failure to sufficiently establish victims age by independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its
qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J., independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes
vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances
for the imposition of the death penalty set by the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed by the death
penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape
was committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the
same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil
indemnity. However, the award of another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article
2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code for each count is imprecise. In rape cases, the
prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need for pleading or proof as to the
basis thereof.[38] Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a different
amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the
alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an aggravating
circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing the death
penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view
of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been
treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death
penalty mandatory.[39] However, in this case, the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was
proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death
sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in this instance so
that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary
damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from
sexually abusing their own daughters.[40]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos.
DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2)
counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPS. ERNESTO and MINA CATUNGAL, petitioners, vs. DORIS HAO, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 March 1998 and Resolution
dated 30 July 1998 in the case entitled Doris Hao vs. Sps. Ernesto and Mina Catungal docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 46158. Said decision affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On December 28, 1972, the original owner, Aniana Galang, leased a three-storey building situated at
Quirino Avenue, Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila, to the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) for a period
of about fifteen (15) years, to expire on June 20, 1986. During the existence of the lease, BPI subleased the
ground floor of said building to respondent Doris Hao.
On August 24, 1984, Galang and respondent executed a contract of lease on the second and third floors
of the building. The lease was for a term of four (4) years commencing on August 15, 1984 and ending on
August 15, 1988. On August 15, 1986, petitioner spouses Ernesto and Mina Catungal bought the property
from Aniana Galang.
Invoking her right of first refusal purportedly based on the lease contract between her and Aniana Galang,
respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 88-491 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, the lease agreement between BPI and Galang expired.
Upon expiration of the lease agreements, petitioner spouses sent demand letters to respondent for her to
vacate the building. The demand letters were unheeded by respondent causing petitioners to file two
complaints for ejectment, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 7666 and 7667 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Paraaque, Metro Manila.
The institution of the ejectment cases prompted respondent to file an action for injunction docketed as
Civil Case No. 90-758 of the RTC of Makati, to stop the MeTC of Paraaque from proceeding therewith
pending the settlement of the issue of ownership raised in Civil Case No. 88-491. These two cases for
annulment of sale and for injunction were also consolidated before Branch 63 of the RTC of Makati which
rendered a Decision dated September 19, 1991, granting the injunction and annulling the contract of sale
between Aniana Galang and petitioners.
On appeal,[1] the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and the complaints in
Civil Cases Nos. 88-491 and 90-758 were accordingly dismissed.
Not satisfied, respondent elevated the above decision of the CA before this Court. We, however, denied
respondent's petition on April 10, 1996.[2]
The MeTC of Paraaque, after the reversal of the decision in Civil Case No. 90-758 for injunction, proceeded
with the trial of the ejectment cases.
On January 22, 1997, the MeTC of Paraaque rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Doris T. Hao who is in actual
possession of the property and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises in question
and to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 a month from June 28, 1988, until she finally vacates
the premises and to pay attorneys fees of P20,000.00. With costs against the defendant.[3]
Petitioners filed a motion for clarificatory or amended judgment on the ground that although MeTC
"ordered the defendant to vacate the entire subject property, it only awarded rent or compensation for
the use of said property and attorney's fees for said ground floor and not the entire subject
property. Compensation for the use of the subject property's second and third floors and attorney's fees
as prayed for in Civil Case No. 7767 were not awarded."[4] In response to said motion, the MeTC issued an
Order dated March 3, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, the Decision of this Court is hereby clarified in such a way that the dispositive
portion would read as follows: in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant Doris T. Hao who is in actual possession of the property and all persons claiming rights under
her to vacate the premises and to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P8,000.00 a month in Civil Case No.
7666 for the use and occupancy of the first floor of the premises in question from June 28, 1998 until she
finally vacates the premises and to pay the plaintiff a rental of P5,000.00 a month in Civil Case No. 7667
from June 28, 1988, until she finally vacates the premises and to pay attorneys fees of P20,000.00. With
costs against defendant.
So ordered.[5]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the above order, praying that respondent be ordered to pay
P20,000.00 monthly for the use and occupancy of the ground floor and P10,000.00 each monthly for the
second and third floors.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a notice of appeal.
Instead of resolving the motion for reconsideration, on May 7, 1997, the MeTC of Paraaque issued an
Order, elevating the case to the Regional Trial Court:
Considering the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated March 3, 1997 and the
Comment and Opposition thereto of the counsel for the defendant, the Court finds that the said Motion
for Reconsideration should already be addressed to the Regional Trial Court considering that whatever
disposition that this Court will award will still be subject to the appeal taken by the defendant and
considering further that the supersedeas bond posted by the defendant covered the increased rental.[6]
On September 30, 1997, the RTC of Paraaque, Branch 259, rendered a Decision modifying that of the
MeTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In the Light of the foregoing, the appealed decision, being in accordance with law, is hereby affirmed as to
the order to vacate the property in question and modified as to the amount of rentals which is hereby
increased to P20,000.00 a month for the ground floor starting June 28, 1988 and P10,000.00 a month for
the second floor and also P10,000.00 a month for the third floor (or) a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals
commencing June 28, 1988 until the subject property has been vacated and possession thereof turner [sic]
over to the plaintiffs-appellees; to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and with costs.[7]
In her Motion dated October 6, 1997, respondent sought a reconsideration of the above ruling of the
RTC. The same was denied on November 25, 1997.
Respondent elevated her case to the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered the Decision subject of this
petition the dispositive portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the amount of rentals for both the
second and third floors from P20,000.00 to P10,000.00 monthly. With this modification, the judgment
below is AFFIRMED in all other respects.[8]
The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners asked
that the decision of the Regional Trial Court fixing the total monthly rentals at P40,000.00 be sustained. On
the other hand, respondent sought a revival of the decision of the MeTC on the ground that since
petitioners did not interpose an appeal from the amended judgment of the MeTC, the RTC could not validly
increase the amount of rentals awarded by the former.
In its Resolution dated 30 July 1998, the Court of Appeals resolved the parties motions for reconsideration
in favor of the respondent. It ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners before the
MeTC was a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Such being the case, said motion
for reconsideration did not produce any legal effect and thus the amended judgment of the MeTC had
become final and executory insofar as the petitioners are concerned. The dispositive portion of the CA's
resolution reads as follows:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by reducing the monthly rentals for the
first/ground floor from P20,000.00 to P8,000.00 and for the second and third floors from P10,000.00 each
to P5,000.00 for both floors. With this modification the judgment below is affirmed in all other respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Petitioners now come before this Court assigning the following errors:
A.
IN THE ASSAILED DECISION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY USING AS BASIS FOR REDUCING THE RENTAL ONLY THE
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES AND IGNORING CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHICH THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE.
B.
IN THE ASSAILED DECISION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE APPEALED JUDGMENT BY
INCREASING THE AWARD OF MONTHLY RENTALS FROM P13,000.00 TO P40,000.00.[10]
We required respondent to comment on the petition.[11] In her Comment/Compliance, respondent
contends that the petition should be dismissed and the resolution of the case should be based on the
following issues:
1. DID THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED [sic] ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
CONSIDERED PETITIONERS' "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" (ANNEX "I" - PETITION) FILED WITH THE
MTC-COURT AS A PROHIBITVE [sic] PLEADING IN A SUMMARY PROCEDURE CASE SUCH AS THE ONE AT
BAR[?]
2. DID THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED [sic] ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO RESTORE, REINSTATE, AFFIRM AND UPHOLD THE MTC - AMENDEDJUDGMENT OF MARCH
3, 1997 FIXING THE TOTAL AWARD OF P13,000.00 GROUNDED ON A PROHIBITIVE [sic] PLEADING AND
FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL[?]
3. DID THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED [sic] ANY REVERSIBLEERROR WHEN IT RESOLVED TO SUSTAIN
RESPONDENT'S POSITION CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT FOR PETITIONERS'
FAILURE TO APPEAL AND HAVING FILED A PROHIBITIVE [sic] PLEADING, THEY CANNOT ASK FOR
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF SUCH AS INCREASE IN RENTAL[?][12]
There is no question that after the expiration of the lease contracts which respondent contracted with
Aniana Galang and BPI, she lost her right to possess the property since, as early as the actual expiration
date of the lease contract, petitioners were not negligent in enforcing their right of ownership over the
property.
While respondent was finally evicted from the leased premises, the amount of monthly rentals which
respondent should pay the petitioners as forced lessors of said property from 20 June 1988 (for the ground
floor) and 15 August 1988 until 6 January 1998 (for the second and third floors), or a period of almost ten
years remains to be resolved.
Petitioners, in the main, posit that there should be a reinstatement of the decision of the regional trial
court which fixed the monthly rentals to be paid by herein respondent at the total
of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 for the occupancy of the first floor, and P10,000.00 each for the occupancy of
the second and third floors of the building, effective after the lapse of the original lease contract
between respondent and the original owner of the building.
On the other hand, respondent insists on the ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court, which was thereafter
reinstated by the Court of Appeals in its 30 July 1998 Resolution, that the monthly rental rates of
only P8,000.00 for the first floor and P5,000.00 for each of the second and third floors should prevail.
At the outset, it should be recalled that there existed no consensual lessor-lessee relationship between
the parties. At most, what we have is a forced lessor-lessee relationship inasmuch as the respondent, by
way of detaining the property without the consent of herein petitioners, was in unlawful possession of the
property belonging to petitioner spouses.
We cannot allow the respondent to insist on the payment of a measly sum of P8,000 for the rentals of the
first floor of the property in question and P5,000.00 for each of the second and the third floors of the
leased premises. The plaintiff in an ejectment case is entitled to damages caused by his loss of the use and
possession of the premises.[13] Damages in the context of Section 17, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is limited to rent or fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
of the property.[14] What therefore constitutes the fair rental value in the case at bench?
In ruling that the increased rental rates of P40,000.00 should be awarded the petitioners, the regional trial
court based its decision on the doctrine of judicial notice. The RTC held, thus:
While this Court is fully in agreement with the Court of Origin that plaintiffs-appellees have the better right
to the possession of the premises in question being the present owners and the contract of lease between
the former owner and herein defendant-appellant had already expired, the amount of rentals as laid down
in the Clarificatory Order dated 3 March 1997 is inadequate, if not unreasonable.
The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property, its location and the business practice in the
vicinity and indeed committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals in the aforementioned Order.Said
premises is situated along Quirino Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro
Manila, a fully developed commercial area and the place where the famous shrine of the Mother of
Perpetual Help stands. Withal, devotees, traders, tourists and practically people from all walks of life visit
said barangay making it suitable for commerce, not to mention thousand of residents therein. Needless to
say, every square meter of said community is valuable for all kinds of business or commerce of man.
Further, considering that the questioned property has three floors and strategically located along the main
road and consistent with the prevailing rental rates in said business area which is between P20,000.00
and P30,000.00 as testified to by Divina Q. Roco, a real estate agent and Mina Catungal, this Court finds
the amount of P20,000.00 a month for the ground floor and P10,000.00 a month each for the second floor
and third floor or a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals as appropriate and reasonable rentals for the use
and occupation of said premises.
Finally, worth mentioning here as parallel is [the] ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Manila Bay
Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715 and 731-732 citing Licmay vs. Court of Appeals, 215
SCRA 1 (1992) and Commander Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 181. It reads as follows:
It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for
the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and
that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon
termination or expiration of the Contract of Lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise
in values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate
especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondents.[15]
We find that the RTC correctly applied and construed the legal concept of judicial notice in the case at
bench. Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which a judge under rules of
legal procedure or otherwise may properly take or act upon without proof because they are already known
to him, or is assumed to have, by virtue of his office.[16] Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters
that are commonly known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution;
care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should
be promptly resolved in the negative.[17] Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court.
The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the case at bench
based on its location and the commercial viability. The above quoted assessment by the RTC of the
Baclaran area, where the subject property is located, is fairly grounded.
Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving at the said conclusion, the same being based on
testimonies of witnesses, such as real estate broker Divina Roco and the petitioner Mina Catungal.
The RTC rightly modified the rental award from P13,000.00 to P40,000.00, considering that it is settled
jurisprudence that courts may take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of lease contract
renewals much more with business establishments. Thus, We held in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals:[18]
It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for
the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and
that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon
termination or expiration of the contract of lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise
in values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate
especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondent.[19]
The increased award of rentals ruled by the RTC is reasonable given the circumstances of the case at
bench. We note that respondent was able to deny petitioners the benefits, including possession, of their
rightful ownership over the subject property for almost a decade.
The Court of Appeals failed to justify its reduction of the P40,000.00 fair rental value as determined by the
RTC. Neither has respondent shown that the rental pegged by the RTC is exorbitant or
unconscionable. This is because the burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is unconscionable
or exorbitant rests upon private respondent as the lessee.[20] Here, respondent neither discharged this
burden when she omitted to present any evidence at all on what she considers to be fair rental value, nor
did she controvert the evidence submitted by petitioners by way of testimonies of the real estate broker
and petitioner Mina Catungal. Thus, in Sia v. CA, we ruled:
xxx On the contrary, the records bear out that the P5,000.00 monthly rental is a reasonable amount,
considering that the subject lot is prime commercial real property whose value has significantly increased
and that P5,000.00 is within the range of prevailing rental rates in that vicinity. Moreover, petitioner has
not proffered controverting evidence to support what he believes to be the fair rental value of the leased
building since the burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is unconscionable or exorbitant rests
upon the lessee. Thus, here and now we rule, as we did in the case of Manila Bay Club v. Court of Appeals,
that petitioner having failed to prove its claim of excessive rentals, the valuation made by the Regional
Trial Court, as affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, stands.[21]
The Court of Appeals merely anchored its decision to reduce the P40,000.00 rental on procedural
grounds. According to the Court of Appeals, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners before the
MeTC is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure and did not have any effect in stalling
the running of the period to appeal the decision nor could it be considered as notice of appeal and
consequently this affected the elevation of the case to the RTC. Not having appealed the case to the RTC,
the amended judgment of the MeTC fixing the rental rate at P13,000.00 is final and executory as far as
petitioners are concerned.
We disagree. A reading of the order issued by the MeTC will show that said court elevated the issue on
the amount of rentals raised by the petitioner to the RTC because the appeal of respondent had already
been perfected, thus:
Considering the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated March 3, 1997 and the
Comment and Opposition thereto of the counsel for the defendant, the Court finds the said Motion for
Reconsideration should already be addressed to the Regional Trial Court considering that whatever
disposition that this Court will award will still be subject to the appeal taken by the defendant and
considering further that the supersedeas bond posted by the defendant covered the increased rental.
In order that this case will be immediately forwarded to the Regional Trial Court in view of the appeal of
the defendant, the Court deemed it wise not to act on the said motion for reconsideration and submit the
matter to the Regional Trial Court who has the final say on whether the rental or the premises in question
will be raised or not.
It will be to the advantage of both parties that this Court refrain from acting on the said Motion for
Reconsideration so as to expedite the remanding (sic) of this Court to the Regional Trial Court.[22]
When the MeTC referred petitioners motion to the RTC for its disposition, respondent could have opposed
such irregularity in the proceeding.
This respondent failed to do. Before this Court, respondent now insists that the petition should be denied
on the ground that the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the MeTC is a prohibited pleading and
hence could not be treated as a notice of appeal. Respondent is precluded by estoppel from doing so. To
grant respondents prayer will not only do injustice to the petitioners, but also it will make a mockery of
the judicial process as it will result in the nullity of the entire proceedings already had on a mere
technicality, a practice frowned upon by the Court. Our ruling in Martinez, et al. vs. De la Merced, et al.[23] is
illustrative :
xxx In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the proceedings. For it has been
consistently held by this Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active
participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing
such lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals in the assailed Decision correctly observed that the peculiar circumstances attendant
to the ejectment cases warrant departure from the presumption that a party who did not interject an
appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court:
As regard the issue on the propriety of the increase in the award of damages/rentals made by the RTC, the
Court notes that, while respondent spouses did not formally appeal the decision in the ejectment cases,
their motion for reconsideration assailing the clarificatory order reducing the award of damages/rentals
was, by order of the MTC, referred to the RTC for appropriate action. Reason for such action is stated in
the Order of May 7, 1997, thus:
xxx
Neither petitioner nor respondent spouses assailed the above order. In fact, in their appeal memorandum,
respondent spouses reiterated their claim, first ventilated in their motion for reconsideration dated March
24, 1997, that the MTC grievously erred in finding that plaintiffs-appellees are only entitled to a meager
monthly rental of P8,000.00 for the ground floor and P5,000.00 for the second and third floors.
Hence, while the entrenched procedure in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
lower court, the peculiar circumstances attendant to the ejectment cases warrant a departure
therefrom. The rule is premised on the presumption that a party who did not interpose an appeal is
satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court. Respondent spouses, far from showing
satisfaction with the clarificatory order of March 3, 1997, assailed it in their motion for reconsideration
which, however, was referred to the RTC for appropriate action in view of the appeal taken by the
petitioner. Clearly, the increase in the damages/rentals awarded by the MTC was an issue the RTC could
validly resolve in the ejectment cases.[24]
Respondent, argues that ejectment cases are tried under the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure,[25] hence, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was a prohibited pleading and
could not take the place of the required notice of appeal.
The argument by respondent is misleading. Simply because the case was one for ejectment does not
automatically mean that the same was triable under the Rules of Summary Procedure. At the time of the
filing of the complaint by petitioner in 1989, said Rules provide:
SECTION 1. SCOPE - THIS RULE SHALL GOVERN THE PROCEDURE IN THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS IN THE FOLLOWING CASES:
A. CIVIL CASES:
(1) CASES OF FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER, EXCEPT WHERE THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP
IS INVOLVED, OR WHERE THE DAMAGES OR UNPAID RENTALS SOUGHT TO BE RECOVERED BY THE
PLAINTIFF EXCEED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF COMPLAINT. x
xx
In their complaint, petitioners prayed, among others, for rentals for the period covering June 1988 to April
1989, at a rate of P20,000.00 for the first floor alone, as well as P10,000.00 for attorney's fees.Clearly,
considering the amount of rentals and damages claimed by petitioners, said case before the MeTC was
not governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Said case was governed by the ordinary rules where
the general proposition is that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment is allowed. In
the interest of substantial justice, in this particular case, we rule that the MeTC did not err in treating the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner as a notice of appeal.
Finally, respondent questions why petitioners would want to reinstate the RTC decision when in fact they
had already applied for a writ of execution of the 8 March 1997 Decision. Respondent is of the view that
since petitioners had already moved for the execution of the decision awarding a smaller amount of
damages or fair rental value, the same is inconsistent with a petition asking for a greater fair rental value
and, therefore, a possible case of unjust enrichment in favor of the petitioners. We are not persuaded.
In order to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, an immediate execution of a judgment is mandated
and the courts duty to order such execution is practically ministerial.[26] In City of Manila, et al. vs. CA, et
al.,[27] We held that Section 8 (now Section 19), Rule 70, on execution pending appeal, also applies even if
the plaintiff-lessor appeals where, as in that case, judgment was rendered in favor of the lessor but it was
not satisfied with the increased rentals granted by the trial court, hence the appeal xxx.
As above discussed, the petitioners have long been deprived of the exercise of their proprietary rights over
the leased premises and the rightful amount of rentals at the rate of P40,000.00 a month.Consequently,
petitioners are entitled to accrued monthly rentals of P27,000.00, which is the difference between
P40,000.00 awarded by the Regional Trial Court and P13,000.00 awarded by the MeTC and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Said amount of P27,000.00 should rightly be the subject of another writ of execution
being distinct from the subject of the first writ of execution filed by petitioners.
The Court also awards interest in favor of petitioners. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, we gave the following guidelines in the award of interest:
xxx
II With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the
rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing.Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of
the Civil Code.
The back rentals in this case being equivalent to a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due thereon
in twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of extra-judicial demand on September 27, 1988.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners by reinstating the
decision of the RTC, with modifications, and ordering respondent to further pay:
1. The sum of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P27,000.00), corresponding to the difference between the
P40,000.00 awarded by the Regional Trial Court and the P13,000.00 awarded by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, as monthly arrears, computed from respondents unlawful detainer, 20 June 1988 (for the ground
floor) and 15 August 1988 (for the second and third floors) of the subject property until the time she
vacated the premises on 7 January 1998;
2. Legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the foregoing sum from the date of notice of
demand on 27 September 1988 until fully paid;
3. The sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as and for attorneys fees and;
4. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 146733. January 13, 2004]
FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RODRIGO S. CASPILLO, Pairing Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 23, Cabanatuan City and the DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions, the first seeking the review of the February 9, 1999
Decision[1] and the September 22, 1999 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 39913,
which modified the Decision[3] of Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF); and the second for mandamus to compel the said trial court
to issue a writ of execution and to direct Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo to inhibit himself from Agrarian Case
No. 91 (AF).
The undisputed antecedents show that Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare
unirrigated and untenanted rice land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and situated
in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija.[4]
In line with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government, Wycoco voluntarily
offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million.[5] In November 1991,
after the DARs evaluation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for
P1,342,667.46[6] was sent to Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon
review, was modified to P2,280,159.82.[7] The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands,
river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just
compensation in a summary administrative proceeding.[8] The case was docketed as DARAB VOS Case No.
232 NE 93. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and
deposited the compensation offered by DAR.[9] In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-
beneficiaries.
On March 29, 1993, DARAB required the parties to submit their respective memoranda or position papers
in support of their claim.[10] Wycoco, however, decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings,
and instead filed on April 13, 1993, the instant case for determination of just compensation with the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF). [11] Impleaded
as party-defendants therein were DAR and LBP.
On April 30, 1993, Wycoco filed a manifestation in VOS Case No. 232 NE 93, informing the DARAB of the
pendency of Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) with the Cabanatuan court, acting as a special agrarian court.[12] On
March 9, 1994, the DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give way to the determination of just
compensation by the Cabanatuan court. Pertinent portion thereof states:
Admittedly, this Forum is vested with the jurisdiction to conduct administrative proceeding to determine
compensation. [H]owever, a thorough perusal of petitioners complaint showed that he did not only raise
the issue of valuation but such other matters which are beyond the competence of the Board. Besides, the
petitioner has the option to avail the administrative remedies or bring the matter on just compensation
to the Special Agrarian Court for final determination.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answers before the special agrarian court in Agrarian Case
No. 91 (AF), contending that the valuation of Wycocos property was in accordance with law and that the
latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary administrative
proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation.[14]
After conducting a pre-trial on October 3, 1994, the trial court issued a pre-trial order as follows:
The parties manifested that there is no possibility of amicable settlement, neither are they willing to admit
or stipulate on facts, except those contained in the pleadings.
The only issue left is for the determination of just compensation or correct valuation of the land owned by
the plaintiff subject of this case.
The parties then prayed to terminate the pre-trial conference.
AS PRAYED FOR, the pre-trial conference is considered terminated, and instead of trial, the parties are
allowed to submit their respective memoranda.
WHEREFORE, the parties are given twenty (20) days from today within which to file their simultaneous
memoranda, and another ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file their Reply/Rejoinder, if any, and
thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer Certificate of
Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation dated June 18, 1992; and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992
rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR.[16] On the other hand, DAR and LBP presented the Land
Valuation Worksheets.[17]
On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no
need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the
prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00
per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690
hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual
damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. The dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants to pay the amount of P13,419,082.00 to plaintiff as just compensation for the
property acquired;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,663,235.00 representing the unrealized
profits from the time of acquisition of the subject property and the sum of P8,475,210.00 for every
calendar year, until the amount of compensation is fully paid including legal interest which had accrued
thereon.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition brought by DAR on
jurisdictional and procedural issues, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 39234, was dismissed on May 29,
1997.[19] The dismissal became final and executory on June 26, 1997.[20] This prompted Wycoco to file a
petition for mandamus before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 146733, praying that the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) be executed, and that
Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo, the now presiding Judge of said court, be compelled to inhibit himself from
hearing the case.
The petition brought by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No.
39913, was likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals on February 9, 1999.[21] On September 22, 1999,
however, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due Wycoco the
amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was found to have
been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic, thus
WHEREFORE, and conformably with the above, Our decision of February 9, 1999 is hereby MODIFIED in
the sense that the value corresponding to the aforesaid 3.3672 hectares and all the awards appertaining
thereto in the decision a quo are ordered deducted from the totality of the awards granted to the private
respondent. In all other respects, the decision sought to be reconsidered is hereby RE-AFFIRMED and
REITERATED.
SO ORDERED.[22]
In its petition, LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACTING AS A SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT MAY ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER
AGRARIAN CASE NO. 91 (AF) AND RENDER JUDGMENT THEREON WITHOUT AN INITIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BY THE DARAB PURSUANT TO SECTION 16 OF RA 6657, OVER
THE TIMELY OBJECTION OF THE PETITIONER, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND ON FORUM SHOPPING;
II
THAT THE JUST COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE, WHEN IT WAS BASED ONLY ON JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PREVAILING MARKET VALUE OF LAND
BASED ON THE ALLEGED PRICE OF TRANSFER OF TENURAL RIGHTS, TAKEN WITHOUT NOTICE AND
HEARING IN VIOLATION OF RULE 129 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT CAN REQUIRE THE PETITIONER TO COMPENSATE THE PORTIONS OF
RESPONDENTS PROPERTY WHICH WERE NOT DECLARED BY THE DAR FOR ACQUISITION, NOR SUITABLE
FOR AGRICULTURE NOR CAPABLE OF DISTRIBUTION TO FARMER BENEFICIARIES UNDER THE CARP;
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT CAN AWARD AS PART OF JUST COMPENSATION LEGAL INTEREST ON THE
PRINCIPAL AND ALLEGED UNREALIZED PROFITS OF P29,663,235.00 FROM THE TIME OF ACQUISITION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND P8,475,210.00 FOR EVERY CALENDAR YEAR THEREAFTER, CONSIDERING
THAT THE SAME HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND THAT THE RESPONDENT RETAINED THE TITLE TO HIS PROPERTY
DESPITE THE DARS NOTICE OF ACQUISITION;
V
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD VALIDLY GRANTED EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ON THE ALLEGEDLY GOOD
REASON OF THE PETITIONERS ADVANCED AGE AND WEAK HEALTH, CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSIDERING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT DESTITUTE.[23]
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) Did the Regional Trial Court, acting as Special Agrarian Court,
validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant case for determination of just compensation? (2) Assuming
that it acquired jurisdiction, was the compensation arrived at supported by evidence? (3) Can Wycoco
compel the DAR to purchase the entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell? (4) Were the awards of
interest and damages for unrealized profits valid?
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the laws in point are Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) which, in pertinent part, provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty
(30) days from submission of the case for decision.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] it was held that Special Agrarian Courts are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. Section 50 must be
construed in harmony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the determination of just
compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power
conferred to the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR, as an administrative agency,
cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of
property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special Agrarian
Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies.[25] In fact, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the New Rules
of Procedure of the DARAB acknowledges this power of the court, thus
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.
Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged
with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the just
compensation to be paid for their taking.[26] Through a notice of voluntary offer to sell (VOS) submitted by
the landowner, accompanied by the required documents, the DAR evaluates the application and
determines the lands suitability for agriculture. The LBP likewise reviews the application and the
supporting documents and determines the valuation of the land. Thereafter, the DAR issues the Notice of
Land Valuation to the landowner. In both voluntary and compulsory acquisition, where the landowner
rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary
administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to
the Regional Trial Court acting as a special agrarian court. This in essence is the procedure for the
determination of just compensation.[27]
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[28] the landowner filed an action for determination of
just compensation without waiting for the completion of DARABs re-evaluation of the land. This,
notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive
and original jurisdiction over determination of just compensation, thus
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. This original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and
therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is
valid. (Emphasis supplied)[29]
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos complaint for
determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative
proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining
the value of Wycocos land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990. What is more, DAR and
LBPs conformity to the pre-trial order which limited the issue only to the determination of just
compensation estopped them from questioning the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The pre-trial
order limited the issues to those not disposed of by admission or agreements; and the entry thereof
controlled the subsequent course of action.[30]
Besides, the issue of whether Wycoco violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was
rendered moot and academic in view of the DARABs dismissal[31] of the administrative case to give way to
and in recognition of the courts power to determine just compensation.[32]
In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing
market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take
judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon.
After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.
Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court
should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation
without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same
cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair
market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size,
shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon.[33] Since these factors were not considered, a
remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice
is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must
be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally
or professionally known, the basis of his action.[34]
Anent the third issue, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by
Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer
damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the entire land which
was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.
We find Wycocos claim for payment of interest partly meritorious. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals,[35] this Court struck down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, which
provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section
16 (e) of RA 6657.
It is very explicit from [Section 16 (e)] that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere
does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention
to include a trust account among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is
allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of
the term deposit.
xxxxxxxxx
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its powers to enact rules and regulations
when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in
behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e)
of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. In the same vein,
petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations can
not outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in
striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.[36]
Pursuant to the forgoing decision, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1996, converting trust
accounts in the name of landowners into deposit accounts. The transitory provision thereof states
VI. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
All trust accounts issued pursuant to Administrative Order No. 1, S. 1993 covering landholdings not yet
transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines as of July 5, 1996 shall immediately be converted
to deposit accounts in the name of the landowners concerned.
All Provincial Agrarian Reform Officers and Regional Directors are directed to immediately inventory the
claim folders referred to in the preceding paragraph, wherever they may be found and request the LBP to
establish the requisite deposit under this Administrative Order and to issue a new certification to that
effect. The Original Certificate of Trust Deposit previously issued should be attached to the request of the
DAR in order that the same may be replaced with a new one.
All previously established Trust Deposits which served as the basis for the transfer of the landowners title
to the Republic of the Philippines shall likewise be converted to deposits in cash and in bonds. The Bureau
of Land Acquisition and Distribution shall coordinate with the LBP for this purpose.
In light of the foregoing, the trust account opened by LBP in the name of Wycoco as the mode of payment
of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. Such conversion should be retroactive in
application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the
landowners the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals. Otherwise, petitioners right to payment of just and
valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated.[37] The interest earnings
accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of
just compensation.
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation
due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the
nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the
government one of forbearance.[38] It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied
where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in
tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. This is because the
replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation;
for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process.[39]
Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP
opened a trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP
bonds deposit accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be
determined by the Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. In the same vein, the amount
determined by the Special Agrarian Court would also be the basis of the interest income on the cash and
bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of the taking of the property up to the time of actual payment
of just compensation.
The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted. The amount of loss must not only
be capable of proof, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.The claim must be premised
upon competent proof or upon the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts or other documentary
proof.[40] None having been presented in the instant case, the claim for unrealized profits cannot be
granted.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Wycocos petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 should
be dismissed. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, acting as Special
Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF), cannot be enforced because there is a need to remand the
case to the trial court for determination of just compensation. Likewise, the prayer for the inhibition of
Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) is denied for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in G.R. No. 140160 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Agrarian
Case No. 91 (AF) is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, for the
determination of just compensation. The petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and PRESCILLA, all
surnamed HILARIO, petitioners, vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR, respondent.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-
LIM, respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its Resolution[2]denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent
Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land
designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was
[adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single,
and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;
3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of
the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that
he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay
Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer
shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer.[3]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for the
defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant
be made to pay plaintiffs:
a. actual damages, as follows:
a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case amounting
to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case at P1,500.00 each schedule;
a.2. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court appearance;
b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to determine; and
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.[4]
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.[5] He averred that
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-
matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed.
In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the
complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Courts
jurisdiction as provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the
assessed value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather than before
the RTC. [6]
The petitioners opposed the motion.[7] They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since
the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which was P200.00 per
square meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value
thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and
the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value.
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the action
was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1)
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with
counterclaim.[9] Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the petitioners
had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his
grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention[10] making common cause
with the private respondent. On her own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as
intervenor.[11]
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the
property had an assessed value of P5,950.00.[12]
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property; and
Dismissing defendants counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the decision to
the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the
complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without
prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession
of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 33[15] of R.A.
No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court
denied.[16] Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE
REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED
ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN
TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.[17]
The Ruling of the Court
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the
plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein.
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property,
exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition
to respondents motion to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in
question in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one for
damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein.[18] The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the
nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or
agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the
petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners
was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof.
An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property
as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other
hand, an accion publicianais one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred
to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[19]
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the
property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the
private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their
knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the
private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect.
Section 33(3) of the law provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by
the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real
property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous
to taxable value.[20] The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is
not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed
value of the property subject of the complaint.[21] The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or
market value of lands.[22] Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it
cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioners action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing
that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother
to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed
their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in
1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case
involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.[23]
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the
assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the
assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax
declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-
appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not
to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an
assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value,
and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the
property is located, and not the court a quo.[24]
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the
presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.[25]
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of
damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional
amount the demand for interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A.
No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which
states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-
mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
The said provision is applicable only to all other cases other than an action involving title to, or possession
of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction.
The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of
possession of real property.[26]
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including
the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS,
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The
assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof,
to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172,
and enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case, except to
dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and
set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc.
(AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head
of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said
court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age,
and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing
business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services
with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other
defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served
with summons and other court processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX
credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when
petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States
some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit
card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from
the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents'
unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the
period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account.
Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card
and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents'
acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the
affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of
the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte.
Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident
thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he
executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City.
To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in
Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for
Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his
Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any
allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was
the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court
a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since
his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an
office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community
tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by
respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly
laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of
the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical
habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil.
321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined
as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can
have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v.
Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated
January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September
10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on
March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for
certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its
Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from
further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed
by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides
that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the
parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident
thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals5 where the Court
distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it
is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode
of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction
is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the
Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any
means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court
referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax
certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents Fish and Mascrinas.
Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located.8 It also pointed out
that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City.
The foregoing circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner
Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district
of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No
evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and
actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City.
It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the
parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati
City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and
cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.9 Further, fundamental
in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by
the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the
maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the
courts of justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents'
affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in
filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even
to wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in
the said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that
in Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before
the court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an
influential person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are,
VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed
and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining
order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time
by petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein
petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that
petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the
National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution
dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for
review with the Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and
Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein petitioner is
the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence (sic) of
said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the
alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and even
speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to vex the
respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed
reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172
because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern
Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action.
As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's
caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue, like other procedural
rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by
the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides.
If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo
which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency
requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was
not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly
on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also
taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was
improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court had the
occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on
personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for
bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible
to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of
justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation
with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the
relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a
given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory
must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous
stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that -
'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any
means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.'
(Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring
to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent
Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return
there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for
damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of
paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the
action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of
personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court,
was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al.
(G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the
term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.'
This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile
is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district
of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court
admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to
Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house."19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo
as possessing the requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district
which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in
the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent
in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports
"not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention."22When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two
elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party
actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it
is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had
his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is
also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in
another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term
is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the
facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court
of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias,
Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the
intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident
therein at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein
because although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal
presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms,
imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of
filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess
the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the
definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the
intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte,
was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person
can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C.
Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is
acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City.
If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with
his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile
can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with
intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or
doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election
or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have
residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize
plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment
because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude
his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one
and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the
time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because
courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so
certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts
of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for
judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact
of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly
taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the
community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of
by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a
congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in
which he shall be elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a
"specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely
given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner
Saludo deserves scant consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the
contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my
own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes
substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and
Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin
City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
SASAN vs. NLRC
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision[1] dated 24 April
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79912, which affirmed the Decision dated 22 January
2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002 finding that
Helpmate, Inc. (HI) is a legitimate independent job contractor and that the petitioners were not illegally
dismissed from work; and the Resolution[2] dated 31 October 2006 of the same court denying the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),[3] a banking entity duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for Services[4] with HI, a domestic corporation primarily
engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI
shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance
services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after year. Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr.,[5]Leonilo
Dayday,[6] Modesto Aguirre,[7] Alejandro Ardimer,[8] Eleuterio Sacil,[9] Wilfredo Juegos,[10] Petronilo
Carcedo,[11] and Cesar Peciencia[12] were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch
along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas.
On 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City separate
complaints[14] against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for separation pay, service
incentive leave pay, allowances, damages, attorneys fees and costs. Their complaints were docketed as
NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1381-2001 and raffled to Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez) for their proper disposition. Subsequently, on 22 August 2001, the petitioners[15] amended their
complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still failed to arrive
at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they submit their
respective position papers.
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with
respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and
messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and
supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal
by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees
of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job
contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial
services thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners wages, monitored petitioners daily time records (DTR) and
uniforms, and exercised direct control and supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every = 136 days x P190.00 = P25,840.00
right to terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had
committed against its employees.

HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of b) Separation Pay
providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its
June 10, 1996 to July 15, 2001
clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The
Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed = 5 years
said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able
Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply =P190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2 =P12,350.00
with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively, thus, petitioners
complaints before the NLRC were without basis.

Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether petitioners were regular employees c) 13th Month Pay
of HI; (b) whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment; and (c) whether petitioners
= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00
were entitled to their money claims.
Total P43,130.00
On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did
not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service
under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code.[16] HI is therefore a labor-only II Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file Amended Complaint)
contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.According
to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez:

[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to perform not only as janitors but a) Backwages
also as messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an electrician. For us, these jobs are not only
July 15, 2001 to January 15, 2002
directly related to the main business of the principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of
respondent Equitable-PCI Banks principal business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare that the same as Paciencia
[petitioners] are employees of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked with respondent
Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one (1) year, they are deemed regular employees. They cannot, = P25,840.00
therefore, be removed from employment without cause and without due process, which is wanting in this
case. Hence, the severance of their employment in the guise of termination of contract is illegal.[17] b) Separation Pay

Feb. 2, 1999 to July 15, 2001

= P190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2

In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez awarded to petitioners Total = P6,175.00
the following amounts:
= P32,015.00

I. CESAR PACIENCIA
III Roland Mosquera (did not file Amended Complaint)

a) Backwages
a) Backwages
July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002
(same as Paciencia)
= P190.00 per day
= P25,840.00
= 5 months and 6 days
b) Separation Pay
March 8, 1998 to July 15, 2001 Total = P60,420.00

= P190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2

Total = P7,410.00 VI Leonilo Dayday

= P33,250.00

a) Backwages

IV Petronillo Carcedo (same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00

a) Backwages b) Separation Pay

(same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00 Feb. 8, 1983 to July 15, 2001

= P190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2 = P44,460.00

b) Separation Pay

Sept. 16, 1984 to July 15, 2001 c) 13th Month Pay

= P190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2 = P41,990.00 = P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00

c) 13th Month Pay Total = P75,240.00

= P190.00 x 26 days

Total = P4,940.00 VII Eleuterio Sacil

= P72,770.00

a) Backwages

V Rolando Sasan, Sr. (same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00

a) Backwages b) Separation Pay

(same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00 June 2, 1992 to July 15, 2001

= P190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2 = P22,230.00

b) Separation Pay

October 1989 to July 15, 2001 c) 13th Month Pay

= P190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2 = P29,640.00 = P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00

Total = P53,010.00

c) 13th Month Pay

= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00 VIII Mario Juntilla

a) Backwages b) Separation Pay

(same as Pacencia) = P25,840.00 = Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001

= P190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2 = P23,465.00

b) Separation Pay

October 7, 1987 to July 15, 2001 c) 13th Month Pay

= P190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2 = P34,580.00 = P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00

Total = P54,245.00

c) 13th Month Pay

= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00 XI Alejandro Ardimer

Total = P65,360.00

a) Backwages

IX Wilfredo Juegos (same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00

a) Backwages b) Separation Pay

(same as Pacencia) = P25,840.00 = Jan. 20, 1990 to July 15, 2001

= P190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2 = P28,405.00

b) Separation Pay

July 23, 1990 to July 15, 2001 c) 13th Month Pay

= P190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2 = P27,170.00 = P190.00 x 26 days = P4,940.00

Total = P59,185.00

c) 13th Month Pay

= P190.00 x 26 days = P4,840.00 WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondents
Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily the complainants as follows:
Total = P57,950.00
1. Cesar Paciencia - P43,130.00

