PICOP Resources Inc vs Taneca

GR 160828

Facts:

Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members
of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-
SPFL), which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner
PRI. PRI has a CBA with NAMAPRI-SPFL. The CBA contained the following union security
provisions:

Article II- Union Security and Check-Off

Section 6. Maintenance of membership.

6.1 All employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members of the UNION at
the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall, as a condition of continued employment
by the COMPANY, maintain their membership in the UNION in good standing during the
effectivity of this AGREEMENT.6.3 The COMPANY, upon the written request of the UNION
and after compliance with the requirements of the New Labor Code, shall give notice of
termination of services of any employee who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided in
Section 6.1 and 6.2 of this Article

Atty. Fuentes sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of employees
who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of the
Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL
considered said act of campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW
as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its
Constitution and By-Laws, and the terms and conditions of the CBA, specifically Article II,
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security Clause.On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of
termination for causes to employees whom NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on the
ground of “acts of disloyalty” committed against it when respondents allegedly supported and
signed the Petition for Certification Election of FFW before the “freedom period” during the
effectivity of the CBA. A Notice dated October 21, 2000 was also served on the DOLE, Caraga
Region.Respondents then accused PRI of ULP.

Issue: WON respondents were validly terminated.

Held:

“Union security” is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union
shop,” “maintenance of membership,” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon
employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting
employment. There is union shopwhen all new regular employees are required to join the union
within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of
membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the
agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition
for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit, or
the agreement is terminated. A closed shop may be defined as an enterprise in which, by
agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be
employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes,
and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely
comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.

However, in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause,
the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2)
the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3)
there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the
union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the
union security provision of the CBA.
As to the first requisite, there is no question that the CBA between PRI and respondents
included a union security clause. Secondly, it is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRI-SPFL, in
two (2) occasions demanded from PRI, in their letters dated May 16 and 23, 2000, to terminate
the employment of respondents due to their acts of disloyalty to the Union. However, as to the
third requisite, we find that there is no sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to
terminate the employment of the respondents. The mere signing of the authorization in support
of the Petition for Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21, or before the “freedom
period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents inasmuch as the
petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period. Nothing in the records would show
that respondents failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents
did not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong. Respondents
continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW. Petition denied.

Century Canning Corp., et. al. v. Ramil, GR No. 171630, August 8, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Century Canning Corporation, a company engaged in canned food manufacturing,

employed respondent Vicente Randy Ramil in August 1993 as technical specialist. Prior to his
dismissal, his job included, among others, the preparation of the purchase requisition (PR) forms
and capital expenditure (CAPEX) forms, as well as the coordination with the purchasing
department regarding technical inquiries on needed products and services of petitioner's different
departments.

On 3 March, 1999, respondent prepared a CAPEX form for external fax modems and terminal
server, per order of Technical Operations Manager Jaime Garcia, Jr. and endorsed it to Marivic
Villanueva, Secretary of Executive Vice-President Ricardo T. Po, for the latter's signature. The
CAPEX form, however, did not have the complete details and some required signatures. The
following day, with the form apparently signed by Po, respondent transmitted it to Purchasing
Officer Lorena Paz in Taguig Main Office. Paz processed the paper and found that some details
in the CAPEX form were left blank. She also doubted the genuineness of the signature of Po, as
appearing in the form. Paz then transmitted the CAPEX form to Purchasing Manager Virgie
Garcia and informed her of the questionable signature of Po. Consequently, the request for the
equipment was put on hold due to Po's forged signature. However, due to the urgency of
purchasing badly needed equipment, respondent was ordered to make another CAPEX form,
which was immediately transmitted to the Purchasing Department.

Suspecting him to have committed forgery, respondent was asked to explain in writing the events
surrounding the incident. He vehemently denied any participation in the alleged forgery.
Respondent was, thereafter, suspended on 21 April 1999. Subsequently, he received a Notice of
Termination from Armando C. Ronquillo, on 20 May 1999, for loss of trust and confidence.

Respondent, on May 24, 1999, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime
pay, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against petitioner and its
officers before the Labor Arbiter (LA).

