TANADA V.

YULO

Petitioner: JUAN TAÑADA

Respondents: JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice, EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of
the Thirteenth Judicial District, and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of Alabat, Tayabas

Act No. 3899 – “…the present justice and auxiliary justice of the peace who shall, at the time this Act takes
effect, have completed sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred
and thirty-three…”

FACTS:

1. Juan Tañada was appointed justice of the peace of Alabat, Tayabas on December 4, 1911. He
continued in that position until when at his own request and pursuant to the provisions of section
206 of the Revised Administrative Code he was transferred on September 8, 1934 to Perez,
Tayabas.

2. Petitioner turned 65 yrs old on October 5, 1934. Thereupon, in accordance with instructions from
DOJ, CFI Tayabas directed petitioner to cease to act as justice of peace. Petitioner surrendered
under protest and instituted original action of quo warranto.

ISSUE: Whether or not DOJ erred in directing petitioner to cease to act as justice of peace on grounds of
the provision in Act No 3899

RULING:

1. It was clear in the provisions of the Act that only those who have complete 65 years of age at the
time of its effectivity shall cease to hold office on January 1, 1933. Giving effect to the case of
Regalado vs Yulo, it does not apply to justice of peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act
who completed 65 years of age after January 1, 1933. Also, the transfer of a justice of the peace
does not amount to an appointment as in the case of Nicolas vs Alberto.

2. It is fundamental that the determination of the legislative intent from the language itself is the
primary consideration. This must be adhered to even though the court is convinced that the
legislature intended to enact something different. To depart from the meaning expressed by
words is to alter the statue, is to legislate not to interpret.

3. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language use, the subject matter, and the
purposes of those framing them are able to find their true meaning. It is different from judicial
legislation wherein the court supplies the provisions of the law because someone believed it was
just omitted and it was in fact the intent of the legislature.