2. Dominador Suico, Jr. - 32,015.00

X Modesto Aguirre
3. Roland Mosquera - 33,250.00

4. Petronilo Carceda - 72,770.00

a) Backwages
5. Roland Sasan, Sr. - 60,420.00
(same as Paciencia) = P25,840.00
6. Leonilo Dayday - 75,240.00
7. Eleuterio Sacil - 53,010.00
8. Mario Juntilla - 65,360.00
9. Wilfredo Juegos - 57,950.00
10. Modesto Aguirre - 54,245.00
11. Alejandro Ardimer - 59,185.00
TOTAL - P606,575.00[18]
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to
the NLRC, 4th Division, stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals were docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-
2002. In support of its allegation that it was a legitimate job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC
several documents which it did not present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:
1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended Articles of
Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its
authorized capital stock from P1,500,000.00 to P20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the Securities and
Exchange Commission;
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets of P20,939,935.72 as of 31
December 2000;
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00582 registered under
the name of HI showing that it has a parcel of land with Market Value of P1,168,860.00 located along Rizal
Avenue (now Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a
commercial building constructed on the preceding lot located along Bacalso Avenue, CebuCity with
market value of P2,515,170.00.[19]
The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The
NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and,
on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot
be considered engaged in labor-only contracting.
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:
The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that barely eight (8) days from 15
July 2001 when the complainants were placed on a temporary off-detail, they filed their complaints on 23
July 2001 and amended their complaints on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption
that their services were already terminated. Temporary off-detail is not equivalent to dismissal. x x x.[20]
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrezs award of backwages and separation pay, but affirmed his award
for 13th month pay and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13th month pay, to
the petitioners.[21] Thus, the NLRC decreed in its 22 January 2003 Decision, the payment of the following
reduced amounts to petitioners:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez dated 7 January 2002 is
MODIFIED, to wit:
Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and severally[22] pay the
complainants of their 13th month pay and attorneys fees in the aggregate amount of Forty-Three Thousand
Four Hundred Seventy-Two and 00/100 (P43,472.00), broken down as follows:
1. Aguirre, Modesto - P5,434.00
2. Ardimer, Alejandro - 5,434.00
3. Carcedo, Petronilo - 5,434.00
4. Dayday, Leonilo - 5,434.00
5. Juegos, Wilfredo - 5,434.00
6. Juntilla, Mario - 5,434.00
7. Paciencia, Cesar - 5,434.00
8. Sacil, Eleuterio - 5,434.00
TOTAL P43,472.00[23]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 1 July 2003.[24]
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a
Petition for Certiorari[25] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
79912.
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a
legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners:
As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent job contractor, respondent HI illegally
dismissed the petitioners. We rule in the negative.
It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client E-PCIBank expired on July 15,
2000. The record shows that after said expiration, respondent HI offered the petitioners new work
assignments to various establishments which are HIs clients. The petitioners, therefore, were not even
placed on floating status. They simply refused, without justifiable reason, to assume their new work
assignments which refusal was tantamount to abandonment. There being no illegal dismissal, petitioners
are not entitled to backwages or separation pay.[26]
The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the NLRC, Fourth Division, in NLRC Case No. V-000145-
2003 promulgated on June 22, 2003.[27]
Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION
AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4TH DIVISIONS DECISION
AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENTS DURING
APPEAL, ALL EXISTING DURING THE TIME THE NLRC RAB 7S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE
COURTS PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED DECISIONS.
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING OF NLRC RAB 7 THAT THE RESPONDENT
HI WAS LABOR ONLY CONTRACTOR.
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS WERE PREMATURELY
FILED.
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issues raised by petitioners.
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence presented by HI for
the first time on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our jurisprudence is already
replete with cases[29] allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and
submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor
cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.[30]
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure.
After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC
and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of
substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence,
such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of
additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-
evidence.
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] we again emphasized that:
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical
rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of
evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are mandated by the Labor Code to use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v.
NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories Employees Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that even if the evidence was
not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough
basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere
technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action
would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners protestations against the documentary evidence
submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best
evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of
these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court[33] were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming
that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not
covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts.Technical rules
of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its
sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other
documents.[34]
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration before
the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-
evidence to the documentary evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot
now be heard to complain about these documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. It is also an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is not the denial of the right to be heard but denial
of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due process of law. Petitioners herein were
afforded every opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against
them. They had every opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting their own substantial
evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the Court
of Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of
the adverse parties evidence.
We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by petitioners for our consideration,
particularly, whether HI is a labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners principal
employer; and whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put
out or farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or
service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be
performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal.[35] A person is considered engaged
in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to
perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own
manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with
the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual
employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right
to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or
subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a
principal.[37] In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform
the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility; and
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing
activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.[38]
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting,[39] we
elucidated in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,[40] that it is not enough to show substantial
capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered
include the following: whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature
and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the
performance of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the
employers power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractors workers; the control of
the premises; the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and
manner or terms of payment.[41] Simply put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of
the case are to be considered.[42] Each case must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the
relationship are to be considered.[43]
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Certificate of
Registration[44] Numbered VII-859-1297-048. The said certificate states among other things:
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the
Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules and having paid the registration fee in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per Official Receipt Number 9042769, dated October 16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing
Rules specifically Department Order No. 10 series of 1997, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
Official on this 23rd day of December 1997.[45]
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that it was issued
in the regular performance of official duty.[46] In the absence of proof, petitioners bare assertion cannot
prevail over this presumption. Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily responsible for regulating
the business of independent job contractors, we can presume in the absence of evidence to the contrary
that it thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the
Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent business from E-
PCIBank. The employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform janitorial and messengerial services,
clearly distinguishable from the banking services in which E-PCIBank is engaged.
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for permissible job contracting, Labor
Arbiter Gutierrez still declared that HI was engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting because it did not
possess substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own
account or responsibility. Both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
Substantial capital or investment refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of
corporations, tools, equipments, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used
by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted
out.[47] An independent contractor must have either substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others. The law does not require both substantial capital
and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc.[48] It is enough that it has substantial
capital. In the case of HI, it has proven both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI has substantial
capital, it was no longer necessary to adduce further evidence to prove that it does not fall within the
purview of labor-only contracting.[49] There is even no need for HI to refute the contention of petitioners
that some of the activities they performed such as those of messengerial services are directly related to
the principal business of E- PCIBank.
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the petitioners as janitors,
messengers and drivers are considered directly related to the principal business of a bank, in this case E-
PCIBank, nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct of its (E-PCIBANKs) principal business.[50]
HI has substantial capital in the amount of P20,939,935.72. It has its own building where it holds office and
it has been engaged in business for more than a decade now.[51] As observed by the Court of Appeals,
surely, such a well-established business entity cannot be considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee;
(b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence
or absence of control of the putative employees conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the
so-called control test.[52]
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee relationship to wit, the
selection and engagement of the employee is shown by the fact that it was HI which selected and engaged
the services of petitioners as its employees. This is fortified by the provision in the contract of services
between HI and E-PCIBank which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the selection, engagement,
investigation, discipline and discharge of its employees.[53]
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid petitioners their wages and
who provided their daily time records and uniforms and other materials necessary for the work they
performed. Therefore, it is HI who is responsible for petitioners claims for wages and other employees
benefits. Precisely, the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank reveals the following:
Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the salaries, allowances, overtime and
holiday pay, and other benefits of its personnel including withholding taxes.[54]
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employees conduct, and the fourth requisite regarding
the power of dismissal, again E-PCIBank did not have the power to control petitioners with respect to the
means and methods by which their work was to be accomplished. It likewise had no power of dismissal
over the petitioners. All that E-PCIBank could do was to report to HI any untoward act, negligence,
misconduct or malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises. The contract of services between
E-PCIBank and HI is noteworthy. It states:
[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its employees who may be fielded to [E-
PCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a regular supervisor of its employees who may be fielded to
the Bank and which regular supervisor shall exclusively supervise and control the activities and functions
defined in Section 1 hereof. x x x.[55]
All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under its own
responsibility, according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of E-
PCIBank. Where the control of the principal is limited only to the result of the work, independent job
contracting exists. The janitorial service agreement between E-PCIBank and HI is definitely a case of
permissible job contracting.
Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private, as well as in
government institutions and industries, of hiring an independent contractor to perform special
services,[56] ranging from janitorial, security and even technical services, we can only conclude that HI is a
legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate job contractor, the law creates an employer-employee
relationship between HI and petitioners[57] which renders HI liable for the latters claims.
In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees of E-PCIBank
regardless of how long they were working for the latter.[58]
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract
of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. Their
pull-out from E-PCIBank did not constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners were not employees of
E-PCIBank; and second, they were pulled out from said assignment due to the non-renewal of the Contract
of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed their complaints with the Labor Arbiter,
petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they were only off-detail pending their re-assignment by HI to
another client. And when they were actually given new assignments by HI with other clients,[59] petitioners
even refused the same. As the NLRC pronounced, petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal is apparently
premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 24 April
2006 and Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
2. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS ( RULE 129 SECTION 4)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TERESA JALANDONI,
RESOLUTION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This refers to the MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT (as to appellant's civil liability) filed by the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, the private complainant.
In Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-2866 of the defunct Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, Teresa Jalandoni was
accused of estafa. The information alleged that she issued several checks drawn against the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI); that the checks were
dishonored for lack of funds, a fact which was known by the accused; and that as a result thereof the BPI
suffered damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00.
The trial court rendered the following judgment against the accused:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa defined
under Article 315, 2(a), and hereby sentences her to a penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the bank
of the Philippine Islands, Cervantes Branch, in the sum of P1,600,000.00 representing the balance of the
amount which she swindled from the said bank; and to pay the costs. (Expediente, p. 603.)
Jalandoni appealed to this Court which in turn pronounced:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the appellant not having been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, the
appealed judgment is hereby set aside and another one is entered acquitting her of the charge. No costs.
(People vs. Jalandoni G.R. No. 57555, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 588, 600.)
Subsequently, BPI filed the aforesaid Motion to Modify Judgment. BPI invoked a Court of Appeals decision
(People vs. De Castillo, 48 O.G. 4890) where the court acquitted the appellant who was accused of
malversation of public funds on the ground of reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered her to pay the
amount of her civil liability. Accordingly, BPI prayed that in the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity
of suits, a second paragraph be added to Our judgment, to wit:
As to appellant's civil liability, considering that the civil action was instituted at the commencement of the
criminal action, judgment is hereby rendered ordering appellant to pay the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
Cervantes branch, the amount of P1,491,780.00 with interests at the legal rate from the filing of the action
until paid. (Rollo, p. 139.)
In its Sur-Rejoinder, BPI reduced the amount claimed to P1,391,780.00 for the following reason:
Accused-appellant admits that per information for estafa, complainant suffered by her transactions a
damage of P1,391,780.00 which represents P100,000.00 less than complainant's computation. To shorten
the proceedings, as manifested in the oral arguments of 17 October 1983, complainant is willing to accept
P1,391,780.00 as accused-appellant's civil liability to private complainant plus interest at the legal rate of
12% per annum from the time of demand for payment until full payment (Rollo, p. 168.)
The appellant opposed the Motion on the following grounds: (a) People vs. de Castillo is not in point
because it was decided under the old Rules of Court; and (b) the amount of civil liability, if any, is unsettled
and requires necessarily the introduction of proof.
At this stage, the Motion was before the Second Division of this Court which rendered the decision
acquitting the appellant on reasonable doubt. And because the Motion called for the application of a novel
doctrine, the case was prudently referred to the Court En Banc on February 28, 1984.
On May 31, 1984, the Court En Banc promulgated its decision in the case of Padilla, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. L-39999) where it held "that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal." The reason therefor has been stated thus:
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the
facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the
accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the
criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part
of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious
implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of
applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was
acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with
all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
In the instant case, the appellant made the following ad missions in her brief:
The following facts are admitted in the information aforequoted:
(a) accused-appellant issued nine (9) RCBC personal checks;
(b) the sum total of the face value of said nine (9) checks is P2,150,000.00;
(c) of said nine (9) checks, one (1) was honored, namely, RCBC check No. 2424530 in the amount of
200,000.00, when the checks went through clearing;
(d) the checks drawn by accused-appellant against said personal checks aggregated P2,041,780.00;
(e) said checks were drawn in favor of third parties, not the accused-appellant; and
(f) out of the P2,150,000.00 worth of the nine (9) checks involved, the damaged suffered is only
P1,391,780.00. (emphasis supplied.) (pp. 56.)
Jalandoni's claim that "[t]he amount of the civil liability, if any, is unsettled and requires necessarily the
introduction of proof (Rollo, p. 161) is utterly devoid of merit. As shown above the appellant has formally
admitted that BPI suffered damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00. For her now to assert that the civil
liability, if any, is unsettled is an insult to the dignity of this Court. We cannot allow a party to state a fact
only to disown it afterwards because of convenience.
WHEREFORE, the Motion is hereby granted; the judgment of this Court is modified in that the appellant is
ordered to pay the Bank of the Philippine Islands the amount of P1,391,780.00 with interest at the legal
rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the action until paid.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This refers to the MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT (as to appellant's civil liability) filed by the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, the private complainant.
In Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-2866 of the defunct Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, Teresa Jalandoni was
accused of estafa. The information alleged that she issued several checks drawn against the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI); that the checks were
dishonored for lack of funds, a fact which was known by the accused; and that as a result thereof the BPI
suffered damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00.
The trial court rendered the following judgment against the accused:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa defined
under Article 315, 2(a), and hereby sentences her to a penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the bank
of the Philippine Islands, Cervantes Branch, in the sum of P1,600,000.00 representing the balance of the
amount which she swindled from the said bank; and to pay the costs. (Expediente, p. 603.)
Jalandoni appealed to this Court which in turn pronounced:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the appellant not having been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, the
appealed judgment is hereby set aside and another one is entered acquitting her of the charge. No costs.
(People vs. Jalandoni G.R. No. 57555, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 588, 600.)
Subsequently, BPI filed the aforesaid Motion to Modify Judgment. BPI invoked a Court of Appeals decision
(People vs. De Castillo, 48 O.G. 4890) where the court acquitted the appellant who was accused of
malversation of public funds on the ground of reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered her to pay the
amount of her civil liability. Accordingly, BPI prayed that in the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity
of suits, a second paragraph be added to Our judgment, to wit:
As to appellant's civil liability, considering that the civil action was instituted at the commencement of the
criminal action, judgment is hereby rendered ordering appellant to pay the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
Cervantes branch, the amount of P1,491,780.00 with interests at the legal rate from the filing of the action
until paid. (Rollo, p. 139.)
In its Sur-Rejoinder, BPI reduced the amount claimed to P1,391,780.00 for the following reason:
Accused-appellant admits that per information for estafa, complainant suffered by her transactions a
damage of P1,391,780.00 which represents P100,000.00 less than complainant's computation. To shorten
the proceedings, as manifested in the oral arguments of 17 October 1983, complainant is willing to accept
P1,391,780.00 as accused-appellant's civil liability to private complainant plus interest at the legal rate of
12% per annum from the time of demand for payment until full payment (Rollo, p. 168.)
The appellant opposed the Motion on the following grounds: (a) People vs. de Castillo is not in point
because it was decided under the old Rules of Court; and (b) the amount of civil liability, if any, is unsettled
and requires necessarily the introduction of proof.
At this stage, the Motion was before the Second Division of this Court which rendered the decision
acquitting the appellant on reasonable doubt. And because the Motion called for the application of a novel
doctrine, the case was prudently referred to the Court En Banc on February 28, 1984.
On May 31, 1984, the Court En Banc promulgated its decision in the case of Padilla, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. L-39999) where it held "that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal." The reason therefor has been stated thus:
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the
facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the
accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the
criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part
of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious
implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of
applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was
acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with
all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
In the instant case, the appellant made the following ad missions in her brief:
The following facts are admitted in the information aforequoted:
(a) accused-appellant issued nine (9) RCBC personal checks;
(b) the sum total of the face value of said nine (9) checks is P2,150,000.00;
(c) of said nine (9) checks, one (1) was honored, namely, RCBC check No. 2424530 in the amount of
200,000.00, when the checks went through clearing;
(d) the checks drawn by accused-appellant against said personal checks aggregated P2,041,780.00;
(e) said checks were drawn in favor of third parties, not the accused-appellant; and
(f) out of the P2,150,000.00 worth of the nine (9) checks involved, the damaged suffered is only
P1,391,780.00. (emphasis supplied.) (pp. 56.)
Jalandoni's claim that "[t]he amount of the civil liability, if any, is unsettled and requires necessarily the
introduction of proof (Rollo, p. 161) is utterly devoid of merit. As shown above the appellant has formally
admitted that BPI suffered damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00. For her now to assert that the civil
liability, if any, is unsettled is an insult to the dignity of this Court. We cannot allow a party to state a fact
only to disown it afterwards because of convenience.
WHEREFORE, the Motion is hereby granted; the judgment of this Court is modified in that the appellant is
ordered to pay the Bank of the Philippine Islands the amount of P1,391,780.00 with interest at the legal
rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the action until paid.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and FEDERICO MORENO,
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; COMPLAINT; CAUSE OF ACTION; FAILURE TO STATE ULTIMATE FACTS BY
MERE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF COMPLAINT IN CASE AT BAR. — Insofar as the instant petition is
concerned, we are of the opinion that the premises set forth in the principal pleading in the court a quo,
only with respect to private respondent’s participation, suffer a congenital deficiency considering that the
allegations thereof fail to spell out the ultimate facts constitutive of the Republic’s cause of action (Section
3, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). Paragraphs 2 and 15 of the Amended Complaint, earlier quoted, it cannot
be overstressed, are mere conclusions of law unaccompanied by factual and categorical propositions.
Verily, the allegations herein involved bear a striking resemblance to the assertions treated in Tantuico, Jr.
v. Republic (204 SCRA 428 [1991]) which prompted Justice Padilla to require the PCGG to file a bill of
particulars.
2. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; EFFECT OF ADMISSION IN ANSWER; CASE AT BAR. — What about Paragraph 14(h)
which inculpates private respondent when he supposedly "supervised, approved and/or permitted such
importations and purchases" ? It may be recalled that it was the thrust of private respondent’s defense
that elicited the corresponding admission from the Republic on the genuineness and due execution of
Exhibits 5-A and 5-B. In so responding, the Republic failed to realize that it practically pursued a
diametrically opposed and fatal posture because the candid statement carried with it the express
acknowledgment that it was President Marcos, not private respondent, who approved the assailed
importations. Withal, the language of Exhibits 2-A, 2-B, 3-A, and 3-B show that private respondent, as the
Chairman of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, had no authority or discretion to deny, much
less to approve, the corresponding license to import tobacco without referring the matter to the President.
Indeed, there would have been no need to submit every application for the President’s action if private
respondent were clothed with the appropriate faculty to decide on the propriety of importation.
Consequently, Paragraph 14(h) of the expanded complaint can hardly serve as legal basis to inculpate
private Respondent. In view of the admission in the Answer to the request for admission as to the
genuineness and due execution of the handwritten approval of President Marcos on private respondent’s
letter vis-a-vis Fortune Tobacco’s request for importation, petitioner’s efforts to press an imaginary issue
on this point must be brushed aside on account of the legal axiom against vacillating postures (Article
1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(c), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence; Caltex
(Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 448 [1992]; Mentholatum Co., Inc. v. Mangaliman, 72 Phil.
524 [1941]).
3. ID.; ID.; SUMMARY JUDGMENT; CORRECTLY RENDERED IN CASE AT BAR IN VIEW OF SELF-DEFEATING
REPRESENTATION OF PETITIONER. — The Sandiganbayan, therefore, correctly rendered the summary
judgment in view of the self-defeating representations of petitioner, for such recourse is well within the
purview of Section 3, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of Court. Apart from the fact that the expanded
complaint was not crafted with enough significant and substantial allegations of ultimate facts to warrant
continuation of the trial against private respondent (1 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, Revised
ed., 1989, p. 329).
MELO, J.:
Impleaded before the Sandiganbayan as co-defendant in the civil suit for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth against Lucio C. Tan, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and Imelda R. Marcos, was Federico B.
Moreno, Chairman of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, now herein private Respondent. Feeling
that no genuine factual issue was levelled against him by the Government and wholly convinced that the
imputations against him are bereft of factual bases, private respondent availed himself of a mode of
discovery sanctioned by Rule 26 which he followed with a motion for summary judgment when the answer
to the request for admission contained a major explicit admission. The Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan, through Justice Escareal with whom Justices Balajadia and Grospe concurred, entertained
the same perception and granted private respondent’s motion for summary judgment (pp. 82 and 100,
Rollo). Hence, the petition at bar.
The inculpatory allegations lifted from the amended complaint pertinent to private respondent read: The
wrongs committed by Defendants, acting singly or collectively and in unlawful concert with one another,
include the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion,
blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse
of power, as more fully described below, all at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of
plaintiff and the Filipino people.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
x x x Authority to Import Foreign Blending Tobacco during the incumbency of Justice Federico B. Moreno,
8. Defendant FEDERICO MORENO was Chairman of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration when
Defendant Lucio C. Tan’s Fortune Tobacco, Incorporated enjoyed privileges in violation of existing laws,
such as but not limited to the importation and purchase of Virginia tobacco in excess of the ceiling allowed
by law.
This is to certify that, as per National Tobacco Administration (NTA) and Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA) records, NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING COMPANY, INC. was never issued any
former Chairman/General Manager of PVTA. It is further certified that PVTA records do not reveal/show
that former Chairman Justice Federico B. Moreno has ever supervised, approved/and or permitted such
tobacco importation or purchase of imported blending tobacco.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This certification is issued upon the request of Justice Federico B. Moreno for record purposes.
(Sgd.) Minda C. Gapuz

x x x MINDA C. GAPUZ

Manager

14. Defendant Lucio C. Tan, by himself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos Market Development &
and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of his relationship and influence with defendant
Spouses, among others:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Regulations Department

x x x (p. 115, Rollo.)

Exh. 2 — Moreno

(h) established in May, 1985 the Northern Redrying Co., Inc. (NRCI), a Virginia Tobacco Company, which 7 September 1982
on several instances in 1986 made importations and purchases of about 9,607,482.9 net kilos, in excess
of the ceiling set by law, with the active collaboration of Defendants Celso C. Ranola, William T. Wong, Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita who are all Directors of NRCI and at the time of the establishment of
NRCI, were employees of defendant Lucio Tan. Defendant Federico Moreno, as Chairman of the Virginia Cubao, Quezon City, Metro Manila
Tobacco Administration, supervised, approved and/or permitted such importations and purchases.
Attention: Justice Federico B. Moreno
15. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and in unlawful concert with one another, constitute
gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, Chairman — Officer-in-Charge
brazen abuse of right and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. (pp. Dear Sirs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
20-42, Rollo.)
We have the honor to apply for an Import Duty Authority of 3,000,000 kilos for the importation of
On March 8, 1988, private respondent Moreno submitted his Answer, traversing the expanded foreign blending tobacco for the year 1982.
complaint by contending inter alia that Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 655 permits the importation
of Virginia Tobacco pursuant to the exigencies of the tobacco industry, and that there is no law which For your reference, our specific tax payment for the year 1981 was P655.8 Million.
curtails the purchase of local Virginia tobacco. At any rate, private respondent continued, his role as
Chairman of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration was then limited to submitting requests for We have also the honor to inform you that for the year 1981, we purchased 8.6 Million kilos (threshed
importation to the President of the Philippines for approval (p. 60, Rollo). and bundles) of local Virginia/Burley tobacco worth about P141.3 Million.

Of particular significance too, are documents which private respondent wanted the Republic to admit via In view of the foregoing, we hope our request will be given your kind consideration and approval.
a request for admission. The documents, some of which bear then President Marcos’ written approval
(Exhs. 2-A, 3-A, 4-A, and 5-A) are reproduced hereunder. Very truly yours,

Exh. 1 — Moreno LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY

CERTIFICATION (Sgd.) Chung Tiong Tay

January 03, 1991 CHUNG TIONG TAY

To Whom It May Concern:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library First Vice President &
 the President.
Assistant General Manager
(Sgd.) Juan C. Tuvera
(p. 116, Rollo.)
JUAN C. TUVERA
Exh. 2-A — Moreno
Presidential Executive Assistant
September 10, 1982
cc.: Mr. Chung Tiong Tay
His Excellency
First Vice President & Asst. Gen. Manager
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory
Malacañang, Manila
South Super Highway, Parañaque
Dear Mr. President:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Metro Manila
La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory requests for an import quota of 3 million kilos of foreign leaf tobacco
for the year 1982 to be used for blending purposes in its manufacture of cigarettes. (p. 118, Rollo.)

Considering that in 1981 it purchased from the farmers, through trading centers in the North, no less Exh. 3 — Moreno
than 8.6 million kilos (threshed and bundled) of local Virginia and Burley tobacco worth about P141.3
million, and that this year it has bought substantially from the farmers tobacco at high prices, we 14 September 1982
recommend that it be granted the requested allocation to import three (3) million kilos of tobacco for
blending purposes to improve the quality of its cigarettes and that PVTA be authorized to issue the The Chairman/Officer-In-Charge
corresponding license.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
For your consideration and approval.
Cubao, Quezon City
Respectfully,
Re: Authority to Import Tobacco Leaf
(Sgd.) Federico B. Moreno
Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
FEDERICO B. MORENO
In order to satisfy our continuous requirement for foreign tobacco leaf used in blending with locally
Chairman grown tobacco leaf in the manufacture of our various brands of good quality cigarettes, we would like to
seek your permission again to import four (4) million kilograms of foreign tobacco leaf by issuing to us
(p. 117, Rollo.) the corresponding Certificate of Authority to Import as required by law.chanrobles law library

Exh. 2-B — Moreno In support of our request, we would like to inform you that our company has purchased a total of close
to forty-five (45) million kilograms locally grown tobacco leaf of various types for the crop year 1982,
13 September 1982 that includes thirty (30) million kilograms of Flue-Cured Virginia Tobacco; ten (10) million kilograms of
Burley and five (5) million kilograms of Native Tobacco.
MEMORANDUM to —
Hoping for your favorable consideration and approval.
Chairman Federico B. Moreno
Very truly yours,
Philippine Virginia Tobacco
(Sgd.) Mariano G. Ordoñez
Administration
MARIANO G. ORDOÑEZ
I am pleased to inform you that the President has approved the request of the La Suerte Cigar &
Cigarette Factory for an import quota of 3 million kilos of foreign leaf tobacco for the year 1982 to be Brig. Gen. AFP (Ret.)
used for blending purposes in its manufacture of cigarettes and for the PVTA to issue the corresponding
license. Attached is a copy of your letter dated September 10, 1982 bearing the hand-written approval of President
 JUAN C. TUVERA
(p. 119, Rollo.)
Presidential Executive Assistant
Exh. 3-A — Moreno
cc.: Brig. Gen. Mariano G. Ordonez (Ret.)
October 1, 1982
President, Fortune Tobacco Corporation
His Excellency
P.O. Box 3706, Manila
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(p. 121, Rollo.)
Malacañang, Manila.
Exh. 4 — Moreno
Dear Mr. President
25 May 1983
Fortune Tobacco Corporation requests for an additional import quota of four (4) million kilos of foreign
leaf tobacco for the year 1982 to be used for blending purposes in its manufacture of cigarettes. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration

Considering that in 1982, it purchased from the farmers at high prices through trading centers in the Cubao, Quezon City, Metro Manila
North, no less than thirty (30) million kilograms of flue-cured Virginia tobacco; ten (10) million kilograms
of Burley tobacco. We recommend that it be granted the requested additional allocation to import four Attention: Justice Federico B. Moreno
(4) million kilos of tobacco for blending purposes to improve the quality of its cigarettes and that PVTA
be authorized to issue the corresponding license. Chairman - Officer-in-Charge

For your consideration and approval. Dear Sirs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Respectfully, We have the honor to apply for an Import Authority of 3,000,000 kilos for the importation of foreign
blending tobacco for the year 1983.
(Sgd.) Federico B. Moreno
For your reference, our specific tax payment for the year 1982 was P678,789,000.00.
FEDERICO B. MORENO
We have also the honor to inform you that for the year 1982, we purchased 5.98 Million kilos (threshed
Chairman. and bundles) of local Virginia/Burley tobacco worth about 115.7 Million pesos.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(p. 120, Rollo.) In view of the foregoing, we hope our request will be given your kind consideration and approval.

Exh. 3-B — Moreno Very truly yours,

19 November 1982 LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY

MEMORANDUM to — (Sgd.) Chung Tiong Tay

Chairman Federico B. Moreno CHUNG TIONG TAY

Philippine Virginia Tobacco First Vice President &

Administration Asst. General Manager

I am pleased to inform you that the President has approved the request of the Fortune Tobacco (p. 122, Rollo.)
Corporation for an additional import quota of four (4) million kilos of foreign leaf tobacco for the year
1982 to be used for blending purposes in its manufacture of cigarettes, and for the PVTA to issue the Exh. 4-A — Moreno
corresponding license for the purpose, as embodied in your letter dated October 1, 1982, copy enclosed.
May 26, 1983
(Sgd.) Juan C. Tuvera
His Excellency
 9 April 1983
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
The Honorable Chairman
Malacañang, Manila.
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
Dear Mr. President:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Consolacion Building, Cubao
La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory requests for an import quota of 3 million kilos of foreign leaf tobacco
for the year 1983 to be used for blending purposes in its manufacture of cigarettes. Quezon City

Considering that in 1982, its specific tax payment was P678.789 million and it purchased from the Subject: Request for Authority
farmers, through trading centers in the North, no less than 5.98 million kilos (threshed and bundled) of
local Virginia and Burley tobacco worth about P115.7 million, and that this year it has bought to Import Tobacco
substantially from the farmers tobacco at high prices, we recommend that it be granted the requested
allocation to import three (3) million kilos of tobacco for blending purposes to improve the quality of its Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
cigarettes and that PVTA be authorized to issue the corresponding license.
Please issue to us the authority to import Four (4) million kilograms of flue-cured tobacco as our initial
For your consideration and approval. requirement for imported tobacco for the year 1983. The imported tobacco shall be used by us for
blending with locally produced tobacco in the making of our different brands of quality
Respectfully, cigarettes.chanrobles law library : red

(Sgd.) Federico B. Moreno We thank you for your attention and usual prompt action on every matter.

FEDERICO B. MORENO Very truly yours,

Chairman (Sgd.) Mariano G. Ordoñez

(p. 123, Rollo.) MARIANO G. ORDOÑEZ

Exh. 4-B — Moreno Brigadier Gen. AFP (Ret.)

June 20, 1983 President

MEMORANDUM TO — (p. 125, Rollo.)

Chairman Federico B. Moreno Exh. 5-A — Moreno

Philippine Virginia Tobacco April 14, 1983

Administration His Excellency

Please be informed that the President has approved the request of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory President Ferdinand E. Marcos
to import three (3) million kilos of foreign leaf tobacco for 1983, for blending purposes, subject of your
letter dated May 26, 1983, attached. Malacañang, Manila.

(Sgd.) Juan C. Tuvera Dear Mr. President:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

JUAN C. TUVERA Fortune Tobacco Corporation requests for an import quota of four (4) million kilos of foreign leaf tobacco
for the year 1983 to be used for blending purposes in its manufacture of cigarettes.
Presidential Executive Assistant
Considering that in 1982, it purchased from the farmers at high prices through trading centers in the
(p. 124, Rollo.) North, no less than thirty (30) million kilograms of flue-cured Virginia tobacco; ten (10) million kilograms
of Burley tobacco and is presently buying the 1983 crop at good reasonable prices, we recommend that
Exh. 5 — Moreno it be granted the requested allocation to import four (4) million kilos of tobacco for blending purposes to
improve the quality of its cigarettes and that PVTA be authorized to issue the corresponding license.
 which decreed the dismissal of the complaint against private respondent, but without prejudice to the
For your consideration and approval. continuation of the case against the other defendants, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Respectfully, Plaintiff’s admission, through counsel (Com. Jalandoni) as to the genuineness and due authenticity of
then President Marcos’ handwritten notations approving the questioned transactions on Exhibits 3-a, 4-a
(Sgd.) Federico B. Moreno and 5-a of defendant Moreno’s Pre-Trial Brief practically removed or destroyed any factual or legal bases
to implicate defendant Moreno therein. From the time plaintiff started compiling its evidence,
FEDERICO B. MORENO testimonial as well as documentary, to support the filing of its original Complaint, up to the amendment
thereof by an expanded Complaint on January 25, 1988, no amplification or further specification of
Chairman defendant Moreno’s alleged participation or involvement in the questioned transactions had been made.
Even after defendant Moreno had filed his Pre-Trial Brief and, later, his "Request For Admission",
(p. 126, Rollo.) plaintiff could not admit or deny the truthfulness of relevant matters of fact, or genuineness of
documents marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, inclusive, together with their sub-markings, alleging the
Exh. 5-B — Moreno following reasons, to wit: (1) it has no access to the files and records of the National Tobacco
Administration (NTA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA); (2) it has not
April 22, 1983 completely and thoroughly examined all other possible sources of information especially defendant
Moreno’s involvement; (3) it cannot determine with certainty the genuineness and due execution of
MEMORANDUM defendant Moreno’s marked exhibits and the truth of relevant allegations therein since these pertain to
matters which may have extrinsic circumstances involving private and/or undocumented transaction
FOR: Justice Federico B. Moreno between and among the defendants in this case; and (4) it needs more time to make a complete and
thorough verification through other possible documentary and testimonial evidence it may present
Chairman during the trial.