LA Potenciano S. Canizares rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Aggrieved by the LA's finding, respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The NLRC First Division in its Decision set aside the ruling of LA
Canizares. The NLRC declared respondent's dismissal to be illegal and directed petitioner to
reinstate respondent with full backwages and seniority rights and privileges. It found that
petitioner failed to show clear and convincing evidence that respondent was responsible for the
forgery of the signature of Po in the CAPEX form.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. To respondent's surprise and dismay, the NLRC
reversed itself and rendered a new Decision upholding LA Canizares' dismissal of his complaint.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC.

Frustrated by this turn of events, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent and reinstated the earlier
decision of the NLRC. It ordered petitioner to reinstate respondent, without loss of seniority
rights and privileges, and to pay respondent full backwages from the time his employment was
terminated up to the time of the finality of its decision. The CA, likewise, remanded the case to
the LA for the computation of backwages of the respondent. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent was validly dismissed.

RULING:
Yes.
Petitioner's main allegation is that there are factual and legal grounds constituting substantial
proof that respondent was clearly involved in the forgery of the CAPEX form. Petitioner insists
that the mere existence of a basis for believing that respondent employee has breached the trust
and confidence of his employer suffices for his dismissal. Finally, petitioner maintains that aside
from respondent's involvement in the forgery of the CAPEX form, his past violations of
company rules and regulations are more than sufficient grounds to justify his termination from
employment.

However, the record of the case is bereft of evidence that would clearly establish Ramil's
involvement in the forgery. They did not even submit any affidavit of witness or present any
during the hearing to substantiate their claim against Ramil.

Respondent alleged in his position paper that after preparing the CAPEX form on 3 March 1999,
he endorsed it to Marivic Villanueva for the signature of the Executive Vice-President Ricardo
T. Po. The next day, respondent received the CAPEX form containing the signature of Po.
Petitioner never controverted these allegations in the proceedings before the NLRC and the CA
despite its opportunity to do so. Petitioner's belated allegations in its reply filed before this Court
that Marivic Villanueva denied having seen the CAPEX form cannot be given credit. Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative
agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and
the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the
same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.
Thus, if respondent retrieved the form on March 4, 1999 with the signature of Po, it can be
correctly inferred that he is not the forger. Had the CAPEX form been returned to respondent
without Po's signature, Villanueva or any officer of the petitioner's company could have readily
noticed the lack of signature, and could have easily attested that the form was unsigned when it
was released to respondent.

Furthermore, while employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the
services of employees who perform functions which by their nature require the employers' full
trust and confidence and the mere existence of basis for believing that the employee has
breached the trust of the employer is sufficient, this does not mean that the said basis may be
arbitrary and unfounded.

The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust and
confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause. Loss of trust and
confidence, to be a valid cause for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and
founded on clearly established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and
convincingly established, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary. It must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whim, caprice or suspicion;
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer.

MINDANAO TIMES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MITCHEL R. CONFESOR,

Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

FACTS:

Mitchel Confesor (respondent) was employed on May 1998 by petitioner, publisher of a

newspaper of general circulation in Mindanao and Davao City. He became petitioners Associate
Editor in six months.

Respondent resigned from petitioner on June 17, 2003.On August 28, 2003, he filed a verified
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for payment of separation pay and pro-rated 13th month pay
for 2003.He later amended his complaint from one of money claims to illegal dismissal, averring
that petitioners President and Chief Operating Officer forced him to resign after he and Anthony
Allada, a columnist, published separate articles which appeared in the June 14, 2003 issue of
petitioner's newspaper accusing then Presidential Assistant Dominador Boy Zu, Jr., Cong.
Prospero Nograles and Cong. Corazon Malanyaon of being involved in some anomalies; and that
he did resign as he was told that he would be entitled to separation pay and other benefits, but
that the promised benefits were not forthcoming, hence, his filing of the complaint.

The Labor Arbiter, finding that respondent was constructively dismissed, ordered petitioner to
pay him P71,909.77 representing backwages, as well as separation pay and 10% of the total
award as attorney's fees.

Both parties appealed to the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City, respondent contending that, in
addition to the award granted by the Labor Arbiter, he was entitled to service incentive leave pay
and moral and exemplary damages.Petitioner, on the other hand, questioned the Labor Arbiters
finding of constructive dismissal.

In compliance with the appeal bond requirement, petitioner deposited the amount ofP71,909.77
with the United Coconut Planters Bank and surrendered to the NLRC the passbook covering the
deposit, along with a Deed of Assignment it executed assigning the proceeds of the deposit in
favor of respondent and authorizing the NLRC to release the same in the event that the Labor
Arbiters Decision becomes final and executory.

