Sallador, Issabel A.

Tañada v. Yulo,
G.R. No. 43575, 31 May 1935.
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
PetitionerTanada is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. General with the consent by the
Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez,
Tayabas. He reached his 65th birthdays on October 5, 1934, after the approval of Act No. 3899 which
makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act
takes effect on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive of the Secretary
of Respondent Justice, directed petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No. 3899.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the Act. No. 3899 apply to Petitioner Tanada? -No
(2) Whether the transfer denote a new appointment? -No

RULING:
(1) NO, Tanada has not reached 65 when the Act was approved. The law provides that judges who
are already 65 years old upon the time the Act No. 3899 takes effect should surrender their offices.
In this case, Tanada was only 64 when said Act gained approval. Although Tanada did reach 65 later,
such is immaterial as the law only includes those who have reached said date on approval and not
after its approval.

(2) NO, the transfer is not a new appointment because it does not meet the elements of an
appointment. Appointments necessarily has two things: appointment by Governor-General and
consent of Philippine Senate. Transfer only needs the word of the Governor-General. As applied to
Tanada, his transfer is not an appointment because his second reassignment did not have the consent
of Philippine Senate. As well, by definition, transfer is the enlargement or change of jurisdiction
grounded on the original appointment. It being grounded on the original appointment; no new
appointment is necessary.

Topic:
Purpose of construction: Limitation on the power of courts to construe

Case:
Action of quo warranto to clarify Judge Tañada’s position

Doctrine:
The relevant statutory doctrine for this case can be seen in Ratio 1. Defense argues that the relevant
provision is “defective and does not convey the legislative intent.” Later, it was learned that the
defense was seeking for the insertion of a phrase in the provision which would then explicitly
disqualify Tanada from office. To address this argument, the court differentiates between liberal
construction, which the court is allowed to do, and judicial legislation, which is beyond the court’s
jurisdiction. Liberal construction allows courts to find out the true meaning of a provision through
legislative intent. Judicial legislation, meanwhile, is when the court adds certain elements/words in
a provision that has been omitted. In short, the defense sought judicial legislation, an act which courts
cannot do.