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
Quezon City
I wish to inform you that the President has approved on 22 April 1983 your letter dated April 14, 1983
regarding the request of Fortune Tobacco Corporation for an import quota of four (4) million kilos of
foreign leaf tobacco for the year 1983 to be used for blending purposes in its manufacture of cigarettes.
(Sgd.) Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.
JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.
Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant
(p. 127, Rollo.)
The Republic reacted by admitting the genuineness of Exhibits 5-A and 5-B although it offered the caveat
that it was not in a position to deny or admit the veracity of the tenor thereof inasmuch as it has no
access to files of the National Tobacco Administration and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
(p. 64, Rollo). This development triggered the submission by private respondent of a motion for
summary judgment which posited the thesis that there is no factual issue against him vis-a-vis the sole
query of whether he had supervised, approved, or permitted importations of tobacco in favor of
Northern Tobacco Redrying, Co., Inc., considering the general and broad averments in the expanded
complaint (p. 68, Rollo).
In the course of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment on August 6, 1991, private
respondent’s counsel initially manifested that he was withdrawing said motion but changed his mind
when Commissioner Mario C. Jalandoni of the Presidential Commission on Good Government declared
that the Republic is admitting the genuineness and due execution of the documents containing President
Marcos’ handwritten approval (p. 1, Resolution; p. 82, Rollo).chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
An exchange of pleadings ensued and on October 21, 1991, the impugned Resolution was promulgated
Thus, defendant Moreno’s motion for summary judgment, viewed from the context by which plaintiff
made its answers to the request for admissions, present a classic case for the affirmative application of
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. Even if We are to take a view of the evidence most favorable to
the plaintiff, giving it the benefit of all favorable inferences, the fact still remains that plaintiff had not
successfully made out any bona fide issue or a genuine triable issue of fact which would warrant the
denial of the instant motion and necessitate trial thereof. The test is whether the plaintiff had, in its
original and Expanded Complaints, as well as in its Answer to the Request for Admission, set out, and
maintained the existence of, any genuine issue of fact.
As above-stated, plaintiff had admitted a vital fact which defendant Moreno had offered for admission
— that then President Marcos had approved the implementation of the transactions in question.
Coupled with defendant Moreno’s averment in his Answer that no specific act of illegality had been
committed by him, more particularly when he denied that he had any dealing with Northern Tobacco
Redrying Co., Inc.; that the latter was ever authorized to import Virginia Tobacco; and that he had any
acquaintance with his co-defendants Celso C. Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim and Benjamin T.
Albacita, which plaintiff has not, REPEAT, has not directly or indirectly controverted or overthrown,
either in its Expanded Complaint or in its Answer To The Request For Admission, then defendant
Moreno’s claim that no genuine triable issue of fact exists must be upheld. Furthermore, plaintiff has
admitted that it has not dug up or found any document or record to blunt or destroy the allegations of
Minda C. Gapuz, PVTA Market Development and Regulations Department Manager, that defendant
Moreno had ever supervised, approved and/or permitted any tobacco importation or purchase of
imported blending tobacco and that PTA and PVTA records do not show any authority granted to
Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc. to import foreign blending tobacco during defendant Moreno’s
incumbency as General Manager of PVTA. If at all, his admitted referral of applications for such
importations to the Office of the President, which acts and approves such application through Pres.
Marcos’ handwritten notations on the referral letters themselves, and confirmed by memoranda of Pres.
Exec. Assts. Tuvera and Venus, only shows that the specific averments of supposed irregularities on the
part of defendant Moreno do not support plaintiff’s cause of action based on alleged breach of public
trust.
Again, even if we accept plaintiff’s contention that the "Answer To The Request For Admission" was filed
on the last day of the extension period granted by the Court, as shown by the Registry Notice dated July
8, 1991 evidencing the mailing of a copy thereof to counsel for defendant Moreno, and overlook the
actual filing of said Answer with the Court on July 17, 1991, still we do not consider such facts decisive
anymore for the purpose of sustaining the instant motion for summary judgment, inasmuch as our
justifications therefor are based on the admissions and denials reflected in all of plaintiff’s pleadings
which are material, pertinent and relevant to the issue involved.
The query is posed — should the forms of law be gone through, and the time of the court, the parties
and counsel be wasted on the facts and circumstances standing incontrovertible on the record? Our
answer is in the negative. The summary judgment procedure is intended to "defeat the laws’ delays" by
giving prompt relief to those having a clear-cut claim or defense, to provide a more adequate and elastic
procedure for the protection of the rights of the parties and the prompt dispatch of litigation, and does
not contemplate that a party must follow his case through the lights and shadows of the evidence in it.
All that the rules require, or is meant to require, is that the party must furnish the court with proof of the
highest testimony or verification within his power, and thus eliminate any and all issues which have no
basis in fact, no matter how well pleaded in form, by allowing the moving party to pierce the allegation
of fact in the pleadings. In the case at bar, the incident involved in the motion for summary judgment
brings to the fore and positively accentuates the blatant lack, or bankruptcy, in the Expanded Complaint
as to any cause of action against defendant Moreno. The facts or combination of facts which would
afford plaintiff a right to judicial interference for the purpose of holding defendant Moreno liable in this
case is totally wanting. There being no genuine fact in issue, much less any cause of action against
defendant Moreno, further proceedings against him would be sheer waste of time and effort. (pp. 12-17,
Resolution; pp. 93-98, Rollo).
Following the denial of the motion for reconsideration (p. 100, Rollo), petitioner ascended the judicial
ladder through the present petition for certiorari ascribing wanton exercise of discretion on the part of
public respondent in declaring extinct the cause of action against Moreno. The Republic argues that
instead of disapproving Fortune Tobacco Corporation’s application geared towards importation of
tobacco, private respondent recommended approval thereof to President Marcos thereby suggesting
that private respondent acted in concert with President Marcos and Lucio Tan albeit private respondent
knew that the importations had already surpassed the ceiling fixed by Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 655. Even then, the Republic was frank in representing that no triable issue of fact exists as regards
the importations by Northern Redrying Co., Inc. (p. 9, Petition for Review; p. 13, Rollo), which admission
in judicio was amplified in the Republic’s Reply to private respondent’s Comment (p. 170, Rollo).
For his part, private respondent persists in advancing the idea that there is no intrinsic worth which can
be gathered from the bare and general statements of petitioner’s amended complaint.
At this juncture, one cannot gainsay the efforts exerted by the Republic, through the collective action of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government and the Office of the Solicitor General, in the quest
for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth accumulated by certain individuals identified with the past
regime. We must hasten to add, however, that insofar as the instant petition is concerned, we are of the
opinion that the premises set forth in the principal pleading in the court a quo, only with respect to
private respondent’s participation, suffer a congenital deficiency considering that the allegations thereof
fail to spell out the ultimate facts constitutive of the Republic’s cause of action (Section 3, Rule 6, Revised
Rules of Court).
Paragraphs 2 and 15 of the Amended Complaint, earlier quoted, it cannot be overstressed, are mere
conclusions of law unaccompanied by factual and categorical propositions. Verily, the allegations herein
involved bear a striking resemblance to the assertions treated in Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic (204 SCRA 428
[1991]) which prompted Justice Padilla to require the PCGG to file a bill of particulars, in the process
elucidating:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As quoted above, paragraph 9(a) of the complaint alleges that "Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together
with other Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in
flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth." In the light of the rules
on pleading and case law cited above, the allegations that defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with
the other defendants "embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth" and that said
defendants acted "in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers,
with gross and scandalous abuse of right and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines", are conclusions of law unsupported by factual premises.
Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioner’s acts in execution of the alleged "systematic plan
to accumulate ill-gotten wealth", or which are supposed to constitute "flagrant breach of public trust,"
"gross and scandalous abuse of right and power", and "violations of the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines." The complaint does not even allege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the
particular rights he abused.
Likewise, paragraph 15 avers that "defendant Francisco Tantuico, taking undue advantage of his position
as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as
such Chairman, acting in concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos facilitated
and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds as stated
in the foregoing paragraphs to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of Plaintiff and the entire
Filipino people." In like manner, the allegation that petitioner "took undue advantage of his position as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit," that he "failed to perform his constitutional duties as such
Chairman," and acting in concert with Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, "facilitated and made
possible the withdrawals, disbursements, and questionable use of government funds as stated in the
foregoing paragraphs, to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of plaintiff and the entire Filipino
people", are mere conclusions of law. Nowhere in the complaint is there any allegation as to how such
duty came about, or what petitioner’s duties were, with respect to the alleged withdrawals and
disbursements or how petitioner facilitated the alleged withdrawals, disbursements, or conversion of
public funds and properties, nor an allegation from where the withdrawals and disbursements came
from, except for a general allegation that they came from the national treasury. On top of that, the
complaint does not even contain any factual allegation which would show that whatever withdrawals,
disbursements, or conversions were made, were indeed subject to audit by the COA.
In this connection, it may well be stated that the Commission on Audit (COA) is an independent,
constitutional commission, which has no power or authority to withdraw, disburse, or use funds and
property pertaining to other government offices or agencies. This is done by the agency or office itself,
the chief or head of which is primarily and directly responsible for the funds and property pertaining to
such office or agency. The COA is merely authorized to audit, examine and settle accounts of the various
government offices or agencies, and this task is performed not by the Chairman of the COA but by the
COA auditors assigned to the government office or agency subject to COA audit.
Thus, in each agency of the government, there is an auditing unit headed by an auditor, whose duty is to
audit and settle the accounts, funds, financial transactions, and resources of the agency under his audit
jurisdiction. The decision of the auditor is appealable to the Regional Director, whose decision, is in turn,
appealable to the COA Manager. Any party dissatisfied with the decision of the COA Manager may bring
the matter on appeal to the Commission proper, a collegiate body exercising quasi-judicial functions,
composed of three (3) COA Commissioners, with the COA Chairman as presiding officer. It is only at this
stage that the COA Chairman would come to know of the matter and be called upon to act on the same,
and only if an aggrieved party brings the matter on appeal.
In other words, the Chairman of the COA does not participate in or personally audit all disbursements
and withdrawals of government funds, as well as transactions involving government property. The
averments in the particular paragraph of the complaint merely assume that petitioner participated in or
personally audited all disbursements and withdrawals of government funds, and all transactions
involving government property. Hence, the alleged withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of
government funds could not have been, as held by respondent Sandiganbayan, "within the peculiar and
intimate knowledge of petitioner as Chairman of the COA." Mangaliman, 72 Phil. 524 [1941]). The Sandiganbayan, therefore, correctly rendered the summary
judgment in view of the self-defeating representations of petitioner, for such recourse is well within the
The complaint further avers in paragraph 17 that" (t)he following Defendants acted as dummies, purview of Section 3, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of Court that:
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves (i) to be instruments in accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be "After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
incorporators, directors, or members of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by Defendants admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) T. Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained: Francisco Tantuico . . . ." Again, the
law." apart from the fact that the expanded complaint was not crafted with enough significant and
allegation that petitioner acted as dummy, nominee, or agent by allowing himself "to be used as
instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies substantial allegations of ultimate facts to warrant continuation of the trial against private respondent (1
prejudicial to Plaintiff" or "to be (an) incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially held Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, Revised ed., 1989, p. 329).
and/or controlled" by the Marcoses and Romualdezes, is a conclusion of law without factual basis
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated October
The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is perceived to be, 21, 1991 and December 13, 1991, AFFIRMED.
a dummy, nominee or agent. Besides, there is no averment in the complaint how petitioner allowed
himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions, orders SO ORDERED.
and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do with the
granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies. Moreover, Annex "A" G.R. No. 110970 March 16, 1994
of the complaint lists down sixty-one (61 corporations which are supposed to be beneficially owned or
ASUNCION JUANIR VDA. DE ALVAREZ, petitioner,
controlled by the Marcoses and Romualdezes. However, the complaint does not state which corporations
vs.
petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More
COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSEFA ALMEDA (Deceased) NOW HER HEIRS Namely: FREDISVINDA A.
significantly, the petitioner’s name does not even appear in Annex "B" of the complaint, which is a listing
CONSUNJI, ANGELITA A. CRUZ, EMMANUEL M. ALMEDA, ERLINDA A. CHIKIANCO, ZENAIDA A. ROXAS,
of the alleged "Positions and Participations of Some Defendants." The allegations in the complaint, above-
BENJAMIN A. ALMEDA, DOMINADOR M. ALMEDA, JR., and ERMELO M. ALMEDA, represented by
referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of
ERMELO M. ALMEDA, respondents.
law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises.
CRUZ, J.:
What about Paragraph 14(h) which inculpates private respondent when he supposedly "supervised,
approved and/or permitted such importations and purchases" It may be recalled that it was this portion The main issue for resolution is whether Lot 129 at Penefrancia Avenue, Naga City, with an area of 510
of the Amended Complaint which was the thrust of private respondent’s defense that elicited the square meters, was actually sold by Asuncion Juanir Vda. de Alvarez to Josefa Almeda or merely mortgaged
corresponding admission from the Republic on the genuineness and due execution of Exhibits 5-A and 5- to secure a loan.
B. In so responding, the Republic failed to realize that it practically pursued a diametrically opposed and
fatal posture because the candid statement carried with it the express acknowledgment that it was In a complaint for "Recovery of Possession" filed on January 30, 1981, with the Court of First Instance of
President Marcos, not private respondent, who approved the assailed importations. Withal, the language Camarines Sur, plaintiff Josefa Almeda alleged that, as the registered owner of the said Lot 129, she leased
of Exhibits 2-A, 2-B, 3-A, and 3-B show that private respondent, as the Chairman of the Philippine Virginia a 170 square-meter thereof, including the building erected on it, to defendant Asuncion Juanir, Vda. de
Tobacco Administration, had no authority or discretion to deny, much less to approve, the corresponding Alvarez for a monthly rental of P900.00; that the defendant failed to pay the rentals from August to
license to import tobacco without referring the matter to the President. Indeed, there would have been December 1978, from October to December 1979, and from January 1980 onward, and did not keep her
no need to submit every application for the President’s action if private respondent were clothed with the promise to leave the rented property after Christmas of 1979; and that despite written demands, she had
appropriate faculty to decide on the propriety of importation. Consequently, Paragraph 14(h) of the refused to vacate the premises.1
expanded complaint can hardly serve as legal basis to inculpate private Respondent.
In her answer, defendant Alvarez averred that sometime in 1973, the plaintiff offered to lend her money
At any rate, the Republic’s propensity to admit statements from the opposing party with prejudicial to settle her unpaid loan of P20,000.00 with the Continental Bank, Naga City, provided that the land given
repercussions is easily discernible and can be confirmed from the pleadings submitted to us which contain as security for the said loan would be mortgaged to the plaintiff instead. For this purpose, the plaintiff
the candid acknowledgment that there is no genuine triable issue of fact insofar as Northern Redrying Co., asked her to sign a document, which she did not read nor was it read to her, that she assumed was a
Inc. is concerned (p. 9, Petition for Review, p. 13, Rollo; pp. 5-7, Reply to Private Respondent’s Comments, mortgage pursuant to their agreement. It was only later that she discovered it was a deed of sale of her
pp. 170-172, Rollo). Notwithstanding said categorical admission in judicio, petitioner offers the excuse that land together with the improvements thereon for the sum of P80,000.00.2
the scenario is different as to Fortune Tobacco Corporation. Yet, we have already said with sufficient
While the case was pending in the trial court, plaintiff Josefa Almeda died and was substituted by her heirs,
emphasis that in view of the admission in the Answer to the request for admission (p. 64, Rollo) as to the
the private respondents therein.
genuineness and due execution of the handwritten approval of President Marcos on private respondent’s
letter vis-a-vis Fortune Tobacco’s request for importation (Exhibit 5-A; p. 126, Rollo), petitioner’s efforts On April 20, 1990, the lower court rendered judgment: 1) declaring that the contract entered into by the
to press an imaginary issue on this point must be brushed aside on account of the legal axiom against parties was one of absolute sale; 2) confirming the validity of the contract; 3) ordering defendant Alvarez
vacillating postures (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules and her successors-in-interest to surrender the possession of the subject lot to plaintiff Almeda's heirs or
on Evidence; Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 448 [1992]); Mentholatum Co., Inc. v. successors-in-interest; 4) ordering the defendant to pay the monthly rental of P900.00 for the entire
duration of her occupancy of the land and building until the same was vacated, P2,500.00 as attorney's
fees, and P500.00 as expenses of litigation; and 5) granting the writ of injunction preventing the defendant
or her heirs or successors-in-interest from committing further acts of dispossession.3
On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the respondent court,4 which also subsequently denied the
appellant's motion for new trial and/or reconsideration. Alvarez the came to this Court, insisting that the
contract invoked by Almeda should be treated as an equitable mortgage on the grounds that: 1) the
document purporting on its face to be an absolute sale was in fact a mortgage given as a security
repayment of a loan; 2) being merely a second grader, he could not have intelligently understood the
document she signed; 3) the price is grossly inadequate; and 4) she continued to possess the property in
the concept of an owner.
The petitioner bases her arguments on the presumptions laid down by Article 1602 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Article 1604 of the same Code, said provisions reading as follows:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgaged, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period
of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairy inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or
otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.
Art. 1604. The provision of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.
The document evidencing the transaction between Josefa Almeda and the petitioner is denominated a
contract of sale.5 However, parol evidence may be introduced to show that the agreement was in fact
merely a mortgage masquerading as a sale.
Section 9, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
When the terms of agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing al the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement
if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
xxx xxx xxx
There is no ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the deed of sale. We also find no compelling reason to
consider the express stipulations in the deed of sale were intended only to create an equitable mortgage.
The petitioner has not presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the real intention of the
parties to the said deed was to make the property in question merely a security for a loan extended by
Almeda to the petitioner.
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provided that in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. In the case before us, the facts
clearly show that the transaction between Almeda and the petitioner was indeed a contract of sale.
It is noted that in May 1973, Almeda caused the registration of the disputed deed of sale, resulting in the
cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 2896 in the name of the petitioner and the consequent
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6999 7 in Almeda's favor. The petitioner admitted having
learned this fact as early as 1973, first from her lawyer and personally afterwards, when she went to the
Register of Deeds to verify the matter.
If Alvarez was really mislead into signing the deed of sale, she should have protested or at least notified
the Register of Deeds that she had only mortgaged and not sold the land to Almeda. Better still, she should
have taken steps to annul the sale and recover the property. Inexplicably, she did nothing at all. It was only
in 1981, when Almeda sued her recovery of the property, that she alleged in her answer that the deed sale
was a disguised mortgage. It took her all of eight years to challenge the registration of the disputed
property in favor of Almeda.
The Court also notes that, also in 1973, Almeda declared the subject property in her name for tax purposes,
resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the petitioner's name.8 Alvarez never questioned the
said cancellation nor did she ask the tax declaration in her name to be revived.
It is a matter of record that when the petitioner and Almeda were sued in 1979 by Dolores Salvan, one of
the lessees of the subject property, she declared in her answer9 to the complaint:
4. That defendant admits that she has been receiving plaintiff's rentals but from 1973 she has been
receiving such rentals for defendant Josefa Almeda after the latter purchased the land from her and that
when she refused to receive plaintiff's rental for March, it was upon instruction of defendant Josefa
Almeda, the owner of the land;
5. That she denies the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the complaint, the truth being that if she
refused to accept payment, it was because of the instruction made upon her by her co-defendant, owner
of the land, Josefa Almeda;
6. That plaintiff knows that she has no cause of action against the herein defendant, she being no longer
the owner of the land or the leased premises, . . . (Emphasis Supplied).
And when in May 1979, another lessee, Basilio Caning, filed a complaint against her, the petitioner made
the following allegations in her answer: 10
4. That she denies the allegations contained in par. 4 of the complaint, the truth being that plaintiff has
never tendered any payment in February or March, what happened was that defendant, upon instruction
of Mrs. Josefa Almeda, who is the present owner of both the land and the building occupied and leased by
plaintiff, Mrs. Almeda having long bought this from defendant, she gave notice to plaintiff to vacate the
premises as the land will be used for the construction of a multi-story building to keep up with the growing
commercial needs of the City;
5. That she specifically denies each and every allegation contained in pars. 5, 6, 7, and 9 of the complaint,
she having no knowledge of any useful improvement made by plaintiff, nor has she given any consent
therefor, and she knows not only any portion of the building which needed repairs and besides as already
stated defendant sold the lot including the building to Mrs. Josefa Almeda since 1973 and therefore she
had no more obligation to repair the same, but the owner if at all which it Mrs. Almeda;
xxx xxx xxx
7. That the complaint does not include the real parties in interest, Mrs. Josefa Almeda, who is the
registered owner and lessor of the lot and building in question and without her included no final
determination of this case can be had;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that this case be
dismissed, or if at all that it be prosecuted against the proper party, Mrs. Josefa Almeda, . . . (Emphasis
Supplied)
The petitioner points out that it was Almeda who paid for the services of the lawyer who prepared the
said pleadings, but that fact alone does not disprove or nullify her declarations therein.
An Admission in a pleading in one action may be admitted in evidence against the pleader or his successor-
in-interest at the subsequent trial of the same suit or in another action involving the same issue or in which
the admission is pertinent tot he issues. 11 It is true that this rule will not apply if the pleading in which the
statement is found was not signed by the party and no proof was presented that he had authorized the
making of such admission. 12 In the case at bar, however, the aforequoted answer bear the signature of
the petitioner, who in fact acknowledged it at the trial. 13
Alvarez now claims that she signed the pleadings merely upon the prodding of Almeda, who had not read
or explained their contents to her. The petitioner's behavior is certainly strange, considering that this
happened six years after she and her lawyer came to know about the transfer of the land in Almeda's
name. Almeda and Alvarez would have been at loggerheads by that time. Yet Alvarez, would have this
Court believe that she still willingly left their common defense to Almeda and willingly signed the pleadings
without clearing them first with her own lawyer. It is inconceivable that Alvarez would still have trusted
Almeda if it is true that she had earlier been deceived by this person.
The petitioner says Almeda took advantage of her illiteracy but her own evidence reveals her shrewdness
and shows that she is not all that gullible or helpless, as she pretends. She herself negated this pose when
she testified that she was able to mortgage the subject lot no less than three times with different banks
without any difficulty or the assistance of a lawyer. She said she knew she could manage by itself. 14
Alvarez also claims that she could not have sold the disputed property for only P80,000.00 because she
even turned down an offer in 1971 to buy the land at P265,200.00. She presents no corroboration,
however, such as the testimony of the supposed offeror.
To show that the consideration of P80,000.00 was grossly inadequate, the petitioner invites attention to
Tax Declaration No. 16807 15 and a deed of sale covering a nearby 906 square meter lot, which was sold
for P600,000.00. 16
The deed was executed on June 22, 1987. Surely, it cannot be considered evidence of the market value of
the land in 1973, all of fourteen years earlier. As for the tax declaration, which was issued on May 14, 1974,
the true market value of the land in question is placed at only P60,000.00 and that of the building at only
P7,200.00, for a total of P67,200.00. This instrument belies the petitioner's contention that the price of
P80,000.00 is grossly inadequate.
The petitioner points to certain documents she filed with the respondent court tending to show, from a
comparison of the 1987 market value of a lot adjacent to the disputed property and the 1973 market value
of the disputed property itself, that the consideration for her land was grossly inadequate. The Court of
Appeals did not err in rejecting these documents on the ground that they had not been formally offered
as evidence with the trial court. Section 34, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court provides that the court shall
not consider evidence not formally offered. Furthermore, the documents could hardly be considered
newly-discovered evidence to justify the grant of a new trial as they were existing and known to the
petitioner at the time of the original trial.
Even on the assumption that the price of P80,000.00 was below the market value of the lot in 1973, it
would nonetheless not be gross and unconscionable, as the petitioner insists. According to Tolentino, the
presumption of equitable mortgage will apply only if it is clearly shown that the consideration was
unusually inadequate such that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable man would neither
directly or indirectly be likely to consent to it. 17
In Cuyugan v. Santos, 18 the Court held that another test to determine whether a conveyance is a sale or
merely a security for the payment of a loan is the continued existence of a debt or liability on the part of
the alleged mortgagor. If such a relationship exists, the transaction is a mortgage; otherwise, it is a contract
of sale.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that she never paid the alleged indebtedness 19 and there is
no evidence either that she attempted or offered to discharge the alleged mortgaged. On the contrary, it
was Almeda, the alleged lender, who had made payments to the petitioner as follows: P40,000.00 on May
23, 1973; 20 P60,000.00 on February 11, 1974. 21 P2,000.00 on February 7, 1975; 22 and P18,00.00 on April
22, 1976 23. All the receipts acknowledging the said payments were signed by the petitioner, who did not
controvert them at the trial.
It would appear from these payments that the true selling price of the land was P120,000.00, which was
way above the market value stated in the 1973 tax declaration covering the property in question. There
was an obvious reason for fixing the consideration at only P80,000.00 in the dispute deed of sale. As the
petitioner blandly admitted in her brief, "the true consideration of sales of land are not usually placed in
the documents of conveyances to reduce the documentary stamps, the transfer tax fees as well as other
taxes chargeable relative thereto."
The petitioner next asserts that if the deed of sale were considered a contract of antichresis, the loan of
P80,000.00 would be deemed fully paid or offset by the rentals received by Almeda (or the private
respondents) from the 340 square-meter portion of the subject lot since 1973 up to the present. The
aggregate amount of these rentals could be more than P211,400.00.
This Contention is untenable.
The Civil Code provides:
Article 2132. By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and
thereafter to the principal of his credit.
Article 2134. The amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise, the
contract of antichresis shall be void.
There is no provision in the disputed documents specifically authorizing Almeda to receive the fruits of the
land in question with the obligation to apply them to the payment of interest if any was due, and to the
principal of the alleged loan. The instrument also does not fix the amount of P80,000.00 as the petitioner's
principal obligation.
Alvarez also stresses that she remained in actual possession of the subject property and says this
possession has given rise to the presumption of an equitable mortgage. That presumption cannot override
her own judicial admission that Almeda was the new owner of the property, having bought it from her
way back in 1973. If Alvarez was indeed in possession, it was because the property had been leased to her
by Almeda, who in fact later sued her for its recovery and payment of back rentals.
There is no merit in the private respondents' submission that the decision of the respondent court has
already become final and executory. The petitioner received that decision on May 5, 1993, and so had until
May 20, 1993, to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The registry receipt and the envelope,
containing her motion disclose that it was mailed on May 14, 1993, well within the period to stay
enforcement of the judgment under review.
The private respondent' contention that the petitioner failed to comply with Par. 4 of Circular 1-88 is also
untenable. The "verification" accompanying the petition clearly states the material dates, i.e., the date of
receipt of the questioned decision, the date of filing of the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,
and the date of receipt of the order denying such motion.
Our conclusion is that the respondent Court of Appeals committed no error in sustaining the finding of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City that the document executed between Josefa Almeda and Asuncion Juanir
Vda. de Alvarez was a deed of sale and not an equitable mortgage.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT
HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled State Investment House, Inc., v.
Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC Chemical Corporation. The questioned decision affirmed in toto the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case No. 84-25881, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the following: a) To pay plaintiff
State Investment House, Inc., the sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum reckond
(sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25%
of the total amount due and demandable as attorneys fees and to pay the cost(s) of suit.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27, 1997, denying
SCC Chemicals Corporations motion for reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman, private
respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State
Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest
rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-
payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private
respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and
severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then
sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note
upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of
consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the
dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has
jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the
capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated April
4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which were both received by the herein
defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting
through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December
13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.[2]
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to the
plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed
several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several
times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared
by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the latter
had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient
as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no showing that he had personal
knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of the genuineness of the
signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these signatures were neither
marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents
were not presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution dated February 27, 1997.
Hence, petitioners recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED
ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVERCAME ITS BURDEN OF PROOF.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent SIHI had
proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorneys fees to SIHI.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the
testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the
truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of
Sections 36[3] and 48,[4] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals
to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to have
seen the document presented in evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness
was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2,[5] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of
due execution and authenticity of private documents before the same can be received as evidence.
Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary evidence presented by
SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of the requirement of
Section 34,[6] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate court
to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the documents
presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence provided for in Section 3
(e),[7] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.
Petitioners arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled hearing
dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was supposed
to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the appellate
court with committing an error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony
pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence
is excluded and carries no probative value.[8] However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party
failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.[9] The rationale for this exception is to
be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine
which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.[10] However, the right to
cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied
waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the
other partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was
thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing partys witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising
this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was
a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the
requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were
satisfied.
Respecting petitioners other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals, petitioners admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private
respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be
treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4,[11] Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof.
Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence rule[12] advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no need
to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial
of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner
to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to
establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or
other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate
court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith.
On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having sustained the
trial courts award of attorneys fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of the Philippines v.
Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899,909 (1990), where we held that when attorneys fees are awarded, the reason
for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts decision. Petitioner submits that
since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the same, the award of attorneys fees should
have been disallowed by the appellate court.
We find for petitioner in this regard.
It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is necessary for
the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within the exception and justify
the grant of the award.[13] Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the
rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of
the records shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same
should thereby be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November 12, 1996 of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees to private respondent SIHI
is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
+ 14
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that
he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The
warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues
embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the
relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the
petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were
to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly
but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech
entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was
referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator
Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint
investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then
headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the
other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the
move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued
a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner
to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on
October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the
petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that
the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined
the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of
Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously
held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior
Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata,
former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also
resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon,
and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling
coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses
of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as
prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo,
Wigberto Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors
led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as
defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of
Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the
House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was
covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were
the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings
was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she
was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents
involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it
resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty.
Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that
the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of
insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets
of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur
were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment
proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line
of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala
Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance.
Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted
more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner
informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election
for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m.,
Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the
armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and
hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing
our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major
service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for
the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage,
petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial
second envelope.26There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary.
Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito
Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management
Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary
Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada
protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent
Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He issued the
following press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to
be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy
was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of
Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent
request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.1âwphi1.nêt
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On
January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal
Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent
Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House
conveying US recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.37The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she
also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The
next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr.43Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with
reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were
absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No.
178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus
officio and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she
voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide
on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still
qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up
from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-
CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted
President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in
Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very
poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of
Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury,
serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000
for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No.
0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the
following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and
Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to
the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-
15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,
1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos.
146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within
a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the
consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on
or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing,
Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of
petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that
they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but
nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to
file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement
for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court
resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office
of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited
for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar
while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for
decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution
of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he
is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence,
are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases
at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended
the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign
governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court
cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the
shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the
courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of
powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the
United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled
out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of
'political questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions
refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of
the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the
"thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.60With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and
symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid
language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus)
or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar
involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A
more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held
that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign
people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a
government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that
government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of
respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath
under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves
the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA
II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the
Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II
involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is
not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of
the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for
the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus
non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its
Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally
or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for
purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions
to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United
States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission
of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill,
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These
rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident.
The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring
individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth;
third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth,
it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the
precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of
speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society
can take place without destroying the society."70In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this
function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee
of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the
substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all
and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that
"… it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to
petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those
who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article
II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political
question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question.
Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case
and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the
Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a
high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is
not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express.
It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the
succession of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed,
it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon,
petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social
Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then,
his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The
call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open
the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over,
the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew
exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning
of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence,
they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m.,
petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed,
seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or
at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a
candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General
Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically
announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent
Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he
asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or
resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner.
At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified
exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with
enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the
suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m.,
petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a
week in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was
a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and
requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and
orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again,
we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The
resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of
January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period
of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his
family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the
petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner
on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his
name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red
tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he
said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following
happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective
on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the
Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities – Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize
the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account
does not belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition
Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for
in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted
that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given
fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the
petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes
and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party
of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful
events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in
the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January
2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start
orientation activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security
of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military
and police authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial,
the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B"
heretofore attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the
agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already
moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which
have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side,
as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG
is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal
possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President,
I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that
he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now
in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20,
2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer
to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases
at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press
release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily
unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time
bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the
petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it
was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation
from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot
given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this
Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not
resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No.
3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate,
did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship
speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of
amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for
any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign
or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this
Act for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph
of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15
above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly
focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill.
There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official
with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought
to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to
prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code.
To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional
right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at
the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or
prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative
proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records
show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune
from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment
proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance,
and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending
against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim
is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel
and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of
the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII." 95 This
contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo
is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties
of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to
the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within
twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his
office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about
12:30 p.m.;
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution
No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO
OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their
recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus
by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the
individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must
ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the
attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation,
to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national
interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines
– qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change
and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose
and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served
the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which
qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus
officioand has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January
16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the
Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the
Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its
judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually
demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the
Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is
a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation
of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is
a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-
equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most
enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In
the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen,
sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages
for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded
and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the
law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from
interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive
authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary,
it means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the
Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in
the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly
presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void
and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property
by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his
personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which
the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the
performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the
Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all
in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a
case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without
authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he
decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men,
reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority
to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts,
not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his
act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief
executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials
of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust
as to the integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then
came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity.
Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's
Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former
Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this
constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the
absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also
from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of
the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include
not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who
acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS
(or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive
immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of
Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos
violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the
anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power
revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive
immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J.
Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity
provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking
out second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence
that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him
that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in
Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that
he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the
events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment
Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against
his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation
than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the
object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear
that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the
proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the
impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily
dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation
would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects
of it may continue in the ordinary courts."
Saturnino Bermudez111
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from
suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos
for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The
cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite
any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability
for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to
produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven
advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other
offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted
co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the
President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from
office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US
Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the
1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president
from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate
this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for
money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in
our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It
declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel." 121 It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and
endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-
sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation
of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the
right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of
Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial
for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting
the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity
so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the
minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases.
The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast
tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of
life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the
world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they
lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage
of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et
al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we
ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a
bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence
of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which
is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and
its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes,
its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For
sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair
trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal
case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted
fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often
follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing
an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's
criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S
Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that
a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of
justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be
read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees;
the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom
doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover,
the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a
catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen
deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives
of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance
the integrity and quality of what takes place.
Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the right
to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as
indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners
cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these
are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor
to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their
26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any
extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander
did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting to some people's prejudice.
from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note,
REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION VS. QUA
the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the DECISION
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because
of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its The Case
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the
petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 6 March 2000 Decision[2] and the 26 July 2000
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54737. The Court of Appeals set aside the Order[3] of
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote 3 May 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63 (RTC-Branch 63), in Civil Case No. 88-2643 and
petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reinstated the Decision[4] of 12 January 1996 in respondents favor.
reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports
have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of The Facts
the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by
Petitioners Republic Glass Corporation (RGC) and Gervel, Inc. (Gervel) together with respondent Lawrence
this bias of their superior.
C. Qua (Qua) were stockholders of Ladtek, Inc. (Ladtek). Ladtek obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news and Trust Company (Metrobank)[5] and Private Development Corporation of the Philippines[6] (PDCP) with
reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light RGC, Gervel and Qua as sureties. Among themselves, RGC, Gervel and Qua executed Agreements for
of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good Contribution, Indemnity and Pledge of Shares of Stocks (Agreements).[7]
faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory
The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of Ladteks loans, the parties would
of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
reimburse each other the proportionate share of any sum that any might pay to the creditors.[8] Thus, a
subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the
common provision appears in the Agreements:
independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively reimburse the party made to pay the
dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Lenders to the extent and subject to the limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which the party
Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter made to pay the Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay by reason of any of the foregoing, and will make
believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of such payments within five (5) days from the date that the party made to pay the Lenders gives written
assailing it before the proper court. notice to the parties hereto that it shall have become liable therefor and has advised the Lenders of its
willingness to pay whether or not it shall have already paid out such sum or any part thereof to the Lenders
VI.
or to the persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
Epilogue
Under the same Agreements, Qua pledged 1,892,360 common shares of stock of General Milling
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different Corporation (GMC) in favor of RGC and Gervel. The pledged shares of stock served as security for the
dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the payment of any sum which RGC and Gervel may be held liable under the Agreements.
majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more
Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP. Hence, Metrobank filed a collection case
threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to
against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua docketed as Civil Case No. 8364 (Collection Case No. 8364) which was
prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized
raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 (RTC-Branch 149). During the pendency of
as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and
Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million. Later, Metrobank executed a waiver
less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall
and quitclaim dated 7 September 1988 in favor of RGC and Gervel. Based on this waiver and
have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient
quitclaim,[9] Metrobank, RGC and Gervel filed on 16 September 1988 a joint motion to dismiss Collection
vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated
Case No. 8364 against RGC and Gervel. Accordingly, RTC-Branch 149 dismissed the case against RGC and
by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy,
Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as defendants.[10]
the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy
has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may
In a letter dated 7 November 1988, RGC and Gervels counsel, Atty. Antonio C. Pastelero, demanded that
Qua pay P3,860,646, or 42.22% of P8,730,543.55,[11] as reimbursement of the total amount RGC and
Gervel paid to Metrobank and PDCP. Qua refused to reimburse the amount to RGC and
Gervel. Subsequently, RGC and Gervel furnished Qua with notices of foreclosure of Quas pledged shares.
Qua filed a complaint for injunction and damages with application for a temporary restraining order,
docketed as Civil Case No. 88-2643 (Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643), with RTC-Branch 63 to prevent RGC
and Gervel from foreclosing the pledged shares. Although it issued a temporary restraining order on 9
December 1988, RTC-Branch 63 denied on 2 January 1989 Quas Urgent Petition to Suspend Foreclosure
Sale. RGC and Gervel eventually foreclosed all the pledged shares of stock at public auction. Thus, Quas
application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction became moot.[12]
Trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 ensued. RGC and Gervel offered Quas Motion to Dismiss[13] in
Collection Case No. 8364 as basis for the foreclosure of Quas pledged shares. Quas Motion to Dismiss
states:
8. The foregoing facts show that the payment of defendants Republic Glass Corporation and
Gervel, Inc. was for the entire obligation covered by the Continuing Surety Agreements which were
Annexes B and C of the Complaint, and that the same naturally redound[ed] to the benefit of defendant
Qua herein, as provided for by law, specifically Article 1217 of the Civil Code, which states that:
xXX
10. It is very clear that the payment of defendants Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc. was much
more than the amount stipulated in the Continuing Surety Agreement which is the basis for the action
against them and defendant Qua, which was just SIX MILLION TWO HUNDRED [THOUSAND] PESOS
(P6,200,000.00), hence, logically the said alleged obligation must now be considered as fully paid and
extinguished.
RGC and Gervel likewise offered as evidence in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 the Order dismissing
Collection Case No. 8364,[14] which RTC-Branch 149 subsequently reversed on Metrobanks motion for
reconsideration. Thus, RTC-Branch 149 reinstated Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua.
On 12 January 1996, RTC-Branch 63 rendered a Decision in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 (12 January 1996
Decision) ordering RGC and Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of stock to Qua. The dispositive portion
of the 12 January 1996 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment ordering defendants jointly and
severally liable to return to plaintiff the 1,892,360 shares of common stock of General Milling Corporation
which they foreclosed on December 9, 1988, or should the return of these shares be no longer possible
then to pay to plaintiff the amount of P3,860,646.00 with interest at 6% per annum from December 9,
1988 until fully paid and to pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as and for attorneys fees. The costs will be for
defendants account.
SO ORDERED.[15]
However, on RGC and Gervels Motion for Reconsideration, RTC-Branch 63 issued its Order of 3 May 1996
(3 May 1996 Order) reconsidering and setting aside the 12 January 1996 Decision. The 3 May 1996 Order
states:
After a thorough review of the records of the case, and an evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
parties as well as their contentions, the issues to be resolved boil down to the following:
1. Whether or not the parties obligation to reimburse, under the Indemnity Agreements was premised on
the payment by any of them of the entire obligation;
2. Whether or not there is basis to plaintiffs apprehension that he would be made to pay twice for the
single obligation; and
3. Whether or not plaintiff was benefited by the payments made by defendants
Regarding the first issue, a closer scrutiny of the pertinent provisions of the Indemnity Agreements
executed by the parties would not reveal any significant indication that the parties liabilities are indeed
premised on the payment by any of them of the entire obligation. These agreements clearly provide that
the parties obligation to reimburse accrues upon mere advice that one of them has paid or will so pay the
obligation. It is not specified whether the payment is for the entire obligation or not.
Accordingly, the Court stands corrected in this regard. The obvious conclusion that can be seen now is that
payment of the entire obligation is not a condition sine qua non for the paying party to demand
reimbursement. The parties have expressly contracted that each will reimburse whoever is made to pay
the obligation whether entirely or just a portion thereof.
On the second issue, plaintiffs apprehension that he would be made to pay twice for the single obligation
is unfounded. Under the above-mentioned Indemnity Agreements, in the event that the creditors are able
to collect from him, he has the right to ask defendants to pay their proportionate share, in the same way
defendants had collected from the plaintiff, by foreclosing his pledged shares of stock, his proportionate
share, after they had made payments. From all indications, the provisions of the Indemnity Agreements
have remained binding between the parties.
On the third issue, there is merit to defendants assertion that plaintiff has benefited from the payments
made by defendants. As alleged by defendants, and this has not been denied by plaintiff, in Civil Case No.
8364 filed before Branch 149 of this Court, where the creditors were enforcing the parties liabilities as
sureties, plaintiff succeeded in having the case dismissed by arguing that defendants payments [were] for
the entire obligation, hence, the obligation should be considered fully paid and extinguished. With the
dismissal of the case, the indications are that the creditors are no longer running after plaintiff to enforce
his liabilities as surety of Ladtek.
Whether or not the surety agreements signed by the parties and the creditors were novated is not material
in this controversy. The fact is that there was payment of the obligation. Hence, the Indemnity Agreements
govern.
In the final analysis, defendants payments gave rise to plaintiffs obligation to reimburse the former. Having
failed to do so, upon demand, defendants were justified in foreclosing the pledged shares of stocks.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 12, 1996 is reconsidered and set aside. The
above-entitled complaint against defendants is DISMISSED.
Likewise, defendants counterclaim is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
Qua filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 May 1996 Order which RTC-Branch 63 denied.
Aggrieved, Qua appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Qua filed a
Manifestation[17] with the Court of Appeals attaching the Decision[18]of 21 November 1996 rendered in
Collection Case No. 8364. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Ladtek, Inc. and
Lawrence C. Qua:
1. To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the amount of P44,552,738.34 as of October 31, 1987
plus the stipulated interest of 30.73% per annum and penalty charges of 12% per annum from November
1, 1987 until the whole amount is fully paid, less P7,000,000.00 paid by defendants Republic Glass
Corporation and Gervel, Inc., but the liability of defendant Lawrence C. Qua should be limited only
to P5,000,000.00 and P1,200,000.00, the amount stated in the Continuing Suretyship dated June 15, 1983,
Exh. D and Continuing Suretyship dated December 14, 1981, Exh. D-1, respectively, plus the stipulated
interest and expenses incurred by the plaintiff.
2. To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff an amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the
total amount due as and by way of attorneys fees;
3. To pay the cost of suit.
The Counterclaims of the defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence C. Qua against the plaintiff are hereby
dismissed.
Likewise, the cross-claims of the defendants are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
On 6 March 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned Decision setting aside the 3 May 1996
Order of RTC-Branch 63 and reinstating the 12 January 1996 Decision ordering RGC and Gervel to return
the foreclosed shares of stock to Qua.[20]
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the 3 May 1996 Order and reinstating the 12 January 1996 Decision, the appellate court
quoted the RTC-Branch 63s 12 January 1996 Decision:
The liability of each party under the indemnity agreements therefore is premised on the payment by any
of them of the entire obligation. Without such payment, there would be no corresponding share to
reimburse. Payment of the entire obligation naturally redounds to the benefit of the other solidary debtors
who must then reimburse the paying co-debtors to the extent of his corresponding share.
In the case at bar, Republic Glass and Gervel made partial payments only, and so they did not extinguish
the entire obligation. But Republic Glass and Gervel nevertheless obtained quitclaims in their favor and so
they ceased to be solidarily liable with plaintiff for the balance of the debt (Exhs. D, E, and I). Plaintiff thus
became solely liable for the unpaid portion of the debt even as he is being held liable for reimbursement
on the said portion.
What happened therefore, was that Metrobank and PDCP in effect enforced the Suretyship Agreements
jointly as against plaintiff and defendants. Consequently, the solidary obligation under the Suretyship
Agreements was novated by the substantial modification of its principal conditions. xxx The resulting
change was from one with three solidary debtors to one in which Lawrence Qua became the sole solidary
co-debtor of Ladtek.
Defendants cannot simply pay off a portion of the debt and then absolve themselves from any further
liability when the obligation has not been totally extinguished.
xxx
In the final reckoning, this Court finds that the foreclosure and sale of the shares pledged by plaintiff was
totally unjustified and without basis because the obligation secured by the underlying pledge had been
extinguished by novation. xxx[21]
The Court of Appeals further held that there was an implied novation or substantial incompatibility in the
suretys mode or manner of payment from one for the entire obligation to one merely of proportionate
share. The appellate court ruled that RGC and Gervels payment to the creditors only amounted to their
proportionate shares of the obligation, considering the following evidence:
The letter of the Republic to the appellant, Exhibit G, dated June 25, 1987, which mentioned the letter
from PDCP confirming its willingness to release the joint and solidary obligation of the Republic and Gervel
subject to some terms and conditions, one of which is the appellants acceptable repayment plan of his
pro-rata share; and the letter of PDCP to the Republic, Exhibit H, mentioning full payment of the pro rata
share of the Republic and Gervel, and the need of the appellant to submit an acceptable repayment plan
covering his pro-rata share, the release from solidary liability by PDCP, Exhibit J, mentioning full payment
by the Republic and Gervel of their pro rata share in the loan, as solidary obligors, subject however to the
terms and conditions of the hold out agreement; and the non-payment in full of the loan, subject of the
May 10, 1984 Promissory Note, except the 7 million payment by both Republic and Gervel, as mentioned
in the Decision (Case No. 8364, Metrobank vs. Ladtek, et al). Precisely, Ladtek and the appellant, in said
Decision were directed to pay Metrobank the balance of P9,560,798, supposedly due and unpaid.
Thus, the payment did not extinguish the entire obligation and did not benefit Qua. Accordingly, RGC and
Gervel cannot demand reimbursement. The Court of Appeals also held that Qua even became solely
answerable for the unpaid balance of the obligations by virtue of the quitclaims executed by Metrobank
and PDCP in favor of RGC and Gervel. RGC and Gervel ceased to be solidarily liable for Ladteks loan
obligations.
The Issues
RGC and Gervel raise the following issues for resolution:
I.
WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO QUAS JUDICIAL STATEMENTS THAT RGC AND GERVEL
PAID THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION.
II.
WHETHER PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR RGC AND GERVEL
TO DEMAND REIMBURSEMENT FROM QUA UNDER THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS EXECUTED BY THEM
AFTER RGC AND GERVEL PAID METROBANK UNDER THE SURETY AGREEMENT.
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NOVATION OF THE SURETY AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE
PARTIES AND THE CREDITORS, WHETHER THE NOVATION IS MATERIAL IN THIS CASE.[23]
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition.
Whether Qua was in estoppel
RGC and Gervel contend that Qua is in estoppel for making conflicting statements in two different and
separate cases. Qua cannot now claim that the payment made to Metrobank was not for
the entire obligation because of his Motion to Dismiss Collection Case No. 8364 where he stated that RGC
and Gervels payment was for the entireobligation.
The essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in relation to the party to be estopped, and to
the party invoking the estoppel in his favor. On the party to be estopped, such party (1) commits conduct
amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the
impression that the facts are inconsistent with those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2)
has the intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall at least influence the other party; and (3) has
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. On the party claiming the estoppel, such party (1)
has lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth on the facts in question; (2) has relied,
in good faith, on the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) has acted or refrained from
acting based on such conduct or statements as to change the position or status of the party claiming the
estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice.[24]
In this case, the essential elements of estoppel are inexistent.
While Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364 conflict with his statements in Foreclosure Case No.
88-2643, RGC and Gervel miserably failed to show that Qua, in making those statements, intended to
falsely represent or conceal the material facts. Both parties undeniably know the real facts.
Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel relied on Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364
such that they changed their position or status, to their injury, detriment or prejudice. RGC and Gervel
repeatedly point out that it was the presiding judge[25] in Collection Case No. 8364 who relied on Quas
statements in Collection Case No. 8364. RGC and Gervel claim that Qua deliberately led the Presiding Judge
to believe that their payment to Metrobank was for the entire obligation. As a result, the presiding judge
ordered the dismissal of Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua.[26]
RGC and Gervel further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court to support their stance:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) during the trial either by
verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.[27]
The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua made conflicting statements in Collection
Case No. 8364 and in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, and not in the same case as required in Section 4 of
Rule 129. To constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is
offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact of such admission must be proved as in the
case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight.[28]
RGC and Gervel introduced Quas Motion to Dismiss and the Order dismissing Collection Case No. 8364 to
prove Quas claim that the payment was for the entire obligation. Qua does not deny making such
statement but explained that he honestly believed and pleaded in the lower court and in CA-G.R. CV No.
58550 that the entire debt was fully extinguished when the petitioners paid P7 million to Metrobank.[29]
We find Quas explanation substantiated by the evidence on record. As stated in the Agreements, Ladteks
original loan from Metrobank was only P6.2 million. Therefore, Qua reasonably believed that RGC and
Gervels P7 million payment to Metrobank pertained to the entire obligation. However, subsequent facts
indisputably show that RGC and Gervels payment was not for the entire obligation. RTC-Branch 149
reinstated Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua and ruled in Metrobanks favor, ordering Qua to pay P6.2
million.
Whether payment of the entire obligation is an
essential condition for reimbursement
RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals ruling that the parties liabilities under the Agreements depend
on the full payment of the obligation. RGC and Gervel insist that it is not an essential condition that the
entire obligation must first be paid before they can seek reimbursement from Qua. RGC and Gervel
contend that Qua should pay 42.22% of any amount which they paid or would pay Metrobank and PDCP.
RGC and Gervels contention is partly meritorious.
Payment of the entire obligation by one or some of the solidary debtors results in a corresponding
obligation of the other debtors to reimburse the paying debtor.[30]However, we agree with RGC and
Gervels contention that in this case payment of the entire obligation is not an essential condition before
they can seek reimbursement from Qua. The words of the Agreements are clear.
RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively reimburse the party made to pay the
Lenders to the extent and subject to the limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which the party
made to pay the Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay by reason of any of the foregoing, and will make
such payments within five (5) days from the date that the party made to pay the Lenders gives written
notice to the parties hereto that it shall have become liable therefor and has advised the Lenders of its
willingness to pay whether or not it shall have already paid out such sum or any part thereof to the Lenders
or to the persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Agreements are contracts of indemnity not only against actual loss but against liability as well.
In Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Chua,[31] we distinguished between a contract of indemnity
against loss and a contract of indemnity against liability, thus:[32]
The Agreement here sued upon is not only one of indemnity against loss but of indemnity against
liability. While the first does not render the indemnitor liable until the person to be indemnified makes
payment or sustains loss, the second becomes operative as soon as the liability of the person indemnified
arises irrespective of whether or not he has suffered actual loss. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, whether the solidary debtor has paid the creditor, the other solidary debtors should indemnify
the former once his liability becomes absolute. However, in this case, the liability of RGC, Gervel and Qua
became absolute simultaneously when Ladtek defaulted in its loan payment. As a result, RGC, Gervel and
Qua all became directly liable at the same time to Metrobank and PDCP. Thus, RGC and Gervel cannot
automatically claim for indemnity from Qua because Qua himself is liable directly to Metrobank and PDCP.
If we allow RGC and Gervel to collect from Qua his proportionate share, then Qua would pay much more
than his stipulated liability under the Agreements. In addition to the P3,860,646 claimed by RGC and
Gervel, Qua would have to pay his liability of P6.2 million to Metrobank and more than P1 million to
PDCP. Since Qua would surely exceed his proportionate share, he would then recover from RGC and Gervel
the excess payment. This situation is absurd and circuitous.
Contrary to RGC and Gervels claim, payment of any amount will not automatically result in
reimbursement. If a solidary debtor pays the obligation in part, he can recover reimbursement from the
co-debtors only in so far as his payment exceeded his share in the obligation.[33] This is precisely because if
a solidary debtor pays an amount equal to his proportionate share in the obligation, then he in effect pays
only what is due from him. If the debtor pays less than his share in the obligation, he cannot demand
reimbursement because his payment is less than his actual debt.
To determine whether RGC and Gervel have a right to reimbursement, it is indispensable to ascertain the
total obligation of the parties. At this point, it becomes necessary to consider the decision in Collection
Case No. 8364 on the parties obligation to Metrobank. To repeat, Metrobank filed Collection Case No.
8364 against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua to collect Ladteks unpaid loan.
RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals consideration of the decision in Collection Case No.
8364[34] because Qua did not offer the decision in evidence during the trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-
2643 subject of this petition. RTC-Branch 62[35] rendered the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 on 21
November 1996 while Qua filed his Notice of Appeal of the 3 May 1996 Order on 19 June 1996. Qua could
not have possibly offered in evidence the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 because RTC-Branch 62
rendered the decision only after Qua elevated the present case to the Court of Appeals. Hence, Qua
submitted the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 during the pendency of the appeal of Foreclosure Case
No. 88-2643 in the Court of Appeals.
As found by RTC-Branch 62, RGC, Gervel and Quas total obligation was P14,200,854.37 as of 31 October
1987.[36] During the pendency of Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million.
Because of the payment, Metrobank executed a quitclaim[37] in favor of RGC and Gervel. By virtue of
Metrobanks quitclaim, RTC-Branch 62 dismissed Collection Case No. 8364 against RGC and Gervel, leaving
Ladtek and Qua as defendants. Considering that RGC and Gervel paid only P7 million out of the total
obligation of P14,200,854.37, which payment was less than RGC and Gervels combined shares in the
obligation,[38] it was clearly partial payment. Moreover, if it were full payment, then the obligation would
have been extinguished. Metrobank would have also released Qua from his obligation.
RGC and Gervel also made partial payment to PDCP. Proof of this is the Release from Solidary Liability that
PDCP executed in RGC and Gervels favor which stated that their payment of P1,730,543.55 served as full
payment of their corresponding proportionate share in Ladteks foreign currency loan.[39] Moreover, PDCP
filed a collection case against Qua alone, docketed as Civil Case No. 2259, in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 150.[40]
Since they only made partial payments, RGC and Gervel should clearly and convincingly show that their
payments to Metrobank and PDCP exceeded their proportionate shares in the obligations before they can
seek reimbursement from Qua. This RGC and Gervel failed to do. RGC and Gervel, in fact, never claimed
that their payments exceeded their shares in the obligations. Consequently, RGC and Gervel cannot validly
seek reimbursement from Qua.
Whether there was novation of the Agreements
RGC and Gervel contend that there was no novation of the Agreements. RGC and Gervel further contend
that any novation of the Agreements is immaterial to this case. RGC and Gervel disagreed with the Court
of Appeals on the effect of the implied novation which supposedly transpired in this case. The Court of
Appeals found that there was an implied novation or substantial incompatibility in the mode or manner of
payment by the surety from the entire obligation, to one merely of proportionate share. RGC and Gervel
claim that if it is true that an implied novation occurred, then the effect would be to release respondent
(Qua) as the entire obligation is considered extinguished by operation of law. Thus, Qua should now
reimburse RGC and Gervel his proportionate share under the surety agreements.
Novation extinguishes an obligation by (1) changing its object or principal conditions; (2) substituting the
person of the debtor; and (3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. Article 1292 of the
Civil Code clearly provides that in order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which
substitutes the same, it should be declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and new obligations be
on every point incompatible with each other.[41] Novation may either be extinctive or
modificatory.Novation is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new
obligation that takes the place of the former. Novation is merely modificatory when the old obligation
subsists to the extent it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement.[42]
We find that there was no novation of the Agreements. The parties did not constitute a new obligation to
substitute the Agreements. The terms and conditions of the Agreements remain the same. There was also
no showing of complete incompatibility in the manner of payment of the parties obligations. Contrary to
the Court of Appeals ruling, the mode or manner of payment by the parties did not change from one for
the entire obligation to one merely of proportionate share. The creditors, namely Metrobank and PDCP,
merely proceeded against RGC and Gervel for their proportionate shares only.[43] This preference is within
the creditors discretion which did not necessarily affect the nature of the obligations as well as the terms
and conditions of the Agreements. A creditor may choose to proceed only against some and not all of the
solidary debtors. The creditor may also choose to collect part of the debt from some of the solidary
debtors, and the remaining debt from the other solidary debtors.
In sum, RGC and Gervel have no legal basis to seek reimbursement from Qua. Consequently, RGC and
Gervel cannot validly foreclose the pledge of Quas GMC shares of stock which secured his obligation to
reimburse.[44] Therefore, the foreclosure of the pledged shares of stock has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 6 March 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 54737 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ET. AL
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.[2]
The facts are simple:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private
respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits,
the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit -
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows: nigel
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the parcels of land
mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and legal bases;
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the
land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as supported
by its technical descriptions now forming parts of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the names of petitioners Damian Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao De Guzman, Zenaida
Ermitao De Guzman, Alicia Ermitao De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with
residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject to the claims of oppositors
Dominga Ermitao, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitao
and Esmeranso Ermitao under an instrument entitled 'Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and
conditions of which are hereby ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title
to be issued to the petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court. brnado
SO ORDERED."[3]
As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition
for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was approved.
Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following assignments of error
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF THEIR
FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO
JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE. novero
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT OVERTHROWN THE
PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES.[4]
We find merit in the instant Petition.
It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 1965 [5] while
the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in 1991.[6] Thus the
period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in
1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period possession
requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No. 6940.
In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court of
Appeals reasoned out that - nigel
"(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965, however, records
indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees' predecessor-in-interest, was already in possession
of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops thereon. It follows that appellees' possession as
of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitao's possession is 63 years or
more than the required 30 years period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been converted
to private property ."[7]
We disagree.
The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the subject land was
released as agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of
Appeals,[8] to wit -
"The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest
land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968,
could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open
and continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords
with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that: marinella
'Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148
SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
'Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vamo vs.
Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil. 410 [1960]). A parcel of forest
land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of
the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648;
Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984])."
(emphasis ours)
So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs. Court of
Appeals[9] misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest was
tacked to his own possession to comply with the required thirty year period possession requirement, the
land involved therein was not forest land but alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before
us, the property subject of private respondents' application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to
such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, (unless) and until
such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.[10] alonzo
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession
thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord
with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.[11]
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the application
of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to
them. The fact remains that from the time the subject land was declared alienable until the time of their
application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider
their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent the
fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property
occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by
prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
them into private property. Possession of the land by private respondents, whether spanning decades or
centuries, could never ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura
lex, sed lex".[12] iska
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 38, in LRC Case No.
TG-396 are both REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC Case No. 396 for failure of the applicants
therein to comply with the thirty year occupancy and possessory requirements of law for confirmation of
imperfect title. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, Petitioner, v. FE. T. ADOLFO, Respondent.
DECISION
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside: 1) the October 6, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783 reversing the October 2, 2006 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court,
7th Judicial Region, Mandaue City (RTC Mandaue), Branch 55 in Civil Case No. MAN-4821; as well as 2) the
CA’s March 2, 2012 Resolution4 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration5 and
Supplement6 thereto.
Civil Case No. MAN-4821
On April 14, 2004, petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition7 for judicial
separation of property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo, nee Tudtud. Docketed as Civil
Case No. MAN-4821 and assigned to Branch 55, the petition alleged that the parties were married on
November 26, 1966; that the union bore one child; that during the marriage, they acquired through
conjugal funds Lot 1087-A-2-E, a 3,652-square meter property in Brgy. Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Cebu
(the subject property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 18368; that later on, the parties
separated due to irreconcilable differences; that since reunion was no longer feasible, petitioner
suggested a separation of the conjugal property, but respondent adamantly refused; that respondent
denied petitioner’s co-ownership of the subject property, claiming the same as her paraphernal
property; that several earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between them proved unavailing;
and that a judicial separation of property is proper under the circumstances and pursuant to Article
135(6) of the Family Code.8 Petitioner thus prayed that judgment be rendered decreeing a separation of
the conjugal property and the subdivision or sale thereof, to the end of dividing the same or the
proceeds thereof; and ordering respondent to pay petitioner P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, appearance
fees (P2,000.00 per hearing), and P20,000.00 litigation costs.
In her Answer9 with counterclaim, respondent contended that while she remained married to petitioner,
she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal property which she
inherited from her mother; that petitioner is a lazy bum, gambler, drunkard, wife abuser, and neglectful
father; that respondent found all means to support the family even as petitioner neglected it; that
respondent bought on installment a tricycle for the petitioner’s use in business, but he kept the proceeds
thereof to himself and used the same in his gambling and drinking sprees; that respondent alone took
the initiative to support the family and found ways to take care of the daily needs of her child; that she
caused to be built on a portion of her mother’s land a house even while petitioner was bumming around;
that one day, petitioner destroyed the roof of the house that was then being built; that petitioner
subsequently abandoned her and their child in 1968, and transferred to Davao City where he took a
mistress and begot four children by her; that in 1986, petitioner returned to Cebu City seeking
reconciliation with respondent; that respondent took petitioner back, but in 1987 they once more
separated; that thereafter, respondent never again saw or heard from petitioner.
Respondent claimed in her Answer that the subject property was a portion of a bigger lot (mother lot)
owned by her mother Petronila Tudtud which was covered by TCT T-15941. On October 11, 1967, her
mother executed a quitclaim deed transferring a portion of the mother lot – the subject property – to
respondent. The mother title TCT T-15941 was then cancelled and a new one, TCT (17216)-5415, was
issued in respondent’s name. Respondent then sold the subject property to her brother on January 19,
1968, and a new TCT (17833)-5515 was issued in her brother’s name. Her brother then mortgaged the
property to Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which foreclosed on the same. TCT 18231 was
issued in DBP’s name. DBP then sold the property to the spouses Antonio and Lucy Garcia (the Garcias),
and TCT 18266 was in turn issued in their name. Finally, on May 25, 1983, the Garcias sold back the
subject property to respondent, and a new title – TCT 1836810 – was then issued in the name of
respondent “FE M. TUDTUD, x x x married to Teofilo Adolfo.”
Respondent argued that she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal
property which she alone redeemed from the Garcias; that the inclusion of petitioner’s name in TCT
18368 does not make him a co-owner of the property, but was merely necessary to describe
respondent’s civil status; and that under Article 13511 of the Civil Code, all property brought by the wife
to the marriage as well as all property she acquires during the marriage in accordance with Article
14812 of the same Code constitutes paraphernal property.
Respondent thus prayed that the petition be dismissed. By way of counterclaim, she sought the
payment of moral, exemplary, and nominal damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
Civil Case No. MAN-2683
In 1996, respondent’s sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon (the Gingoyons) filed a
case for partition with damages against respondent. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2683
and raffled to Branch 55 of the RTC Mandaue. The Complaint13 therein alleged that in 1988, respondent
executed a deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons over a 300-square meter portion of the subject
property, but that respondent refused to partition/subdivide the same even after the Gingoyons paid the
taxes, fees and expenses of the sale. For her defense, respondent claimed in her Answer14 that when the
sale to the Gingoyons was made, the subject property constituted conjugal property of her marriage
with petitioner; that as early as 1983, or when the Garcias executed the deed of sale in her favor, the
subject property became a conjugal asset; since petitioner did not sign the deed of sale in favor of the
Gingoyons as he was in Davao at the time and knew nothing about the sale, the sale was null and void.
On May 15, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision15 in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, declaring that the
subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage. It thus nullified the 1988 deed of sale
executed by respondent in favor of the Gingoyons for lack of consent on the part of petitioner, citing
Article 124 of the Family Code.16 The trial court likewise awarded moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses in favor of the respondent in the total amount of P107,000.00.
The Gingoyons filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78971.
Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings in Civil Case No. MAN-4821
Meanwhile, during the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, petitioner submitted as part of
his evidence and for marking certified true copies of the Gingoyons’ Complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-
2683, respondent’s Answer thereto, and the trial court’s May 15, 2002 Decision in said case.
On August 1, 2005, petitioner filed a Request for Admission17 of 1) the genuineness of the duly marked
certified true copies of the Complaint, Answer, and Decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 (Exhibits “F,”
“G” and “H,” respectively); 2) respondent’s declaration in said Answer that the subject property
constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and 3) the trial court’s pronouncement in said case that
the subject property forms part of the conjugal estate.
Respondent failed to file her answer or response to the request for admission.
On September 5, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings,18 stating that
since respondent failed to answer his request for admission, the matters contained in the request are
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure19 (1997 Rules); that
as a consequence of the application of the rule, respondent is in effect considered to have admitted that
the subject property is a conjugal asset of their subsisting marriage which may thus be the subject of his
petition for judicial separation of property; and that on account of said admission, a hearing on the
merits becomes unnecessary and, instead, Rule 3420 of the 1997 Rules on judgments on the pleadings
should apply. Petitioner thus prayed that the trial court render judgment in his favor based on the
pleadings.
Respondent filed an Opposition.21 In her Opposition to Plaintiff’s Memorandum,22 respondent argued
among others that the request for admission was premature considering that the decision in Civil Case
No. MAN-2683 was the subject of an appeal, and thus not yet final.
In an October 11, 2005 Order,23 the trial court directed the transfer of Civil Case No. MAN-4821 to
Branch 55 of the RTC Mandaue, since it is said court which decided the closely related Civil Case No.
MAN-2683.
On October 2, 2006, Branch 55 issued an Order24 granting petitioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. It held as follows:
This court has painstakingly exerted effort in going over the record and took serious note of all the
pleadings, documents and others on file. After serious consideration, the court believes and so holds that
there is basis in rendering judgment. The Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings though
denominated as such but [sic] shall be treated as a move to seek summary judgment. x x x
x x x x
The court in arriving at this resolution was guided by the following pronouncements by the Supreme Court
in the case of Diman vs. Alumbres, G.R. No. 131466, November 27, 1998, 299 SCRA 459 x x x:
xxxx
In the same case, it was held –
“It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares that although the
pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact – e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in, factual
allegations – if it is shown by admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious,
or not genuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that ‘except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law, the Court shall render a summary judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be.
(Italics and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment[,] issues apparently exist – i.e.. facts are asserted
in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific
denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer – but the issues thus arising from the
pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by [affidavits], depositions or admissions. In other
words, as a noted authority remarks, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as
pleaded, while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits,
depositions or admissions.” (Italics and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
Defendant25 did not file any verified answer or a pleading denying under oath the genuineness and
authenticity of the documents attached to the Request for Admission and of the other matters therein
set forth. This failure has far reaching implications in that the following are deemed admitted: a) the
genuineness of Exhibits F, G and H, all attached to the Request for Admission; b) that she admitted in
paragraph 10 in her Answer to Civil Case No. MAN-2683 that Lot 1087-A-2-E was no longer paraphernal
property but rather a conjugal property of Spouses Teofilo and Fe Adolfo and; c) that RTC, Branch 55,
Mandaue City, sustained and/or held the view of defendant (Fe Tudtud) that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal
property of Spouses Teofilo and Fe Adolfo, thus, dismissed Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and awarded
damages to the defendant.
Judicial admissions may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in the course of the trial
either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding,
as in the pre-trial of the case. Admissions obtained through depositions, written interrogatories or
requests for admission are also considered judicial admissions.” Page 686, Remedial Law Compendium,
Vol. II, 9th Rev. Ed., Regalado
With the admission that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property, it follows as its necessary and logical
consequence, that plaintiff26 is entitled to the relief demanded.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
A DECISION in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 had already been rendered by RTC, Branch 55, on the 15th day
of May 2002 with the court finding that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property x x x –
xxxx
For reason[s] of expediency and convenience, the court may even take judicial notice of its earlier
decision finding Lot 1087-A-2-E as a conjugal property.27cralawred
xxxx
Under the circumstances, judicial separation of property is proper. Aware that the separation has the
effect of a dissolution of the conjugal partnership property regime, the presumptive legitime of Nilo
Adolfo (the only common child of the spouses) has to be delivered in accordance with Article 51 in
relation to paragraph (8) Article 127 and Article 137 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the partition of Lot 1087-A-2-
E between the plaintiff and the defendant in equal share of what remains after allocating to Nilo Adolfo a
portion of Nine hundred thirteen (913) square meters representing his presumptive legitime.
The plaintiff is directed to submit to this court the proposed subdivision plan for its consideration before
submitting the same for approval to the Bureau of Lands.
In case of disagreement as to their respective location, the same shall be done through raffle to be
conducted by the sheriff who shall see to it that judgment in this case shall be fully implemented.
SO ORDERED.28cralawlawlibrary
Respondent instituted an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 01783.
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971
Meanwhile, on May 30, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision29 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It reversed the
May 15, 2002 Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. MAN-2683. It declared, among others, that the
subject property was respondent’s paraphernal property. Thus, it held:
Proceeding from the foregoing consideration, the finding that Lot No. 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property
does not have any basis, hence, does not have any merit at all. On the contrary, plaintiffs-
appellants30 sufficiently proved that the aforesaid lot was defendant-appellee’s31 paraphernal property
as the latter even admitted that she inherited the same from her mother although she claimed it as a
conjugal property based on the TCT’s attached to her answer. Another strong indication that Lot No.
1087-A-2-E is solely owned by defendant-appellee is the fact that in another case (Civil Case No. MAN-
2008) involving the same property and the same parties but for a different issue (road right of way),
defendant-appellee alone signed the compromise agreement ceding a portion of the subject lot as a
right of way perpetually open and unobstructed for the benefit of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-
appellee, their respective heirs, assigns and transferees and guests. The same compromise agreement
which became the decision of the case attained finality without defendant-appellee questioning the
absence of her husband’s signature.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing premises, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55, dated 15 May 2002, in Civil Case No. MAN-2683
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the partition of Lot No. 1087-A-2-E consisting of 300 square meters bought by plaintiffs-appellants
from defendant-appellee be done in accordance to [sic] the sketch plan executed for that purpose.
SO ORDERED.
On June 23, 2007, the above CA decision became final and executory.33cralawred
Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783
In CA-G.R. CV No. 01783, respondent filed her Appellant’s Brief,34 where she argued that the trial court
erred in issuing its October 2, 2006 Order directing the partition or sale of the subject property; that it
was error for the trial court to take judicial notice of its own judgment in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and
thus declare that the subject property is conjugal, since the issue of whether it constitutes conjugal or
paraphernal property was still pending in the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971; that since the proceedings
in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 have not been terminated and the issue regarding the character of the
subject property has not been resolved with finality, then petitioner’s resort to a request for admission
and motion for judgment on the pleadings was premature; and that with the May 30, 2007 Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner and the trial court should submit to the finding therein that the subject
property is her paraphernal property.
In his Appellee’s Brief,35 petitioner insisted that the trial court did not err in treating his motion for
judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment; that respondent’s Answer in Civil Case No.
MAN-2683 constituted a judicial admission that the subject property was a conjugal asset, which
required no further proof; that respondent’s failure to reply to his written request for admission also
resulted in the acknowledgment that the subject property is a conjugal asset; that the trial court
correctly took judicial notice of the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as they were relevant and
material to the resolution of Civil Case No. MAN-4821; that since it was not respondent who appealed
the May 15, 2002 decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, then the finding therein that the subject property
is conjugal should bind her; and that the CA’s eventual finding in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 that the subject
lot was respondent’s paraphernal property cannot bind him because he was not a party to Civil Case No.
MAN-2683.
On October 6, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decretal
portion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, based from the foregoing premises, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Mandaue City, in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the records of this case
are remanded to RTC (Branch 55), Mandaue City, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED
In arriving at the above conclusion, the CA held that the trial court cannot treat petitioner’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment. It stated that in a proper case for judgment on
the pleadings, there are no ostensible issues at all on account of the defending party’s failure to raise an
issue in his answer, while in a proper case for summary judgment, such issues exist, although they are
sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions. In other words, a
judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is a judgment
on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.37 It added that respondent’s
Answer appeared on its face to tender an issue; it disputed petitioner’s claim that the subject property is
their conjugal property. The next thing to be determined is whether this issue is fictitious or sham as to
justify a summary judgment.
The CA added that although respondent was bound by the resulting admission prompted by her failure to
reply to petitioner’s request for admission, her claims and documentary exhibits clearly contradict what
petitioner sought to be admitted in his request; that the trial court disregarded the fact that the issue of
whether the subject property is conjugal was still unresolved as CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 was still pending;
and that finally, the trial court should have been guided by the principles that trial courts have but limited
authority to render summary judgments and that summary judgments should not be rendered
hastily.38cralawred
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in a March 2, 2012 Resolution, he was rebuffed. Hence, the present
Petition was filed on April 30, 2012.
In a March 20, 2013 Resolution,39 the Court resolved to give due course to the instant Petition. y
Issue
Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not
in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable jurisprudence.40cralawred