By Resolution of November 30, 2004, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed respondents complaint, holding that there was no constructive dismissal since
respondent effectively resigned from his employment.

The Court of Appeals, to which respondent assailed the NLRC resolution via petition for
certiorari, dismissed said petition by Decision of November 13, 2006.

On respondents Motion for Reconsideration, however, the appellate court, by the assailed
Amended Decision of November 29, 2007, set aside the NLRC February 28, 2005 Resolution
and reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision which it declared to have become final and executory.

Petitioners motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the
present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the bank deposit and Deed of Assignment which it transmitted to the NLRC,
along with the passbook, constituted substantial compliance with the rule on perfection of
appeals.

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.

LABOR LAW

Article 223of the Labor Code provides that an appeal by the employer to the NLRC from a
judgment of a labor arbiter which involves a monetary award may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
NLRC,in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.Section 4
of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC echoes the provision,viz.:
SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL.

a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule;
shall be verified by appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by memorandum of appeal in three (3)
legibly typewritten copies which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for, and a statement of the date when the appellant received the
appealed decision, resolution or order and a certificate of non-forum shopping with proof of
service on the other party of such appeal.A mere notice of appeal without complying with the
other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

b) The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office where the
appeal was filed, his answer or reply to appellant's memorandum of appeal, not later than ten
(10) calendar days from receipt thereof.Failure on the part of the appellee who was properly
furnished with a copy of the appeal to file his answer or reply within the said period may be
construed as a waiver on his part to file the same.

c) Subject to the provisions of Article 218, once the appeal is perfected in accordance with these
Rules, the Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding specific issues that were
elevated on appeal.
Further, Sec. 6 of the same Rules provides:
SECTION 6.BOND. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves
a monetary award,an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond.The appeal bond shall either be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission or the Supreme Court, and shall be accompanied by:
1. A joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel, and the bonding company,
attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.
2. A copy of the indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and bonding company;
and
3. A copy of security deposit or collateral securing the bond.
A certified true copy of the bond shall be furnished by the appellant to the appellee who shall
verify the regularity and genuineness thereof and immediately report to the Commission any
irregularity.

Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the Commission
shall cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal.

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the
posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.

The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding
paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.(emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Clearly, an appeal from a judgment as that involved in the present case is perfected only upon the
posting of acash or surety bond. Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabanza enlightens:

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary
awards from the decision of the LA. The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond a
mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the
provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond."The word"only"makes it perfectly plain that the lawmakers intended the posting of
a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the essential and exclusive means by which an
employer's appeal may be perfected.The word"may"refers to the perfection of an appeal as
optional on the part of the defeated party, but not to the compulsory posting of an appeal bond, if
he desires to appeal. The meaning and the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute must
be determined from the language employed; and where there is no ambiguity in the words used,
then there is no room for construction.

The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be
complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders
the decision of the LA final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers
that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon
thedismissal oftheemployer's appeal.It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal
to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

Cash, means a sum of money;cash bail (the sense in which the term cash bond is used) is a sum
of money posted by a criminal defendant to ensure his presence in court, used in place of a surety
bond and real estate.

In the present case, the Deed of Assignment, as well as the passbook, which petitioner submitted
to the NLRC is neither a cash nor surety bond. Petitioners appeal to the NLRC was thus not duly
perfected, thereby rendering the Labor Arbiters Decision final and executory.

DENIED

G.R. No. 180045: November 17, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner v. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), DIONISIO BANLASAN, ALFREDO T.
TAFALLA, TELESFORO D. RUBIA, ROGELIO A. ALVAREZ, DOMINADOR A.
ESCOBAL, and ROSAURO PANIS, Respondent

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:

Private respondents were security guards hired by DNL Security, and they were assigned to
Petitioners Tacloban office. In July 1989, GSIS voluntarily increased their salaries from 1400 to
3000 php. In February 1993, DNL Security informed respondents that its service contract with
petitioner was terminated. This notwithstanding, DNL Security instructed respondents to
continue reporting for work to petitioner. Respondents worked as instructed until April 20, 1993,
but without receiving their wages; after which, they were terminated from employment.

Respondents filed before the NLRC a complaint against GSIS and DNL Security for illegal
dismissal, which they won. The LA found that respondents were not illegally terminated from
employment because the employment of security guards is dependent on the service contract
between the security agency and its client. However, considering that respondents had been out
of work for a long period, and consonant with the principle of social justice, the LA awarded
respondents with separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, to
be paid by DNL Security. DNL Security filed a motion for reconsideration, while petitioner
appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC treated DNL Securitys motion for reconsideration as an appeal, but dismissed the
same, as it was not legally perfected. It likewise dismissed petitioners appeal, having been filed
beyond the reglementary period. The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the NLRC upon
petition for certiorari, and GSIS institutes the instant action.

ISSUES:

1. Whether GSIS appeal was seasonably filed before the NLRC.

2. Whether GSIS is liable as an indirect employer

HELD:

Petition is partly granted

REMEDIAL LAW: Reglamentary period of appeals

Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, where the filing of pleadings, appearances,
motions, notices, orders, judgments, and all other papers with the court/tribunal is made by
registered mail, the date of mailing, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the
registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of filing. In any case, even if the appeal was filed
one day late, the same should have been entertained by the NLRC. However, in exceptional
cases, a belated appeal may be given due course if greater injustice will be visited upon the party
should the appeal be denied. The Court has allowed this extraordinary measure even at the
expense of sacrificing order and efficiency if only to serve the greater principles of substantial
justice and equity.

LABOR LAW: Indirect employment

The fact that there is no actual and direct employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondents does not absolve the former from liability for the latters monetary claims. When
petitioner contracted DNL Security's services, petitioner became an indirect employer of
respondents, pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code which states: The provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or
corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the
performance of any work, task, job or project.

Petitioners liability covers the payment of respondents salary differential and 13thmonth pay
during the time they worked for petitioner. In addition, petitioner is solidarily liable with DNL
Security for respondents unpaid wagesfrom February 1993 until April 20, 1993. While it is true
that respondents continued working for petitioner after the expiration of their contract, based on
the instruction of DNL Security, petitioner did not object to such assignment and allowed
respondents to render service. Thus, petitioner impliedly approved the extension of respondents
services.Accordingly, petitioner is bound by the provisions of the Labor Code on indirect
employment.

However, GSIS is exempt from paying separation pay because it is punitive in character,
and an indirect employer cannot be held liable for this unless it conspired with the
dismissal.

Petition partly granted. GSIS is solidarily liable with DNL Security.

UNITED FIELD SEA WATCHMAN AND CHECKERS AGENCY vs REQUILLO Case

Digest
[G.R. No. 143527, December 06, 2006]

UNITED FIELD SEA WATCHMAN AND CHECKERS AGENCY, JAIME AMAMIO,

GLENN GUIRAL, AND PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, PETITIONERS, VS.
WILLIE REQUILLO, NORBEM DAHANG, JR., ROMEO BUHANGIN, ANTONIO
RUAZA, ELSIE TABLA, AND CONSTANTINO DANUCO, RESPONDENTS .

FACTS

Respondents were security guards of the United Field Sea Watchman and Checkers Agency
(UFSWCA) assigned to the Port of Surigao City operated by the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA). UFSWCA is a single proprietorship owned by Jaime Amamio. Its operations in Surigao
City are managed by Glenn Guiral.

In the course of their employment, respondents applied for loans with the SSS Office at Surigao
City. To their dismay, they found that UFSWCA has not been remitting to the SSS their
contributions being deducted regularly from their salaries. Upon advice of the SSS, they filed
with the DOLE in Surigao del Norte complaints against UFSWCA.

On June 30, 1997, UFSWCA issued Agency Order No. 167-97 reassigning respondents to
various PPA offices in Iligan City, Ozamiz City, Cagayan, Nasipit, and Iloilo. Respondents
refused to heed the agency order as they were residing in Surigao City with their families and
they considered the order a form of retaliation on the part of UFSWCA. Instead, they continued
reporting for work at the PPA office in Surigao City. Hence, UFSWCA refused to pay their
salaries for the month of June 1997 as they were considered absent without leave.

Consequently, respondents filed with the Labor Arbitration Branch in Butuan City a complaint
for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and nonpayment of wages, backwages, differential pay,
and rest day premium pay against petitioners.

Labor Arbiter Rogelio Legaspi found repondents’ dismissal illegal and ordered UFSWCA and/or
Jaime Amamio and PPA, Surgao City to jointly and severally pay respondents salary
differentials, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, unpaid salaries, premium pay for
holidays and rest days, backwages as well as damages for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice.