Petitioner’s Arguments
In his Petition seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and thus reinstate the
October 2, 2006 Order of the trial court, petitioner insists that respondent’s failure to reply to his written
request for admission resulted in her admitting that the subject property is a conjugal asset, applying
Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules; that the CA grossly erred in disregarding the rule; that with the
resulting admission, there remains no genuine issue to be resolved in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, such that
judgment based on the pleadings is proper. Finally, petitioner adds that respondent’s trifling with the
law and rules of procedure – by conveniently claiming in one case that the subject property is conjugal,
and then in another that it is paraphernal – should not be countenanced; she should be held to her
original declaration that the subject property is conjugal.
Respondent’s Arguments
In her Comment,41 respondent counters that, as correctly ruled by the CA, petitioner elected the wrong
remedy in filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings when he should have moved for summary
judgment; that in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the movant is deemed to admit the truth of
all of the opposing party’s material and relevant allegations, and rest his motion on those allegations
taken together with that of his own as are admitted in the pleadings;42 that the effect of this is that
petitioner is deemed to have admitted that the subject property is paraphernal, as claimed in her
Answer; that with the final and executory May 30, 2007 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, the
subject property should now be considered as her paraphernal property, and petitioner’s case for
partition on the claim that the subject property is conjugal should be dismissed for being moot and
academic.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.”43 Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be
granted “if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as
to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”44cralawred
We have elaborated on the basic distinction between summary judgment and judgment on the
pleadings, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or
fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for
a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue
at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the
case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist ? i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding
which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses
are in truth set out in the answer?but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not
genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.45cralawlawlibrary
An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it “does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or
admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof
and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material
averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while
admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or
bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.”46cralawred
On the other hand, “whether x x x the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in
a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for
judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential question in such
a case is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings.”47 “A ‘genuine issue’ is an issue of fact
which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine
issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for.”48cralawred
In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent’s failure to reply to petitioner’s
request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its May 15, 2002 Decision
declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. It took judicial notice of the proceedings in said
case. While there is nothing irregular with this – as courts may “take judicial notice of a decision or the
facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent
any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so”49 – the trial court
however disregarded the fact that its decision was then the subject of a pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
78971. It should have known that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it would be
premature to render judgment on petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; that it would be
presumptuous to assume that its own decision would be affirmed on appeal. One of the issues raised in
the appeal is precisely whether the subject property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the
respondent. Thus, instead of resolving petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court
should have denied it or held it in abeyance. It should have guided petitioner to this end, instead of aiding
in the hasty resolution of his case. In the first place, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 was transferred to it from
Branch 56 precisely for the reason that it was the court which tried the closely related Civil Case No. MAN-
2683.
Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in petitioner’s request for admission
by her failure to reply thereto, the trial court should have considered the pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 78971. It cannot take judicial notice solely of the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, and ignore
the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. After all, CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case
No. MAN-2683; an appeal is deemed a continuation of the same case commenced in the lower
court.50cralawred
On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a motion for judgment
on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may appear that under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules,
he may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent
admission by respondent that the subject property is conjugal, this is not actually the case. Quite the
contrary, by invoking the proceedings and decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, petitioner is precluded
from obtaining judgment while the appeal in said case is pending, because the result thereof determines
whether the subject property is indeed conjugal or paraphernal. He may not preempt the appeal in CA-
G.R. CV No. 78971.
While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action,51 petitioner cannot,
after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 to secure affirmative relief against respondent
and thereafter failing to obtain such relief, be allowed to repudiate or question the CA’s ruling in CA-G.R.
CV No. 78971. The principle of estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the
appellate court, which became final and executory, that the subject property is respondent’s paraphernal
property. “In estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular
manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby
causes loss or injury to another. It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the
contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial or legislative officers or by
the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in
pais.”52cralawred
Finally, the Court notes that the appellate court overlooked the May 30, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
78971, which became final and executory on June 23, 2007. The respondent included this development
in her appellee’s brief, but the CA did not take it into account. As an unfortunate consequence, the case
was not appreciated and resolved completely.
Thus, with the development in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 brought upon by the final and executory decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner’s case is left with no leg to stand on. There being no conjugal property
to be divided between the parties, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2009 Decision and March 2, 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that Civil Case No. MAN-
4821 is ordered DISMISSED.
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that
power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the
guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of
property.
9Rollo, pp. 38-44.
10 Id. at 33-34.
11
Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during
the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary 12 Art. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

Carpio, (Acting Chief Justice),* Velasco, Jr.,** Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur. (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
Endnotes: (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only
one of the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
* Per Special Order No. 1945 dated March 12, 2015.
13
Rollo, pp. 57-60.
** Per Special Order No. 1951 dated March 18, 2015.
14
Id. at 61-65.
1Rollo, pp. 3-26.
15
Id. at 66-79; penned by Judge Ulric R. Canete.
2Id. at 182-192; penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred in by Associate Justices
16Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
Manuel M. Barrios and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
3 Id. at 151-159; penned by Judge Ulric R. Canete. court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
4
Id. at 239-241; penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and concurred in by Associate
Justices Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and Abraham B. Borreta. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
5 Id. at 193-202. not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
6 Id. at 229-238. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
7 Id. at 27-31. spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

19 RULE 26 ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

8 Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil xxxx
interdiction;
Sec. 2. Implied admission. – Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days
after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom
the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement
either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested within
the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding paragraph
and his compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are resolved, which resolution shall
be made as early as practicable.
20 RULE 34 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or
for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
ADOPTIVE ADMISSION
ESTRADA VS DESTIERO, SUPRA
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority, Petitioner,
vs.
KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision 1 and August 20, 2001 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete
perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters
of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly
originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17,
1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report.
The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450.
The land allegedly covered by respondent’s titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base
(headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint
for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to
Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos,
Jr. as counsel for respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the
issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.
The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial,
postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other
procedural matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular,
the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was
able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos,
respondent’s former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an
unsigned draft to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was
not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to
declare respondent in default, 2 predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that,
since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him,
the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it
was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republic’s motion. 4 It found
respondent’s answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court
ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic
to present its evidence ex parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its
evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court
denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari 5 seeking to
set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court
erred in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos’ statements
in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The
appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer 6 and concluded that he
assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect
the answer may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari. It
directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to
trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order which declared respondent in default for
its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement. 7 Where it appears
that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of
those statements is admissible against him. 8 This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is
reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person. 9 By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party
embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; 10
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; 11
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; 12
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which
he or she has heard the other make 13 or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. 14
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance
did it ever deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty.
Garlitos’ testimony as well as its implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the
pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who
signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The
important thing was that the answer bore a signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not
prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was
what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as counsel
knew that it would be signed by another. This was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom
it may concern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he resumed
acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos
conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in
the comment 15 and memorandum it submitted to this Court.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements as its own. Respondent’s adoptive
admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his
counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a
pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any
person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best
of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. 16Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer 17 but cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, 18 something the
law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any
act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or
ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to
the signing of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever
to such self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer.
The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its
answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their
own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result
in arbitrariness and injustice. 19
The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game
of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent failed to show
any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999
resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is
hereby REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his
possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
NOT CONSIDERED JUDICIAL ADMISSION
ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assails the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated November 27, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33585, as well as the Resolution[2] on April 2,
1996 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The impugned decision granted the private
respondents petition for certiorari and set aside the Orders of the trial court dated December 15,
1993[3] and February 17, 1994[4] nullifying the attachment of 100,000 shares of stocks of the Citycorp
Investment Philippines under the name of petitioner Alfredo Ching.
The following facts are undisputed:
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan
of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its
Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay
on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum.[5] As added security for the said loan, on
September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI
obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00.[6] The loan was subsequently renewed on
various dates, the last renewal having been made on December 4, 1980.[7]
Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount
of P13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the
PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29,
1981.[8] This was renewed once for a period of one month.[9]
The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint
for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect
the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants
in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the
PBMCI.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 142729 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XVIII.[10] In its
application for a writ of preliminary attachment, the ABC averred that the defendants are guilty of fraud
in incurring the obligations upon which the present action is brought[11] in that they falsely represented
themselves to be in a financial position to pay their obligation upon maturity thereof. [12] Its supporting
affidavit stated, inter alia, that the [d]efendants have removed or disposed of their properties, or [are]
ABOUT to do so, with intent to defraud their creditors.[13]
On August 26, 1981, after an ex-parte hearing, the trial court issued an Order denying the ABCs application
for a writ of preliminary attachment. The trial court decreed that the grounds alleged in the application
and that of its supporting affidavit are all conclusions of fact and of law which do not warrant the issuance
of the writ prayed for.[14] On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court, in an Order dated
September 14, 1981, reconsidered its previous order and granted the ABCs application for a writ of
preliminary attachment on a bond of P12,700,000. The order, in relevant part, stated:
With respect to the second ground relied upon for the grant of the writ of preliminary attachment ex-
parte, which is the alleged disposal of properties by the defendants with intent to defraud creditors as
provided in Sec. 1(e) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the affidavits can only barely justify the issuance of
said writ as against the defendant Alfredo Ching who has allegedly bound himself jointly and severally to
pay plaintiff the defendant corporations obligation to the plaintiff as a surety thereof.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary attachment issue as against the defendant Alfredo Ching requiring
the sheriff of this Court to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching not exceeding P12,612,972.82 in
value, which are within the jurisdiction of this Court and not exempt from execution upon, the filing by
plaintiff of a bond duly approved by this Court in the sum of Twelve Million Seven Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P12,700,000.00) executed in favor of the defendant Alfredo Ching to secure the payment by
plaintiff to him of all the costs which may be adjudged in his favor and all damages he may sustain by
reason of the attachment if the court shall finally adjudge that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Upon the ABCs posting of the requisite bond, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment. Subsequently, summonses were served on the defendants,[16] save Chung Kiat Hua who could
not be found.
Meanwhile, on April 1, 1982, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of
payments with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 2250, at the same
time seeking the PBMCIs rehabilitation.[17]
On July 9, 1982, the SEC issued an Order placing the PBMCIs business, including its assets and liabilities,
under rehabilitation receivership, and ordered that all actions for claims listed in Schedule A of the petition
pending before any court or tribunal are hereby suspended in whatever stage the same may be until
further orders from the Commission.[18] The ABC was among the PBMCIs creditors named in the said
schedule.
Subsequently, on January 31, 1983, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or
motion to suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No. 142729 invoking the PBMCIs pending application for
suspension of payments (which Ching co-signed) and over which the SEC had already assumed
jurisdiction.[19] On February 4, 1983, the ABC filed its Opposition thereto.[20]
In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000
common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.[21]
Thereafter, in an Order dated September 16, 1983, the trial court partially granted the aforementioned
motion by suspending the proceedings only with respect to the PBMCI. It denied Chings motion to dismiss
the complaint/or suspend the proceedings and pointed out that P.D. No. 1758 only concerns the activities
of corporations, partnerships and associations and was never intended to regulate and/or control activities
of individuals. Thus, it directed the individual defendants to file their answers.[22]
Instead of filing an answer, Ching filed on January 14, 1984 a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the same
ground of the pendency of SEC Case No. 2250. This motion met the opposition from the ABC.[23]
On January 20, 1984, Taedo filed his Answer with counterclaim and cross-claim.[24] Ching eventually filed
his Answer on July 12, 1984.[25]
On October 25, 1984, long after submitting their answers, Ching filed an Omnibus Motion,[26] again praying
for the dismissal of the complaint or suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the July 9, 1982
Injunctive Order issued in SEC Case No. 2250. He averred that as a surety of the PBMCI, he must also
necessarily benefit from the defenses of his principal. The ABC opposed Chings omnibus motion.
Emilio Y. Taedo, thereafter, filed his own Omnibus Motion[27] praying for the dismissal of the complaint,
arguing that the ABC had abandoned and waived its right to proceed against the continuing guaranty by
its act of resorting to preliminary attachment.
On December 17, 1986, the ABC filed a Motion to Reduce the amount of his preliminary attachment bond
from P12,700,000 to P6,350,000.[28] Alfredo Ching opposed the motion,[29] but on April 2, 1987, the court
issued an Order setting the incident for further hearing on May 28, 1987 at 8:30 a.m. for the parties to
adduce evidence on the actual value of the properties of Alfredo Ching levied on by the sheriff.[30]
On March 2, 1988, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the ABC and rendered the
attachment bond of P6,350,000.[31]
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set
Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the
sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp
Investment Philippines was established in 1974.Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing
guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of
PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She, likewise, alleged that being the
wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the
properties.[32] She attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.[33]
The ABC filed a comment on the motion to quash preliminary attachment and/or motion to expunge
records, contending that:
2.1 The supposed movant, Encarnacion T. Ching, is not a party to this present case; thus, she has no
personality to file any motion before this Honorable Court;
2.2 Said supposed movant did not file any Motion for Intervention pursuant to Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court;
2.3 Said Motion cannot even be construed to be in the nature of a Third-Party Claim conformably with Sec.
14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
3. Furthermore, assuming in gracia argumenti that the supposed movant has the required personality, her
Motion cannot be acted upon by this Honorable Court as the above-entitled case is still in the archives and
the proceedings thereon still remains suspended. And there is no previous Motion to revive the same.[34]
The ABC also alleged that the motion was barred by prescription or by laches because the shares of stocks
were in custodia legis.
During the hearing of the motion, Encarnacion T. Ching adduced in evidence her marriage contract to
Alfredo Ching to prove that they were married on January 8, 1960; [35] the articles of incorporation of
Citycorp Investment Philippines dated May 14, 1979;[36] and, the General Information Sheet of the
corporation showing that petitioner Alfredo Ching was a member of the Board of Directors of the said
corporation and was one of its top twenty stockholders.
On December 10, 1993, the Spouses Ching filed their Reply/Opposition to the motion to expunge records.
Acting on the aforementioned motion, the trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an Order[37] lifting the
writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to return the said stocks to
the petitioners. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion to Quash Preliminary Attachment, dated November 9, 1993, is hereby
granted. Let the writ of preliminary attachment subject matter of said motion, be quashed and lifted with
respect to the attached 100,000 common shares of stock of Citycorp Investment Philippines in the name
of the defendant Alfredo Ching, the said shares of stock to be returned to him and his movant-spouse by
Deputy Sheriff Apolonio A. Golfo who effected the levy thereon on July 26, 1983, or by whoever may be
presently in possession thereof.
SO ORDERED.[38]
The plaintiff Allied Banking Corporation filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order but denied the
same on February 17, 1994. The petitioner bank forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33585, for the nullification of the said order of the court, contending that:
1. The respondent Judge exceeded his authority thereby acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of, and granting a Motion filed by a complete stranger to the case.
2. The respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in lifting the writ of preliminary
attachment without any basis in fact and in law, and contrary to established jurisprudence on the
matter.[39]
On November 27, 1995, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and setting aside the assailed
orders of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED, hereby setting aside the questioned orders
(dated December 15, 1993 and February 17, 1994) for being null and void.
SO ORDERED.[40]
The CA sustained the contention of the private respondent and set aside the assailed orders. According to
the CA, the RTC deprived the private respondent of its right to file a bond under Section 14, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court. The petitioner Encarnacion T. Ching was not a party in the trial court; hence, she had no
right of action to have the levy annulled with a motion for that purpose. Her remedy in such case was to
file a separate action against the private respondent to nullify the levy on the 100,000 Citycorp shares of
stocks. The court stated that even assuming that Encarnacion T. Ching had the right to file the said motion,
the same was barred by laches.
Citing Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[41] the CA ruled that the presumption in Article 160 of the
New Civil Code shall not apply where, as in this case, the petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of
the money used to acquire the shares of stock. It held that the levied shares of stocks belonged to Alfredo
Ching, as evidenced by the fact that the said shares were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp
solely under his name. Thus, according to the appellate court, the RTC committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. The petitioners motion
for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 2, 1996.
The petitioner-spouses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, asserting that the RTC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
orders in their favor; hence, the CA erred in reversing the same. They aver that the source of funds in the
acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of
the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 160,[42] and that such presumption subsists even if the property is
registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. [43] According to
the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husbands
profession or business.[44] And, contrary to the ruling of the CA, where conjugal assets are attached in a
collection suit on an obligation contracted by the husband, the wife should exhaust her motion to quash
in the main case and not file a separate suit.[45] Furthermore, the petitioners contend that under Art. 125
of the Family Code, the petitioner-husbands gratuitous suretyship is null and void ab initio,[46] and that the
share of one of the spouses in the conjugal partnership remains inchoate until the dissolution and
liquidation of the partnership.[47]
In its comment on the petition, the private respondent asserts that the CA correctly granted its petition
for certiorari nullifying the assailed order. It contends that the CA correctly relied on the ruling of this Court
in Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court. Citing Cobb-Perez v. Lantin and G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, the private respondent alleges that the continuing guaranty and suretyship executed by
petitioner Alfredo Ching in pursuit of his profession or business. Furthermore, according to the private
respondent, the right of the petitioner-wife to a share in the conjugal partnership property is merely
inchoate before the dissolution of the partnership; as such, she had no right to file the said motion to
quash the levy on attachment of the shares of stocks.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to
quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines; (b)
whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had the right to file the said
motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No. 142729.[48]
In Ong v. Tating,[49] we held that the sheriff may attach only those properties of the defendant against
whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on
attachment and seizes the property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest,
the superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution may be invoked by the aggrieved
third person in the same case. Upon application of the third person, the court shall order a summary
hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance
of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment, more specifically if he has indeed levied on
attachment and taken hold of property not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may then order the
sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. In
resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not and cannot pass upon the question of the title
to the property with any character of finality. It can treat the matter only insofar as may be necessary to
decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. If the claimants proof does not persuade the court of the
validity of the title, or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied by the court. The aggrieved
third party may also avail himself of the remedy of terceria by executing an affidavit of his title or right of
possession over the property levied on attachment and serving the same to the office making the levy and
the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to nullify the levy with damages resulting from the
unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a totally separate and distinct action from the former case. The
above-mentioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may be resorted to by one third-party
claimant without availing of the other remedies.[50]
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares
of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature;
hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.
On the second issue, we find and so hold that the CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of the
RTC. The private respondent, the petitioner in the CA, was burdened to prove that the RTC committed a
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The tribunal acts without
jurisdiction if it does not have the legal purpose to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where
the tribunal, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined
by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment and is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[51]
It was incumbent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the RTC
acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of, the controversy before
certiorari will lie. A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while
so engaged does not deprive it of its jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.[52]
After a comprehensive review of the records of the RTC and of the CA, we find and so hold that the RTC
did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed orders.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals,[53] we held that it is not even necessary to prove that
the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by
the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the
manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties
acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome the same.[54]
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the
Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the
petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during
the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be
the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence
that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.[55] The barefaced fact that the
shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the
name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal
partnership, owned the same.[56] The private respondents reliance on the rulings of this Court in Maramba
v. Lozano[57] and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Banzon[58] is misplaced. In the Maramba case,
we held that where there is no showing as to when the property was acquired, the fact that the title is in
the wifes name alone is determinative of the ownership of the property. The principle was reiterated in
the Associated Insurance case where the uncontroverted evidence showed that the shares of stocks were
acquired during the marriage of the petitioners.
Instead of fortifying the contention of the respondents, the ruling of this Court in Wong v. Intermediate
Appellate Court[59] buttresses the case for the petitioners. In that case, we ruled that he who claims that
property acquired by the spouses during their marriage is not conjugal partnership property but belongs
to one of them as his personal property is burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase
the same. In this case, the private respondent claimed that the petitioner-husband acquired the shares of
stocks from the Citycorp Investment Philippines in his own name as the owner thereof. It was, thus, the
burden of the private respondent to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the
shares of stocks was that of the petitioner-husband alone. As held by the trial court, the private
respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove this assertion.
The CA, likewise, erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with
the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of
his profession, pursuing a legitimate business. The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal
partnership is liable for the said account of PBMCI under Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code.
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3][60] of the Family Code of the Philippines)
provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement as security for the
payment of the loan obtained by the PBMCI from the private respondent in the amount
of P38,000,000. In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court ruled that
the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a
business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own
employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or
guaranty.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there
must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the
objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family
as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to
the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.[62]
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the
fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety,
the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish
that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.[63]
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was
one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family
would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-
husbands career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh
capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The
benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off
of the loan itself.[64]
This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives services to be used for
his own business or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one within the
term obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Thus:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature
of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or
profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of
the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.[65]
The Court held in the same case that the rulings of the Court in Cobb-Perez and G-Tractors, Inc. are not
controlling because the husband, in those cases, contracted the obligation for his own business. In this
case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the
private respondent.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
III. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY (RULE 130)
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE (SECTION 1)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO ISON @ DANNY, defendant-appellant.
At the instance of the offended party, Leonila P. Santiago, who flied the corresponding criminal complaint
before the Municipal Court of Echague, Isabela, the Accused Danilo Ison was charged with Rape committed
in an uninhabited place and with grave abuse of confidence.
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that Complainant, Leonila P. Santiago, was a 13-year
old girl on 17 April 1979, who, with her widowed mother, Cresencia Paynor Santiago, were residents of
Lambaken, Jaen, Nueva Ecija. They had relatives in Roxas, Isabela, namely, Mr. and Mrs. Florencio Antolin
and Alex Bautista, a brother-in-law of Cresencia. Cresencia also had a brother in Echague, Isabela, by the
name of Florencio Paynor. After the school term, Leonila usually went to Roxas, Isabela, at her uncle Alex
Bautista's place to spend her vacation.
On 17 April 1979, Complainant hitched a ride in the jeep of the Accused to go to Roxas, Isabela, to spend
the summer vacation. The Accused was actually a distant uncle, being a third degree cousin of
Complainant's mother. He was a businessman, who usually made trips to Roxas, Isabela with his helper,
Alfredo Lozada, to deliver eggs for sale. The group left Lambaken, Jaen, at about 4:30 in the afternoon with
the three of them sitting on the front seat of the jeep. Complainant was seated between the two men
because the back of the jeep was filled with egg boxes.
Upon reaching the diversion road at Echague, Isabela near the Echague cemetery, the Accused told
Complainant that they would spend the night there. They slept in the jeep, the Accused lying down on the
front seat behind the steering wheel while Leonila slept in a sitting position at the other end of the front
seat. The legs of the Accused dangled outside the jeep.
While Complainant was thus asleep, she was awakened when she felt someone, who turned out to be the
Accused, holding her hands. Complainant struggled and fought to free herself when the Accused started
embracing her. She cried for help from all who happened to be at the back of the front seat, but instead
of helping her, Al assisted the accused by holding her hands. Suddenly, the Accused gave Complainant a
fist blow in the abdomen which rendered her unconscious. She later regained consciousness when she felt
pain in her private part as the Accused succeeded in violating her. She noticed that her pants and panty
were already removed and she was in a lying position on the front seat with her left leg hanging from the
seat and the Accused was on top of her doing the push-and-pull movement. Complainant was shocked
and cried for help but none was forthcoming. The act consummated, the Accused threw her pants and
torn panty at her and threatened her not to make any revelation otherwise he would kill her and her
mother.
Soon thereafter they proceeded to Roxas arriving thereat at about 6:30 in the morning at her uncle
Antolin's place. Immediately, Complainant mailed a letter to her mother (Exhibit "B") narrating the offense
on her person. She did not disclose the incident to her uncle because of the threats made to her by the
Accused.
Cresencia Santiago, Complainant's mother, received her daughter's letter on 28 April 1979. Immediately,
she sent a telegram to her brother-in-law, Alex Bautista, at Roxas, Isabela requesting the latter to bring
Complainant home to Lambaken so that she could verify the truth. The day after Cresencia had sent the
telegram, Alex and the Complainant arrived. The latter recounted how she was taken advantage of by the
Accused. Because Cresencia was a widow and financially hardup she decided to ask for help from her
brother, Florencio Paynor, who was staying in Echague, Isabela. Thus, Cresencia, Complainant and Alex
immediately went to Echague, Isabela, that same afternoon, and on 7 May 1979, Complainant signed and
filed a criminal complaint for Rape with the Municipal Court thereat (Exhibit "C")
The corresponding Information was thereafter filed with the Court of First Instance of Isabela and trial on
the merits ensued. On 7 June 1982, said Court 1 found the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
convicted him of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, DANILO ISON alias
DANNY, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED under Art, 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2632 and 41 11, and as charged in the
Information, and accordingly, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay and indemnify the offended party, LEONILA P.
SANTIAGO, the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) as moral damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be extended the benefits of Article 29, Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 127, when he underwent preventive imprisonment from May 14, 1979
to May 18, 1979, provided he complied with the conditions therein imposed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 23-24, Rollo)
In this appeal, the Accused faults the Court a quo with the following errors:
(1) The trial court erred in not considering and finding that it was physically improbable, if not impossible,
for the accused to be at the scene of the alleged rape at the diversion road near the cemetery of Echague,
Isabela, in the evening of April 17, 1979 considering certain factors/circumstances (discussed hereunder).
(2) The trial court erred in believing complainant's utterly incredible story of rape in this case.
(3) The trial court erred in convicting the appellant and in not acquitting him of the criminal charge of rape.
(p. 1, Accused-Appellant's Brief)
Being inter-related, we well discuss the first and second assignments of error jointly.
It is the Accused's submission that they left Barrio Lambaken Jaen, Nueva Ecija, at 5:00 P.M. and not at
4:30 P.M. as alleged by Complainant; that considering the physical distance of 267 kilometers from Barrio
Lambaken, Jaen, Nueva Ecija to Echague, Isabela, the scene of the alleged incident, they could not have
arrived at Echague in the evening of the same day inasmuch as the passenger jeepney was fully loaded
with eggs up to the top and they were travelling at a speed of only 30 kilometers or less per hour besides
making several stops on the way; that added to this the bad condition of the barrio road from Lambaken,
Jaen, Nueva Ecija and the treacherous zigzag from Dalton Pass, Nueva Ecija to Sta. Fe, Nueva Viscaya,
compelled them to drive slowly with great caution thereby rendering it improbable for them to have been
at the diversion road near the cemetery at Echague, Isabela, in the evening of 17 April 1979 as Complainant
contended.
The foregoing defense does not impress us. Under normal road conditions, 267 kilometers can be
negotiated by car in four (4) to five (5) hours. Add another one (1) or two (2) hours taking into consideration
that the vehicle used was a jeep and the alleged poor condition of the roads as well as the zigzag from
Dalton Pass, and the aforesaid distance could have been negotiated in seven (7) hours, or up to
approximately 12 midnight. Complainant's testimony, therefore, that she was abused in the evening of 17
April 1979 is sufficiently credible. And even if it were past midnight, it would still be dark "in the evening"
to a 13-year old barrio lass who was not said to have been wearing a watch to tell the time by.
Alfredo Losada's testimony corroborating the Accused's theory that they never stopped at the diversion
road at Echague, Isabela, is not deserving of credence not only because it is biased considering that as a
helper of the Accused, he would naturally be beholden to the latter, but more so because Complainant's
declarations sufficiently rebut it.
Contrary to the Accused's assertions, Complainant's story is not "utterly incredible." For one thing, the
circumstance of force and intimidation attending the abuse on Complainant's person is proven not only
by her testimony but also by the medicolegal report of Dr. Corazon Lappay, the examining physician. The
latter attested to the existence of recently healed lacerations at 3, 6, 9, 12 o'clock positions of the hymen,
thus confirming the fact of forced sexual intercourse. The physical evidence is of the highest order. It
speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses (People vs. Bardaje, G.R. No. L-29271, 29 August 1980,
99 SCRA 388).
Appellant's posture that the lacerations in complainant's hymen were intentionally induced through the
use of fingers to simulate a rape case was refuted by Dr. Lappay who testified that fingers could not cause
the multi-lacerations sustained by complainant (t.s.n., December 18,1979, pp. 19-20).
The absence of bruises, contusions and abrasions in the body of the complainant is neither inconsistent
with her claim that she was ravished by the accused in the manner she described. It is to be recalled that
Complainant was boxed in the abdomen as a result of which she lost consciousness. It was thus
unnecessary to inflict other injuries on her.
The absence of any discernible trace of a fist blow on Complainant's abdomen is of no moment either,
especially since the medical examination on her was conducted seventeen (17) days after the incident, at
which time no visible signs of such injury might be expected any longer (People vs. Ruben Corral y
Hernandez, G. R. No. 73604, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 673).
The non-presentation of Complainant's torn panty was due to the fact that she had thrown the same in
the garbage can upon reaching Roxas. A simple barrio girl like her could not be expected to realize its
evidentiary value in the event of a court litigation.
Furthermore, Complainant lost no time in denouncing the wrong done to her upon arrival at Roxas by
writing a letter to her mother at Jaen, Nueva Ecija. This fact immediately negates any alleged voluntary
submission of Complainant to the Accused's sexual advances (People vs. Isaac, G.R. No. 36136, 16 March
1988,158 SCRA 725).
Indeed, Complainant, a thirteen-(13)-year old girl, could not be expected to personally report to the police
without the knowledge of her elders.
The Accused makes much of the alleged inconsistency in the prosecution evidence in that while
Complainant testified that she wrote her mother upon her arrival on 18 April 1979 the postmark stamped
on the envelope shows that it was received in "Jaen, Nueva Ecija, on April 17, 1979." The records show,
however, that the latter postmark had been crossed out and initialed to correct the mistake in the dates.
This conclusion is supported by two other entries in the envelope which read: "Jaen, Nueva Ecija Received
April 27, 1979 Philippines" Exhibit B-1-C and "Roxas P.O. 19 IV 79 Isabela" (Exhibit B-I-A These entries show
that the letter was actually mailed at Roxas, Isabela, on 19 April 1979 and received at the Jaen, Nueva Ecija
Post Office on 27 April 1979. Evidently, if the letter was mailed at Roxas, Isabela on 19 April 1979, it would
be impossible for it to reach the Postal Office of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, 267 kilometers away on 17 April 1979
or two (2) days before it was mailed (Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). And, as to whether Complainant's
mother sent the telegram to her brother-in-law via the Bureau of Telecommunications or RCPI is actually
inconsequential.
The defense also sought to establish that it was impossible to commit Rape on the front seat of the jeep.
It even presented the vehicle for ocular inspection and made Complainant demonstrate how the crime
was committed. Photographs of the demonstration were also submitted in an attempt to prove
impossibility of its commission. Suffice it to state that the front seat of the jeep measures 62 1/2 inches
long, which is equivalent to approximately five feet and two and one half inches, and twenty-nine (29)
inches wide (t.s.n., August 9,1980, p. 315). Complainant was somewhat thin and short, as can be seen from
the photographs (Exhibit "3" and "3-D"). Complainant even demonstrated to the Court that she could lie
flat on the front seat, her feet to the right side thereof (t.s.n., August 9, 1980, pp. 35-36). Neither is the
Accused a very big man; he is 5' 5" in height and weighs 116 lbs. as disclosed by the record. It was not
impossible then for Complainant to have lain flat on the front seat with the Accused on top of her. It should
be recalled that Complainant was unconscious at the beginning of the commission of rape because the
Accused had boxed her in the abdomen. When she was thus rendered unconscious, it was a simple matter
for the accused to have positioned her so that he could abuse her with ease.
A rapist, however, rarely considers the position his victim may have in the sexual act, his purpose is to be
sated and that alone. Whether or not his victim is contorted is the least of his concern. It is not improbable
therefore, that the appellant could have violated the complainant in the manner she described (People vs.
Salazar, 93 SCRA 796, 807).
In a last-ditch effort at exculpation, the Accused further contends that he was charged with the offense
because he refused to lend money to Florencio Paynor, brother of Complainant's mother. He avers that
this case was filed in order that they could extract money from him as shown by the fact that his helper,
Alfredo Lozada, was not included as a co-accused although Complainant testified that said helper held her
hand while the Accused was abusing her.
The contention is preposterous. It is highly improbable for Complainant's mother and close relatives to
sacrifice the honor, dignity and future of an innocent young girl for such mercenary motives. Besides, the
evidence amply supports the commission of the crime.
The non-inclusion of Alfredo Lozada, the Accused's helper, in the criminal Complaint can be explained by
the fact that his participation was not brought up during the police investigation. It was only during the
cross-examination of Complainant that "Al's" participation was disclosed.
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we find the conscience resting easy on a finding
of guilt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the indemnity
to the offended party, Leonila Santiago, is hereby increased to P20,000.00 consistent with case law. With
costs against the accused, Danilo Ison.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ORLANDO LUTAO Y LOBOS AND JULIO MEDERA Y
TURCIDO, Accused-Appellants, BATING NAZA, JOHN DOE, AND PETER DOE (at large), Accused.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION SUFFICIENT; PROSECUTION WITNESSES
RELIEVED OF THE BURDEN OF MAKING AN IN COURT IDENTIFICATION. — By their admission that they are
the Orlando Lutao and the Julio Medera accused of committing the crime at bar, the prosecution witnesses
were relieved of the burden of making an in court identification of accused-appellants as the malefactors.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF THE VICTIMS CONSIDERED IN THE
ASSESSMENT THEREOF. — The conduct of the Siervo spouses subsequent to the crime fortified their
credibility. They promptly revealed their misfortune to Acero. They gathered their guts and reported the
incident not only to the Mondragon police authorities but also to the San Roque police. Lourdes submitted
herself to physical examination. These were all spontaneous actions. Indeed, it was far fetched for this
rural couple, in living in an isolated, unprotected house to falsely impute all atrocious crime against
accused-appellants who were influential CAFGU members assigned in their barangay. They would not put
their lives on the line except for a legitimate grievance.
3. ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED. —
Easy to concoct, alibi is a weak defense. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused. It
cannot succeed when there is no showing that it is not physically impossible for the accused to be at the
crime scene at the time of its commission.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH RAPE; COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. — The trial court, erred in
denominating the crime committed by accused-appellants as Robbery in Band with Multiple Rape. In
People v. Precioso, (G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993, 221 SCRA 748) we held that there is no such composite
crime of robbery in band with multiple rape. The crime is robbery, with rape, with band as a mere
aggravating circumstance. It is penalized under Article 294 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 imposing the death penalty.
DECISION
Bad elements of the Civilian Armed Forces and Geographic Unit (CAFGU) again take centerstage in the Inanasan?" 7 He did not hear the question well and he asked, "What is that?" The man repeated the
case at bar. ORLANDO LUTAO and JULIO MEDERA, members of the CAFGU, were convicted of Robbery in question: "Where is the trail going to Inanasan, we are lost in our way." 8 Arturo recognized the voice of
Band with multiple Rape 1 in a Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar. They Julio Medera, who used to be a buyer of their chicken.
were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the amount of P30,000.00
to Lourdes Siervo or a total of P60,000.00 and to pay spouses Siervo jointly and severally the amount of A "pa-agahan" (kerosene lamp) hanged at the corner of their house. 9 With its light, Arturo saw Julio
P4,060.00 corresponding to the stolen money plus the costs of the suit. They insist on their alibi in their Medera, Orlando Lutao, Bating Naza, and their two (2) other companions who were unknown to him. 10
appeal to this Court. We reject their pretended innocence. Medera and Lutao were armed with an M-14 rifle and M-1 garand, respectively. They wore military
uniforms. Arturo groped his way to the doorway and asked them where they came from. Medera
The Amended Information against the five (5) accused — Orlando Lutao, Julio Medera, Bating Naza, John responded by dragging him downstairs. At the ground, Medera poked his gun at Arturo and ordered him
Doe, and Peter Doe reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph to kneel while the others stood guard.