On appeal by petitioners, NLRC deleted the awards for backawages, damages, and attorney’s
fees as well as the awards granted to Constancio Danuco.

On petition for certiorari by respondents, the CA set aside the Resolution of the NLRC holding
that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
gave due course to petitioners’ appeal which was filed beyond the reglementary period. The
CA’s decision was premised on the finding of patent irregularity in the registry return slips
addressed to private respondent Jaime Amamio and his counsel Atty. Estanislao Ebarle which
are not the original return slips of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The non-submission of the
original return slips is an indication that if the originals were submitted they would reveal that
private respondent Jaime Amamio and Atty. Estanislao Ebarle received the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter on a much earlier date.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners’ appeal to the NLRC was
filed beyond the reglementary period.

HELD

Petition is denied. The decision and resolution of the CA are affirmed.

Rule 131, Section 3 (e) of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that ‘evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.’ There being no contradictory evidence to debunk
such supposition, the presumption stands.

Article 223 of the Labor Code provides in part:

ART. 223. Appeals. – Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders, x x x.

The appeal not having been filed within the ten (10) day period to appeal, the appeal filed by
private respondents before the NLRC should not have been given due course. The failure of
private respondents to perfect the appeal in accordance with the prescribed procedure renders the
same ineffective to stop the running of the ten (10) day reglementary period to appeal

The right to appeal is not part of due process but a mere statutory privilege that has to be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Since the perfection
of an appeal within the statutory reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional, petitioners’ failure to perfect their appeal to the NLRC seasonably rendered the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision final and executory. Accordingly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction to give
due course to petitioners’ appeal, much less render a Resolution modifying the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision. Indeed, such Resolution is a patent nullity for want of jurisdiction.

Becton Dickinson Phils, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in importation, warehousing,

exportation, manufacture, assembly, sale at wholesale, and promotion of health care products
needed by hospitals, doctors, laboratories, and pharmaceutical companies. The company is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Becton Dickinson Worldwide, Inc., USA, and with operations in the
Asia Pacific Region under the charge of Becton Dickinson Asia Pacific. Becton, Phils. had
two main divisions: (a) medical; and (b) diagnostics. Jesus Fargas headed the Medical Division,
while the position of head of the Diagnostics Division was vacant. The position of Country
Manager of Becton, Phils., was also vacant. Respondent Reinerio Z. Esmaquel was hired as
Director of Sales and Marketing of the Diagnostics Division.

Jesus Fargas was promoted to Country Manager. Respondent Esmaquel was appointed Business
Director, reporting to the Country Manager.

A few years later, Becton, Phils. reorganized under the concept of "Go To Market." It organized
2 divisions, the sales division and the marketing division, and designated Respondent as the
director of sales. The marketing division was placed under the office of the country manager.
Eventually, respondent was also appointed one of the members of the Becton Dickinson (BD)
Philippines Leadership Team, a group within Becton, Phils., which was responsible for the
formulation of policies and rules of the company.

Pursuant to its established policies and guidelines for terminating employees, Becton, Phils.
retrenched nine (9) employees, giving them separation benefits in accordance with such
guidelines. Its very own Country Manager, Jesus Fargas, was among those whose services were
terminated. Accordingly, each of them received separation benefits computed as follows:

Separation pay = Adjusted Monthly Salary x 3 x No. of years of service

Where

Adjusted Monthly Salary = Monthly Salary x 13/12

In addition thereto, the nine (9) terminated employees were also paid retirement benefits

under the company’s Retirement Plan, computed as follows:

Retirement Benefits = Monthly Salary x 1.5 x No. of years of service

After Country Manager Jesus Fargas left the company, respondent was considered for said
position. Pending the appointment of a Country Manager, Becton, Asia created a “Self-
Managed Team” to run the day-to-day operations of the company, where respondent was made a
member.

Becton, Asia announced the appointment of petitioner Wilfredo Joaquin, a former Filipino
citizen who later acquired American citizenship, as the new Country Manager of Becton,
Phils. Barely two (2) months from Joaquin’s assumption of his position as Country Manager,
Becton, Phils. served upon respondent a notice of termination of employment on the ground that
his position has been declared redundant.

Becton, Phils. offered to pay separation benefits to respondent computed as follows:

Separation pay = monthly salary x 1.38 x No. of Years of Service

plus retirement pay computed as follows:

RETIREMENT BENEFITS = Monthly Salary x .75 x No. of Years of Service

Respondent objected to his termination because, as member of the BD Philippines Leadership

Team, he was not aware of any meeting or discussion of the team about the roles of his position
in the organization. The roles of his position/function in the company have never been placed in
the agenda for meeting of the BD Philippines Leadership Team. Respondent asked
Joaquin why his position was declared redundant but Joaquin could not give him any plausible
reason except that the redundancy of his position was due to restructuring of the company
organization.

Respondent asked Joaquin if he had taken into consideration in declaring redundant his position,
the guidelines/rules for termination of employment as directed by Becton, Asia’s President,
namely: (a) to retain the best employee; (b) consider the performance of the employee for the last
three (3) years (having won an excellence award and meeting the targets); and (c) refrain from
taking decision based on individual salary. Joaquin failed to answer this question.
Respondent further protested when he was informed that the separation benefits to be paid to him
was way below those received by the nine (9) employees previously terminated. He demanded
an equal treatment from the company, considering that he rendered exemplary service thereto
and that he is being terminated involuntarily.

This notwithstanding, he was terminated and required to sign a Release and Quitclaim.

Respondent sent Becton, Phils. a letter protesting his termination from service and/or illegal
dismissal and demanded full payment of his separation pay and retirement benefits. Becton,
Phils. rejected respondent’s claim, explaining that he had been given his full separation pay and
retirement benefits (net of outstanding retirement loan and 50% share in the car loan) in addition
to which, he was also given a laptop computer, a Nokia 8850 cellular phone, free of charge, and
that he had already signed a Release and Quitclaim.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint against Becton, Phils. and Wilfredo Joaquin with the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for illegal dismissal, underpayment of separation pay and
retirement benefits, actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of the complaint
as illegal, and ordering the payment of a) Backwages of P197,525.00 per month reckoned from
August 11, 2001 until actually paid; b) Separation pay differential of P4,148,024.76 with legal
interest from date of judgment until actually fully paid; c) Retirement benefit differential of
P1,765,873.50 with legal interest from date of this judgment until actually paid; d) Moral
damages of P300,000.00. e) Exemplary damages of P300,000.00 and f) Attorney’s fees in an
amount equivalent to 10% of the total of all the foregoing amounts. Petitioners Becton, Phils. and
Joaquin jointly appealed to the NLRC which affirmed that of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioners jointly went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the rules of court

ISSUE:

whether or not the ground of “redundancy” applies

HELD:

On the matter of redundancy, the Labor Arbiter ruled, and both the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals unanimously agreed, that the record supports the finding that the Company and Joaquin
disregarded totally the Company’s guidelines in declaring [respondent’s] position redundant. The
principal reason why [respondent’s] position was declared redundant is the fact that he was the
highest paid employee. The Company’s main purpose in terminating [respondent] was to cut
down expenses and it did so by dismissing him in one fell swoop, camouflaging its malice by
using the ground of redundancy. Thus was violated the Company rule that the decision to
terminate must not be based on salary. The Company certainly could not find fault with
[respondent’s] performance. In 1999 his work performance was “outstanding”. In 2000 his
work performance was “very good”. For the FY 2000, [respondent] achieved 104% sales
performance. Hence, there were violations of the Company rules to retain the best employee; to
consider the performance of the employee for the last three years; protect the best people; and
remove those who least contribute. The superfluity of [respondent’s] position has not been
established. petitioners utterly failed to establish by substantial evidence that indeed,
respondent’s position in the company became redundant due to concrete and real factors
recognized by law and relevant jurisprudence. evidence not presented during the trial cannot be
considered at all.

When Becton, Asia laid down guidelines for terminating employees and petitioner Becton, Phils.
applied these in previously laying off nine (9) of its employees, Becton, Phils. committed grave
abuse of discretion in not applying the same criteria in respondent’s case. Moreover, even after
a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds no valid and acceptable explanation
for the unequal treatment by petitioner Becton, Phils. in the manner of termination of the nine
(9) employees and that of respondent, and therefore agrees with the Labor Arbiter that such
discriminatory act is abhorrent to the basic principles of social justice and protection of labor,
akin to a violation of the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. Indeed, it smacks
of incredulity to believe that a topnotch employee who has contributed much to the growth of the
company and for which the latter even reciprocated him with honors and awards, suddenly in a
span of less than two (2) months from the time a new company Country Manager assumed post,
would wake up one morning with a notice that his position is already superfluous and therefore
he is no longer needed.