"That on or about the 29th day of December, 1991, at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, in Sitio Lutao then barged into the house, shook the left shoulder of Lourdes with his gun and announced a "hold-
Camarino, Barangay Malobago, Municipality of San Roque, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines and up." He demanded money from Lourdes. Lourdes begged him to spare their money which was earmarked
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with M-14 and M-1 for the medical treatment of their child. Lutao answered her plea by hitting her chest with the butt of his
(Garand) riffles, conspiring with, and confederating together with two (2) persons (John Doe and Peter gun. 11 Stricken with fright, Lourdes yielded the leather wallet under her pillow containing four thousand
Doe) whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, and mutually, unlawfully sixty pesos (P4,060.00) realized from the sale of their copra and pig. She handed it to Lutao who threw the
and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation take, rob and carry coins on the floor.
with them a cash money in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND SIXTY (P4,060.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
belonging to spouses Arturo M. Siervo and Lourdes Siervo, against their will and this was committed inside Then, Lutao’s lust was aroused. He pulled down the skirt and panty of Lourdes and ordered her to lie down.
their residence in the above-mentioned place, to the damage and prejudice of said owners in the aforesaid Lourdes begged not to be abused because she was menstruating. Lutao ignored her pleas and poked a gun
sum of FOUR THOUSAND SIXTY (P4,060.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency; that in the commission of the said at her. 12 He shed off his fatigue jacket, maong pants, and green brief and forced his lust upon her.
offense the above named accused, Orlando Lutao, Julio Medera, Bating Naza, John Doe, and Peter Doe, Lourdes’ resistance was futile. Medera, Naza, and their two other companions joined the sexual orgy. They
with lewd design, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another did then and there raped Lourdes in succession. Lourdes’ youngest child awoke and cried unaware of his parents’ harrowing
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, violence and intimidation took turns in lying down experience. 13
with and having carnal knowledge of Lourdes Siervo against her will and consent while accused Julio
Medera stood guard and threatened with the use of his M-14 rifle the husband of Lourdes Siervo and Arturo, was a meter away when Lourdes was violated the accused. Throughout the unfortunate ordeal of
thereafter watched his companions raped Lourdes Siervo. his wife, he was furious but helpless. The accused guarded him.

With the aggravating circumstances that accused Orlando Lutao had been sentenced by the Court of Their lust satisfied, the accused set to flee. But before fleeing, Medera pointed his gun at Arturo and
Appeals on January 22, 1987 to suffer imprisonment of 8 years and one day to 14 years, 8 months and one ordered him to run. Arturo rushed towards the bushes about fifteen (15) brazas away from his house. The
day in Criminal Case No. 323 for Murder. malefactors then fled to Inanasan.

CONTRARY TO LAW." 3 Lourdes who passed and regained consciousness. Her abusers were no longer around and so was her
husband. She cried and her weeping awakened her other children. Still shaking with fear, She and her four
Accused-appellants Lutao and Medera pleaded not guilty. Accused Bating Naza, John Doe and Peter Doe (4) children walked and sought immediate refuge at the house of Fausto Acero. The house of Acero is ten
remained at large. (10) kilometers away from her house. 14

At the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the accused-appellants on trial are Orlando Lutao y Lobos and Julio Daylight broke. Arturo came out from the grasses and searched for his family. They were united at Acero’s
Medera y Turcido, both members of the CAFGU under the command of Lt. Arismindo Dayaon of the house. It was then that they revealed to Acero their ordeal.
Philippine Army and stationed in Barangay Malobago, Municipality of San Roque, Northern Samar.
Initially, the spouses hesitated to report the incident to the police authorities for fear of reprisal from Lutao
At the trial, the evidence of the prosecution was given by witnesses ARTURO SIERVO, 4 LOURDES SIERVO, and Medera who were CAFGU members. They finally mustered courage and reported the crime to the
5 and DR. MELODIA NERIDA. 6 Mondragon Police Station on December 31, 1991. 15 They named Orlando Lutao, Julio Medera, and Bating
Naza as the culprits. Two (2) days thereafter or on January 2, 1992, they retold their story to the San Roque
The spouses Arturo and Lourdes Siervo lived in a one-room house with a floor area of a two and a half (2 Philippine National Police Headquarters. 16 Petrified by the incident, the Siervo family abandoned their
1/2) meters by three (3) meters. Their house is located in an isolated farm and about six (6) kilometers by house and farm in Barangay Malobago and lived with Arturos’ mother in Barangay Bantayan. Their physical
feeder road from the poblacion of Barangay Malobago, San Roque, Northern Samar. On December 29, and emotional disturbance were beyond doubt.
1991, they and their four (4) children, ages two (2) to eight (8), went to bed at 7:00 p.m. They slept on the
bamboo flooring with Arturo near the doorway. A sack draped at their door served as its shutter. Dr. Melodia Nerida, the Medical Officer of Northern Samar General Hospital, certified that there was no
trace of irritation, sperm cells, and sexual coition in the genitalia of Lourdes. She, however, opined that
At about 10:00 p.m., Arturo was awakened by a voice yelling, "Toring, Toring. Where is the trail going to the victim’s menstrual flow could have washed-out the semen. 17 She added that it was difficult to detect
the sexual assault since the victim’s organ already experienced four (4) pregnancies and childbirth. to identify him. The prosecution tried to remedy the lapse by introducing the identification made by the
victim of the accused in a police line-up, an out of court identification. The Court found this identification
Accused-appellants Medera and Lutao denied their involvement in the crime and anchored their defense as infirmed as it was suggested by the police. It acquitted the accused, ruling: "The failure of the
on alibi. prosecution witnesses to positively identify the assailant in court is fatal to the prosecution’s cause. Pre-
trial identification is not sufficient." Hatton is, thus, distinguishable for in the case at bar, Accused-
Medera testified that on December 29, 1991, Lt. Arismindo Dayaon ordered them on "red alert" because appellants judicially admitted they are the persons charged with the offense.
of an imminent raid by the New People’s Army (NPA). 18 His tour of duty to guard the 19th IB Detachment
Camp, Charlie Company, Philippine Army was from 10:00 to 12:00 p.m. He was relieved by Lutao at twelve It is also inaccurate to contend that accused-appellant, Julio Medera was not identified in court. Lourdes
midnight. Siervo positively identified him in the course of her testimony. We quote the relevant part of her direct
testimony, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Lutao corroborated Medera’s testimony. He testified that on December 29, 1991, he guarded the camp
from 12:00 p.m. till 2:00 a.m. He said he never left the barracks while on duty. 19 x x x
"Q If that Julio is in court, will you point to us where he is?
Lt. Arismindo Dayaon, Cpl. Manuelito Anata, and Cpl. Celso Mabascog likewise corroborated the alibi
of Accused-Appellants. Lt. Dayaon confirmed that he ordered accused-appellants to guard the barracks on "A (Witness pointing to a person with blue t-shirt and when asked his name, answered Julio Medera)." 23
December 29, 1991. Cpl. Anata and Cpl. Mabascog testified that they supervised the assignments of the
accused-appellants on the said date. 20 Next, Accused-appellants urge that the spouses Siervo should not be believed because of inconsistencies
in their testimonies, viz:
The trial court on June 30, 1992 convicted the accused-appellants of the crime of Robbery in Band with
x x x
Multiple Rape.

In this appeal, Accused-appellants assail the Decision of the trial court as follows: "
"(1) Lourdes Siervo, during her direct testimony, . . . point(ed) to . . . Julio Medera as the one who woke
I
her up and demanded money. . . (But) during her cross examination . . . she easily changed her answer
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
from Julio Medera to Orlando Lutao . . . to conform with what she has declared in her affidavit.
PROSECUTION AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
x x x
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
(2) The spouses Siervo reported (to the Mondragon police) that they were robbed and Lourdes Siervo was
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY IN BAND WITH RAPE."cralaw virtua1aw library
raped by . . . Bating Naza, Orling Lutao, Jerry Medera, and two unidentified companions. . . . (But) on
January 22, 1992, the couple reported the incident before the San Roque (police) . . . that the two (2) of
We affirm the conviction with modification.
the five (5) malefactors were Orlando Lutao . . . and Julio Medera.
We shall first rule on accused-appellants’ argument that they were not identified in court by the spouses x x x
Siervo, and hence, should be acquitted. They rely on People v. Hatton, 21 where we held that pre-trial (3) Arturo Siervo testified that . . . he ran to the bushes . . . because he was told by the five (robbers) to
identification is not sufficient. run. . . . Whereas in his affidavit . . . he stated that he ran to the bushes to hide." 24

We reject accused-appellants’ argument. The question of whether accused-appellants are the persons We hold that these inconsistencies are not malicious marks of falsehood. It is true that in her direct
actually accused in the case at bar is a non-issue. The issue was settled during the pre-trial of the case examination, Lourdes pointed to Medera as the one who announced the hold-up. On cross-examination,
where the parties agreed that the accused-appellants on trial are Orlando Lutao y Lobos and Julio she changed her testimony and affirmed the content of her prior affidavit that it was Lutao who declared
Medera y Turcido. 22 They were even described as members of the CAFGU under the command of Lt. the hold-up. On questioning by the trial judge, Lourdes admitted her mistake, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
Arismindo Dayaon of the Philippine Army and stationed in Barangay Malobago, Municipality of San library
Roque, Northern Samar. By their admission that they are the Orlando Lutao and the Julio Medera
accused of committing the crime at bar, the prosecution witnesses were relieved of the burden of x x x
making an in court identification of accused-appellants as the malefactors. Throughout the proceedings, "Q When you asserted that it was Julio Medera who awakened you by shaking you by your shoulder it was
they never claimed that their admission was an error. Indeed, they did not claim as defense that they are by mistake because it was Orlando Lutao who did that?
not the persons accused of the crime at bar. Their defense is alibi — that they were at another place
when the crime was committed. A Yes, sir."

Quite clearly, Accused-appellants cannot lean on the Hatton case. In Hatton, the accused did not admit Lourdes was candid in admitting her mistake. It was an honest mistake. One honest mistake in the courser
he was the Hatton charged in the Information. During the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution failed of as long testimony cannot dilute her credibility. To be sure, Arturo corroborated the testimony of Lourdes
that it was Lutao who roused his wife from sleep, announced the hold-up, and carted the money away.
There was also an initial confusion on whether the Medera involved in the case at bar was Jerry and Julio.
We agree with the trial court’s rationalization as it deflated the significance in the discrepancy of the
names of Jerry Medera and Julio Medera, viz:
x x x
"The initial identification by name Jerry Medera before the police in Mondragon given only by Arturo
Siervo as one of the criminals, it being shown that Julio Medera has a brother by said name and who is
also a member of the CAFGU in San Roque (Exhs. "5" and "6" in relation to Exh. "9") detracts nothing
from Lourdes Siervo’s spontaneous court room identification when she pointed out to the person of Julio
Medera upon his name being mentioned in the course of an answer while ‘Pating’ Naza, instead of
Bating Naza, as written in the police blotter (Exh. "9") is so innocuous an error that it should be
attributable to inaccuracy of the hearing and/or pronunciation." 26
Accused-appellants also claims that it was unnatural for Arturo to run to the bushes and abandon his
wife who has just been raped. We do not agree. Arturo was under the gun. It would have been foolhardy
for him to disobey the order for him to run. He would have been shot dead if he did not. Even his family
would have been further endangered. He did not have any rational choice except to run.
The conduct of the Siervo spouses subsequent to the crime fortified their credibility. The promptly
revealed their misfortune to Acero. They gathered their guts and reported the incident not only to the
Mondragon police authorities but also to the San Roque police. Lourdes submitted herself to physical
examination. These were all spontaneous actions. Indeed, it was far fetched for this rural couple, living in
an isolated, unprotected house to falsely impute an atrocious crime against accused-appellants who
were influential CAFGU members assigned in their barangay. They would not put their lives on the line
except for a legitimate grievance.
In checkered contrast, Medera self-destructed when he testified. He unabashedly admitted in court that
Lt. Dayaon did not order them on "red alert" from December 26, 1991 to January 1, 1992 for the
perceived NPA raid. 27 He was with the other soldiers patrolling Barangay Malobago. 28
Nor does the testimony of Cpl. Mabascog inspire credence. He testified that he remembered the
December 29, 1991 assignments of accused-appellants because he reported that day after his Christmas
vacation. His assertion was negated by Lt. Dayaon’s testimony that when a camp is on "red alert," it
means maximum vigilance and all leaves and furloughs are cancelled. 29
In addition, we cannot give full faith and credit to Exhibit "4" and Exhibit "5," the duty roster and guard
detail, respectively, presented by Accused-Appellants. They were handwritten on papers when they
should have been properly recorded in a logbook. The accused-appellants failed to explain his
irregularity which was vital to the truth of their alibi.
Easy to concoct, alibi is a weak defense. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused. It
cannot succeed when there is no showing that it is not physically impossible for the accused to be at the
crime scene at the time of its commission. 30
At the trial, Accused-appellants admitted that they patrolled Barangay Malobago when the crime
happened on December 29, 1991. Their camp can be negotiated in ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes walk
to the locus criminis. Since accused-appellants were in Barangay Malobago from 10:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.,
it was not physically impossible for them to be at the Siervo’s house and commit the crime.
The probability that the Siervo spouses erred in identifying the accused-appellants is nil. Accused-
appellants were not strangers to the spouses. They often patrolled Barangay Malobago. Medera was the
couple’s barriomate and a regular buyer of their chicken. There was also a kerosine lamp which
illuminated the locus delicti. Accused-appellants wore no mask to hide their identity. Loose alibi must
yield to and cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the spouses. 31
The trial court, however, erred in denominating the crime committed by accused-appellants as Robbery
in Band with Multiple Rape. In People v. Precioso, 32 we held that there is no such composite crime of
robbery in band with multiple rape. The crime is robbery with rape, with band as a mere aggravating
circumstance. It is penalized under Article 294 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 imposing the death penalty. Since the crime charged was committed on December 29, 1991
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, the said law cannot be applied
retroactively and the death penalty cannot be given to the Accused-Appellants. The trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed Decision dated June 30, 1992 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellants are convicted of Robbery with Rape and ordered to pay in solidum Lourdes Siervo in
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages and Arturo and Lourdes Siervo four
thousand sixty pesos (P4,060.00) corresponding to the stolen money. With costs against Accused-
Appellants.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO LOTEYRO AGUINALDO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
This is an automatic review of the Decision imposing the death penalty on Rodrigo Loteyro Aguinaldo for
committing the crime of rape.[1]
The Information against appellant Aguinaldo reads:
"That on or about the 24th day of June, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by
then and there pointing a pointed object at the side of one Jeannette Aguinaldo y Yap and threatening to
kill her, have carnal knowledge of said Jeannette Aguinaldo y Yap, a minor, 17 years of age, without her
consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Appellant, who is complainant's father, waived his right to a pre-trial and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.[2] The trial court initially subpoenaed the complainant Jeannette[3] on October 8, 1996 as the
prosecution's first witness.[4] She failed to appear and the case was reset to November 20, 1996.[5]
On November 20, 1996, Jeannette appeared and answered questions relating to her personal
circumstances, i.e., she is a 17-year-old resident of 2541 Sulu St., Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila; she is
called Net; she graduated from high school and appellant is her father. She claimed that at 10:00 p.m. of
June 24, 1995, something happened while she was sleeping at home. Asked what happened, Jeannette
hedged. The trial judge encouraged her to answer but she kept silent. She was on the verge of tears. The
trial judge inquired if she wanted the appellant to leave the courtroom. She agreed.
After the appellant left the courtroom, Jeannette was again queried why she woke from her sleep that
night. Still, Jeannette stayed as silent as a sphinx. This prompted the defense counsel de oficio[6] to move
for the dismissal of the case. The trial judge asked Jeannette if she wanted the case dismissed and if she
would like to pardon the appellant. Failing to elicit a response from her, the trial judge ordered the
prosecutor to talk to Jeannette. The prosecutor then asked Jeannette if she executed a statement to the
police[7]and Jeannette responded positively. She acknowledged her signature on the statement and
affirmed its truthfulness. The prosecution then adapted her sworn statement as her direct testimony. Her
sworn statement narrated how she was forced to have sexual intercourse with the appellant.
On cross-examination, Jeannette claimed that her parents had long been separated. She, her elder brother
and younger sister stayed with their father. On the night she was allegedly raped, she slept with her father
in a room upstairs while her brother slept downstairs. Her sister was not around at that time. She confided
to Tita Nelia, a family friend, that her father raped her. However, she could not tell when she revealed the
incident to Tita Nelia. She admitted that she did not immediately undergo any physical examination after
the incident.[8]
On redirect examination on November 27, 1996, the prosecutor asked Jeannette what woke her up on the
night she was allegedly raped. She did not answer but merely muttered, "I'm afraid. . ." She alleged it was
only on February 24, 1996 that she divulged the incident to her tatay-tatayan, a neighbor, because
appellant again mauled her. She stated that she understood the term "ginahasa" in her sworn statement
to be the Tagalog word for "rape." When asked what appellant did that prompted her to execute a sworn
statement using the term "ginahasa," she did not again respond.
On recross-examination, Jeannette admitted that she was mad at her father for mauling her. However,
she denied she filed the rape charge because of her maltreatment.[9]
The prosecution was obviously disappointed with the timid testimony of Jeannette. At the trial on
December 3, 1996, it manifested that Jeannette was willing to narrate the details on how she was raped.In
the interest of justice, the trial court allowed the prosecution to recall Jeannette as a witness. She declared
that she woke up when she felt appellant lying down beside her. He placed a blanket over her but in the
process, held her breast and touched her private part. She asked him why he did that and he explained
that he was just "putting blanket" over her. He then turned off the light and they continued to sleep.She
woke up for the second time when she felt someone was licking her face. She thought it was her dog but
found out that it was appellant doing it. She asked, "Bakit po, Pa?" Appellant told her to keep quiet,
mounted her and held her shoulder as she pushed him away. He mashed her breast and threatened to kill
her. Then he "penetrated" her with his organ. She was wearing a T-shirt and shorts when she slept but
when he started raping her, she found that appellant had removed her shorts. She said she felt pain as
appellant raped her. Her efforts to resist proved futile. His lust sated, appellant slept while she cried until
the morning. Appellant was drunk that night.[10]
On February 25, 1996, Senior Inspector Eliseo I. Canares, Jr. of the Western Police District Command
requested the NBI Medico-Legal Officer to conduct a physical examination on Jeannette.[11] In his report
for Living Case No. MG-96-308,[12] NBI Medico-Legal Officer Valentin T. Bernales made the following
findings:
"EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURIES:
Contusions, light blue: nipple, right, upper-outer quadrant, 3.0 x 2.5 cm.; leg, right, upper third, anterior
aspect, 4.0 x 4.0 cm.
Abrasions, healing, with black scab formation; linear; back, scapular and supra-scapular areas, both sides,
multiple, sizes ranging from 2.0 cm. to 4.0 cm; arm, left, middle third, postero-lateral aspect, multiple,
whitish, sizes ranging from 4.0 cm to 7.0 cm; with tenderness' thigh, right, middle third, anterior aspect,
linear, 3.0 cm.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, short, fine and scanty. Labia majora, gaping and minora, coaptated. Fourchette,
tense. Vestibule, pinkish. Hymen, short, thick and intact. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube of 1.0 cm. in
diameter with marked resistance. Vagina walls, and rugosities cannot be reached by an examining finger.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above described physical injuries were noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
2. Hymen, intact."
Dr. Bernales opined that there was no penetration of the complainant's hymen as it was intact and
that complainant was physically a virgin. He explained that the complainant's hymen could not admit a
tube with 1.0 cm. diameter, which implied that the opening was "too small for a complete previous
penetration."
With respect to the extragenital physical injuries sustained by the complainant, Dr. Bernales declared that
these could have been produced by direct contact of the skin with a hard object. The injuries could also
be produced by a rough surface and these would have been inflicted "a week or two before" the
examination on February 25, 1996.[13]
The defense interposed denial. Appellant, a commercial artist and barangay official in-charge of twenty
five (25) tanods, branded as a lie his daughter's accusation. He admitted he was in their house at 10:00
p.m. of June 24, 1995. He said if he had no drinking session, he would sleep before 9:00 p.m., wake up at
12:00 midnight to check on the attendance and the equipment of the barangay tanods on duty and would
be back home before sunrise. He denied he was drunk that fateful night because he did not have money
except for the "allowance for the house."
On cross-examination, appellant stated that he lived in his house with his three children. His house had
two stories with two bedrooms upstairs. As he was renting out one of the rooms, he and his son slept
downstairs while his daughters slept in the vacant room. In the evening of June 24, 1995, his son slept on
the sofa while he slept on the floor downstairs. He admitted beating up Jeannette because of "her
attitude" of going out in the morning and coming home only at night. She would also go out at night
without any permission but their neighbors would always tell on her.
On redirect examination, appellant charged that Jeannette had a "split personality" - one time she would
be sweet to him and her siblings and then, for no reason at all, she would be mad at all of them. He claimed
that he could not understand her although he knew that she was intelligent (matalino siyang
masyado). Jeannette stopped schooling in 1995 because she spent her enrollment money.
Appellant's eldest child, Boy (Roy) Aguinaldo testified in his favor. He stated he slept between 11:00 and
12:00 midnight on June 24, 1995 at the ground floor of their house with his father and a friend.According
to him, his sister Jeannette "is a very good person but once in a while she is irritable" (may sumpong). He
opined that she could file an unfounded rape case against their father because his sister is a "100% liar."[14]
On August 7, 1997, the trial court[15] rendered a 3-page Decision finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to death. Holding that a broken hymen is not
an essential element in rape, it concluded that the complainant's testimony was "strong enough to
overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused and establish his guilt." It held further that it was
"unthinkable and unnatural" for the complainant to "invent" a story and charge her own father with
rape. The trial court convicted appellant of the crime under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which imposes the death penalty on an accused who is the parent of
a complainant below eighteen years of age. It disposed of Criminal Case No. 96-147936 as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of R. A. No. 7659, and he is sentenced to
suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection and the accessory penalties provided by law and to
pay the costs. On the civil liability of the accused, he is further sentenced to pay the complainant moral,
nominal and exemplary damages in respective sums of P50,000.00, P100,000.00 and P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED."
Before this Court, appellant contends:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON THE
UNCORROBORATED, DOUBTFUL, UNRELIABLE AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE RENDERED BY DR. VALENTIN BERNALES, NBI MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER, FAVORABLE TO THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT."
To start with, the trial court wrongly imposed on appellant the death penalty considering the nature of the
crime charged in the information. The information charged the appellant with the crime of simple rape. It
did not qualify that appellant is the father of the complainant or that complainant is the daughter of
appellant. This qualification is very material in determining the nature of the crime for which the accused
should be held liable and the corresponding penalty under the law. Thus, in People v. Ilao,[16] a rape case
where the relationship between the minor complainant and the accused was not alleged in the
information, this Court ruled:
"Adopting our pronouncements in People v. Ramos, we perforce have to rule that appellant can only be
convicted of simple statutory rape and cannot be held liable for qualified rape for want of the allegation
of relationship in the present information. Even if relationship was duly proved during the trial, still such
proof cannot be considered to convict appellant of qualified rape and to consequently impose on him the
death penalty since he would thereby be denied his constitutional and statutory right to be informed of
the nature and the cause of accusation against him.
To emphasize such substantial and procedural irregularity in simple terms of dialectics, to charge appellant
with rape in one of its simple forms and then try and convict him of rape in one of its qualified forms would
be a prosecution which leads to a trial and conviction without a valid accusation.
We repeat, therefore, that the attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 must be
specifically pleaded in an information for rape in order that the same may correctly qualify the crime and
to justify the penalty prescribed by the law. If it is the prosecution's goal to have appellant adjudged guilty
of raping his minor daughter, such conviction is not possible under the wordings of the information
herein. With the failure of the information to state the qualifying circumstance of relationship between
appellant and Jonalyn, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon appellant, just as in People v. Ramos."
For this reason alone, the trial court should not have imposed the death penalty on the appellant. But this
is not all the error of the trial court. In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by three
principles: First, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt
or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. Second, unless there are
special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to
great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Third, the disposition of rape cases are governed by the
following guidelines: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution, and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[17]
Prescinding from these principles, we acquit the appellant. As correctly pointed out by appellant's counsel,
the complainant's conduct on the witness stand did not evince truthfulness.[18] Instead of being
straightforward, she hesitated, and even refused, not only once but twice, to give testimony on the alleged
rape. The records show that she failed to appear in court the first time the case was set for hearing.On the
re-scheduled hearing where she was presented as the first witness, she balked, flatly refused to answer
the questions propounded by the prosecutor as well as the questions of the trial court on the alleged
sexual assault by the appellant. This led the trial court to strongly admonish and mildly berate her for her
uncharacteristic silence on a critical point in the prosecution's case. Instead of dismissing the case as
suggested by the defense, the trial court encouraged further the prosecution and hence, complainant was
made to affirm her sworn statement that served as her direct testimony. At the next date for redirect
examination, complainant once again refused to answer the prosecutor's questions notwithstanding the
trial court's effort encouraging her to talk. It was only on December 3, 1996 that complainant broke her
silence on the witness stand. This hesitance of the complainant to testify on the very meat of her case
against appellant certainly evokes disbelief in her sworn statement. More so because her testimony is a
mere parroting of her sworn statement.
The Solicitor General justifies complainant's hedging as natural for a "naive barrio lass" who is "incapable
of hatching such a devious scheme" against her own father.[19] The records show, however, that
complainant is a city-bred teenage girl who grew up in the Sta. Cruz district in the heart of Manila, the
country's capital where, as in any other city, both progress and decadence exist. She is a high school
graduate and already seventeen (17) years of age at the time the alleged crime was committed. That she
was less than lily white in virtues was testified to by her brother who charged her as a "100% liar." Such
negative testimony from a brother who is naturally expected to throw his support to his own sister but did
not, says much about her character and raises serious doubts as to the truthfulness of her testimony.
Moreover, evidence of her wayward ways demonstrated by complainant's leaving home without her
father's permission, nocturnal escapades and joyrides with jeepney drivers that elicited harsh disciplinary
action from appellant has remained unrebutted. Hence, the Solicitor General's conclusion that "the moral
ascendancy of appellant as a father of private complainant while on the witness stand all the more instilled
fear in the latter" is not appropriate in this case.[20] Appellant's moral ascendancy or influence as a father
is negated by proof of complainant's notoriously defiant and recalcitrant behavior towards him.
It is true that in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining
witness provided such testimony is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the course
of things.[21] In the case at bar, however, the complainant lacked candor and spontaneity as a witness. Her
demeanor, composure and manner of testifying revealed heavy traces of insincerity and falsehood even
to one who is simply reading the transcripts of her testimony. Thus, complainant alleged in her sworn
statement that she bled after her private part was fully penetrated during the sexual assault, viz:
"x x x. Hinawakan niya ako sa balikat at pinapatungan, pero itinutulak ko siyang palayo sa akin, hanggang
sa manghina ako at natatakot sa sinasabi niyang papatayin ako. Hanggang sa naipasok na niya ang titi niya
sa puki ko. Nasaktan po ako. Gumalaw-galaw siya at nilalamas niya ang suso ko. Tapos, tumigil siya at inalis
niya ang titi niya at nahiga na siya uli at natulog. Ako naman ay umiyak hanggang umaga. Noong bigla Q: If there is a penetration only of a portion of the head of the penis that would not have cause(d) the
akong tumayo, may biglang may tumulo pero hindi ko na tiningnan, pero ang alam ko dugo dahil hanggang break up of the hymen of the victim?
kinabukasan ay may dugo ako. x x x."[22] (Underscoring supplied.)
A: That is possible, Your Honor.[25]
Complainant affirmed her sworn statement during direct examination as follows:
xxx
"PROSECUTOR EDAD TO WITNESS:
Q: So in this particular case it was possible for the victim to have a sexual intercourse even her hymen is
xxx intact? (sic)

Q: What else did he do aside from mashing your breasts? A: No, Your Honor. In this particular case, it admit (stop) the hymen, the opening of the hymen only admits
a 1.0 cm. tube.
A: He penetrated me with his penis.
THE COURT:
xxx
Yes.
Q: What are you doing at the time or how did you feel at the time that you father inserted his organ on
(sic) you? A: That is a very small compared to 2.5 average size penis (sic). So it only shows that there is no previous
contact or no previous sexual intercourse because the orifice or the opening remain to 1 cm. (sic)"
A: It was painful.
Needless to state, complainant's claim that she bled implies that there must have been laceration of her
xxx sex organ. Unless there is evidence that she underwent "cosmetic" surgery to restore the hymen's virginal
state[26] before the NBI medico-legal officer examined her, complainant's claim of bleeding is a manifest
Q: How did you know that it was his penis that was inserted to your vagina?
falsehood. When physical evidence runs counter to testimonial evidence, conclusions as to physical
A: I felt it."[23] (Underscoring supplied.) evidence must prevail. Physical evidence is that mute but eloquent manifestation of truth which rate high
in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[27] The inevitable conclusion therefore is that complainant was
On the witness stand, complainant never testified as to her having bled after that sexual intercourse. More lying through her teeth when she swore that appellant's organ penetrated hers and that she felt pain and
importantly, her claim in her sworn statement that she bled because of full penetration of her sex organ was bleeding even until the morning. That material lapse in her testimony destroys her credibility.
is belied by the medical record which revealed that her hymen was "short, thick and intact," that the
hymenal orifice could admit a tube with 1.0 cm. in diameter only with "marked resistance" and that the The other bruises and contusions her body sustained could have been the result of maltreatment by her
vaginal walls and rugosities "cannot be reached by an examining finger."[24] Fortifying his report, Dr. father. However, that matter is completely divorced from her allegation of rape. The medico-legal officer
Valentin T. Bernales, NBI medico-legal officer, testified as follows: affirmed that complainant's injuries were new and could not have been sustained simultaneously with the
alleged rape that was committed eight (8) months before she was physically examined.
"Q: Doctor, is it possible that the hymen remain intact despite (stop) is it possible that the hymen shall
remain intact despite the penetration of an object on (sic) the vagina? As a rule, delay in the reporting of a rape incident is treated leniently by the courts in view of the ill effects
that forcible defloration usually brings upon both the accused and the accuser. Such delay may become
xxx even longer when the rape committed is incestuous for the reason that our culture shields from the public
embarrassing intrafamilial sexual incidents. Thus, the court shall not discredit the victim as a witness
A: It is possible that the hymen is still intact but there would be difference upon examination that it could simply because it took her months to report her having been the victim of sexual abuse considering her
be shown or be noted that the hymen could not admit a tube of 1.0 cm. in diameter that this opening is tender age, the moral ascendancy of the accused and his threats against the victim.[28]
too small for a complete previous penetration (sic).
In this case, however, complainant's delay in reporting the alleged rape incident tolls negatively on her
Q: So there was no complete penetration that could not have happen base on your (sic) (interrupted) credibility. If indeed appellant ravished her, she would not have lost time to reveal the incident to her
brother, her other relatives, her neighbors and the police. It is worth noting that she could not even tell
A: Examination.
when she related the alleged incestuous coitus to her Tita Nelia or to her tatay-tatayan (surrogate
xxx father). Complainant waited eight (8) months before she reported the rape and only as an obvious
afterthought to the maltreatment by appellant.
Q: There could have not been a complete penetration?
Indeed, complainant's motive for charging appellant with the crime of rape is suspect. From the
A: Yes. unrebutted testimonies of appellant and complainant's brother, she had an axe to grind against her
father.It appears that the mauling incident before her physical examination triggered the
xxx complaint. Having suffered contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body, she went to the
authorities to report the maltreatment and, in addition, the alleged rape incident that took place eight (8)
months before or on June 24, 1995. Fed up with physical abuse, complainant had a reason to exact revenge
from a father she perceived as cruel. That complainant was actually motivated by anger and revenge,
rather than the call for justice, in reporting the alleged rape is buttressed by her brother's testimony that
she was a 100% liar and that her charge of rape against their father was a mere fabrication.
In sum, complainant's version of the alleged incident cannot withstand objective scrutiny. This Court will
not affirm a conviction for any crime, much more one for which the death penalty may be imposed, on an
account that permits the entertainment of a reasonable doubt as to the culpability of the accused. A
reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt having been created by an appraisal of the prosecution evidence
alone, a detailed examination of appellant's defense is rendered unnecessary.[29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 96-147936 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XVIII, is REVERSED and appellant Rodrigo Aguinaldo y Loteyro is ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of rape. No costs.
The Director of the NBP is required to report to this Court the proper implementation of this Decision
within ten (10) days from its receipt.
SO ORDERED.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (SECTION 2)
BASIC CONCEPTS
-ORDINARY DOCUMENTS (SECTION 4)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN
In Criminal Case No. 36885 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales
and others charged with the crime of falsification of the public documents, in their capacities as public
officials and employees, by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were
purchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers, in such
quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or persons as are made to appear in
the said public documents, when in fact and in truth, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as
valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Madrigal Gonzales in the public and official documents
had ever been made.
In order to prove the charge of falsification, the prosecution presented to a witness a booklet of receipts,
which was marked Exh. "D", containing value invoices numbered 101301 to 101400 of the Metro Drug
Corporation, Magallanes corner Jakosalem, Cebu City. The booklet contained the triplicate copies, and
according to said witness the original invoices were sent to Manila office of the company, the duplicates
to the customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in the booklet. Witness further explained that in
preparing receipts for sales, two carbons were used between the three sheets, the original, the duplicate
and triplicate so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out by the use of the carbons in the
course of the preparation and signing of the originals. The witness giving the testimony was the salesman
who issued a triplicates marked as Exh. "D-1".
As the witness was explaining the figures or words appearing on the triplicates, Hon. Bienvenido M. Tan,
then presiding in the court below, interrupted the proceeding holding that the triplicates are not
admissible unless it is first proven that the originals were lost and can not be produced. Said the court:
Triplicates are evidence when it is proven first that the original is lost cannot be produced. But as the
witness has alleged that the original is in the Manila Office, why not produce the original?
Another witness, accountant of the Metro Drug Corporation in Manila, was also called by the prosecution
to testify. He declared that sales in the provinces were reported to the Manila office of the Metro Drug
Corporation, and that the originals of the sales invoices are transmitted to the main office in support of
cash journal sheets, but that the original practice of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails
as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicate or pink copies are submitted to the
central office in Manila. Testifying on certain cash journal sheets, Exhs. "A", "A-1" to "A-10" he further
declared that he received these from the Metro Drug Corporation, Cebu branch, and that the said cash
journal sheets contained the sales made in the Cebu branch.
After the cross-examination of this last witness, the prosecution again went back to the identification of
the triplicate invoice, Exh. "D-1", already above referred to. It was at this stage that the judge below told
the prosecution that the law applicable is Section 46, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which requires the
production of the originals. In response to the above ruling, the special prosecutor claimed that the
evidence of the prosecution would not be able to secure the production of the originals on account of
their loss.
In view of the above circumstances, the prosecution announced its intention to file a petition for certiorari
against the ruling of the court below to which the court below to which the court below agreed. Hence
this petition.
It is alleged that the invoice sought to be introduced, which were produced by the use of carbon sheets,
and which thereby produced a facsimile of the originals, including the figures and the signatures on the
originals, are regarded as duplicate originals and may introduced as such, even without accounting for the
non-production of the originals.
The decision of the question is far from difficult. The admissibly of duplicates or triplicates has long been
a settled question and we need not elaborate on the reasons for the rule. This matter has received
consideration from the foremost commentator on the Rules of Court thus:
"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a
contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces
2facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen
which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate
originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others." (Moran, 1952 ed., p. 444.)
It has also been in favor of the petitioner by US in the case of People vs. Quinones, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 5,
1520, 1525, thus:
It is argued in the second assignment of error that the confession Exhibit B is not admissible because it is
merely a carbon copy. The said confession Exhibit B, being a carbon copy of the original and bearing as it
does the signature of the appellant, is admissible in evidence and possess all the probative value of the
original, and the same does not require an accounting for the non-production of the original. (Sec 47, Rule
123, Rules of Court).
Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of the admissibility of duplicate
originals, as follows:
SEC. 386. . . . the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable
to prove a disputed fact. p. 616. A "duplicate sales slip" (People vs. Stone, 349 III. 52, 181 N. E. 648) has
been held to be primary evidence, p. 616.
SEC. 420. Duplicate originals. — Where letters are produced by mechanical means and, concurrently with
the original, duplicate are produced, as by placing carbon paper and writing on the exposed surface at the
same time, all are duplicate originals, and any one of them may introduced in evidence without accounting
for the nonproduction of the other. Citing International Harvester Co. vs. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263, 112 N.
W. 252. See also 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 343, People of Hauke, 335 II, 217, 167 N. E. 1; State vs. Keife, 165 La. 47,
115 So. 363; Taylor vs. Com. 117 Va. 909, 85 S.E. 499. (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, p. 661).
SEC. 100. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original,
are duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. Citings
U.S. vs. Manton, 107 Fed. (2d) 834, denied 309 U. S. 664, 84 L. ed. 1012; O'Shea vs. U.S. 93 F. (2d) 169;
Leonard vs. State, 36 Ala. App. 397, 58 So. (2d) 138; State vs. Lee, 173 La. 770, 138 So. 662; Newman vs.
State 65 Ga. App. 288, 16 S. E. (2d) 87. (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 168.)
We find that the ruling of the court below to the effect that the triplicates formed by the used of carbon
papers are not admissible in evidence, without accounting first for the loss of the originals is incorrect and
must be reversed. The court below is hereby ordered to proceed in the trial of the case in accordance with
this ruling. No cost. So ordered.
NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEARCORPORATION PHILIPPINES and/or CATHY NG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and VIRGINIA M. PUBLICO, respondents.
DECISION
In this petition for review, petitioners NYK International Knitwear Corporation Philippines (henceforth NYK,
for brevity) and its manager, Cathy Ng, assail the resolution[1] dated September 15, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60542, which dismissed their petition for certiorari for non-compliance with
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Also assailed is the appellate courts resolution[2] of
December 5, 2000, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as gleaned from the findings of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), show that:
On February 8, 1995, herein petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia Publico as a sewer. Under the terms
and conditions of her employment, Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but required to work from 8:00
A.M. to 12:00 midnight. On the average, she earned P185.00 daily.
At about 10:00 P.M. of May 7, 1997, Publico requested that she be allowed to leave the work place early,
as she was not feeling well due to a bout of influenza. Permission was refused but nonetheless, Publico
went home.
The following day, Publico called up her employer and notified management that she was still recovering
from her ailment.
On May 9, 1997, Publico reported for work. To her mortification and surprise, however, the security guard
prevented her from entering the NYK premises, allegedly on managements order. She begged to be
allowed inside, but the guard remained adamant. It was only when Publico declared that she would just
complete the unfinished work she had left on May 7 that the guard let her in.
Once inside the factory, Publico requested to see the owner, one Stephen Ng. Her request was
declined. She was instead asked to come back the following day.
On May 10, 1997, Publico returned to NYK as instructed. After waiting for three and half (3) hours, she was
finally able to see Stephen Ng. When she inquired why she was barred from reporting for work, Mr. Ng
told her she was dismissed due to her refusal to render overtime service.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner corporation and its
manager, petitioner Cathy Ng, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-03925-97.
Before the Labor Arbiter, petitioners predictably had a different version of the story. Allegedly, they took
the pains to verify why Publico did not report for work on May 7, 1997 and found out that her husband
did not allow her to work at night. As night work is a must in their line of business, particularly when there
are rush orders, petitioners claimed that given Publicos failure to render overtime work, they were left
with no other recourse but to fire her.
On March 19, 1998, the Labor Arbiter held Publicos dismissal to be illegal, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant to her former position
with full backwages from the date her salary was withheld until she is actually reinstated, which amounted
to P50,168.30 x x x. The respondents are, likewise, assessed the sum of P5,016.83 representing 10% of the
amount awarded as attorneys fees. The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On appeal, the NLRC, in a resolution[4] dated May 17, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in
toto.
In due time, petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a special civil action of certiorari filed
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60542. Petitioners ascribed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to public respondent NLRC for affirming the ruling of
the Labor Arbiter.
In its resolution of September 15, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the petition outright. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that there was non-compliance with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as the petition was merely accompanied by a certified xerox copy of the assailed NLRC decision,
instead of a certified true copy thereof as required by the Rules of Court.[5] Furthermore, petitioners failed
to attach the other pleadings and documents pertinent and material to their petition, such as the parties
position papers, their evidence and the motion for reconsideration in contravention of the said rule.[6]
Petitioners duly moved for reconsideration, explaining that they had requested for a certified true copy of
the NLRCs decision but since the original NLRC decision was printed on onionskin was not legible, the NLRC
itself photocopied the resolution and certified it afterwards. As proof of payment of petitioners request
for a certified true copy of the NLRC decision, petitioners attached a copy of the official receipts issued by
the NLRC, which described the nature of the entry as CERT. TRUE COPY.[7] Petitioners, likewise, appended
in their motion copies of pertinent pleadings and documents not previously attached in their petition.
On December 5, 2000, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[8]
Hence this petition for review.
Before us, petitioners submit the following issues for our resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THERE EXISTS EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO WARRANT THE RULING THAT COMPLAINANT
WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED, AND COROLLARY THERETO, WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
TO AWARD BACKWAGES AND ORDER REINSTATEMENT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
NLRC SO AS TO JUSTIFY A REVERSAL OF ITS RESOLUTIONS DATED MAY 17, 2000 AND JUNE 30, 2000.[9]
Only two issues need resolution, one having to do with adjective law and the other with substantial law,
namely:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 60542 on purely
technical grounds, i.e., that the attached copy of the NLRC decision is a mere photocopy of the original
decision; and
(2) Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to rule on the correctness of the NLRCs findings that private
respondent was illegally dismissed?
On the first issue, petitioners contend that they have substantially complied with the requirements of
Section 1, Rule 65, hence, in the interests of justice and equity, the Court of Appeals should have given
due course to their special civil action for certiorari.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners wanton disregard of the Rule warrant
the outright dismissal of their petition. She adds that the present petition raises factual issues that the
Court cannot pass upon at the first instance.
Section 1 of Rule 65,[10] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition shall be accompanied by
a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The precursor of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
Administrative Circular No. 3-96, which took effect on June 1, 1996, instructs us what a certified true copy
is:
1. The "certified true copy" thereof shall be such other copy furnished to a party at his instance or in his
behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or representatives of the issuing entity as hereinbefore
specified.
xxx
3. The certified true copy must further comply with all the regulations therefor of the issuing entity and it
is the authenticated original of such certified true copy, and not a mere xerox copy thereof, which shall be
utilized as an annex to the petition or other initiatory pleading. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx
Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the disputed document although stamped as
certified true copy is not an authenticated original of such certified true copy, but only a xerox copy
thereof, in contravention of paragraph 3 of the above-quoted guidelines. Hence, no error may be ascribed
to the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright pursuant to paragraph 5 of
Administrative Circular No. 3-96, which provides:
5. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the party using the documents required by Paragraph (3) of
Circular No. 1-88 to verify and ensure compliance with all the requirements therefor as detailed in the
preceding paragraphs. Failure to do so shall result in the rejection of such annexes and the dismissal of the
case. Subsequent compliance shall not warrant any reconsideration unless the court is fully satisfied that
the non-compliance was not in any way attributable to the party, despite due diligence on his part, and
that there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to make such other disposition as it
may deem just and equitable. (Emphasis supplied.)
The members of this Court are not unmindful that in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, we
have disregarded similar procedural defects in order to correct a patent injustice made. However,
petitioners here have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule. Petitioners are hereby
reminded that the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued
except in the exercise of judicial discretion.[11]Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it
only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
To avoid further delay in resolving the present controversy, we now come to the second issue. Petitioners
contend that private respondents refusal to render night work is tantamount to abandonment of duties
which constitutes a just ground for termination of service. They aver that the Labor Arbiter gravely erred
in awarding backwages to private respondent, as there was no illegal dismissal. Petitioners allege that
management did not terminate her services, but in fact asked her to return to work during the preliminary
conferences. Hence, it would be the height of injustice to award backwages for work, which was never
rendered through private respondents own choice. Petitioners add that they cannot be held solidarily
liable in this case as there was neither malice nor bad faith.
Petitioners arguments fail to persuade us. Petitioners raise factual questions which are improper in a
petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of the NLRC, particularly in a case where the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon this Court.[12]
Hence, petitioners bare allegations of abandonment cannot stand the unswerving conclusion by both
quasi-judicial agencies below that private respondent was unlawfully dismissed.We find no reason to
deviate from the consistent findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that there was no basis to find that
Virginia abandoned her work. Indeed, factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter,
both bodies being deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when
sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered
binding on this Court.[13] As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the
process of their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is for the Court to
stamp its affirmation and declare its finality. No reversible error may thus be laid at the door of the Court
of Appeals when it refused to rule that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want
or excess of jurisdiction in holding that private respondent was illegally dismissed.
Anent petitioners assertion that they cannot be solidarily liable in this case as there was no malice or bad
faith on their part has no leg to stand on. What the Court finds apropos is our disquisition in A.C. Ransom
Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC,[14] which held that since a corporation is an artificial person, it must have an
officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the person acting in the interest of the
employer. In other words the corporation, in the technical sense only, is the employer. In a subsequent
case, we ordered the corporate officers of the employer corporation to pay jointly and solidarily the
private respondents monetary award.[15] More recently, a corporation and its president were directed by
this Court to jointly and severally reinstate the illegally dismissed employees to their former positions and
to pay the monetary awards.[16]
In this case Cathy Ng, admittedly, is the manager of NYK. Conformably with our ruling in A. C. Ransom, she
falls within the meaning of an employer as contemplated by the Labor Code,[17] who may be held jointly
and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, Cathy Ng, in her capacity as manager and responsible officer of NYK, cannot be
exonerated from her joint and several liability in the payment of monetary award to private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 2000 and December 5, 2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SPS. PEBLIA ALFARO and PROSPEROUS ALFARO, Petitioners, v.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. OLEGARIO
P. BAGANO and CECILIA C. BAGANO Respondents.
DECISION
There lies an inherent oxymoron to the term "duplicate originals" as applied to documents. Yet, even as
two "duplicate originals" of the same document are not exactly identical, they may be considered as
identical for all legal intents and purposes. Indeed, each "duplicate original" may be considered as the best
evidence of the transaction embodied therein.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 17
November 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72335, as well as the Resolution dated 3 March 2004, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
First, the facts on record.
On 15 April 1996, Spouses Olegario and Cecilia Bagano (respondents) filed a complaint against Spouses
Peblia and Prosperous Alfaro (petitioners) for Declaration of Nullity of Sale with Damages and Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. In the complaint, respondents as plaintiffs
alleged the following: that they were the previous registered owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
1710, located at San Roque, Talisay, Cebu and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 78445; that
on 22 June 1994, respondents executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the lot in favor of petitioners to
secure payment of an obligation in the amount of P180,000.00; that upon payment of the mortgage debt,
a Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage2 dated 20 June 1995 was executed; that when respondents
demanded the return of their title, petitioners refused, prompting the former to check with the Register
of Deeds; that upon verification, respondents learned that their title had already been cancelled and in
lieu thereof TCT No. 927833 was
issued in the name of petitioners by virtue of a spurious Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 June 1995 (Deed
of Absolute Sale) purportedly executed by respondents. Thus, respondents sought the nullification of the
deed of sale on the ground that their signatures thereon were forged.
In their answer, petitioners as defendants denied the alleged forgery. They insisted that respondents sold
Lot No. 1710 to them in consideration of the amount of P534,000.00 sometime in June 1995.
Respondents' evidence tend to establish that they sent a letter-request to Romeo Varona (Varona), a
handwriting expert from the Cebu City PNP Crime Laboratory, for the examination of the questioned
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale. The request was accompanied by a set of documents consisting
of the Deed of Conditional Sale dated 23 October 1989 (Exh. "H")4 together with documents containing
the specimen signatures of respondents, namely: five (5) receipts with corresponding dates (Exhs. "I," "I-
1," "I-2," "I-3," "I-4"),5 Community Tax Certificate dated 13 January 1995 (Exh. "J"),6 Individual Taxpayer's
ID (Exh. "K"),7Partido ng Masang Pilipino ID (Exh. "L"),8 and a copy of the Deed of Sale
(Exh. "B").9 After examining Exh. "B" and comparing the signatures thereon purporting to be those of
respondents with the specimen signatures on the documents provided by respondents, Varona issued
Report No. 006-9610 dated 11 January 1996 containing his findings.
On 25 November 1998, respondents presented Varona as an expert witness on their behalf. Varona
affirmed the conclusion embodied in his Report that the questioned signatures appearing on Exhibit "B"
were forged.
On the same trial date, petitioners manifested their intention to have Varona examine another set of
documents which according to them contain the genuine signatures of respondents. Hence, on 12 March
1999, petitioners sent a letter to Varona, requesting him to examine the signatures on the other set of
documents, namely: Real Estate Mortgage dated 22 June 1994 (Ex. "2"),11 Acknowledgement Receipt for
the sum of P216,000.00 dated 14 June 1995 (Ex. "3"),12 six (6) deeds of conditional sale (Exhs. "4" to
"9"),13 China Bank Check No. A-190308 dated 5 August 1994 for P52,000.00 (Exh. "10"),14 and Community
Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 19886842 dated
8 February 1995 (Exh. "11").15 At the continuation of the cross-examination, Varona stated that the
signatures on the documents provided him, which purport to be those of respondents, as well as the
signatures on another copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "13"), which similarly purport to be those
of respondents, were affixed by the same persons.16
According to petitioners' evidence, respondents had initially mortgaged Lot No. 1710 in their favor
for P180,000.00 on 22 June 2004, as evidenced by a Real Estate Mortgage.17 Two months later,
respondents sold a different set of lots, i.e., Lot Nos. 809-C, 809-D, 809-J, 809-K, 809-T and 809-U, by virtue
of six (6) deeds of conditional sale in favor of petitioners who paid the sum of P138,000.00 as
downpayment. Thereafter, petitioners discovered that the lots subject of the conditional sale were also
sold on installment basis to other parties. To placate petitioners, respondents sold to them the lot in
question, Lot No. 1710, in consideration of P534,000.00, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Petitioners paid an additional P216,000.00 after being credited the amounts of P180,000.00 representing
the debt secured by the Real Estate Mortgage and P138,000.00 representing the aggregate
downpayments for the six (6) conditional deeds of sale.18
On 23 April 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision19 dismissing the complaint and ordering respondents to
pay P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses,
plus costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision,20reversing and setting aside the
Decision of the RTC. It declared the Deed of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio, reinstated TCT No. 78445
in the name of respondents, and ordered petitioners to pay the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages
and attorney's fee to respondents.
In the present petition, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals committed an error in reversing the
judgment of the trial court. Issues were raised, concerning the following points, to wit: first, the selective
reversal by the appellate court of the RTC's factual findings; second, the selective discussion of the
elements of a contract of sale as basis for the invalidation of the Deed of Absolute Sale; third, the ruling
that failure to offer in evidence the second questioned report proved fatal to petitioners' cause; fourth,
the blanket denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration; and fifth, the citing of
respondent Olegario Bagano's testimony in the Decision despite its having been stricken off the records
for his failure to be cross-examined.21
The first three (3) points raised obviously relate to the determinative issue whether or not the questioned
signatures of respondents on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged, thereby rendering the document
spurious. Such determination is evidently factual in nature, and the well-entrenched rule is that in the
exercise of this Court's power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on this Court.22 However, there are recognized exceptions,23 among which is when the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting.24 This case falls under the exception. The
disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the factual conclusion, especially with
regard to the alleged forgery of respondents' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale, has constrained us
to minutely examine the evidence submitted by the parties.
On its face, the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized; as such, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.25 Absent evidence that
is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld.26
In their bid to establish "clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence," respondents
presented an expert witness, Varona, who attested that the Deed of Absolute Sale was indeed forged. Was
the witness successful in that regard?cralaw library
Respondents rely on Varona's testimony on direct examination, as well as his findings in the examination
of the copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exh. "B." On that basis, they claim forgery. In their effort to
refute respondents' allegation, petitioners hinge on the testimony on cross-examination of the same
expert and his findings in the examination of another original of the Deed of Absolute Sale, marked as Exh.
"13." The two varying findings led the trial court to conclude that Varona had retracted his earlier finding
of forgery, thus:
When Mr. Romeo Varona was presented by the defendants to identify and give his expert opinion about
the signatures appearing in the documents marked as annexes 1 to 13, he categorically told the Honorable
Court that the signatures of Olegario Bagano and Cecilia Bagano appearing in the said documents are
genuine, thus belying the claim of the plaintiff that said signatures are forged.
It should be noted[,] however, that in an earlier testimony, Mr. Romeo Varona testified that the deed of
sale in question is a forgery, but he later on retracted his earlier testimony after he conducted an
examination of the documents sent to him by the defendants.27
The trial court further sustained the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale by citing the rule that instruments
are evidence, even against third persons, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter.28 The trial court also emphasized the character of the questioned deed as a notarial document,
which cannot be disproved by mere denial of the alleged signatory, and bears the presumption of
regularity.29 Moreover, the RTC noted that respondents filed the case in bad faith to appease their buyers
and cover up their wrongdoings in subdividing the lot and selling the resulting lots to different parties.30
The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's conclusion and proceeded from a different premise, i.e.,
that in the second examination which involves the standard and specimen signatures submitted by
petitioners, Varona did not actually receive and examine the original of the Deed of Sale, Exh. "13." It
explained, thus:
Records show that the signatures of Spouses Bagano appearing in the Deed of Sale dated June 14, 1995
were forged. Witness Romeo O. Varona, a document examiner of the PNP Crime Laboratory came out with
his Questioned Document Report No. 006-96 dated January 11, 1995 which states that after a careful
examination of the questioned document submitted by Spouses Bagano, he found out that the signatures
of Spouses Bagano appearing in the questioned Deed of Sale dated June 14, 1995 were forged. x x x
x x x
Likewise, he confirmed on the witness stand on November 25, 1998 that indeed the signatures of Spouses
Bagano appearing in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale are forgeries. However, on cross-examination
conducted on February 10, 1999, counsel for Spouses Alfaro manifested that they would submit for
examination the subject documents and that she would cross-examine Mr. Varona after the latter's
examination of the submitted documents. On February 28, 1999[,] counsel for the Spouses Alfaro, Atty.
Montesclaros, submitted other documents for examination, except the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June
14, 1995. On May 19, 1999, during Mr. Varona's cross-examination, he testified that his findings and
conclusions, as stated in the Questioned Document Report No. 039-39 dated March 12, 1999, were that
the signatures appearing thereon were written by one and same person. On May 28, 1999, Atty.
Montesclaros again requested Mr. Varona to examine the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995. On
June 16, 1999, Mr. Varona categorically testified that he had examined the said deed of sale and when
asked if he prepared a report on the said examination he answered in the affirmative. But when again
asked where that report was, Mr. Varona referred to Questioned Document Report No. 039-39 dated
March 12. 1999, which was the same report that he prepared previously on the basis of the first request
of Atty. Montesclaros dated February 28, 1999, where it did not include for examination the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995.
Such a testimony cannot be taken as a retraction of his previous testimony. What the lower court failed to
realize was that Romeo Varona did not actually receive and examine the original copy of the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale, as testified to by him. x x x
x x x
Such a statement categorically means that Romeo Varona did not actually receive any copy of the
questioned deed of absolute sale during his first examination upon the request of Atty. Montesclaros. This
Court observed that during Mr. Varona's cross-examination on June 16, 1999, defendants-appellees'
counsel, Atty. Juanita Montesclaros, tried to make it appear that Mr. Varona examined the Deed of
Absolute Sale, when in truth and in fact, he did not. x x x
x x x
It is very clear that Atty. Montesclaros tried to make it appear that the questioned document which was
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995 was indeed examined. However, this was not the case
because Mr. Varona's alleged report on the second request for examination still refers to the previous
report, Questioned Document Report No. 039-39 dated March 12, 1999, which was the same report that
he prepared previously on the basis of the first request of Atty. Montesclaros dated February 28, 1999,
wherein it did not include for examination the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995, and
which he had already identified on May 19, 1999. This only means that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not
received and examined by Mr. Varona and yet his testimony on cross, dated June 16, 1999[,] still referred
to the same report. There was[,] therefore no report made on the second request for examination dated
May 28, 1999 on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995 as Mr. Varona merely referred to his
previous report as his alleged second report on the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, the date of the
second Written Request for examination is May 28, 1999 and the date of the Questioned Document Report
No. 039-39 is March 12, 1999, and Mr. Varona's testimony of June 16, 1999 referred to the said report of
March 12, 1999 which report was made on the basis of the first written request for examination.31
The disparate conclusions reached by the courts below are such because they originated from different
but similarly erroneous basic premises.
When a document in two or more copies is executed at or about the same time, with identical contents,
all such copies are equally regarded as originals.32 Original does not mean the first paper written, in
contrast to a copy or transcript made later. The original depends upon the issue to be proved. 33 It is
immaterial whether that document was written before or after another, was copied from another, or was
itself used to copy from,34as long as its contents are the subject of inquiry.35 Hence, one or some of these
copies are still considered as originals, and they have equal claims to authenticity.
As a matter of practice, deeds of conveyance are prepared in several copies for notarization and record
purposes. After notarization, the notary public retains copies pursuant to the Rules on Notarial Practice,
one for his record and the other for transmittal to the court, through Clerk of Court concerned, where he
secured his notarial commission.36 When he gives all the other copies to the parties, the latter agree
between themselves how many copies should be kept by each. The parties also agree which copies shall
be presented to the Register of Deeds for registration, the city or municipal assessor in connection with
the payment of transfer tax and other fees, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue in connection with the
payment of the capital gains tax. All the notarized copies are originals. They are sometimes loosely referred
to as "original copies" or "duplicate originals."
In the case at bar, presented in evidence were two copies of one and the same Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 14 June 1995. These are respondents' Exh. "B"37 and petitioners' Exh. "13"38 which was also marked
by respondents as their Exh. "O."39 Exh. "B" appears to be a certified true copy of the original of the Deed
of Absolute Sale presented to and kept as part of the records of the Register of Deeds.40 Exhibit "13" is a
copy of the original retained by petitioners.
Respondents had engaged Varona to determine the genuineness of the signatures purporting to be theirs
on Exh. "B" by comparing them with the specimen signatures on the documents41 which they also provided
Varona. On the witness stand, Varona affirmed his finding in his Report42that the questioned signatures
on Exh. "B" were not affixed by the same persons who affixed the specimen signatures and thus the
questioned signatures were forged.43
However, after Varona testified on direct examination, petitioners manifested that they would engage him
to examine a different set of documents which contain the signatures of respondents. 44 On cross-
examination, Varona stated that he examined the signatures on Exh. "13" and the specimen signatures on
the other documents furnished him and that after making the examination he arrived at the conclusion
that the signatures on the documents, including Exh. "13," were affixed by the same persons.45
On the basis of the two findings of Varona, the first involving Exh. "B" and the second relating to Exh. "13,"
the trial court concluded that the questioned deed is genuine as the signatures thereon which purport to
be those of respondents are really theirs. It ratiocinated that Varona had retracted his first opinion when
he came out with his second opinion.
The trial court erred in using the supposed retraction as basis for its ruling. It cannot properly speak of
retraction of one finding by the other because the examinations conducted by Varona covered two
different standard signatures and two different sets of specimen signatures. It would have been a
retraction or repudiation of the first conclusion if the standard signatures analyzed and compared with the
specimen signatures were one and the same in the two examinations, even if the specimen signatures
were contained in two different sets of documents which is not even the case here.
Yet clearly, Varona came out with inconsistent findings. On one hand, he concluded that Exh. "B" is
spurious because the questioned signatures thereon were forged. On the other, he issued a different
determination as regards Exh. "13," finding that the signatures thereon which purport to be those of
respondents and the counterpart specimen signatures were affixed by the same persons. Since Exhs. "B"
and "13" are copies of two originals of one and the same deed, his conclusions with respect to the two
exhibits should be common, i.e., either the questioned signatures thereon were both affixed by the same
persons or they were affixed by different persons.
The disharmonious findings render Varona's testimony unconvincing. Thus, the presumption of validity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale as a notarized document is left unscathed.
Respondents seek to downplay the determinations made by Varona concerning Exh. "13" by impugning
the authenticity of the specimen signatures, specifically the signature of Olegario Bagano on the CTC, Exh.
"11." They claim in particular that the issuance date of the CTC was altered. Respondents, however, did
not present any tangible proof to support their allegation. On the other hand, petitioners procured a
certification from Cebu City Treasurer Eustaquio B. Cesa to the effect that the subject CTC belonged to
Olegario Bagano.46 As regards the other documents which contain the specimen signatures, namely: the
Real Estate Mortgage (Exh. "2"), the Acknowledgment Receipt (Exh. "3"), the six deeds of conditional sale
(Exhs. "4" to "9") and the China Bank check (Exh. "10"), respondent failed to adduce countervailing
evidence of spuriousness. It is noteworthy that the parties to the deeds of sale were also petitioners and
respondents themselves. Also, the amount covered by the Acknowledgment Receipt was the additional
cash payment of petitioners to respondents.
On the part of the Court of Appeals, it chose to disregard Varona's conclusions on Exh. "13" on the premise
that the written report which contained the conclusions was not presented in evidence.
However, as borne out by the record, Varona repeated his findings in open court in the course of his
testimony on cross-examination and even was asked on re-direct examination by respondents' counsel
thereon.47
Generally, it has been held that handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting.48Yet without Varona's testimony, the Court is hard-pressed to find
any other basis on the record to establish the forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it.49 Aside from the opinion of the handwriting expert which this
Court finds inconsequential, the bare assertions on the part of respondent Cecilia Bagano that the
signature appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale is not that of her husband is not enough. No additional
witnesses were presented.
We reassert that forgery is not presumed; it must be proven by clear, positive and convincing evidence.
Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it.50 Respondents failed to
substantiate with sufficient evidence their claim that their signatures appearing on the deed of sale were
forged.
We are moreover influenced in our ultimate finding by the fact that there is also sufficient evidence on
record to bolster the presumption that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was genuine. Ultimately
worthy of consideration is petitioner Plebia Alfaro's positive testimony that she actually saw respondent
Olegario Bagano affix his signature on the questioned document.51 However self-serving that allegation
may seem, it corroborates the other evidence that respondents did affix their signatures on the deed.
Equally relevant in this supposition is the comparison of the standard signatures on Exh. "13" with the
signatures of respondents found in the Real Estate Mortgage, Exh. "2," a document which was duly
notarized and thus bears prima facie proof as to its due execution and the validity of the contents therein.
Even respondent Cecilia Bagano admitted the genuineness of said document in her testimony.52No specific
objection was raised by respondents as to the validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, their blanket
objection thereto being confined to an overarching allegation against its materiality and relevancy, which
is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of authenticity of the notarized deed.
And it must be said that our own comparison of the signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale to the
specimen signatures submitted by the parties reveals no substantial variance to warrant the conclusion
that there was forgery. Mere variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the
same were forged.53
What could respondents have done in order to fortify their claim of forgery following the manifest
indecisiveness of the expert witness they had relied on? Considering that the burden was upon
respondents to establish the alleged forgery, they should have presented evidence on rebuttal, which they
did not do, or even another expert witness to attest to their claim of forgery, which again they failed to
do. Disingenuous as petitioners' tactic may have seemed, in using their opponent's expert witness to
advocate the contrary cause, respondents were not without remedy to mitigate the damage wrought by
said witness. That they failed to introduce rebuttal evidence finally led to the collapse of their cause of
action.
With the foregoing disquisition, discussion of the other issues raised by petitioners is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 12, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE (SEC 3)
-PURPOSE OF THE RULE
ESTER M. ASUNCION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division,
MABINI MEDICAL CLINIC and DR. WILFRIDO JUCO, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In her petition filed before this Court, Ester Asuncion prays that the Decision, dated November 29, 1996,
and the Resolution, dated February 20,1997, of the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, Second Division, in NLRC CA. 011188 which reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated
May 15, 1996 be set aside.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On August 16, 1993, petitioner Ester M. Asuncion was employed as an accountant/bookkeeper by the
respondent Mabini Medical Clinic. Sometime in May 1994, certain officials of the NCR-Industrial Relations
Division of the Department of Labor and Employment conducted a routine inspection of the premises of
the respondent company and discovered upon the disclosure of the petitioner of (documents) violations
of the labor standards law such as the non-coverage from the SSS of the employees. Consequently,
respondent Company was made to correct these violations.
On August 9, 1994, the private respondent, Medical Director Wilfrido Juco, issued a memorandum to
petitioner charging her with the following offenses:
1. Chronic Absentism (sic) You have incurred since Aug. 1993 up to the present 35 absences and 23 half-
days.
2. Habitual tardiness You have late (sic) for 108 times. As shown on the record book.
3. Loitering and wasting of company time on several occasions and witnessed by several employees.
4. Getting salary of an absent employee without acknowledging or signing for it.
5. Disobedience and insubordination - continued refusal to sign memos given to you.[1]
Petitioner was required to explain within two (2) days why she should not be terminated based on the
above charges.
Three days later, in the morning of August 12, 1994, petitioner submitted her response to the
memorandum. On the same day, respondent Dr. Juco, through a letter dated August 12, 1994, dismissed
the petitioner on the ground of disobedience of lawful orders and for her failure to submit her reply within
the two-day period.
This prompted petitioner to file a case for illegal termination before the NLRC.
In a Decision, dated May 15, 1996, Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday rendered judgment declaring that the
petitioner was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter found that the private respondents were unable to
prove the allegation of chronic absenteeism as it failed to present in evidence the time cards, logbooks or
record book which complainant signed recording her time in reporting for work. These documents,
according to the Labor Arbiter, were in the possession of the private respondents. In fact, the record book
was mentioned in the notice of termination. Hence, the non-presentation of these documents gives rise
to the presumption that these documents were intentionally suppressed since they would be adverse to
private respondents claim. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioners absences were with the
conformity of the private respondents as both parties had agreed beforehand that petitioner would not
report to work on Saturdays. The handwritten listing of the days when complainant was absent from work
or late in reporting for work and even the computerized print-out, do not suffice to prove that petitioners
absences were unauthorized as they could easily be manufactured.[2] Accordingly, the dispositive portion
of the decision states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the
complainant as illegal and ordering the respondent company to immediately reinstate her to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and to pay the complainants backwages and other benefits, as
follows:
1) P73,500.00 representing backwages as of the date of this decision until she is actually reinstated in the
service;
2) P20,000.00 by way of moral damages and another P20,000.00 representing exemplary damages; and
3) 10% of the recoverable award in this case representing attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On appeal, public respondent NLRC rendered the assailed decision which set aside the Labor Arbiters
ruling. Insofar as finding the private respondents as having failed to present evidence relative to
petitioners absences and tardiness, the NLRC agrees with the Labor Arbiter. However, the NLRC ruled that
petitioner had admitted the tardiness and absences though offering justifications for the infractions. The
decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a NEW
ONE entered dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
However, respondents Mabini Medical Clinic and Dr. Wilfrido Juco are jointly and solidarily ordered to pay
complainant Ester Asuncion the equivalent of her three (3) months salary for and as a penalty for
respondents non-observance of complainants right to due process.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the public respondent denied in its Resolution, dated
February 19, 1997. Hence, petitioner through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks recourse to this Court and raises the following issue:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS DISMISSED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FOR A JUST OR AUTHORIZED CAUSE.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Although, it is a legal tenet that factual findings of administrative bodies are entitled to great weight and
respect, we are constrained to take a second look at the facts before us because of the diversity in the
opinions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[5] A disharmony between the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter and those of the NLRC opens the door to a review thereof by this Court.[6]
It bears stressing that a workers employment is property in the constitutional sense. He cannot be
deprived of his work without due process. In order for the dismissal to be valid, not only must it be based
on just cause supported by clear and convincing evidence,[7] the employee must also be given an
opportunity to be heard and defend himself. [8] It is the employer who has the burden of proving that the
dismissal was with just or authorized cause.[9] The failure of the employer to discharge this burden means
that the dismissal is not justified and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and backwages.[10]
In the case at bar, there is a paucity of evidence to establish the charges of absenteeism and tardiness. We
note that the employer company submitted mere handwritten listing and computer print-outs. The
handwritten listing was not signed by the one who made the same. As regards the print-outs, while the
listing was computer generated, the entries of time and other annotations were again handwritten and
unsigned.[11]
We find that the handwritten listing and unsigned computer print-outs were unauthenticated and, hence,
unreliable. Mere self-serving evidence of which the listing and print-outs are of that nature should be
rejected as evidence without any rational probative value even in administrative proceedings. For this
reason, we find the findings of the Labor Arbiter to be correct. On this point, the Labor Arbiter ruled, to
wit:
x x x In the instant case, while the Notice of Termination served on the complainant clearly mentions the
record book upon which her tardiness (and absences) was based, the respondent (company) failed to
establish (through) any of these documents and the handwritten listing, notwithstanding, of (sic) the days
when complainant was absent from work or late in reporting for work and even the computerized print-
outs, do not suffice to prove the complainants absences were unauthorized as they could easily be
manufactured. x x x[12]
In IBM Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC,[13] this Court clarified that the liberality of procedure in administrative
actions is not absolute and does not justify the total disregard of certain fundamental rules of
evidence. Such that evidence without any rational probative value may not be made the basis of order or
decision of administrative bodies. The Courts ratiocination in that case is relevant to the propriety of
rejecting the unsigned handwritten listings and computer print-outs submitted by private respondents
which we quote, to wit:
However, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic
requirements of due process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative value. More specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC:
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules
of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a
license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the
courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before
it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The Statement of
Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying signature
of a certified public accountant or audited by an independent auditor, are nothing but self-serving
documents which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value.
The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance of their
authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the
conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some
proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.
In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC,[14] this Court held as incompetent unsigned daily
time records presented to prove that the employee was neglectful of his duties:
Indeed, the DTRs annexed to the present petition would tend to establish private respondents neglectful
attitude towards his work duties as shown by repeated and habitual absences and tardiness and
propensity for working undertime for the year 1992. But the problem with these DTRs is that they are
neither originals nor certified true copies. They are plain photocopies of the originals, if the latter do
exist. More importantly, they are not even signed by private respondent nor by any of the employers
representatives. x x x.
In the case at bar, both the handwritten listing and computer print-outs being unsigned, the authenticity
thereof is highly suspect and devoid of any rational probative value especially in the light of the existence
of the official record book of the petitioners alleged absences and tardiness in the possession of the
employer company.
Ironically, in the memorandum charging petitioner and notice of termination, private respondents referred
to the record book as its basis for petitioners alleged absenteeism and tardiness. Interestingly, however,
the record book was never presented in evidence. Private respondents had possession thereof and the
opportunity to present the same. Being the basis of the charges against the petitioner, it is without doubt
the best evidence available to substantiate the allegations. The purpose of the rule requiring the
production of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such
evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally
arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and
defeat.[15] Thus, private respondents unexplained and unjustified non-presentation of the record book,
which is the best evidence in its possession and control of the charges against the petitioner, casts serious
doubts on the factual basis of the charges of absenteeism and tardiness.
We find that private respondents failed to present a single piece of credible evidence to serve as the basis
for their charges against petitioner and consequently, failed to fulfill their burden of proving the facts
which constitute the just cause for the dismissal of the petitioner. However, the NLRC ruled that despite
such absence of evidence, there was an admission on the part of petitioner in her Letter dated August 11,
1994 wherein she wrote:
I am quite surprised why I have incurred 35 absences since August 1993 up to the present. I can only
surmise that Saturdays were not included in my work week at your clinic. If you will please recall, per
agreement with you, my work days at your clinic is from Monday to Friday without Saturday work. As to
my other supposed absences, I believe that said absences were authorized and therefore cannot be
considered as absences which need not be explained (sic). It is also extremely difficult to understand why
it is only now that I am charged to explain alleged absences incurred way back August 1993.[16]
In reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, public respondent NLRC relied upon the supposed admission
of the petitioner of her habitual absenteeism and chronic tardiness.
We do not subscribe to the findings of the NLRC that the above quoted letter of petitioner amounted to
an admission of her alleged absences. As explained by petitioner, her alleged absences were incurred on
Saturdays. According to petitioner, these should not be considered as absences as there was an
arrangement between her and the private respondents that she would not be required to work on
Saturdays. Private respondents have failed to deny the existence of this arrangement. Hence, the decision
of the NLRC that private respondent had sufficient grounds to terminate petitioner as she admitted the
charges of habitual absences has no leg to stand on.
Neither have the private respondents shown by competent evidence that the petitioner was given any
warning or reprimanded for her alleged absences and tardiness. Private respondents claimed that they
sent several notices to the petitioner warning her of her absences, however, petitioner refused to receive
the same. On this point, the Labor Arbiter succinctly observed:
The record is bereft of any showing that complainant was ever warned of her absences prior to her
dismissal on August 9, 1994. The alleged notices of her absences from August 17, until September 30,
1993, from October until November 27, 1993, from December 1, 1993 up to February 26, 1994 and the
notice dated 31 May 1994 reminding complainant of her five (5) days absences, four (4) half-days and
tardiness for 582 minutes (Annex "1" to "1-D" attached to respondent' Rejoinder), fail to show that the
notices were received by the complainant. The allegation of the respondents that the complainant refused
to received (sic) the same is self-serving and merits scant consideration. xxx[17]
The Court, likewise, takes note of the fact that the two-day period given to petitioner to explain and answer
the charges against her was most unreasonable, considering that she was charged with several offenses
and infractions (35 absences, 23 half-days and 108 tardiness), some of which were allegedly committed
almost a year before, not to mention the fact that the charges leveled against her lacked particularity.
Apart from chronic absenteeism and habitual tardiness, petitioner was also made to answer for loitering
and wasting of company time, getting salary of an absent employee without acknowledging or signing for
it and disobedience and insubordination.[18] Thus, the Labor Arbiter found that actually petitioner tried to
submit her explanation on August 11, 1994 or within the two-day period given her, but private
respondents prevented her from doing so by instructing their staff not to accept complainants explanation,
which was the reason why her explanation was submitted a day later.[19]
The law mandates that every opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee by the
management to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense.[20] In Ruffy v. NLRC,[21] the Court held
that what would qualify as sufficient or ample opportunity, as required by law, would be every kind of
assistance that management must accord to the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his
defense. In the case at bar, private respondents cannot be gainsaid to have given petitioner the ample
opportunity to answer the charges leveled against her.
From the foregoing, there are serious doubts in the evidence on record as to the factual basis of the
charges against petitioner. These doubts shall be resolved in her favor in line with the policy under the
Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in favor of labor.[22] The consistent rule is
that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate
evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.[23] Not having satisfied its burden of proof, we
conclude that the employer dismissed the petitioner without any just cause. Hence, the termination is
illegal.
Having found that the petitioner has been illegally terminated, she is necessarily entitled to reinstatement
to her former previous position without loss of seniority and the payment of backwages.[24]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, dated November 29, 1996 and the
Resolution, dated February 20, 1997 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, dated May 15, 1996 REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THE CONSOLIDATED BAN AND TRUST CO. VS DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16886
entitled, The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., Narciso
O. Morales and Spouse promulgated on 25 November 1999 and of the Resolution of the appellate court
dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed
the order dated 28 December 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint[3] for recovery of sum of money
against respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in
order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust corporation,
alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same
date. Under the promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and
Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through
twenty-five monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. The note
was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the full
amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. Petitioner
likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle their obligation but
notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness which, as of 09 March
1984, stood at P1,332,474.55. Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B, and C, respectively, a
photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it
sent respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents loan.
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default which was
opposed by the defendants upon the ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and
of petitioners complaint.
On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed before the trial court a manifestation attaching
thereto its answer to petitioners complaint which states the following:
2- That it denies generally and specifically the allegations contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof
for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters therein
alleged, the truth being those alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow contained;
3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a first special and affirmative defense, defendant herein states
that the promissory note in question is void for want of valid consideration and/or there was no valuable
consideration involved as defendant herein did not receive any consideration at all;
4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a second special affirmative defense, defendant herein alleges
that no demand has ever been sent to nor received by herein defendant and if ever demands were made,
denies any liability as averred therein.
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a third special and affirmative defense, defendant herein avers
that the complaint states no cause of action and has no basis either in fact or in law;
VERIFICATION
I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose
and state:
That I am the Controller of Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., one of the defendants in this case.
That for and in behalf of the defendant corporation, I caused the preparation of the above-narrated
answer.
That I have read the contents thereof and they are true of my own knowledge.
(SGD) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO[4]
On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his manifestation together with his answer wherein he
likewise renounced any liability on the promissory note, thus:
1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the complaint with a qualification in paragraph 3 thereof that he
has long been separated from his wife and the system governing their property relations is that of
complete separation of property and not that of conjugal partnership of gain[s];
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically, the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof,
for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief and as to the truth of the matter therein
averred, the truth being those alleged in the Special And Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow pleaded;
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
4. He has never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in his personal and/or individual
capacity as such;
5. That the said promissory note is ineffective, unenforceable and void for lack of valid consideration;
6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia, the validity and execution of the questioned promissory note,
still, defendant herein cannot be bound personally and individually to the said obligations as banking
procedures requires, it being a standard operating procedure of all known banking institution, that to hold
a borrower jointly and severally liable in his official as well as personal capacity, the borrower must sign a
Suretyship Agreement or at least, a continuing guarranty with that of the corporation he represent(s) but
which in this case is wanting;
7. That transaction/obligation in question did not, in any way, redound/inure to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gain, as there is no conjugal partnership of gain to speak with, defendant having long been
separated from his wife and their property relation is governed by the system of complete separation of
property, and more importantly, he has never signed the said promissory note in his personal and
individual capacity as such;
VERIFICATION
That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and
declare that:
I am one of the named defendant[s] in the above-entitled case;
I hAve cause[d] the preparation of the foregoing Answer upon facts and figures supplied by me to my
retained counsel; have read each and every allegations contained therein and hereby certify that the same
are true and correct of my own knowledge and information.
(SGD) NARCISO MORALES
Affiant
On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in default and
admitted their respective answers.[6]
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino
(Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated that respondents
obtained the loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and due to respondents failure to pay a single
monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was constrained to send a demand letter to respondents; that
as a result of this demand letter, Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino), respondent corporations controller,
wrote a letter to petitioner requesting for some consideration because of the unfavorable business
atmosphere then buffeting their business operation; that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a check with a
face value of P220,020.00 to be discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as partial
payment to their companys obligation to petitioner; that after receipt of this partial payment, respondents
obligation again became stagnant prompting petitioner to serve respondents with another demand letter
which, unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents. Lavarino also identified the following exhibits for
petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as Exhibit
A;[7]petitioners 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as Exhibit B;[8] Tolentinos letter to petitioner dated
10 February 1983 and marked as Exhibit C;[9] and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to
respondents marked as Exhibit D.[10]
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of
Exhibit A could no longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the
promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit E.
The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit E and granted respondents motion that they be
allowed to amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence.[11]
On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration[12] of
the trial courts order admitting into evidence petitioners Exhibit E. Respondent corporation claims that
Exhibit E should not have been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and
hearsay evidence. Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit E was not properly identified by Lavarino
who testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of
which was Exhibit E. Further, as there were markings in Exhibit A which were not contained in Exhibit E,
the latter could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit A. Lastly, respondent corporation
claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit E
was not the original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the complaint and upon which respondent
corporation based its own answer.
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to reconsider order admitting as evidence
Exhibit E[13] which, other than insisting that the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note
were not established as far as he was concerned, essentially raised the same arguments contained in
respondent corporations manifestation with motion for reconsideration referred to above.
On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted respondents motions for reconsideration.[14] Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of this order which was denied by the court a quo on 20 December 1985.[15]
On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that
with the exclusion of Exhibits A and E, petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged
indebtedness.
On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion[17] praying that the presiding judge, Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of
the court a quo inhibit himself from this case maintaining that the latter rushed into resolving its motion
for reconsideration of the trial courts order of 06 December 1985 thereby depriving it the opportunity of
presenting proof that the original of Exhibit A was delivered to respondents as early as 02 April 1983. Such
haste on the part of the presiding judge, according to petitioner, cast doubt on his objectivity and fairness.
This motion to inhibit was denied by the trial court on 06 August 1987.[18]
In an order dated 28 December 1987,[19] the case before the trial court was dismissed, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant case against defendants Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. and Narciso O. Morales
and spouse, is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiff.
The trial courts finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision now before us. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated
December 28, 1987 dismissing plaintiff-appellant['s] complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the
plaintiff-appellant.[20]
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 December 1999 which was denied for
lack of merit in a resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 11 May 2000.[21]
Aggrieved by the appellate courts ruling, petitioner now seeks redress from this Court imputing the
following errors on the Court of Appeals:
I Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
DENIED THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANKS COMPLAINT, DESPITE THE PRESENCE
OF INDUBITABLE FACTS CLEARLY POINTING TO THE FACT THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED
THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT E,
THE SECOND ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL OF EXHIBIT A
(XEROX COPY OF THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE) WAS ACTUALLY IN THE
POSSESSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THUS WARRANTING THE ADMISSION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD
HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND FROM TRYING AND DECIDING THE
INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING HIS PERCEIVED AND MANIFEST BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THE GRAVE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK.[22]
The petition is meritorious.
In resolving the case against petitioner, the appellate court held that contrary to petitioners stance,
respondents were able to generally and specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution
of the promissory note, thus:
There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the answer (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both
defendants, they denied generally and specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
promissory note and by way of special and affirmative defenses herein states that he (MORALES) never
signed the promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in his personal and/or individual capacity.
Moreover, what appears in the record (Record, p. 20) was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny
generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It would be considered that there is a sufficient
compliance of the requirement of the law for specific denial.[23]
We hold otherwise.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does
not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance
with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.[24]
In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde,[25] this Court held that
. . . Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount
stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent
reiterated these allegations in his denial under oath, stating that the promissory note sued upon, assuming
that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it
did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses
case of Songco vs. Sellner,[26] the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of
an actionable document, viz.:
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is
otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument
was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the
contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to
avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.[27]
In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to
specifically deny the allegations in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules.
In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the genuineness and due execution of
the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the best evidence rule or primary
evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of the writing meaning the
alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly loaned to the defendants
(respondents herein).
The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The best evidence rule, according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one
case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C. J., was quoted as stating that they should take into consideration the
usages of trade and that the best proof that the nature of the thing will afford is only required.[29] Over the
years, the phrase was used to describe rules which were already existing such as the rule that the terms
of a document must be proved by the production of the document itself, in preference to evidence about
the document; it was also utilized to designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out
of court and not subject to the rigors of cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise used to designate
the group of rules by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was preferred to that of others.[30]
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, the only actual rule that the best evidence
phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original writing[31] the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average
importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and
contracts, since a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is a
substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting,
and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special
risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. In the light of
these dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection, largely
avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the preference for the original writing
is justified.
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the best
evidence rule, we declare that this rule finds no application to this case. It should be noted that
respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude
that as far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough and
leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents principal defense rests on
the alleged lack of consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that
he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the precise
wording[33] of the promissory note which should have paved the way for the application of the best
evidence rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court
on this point.
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As quoted
earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the
possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the
opportunity by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit A was in
the possession of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the best
evidence rule.
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the
promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the
promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the
promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner
failed to present the original of said note.[34]
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness
of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by
the defendant.[35] In the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.,[36] this Court held that
Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into consideration the
documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof, without having been expressly introduced in
evidence. This was no error. In the answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the
authenticity of these documents. Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity and
due execution of these documents must, in that case, be deemed admitted. The effect of this is to relieve
the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The court, for the proper
decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted
by the parties.
Anent petitioners allegation that the presiding judge of the court a quo should have inhibited himself from
this case, we resolve this issue against petitioner.
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and prejudice brought against a judge, there must
be convincing proof to show that he or she is, indeed, biased and partial. Bare allegations are not enough.
Bias and prejudice are serious charges which cannot be presumed particularly if weighed against a judges
sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal
right to the poor and the rich.[38] There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case.[39]
In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any evidence indicating that Judge Diaz was guilty of bias and
prejudice, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that there was no cogent reason for him to disqualify
himself from this case.
Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states the rule on the effect of judgment
on demurrer to evidence. It reads:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.- After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present 2. Record incoming and outgoing deliveries to stock ledger and stock card;
evidence.
3. Received (sic) requisition from branch retail outlets;
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action. Caution, however, must be exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case 4. Select products from storage and place them inside the box, label the boxes and prepare the
upon this ground as under the rules, if the movants plea for the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is corresponding delivery receipts;
granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his right to adduce evidence. If the
5. Make physical count at regular intervals and reconciles physical count with book records;
defendants motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently
reversed on appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right 6. Other assignments as and when required by supervisor from time to time.
to present evidence.[40] The reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it
should render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.[41] Initially, the private respondents employment status was probationary. Six months later, or on 1 March
1992, however, she was regularized.
Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case, they are obligated to petitioner in the
amount of One Million Pesos, this being the amount of loan they obtained on 23 April 1982. In addition, But before her employment status was made permanent, private respondent was given
they also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on the loan; and a penalty charge of 3% per a Memorandum[5] by petitioner Miguel Acebedo III, Operations Manager of petitioner corporation,
annum on the amount due until fully paid. Respondents likewise agreed to pay attorneys fees equivalent reading as follows:
to 10% of the total amount due, but in no case less than P200.00, plus costs of suit with both these
amounts bearing a 1% interest per month until paid. Costs against respondents. TO : MELENCIA BUTIL

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals decision dated 25 November 1999 as well as its FROM : THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
Resolution of 11 May 2000, affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated 28
SUBJECT : WRITTEN WARNING on . . . . . . .
December 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are ordered to pay One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) plus 23% interest per annum, penalty charge of 3% interest per annum, and 10% of the DATE : September 7, 1991
amount due as attorneys fees together with a 1% interest per month until fully paid. The sum
of P220,020.00 which was the value of the postdated check given by respondents to petitioner as partial As pEr report of the Personnel Department on the Absences and Tardiness for the month of August, you
payment should be deducted from the amount due from respondents. were found to have 1 hr. & 34 mins. late (sic).

SO ORDERED. Be informed that habitual absences/tardiness is a grave violation of company policy.

ABCEBEDO VS NLRC This serves as your written warning.

For Review on Certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the Decision,[2] dated 16 [Signed]
May 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59471, and its Resolution dated 19 September 2001,
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of said decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition MIGUEL R. ACEBEDO III
for certiorari, filed by herein petitioners Acebedo Optical (Corporation) and Miguel Acebedo III (Acebedo)
Operations Manager
and affirmed in toto the Resolution,[3] dated 17 November 1999, of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC)-First Division in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-00651-97, which, in turn, sustained The memorandum was to apprise her of her accumulated tardiness of one hour and a half for the month
the Decision dated 22 May 1998, of Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon directing herein petitioners to of August 1991; likewise, it served as a warning to her that habitual tardiness/absenteeism is considered
reinstate private respondent Melencia B. Asegurado to her former or equivalent position without loss of a violation of company policy.
seniority rights, for illegally terminating the latters employment from petitioner corporation; and ordering
them to pay her full backwages, service incentive leaves and attorneys fees. On 15 October 1992, private respondent received another memorandum[6] essentially warning her that
habitual tardiness was considered a grave violation of Company Policy;[7] but without actually notifying her
This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of of the actual period of her alleged tardiness. According to said memorandum, it was to serve as private
full backwages and other benefits. Said grievance was filed by herein private respondent against herein respondents first written warning as well. A copy of the communication reads:
petitioners on 22 January 1997 before the National Labor Relations Commission.
TO : MELENCIA BUTIL
The facts of the case as synthesized from the records are as follows:
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
On 16 August 1991, petitioners engaged the services of private respondent as a packaging clerk
responsible for the following tasks: SUBJECT : AS STATED

1. Receives (sic) product from supplier and sort them out; DATE : October 15, 1992
Be reminded that habitual tardiness is considered a grave violation of Company Policy and is subject to Despite of (sic) previous notices and suspension, you still failed to meet the companys policy on
strict disciplinary action. attendance. Since the company is implementing [unreadable] Disciplinary Measures for this kind of
infraction, you are hereby given seven (7) days suspension which will [unreadable] effective on March 6,
This will serve as your first written warning. 9, 14, 16, 21, 23 & 27, 1995.
[Signed] Please Adhere to the policy [unreadable] failure to improve on this aspect will result in severe penalties.
THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT For your guidance.
On 22 April 1994, a three-day suspension from work was imposed on private respondent on the ground of [Signed]
her being tardy twenty-six times within the period of January to March 1994. The suspension notice was
served on her via a Memorandum[8] dated the same day. It was averred that private respondent incurred LUTZ PENAFLORIDA
twenty-six counts of tardiness within the above-specified months which number far exceeded the
maximum allowable limit per month of only four times.[9] The third Memorandum states: Personnel Manager

TO : MELENCIA ASEGURAD On 22 May 1995, private respondent filed an application for an indefinite leave of absence. In
a Memorandum[11] dated 26 May 1995, petitioner corporations Head of Personnel denied said
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT application, viz:

SUBJECT : TARDINESS, Suspension notice on TO : MELENCIA B. ASEGURADO

DATE : APRIL 22, 1994 FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT

The report on tardiness for the period January to March 1994, showed that you incurred lates (sic) twenty
six (26) times (11, 7, 8) the said numbers exceeded the maximum limit of four times each month.
It is one of the fundamental duties of any employee to follow rules and regulations of the company, and
(sic) one of the most basic is the observance of official time. Your 201 file kept two (2) written warnings
on tardiness.
This time, you are given a three (3) days suspension without pay effective May 10, 11 & 12, 1994.
Please be advised to manage your time very well to avoid future offenses.
[Signed]
LUTZ PENAFLORIDA
Acting Head Personnel
On 28 February 1995, private respondent was served a fourth Memorandum.[10] For having incurred
twenty-one counts of tardiness for the months of [unreadable] to December 1994, the latter was meted
another suspension, this time for seven days, or four days longer than the first. More specifically, it
provides:
TO : MELENCIA ASEGURADO
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : TARDINESS, Suspension notice of
DATE : February 28, 1995
The report on tardiness for the period of [unreadable] to December 1994, (sic) showed that you incurred
lates (sic) twenty-one (21) times (3, 9, 9), the said number exceeded the maximum limit of four times each
month.
SUBJECT : STATEMENT OF CHARGE
DATE : May 26, 1995.
Be informed that the indefinite leave of absence which you have filed last May 22, 1995 is not approved,
this nature of leave is not being considered in our prescribed policy. Be reminded also that you have
accumulated a total of fourteen (14) days absence for this month alone.
Although, (sic) we understood (sic) your reason (no babysitter), we are also concerned about the smooth
flow of work in your section. Since you went on leave, some GSD staff took turn (sic) in doing your function.
Due to this situation, I am worried that this would led (sic) to confusion, error and delay because theres
nobody who is completely in charged (sic) in monitoring their activities.
I am giving you up to the end of the month to sort out your personal problem. Failure to go back to work
on June 01, 1995 would make your extended leave of absence unauthorized (sic). This would constitutes
(sic) a valid ground for the termination of your services.
For your guidance.
[Signed]
LUTZ PENAFLORIDA
Personnel Head
On 29 August 1995, private respondent was suspended for the third time, this time for thirteen days. The
reason given for the imposition of such penalty was the employees failure to meet the company policy on
tardiness. The Memorandum[12] reads in full:
TO : MS. MELENCIA ASEGURADO PACKAGING CLERK
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : SUSPENSION, Notice of
DATE : August 29, 1995
Based on the Tardiness Report, you have accumulated a total of 17 lates for the quarter (April June).
As per company policy, Head Office employees are limited only to four (4) lates per month or a total of
twelve (12) per quarter.
The said policy is being implemented to control excessive lateness and to prevent time being wasted for
non-performance. Despite of (sic) previous warnings and/or suspension given, (March 1995) you still failed
to meet the company policy on Tardiness.You are hereby given a (sic) 13 days suspension which will take
effect on Sept. 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26 & 27, 1995.
Be advised to observe the said policy accordingly. Future offense will be treated with more severe penalty.
For your guidance.
[Signed]
LUTZ PENAFLORIDA
Head Personnel
On 12 November 1996, private respondent did not report for work allegedly due to the demolition of the
place that her family was renting.
On 2 December 1996, private respondent again absented herself from work this time because her child
was allegedly hospitalized.
Six days later, or on 8 December 1996, the Head of the Personnel Department of petitioner
corporation issued a Notice of Termination[13] against private respondent. The memorandum reads:
TO : MELY ASEGURADO
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : NOTICE OF TERMINATION
DATE : December 08, 1996
Despite several warnings both verbal and written accompanied with suspension, you were found to be
abusive in your lates and absences as shown by the result of 1996 Attendance Report for the quarter Jan-
Mar. 12, April-June 21, July-Sept. 43, Oct.-Nov. 17. Only four (4) lates per month or twelve (12) per quarter
is allowed. Regarding absences and leaves, you already exhausted the company provision of 8 days sick
leave plus 7.5 vacation leave and had accumulated a total of [unreadable] days absences without pay as
of December 7, 1996.
This kind of performance is below company standard. Chronic absenteeism combined with abusive
tardiness is considered as gross and habitual negligence that constitutes a valid ground for dismissal. Be
reminded that you were suspended for 13 days (September 95) for similar infraction and were advised to
improve your performance otherwise (sic) facing the maximum penalty is inevitable.
The management has the prerogative to [unreadable] also discipline [unreadable] its employees who are
not capable of following their fundamental duty to obey basic rules and regulations of the company in
order to protect its interest. Several [unreadable] both verbal and written accompanied with suspension
were issued to you but you failed to live up to a higher standard of responsibility.
Please be informed that your services shall be terminated on January 15, 1997 due to gross and habitual
neglect of your duty.
For your guidance
[Signed]
LUTZ PENAFLORIDA
Personnel Head
From the aforequoted memorandum, private respondents dismissal from service was brought on by her
supposed exhaustion of the allowable sick and vacation leaves per month constituting gross and habitual
neglect of your duty.[14] Notice of the termination of her employment was received by private respondent
under protest and six days after the fact, or only on 21 January 1997.
The foregoing state of affairs prompted private respondent to file a case for illegal dismissal with the NLRC
the very next day.
In a Decision dated 22 May 1998, Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon rendered judgment declaring private
respondent illegally dismissed from service. The Labor Arbiter held that petitioners failed to accord said
employee due process of law; and found that private respondents dismissal from service was anchored on
past infractions for which she had already been penalized. Accordingly, the dispositve of the decision
states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant unlawful and unjustified
and ordering the respondents jointly and severally to reinstate said complainant to her former or
equivalent position without loss of seniority rights with full backwages which as of the date of this Decision
has ballooned to the amount of P79,716.00 plus other benefits such as 13th month pay in the amount
of P6,643.00 and service incentive leave pay in the amount of P2,628.00.
Respondents are also ordered to pay complainants counsel ten (10%) percent of the total award recovered
as attorneys fees pursuant to law.[15]
On appeal, in a Resolution dated 17 November 1999, public respondent NLRC rendered a decision
dismissing petitioners appeal for allegedly being filed out of time long after the assailed decision of the
Labor Arbiter had supposedly become final and executory. Accordingly, the assailed decision was
affirmed in toto. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed
decision dated May 22, 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.[16]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] which public respondent NLRC denied in
its Resolution dated 17 April 2000.
Undaunted, herein petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the National Labor Relations
Commission for ordering the payment of backwages, damages and attorneys fees to an employee who
had been dismissed for just cause.
On 16 May 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive of
which states that:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED.[18]
In essence, the Court of Appeals held that herein petitioners failed to marshal the obligatory quantum of
evidence needed to substantiate a finding of legitimacy or validity in the termination of employment of
private respondent, the reason for which was supposedly her repeated defiance of company
policy. According to the appellate court, petitioners failure to adduce in evidence a copy of the
contravened company policy was fatal to their cause. Absent proof of evidence of such document
embodying the flouted rule, the appellate court, along with the labor arbiter and the NLRC, was unable to
make a categorical finding on the issue of whether or not the private respondents accumulated absences
and/or tardiness were, indeed, in violation of petitioner companys rules and regulations. Further, as to the
allegation of chronic absenteeism and/or tardiness for the period of 1991 to 1995, the appellate court
likewise held that the non-presentation of the Daily Time Records (DTRs) for said period was a grave
error. It held that the numerous memoranda issued to private respondent were mere self-serving
evidence and made the following observations
Petitioners stance is even incongruent with the evidence on record. Thus, the Private Respondent was
employed, (sic) on a probationary basis or status x x x [she] incurred tardiness in the accumulated time of
one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes for the month of August, 1991, and yet, the Private Respondent was
promoted and made a permanent employee on March 1, 1992.
[A]fter her one (1) hour and thirty four (34) minute tardiness in September 1991, nothing on record reveals
that she had been tardy for the year 1992. The Memorandum reminding the Private Respondent about
her tardiness did not establish that Private Respondent again incurred any tardiness. It is noted that Private
Respondent was not tardy in the year 1993. Although she was tardy during the period from January to
March 1994, however, she was ordered suspended on May 10 to 12, 1994. Thereafter, Private Respondent
did not report late for the rest of the year as the next Memorandum of the Petitioner Corporation was
issued on February 28, 1995, informing Private Respondent of her suspension on March 6, 9, 14, 16, 21,
23 and 27, 1995.
Based on the Memorandum of the Petitioners, the Private Respondent was tardy for seventeen (17) times
for the quarter from April to June, 1995. However, the Memorandum of the Petitioners did not indicate
the dates and precise times when the Private Respondent was tardy. Without the Daily Time Records of
the Respondent during the period envisaged in the Memoranda of the Petitioners, it cannot be ascertained
whether Private Respondents tardiness was habitual and incorrigible.[19]
Anent the finding by the NLRC that herein petitioners appeal was filed out of time, the Court of Appeals
clarified that Sec. 224 of the Labor Code requires that both party and counsel must be served their
respective copies of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In the instant case, herein petitioners received a
copy of the Labor Arbiters decision only on 5 March 1999. They then filed an appeal, 15 March
1999. Therefore, it cannot be said that their recourse to the NLRC was filed out of time.
In fine, the Court of Appeals ruled that the appeal, having been filed with the NLRC within the reglementary
period, dismissal of the employee was too severe a penalty and, thus, unwarranted. Such conclusion was
based on the finding that even on the assumption that Private Respondent incurred tardiness and/or
absences in the course of her employment, she had been duly penalized therefor.[20]
HenCe, petitioners, through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, seek recourse to this Court and raise the following issues:[21]
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED PALPABLE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DECLARED RESPONDENT TO HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY DISMISSED DESPITE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT SHE INCURRED EXCESSIVE TARDINESS AND ABSENTEEISM IN
VIOLATION OF THE COMPANYS RULES AND REGULATIONS WHICH WARRANTED HER TERMINATION FROM
WORK; [and]
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED PALPABLE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT ORDERED RESPONDENT REINSTATED TO HER FORMER POSITION OR TO
REINSTATE HER TO HER FOREMER OR EQUIVALENT POSITION WITH FULL BACKWAGES PLUS OTHER
BENEFITS[,] SUCH AS 13TH MONTH PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY.
At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the first issue raised by petitioners inquires into the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. They are fundamentally assailing the appellate courts finding that
whatever evidence is on record, it is insufficient to establish that company policies were contravened by
private respondent. In effect, petitioners would have us sift through the data on record and pass upon
whether or not there is sufficient basis to hold private respondent accountable for continually disobeying
the established company policy respecting tardiness and absenteeism allegedly amounting to gross and
habitual negligence. This clearly involves a factual inquiry, the determination of which is the statutory
function of the NLRC.[22]
Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts; only errors of law are generally reviewed
in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the Court of Appeals. Questions of fact are not
entertained.[23] And in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.[24] Factual questions are for
labor tribunals to resolve.
Judicial Review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which its labor officials findings rest.[25] As such, the findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are
generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding
on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[26] This Court finds no basis for
deviating from said doctrine without any clear showing that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed
by the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the Court of
Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed.[27]
Nevertheless, we have reviewed the records of the case at bar and find no reversible error committed by
the Court of Appeals concerning the merits of the present petition.
Bearing in mind the facts of the case, petitioners assert that private respondents numerous tardiness
and/or absenteeism is tantamount to gross habitual neglect of duty amounting to gross negligence; thus,
a valid ground for dismissal of an employee.
We find the instant petition to be without merit.
The Labor Code, specifically Article 277(b), guarantees the right of an employee to security of tenure. It
provides that
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. x x x
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected
against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so
desires in accordance with company rules and regulations x x x.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the dismissal of private respondent may be upheld only if shown
to have been made for a just or authorized cause and attended with due process.
Corollary to the preceding legal policy is the equally basic principle of labor law, that, it is the employer
who has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just cause, and failure to do so would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was unjustified; and, therefore, illegal.
In the present petition, the labor arbiter evaluated the evidence presented by herein parties and
concluded that private respondent Asegurado was not afforded the due process guaranteed by law and
jurisprudence. Moreover, the alluded incidences of absenteeism and tardiness which constituted the
charge of habitual neglect of duty amounting to gross negligence were past infractions that have already
been penalized.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the finding of illegal dismissal.
In agreement with the assailed decisions, the Court of Appeals, heedful of the legal principle that it is the
employer which has the onus probandi to prove that private respondents dismissal was based on valid
ground, ruled that the Commission committed no grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the finding
by the labor arbiter that the evidence on record was insufficient to sustain the legality of private
respondent Asegurados dismissal from service; therefore, the appellate court dismissed the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioners.
As earlier stated, we find no basis for deviating from the oft-espoused legal tenet that findings of facts and
conclusion of the labor arbiter are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed
with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence,
without any clear showing that such findings of fact, as affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of
substantiation. More so, when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are binding and
conclusive upon us and will not normally be disturbed;[28] accordingly, the finding that the alleged absences
and incidences of tardiness of private respondent are but past infractions for which petitioners had already
imposed several sanctions and for which private respondent had been duly penalized. And being past
infractions, they cannot be taken collectively as a justification for the dismissal from service of the
employee.[29]
But even assuming for the sake of argument that the past infractions could still validly be the subject of
future punishment, still there is no basis for petitioners claim that private respondents supposed habitual
absenteeism and tardiness is a form of gross and habitual neglect of duty. Under Article 282(b) of the Labor
Code, gross and habitual neglect of duty by the employee of his duties is a just cause for the termination
of the latters employment. To warrant removal from service, however, the negligence should not merely
be gross but also habitual.[30] In this case, assuming the absences and tardiness of private respondent
Asegurado to be habitual, can they also be categorized as gross?
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise even slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to
avoid them.[31] Though there may have been times when private respondents absences were undertaken
without the necessary approved leave applications, nevertheless, she would send word for when these
would occur. Moreover, quite telling is the fact that nowhere in the memoranda sent to private
respondent was there any mention of a complaint relating to the quality of her work. As the present case
does not show the presence of one of the two requisites to make the finding of negligence a just cause for
dismissal. At the most, private respondent should have been further suspended from service for taking for
granted that her leave would be approved by the personnel department of petitioner corporation. The
penalty of dismissal is too harsh, considering that private respondent had been with the company for five
years and, apparently, the management had no complaint as regards the formers quality of work.
Herein, to our mind, petitioners have not sufficiently shown that private respondent had willfully
disobeyed the company rules and regulations respecting absences and tardiness. The cause for the
termination of private respondents employment was not simply habitual tardiness and/or
absenteeism. Petitioners have alleged time and again that the basis upon which the dismissal of private
respondent was anchored was breach or violation of company policy. It was their contention that private
respondents habitual tardiness and/or absences were in violation of petitioner companys rules and
regulations. Ironically, though petitioners referred to their company policies, they never presented a copy
of these in evidence except in their Motion for Reconsideration too late in the day. Being the basis of the
charge against private respondent, it is without doubt the best evidence available to substantiate the
allegations. The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of
fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place (or none at all save for mere allegation), the presumption naturally arises that the
better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and defeat.[32]
By failing to prove the existence of the company rules in due time, i.e., non-presentation of an
authenticated copy, unarguably the best evidence, casts skepticism on the factual basis of the charge of
violation thereof; arguably, therefore, it cannot be said that the assailed conduct can be considered gross
neglect of duty.
It is indeed true that administrative agencies, like the NLRC, are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases.[33] However, this procedural liberty must not be
interpreted to mean an unfettered license to put forth assertions without at least presenting tangible
proof to back them up. Otherwise, such assertions would just be allegations, and allegations are not
evidence.[34] What is involved here transcends mere procedural technicality and concerns the more
paramount principles and requirements of due process, which may not be sacrificed at the altar of
expediency. Upon this principle, the failure to present a copy of the supposed Company Policy to prove
the allegation of their existence must be seen and taken for what they are inadmissible hearsay. Mere
allegation or assertion, by any stretch of reasoning, cannot be considered substantial evidence of their
existence and of the subsequent violation complained of.
From the preceding discussion, the dearth of reliable evidence on record constitutes serious doubt as to
the factual basis of the charge of violation of company policy filed against private respondent. This doubt
shall be resolved in her favor in line with the policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and
construe doubts in favor of labor.[35] The consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be titled in favor of the latter. The
employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable
cause.[36] Having failed to satisfy this burden of proof, we find that petitioners dismissed private
respondent without just cause. Consequently, the termination of her employment was illegal.
To finish, as a final nail to the coffin that is the petitioners recourse to this Court, we find that private
respondent was not accorded due process by petitioners prior to being dismissed from service. Despite
the fact that private respondent was repeatedly warned through the numerous memoranda sent to her
for coming in late or not reporting at all to the office, she was never asked to defend her position, much
less voice an objection to the charges leveled at her.
Law and jurisprudence require an employer to furnish the employee two written notices before
termination of his employment may be ordered. The first notice must inform him of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought; the second, of the employers decision to dismiss the employee
after he has been given the opportunity to be heard and defend himself.[37] With regard to private
respondent, prior to the Notice of Termination, no occasion was given to her to explain her side on why
she should not be terminated. There is no evidence that there was an exchange of communication
between petitioners and private respondent regarding the latters supposed infractions. Lest it be
forgotten, every opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee by the management to
enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation.[38] No chance
whatsoever was given to private respondent in this case. She was simply served her termination notice
without being heard in her defense.
In retrospection, if, indeed, private respondent was a delinquent and an errant employee, why did
petitioners put up with such behavior for no less than five years?
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 16
May 2001, and Resolution dated 19 September 2001, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59471,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners Acebedo Optical, Inc. and Miguel Acebedo III.
SO ORDERED.
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioner,
vs.
MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
For consideration of the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari dated April 20, 20li filed by MCMP
Construction Corp. under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition seeks the reversal of the Decision
dated October 14, 20112and Resolution dated March 9, 20123 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA
G.R. CV No. 91860 entitled Monark Equipment Corporation v. MCMP Construction Corporation. The CA
Decision affirmed the Decision dated November 20, 20074 and Order dated April 28, 20085 issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 in Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-02-4 7092 entitled Monark
Equipment Corporation v. MCMP Construction Corporation.
The facts of the case are as follows:
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation
(Monark) for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus,
Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac,
Quezon, the delivery evidenced by invoices as well as Documents Acknowledgment Receipt Nos. 04667
and 5706, received and signed by representatives of MCMP, namely, Jorge Samonte on December 5, 2000
and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001, respectively. Notably, the invoices state:
"Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date of invoice. Customer agrees to pay interest at 24%
p.a. on all amounts. In addition, customer agrees to pay a collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and
2% per month penalty charge for late payment on amounts overdue. Customer agrees to pay a sum equal
to 25% of any amount due as attorney’s fees in case of suit, and expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for any legal action arising from, this
transactions."
Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated in the invoices, MCMP failed to pay the rental
fees. Upon demands made upon MCMP to pay the amount due, partial payments were made in the
amount of Ph₱100,000.00 on April 15, 2001 and Ph₱100,000.00 on August 15, 2001. Further demands
went unheeded. As of April 30, 2002, MCMP owed Monark the amount of Ph₱1,282,481.83, broken down
as follows:
Principal Accumulated PhP 765,380.33
Interest (2%) 253,226.17
2% Monthly Penalty Charge 253,226.17
Collection Fee (1%) 10,649.16
===============
Ph₱1,282,481.836
Thus, on June 18, 2002, Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the RTC docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
02-47092.7 In its Answer filed on July 5, 2002,8 MCMP alleged in defense thatthe complaint was premature
as Monark has refused to give a detailed breakdown of its claims. MCMP further averred that it had an
agreement with Monark that it would not be charged for the whole time that the leased equipment was
in its possession but rather only for the actual time that the equipment was used although still on the
project site. MCMP, however, admitted that this agreement was not contained in the Contract.
During trial, Monark presented asone of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account
Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies ofthe Contract, one retained by
Monark, while the other was given to MCMP. He further testified that Monark’s copy had been lost and
that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the
Contract which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent efforts to search for the original
copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial
court to produce the same.9
On November 20, 2007, the RTC issued its Decision finding for Monark as plaintiff, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and legal premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay the former:
1. PhP 1,282,481.83 as balance for the rental fees of the subject heavy equipments (sic) as of April 30,
2002, inclusive of the interests thereof;
2. Twenty-Five percent (25%) of the total amount to be recovered as payment for the attorney’s fees; and,
3. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
From this Decision of the RTC, MCMP filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 31, 2008 while
Monark interposed a Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration.10 On April 28, 2008, the RTC
issued an Order, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reversible error in the assailed decision
henceforth, the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. On the other
hand, the plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED for being
meritorious. Therefore, in the dispositive portion of the assailed decision dated 20 November 2007, the
following should be included:
‘The payment of interests, charges and fees due after April 30, 2002 and up to the time when all the
obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff shall have been fully paid, computed in accordance with the
stipulations entered into between the parties under Exhibits "A" to "G", and uniformly stated in the
following wise:
Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date of invoice. Customer agreesto pay interest at 24%
p.a. on all amounts. In addition, customer agrees to pay a collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and
2% per month penalty charge for late payment on amounts overdue. Customer agrees to pay a sum equal
to 25% of any amount due as attorney’s fees in case of suit, and expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for any legal action arising from, this
transactions.’
SO ORDERED."
Unsatisfied, MCMP appealed the RTC’s Decision and Order to the Court of Appeals (CA). Eventually, the
appellate court, by a Decision dated October 14, 2011, affirmed in totothe Decision and Order of the RTC.
MCMP’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March
9, 2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
MCMP challenges the ruling of the CA arguing that the appellate court should have disallowed the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence
Rule. MCMP specifically argues that based on the testimony of Peregrino, Monark did not diligently search
for the original copy of the Contract as evidenced by the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of the document
was not presented; 2) the alleged loss was not even reported to management or the police; and 3) Monark
only searched for the original copy of the document for the purposes of the instant case.
Petitioner’s contention is erroneous.
The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court which
provides:
"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
(Emphasis supplied)"
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:
"Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost
ordestroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is inthe
custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence
may be presented as in the case of its loss."
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman,11 the Court set down the requirements before a
party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original document whenever the
original copy has been lost:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of
the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence
of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the instant case, the CA correctlyruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC
gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has
been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has
remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, "findings offacts and assessment
ofcredibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court."12 Hence, the Court will respect the
evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.
MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered
into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request ofthe trial court for it to
produce its copy of the Contract.13 Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for
and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to present the same and even explain its
failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, butit also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP
under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
if produced."
Next, MCMP claims that the piecesof equipment were not actually delivered to it by Monark. It bears
pointing out, however, that the witnesses of MCMP itself, Jorge Samonte, a Budget Supervisor of MCMP,
and Engr. Horacio A. Martinez, Sr., General Manager of MCMP, both acknowledged the delivery of the
equipment to the project sites.14Clearly, the contention of MCMP is false.
Evidently, the instant petition must be dismissed.
Nevertheless, the Court takes notice that the trial court imposed upon MCMP a 24% per annum interest
on the rental fees as well as a collection fee of 1% per month compounded monthly and a 2% per month
penalty charge. In all then, the effective interest rate foisted upon MCMP is 60% per annum. On top of
this, MCMP was assessedfor attorney’s fees at the rate of 25% of the total amount due. These are
exorbitant and unconscionable rates and, following jurisprudence, must be equitably reduced.
In Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,15 the Court reduced the interest imposed by the bank of
36% for being excessive and unconscionable:
"x x x Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is not the first time that this Court has considered the
interest rate of 36% per annum as excessive and unconscionable. We held in Chua vs. Timan:
The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on respondents’ loans mustbe equitably
reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum. We need not unsettle the principle we had affirmed in a
plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the
law. While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling
on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular
could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which
would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract thereon. Hence,
courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand.
The same is true with respect tothe penalty charge. Notably, under the Terms and Conditions Governing
the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, it was also stated therein that respondent BPI shall impose an
additional penalty charge of 3% per month. Pertinently, Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. In exercising this power to determine what is
iniquitous and unconscionable, courts must consider the circumstances of each case since what may be
iniquitous and unconscionable in one may be totally just and equitable in another."
16
In the more recent case of Pentacapital Investment Corporation v. Mahinay, the Court reduced the
interest and penalties imposed in a contract as follows:
"Aside from the payment of the principal obligation of ₱1,936,800.00, the parties agreed that respondent
pay interest at the rate of 25% from February 17, 1997 until fully paid. Such rate, however, is excessive
and thus, void. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract
thereon. To be sure, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand. In this case, 12%
interest is reasonable.
The promissory notes likewise required the payment of a penalty charge of 3% per month or 36% per
annum. We find such rates unconscionable. This Court has recognized a penalty clause as an accessory
obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of ensuring the performance
thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generallyconsisting of the payment of a sum of
money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. However, a penalty
charge of 3% per month is unconscionable; hence, we reduce it to1% per month or 12% per annum,
pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
Lastly, respondent promised to pay 25% of his outstanding obligations as attorney’s fees in case of non-
payment thereof. Attorney’s fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages. As long as said stipulation
does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon respondent. Nonetheless,
courts are empowered to reduce such rate if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable pursuant to the
above-quoted provision. This sentiment is echoed inArticle 2227 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced
if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Hence, we reduce the stipulated attorney's fees from 25% to 10%."
Following the above principles previously laid down by the Court, the interest and penalty charges imposed
upon MCMP must also be considered as iniquitous, unconscionable and, therefore, void. As such, the rates
may validly be reduced. Thus, the interest rate of 24% per annum is hereby reduced to 12% per annum.
Moreover, the interest shall start to accrue thirty (30) days after receipt of the second set of invoices on
January 21, 2001, or March 1, 2001 in accordance with the provisions in the invoices themselves.
Additionally, the penalty and collection charge of 3% per month, or 36% per annum, is also reduced to 6%
per annum.1âwphi1 And the amount of attorney's fees is reduced from 25% of the total amount due to
5%.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit with the
MODIFICATION that the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision dated November 20, 2007, as amended
in an Order dated April 28, 2008, should read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and legal premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay the former:
1. PhP 765,380.33 representing the unpaid rental fees;
2. Interest of 12% per annum on the unpaid rental fees to be computed from March 1, 200117 until
payment;
3. Penalty and collection charge of 6% per annum on the unpaid rental fees to be computed from March
1, 2001;
4. Attorney's Fees of five percent (5%) of the total amount to be recovered; and,
5. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
SECONDARY EVIDENCE RULE (SEC 5-8)
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant-appellee, vs. CARMEN MARTINEZ and DOLORES
MARTINEZ, claimants-appellants. JULIO SALVADOR, claimant-appellee.
C. Lozano for appellants.
Montinola and Montinola for appellee Salvador.
No appearance for the Government.
ARAULLO, J.:
In the cadastral proceedings instituted in the Court of Land Registration for the settlement of titles to lands
in the municipality of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, Dolores and Carmen Martinez on May 11, 1914, appeared
claiming to be the owners of lots Nos. 873 and 450. They alleged in effect, after describing said lots, that
they were in possession thereof for about twenty-five years, having acquired them by donation from Maria
Sarlabus, and that their predecessors in interest had had possession of the same for at least three years
prior to said donation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
When the case came up for trial, Julio Salvador, through his attorney, entered his appearance and claimed
title to said lots, alleging that he was in actual possession thereof, and that his predecessors in interest
had been in possession before him for at least fourteen years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Trial having been held and the parties having adduced their evidence, judgment was rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, which took the place of the Court of Land Registration, denying the claim of
Carmen and Dolores Martinez and adjudicating said lots to Julio Salvador, on the ground that, in the
opinion of the court, it was proved that the Martinez sisters had sold said land to one named Domenech
and that the latter, in return, sold it to Julio Salvador, who could, therefore, be considered owner of the
disputed lots.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Dolores and Carmen Martinez excepted to said judgment and filed a bill of exceptions after their motion
for new trial had been overruled, and they had excepted to the order overruling said motion. they now
allege that the trial court erred:chanrobles virtual law library
1. In admitting the copy of the record of a supposed document of sale presented by the oppositor Julio
Salvador, in support of his claim of title without the disappearance or loss of the original document having
been previously proved;
2. In not considering the evidence of the appellants as to his acts of possession and ownership on the lot
in question; and,
3. In adjudicating and decreeing the registration of said lot in favor of said oppositor.
According to the testimony of Tiburcio Saez, witness of Julio Salvador, he was acquainted with the latter
for about twelve or fourteen years; Julio Salvador acquired said lots from Antonio Domenech, as appeared
in the document exhibited to him at the trial, dated March 14, 1912, and signed by him (the witness) in
the name, and at the request, of the vendor Domenech because the latter had a trembling hand and a
poor eyesight; the notary and two witnesses were present at the time of signing; said lots, according to
the document, consisted of three pieces, to wit, one acquired by Domenech from Anastasio Montes and
the other two from Dolores and Carmen Martinez who, because of certain difficulties he had been in, sold
them in a document acknowledged before the notary public, Mr. Yulo; he was not presented when the
transaction was effected, having only learned of it from the plaintiffs; he did not know of any other
possessor of said land but Domenech, during his lifetime, and Julio Salvador; after Domenech's death
Dolores Martinez told him that the lands did not belong to the former but to them, and finally, Julio
Salvador took possession of said lands at the time of the sale, a fact which he afterwards knew from
Salvador himself, for he was not personally present when the possession was
taken.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Juan Madrenas Soler, attorney in fact of Julio Salvador, who was away in Spain during the trial, testified:
That Julio Salvador gave him certain papers referring to the land in question and that he looked among
them for the document of the sale executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Antonio Domenech but did
not find it; that the made investigations concerning said document, having interviewed My. Yulo, because
he remembered that when Salvador left for Spain he told the witness that the documents concerning the
case had been in Yulo's possession, who informed him that the Martinez sisters had been looking for the
same documents having asked him about them, to which he answered that he remembered having
returned those papers to Domenech and that he did not have them, not having found them, when he had
looked for them, but that, according to Mr. Yulo himself, a copy of them was in some archive in
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As the claimants Martinez denied having sold the aforesaid two lots to Antonio Domenech,, as stated by
the witness Saez, and having executed a document of sale of said lots in favor of Domenech, the attorney
for Julio Salvador, besides the document of sale of said lots executed by Antonio Domenech in favor of
Julio Salvador on March 14, 1912 (Exhibit 1), presented also a certified copy issued by the acting registrar
of deeds of Iloilo and dated May 13, 1914 (Exhibit 2). In referring to the registration of the property
consisting of the two lots in question, after mentioning the acquisition of said lots by Carmen and Dolores
Martinez by virtue of a donation inter vivos made to them of one of said lots by Maria Sarlabus and of a
grant of the other in their favor by Anastasio Montes, respectively, on September 19, 1889, and April 24,
1893, said certified copy stated that said Martinez sold the same lots, that is, the property in the city, to
Antonio Domenech de Toldra for the sum of one hundred fifty pesos, and that the vendors acknowledged
having received the price from the purchaser before the execution of the contract. Said copy also
contained all that was stated in the document of sale executed on January 9, 1900, before the notary
public, Don Gregorio Yulo y Regalado, and presented in that registry at 9:30 a. m. on April 23, 1900,
according to entry No. 2, vol. 1 of the daybook. It further stated that in the same entry there was a marginal
note which read: "This property was sold too Mr. Julio Salvador y Miralles, as appears from record No. 2
of this property No. . . . page . . . of vol. 6 of this book." And said acting registrar, Roman Lacson, having
appeared at the trial, indicated said registration in the book mentioned in said certificate, and also stated
that Exhibit 2 was a true and exact copy thereof.
Said entry, that is, the certified copy already referred to (Exhibit 2), having been presented as evidence,
as already stated, the attorney of the Martinez claimants objected, alleging that it has not been
satisfactorily proved that the document of sale said to have been executed by them in favor of Antonio
Domenech was lots; that Julio Salvador did not say, nor was there any statement, made by him or his
attorney in fact, that the document was in his possession, and, finally, that the previous existence of such
document has not been proved nor had anybody seen it before its supposed loss. The court, however, on
the ground that Julio Salvador's counsel did all he could possibly do when he found himself obliged to
present said document, admitted said certified copy (Exhibit 2), the attorney for the appellants having
excepted to this ruling.
The oppositor or claimant Julio Salvador was under the obligation to present, as evidence of his supposed
title to the lots in question, the document of sale of the said two lots, which, accordingly to the witness
Saez, was executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Antonio Domenech; for to prove said title it was not
sufficient for them to present, as they did, the document of sale of said lots executed by said Domenech
on March 14, 1912, in favor of Julio Salvador, in the execution of which, according to the declaration of
the same witness, Saez, he took part, signing in the name, and at the request, of the vendor Domenech;
but said certified copy of the record in the registry, Exhibit 2, in which mention is made of the document,
was presented by said oppositor, in view of the fact that he did not have said document in his possession.
Nevertheless Julio Salvador ought first to have proved the loss of said original document and that the same
was duly signed and only then could he have proved the contents-thereof by means of the certified copy
of the record, Exhibit 2, or by the statement therein contained of that sale, according to the provisions of
section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The knowledge of the witness Juan Madrenas Soler attorney in fact of Salvador, concerning said document
of sale was obtained from Mr. Yulo who, according to said witness, had told him that the documents
referring to the land in question were again delivered by him to Mr. Domenech. Said witness also testified
that before the search for said document, he had no occasion to see it as he was not interested; that he
did not attempt to look for it after making the declaration he made in the municipal building; that Julio
Salvador himself, before leaving for Spain had not instructed him to look for said papers; and finally, that
when Salvador gave him power to represent him in all his business he only recommended that the name
of Antonio Domenech be changed with that of his own.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
As already stated, Tiburcio Saez only said that he knew that due to certain informations, Dolores and
Carmen Martinez had executed a document of sale in favor of Domenech before the notary public Mr.
Yulo, but that he did not see its execution, learning thereof only through statements made by the Martinez
sisters, which the latter denied while testifying at the trial.
The oppositor Julio Salvador did not present as a witness the notary public, Mr. Yulo, before whom,
according to the witness Saez, Domenech executed said document of sale, in order that he might testify
on this point and corroborate the references made to him by the witnesses Madrenas and Saez and
especially by the first, with respect to the whereabouts of the document. No attempt appears to have
been made to present as witnesses said notary and those persons who must have seen the signing of the
document, nor was it shown that said document had been lost. Finally, it does not appear that Julio
Salvador or his lawyer or his attorney in fact, Madrenas, had made any effort to obtain a copy of said
document from the general archives in the City of Manila, where, according to the lawyer himself, it could
be secured. He, however, promised, after the introduction of evidence, to present it after looking for it in
the archives, which promise was made good, although the court said that he wound limit himself to the
evidence therefore introduced, for the trial having terminated on May 15, 1914, and the court having
rendered judgment on December 15, 1915, that is, one and one-half years afterwards, he had had
sufficient time within which to look for said document and ask for the admission thereof, in case it should
be found, before the final judgment appealed from was rendered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The loss of said document of sale which, it is said, had been executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of
Domenech not having been proved and no proof having been offered that said document was duly
executed and signed, all of this being due to an obvious lack of diligence on the part of the oppositor
himself, his lawyer and attorney in fact, the presentation of the certified copy of the registration, Exhibit
2, and its admission by the court as secondary and supplementary evidence of said document, was
improper and cannot serve as a basis for us to hold it proven, as the lower court did hold, that the Martinez
sisters had sold the land in question to Antonio Domenech and that having acquired it from the latter, Julio
Salvador, the oppositor, could be adjudged to be the owner of said disputed lots.
The appellee, however, invoking section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, maintains that said certified
copy, Exhibit 2, issued by the acting registrar of deeds of Iloilo, was properly admitted as evidence in the
same manner that the original deed of sale of said lots said to have been executed by the Martinez sister
in favor of Antonio Domenech, which, copy being a public document, had the same effect as the original.
Section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The written acts of record of the acts of the sovereign
authority, of official bodies and tribunals and of public officers, legislative, judicial, and executive of the
Philippine Islands, or of the United States, or of any States of the United States or of a foreign country, and
public records kept in the Philippine Islands of private writings are public writings. A copy of a public
writing, duly certified to be a true copy thereof, is admissible evidence in like cases and in like effect as the
original writing." The appellee understands that as the copy of a public writing duly certified to be a true
copy has the same effects as the original, according to section 299, such a copy, as a public writing, is
included in the exception of section 321 of the same Code, which provides that secondary evidence of the
contents of a document cannot be admitted without the requirement of said section having been complied
with, as already explained in the preceding paragraphs.
The first observation that may be made against said argument, is that the certified copy issued by the
acting registrar of deeds of Iloilo, Exhibit 2, is not a true copy of the document of sale which is said to have
been executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Antonio Domenech, but of the recital appearing in the
books of said registry with respect to the urban property, consisting of those two lots, which recital is to
the effect that there was presented in the office of the registrar at 9:30 a. m. on April 23, 1900, a document
of sale, executed on January 9 of said year by Carmen and Dolores Martinez before the notary, D. Gregorio
Yulo y Regalado, in favor of Antonio Domenech, of said property or lot composed of two parts, one
acquired by said Martinez from Doña Maria Victoria Sarlabus by donation inter vivos, according to the
document of September 19, 1889, ratified before a notary of that province, D. Andres Pastor Santana, and
the other by a grant from D. Anastasio Montes, as evidenced by a private document executed on April 24,
1893. On the margin of said entry it is stated that said lot was sold to Julio Salvador. In short, the effect of
the certified copy as evidence is that said document, in which the facts already stated appear, was
presented to the registrar of deeds on April 23, 1900. So that all that was certified to by the registrar of
deeds in the document, Exhibit 2, is that said recital, referring to the document appears in the books of
the registry. For this reason it is evident that as said certified copy was not a copy of the original document
it could not, unlike the original writing, be properly admitted as evidence in the present case on the ground
that it was a public document according to section 299. Neither could said copy produce the same legal
effect as the original. Such certification has the character of a public document and is such indeed,
according to said section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is only effect is to show that said document
was presented at the office of the registrar of deeds of Iloilo, where the aforesaid statements appear. It
does not, however, prove that said lots had in fact been sold by the Martinez sisters to Antonio Domenech,
or that the document presented was true, duly executed or ratified before the notary, D. Gregorio Yulo,
for the simple reason that said document presented to the registrar might have been false and simulated,
and the signatures appearing thereon might not have been the authentic and legitimate signatures of the
vendors, or of the notary before whom it was ratified, or of the witnesses who appear in said document
as eyewitnesses to the signing thereof by the vendors.
It is true that section 299 already cited includes among public documents the public records of private
writings existing in the Philippine Islands; and this may very well give rise to the interpretation , which the
appellee seems to give it, that the entry in the books of the registry of Iloilo as to the presentation of said
document of conveyance executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Domenech is a public record of the
same writing, and therefore the recital of said entry is a public writing. But in the first place it must be
taken into account that the entry made in the registry and mentioned in Exhibit 2 refers only to the
presentation of the writing at the office of the registrar; and as the Martinez sisters denied at the trial
having executed said document in favor of Domenech and sold the property therein described, and the
document itself not being literally transcribed in said entry or registry, and as it is neither proved that in
the filing of said document with the registrar the Martinez sisters took any part, said certified copy cannot
have the effect of proving the said sale took place, even considering said document as a public writing. It
was therefore necessary for the claimant Julio Salvador, in order to fully and sufficiently prove his alleged
title to that real property, to present the original document of said to have been executed by the Martinez
sisters in favor of Domenech, or a literal copy of the same, or a recital thereof appearing in some authentic
document. If he could not do so he should have proved its contents by means of the recollection that a
witness might have had thereof.
The recital in the entry in the registry, a certified copy of which has been presented as Exhibit 2, by counsel
of Julio Salvador, cannot be held to have the effect of proving the contents of the documents referred to,
for the reason that the Martinez claimants have questioned and denied the authenticity of said document
which, according to the entry in the registry, was presented to the registrar on April 23, 1900. And, as
already stated with respect to the recollection that a witness may have of said document, none of the
witnesses who testified for the oppositor, Salvador, affirmed having seen such document, said witnesses
having learned of it only by reference, as he himself stated, from the Martinez claimants themselves, who
denied even this fact.
But whether said entry in the registry be considered as a recital of said document in an authentic writing,
or whether it be held that some witness had some recollection of said document, this secondary evidence
of said document should not have been admitted by the court for the reason that the oppositor, Julio
Salvador, had not first complied with the provisions of section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The best obtainable evidence should be adduced to prove every disputed fact, and a failure to produce it,
but an attempt instead to sustain the issue by inferior evidence, will authorize the inference that the party
does not furnish the best evidence because it would tend to defeat, instead of sustaining, the issue of his
part. In requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant that no
evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence
can be had. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 903, par. 54, and cases therein cited.) chanrobles virtual law library
Undoubtedly the best evidence of the contents of a written instrument consists in the actual production
of the instrument itself, and the general rule is that secondary evidence of its contents cannot be admitted
until the nonproduction of the original has been satisfactory accounted for. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p.
903, par. 55, and cases therein cited.) chanrobles virtual law library
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings if admitted on the theory that the original cannot be
produced by the party by whom the evidence is offered, within a reasonable time by the exercise of
reasonable diligence. And ordinarily secondary evidence is not admissible until the nonproduction of the
primary evidence has been sufficiently accounted for. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 911, par. 66, and cases
therein cited.) chanrobles virtual law library
Under the earlier English decisions no degrees of secondary evidence are recognized. The American courts,
however, have asserted that secondary evidence, to be admissible, must be the best evidence obtainable
under the circumstances . It is a rule of evidence, too ancient and too well understood to require proof of
its existence, that the original instrument is better evidence than a copy. Again, whenever a copy of a
record or document is itself made original or primary evidence, the rule is clear and well settled that it
must be a copy made directly from or compared with the original. If the first copy be lost, or in the hands
of the opposite party, so long as another may be obtained from the same source, no ground can be laid
for resorting to evidence of an inferior or secondary character. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 912, par. 68,
and cases therein cited.)
Preliminary to the introduction of secondary evidence under the principle herein referred to, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the primary evidence, and its loss or destruction as the
case may be. . . . It has been held that the existence of a deed is sufficiently proved where there is a
preponderance of proof in its favor. (Ruling Case Law, vol, 10, p. 917, par. 75, and cases therein cited.)
The contents of a lost instrument cannot be proved unless it appears that reasonable search has been
made in the place where the paper was last know to have been, and if not found there, that inquiry has
been made of the person last known to have had its custody. (Ruling Case Law, vol, 10, p. 917, par. 76, and
cases therein cited.)
In accordance with the rule set forth in the next preceding paragraph parol evidence of the contents of a
will is inadmissible, unless it is first shown that diligent and unavailing search has been made for the
original, by or at the request of the party interested, and in the place where it is most likely to be found. .
. . But to justify admission of secondary evidence of a deed, it is not necessary to prove its loss beyond all
possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient; and this may be shown by a bona
fide and diligent search, fruitless made for it in places where it is likely to be found. (Ruling Case Law, vol,
10, p. 918, par. 77, and cases therein cited.)
As the failure of the oppositor to present the original document in question was not accounted for; as it is
not proper to suppose that the original could not have been presented within a reasonable time if he had
exercised due diligence for he or his counsel had the means, opportunity and time to find the original if it
really existed; as no proof was adduced that said document had been lost, or destroyed, or that proper
search therefor was made in the general files of notarial documents in the City of Manila, or that an
attempt was made to secure a copy thereof if it existed in said files; as the notary, Gregorio Yulo, a person
well known in Iloilo, was not asked directly and clearly as to the whereabouts of said document or some
particular or data it in order to obtain from him some conclusive and categorical answer; as said notary
has not been presented at the trial to be examined on these points; and, lastly, as it was not shown that
the party interested in the presentation of said document who is Julio Salvador, had made a diligent and
proper, but fruitless, search for said document in any place where it could probably be found - therefore
the secondary evidence presented by the oppositor, consisting of the testimony of the witnesses, Saez and
Madrenas, and the certified copy issued by the registrar of deeds of Iloilo, Exhibit 2, is of no value for the
purpose intended and such evidence was improperly considered by the court in reaching the conclusion
that said Julio Salvador was the owner of the lots in question.
But not only this - as stated in said certified copy of the registry, Exhibit 2, Carmen and Dolores Martinez
acquired said lots, one by donation inter vivos from Maria Sarlabus, made in a public document, and the
other by grant fro Anastasio Montes, evidenced by a private document. These documents being a part of
the title deeds of the lots, they ought to have been delivered by the Martinez sisters to Domenech; and
when the registration of said sale in the registry was asked, these documents should have been presented
by the latter, together with the deed of sale which is said to have been the notary Yulo on January 9, 1900;
and when they were returned to Domenech or to any other, the registrar ought to have made at the foot
of said documents, a note stating the fact of their presentation, together with the document of April 23,
1900, as well as of the fact that they were properly noted in the registry; and, finally, said documents ought
to be in the possession of Domenech, and afterwards, when the lots were sold to Julio Salvador, those
documents should have been delivered by Domenech to the latter
Yet said documents were not in the possession of Julio Salvador, or his attorney in fact, but of Dolores and
Carmen Martinez, who presented them at the trial and were there marked as Exhibit A and B, for the
purpose of proving their title to said lots, and there appears no note whatever of the registrar to the effect
that they had been presented in the registry and that they had been noted in said office. This is evident
proof that really they were not presented to the registrar when the document of sale alleged to have been
executed on January 9, 1900, by the Martinez sisters in favor of Domenech, and ratified before the notary
public, Mr. Yulo, was presented by Domenech or his representative. Said document of donation, Exhibit B,
and that of grant, Exhibit A, being among the title deeds of said lots, it is strange that in registering said
sale the should have presented the said document only, the existence and execution of which were denied
by the Martinez sisters. There are therefore sufficient grounds to hold it not proved that the latter sold
said lots to Antonio Domenech, and, consequently, they could not have transferred any title thereto to
Julio Salvador.
On the other hand, the title of Carmen and Dolores Martinez to said lots, Nos. 873 and 450, which
constitute the property described in their claim and that of Julio Salvador, respectively, is recognized by
the latter, when he attempted to prove that they were sold by the former to Antonio Domenech, as well
as by the witnesses of said oppositor, Tiburcio Saez, when he stated that they were sold by said two sister
to Domenech; and this title has been confirmed by the documents already mentioned, Exhibits A and B.
The first of said documents states that on April 24, 1893, Anastasio Montes gratuitously ceded a lot 9:20
meters wide and 11.80 meters long, bordering on Calle San Rafael, and bounded on the north by the lot
of Don Leon Yorac, while the document, Exhibit B, which is a public document executed on September 29,
1869, and ratified before the notary public of Iloilo, Don Andres Pastor Santana, states that Maria Victoria
Sarlabus, in order to show affection to her intimate friends Carmen and Dolores Martinez, gave them by
way of a perfect and irrevocable donation inter vivos a lot belonging to her, situated on said Calle San
Rafael, Iloilo, being 6 brazas wide and 7 brazas long, and bounded on the right by the lot of Mateo Catalva, that the two lots Nos. 873 and 450 should be adjudicated to the appellants Carmen and Dolores Martinez
on the left by that of Nicolas Batingui, and on the rear by that of Anastasio Montes. These lots are and be registered in their name. No special pronouncement is made as to costs. So ordered.
numbered as 450 and 873 in the cadastral plans of the municipality of Iloilo and constitute the lot now in
question. ROMEO PAYLAGO and ROSARIO DIMAANDAL, petitioners,
vs.
It appears from the evidence that the lot in question was not fenced and there was no building at all on it, INES PASTRANA JARABE and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents..
the witness Tiburcio Saez having declared that he knew that Domenech was in possession thereof and
after him Julio Salvador, which statement was contradicted by Dolores Martinez and her witness Manuel This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the lower court's
Zerrudo. Dolores Martinez stated that during all the time that were in possession of the land, Julio Salvador decision in the case of Romeo Paylago, et al. vs. Ines Pastrana Jarabe, CA-G.R. No. 25031-R, promulgated
never laid any claim to them until lately, that is, about two or three years ago; that during the lifetime of on June 6, 1962. (Civil Case No. R-709 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro).
Domenech they paid the real estate taxes of the land, giving the sum of P6 to him every year, and that
The entire lot involved in this suit was originally covered by Homestead Patent issued on June 7, 1920
they had no receipts because Domenech had a lot adjacent to theirs and he included it in the receipt of
under Act No. 926 and later under OCT No. 251 of the Registry of Deeds of Mindoro, issued on June 22,
the lot in question for they look their receipts at the same time; and that even after Domenech's death,
1920 in the name of Anselmo Lacatan. On May 17, 1948, after the death of Anselmo Lacatan, TCT No. T-
Julio Salvador paid for the taxes, and they did not attempt to pay for them because Domenech had already
728 (which cancelled OCT No. 251) was issued in the name his two sons and heirs, Vidal and Florentino
talked to Mr. Campos, who told him that he paid for said taxes; that it seemed that lately Salvador was in
Lacatan. Vidal Lacatan died on August 27, 1950.
possession of the land; that during the lifetime of Domenech they had filled it and that it was not true that
Campos or Salvador had paid for the filling of the land. The witness Manuel Zerrudo declared that he knew On March 23, 1953, Vidal Lacatan's heirs, namely, Maximo, Tomas and Lucia Lacatan, executed a
the land for about twenty years; that since he knew it, it has been in the possession of Carmen and Dolores deed of sale (Exh. C) in favor of the spouses Romeo Paylago and Rosario Dimaandal, plaintiffs-petitioners
Martinez and at the date of the trial was still in their possession; that Julio Salvador at no time possessed herein, over a portion of the entire lot under TCT No. T-728, which portion is described as follows:
it; that he did not see Salvador fence it; and that he knew of the possession of the Martinez sisters for he
lived on Calle Del Rosario and the lot was next to that of his teacher, Mr. Anastasio Montes; and, finally, North — Provincial Road;
he indicated, as an act of possession of the claimants, the fact that they had put it in their name. The East — Property of Romeo Paylago;
attorney for the Bishop of Jaro, Jose Maria Arroyo, witness for the claimants, Martinez, stated that the South — Property of Florentino Lacatan;
bishop, having attempted to acquire the lot in question, as it adjoins a lot of his, Domenech took him to West — Provincial Road (Nabuslot-Batingan);
the land, stating that he wanted to sell it, but that the bishop did not put the sale through, because he
suspected that it belonged to the Martinez sisters; that he could not tell whose property it was; that he containing an area of 3.9500 hectares.
did not know whether Domenech possessed it; that he did not know who collected the fruits of the land,
On October 6, 1953, Florentino Lacatan also died, leaving as his heirs his widow and three children,
but he had information that it belonged to the Martinez sisters, although he had not seen the title deeds,
Felipe, Rosita and Florencia Lacatan. On December 31, 1953, the said children of Florentino Lacatan
documents, or anything. He furthermore insisted that the purchase was not effected because of the
likewise executed a deed of sale (Exh. D) in favor of the same vendees over another portion of the same
doubts that existed about the ownership of the land.
lot described as follows:
Lastly, according to Dolores Martinez, a woman who like her sister Carmen, was already in the sixties,
North — Provincial Road (Calapan-Pinamalayan);
Antonio Domenech lived in their house before the bombardment of the city (which must have taken place
East — Heirs of Sotero Mongo;
in 1898) until 1912, when he died; that although Domenech had been a supervisor of laborers, he no longer
South — Aniceta Lolong;
had that occupation when he came to live in their house; that during the first years he paid the
West — Heirs of Vidal Lacatan; with an area of 2.8408 hectares.
corresponding rent, but after the bombardment he ceased to pay rent and for his subsistence, which was
given him by them. Dolores Martinez and her sister also denied having sold the two lots of land in question On March 2, 1954, by virtue of the registration of the two deeds of sale (Exhs. C and D), a new TCT
to Domenech or that they had received any sum from him in payment of said lot, or that they had executed No. T-4208 covering the total area of
the document already reffered to. The former further stated that she did not make any statement 6.7908 hectares was issued in favor of plaintiffs-petitioners, the Paylago spouses. A subsequent
whatever to the witness Saez on the occasions referred to by him to the effect that they had sold said lot subdivision survey for the purpose of segregating the two aforementioned portions of land described in
to Domenech. She also declared that she had not received any sum of money from him for, on the contrary, the deeds (Exhs. C and D) as well as in the new TCT No. T-4208, however, disclosed that a portion (one half
they had to support him. hectare) of the total area purchased by plaintiffs-petitioners and indicated in the sketch Exh. B at a point
marked Exh. B-1 was being occupied by defendant-respondent. Hence, the action to recover possession
As the title of the claimants Dolores and Carmen Martinez to the lots in question was proved, as it was not
and ownership of the said portion.
proved that they had sold them to Antonio Domenech, and as Julio Salvador could not have acquired said
property from Antonio Domenech, these lots still belong to the Martinez sisters; and, on the other hand, Vis-a-vis the foregoing undisputed facts, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that a portion
as it was established that they had been in possession of said lots since the acquisition thereof; and as the of land in question which is described as follows:
possession which Julio Salvador might have exercised during the last years (admitting the statements in
the record to this effect) is not based upon any valid or legitimate title, it is evident that the two sister are North — Provincial Road;
entitled to have their rights to the lots in question confirmed and to have them registered in their name. East — Apolonio Lacatan;
It is, therefore, clear that the trial court erred in not so holding in the judgment appealed from. The South — Anselmo Lacatan;
judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the claims of Julio Salvador is denied; and we declare
West — Valentin Lastica; and with an area of one half hectare is indicated in the sketch of subdivision
plan marked Exh. B-1 of Exh. B; that on November 27, 1938, the said portion of land was purchased by
Hilario Jarabe, late husband of defendant-respondent, from one Apolonio Lacatan, which sale is
evidenced by an unregistered deed of sale (Exh. 6); that Apolonio Lacatan, in turn, bought the same in
1936 from Anselmo Lacatan, the original registered owner in whose favor OCT No. 251 and later TCT No.
T-4208 were issued; that the first deed of sale, also unregistered, executed by Anselmo Lacatan in favor
of Apolonio Lacatan was lost during the Japanese occupation; that the herein defendant-respondent has
been in possession of the said portion continuously, publicly, peacefully and adversely as owner thereof
from 1938 up to the present; and, that the herein plaintiffs-petitioners knew, nay, admitted in a deed of
lease, paragraph 3 (Exh. 4), that defendant-respondent has been in possession of the premises since
1945.
After trial, the lower court held that plaintiffs-petitioners were not purchasers in good faith and,
accordingly, rendered judgment in favor of defendant-respondent, declaring the latter as owner of the
land in question with the right to retain possession of the same. The decision was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals.
From the evidence adduced by the parties evolved the issue: Who has a better right in case of double
sale of real property, the registered buyer or the prior but unregistered purchaser?
This Court has formulated in no uncertain terms the general principle governing the matter: as
between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his favor, in good faith, has a preferred
right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in the actual possession of the
immovable property (Mendiola v. Pacalda, 10 Phil. 705; Veguillas v. Jaucian, 25 Phil. 315; Po Sun Tun v.
Price, 54 Phil. 192). Indeed, the foregoing principle finds concrete bases in the pertinent provisions of the
New Civil Code, Article 1544, providing that if the same immovable property should have been sold to
different vendees, "the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded
it in the registry of property."
There is no question that the sales made in favor of plaintiffs-petitioners were registered while the
alleged sale executed in favor of defendant-respondent was not. Applying the foregoing principle of law
to the instant case, it is now contended by plaintiffs-petitioners that their certificate of title must prevail
over defendant-respondent, and that the courts below correspondingly committed error in deciding the
case to the contrary.
But there is more than meets the eye in the case at bar. While plaintiffs-petitioners have a registered
title, it cannot be denied that their acquisition and subsequent registration were tainted with the vitiating
element of bad faith. It was so found by both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, and
their finding is conclusive upon us. Thus, in Evangelista vs. Montaño, 93 Phil. 275, 279, this Court ruled:
Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals absolved the defendants, having found and
declared after weighing the evidence that the plaintiff, was not a purchaser in good faith. That this
conclusion is a finding of fact and, being a finding of fact, not subject to review, is too plain to admit of
argument.
Both Courts below found that petitioners knew beforehand that the parcel of land in question was
owned by defendant-respondent.1äwphï1.ñët
In its decision the Court of Appeals declared that "plaintiffs herein were aware of that peaceful,
continuous and adverse possession of defendant since 1945, because this fact is admitted by said plaintiffs
in a deed of lease, paragraph 3 (Exhibit 4) covering a portion of the entire lot, and situated just across the
road from the land in question." (Dec., C. App., p. 4).
Considering that the boundaries of the lands that the petitioners Paylago purchased in 1953 and
1954 were well defined, they must have known that the portion occupied by the defendant-respondent
under claim of ownership and leased to them by the latter was included in the description. And coupled
with their knowledge that defendant-respondent purchased the same from Apolonio Lacatan, plaintiffs-
petitioners should have inquired and made an investigation as to the possible defects of the title of the
Lacatan heirs over the entire lot sold to them, granting that the latter's certificate of title was clear. This,
they failed to do. They cannot now claim complete ignorance of defendant-respondent's claim over the
property. As was well stated in one case, "a purchaser who has knowledge of facts which should put him
upon inquiry and investigation as to possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such
inquiry and investigation, cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and has acquired a valid title
thereto". (Sampilo vs. Court of Appeals, 55 O.G. No. 30, p. 5772). To the same effect is the following
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. &
Williamson, 37 Phil. 644. Said the Court:
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim
that he has acquired title thereto in good faith, as against the true owner of the land or of an interest
therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects of the title of
his vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard
and then claims that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility
of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it
afterwards develops that the title was defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as
would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be
required of a prudent man in a like situation.
The fundamental premise of the preferential rights established by Article 1544 of the New Civil Code
is good faith (Bernas v. Bolo, 81 Phil. 16). To be entitled to the priority, the second vendee must not only
show prior recording of his deed of conveyance or possession of the property sold, but must, above all,
have acted in good faith, that is to say, without knowledge of the existence of another alienation by his
vendor to a stranger (Obras Pias v. Ignacio, 17 Phil. 45; Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co., et al., op.
cit.; Emas v. De Zuzuarregui, et al., 53 Phil. 197). Short of this qualifying circumstance, the mantle of legal
protection and the consequential guarantee of indefeasibility of title to the registered property will not in
any way shelter the recording purchaser against known and just claims of a prior though unregistered
buyer. Verily, it is now settled jurisprudence that knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by
a subsequent purchaser makes him a purchaser in bad faith and his knowledge of such transfer vitiates his
title acquired by virtue of the later instrument of conveyance which was registered in the Registry of Deeds
(Ignacio v. Chua Hong, 52 Phil. 940; Gustilo, et al. v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442; Ramos, et al. v. Dueno, et al.,
50 Phil. 786). The registration of the later instrument creates no right as against the first purchaser. For
the rights secured under the provisions of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code to the one of the two
purchasers of the same real estate, who has secured and inscribed his title thereto in the Registry of Deeds,
do not accrue, as already mentioned, unless such inscription is done in good faith (Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong
Machinery Co., et al., op. cit.). To hold otherwise would reduce the Torrens system to a shield for the
commission of fraud (Gustilo, et al. v. Maravilla, op. cit.).
Plaintiffs-petitioners cited the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. De la Rama, et al., G.R. No.
L-4526 September 1959, to disprove bad faith ascribed to them. But the citation does not fit with the facts
of the present case. It is to be noted that the second purchaser in the De la Rama case had no knowledge
of the previous sale and possession of the first purchaser at the time he (second purchaser) acquired the
property involved therein. "(T)here is nothing in the complaint which may in any way indicate that he knew
such possession and encumbrance when he bought the property from its owner." Plaintiffs-petitioners in
the instant case, however, had knowledge of defendant-respondent's claim of ownership over the land in
question long before they purchased the same from the Lacatan heirs. They were even told, as previously
intimated, that defendant-respondent bought the land from Apolonio Lacatan. Thus, it could easily be
distinguished that the second purchaser in the De la Rama case acted with good faith, i.e., without
knowledge of the anterior sale and claim of ownership of the first vendee, whereas, plaintiffs-petitioners
herein acted with manifest bad faith in buying the land in question, all the while knowing that defendant-
respondent owns the same. Such knowledge of defendant-respondent's ownership of the land is more
than enough to overthrow the presumption of good faith created by law in favor of plaintiffs-petitioners.
This being the case, we cannot just close our eyes and blindly stamp our approval on the argument of
plaintiffs-petitioners that they have the better right simply because their title is registered and as such is
indefeasible.
Plaintiffs-petitioners also contend that the identity of the land in question has not been established.
Again, we disagree. Evidence of record, both oral and documentary, unequivocally show that the said
portion of land can be identified and segregated, and has been in fact identified and segregated (Exh. B-
1), from the entire lot covered by TCT No. T-4208 (Exh- A) issued in the names of plaintiffs-petitioners. The
boundaries of the same have been clearly indicated as that planted by madre cacao trees. Even the
surveyor hired by plaintiffs-petitioners was able to fix the said boundaries in such a manner as to definitely
and accurately segregate the premises from the adjoining property. How could plaintiffs-petitioners now
argue that the land has not been identified when the Supreme Court itself says that what really defines a
piece of land is not the area mentioned in the description but the boundaries (Sanchez v. Director of Lands,
63 Phil. 378; Buizer v. Cabrera, etc., 81 Phil. 669; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935)? Besides, the area
has been also established as one-half hectare.
Another collateral question raised by plaintiffs-petitioners is the admission by the courts a quo of
secondary evidence to establish the contents of the first unregistered deed of sale executed by Anselmo
Lacatan in favor of Apolonio Lacatan when the loss or destruction of the original document, according to
them, has not been established. Again, the findings of the Court of Appeals destroy this assertion of
petitioners (Dec., p. 5):
Undeniably the alleged unregistered document could no longer be examined by the parties in court,
because it was lost — but its original, however, upon, the trial court's findings which we have no reason to
question — has been sufficiently proved as having existed.
As observed by this Supreme Court, "the destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person
knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who
has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination of the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was,
and has been unable to find it; or has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
that the instrument is indeed lost." (Michael & Co. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87). And "it is not even necessary
to prove its loss beyond all possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient, and this
may be shown by a bona fide and diligent search, fruitlessly made, for it in places where it is likely to be
found." (Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817). And after proving the due execution and delivery of
the document, together with the fact that the same has been lost or destroyed, its contents may be
proved, among others, by the recollection of witnesses (Vaguillas v. Jaucian, 25 Phil. 315).
Finding that the facts and the law support the same, it is our opinion, and so hold, that the appealed
decision should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioners spouses Paylago and Dimaandal.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
From the decision rendered by respondent court dated November 27, 1989, declaring respondent Ortigas
and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) as the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land,
petitioner Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora), interposes this petition for review seeking ng
to annul the aforesaid judgment and prays that the case be remanded to the trial court and there be tried
on the merits. The facts, as found by respondent court, are as follows:
On August 27, 1974, respondent Widora filed LRC Case No. Q-336 before the respondent (trial) court an
application for registration of title of a parcel of land as shown in Plan No. LRC (SWO)-l5352. Widora alleged
that the parcel of land is covered by Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136, dated April 25, 1894, issued in the
name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. Later, on June 14, 1978, Widora filed an amended
application for registration of the said parcel of land. It alleged that the parcel of land is situated at Malitlit-
Uoogong, Quezon City, with an area of 156 hectares, more or less, described in Plan No. LRC (SWO)-15352;
and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro on December 12,
1954. The amended application prayed that said parcel of land be ordered registered in the name of
Widora.
On August 25, 1978, respondent Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to 14
hectares of Lot 8 (LRC) SWO-15352, and praying for a decree of registration over said portions of Lot 8.
On October 24, 1978, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among others, that
respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for having been already
registered under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653.
On April 20, 1979, the respondent (trial) court issued an order directing the applicant to prove its
contention that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of titles
from which they were purportedly issued, and setting the case for hearing on June 28, 1979, at 8:30 a.m.
On June 27, 1979, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsideration of said order of April 20, 1979,
alleging that a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after a year and that the same becomes conclusive upon
the entire world; that the Land Registration Commission itself has advised the court that the 156 hectare
property sought to be registered is covered by valid and subsisting titles in the name of Ortigas; that Courts
of First Instance and the appellate courts in previous cases had sustained the Ortigas titles over the land
in question.
On October 3, 1979, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Ortigas was denied by the respondent
(trial) court, but the latter set the motion to dismiss for hearing on October 18 and 19, 1979 at 8:30 a.m.,
for the purpose of enabling the applicant to prove its contention that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 are not
proper derivatives of the original certificates of title from which they were purportedly issued.
The parties presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before the respondent (trial) court in
support of their respective positions.
On March 30, 1988, the respondent (trial) court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas,
holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that they were derived from
OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 1425; that if there was error in the correct number of OCT on
said titles, no step or measure to rectify the same was taken; that Decree No. 1425 shows that it covers a
total area of only 17 hectares, more or less, located in Sta. Ana, Manila, which was four kilometers away
from the land subject of the application for registration which covers an area of 156 hectares, more or
less, described in Plan No. LRC (SWO)-15352 situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City; that the contention
of Ortigas that Decree No. 1425 covers an area in Manila and also a part of Rizal is not credible, for if this
were true then the area of said Rizal portion should appear on the face of said decree of registration, which
is not the case; that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 were not derived from any decree of registration, and that
the said TCTs being null and void, cannot be used as basis to contest the right of the applicant to apply for
registration over the subject land. The order of March 30, 1988, in its dispositive portion stated:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion dated October 4, 1978 and Motion to Dismiss,
dated, October 23, 1978 filed by oppositor Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership are both DENIED for
lack of merit; while this Court's order of September 15, 1978 directing the City Assessor of Quezon City to
issue a separate tax declaration corresponding to the 12 or 14 hectares which is an undivided portion of
the land applied for registration and now belonging to the said Dolores V. Molina; further, authorizing the
City Treasurer of Quezon City to accept the corresponding realty taxes due thereon; and further the said
Dolores V. Molina is allowed to intervene in these proceedings, is hereby affirmed; likewise, the City
Treasurer is directed to accept the whole of the taxes due on the property subject of the instant petition
from applicants Widows & Orphans Association, Inc., as prayed for in its Manifestation with Motion subject
to the right of the oppositor Dolores V. Molina as contained in this Court's order of September 15, 1978."
On April 26, 1988, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsider consideration of the said order of March
30, 1988, taking exception to the ruling that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 are null and void, and alleging,
among others, that respondent (trial) court had no jurisdiction to hear an application for registration of a
previously registered land; that the parcels of land applied for are covered by TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 in
the name of Ortigas; that the parcels of land covered by TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are within the parcel
of land covered by OCT 351; and that OCT 351 is a copy of Decree No. 1425 issued on April 26, 1905. The
motion for reconsideration prayed the respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30, 1988 on the
ground that it had no jurisdiction over the application for registration, the parcels of land subject thereof
being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title.
On May 19, 1989, the respondent (trial) court issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration of
Ortigas, and setting the hearing on the merits on July 26, 1989, ... for the "eventual presentation of the
parties' respective evidence respecting their alleged ownership of the property subject of this petition."
(Rollo, pp. 24-26)
Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
respondent court praying for the annulment of the March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the trial
court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land registration case.
On November 27, 1989, respondent court rendered the decision sought to be reviewed, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas & Company
Limited Partnership is GRANTED. The orders of March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, in LRC Case No. Q-336, are REVERSED and ANNULLED, and said LRC Case
No. Q-336 is DISMISSED. The injunction issued by the Court, per Resolution of August 8, 1989, is made
permanent. (Rollo, p. 35)
Based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas at the hearing of its application
for preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from proceeding with the hearing of LRC Case No. Q-
336, respondent court held that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, albeit reflecting their origins as OCT Nos. 337,
19, 336 and 334, are actually derivatives of OCT No. 351, the latter having been issued pursuant to Decree
1425 and that since OCT 351 is allegedly a copy of Decree 1425, the mere fact that the original copy of
Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be located or produced, does not mean that Decree
1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 was not issued. Concluding, respondent
court said:
It may be that TCT 77652 and 77653 do not show on their face (sic) that they were derived from OCT 351.
But the fact remains, as shown above, that the parcel of land covered by OCT 351 embraced the parcels
of land, Lots 7 and 8, of TCT 77652 and 77653. There was, therefore a mistake in the entries in TCT 77652
and 77653 when the same referred to OCTs 337, 19, 336, 337 (sic) and 334, as their source, for the correct
OCT insofar as Lots 7 and 8 are concerned, should be OCT 351. (Rollo, p. 27)
In this petition, petitioner WIDORA avers that the respondent Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of this Court because:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS INSISTED IN UPHOLDING THE EXISTENCE OR VALIDITY OF TCTs 77652 and 77653
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A SUPPORTING DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
II
THE QUESTIONED DECISION UTILIZED SECONDARY EVIDENCE DESPITE THE EXISTENCE AND AVAILABILITY
OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ENJOIN THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF LRC
NO. Q-336 SINCE JURISDICTION RESIDES WITH THE RTC ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT.
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner that respondent court's grounds and reasoning in support of
its findings that respondent Ortigas is the registered owner of the disputed property are baseless in law
and fact. Petitioner argues that respondent court erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. 77652 and
77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration and instead utilized secondary evidence,
OCT 351 which is supposedly a copy of Decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself existing
and available at the Register of Deeds of Manila and on its face shows that it covers a parcel of land with
an area of only 17 hectares in Sta. Ana, Manila while the parcel of land applied for contains an area of 156
hectares, located at Malitlit-Uoogong Quezon City, four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila and is
certified by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry as alienable and disposable.
Respondent Ortigas claims that respondent court committed no error in rectifying the mistake in the
entries in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 as regards their sources and/or origins arguing that the correction
was justified by the fact that the plan of OCT 351 coincides with the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
77652 and 77653; that OCT 351 was issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that OCT 351 is a copy of the
Decree itself.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Undoubtedly, the evidence (i.e., plan submitted by respondent Ortigas, testimony of its surveyor and OCT
351) adduced by private respondent to prove the contents of Decree 1425 and admitted by respondent
court is merely secondary and should not have been admitted in the first place.
Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there must be 1) proof of the execution of the original writing
and 2) that it has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in the possession of
the adverse party who has failed to produce it after reasonable notice (Michael and Co. v. Enriquez, 33
Phil. 87 [1915]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146 [1976]). Private respondent has not shown
compliance with the above requisites which would justify the admission of the secondary evidence used
and erroneously relied upon by respondent court.
Furthermore, the unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own findings regarding the extent
of the coverage of the land included in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, ostensibly to correct the error in, and
conform with, the technical description found in OCT 351 based on the plan and other evidence submitted
by respondent Ortigas cannot be sustained. That function is properly lodged with the office of the trial
court sitting as a land registration court and only after a full-dress investigation of the matter on the merits.
It is before the land registration court that private respondent must adduce the proof that the disputed
parcels of land is legally registered in its favor.
In Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (179 SCRA 163 [1989]), this Court held that "(w)hile it is true
that the Court of Appeals is vested with the 'power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised ..." (Sec. 9 [3], BP 129), there was
not even a request for evidentiary hearing filed in this case. The Court of Appeals therefore should not
have admitted said evidence without giving the adverse party opportunity to present counter evidence, if
any. Besides, "evidence necessary in regards to factual issues raised in cases falling within the Appellate
Court's original and appellate jurisdiction contemplates incidental facts which were not touched upon, or
fully heard by the trial or respondent Court. The law could not have intended that the Appellate Court
would hold an original and full trial of a main factual issue in a case, which properly pertains to trial courts"
(citing Lingner & Fisher GMBH v. IAC, 125 SCRA 522 [1983]). In the case at bar, it appears that the parties
have yet to fully present their respective evidence in support of their claims before the trial court. As a
matter of fact, the trial court had set the case for hearing on the merits in its order dated May 19, 1989.
What is more, the case involves a vast tract of land consisting of 156 hectares, separately situated in two
outlaying localities (i.e., Quezon City and Sta. Ana, Manila.) The resolution of this controversy calls for a
full-blown trial on the merits if only to afford the contending parties their respective days in court. Further,
a ground for dismissal based on disputed facts, as in this case is not proper in a motion to dismiss (Spouses
Jayme and Solidarios v. Alampay, 62 SCRA 131 [1975]).
In the case at bar, respondent Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its TCT Nos.
77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied for by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner
maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila while the lot applied for is
alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area
of 156 hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the
necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain the disputed facts, i.e., whether the lot applied for is covered
by Decree No. 1425 or is alienable and disposable. Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by
the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title
by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court
of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering the
parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the
title to nor bind the land and is null and void.
Besides, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and, unless it constitutes clearly a
grave abuse of discretion or was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, the error, if any, should be
corrected by appeal in due time, after trial and judgment on the merits and not by the extraordinary writ
of prohibition (Moreno v. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 700 [1963]; National Investment and Development
Corporation v. Aquino, 163 SCRA 53 [1988]).
Furthermore, on grounds of pre-maturity, interlocutory orders cannot be decided by the appellate courts
until the lower court shall have decided the merit of the case. Thus, in Villegas v. Fernando (27 SCRA 1119
[1969]), this Court held:
This first assigned error (assailing the personality of the appellees to ask for a review of the decision and
decree in the registration case) is actually directed at an earlier order dated 26 April 1961 denying
appellants heirs' motion to dismiss the petitions for review filed by the present appellees. And inasmuch as
said order of 26 April 1961 is interlocutory, there being as yet no trial and decision on the merits of the
petition for review, it is premature to raise said assigned error in appellants heirs' instant appeal. We shall
rule thereon only when the proper time comes, i. e., after the lower court shall have settled not only the
still unresolved status and rights of the parties, particularly those of petitioners (sic) for review, now
appellees herein, almost all of whom are claiming that they are not mere homestead or free patent
applicants but patent or title holders, but also whether the original decision should be maintained or not.
For the court below, after receiving and hearing the parties, may still conclude in favor of appellants
herein. (Emphasis supplied)
But not only that. Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting the alleged error in the
questioned TCTs.1âwphi1 A certificate of title cannot be altered, amended or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law (Sec. 48, PD 1529; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534
[1989]; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915]). Also, no correction of certificate of title shall be made
except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which
the decree of registration was entered (Sec. 112, Act 496; now Sec. 108, PD 1529). While the law fixes no
prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to alter or correct the certificate of title
if it would mean the reopening of the decree of registration beyond the period allowed by law (Rodriguez,
v. Tirona, 68 Phil. 264 [1939]).
Respondent Ortigas, on the other hand, argues that this Court has already recognized the fact that the
parcel of land under TCT No. 227758 from which TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 were issued, are covered by,
among others, Decree 1425 issued in GLRO Record No. 917 (Rollo, p. 94).
The argument is without merit True this Court declared in Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v.
Ruiz (148 SCRA 326 [1987]) that "petitioner is the duly registered owner of the land * (then) in dispute as
evidenced by OCT Nos. 13, 33, 334, and 337 by virtue of Decrees Nos. 240, 1942 and 1925 issued in GLRO
Record Nos. 699, 875 and 917 ..." Nowhere in said decision, however, is a pronouncement that TCT Nos.
77652 and 77653 were issued from TCT No. 227758. On the contrary, it is not disputed by the parties that
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 themselves show that they were derived from OCT No. 337, 19, 336 and 334
and not from OCT 351 or TCT 227758. If indeed, the real origin thereof is OCT No. 351, what respondent
Ortigas should have done was to file a petition for the correction of the TCTs in question as stated earlier.
While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over
parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is nevertheless true that the aforesaid rule only
applies where there exists no serious controversy as to the certificate's authenticity visa vis the land
covered therein. In the case at bar, the claimed origin of the questioned TCTs evidently appear to be
different from what is stated therein. It does not appear indubitable that the disputed parcels of land are
properly reflected in the TCTs relied upon by private respondent. Off-hand, and as the parties admit, the
TCTs do not show that they are actually derivatives of OCT 351. Such being the case, the rule relied upon
cannot therefore apply. One who relies on a document evidencing his title to the property must prove not
only the genuineness thereof but also the identity of the land therein referred to (CF. Lasam v. Director of
Lands, 65 Phil. 637 [1938]). In the case at bar, private respondent's TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 trace their
origins from OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 as it is now claimed by respondent
Ortigas.
The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply
because the TCTs relied upon by the latter do not accurately reflect their supposed origin. Thus, in Ledesma
v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1926]) this Court held that the "simple possession of a certificate of
title, under the Torrens System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included (citing Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])."
TMs pronouncement was reiterated by the Court in Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 718
[1984]; Coronel v. Intermediate Appellate Court (155 SCRA 270 [1987]; Goloy v. Court of Appeals (173
SCRA 26 [1989]; and Miranda v. Court of Appeals (177 SCRA 303 [1989]). As it is in this case, a certificate
of title cannot be considered conclusive evidence of ownership where the certificate itself is faulty as to
its purported origin.

Further, the fact that respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss was denied does not mean that it could no
longer participate in the resolution of the case and factual determination of the parties' allegations. As
correctly stated by the trial court, "(i)t is to be stressed, however, that the denial of oppositor Ortigas'
instant motion for reconsideration does not necessarily mean that it is deprived of any participation in the
instant petition. For as already stated, what follows after its denial is the eventual presentation of all the
parties' respective evidence respecting their alleged ownership of the property subject of this petition."
(Rollo, p. 65)

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and the orders of the trial court in
LRC Case No. Q336 entitled, "In Re-Application for Registration of Title, WIDOWS and ORPHANS
ASSOCIATION, Inc., Applicant, ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and DOLORES V. MOLINA,
Oppositors", dated March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 are hereby REINSTATED insofar as the denial of
oppositor Ortigas' motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration, respectively, are concerned and the
case remanded to the trial court for trial and adjudication on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

Sparate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 purports to cover extensive portions of several provinces and cities in
Luzon and Metro Manila from Dingalan Bay in the north to Tayabas Bay in the south. It is the most fantastic
land claim in the history of the country and has spawned countless land swindles and rackets not to
mention tedious litigation in so many trial courts, the Court of Appeals and this Court.

I fail to understand why the appropriate government authorities do not take determined efforts to slay
the dragon once and for all. Cases involving lots sold or conveyed by the Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
estate, which incidentally claims all land on which government buildings are constructed in Quezon City
including the sprawling University of the Philippines campus, the Batasan and Commission on Audit
complex, the areas around and including the Quezon Memorial Circle all the way to and beyond EDSA,
etc., are periodically taken to court and just as periodically disposed of after years of litigation. To avoid
having the Government as an adversary, the Estate has reportedly in a spirit of "magnanimity" waived its
rights to lots on which government buildings are located. I understand that certain Torrens Title owners
have been "awarded" similar assurances in the past. However, squatters and innocent buyers have been
given lease rights or outright deeds of sale over land possessed and owned by other persons resulting in
litigation.

I concur in the decision because the Court has to accord due process to all litigants and apply basic rules
of procedure fairly and evenly. While I have background knowledge of so many scams arising from the
dubious Titulo de Propriedad, we are bound to act only on evidence found in the records. The association's
name of Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. is a heart tugging appellation. Who are the members? Are
they victims of a scam? Or are they being used by smart operators? Since Ortigas and Company admits to
an error in its title, the extent and import of the error have to be ascertained. These call for presentation
of evidence which will be to everybody's interest if adduced.

I believe the Department of Justice should look more carefully into the Titulo de Propriedad situation.
Instead of running after individual termites gnawing away in all directions, the Government should ferret
out the mother of the termites and dispose of it once and for all, if indeed it is a termite and not the
legitimate and aggrieved owner it claims to be.