Petitioners also contend that respondent already signed a Release and Quitclaim which forthwith
bars any further claims against the company. The Labor Arbiter, however, ruled that:
[Respondent] is not on equal footing with the Company; he was in a precarious financial
position; he needed the money, to be given to him by the Company; so he signed, otherwise his
family would starve. [Respondent’s] signing of the Release and Quitclaim as a condition for
payment to him of the separation pay and “Goodwill” does not bar him from seeking the full
measure of his right or to demand benefits to which he is legally entitled or to question the
legality of his dismissal.

Petitions are denied.

STOLT-NIELSEN MARINE SERVICES V. NLRC
258 SCRA 643
ROMERO, J.
FACTS
1. Respondent Meynardo J. Hernandez was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services
(Phils.) Inc. as radio officer on board M/T Stolt Condor for a period of ten months. He
boarded the vessel on January 20, 1990.
2. On April 26, 1990, the ship captain ordered private respondent to carry the baggage
of crew member Lito Loveria who was being repatriated. He refused to obey the
order out of fear in view of the utterance of said crew member "makakasaksak ako"
and also because he did not perceive such task as one of his duties as radio officer.
3. As a result of such refusal, private respondent was ordered to disembark on April 30,
1990 and was himself repatriated on May 15, 1990. He was paid his salaries and
wages only up to May 16, 1990.
4. Private respondent filed before public respondent POEA a complaint for illegal
dismissal and breach of contract paying for, among other things, payment of salaries,
wages, overtime and other benefits due him for the unexpired portion of the contract
which was six (6) months and three (3) days.
5. Petitioner in its answer alleged that private respondent refused to follow the "request"
of the master of the vessel to explain to Lolito Loveria, the reason for the latter's
repatriation and to assist him in carrying his baggage, all in violation of Article XXIV,
Section I of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the POEA Standard
Contract. Hence, private respondent, after being afforded the opportunity to explain
his side, was dismissed for gross insubordination and serious misconduct.
6. Respondent denied that the master of the vessel requested him to explain to Loveria
the reason for the latter's repatriation.
7. Thereafter, POEA Administrator rendered an award in favor of private respondent.
8. Aggrieved, petitioner Stolt-Nielsen appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The NLRC concurred with the POEA Administrator in ruling
that private respondent, having been illegally dismissed, was, therefore, entitled to
the monetary award.
9. It further stated that private respondent's duty as a radio officer or radio operator
does not include the carrying of the luggage of any seaman or explaining to said
seaman the reason for his repatriation. Thus, concluded the NLRC, his termination
on this ground was not proper and, therefore, he had every right to the monetary
award. The NLRC likewise granted private respondent's claim for fixed overtime pay
and attorney's fees.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not private respondent was legally dismissed on the ground of gross
insubordination and serious misconduct.
2. Whether or not private respondent was entitled to the award of over-time pay.
HELD
1. YES. Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for the
dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites.
The employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the
willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude", and the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The Court agrees
that by virtue of the aforementioned CBA and POEA Standard Contract provisions
cited by petitioner, private respondent is indeed bound to obey the lawful commands
of the captain of the ship, but only as long as these pertain to his duties. The order to
carry the luggage of a crew member, while being lawful, is not part of the duties of a
radio officer. Assuming arguendo that lawful commands of a ship captain are
supposed to be obeyed by the complement of a ship, private respondent's so-called
"act of disobedience" does not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal. In instant
case, the POEA found that private respondent's actuation which led to his dismissal
was the first and only act of disobedience during his service with the petitioner,
Furthermore, examination of the circumstances surrounding private respondent's
disobedience shows that the repatriated seaman's utterance of "makakasaksak ako"
so instilled fear in private respondent that he was deterred from carrying out the
order of the captain. Hence, his act could not be rightfully characterized as one
motivated by a "wrongful and perverse attitude." Besides, said incident posed no
serious or substantial danger to the well-being of his other co-employees or of the
general public doing business with petitioner employer, neither did such behavior
threaten substantial prejudice to the business of his employer.
2. NO. The Court reiterated that the rendition of overtime work and the submission of
sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied
before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the
basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees
the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established.
Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship
or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him
overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his
personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable