UPDATES IN CRIMINAL LAW

(JURISPRUDENCE)
These updated materials are product of lectures of Judge Marlo Campanilla

1. Generality - If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court because of the unique characteristic of
his person (e.g. he is a foreigner, military, ambassador, President), the applicable principle is generality. If
the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court due to the unique characteristic of the place where the
crime was committed (e.g. foreign vessel, embassy or high sea), the applicable principle is territoriality.

a. Consular and diplomatic immunity - Consular officers are immune from criminal prosecution of acts
performed in the exercise of function (1967 Convention on Consular Relation). Immunity does not cover
slander (Liang vs. People, GR No.125865, January 28, 2000), or reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide for not being function-related. A Chinese diplomat, who killed another Chinese diplomat in
Cebu, is immune from criminal prosecution (The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). Unlike
consular officers, diplomatic agents are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits (Minucher vs. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003).

b. Presidential immunity - The presidential immunity is subject the following conditions: (1) the
immunity has been asserted during the period of his incumbency and tenure; and (2) the act constituting
the crime is committed in the performance of his duties. This immunity will assure the exercise of
presidential functions free from any hindrance, considering that the Chief Executive is a job demands
undivided attention (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001).

It is submitted that a Vice-President even during his tenure could not invoke immunity from criminal
prosecution for plunder on the following reasons: (1) plunder are not his official conducts as Vice-
President; (2) the job of the Vice-President unlike the head of the executive department does not demands
undivided attention; (3) and the implementation principal penalty of imprisonment for plunder is not
inconsistent with the constitutional provision on non-removal of impeachable officer except through
impeachment since he can function as Vice-President while serving sentence in prison. However,
accessory penalty of disqualification, which involved removal from office, is not implementable since the
enforcement thereof will offend the constitutional provision on non-removal of impeachable officer.

c. Parliamentary immunity - An incumbent Senator is not immune from suit for being a protector or
coddler of trading of dangerous drugs under RA No. 9165. Legislator’s immunity is confined to
parliamentary privilege from arrest while the Congress is in session in all offenses punishable by not more
than 6 years imprisonment and parliamentary immunity from prosecution for libel in connection with any
Congressional speech or debate.

2. Territoriality – The ground occupied by US embassy is in fact the territory of the USA to which the
premises belong through possession or ownership. A person who committed a crime within the premises
of an embassy will be prosecuted under the law of Philippines because of the principle of territoriality
(Reagan vs. Commissionon Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968).

b. Convention of the law of the sea - Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the flag state of
foreign merchant vessel passing through the territorial sea of another state has jurisdiction over crimes
committed therein. However, a coastal state such as the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over any
crime committed on board such ship in the following cases: (1) if its consequences extend to the coastal
State; (2) if it disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (3) if the ship
master or a diplomatic or consular officer of the flag State requested assistance from the local authorities;
or (4) if it is for the suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. Murder or serious
physical injuries committed in a foreign vessel anchored in a Philippine port against a passenger thereof is
within the jurisdiction of the Philippine court since this crime disturb the peace of the country.
b. Regime of islands - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has also jurisdiction over crime
committed in Kalayaan Islands or Scarboruogh Shoal because the Baseline Law (RA No. 9522) declares
that the Philippines exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over it.

c. Bigamy - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has jurisdiction over concubinage involving
illicit relationship maintained in the Philippines; but it has no jurisdiction over bigamy involving
subsequent marriage contracted in Taiwan.

3. Extraterritoriality – Under the flag state rule, the Philippines has jurisdiction over hijacking of PAL
airplane in an American territory since it its registered in the Philippines but not over murder committed
in vessel registered in Panama while on high seas although it is owned by a Filipino. Under the protective
principle, the court has jurisdiction over forgery of Philippine money committed in Taiwan whether by a
Filipino or an alien but not over forgery of US dollars committed therein. Under the extraterritoriality
rule, the court has jurisdiction over plunder, direct bribery and falsification of document by a public
officer in a Philippines consular premises stationed in America but not corruption of public officer and
falsification of document committed by private individual as principal by inducement. Under the
universality principle, the court has jurisdiction over piracy committed on high seas for being a universal
crime but not over murder qualified by the circumstance of taking advantage of the calamity brought
about by piracy on high seas. The 12-mile territorial water of Taiwan or Sabah may be considered as high
seas; hence, piracy committed thereincan be prosecuted in the Philippines (People vs. Lol-Lo and Saraw,
G.R. No. L-17958,February 27, 1922).

4. Prospectivity -If the court in trying an accused, who committed a crime prior to the passage of the law,
should give retroactive effect to the law provided that: (1) it is favorable to the accused and (2) the
accused is not a habitual delinquent (Article 22of RPC). If the law repeals a previous law or provision
defining a crime, the applicable principle is not Article 22 of RPC but nullum crimen poena sine lege.
Since the intention of the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable by the repealed law, the accused
should be acquitted or released if the already convicted, even though he is a habitual delinquent.
Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27 of RPC and 30 years under Article
29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592 if the convict has undergone preventive imprisonment, is a
lighter penalty than life imprisonment, which has no duration. Amendatory law, which prescribes
reclusion perpetua instead of life imprisonment, shall be given a retroactive effect for being favorable to
the accused (People vs. Morilla, GR No. 189833, February 5, 2014).

If a child in conflict, who is a habitual delinquent, committed the crime prior to RA No. 9344, he is
entitled to retroactive application thereof. Section 68 of RA No. 9344 expressly provides retroactive
application of the privileges to a child in conflict with the law (Atizado vs. People, G.R. No. 173822,
October 13, 2010, Bersamin) without condition. On the other hand, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides retroactive application of the favorable law subject to the condition of non-habitual delinquency.
Since Section 68 of RA No. 9344 is a specific provision while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is a
general provision, the latter yields to the former. Generalia specialibus non derogant. Hence, the
retroactive effect of RA No. 9344 is unconditional.

5. Decriminalization - RA No. 10158 has decriminalized vagrancy by omitting portions of Article 202 of
RPC involving this crime. Vagrants are victims of poverty and that the law on vagrancy serves to oppress
the very people that the government sought to protect. RA No. 10655 has decriminalized premature
marriage by repealing Article 351 of RPC. This provision is discriminatory because it is not applicable to
men. Moreover, Article 351, which was sought to prevent a possible confusion as to who is the father of
the child born within the period of 301 days after the dissolution of the marriage, is not anymore
necessary since paternity and filiation can now be easily determined through modern technology.

6. Repeal –RA No. 10655 has repealed Article 351 of RPC on premature marriage without re-enactment.
This is a total repeal in which the intention of the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable of old
law. A total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old
penal law prior to its repeal (Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000). RA 8353 expressly repealed Article 336
of RPC on rape but re-enacted it redefining this crime under Article 266-A. This is a partial repeal in
which the intention of the new law is not to decriminalize an act punishable of old law but to introduce
changes. The effect of the new law is amendatory. This partial repeal of Article 336 does not deprive the
courts of jurisdiction to try and punish offender for rape committed prior to RA No. 8353 (U.S. vs. Cana,
12 Phil. 241). RA No. 8353 shall be given prospective effect since it is not favorable to the accused.

7. Mistake of fact - Authorities, who manned a checkpoint because of information that there are armed
rebels on board a vehicle, have the duty to validate the information, identify them, and to make a
bloodless arrest unless they were placed in real mortal danger. If they shot the suspected vehicle, which
did not stop after have been flagged down and killed the occupants therein, who turned out be unarmed
civilians, they are liable for multiple homicides. The mistake of fact principle is not applicable since there
is negligence or bad faith on their part (Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 120744-46, June 25, 2012).
The accused shot with a firearm and killed by mistake a thief in the toilet, who turned out to be his
girlfriend. Invasion of property is considered as unlawful aggression under Article 12 of the RPC because
of the self-help doctrine under the Civil Code (People vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20,
1983). Even though there is no actual invasion of property, unlawful aggression as an element of defense
of property will be considered as present because of the mistake of fact principle. However, the means
employed by him firing shots through the toilet door is not reasonable; and hence, he is only entitled to
privilege migrating circumstance of incomplete defense of property (US vs. Apego, G.R. No. L-7929,
November 18, 1912).

8. Proximate cause – Suicide is not a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC; hence, a pregnant
woman who attempted to commit suicide is not liable for abortion due to the consequent death of the
infant. Vexatious act (e.g. pouring gasoline) made as part of fun making is not felony within the
contemplation of Article 4. The accused is not liable for homicide. However, such act is considered as
culpable, and thus, he is liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (People vs. Pugay, No
74324, November 17, 1988). Vexatious act made out of hate (such as putting a robber snake inside the
bag of the victim) is unjust vexation, which is a felony within the contemplation of Article 4. The accused
is liable for homicide if the victim died due to heart attack caused by seeing a snake in his bag.

a. Tetanus - There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when
victim was rushed to hospital, exhibiting symptoms of tetanus infection. Since infection is severe, he died
the next day. The incubation period of severe tetanus infection is less than 14 days. Hence, he could not
have been infected at the time of the stabbing since that incident occurred 22 days before the symptoms
manifested. The infection was an efficient intervening cause breaking the connection between the physical
injuries and death. Hence, the crime committed is physical injuries (Villacorta vs. People, G.R. No.
186412, September 7, 2011). If the victim was infected by tetanus at the time of stabbing, and the
infection is the proximate cause of death, the crime committed is homicide (People vs. Cornel, G.R. No.
L-204, May 16,1947).

b. Offense punishable under special law - Practicing medicine without license is an offense punishable
under special law but not a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC. Hence, a quack doctor, who
killed his patient while treating him, is only liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (People
vs. Carmen, G.R. No.137268, March 26, 2001). If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crime committed is qualified carnapping or carnapping in
the aggravated form under Section 3 of RA No. 10883. If the victim accidentally killed is not the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crimes committed are simple carnapping and
homicide. The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft and robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No.
137457, Nov. 21, 2001). Although not punishable under RPC, it can be treated as a felony within the
meaning of Article 4 of RPC (See: Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). Hence, the
accused is liable for homicide, which is the direct and natural consequence of simple carnapping.

c. Evident premeditation - In case of aberatiu ictus and error in personae, the SC did not appreciate
evident premeditation since the victim, who was actually killed, is not contemplated in the premeditation
of the accused (People vs. Trinidad, G.R. NO. L-38930, June 28, 1988; People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil.,
967). However, praetor intentionem and evident premeditation can be independently appreciated. there is
no incompatibility between evident premeditation and no intention to commit so grave a wrong since the
latter is based on the state of mind of the offender while the former manner of committing the crime
(Reyes; People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536).

d. Treachery - If accused employed means to render the victim defenseless, treachery shall be
appreciated even if the killing is due to error in personae (People vs. Del Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. L-32995,
April 30, 1984) or aberratio ictus (People vs. Mabug-at, G.R. No. 25459, August 10, 1926, En Banc) or
with the circumstance of praeter intentionem (People vs. Cagoco, G.R. No. 38511, October 6, 1933)

e. Sense of danger - If a person in committing threat, murder, rape or robbery creates in the mind of the
victim an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures
himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries or death (US
vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 16486, March 22, 1921; People vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17,
1975; People vs. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997; People vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789,
April 25, 1969).

9. Impossible crime - The crime committed is impossible crime if the offense sought to be committed is
factually or legally impossible. Killing a dead person is impossible crime because of legal impossibility.
Putting the hand inside an empty pocket with intention to steal a wallet is impossible crime because of
factual impossibility (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992).

Kidnapping for ransom consummates at the precise moment when the victim was abducted. Receiving
ransom payment is not an element of this crime. What is important is that the victim was kidnapped for
purpose of ransom. Since the crime is already consummated, there is no basis to say that it is impossible
to commit this crime (People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993). Moreover, kidnapping is a
crime against liberty and not against person or property.

Firing a gun at the unoccupied bedroom with intention to kill a victim constitutes impossible crime
because it is factually impossible to kill a victim, who was not in the bedroom (Intod vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992). But throwing grenade at the unoccupied bedroom, where
the victim is supposed to be sleeping, constitutes arson if the bedroom was burned as a consequence.
“A” discharged shotgun at “B” from a distance of 300 yards; but because of the limited range of the
firepower of the shotgun, it would be impossible for “A” to harm “B”. “A” is liable of discharge of
firearm and not impossible crime. Where the offender unlawful entered the house and took a watch that
turned out to be his own, he is liable for trespass to dwelling and not impossible crime (Criminal Law
Conspectus by Justice Florenz Regalado). If the accused administered abortive drugs upon his
girlfriend whom he believed to be pregnant, which turned out not to be true, but the woman became ill for
more than 30 days, the accused will be liable for serious physical injuries and not impossible crime of
abortion (Criminal Law Reviewer by Gregorio).

a. Gender crime - Gender is an element of all crimes against chastity except acts of lasciviousness. In
seduction and consented acts of lasciviousness, and abduction, the offender must be a man, while the
victim must be a woman. The offender in adultery must be a married woman, while in concubinage a
married man. If the element of gender is not present in a crime against chastity, it is impossible to commit
this crime (e.g. it is impossible to commit abduction against a person, who is gay). Despite the
impossibility of its commission, the accused is not liable for impossible crime. To be held liable for
impossible crime, the act which is impossible to commit must constitutes crime against person or
property. However, abduction is a crime against chastity. But the accused may be held liable for illegal
detention. A person, who has sexual intercourse with a woman not knowing that she was already dead, is
liable for impossible crime since rape is now a crime against person. However, if he is aware that the
woman is already dead, he is not liable for impossible crime since criminal intent or propensity to rape,
which is the basis of penalizing impossible crime, is wanting. If the gender element in rape through sexual
intercourse is not present, the offender is not liable for impossible crime. Although it is impossible to
commit rape through sexual intercourse where the victim is a gay, such acts constitute acts of
lasciviousness.

b. Unfunded check - If the check is unfunded, stealing the check and presenting it for payment with the
bank constitute impossible crime. It is factually impossible to accomplish the crime of qualified theft
since the check is unfunded(Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009). If the check is funded,
stealing the check and presenting it for payment with the bank is not impossible crime. Even if the
accused failed to encash the same due to external cause such as apprehension by police or stop payment,
he will be held liable for consummated theft. In theft, taking property with intent to gain consummates the
crime. Actual gain is not an element thereof. Thus, failure to gain will not prevent the consummation of
the crime (See: People vs. Seranilla, G.R. No. L-54090, May 9, 1988);

10. Indeterminate offense - Climbing on top of the naked victim, touching her genitalia and mashing her
breasts are susceptible of double interpretation (People v. Lamahang). His intention is either to rape or
seduce her. Hence, the accused cannot be held liable for attempted rape because intent to have sex is not
clear. He is only liable for acts of lasciviousness (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014,
Bersamin). Inflicting non-mortal wound upon the victim by shooting him constitutes physical injuries if
the accused did not further shoot him to inflict mortal wounds. The crime is not attempted homicide
because failure to shoot him further shows lack of intent to kill. Moreover, spontaneous desistance from
further shooting to victim to inflict mortal wounds is a defense in attempted homicide (Pentecostes, Jr. vs.
People, GR No. 167766, April 7, 2010). But inflicting mortal wound upon the victim constitutes
frustrated homicide (De Guzman vs. People, G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014, Bersamin) even if
the accused desisted from further shooting him. The fact that the wounds are mortal indicates intent to
kill. Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further shooting is not a defense in frustrated homicide
(People vs. Abella, G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013).
11. Self-defense - Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical
force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it
must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive
and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making
a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot (Rustia vs. People, G.R. No. 208351, October 05, 2016,
Bersamin).

12. Battered woman syndrome -The essence of this defense of “Battered Woman Syndrome” as a
defense is that battered woman, who suffers from physical and psychological or emotional distress, is
acting under an irresistible impulse to defend herself although at the time of commission of the crime the
batterer had not yet committed unlawful aggression. That is why “Battered Woman Syndrome” is a
defense notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense
such as unlawful aggression (Section 26 of RA No. 9262). This Syndrome refers to a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of cumulative abuse (Section 3).

The three phases of the Battered Woman Syndrome are: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving or non-violent phase (People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981,
January 15, 2004). The basis of the irresistible impulse to make a defense against the batterer is the
woman’s experiencing two battering episodes. The elements of Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense
are as follows: (1) the woman is subjected to cumulative abuse by the victim, with whom she has marital,
sexual or dating relationship; and (2) the cumulative abuse or battery is the act of inflicting physical harm
resulting to physical and psychological or emotional distress. Since the abuse must be cumulative, there
must be at least two episodes involving the infliction of physical harm. If the first episode is infliction of
physical harm and the second episode is verbal abuse, the accused cannot avail Battered Woman
Syndrome as a defense.

13. Imbecility and minority – Mental retardation includes (a) idiot, whose mental age is two-year old;
(b) imbecile, whose mental age is seven-year old; (c) moron or feebleminded, whose mental age is twelve-
year old and (d) borderline intelligence (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011
Bersamin; People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012). In rape, there is a difference between
actual age and mental age. In statutory rape, the actual age of the victim must be under 12 years old. In
rape against a person deprived of reason, the mental age of the victim is 2 years old (idiot), 7 years old
(imbecile), 12 years old (feebleminded) or above 12 years old but suffering from borderline intelligence
(People vs. Butiong, supra; People vs. Bayrante, supra). In exempting circumstance, there is a difference
between actual age and mental age. In exempting circumstance of imbecility, what is important is the
mental age of the accused. An idiot, whose mental age is 2 years, and imbecile, whose mental
age is 7 years old (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011, Bersamin) are exempt from
criminal liability. A feebleminded, whose mental age is 12 years old, is not exempt from criminal liability
since he is not an imbecile (People vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997) but he is entitled to
mitigating circumstance of mental illness (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29,
1950). In exempting circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important is the
chronological or actual age of the accused. If the actual age of the accused is 18 years old and mental age
is 9 years old, the exempting circumstance of minority and imbecility shall not be appreciated (People vs.
Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014). Under Section 5 (b) of RA No 7610, when the child subjected
to sexual abuse is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape and acts of
lasciviousness under RPC. For purpose of Section 5 (b), there is no difference between actual age and
mental age. Hence, the victim whose actual age is 12 years old but her mental age is 9 years old, is
considered as a victim under 12 year of age within the contemplation of Section 5 (b) (People vs. Pusing,
G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016),

14. Insanity - The presumption, under Article 800 of the Civil Code, is that every human is sane. Anyone
who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence (People vs. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010). There are two tests (People vs.
Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950) to determine whether the mental condition of the
accused is exempting or mitigating:

a. Test of cognition – Under the test of cognition, the mental condition of the accused is an exempting
circumstance of insanity if there was a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act
(People vs. Bulagao, G.R. No. 184757, October 05, 2011); or mitigating circumstance of mental illness if
there was only a partial deprivation of intelligence (People vs. Puno, G.R. No. L- 33211, June 29, 1981).
After satisfying his lust, accused threatened the victim. This implies that accused knew what he was
doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to keep it a secret. It also indicated that the crime was committed
during one of his lucid intervals. Accused is not exempt from liability for failure to pass the cognition test
(People vs. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5. 2009).

b. Test of volition – Under the test of volition, the mental condition of the accused is a mitigating
circumstance of mental illness if there is complete or partial deprivation of freedom. In sum, if a sex
maniac or homicidal maniac had merely passed the volition test but not the cognition test, he will only be
given the benefit of mitigating circumstance of illness. Diminution of freedom is enough to mitigate the
liability of the offender suffering from illness (See: People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991, G.R. No.
54135, November 21, 1991). Thus, kleptomania is a mitigating circumstance of mental illness. Irresistible
homicidal impulse in People vs. Bonoan G.R. No. 45130, February 17, 1937, which is an exempting
circumstance is not anymore controlling. Irresistible homicidal impulse, which is based on the volition
test, is only a mitigating circumstance. To exempt a person from criminal liability due to insanity, the
controlling rule is cognition testand not the volition test(People vs. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March
17, 2004). In several Supreme Court cases, the pleas of insanity of accused who are suffering from
schizophrenia or psychosis were rejected because of failure to pass the cognition test. (People vs. Medina,
G.R. No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 95029, March 24, 1993).

15. Child in conflict with the law -The rights and privileges of a child in conflict with the law are as
follows:

1. If the accused is 15 years of age or below, minority is an exempting circumstance (Section 6 of RA No.
9344). Lack of discernment is conclusively presumed. If the child is above 15 years of age, minority is an
exempting circumstance if he acted without discernment, or privilege mitigating circumstance if he acted
with discernment. This privilege mitigating circumstance shall be appreciated even if minority was not
proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented on appeal (People vs. Agacer,
G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013) and even if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death (People vs.
Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270,October 21, 2015).

2. If the accused is 15 years of age or below but above 12 years, shall be considered as a neglected child.
Neglected child shall be mandatorily placed in a youth care facility or Bahay Pag-asa in the following
instances: (a) If the child commits serious crimes such as parricide, murder, infanticide, rape, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide or rape, robbery with homicide or rape, destructive arson, or
carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or offenses involving dangerous drugs
punishable by more than 12 years of imprisonment; and (b) In case of repetition of offenses and the child
was previously subjected to a intervention program and his best interest requires involuntarily
commitment. In case of commission of serious crime, a petition for involuntarily commitment shall be
filed by social worker in court. In case of repetition of offenses, his parents or guardians shall execute a
written authorization for the voluntary commitment. However, if the child has no parents or guardians or
if they refuse or fail to execute such authorization, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall
be immediately filed social worker in court; but the child may be subjected to intensive intervention
program supervised by the local social officer instead of involuntary commitment (Section 20-A and 20-B
of RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630).
3. If the child is found guilty, the court shall place him under suspended sentence, without need of
application instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction (Section 38 of RA 9344). The law makes no
distinction as to the nature of offense by the child. The Senate debate discloses that the suspension is
applicable to heinous crime (People vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011; People vs. Ancajas,
G.R No. 199270, October 21, 2015).An accused, who is under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime, is a child in conflict with the law. He will not be deprived of privileges under
the law even though he reaches age of majority at time of rendition of judgment. Exception: While
Section 38 of RA 9344 provides suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child is already 18
years of age at the time of conviction. However, Section 40 limits the suspension of sentence until the
child reaches the age of 21 (People vs. Gambao, GR No. 172707, October 01, 2013; People vs. Ancajas,
G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015; Hubilla vs. People, G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014,
Bersamin).

4. If the accused is an adult, application for probation must be filed within the period of perfecting an
appeal (Section 4 of PD No. 968 or Probation Law). However, the accused is a child in conflict with the
law, application for probation may be filed at any time (Section 42 of RA No. 9344). In sum, it can be
filed even beyond the period of perfecting an appeal or even during the pendency of an appeal.
Under Section 9 of PD 968, one, who is sentenced to suffer a penalty (or maximum indeterminate
penalty) of more than 6 years, is not qualified to apply for probation. However, under Section 70 of RA
No. 9165, a first time minor offender can apply for probation for the crime of possession or use of
dangerous drug even if the penalty is higher than 6 years of imprisonment. But Section 70 of RA 9165 is
not applicable sale of dangerous drugs. Section 24 of RA No. 9165 disqualifies drug traffickers and
pushers for applying for probations although the accused is a minor. The law considers the users and
possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators (Padua vs.
People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008).

5. The child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities in accordance with Section 51 of RA No. 9344 (People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563,
December 14, 2011; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015; Hubilla vs. People, G.R.
No. 176102, November 26, 2014, Bersamin).

6. A convict is entitled to a full or 4/5 credit of his preventive imprisonment (Article 29 of RPC).
However, if the convict is a child in conflict with the law, he shall be credited in the services of his
sentence the full time spent in actual commitment and detention (Section 41, RA 9344; Atizado vs.
People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, Bersamin).

16. Status offense – Status offenses such as curfew violation refers to offenses which discriminate only
against a child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty for committing similar acts (Section 3 of RA
No. 9344). In sum, a status offense is a crime where minority of the offender is an element. A child shall
not be punished for committing a status offense (Section 57). Under Section 57-A, local ordinances on
status offenses shall be for the protection of children. For committing status offense, children recorded as
a child at risk shall be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be
released to the custody of their parents instead of being penalized.

17. Exempting circumstance of relationship - The absolutory cause of relationship under Article 332 of
RPC applies to theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply to theft through falsification or
estafa through falsification. It includes step-relationship and in-laws relationship. There are two views on
whether death of his wife dissolves the relationship by affinity of the husband with his mother-in-
law for purpose of absolutory cause. The first holds that relationship by affinity terminates after the death
of the deceased spouse, while the second maintains that relationship continues. The principle of pro reo
calls for the adoption of the continuing affinity view because it is more favorable to the accused (Intestate
estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010). The term “spouses” in Article 332
embraces common-law spouses. The basis of this ruling is the rule on co-ownership over properties by
common-law spouses (People vs. Constantino, No. 01897-CR, September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603).

18. Voluntary confession - A plea of guilty made after the prosecution had begun presenting its evidence
cannot be considered voluntary since it was made only after the accused realized that the evidence already
presented by the prosecution is enough to cause his conviction (People vs. Montinola, G.R. No. 131856-
57, July 9, 2001).

19. Allegation of aggravating circumstances - It is now a requirement that the aggravating or qualifying
circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they
cannot be considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial
(Sombilon, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009). This procedural rule has a retroactive
application because of pre reo (People vs. Dadulla, G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011, Bersamin).

20. Nighttime - Nighttime is aggravating if the accused took advantage of the darkness of the night
(People vs. Banhaon, G.R. No. 131117, June 15, 2004) or silence of the night e.g. the accused take
advantage of the fact that the victims and neighbours were sleeping (People vs. Ventura and Ventura,
G.R. No. 148145-46, July 5, 2004).

21. Band - In robbery, band is a special aggravating circumstance under Article 295 of RPC. In robbery
with homicide or rape, band is an ordinary aggravating circumstance under Article 14.

22. Exploitation of minor –The special aggravating circumstance of exploitation of minor under RA No.
9344 is present if the accused makes use, takes advantage of, or profits from the use of children, or abuses
his authority over the child or takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of the child with abuse of confidence
or induce, threaten or instigate the commission of the crime. The concept of exploitation of children is
comprehensive enough to cover the circumstance of with the aid of minor under 15 years of age under
RPC.
23. Conspiracy - It is immaterial whether appellant acted as a principal or as an accomplice because the
conspiracy and his participation therein have been established. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all and the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime (People vs. Siongco, G.R. No. 186472,
July 5, 2010).

a. Disassociation - To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator just have performed an overt
act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission
thereof (People vs. Ebet, G.R. No. 181635 November 15, 2010). A conspirator, who ran away from the
scene of the crime prior to the commission of robbery with homicide by his co-conspirator, is not liable
because the former dissociated himself from the conspiracy. Conspirators are all liable for robbery
although not all profited and gained from the robbery. When a conspirator committed homicide by reason
of or on the occasion of the robbery, his co-conspirators are liable for special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, unless they endeavored to prevent the killing (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635,
November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu, GR No.
201449, April 03, 2013) or they cannot prevent the killing since they are not aware thereof (People vs.
Corbes, G.R. No. 113470, March 26, 1997). This rule is applicable to special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape (People vs. Anticamaray, GR No. 178771, June 08, 2011) or robbery with rape
(People v. Suyu, G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006; People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 108490 June 22,
1995).

b. Multiple rapes - If there is conspiracy to commit rape, each of conspirators is responsible not only for
the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape committed by the other as well (People vs.
Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012).

c. Offense under special law - B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the supplementary application
of the provisions RPC including the rule on conspiracy. Hence, such rule may be applied supplementarily.
Thus, a non-issuer of bum check can be held liable for violation of BP Blg. 22 on the basis of conspiracy.
(Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005). The principle of conspiracy may be applied
to RA No. 9262. Thus, a person (such as mother-in-law), who has no marital, sexual or dating
relationship with the victim, can be held liable for violence against woman on the basis of conspiracy
(Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008) If there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer
in violating RA No. 3019 is imputable to the private individual although there are not similarly situated in
relation to the object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 provides penalty for public officer or
private person for crime under Section 3. Hence, a private individual can be prosecuted for violation of
RA No. 3019 (Go vs. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007). Even if the
public officer, with whom the private individual allegedly conspired, died, the latter can still be
prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes the criminal liability but not the crime.
Hence, if there is proof of the crime and conspiracy between the dead public officer and private
individual, the latter can still be convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go, GR NO. 168539,
March 25, 2014). However, if the public officer with whom the private individual allegedly conspired is
acquitted, the latter should also be acquitted (Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6,
1998). Mayor, treasurer and planning coordinator approved the overpayments in favour of a private
individual for the construction of public market. The public officers caused undue injury to the
government through manifest partiality and evident bad faith in violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019. The private individual, who was overpaid, is also liable on the basis of conspiracy and Go vs. Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan (Santillano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 03, 2010; Uyboco vs.
People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014).

24. Accomplice - Lending weapon such a gun to a killer for purpose of killing a specific person such as
Pedro is an act of accomplice. But if the killer used the weapon in killing a different person such as Juan,
the lender is not liable as an accomplice. To be held liable as an accomplice, it is important that that he
knows and concurs in the criminal design of the principal (community of design) and participates before
or during the commission of the crime by supplying moral or material aid in an efficacious way. In this
case, the lender concurred in the killing of Pedro but not Juan. Hence, he is not liable as an accomplice. If
the killer used another weapon such as knife instead of the gun borrowed in killing Pedro, the lender is
not liable as an accomplice. Although the lender concurred in the killing of Pedro, he did not supply
the killer material or moral aid in an efficacious way since the weapon used is not the one borrowed from
him.

25. Fencing – In fencing, the property, which the accused possesses with intent to gain, must be derived
from the proceeds of theft or robbery (Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475, April 10, 2013). The concept of
carnapping is the same as that of theft or robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, November 21, 2001).
Thus, carnapping can be considered as within the contemplation of the word “theft” or “robbery” in PD
No. 1612 (Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). If the property is derived from the
proceeds of malversation or estafa, fencing is not committed. But the accused can be held liable as an
accessory if he profited or assisted other to profit from this misappropriated property. Actual knowledge
that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is committed is the accused should have known that the
property is stolen taken into consideration the attending circumstances such as (1) the price of the
property is so cheap; (2) expensive jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight in a street; (3) accused
knew that the car he bought was not properly documented (Dimat vs. People, supra); or (4) new tires are
being peddled in the streets by an unknown seller (Ong vs. People, supra). Furthermore, mere possession
of stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (Section 6 of PD No. 1612).

26. Obstruction of justice – Obstruction of justice can only be committed by a person other than the one
being investigated or tried in a criminal proceeding. Although this is not expressly required in PD No.
1829 to make one liable for obstruction of justice, a principal himself cannot be held liable for obstruction
of justice (Angeles vs. Gaite, G.R No. 165276, November 25, 2009). The criminal actor, who threw the
body of murdered victim into the river to destroy the corpus delicti, is liable for murder qualified by the
circumstance of employment of means to afford impunity.The one who assisted in throwing the body
is liable as an accessory to murder for destroying the body of the crime to prevent its discovery (People
vs. Devaras, G.R. Nos. 100938-39, December 15, 1993)or a principal in the crime of obstruction of
justice for destroying it to impair its availability as evidence in a criminal proceeding. The accused cannot
be prosecuted both as an accessory for murder and as principal for obstruction of justice. The penalty
prescribed for obstruction of justice under PD No. 1829 is prision correccional in its maximum period
unless other law prescribed a higher penalty. Thus, the offender may be prosecuted for murder as
accessory with the penalty of prision mayor or for obstruction of justice as principal also with the penalty
of prision mayor, since this penalty is higher than that prescribed under PD No. 1829. The intention of the
law in prescribing a fixed penalty or that provided by other law such as RPC, whichever is higher, is not
to prosecute the offender for obstruction of justice and for other crime arising from the same act such
as destroying the body of the crime. After the discovery of illegal possession of lumber, the accused
unlawfully took the truck used to commit the crime from the authorities. He is not liable as an accessory
since he did not conceal the instrument of the crime for the purpose of preventing the discovery thereof.
Crime was already discovered when the concealment was made. However, he is liable for obstruction of
justice for concealing the truck to impair its availability as evidence in the criminal proceeding for illegal
possession of lumber (Padiernos vs. People, G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015).

To be held liable as an accessory, the person harbored, concealed, or assisted to escape must be principal
of the crime and the crime committed must be treason, parricide, murder,or an attempt to take the life of
the Chief Executive, or other crime where act was committed with abuse of public function or the
principal is a habitual delinquent. To be held liable as a principal in obstruction of justice, the one
harbored, concealed, or assisted to escape is any person(such as principal or accomplice)and the
crime committed is “any offense under existing law.”

The exempting circumstance of relationship under Article 20 of RPC can be appreciated in favor of an
accessory to a felony but not in favor of an accused in the crime of obstruction of justice since he is being
prosecuted as principal and not as an accessory. Light felony is punishable except when the accused is
merely an accessory (Article 16 of RPC) or when it is at the attempted or frustrated stage unless it is a
crime against property or person (Article 7). However, obstruction of justice can be committed even
though the crime under investigation is a light felony. An accused can be convicted as an accessory to a
felony although the principal was not convicted because the latter was at large, unidentified or dead (Vino
vs. People, G.R. No. 84163, October 19, 1989). The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be
duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal (People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015).

27. Credit of preventive imprisonment –Credit for preventive imprisonment is full if the detention
prisoner executed detainee’s manifestation, which is a written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the
assistant of a counsel, stating his willingness to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a
convicted prisoner for the purpose of availing the full credit of the period of his preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment is 4/5 if the detention prisoner executed detainee’s waiver, which is a
written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating his refusal to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a prisoner convicted by final judgment. There is no credit if the
accused is recidivist; has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; or has failed to
surrender voluntarily before a court of law upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence
(Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592). If the offender is a child, the applicable rule for
crediting the period of commitment and detention is not Article 29 of RPC but Section 41, RA 9344,
which provides that the full time spent in actual commitment and detention of juvenile delinquent shall be
credited in the services of his sentence.
28. Immediate release – If the period of preventive imprisonment is equal to the imposable maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged, the detention prisoner shall be released immediately without
prejudice to the continuation of the case, except for the following: 1) recidivist; 2) habitual delinquent; 3)
escapee; and 4) person charged with heinous crimes. Such period shall include good conduct time
allowance (Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592).

29. Special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) –If detention prisoner or convicted prisoner escapes
during the calamity, and subsequently surrenders within 48 hours from the time the President announces
the passing away of such calamity, he is entitled to 1/5 special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) under
Article 98 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592; if the convicted prisoner did not surrender within the
period, he is liable for evasion of sentence under Article 158 of RPC punishable by penalty equivalent to
one-fifth of the time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in no case shall
exceed six months; if the detention prisoner did not surrender within the period, he is not liable for
evasion of sentence. Only convicted prisoner can commit evasion of service of sentence because a
detention prisoner is not serving sentence, which he can evade. In case of the prisoner chose to stay in the
place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity, he is entitled to 2/5 STAL (Article
98 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592). A prisoner who did not escape despite of the calamity
manifests a higher degree of loyalty to the penal system than those who evaded their sentence but
thereafter gives themselves up upon the passing away of the calamity. Hence, prisoners, who did not
escape, are entitled to a higher special time allowance. However, prisoner is not entitled to STAL if he
has committed other offense or any act in violation of the law.

30. Special complex crime –Raping the victim or inserting instrument in her anal orifice after
treacherously inflicting mortal wounds is not a special complex crime of rape with homicide because the
original design of the victim is kill and not to rape the victim. The crime committed is murder qualified by
treachery and rape shall be regarded either as ignominy or cruelty (People vs. Laspardas, G.R. No. L-
46146, Oct. 23, 1979) or sexual assault shall be treated as cruelty (People vs. Bernabe, G.R. No.
185726, October 16, 2009).

a. Special rule for kidnapping with homicide - Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
accused is liable for a special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide (People vs. Mercado, G.R. No.
116239, November 29, 2000; People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998; People vs.
Larranaga, 138874-75, February 3, 2004; People vs. Montanir, GR No. 187534, April 04, 2011; People
vs. Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014). However, if the deprivation of liberty is just incidental to
the transportation of the victim to the place where he will be executed, the crime is murder. Kidnapping
with homicide is not committed because of lack of intent to deprive liberty (People vs. Estacio Jr., G.R.
No. 171655, July 22, 2009).
b. Doctrine of absorption - In robbery with homicide, all other felonies such as rape, intentional
mutilation, usurpation of authority, or direct assault with attempted homicide are integrated into this
special complex crime. This special complex crime is committed as long as death results by reason or on
occasion or robbery without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime(People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People
vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016).

c. Homicide component - In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a
bystander (People vs. Barut, G.R. No. L-42666 March 13, 1979), a responding police (People vs. Pelagio,
G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967) or one of the robbers (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26,
2009;People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016). The phrase “by reason of the rape”
obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, which is the crime the offender originally
designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. In contrast, the phrase “on the
occasion of the rape” as shown by Senate deliberations refers to a killing that occurs immediately before
or after,or during the commission itself of the rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person
other than the rape victim (People vs. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012, Bersamin; People vs.
Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011). In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that victim is killed
by the responding police and not by the robber (People vs. Ombao, G.R. No. L-30492, February 26,
1981). But in attempted robbery with homicide, the offender must be guilty of both crimes. Hence,
attempted robbery with homicide is not committed where the victim was killed by a co-passenger and not
by the robber (People vs. Manalili, G.R. No. 121671, August 14, 1998).

Ordinarily, homicide means killing another person. In sum, the person responsible for the death of the
victim must be the offender. But in the case of People vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969, the
victim himself, who jumped from boat, is responsible for his own death, and yet, the SC convicted the
accused of robbery with homicide. In other words, death caused by the victim himself is considered as
homicide, which is a component of robbery with homicide. Hence, suicide or death caused by the victim
herself can be considered as homicide as a component of special complex crime of rape with homicide.

d. Violence or intimidation in taking the property - If the taking of property is not committed by
means of violence or intimidation, Article 294 of RPC is not applicable. Taking without violence or
intimidation constitutes theft. If after the taking of property by means of violence or intimidation, the
robber killed a responding police officer, the former is liable for robbery with homicide (People vs.
Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967). If after the taking of the roasters without violence or
intimidation, the thief killed responding police officer, he is liable for theft and direct assault with
homicide (People vs. Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974). If after the snatching of the
complainant’s bag without violence or intimidation, a corobber crashed the getaway motorcycle and died,
the accused is only liable for theft (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 200922, July 18, 2012).

e. Direct connection - After consummation of robbery, passengers reported the matter to the police
authorities. During the manhunt operation, one of the police officers was killed by a robbery. The crime
committed is not robbery with homicide since the connection between the two crimes was “not a direct
connection" (People vs. Quemeggen, G.R. No. 178205, July 27, 2009).

f. Occupation of real property - In simple robbery under Article 294 of RPC, violence and intimidation
is employed to take property. In occupation of real property under Article 312, violence or intimidation is
employed to occupy the real property. If the accused has already occupied the house of the complainant,
and he used violence or intimidation to prevent the said owner from reoccupying the property, the crime
committed is not occupation of real property. The accused may be held liable of grave threat, grave
coercion or discharge of firearm depending upon the circumstance of the case.
g. Robbery by using force upon thing - Breaking the window of a house and taking property inside
without entering constitutes theft. Breaking the window is not a circumstance that will qualify the taking
into robbery by using force upon thins since this crime requires that the breaking of window is a means to
enter the building (People vs. Adorno, CA 40 O.G. 567; People vs. Jaranilla. G.R. No. L-28547, February
22, 1974). Breaking the window to commit theft is an ordinary aggravating circumstance. Using picklock
to open a locked cabinet and taking property therein is not robbery by using force upon thing. To
constitute robbery by using force upon thing, the picklock must be used to open the building and not
merely a lockedfurniture (US vs. Macamay, G.R. No. 11952, September 25, 1917). Entrusted key is not a
false key in robbery by using force upon thing.

h. Complex crime of two robberies - In Sebastian case, when the elements of both robbery by means of
violence and intimidation and robbery by using force upon thing are present, the accused shall be held
liable of the former since the controlling qualification is the violence and intimidation. However, the
penalty for robbery in inhabited house if the robber is armed is graver than simple robbery. Hence, by
hurting the victim, the offender shall be penalized with a lighter penalty. Since Sebastian principle defies
logic and reason, People vs. Napolis, G.R. No. L-28865, February 28, 1972 abandoned it. Under the
present rule, when the elements of both robbery by means of violence and intimidation and robbery by
using force upon thing are present, the crime is a complex one under Article 48 of said Code. Hence, the
penalty for robbery in inhabited house shall be imposed in its maximum period (People vs. Disney, G.R.
No. L-41336, February 18, 1983; Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015, Bersamin). If
the entry into the dwelling is without force upon thing, and the property was taken by means of violence
or intimidation, the crime committed is robbery by means of violence or intimidation with aggravating
circumstance of disregard of dwelling (People vs. Tejero, G.R. No. 128892 June 21, 1999; People vs.
Evangelio, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011). When the elements of both robbery with homicide and
robbery by using force upon thing (unlawful entry) are present, the former shall absorb the latter. In sum,
robbery by using force upon thing committed on occasion of robbery by means of violence or
intimidation shall be integrated into the special complex crime of robbery with homicide (People vs. De
Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016). But
aggravating circumstances of disregard of dwelling and unlawful entry shall be both appreciated (People
vs. Lamosa, G.R. No. 74291-93, May 23, 1989).

31. Compound crime - The single act of rolling the hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium which
resulted in the death of victims constituted a compound crime of multiple murders (People vs. Mores, GR
No. 189846, June 26, 2013). Where the use of grenade render the victim defenseless, “use of explosives”
shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance because this is the principal mode of attack. Thus,
treachery will be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance (People vs. Comadre, et al.,
G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004). The single act of running over the victims with a van constitutes
compound crime of multiple murders (People vs. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012).

a. Single act treated as several acts - Single act of pressing the trigger of Thompson or armalite is
treated as several acts as many as there are bullets fired from gun. Because of special mechanism of
Thompson, the single act of pressing its trigger will cause the continuous firing of bullets. Thus, accused
is liable as many homicides as there are victims (People vs. Desierto, (C.A.) 45 O.G. 4542; People vs.
Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116, August, 27, 1999; People vs. Tabaco, G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March
19, 1997; People v. Vargas, Jr., G.R. No. 86728, April 6, 1990; People vs. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and
94312 July 5, 1999).

b. Variance rule - The body of the information charged the accused of compound crime with murder and
attempted murder since two victims were hit by a single shot. The evidence shows that murder and
attempted murder are separate crimes since the two victims were hit by several shot. Under the variance
rule, if the crime alleged in the information varies with the crime proven with evidence, the accused shall
be convicted of the crime alleged or proven whichever the lesser. Thus, accused shall be convicted of
complex crime, which is lesser compared to two crimes (People vs. Bernardo, GR No. 198789, June 03,
2013).

c. Several acts - Several acts in killing several victims do not constitute a compound crime. Article 48
requires a single act constituting two or more crimes (People vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17,
1975). Exceptions: Several acts in killing several victims under a single criminal impulse (People vs.
Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955) or under single criminal purpose (People vs. Abella, G.R. No. L-
32205 August 31, 1979) shall be considered as a single act. Hence, it is a compound crime. The “single
criminal impulse rule” under the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general rule (People vs.
Remollino, G.R. No. L-14008, September 30, 1960). Article 48 on compound crime speaks of single act,
but not single criminal impulse (People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. L-26222, July 21, 1967). In Lawas case, the
SC was merely forced to apply Article 48 because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of
persons killed by each accused (People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012). Thus, the
Lawas doctrine should not be applied if there is conspiracy since the number of victims actually killed by
each conspirator is not anymore material if there is conspiracy (People vs. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539,
June 29, 2010). The “single criminal purpose rule” under the Abella case was adopted in consideration of
the plight of the prisoners; hence, it is only applicable if killings were commit by prisoners against their
fellow prisoners (People vs. Pincalin, G.R. No. L-38755, January 22, 1981; People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No.
184500, September 11, 2012.

32. Complex crime proper - Stabbing after the rape is a separate crime of frustrated homicide. This is
not a complex crime proper since the latter is not necessary to commit the former (People vs. Isla, G.R.
No. 199875, November 21, 2012).

a. Abduction and rape - If the main objective of the accused is to rape the victim, the crime committed
is rape. Forcible abduction (People vs. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705, July 30, 1993; People vs. Almanzor,
G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002) or illegal detention (People vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, January 21,
2004), which is incidental to the commission of rape, is absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather
than Article 48 of RPC is applicable since forcible abduction or illegal detention is an indispensable
means to commit rape. If forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit rape, this is a complex
crime proper under Article 48 of RPC. However, if multiple rapes were committed, forcible abduction
will be considered as a necessary means to commit the first rape but not the subsequent rape. Hence, with
respect to the first rape, the crime committed is complex crime of rape though forcible abduction while
the subsequent rapes will be treated as separate crimes (People vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, February
6, 1971; People vs. Buhos, G.R. No. L-40995, June 25, 1980; People vs. Tami, G.R. Nos. 101801-03,
May 02, 1995; People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002, En Banc; People vs. Amaro, G.R.
No. 199100, July 18, 2014). As a rule, forcible abduction is an indispensable means to commit rape;
hence, the latter absorbs the former. However, if the victim was brought in a house or motel or in a place
with considerable distance from the place where she was abducted, forcible abduction will be considered
as a necessary means to commit rape; hence, the crime committed is complex crime proper. If the accused
abducted the victim without clear showing of lewd design, the crime committed is kidnapping since it will
appear that the intention of the accused is to deprive victim of his liberty. If as a consequence of illegal
detention, the victim was rape, the crime committed is a special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
This is the crime committed regardless of the number of rapes. Multiple rapes will be considered as a
component of this special complex crime (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011;
People vs. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011). If as a consequence of illegal detention, the
victim was rape and then killed, the crime committed is a special complex crime of kidnapping with
homicide. Rape will be considered as a component of this special complex crime (People vs. Larranaga,
138874-75, February 3, 2004, En Banc). The difference between rape through forcible abduction and
kidnapping with rape lies on the criminal intention of the accused at the precise moment of abduction.
If the abduction is committed with lewd design, the crime committed is rape through forcible abduction.
On the other hand, if the abduction is committed without lewd design, the crime committed is kidnapping
with rape (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011). Even if the victim was detained
for one week and in the course thereof, she was rape, the crime committed is rape through forcible
abduction if the abduction is committed with lewd design (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18,
2014). If the accused was molesting the victim immediately upon abduction, that is proof that abduction
is committed with lewd design (People vs. Jose, supra). After eating the food given by accused, the victim
became dizzy and thereafter, she passed out. When she regained consciousness, she notices that she and
accused are naked inside a room. She was raped and detained for 6 days. The crime committed is rape
through forcible abduction (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).

b. Complex crime and special complex crime - In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is
fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but
generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the
other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific, but in a
complex or compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed
in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound
crime may be made the subject of a separate information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite
crime is absorbed (People vs. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015, Bersamin).

33. Doctrine of absorption - If murder, kidnapping or arson committed in furtherance of rebellion, they
will be divested of their character as common crimes and will assume the political complexion of
rebellion. Hence, rebellion absorbs these crimes (People vs. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, October 23,
1956; People vs. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, July 18, 1956; Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990). Doctrine of absorption is applicable to coup d’etat for being a political crime because the
purpose of coup plotter is to seize or diminish state power (Gonzales vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August
8, 2006, concurring opinion by Justice Callejo). Membership in CPP-NPA alone will not establish
political motivation behind the killing for purpose of convicting the killers for rebellion (People vs.
Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, November 29, 1995; People vs. Solongan, G.R. No. 137182, April 24,
2003). But membership in a liquidation squad and killing a government officer is sufficient to establish
political motivation (People v. Dasig,G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993). RA No. 6968 eliminated the
phrases "engaging in war against the forces of the government", "committing serious violence" and
“destroying property” in Article 135 of RPC. These modes of committing rebellion deleted by RA No.
6968 were used by the SC in justifying the doctrine of absorption. The amendment of Article 135 does
not affect the accepted concept of rebellion and these “overt acts of violence” are deemed “subsumed” in
the provision on public and armed uprising, which is an element of rebellion in Article 134 (Regalado).
Hence, the doctrine of absorption is still good. The incidents in Lovedioro case, and Solongan case
happened after RA No. 6968, and yet, the SC is still applying the doctrine of absorption.

a. Sedition - Doctrine of absorption is not applicable to sedition. There is neither law nor jurisprudence
which can allow the absorption of murder and kidnapping by sedition. The absorption principle in the
cases of Hernandez and Geronimo cannot properly be invoked as authority since those two cases involved
rebellion and not sedition (People vs. Hadji, G.R. No. L-12686, October 24, 1963). Moreover, public and
tumultuous uprising for political or social purpose, which is the essence of sedition, does not require
killings, burning of properties and extortions.

b. Incidental deprivation of liberty - If the principal intention of the offenders is to rob the victims, and
the deprivation of their liberty is just incidental to the prevention of the responding police officers from
arresting them, the crime committed is robbery, which absorbed kidnapping and serious illegal detention
(People vs. Astor, G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April 1987). If the accused committed robbery, but
thereafter, they detained the victims to demand additional money, and later forestall their capture by the
police, the crime committed is complex crime of robbery through kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. The detention was availed of as a means of insuring the consummation of the robbery. The
detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a
means of extortion for an additional amount. Hence, the Astor principle is not applicable (People vs.
Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990). If the accused committed robbery by band, but thereafter, they
took one of the victims and detained him for seven days in another place for purpose of demanding
ransom, they are liable of separate crimes of robbery by band and kidnapping for ransom (People vs.
Basao, G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012).

34. Delito continuado - In order that continuous crime may exist, there should be: (1) plurality of acts
performed separately during a period of time; (2) unity of criminal intent and purpose and (3) unity of
penal provision infringed upon or violated (Santiago vs. Garchitorena , GR NO. 109266, December 2,
1993). The following are delito continuado: (1) several acts of taking roasters owned by different owner
under a single criminal impulse to take them all in violation of a single penal provision, and that is Article
308 of RPC (Note: This is also called single larceny rule; People vs. Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547,
February 22, 1974); and (2)several acts of taking away by force the valuables of the employees working
in Energex gasoline station committed under a single criminal intent to commit robbery in that place in
violation of a single penal provision, and that is Article 294 of RPC (People vs. De Leon, GR No.
179943, June 26, 2009). Accused inserted his penis thrice into the private part of victim for purpose of
changing position. The three penetrations motivated by a single criminal intent to satisfy his lust in
violation of single penal provision (Article 266-A of RPC) constitute continued crime of rape (People vs.
Aaron, G.R. Nos. 136300-02, September 24, 2002). Accused inserted his penis thrice into the private part
of victim for purpose of resting for five minutes. He satisfied his lust every time he would withdraw his
penis to rest. Since the three penetrations were motivated by separate three criminal impulse to satisfy his
lust, three separate crimes of rape are committed (People vs. Lucena, GR No. 190632, February 26,
2014).

Foreknowledge doctrine - There is no delito continuado where the accused when he committed the first
threat against the victim has no foreknowledge that he will chance upon the second and third victims to
commit the second and third threat. Without such foreknowledge, three threats could not be said to have
been committed under a single criminal impulse, which is the basis of applying delito continuado
principle. Several threats can only be considered as continued crime if the offender threatened three
individuals at the same place and at the same time (Paera vs. People, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011).

35. Incorrect penalty – The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict
observance of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, the court should impose the penalty for the graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise,
the penalty prescribed is invalid, and will not attain finality (De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672,
February 02, 2015, Bersamin). In Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015, Bersamin, the
trial judge fixed the indeterminate sentence at "imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum". This is a patent elementary error. Considering that the clear objective of the
ISLAW is to have the convict serve the minimum penalty before becoming eligible for release on parole,
both the minimum and the maximum penalties must be definite, not ranging. This objective cannot be
achieved otherwise, for determining when the convict would be eligible for release on parole would be
nearly impossible if the minimum and the maximum were as indefinite as the RTC fixed the
indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the sentence is an indeterminate one relates only to the fact that such
imposition would leave the period between the minimum and the maximum penalties indeterminate "in
the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in
whole or in part." In People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012, Bersamin – The trial
court sentenced the accused to suffer reclusion perpetua to death for murder. This is erroneous. Reclusion
perpetua and death should not be imposed as a compound, alternative or successive penalty for a single
felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other. Article 64 of RPC provides
the rules on application of divisible penalty. Under this provision, the penalty prescribed for a felony shall
be applied in its proper imposable period based on the presence of modifying circumstances. Under
Article 349 of RPC, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. In the absence of modifying circumstances,
prision mayor pursuant to Article 64 shall be applied in its medium period, which ranges from 8 years and
1 day to 10 years. Applying the Islaw, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the
range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense, which is from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum is proper (Lasanas vs.
People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014, Bersamin). Under Article 249 of RPC, the penalty for homicide
is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstances, reclusion temporal shall be applied
in its medium period, which ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
Applying Article 64, within the limits of the medium period of reclusion temporal, the courts shall
determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime. Thus, the court could not
impose the highest penalty of the medium period of reclusion temporal, and that, is 17 years and 4
months without specifying the justification for so imposing. Without proper justification, the court should
impose the lowest penalty of the medium period of reclusion temporal, and that is, 14 years, 8 months.
Since ISLAW is applicable, 14 years, 8 months shall be considered as the maximum penalty while the
minimum penalty shall be fixed within the limits of prision mayor, which ranges from 6 years and 1 day
to 12 years. Hence, the accused is sentenced to suffer 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
indeterminate penalty to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum penalty (Ladines vs.
People, G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016, Bersamin).

36. Four indivisible penalty - There are four kinds of divisible penalty, which are governed by Article
64, to wit: (1) penalty composed of three periods fixed in accordance with Article 76; (2) penalty not
composed of three periods computed in accordance with Article 65; (3) complex penalty under Article 77,
par. 1; and (4) penalty without specific legal form under Article 77, par. 2.
a. Penalty containing three periods – Article 76 of RPC expressly fixed the range of the period for
reclusion temporal, prision mayor, temporary disqualification, prision correccional, destierro,
suspension, arresto mayor, and arresto menor. To find the range of the periods of any of the afore-said
penalties, one will simply read Article 76. If the crime committed is homicide and there is one mitigating
circumstance of confession, the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal shall be applied in its minimum
period because of Article 64. Article 76 expressly states that the range of the minimum period of reclusion
temporal is from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Within the range of this period, the
maximum indeterminate penalty shall be fixed. The range of the minimum, medium and maximum
periods fixed in accordance with Article 76 is one-third equal portion of the respective penalties except
arresto mayor. Under Article 76, the minimum period of arresto mayor ranges from 1 month and 1 day to
2 months; medium period ranges from 2 month and 1 day to 4 months; and maximum period ranges from
4 months and 1 day to 6 months. Hence, the time included in the duration of the minimum period of
arresto mayor is only one month while that of the medium and maximum is two months.

b. Penalty not composed of three periods - Penalties with divisible duration, the periods of which are
not expressly mentioned in Article 76 are called “penalties not composed of three periods”; since Article
76 has not fixed the duration of their periods, they must be computed in accordance with Article 65.
Under this provision, the time included in the duration of penalty shall be divided into three equal
portions and periods shall be formed from each portion. The penalty for malversation under paragraph 2
of Article 217 of RPC is prision mayor in its minimum and medium period. The range of this penalty is
not found in Article 76. Considering that this penalty is not composed of three periods, the time
included in the penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming
one period, pursuant to Article 65 (Zafra vs. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, Bersamin).
The duration of “prision mayor in its minimum and medium period” is 6 years and 1 day to 10 years. To
determine “the time included in the duration,” deduct “one day” and the lower limit of the prescribed
penalty from its upper limit.

10 years -------------------upper limit

- 6 years and 1 day ------- lower limit
- 1 day
--------------------------
4 years ------- time included in the duration of penalty Four years, which is “the time included in the
duration,” shall be divided into three equal portions.
4 years
÷3
-------------------------
1 year and 4 months --------- one third portion of the penalty The minimum, medium and maximum
periods shall be formed out the 3 equal portions of the penalty. The time included in the duration of each
period is 1 year and 4 months.
6 years
+1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
7 years and 4 months
+ 1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
8 years and 8 months
+1 year and 4 months
-----------------------------
10 years

Thus, the minimum period of the prescribed penalty of “prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods” ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months; its medium period ranges from 7 years, 4
months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months; its maximum period rages from 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to
10 years (Zafra vs. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, Bersamin).

c. Complex penalty – Complex penalty is composed of three distinct penalties. The periods of complex
penalty is formed in accordance with Article 77, par. 1. Applying this provision, each of the components
of the complex penalty shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum, the next the
medium, and the most severe the maximum period. Reclusion temporal to death prescribed for treason
committed by resident alien under Article 114 of RPC is a complex penalty. This penalty is composed to
three distinct penalties, namely: reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua and death penalty. Out of these
three components, periods shall be formed in accordance with Article 77, par. 1. Thus, reclusion
temporal, which is the lightest of the three, shall be minimum period of penalty of reclusion temporal to
death; reclusion perpetua, which is the next penalty, shall be the medium period; death penalty, which is
the most severe, shall be the maximum period. Thus, in the absence of modifying circumstances,
reclusion temporal to death prescribed for treason shall be applied in its medium period, and that is,
reclusion perpetua. Prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period
prescribed for simple robbery under Article 294 of RPC is a complex penalty under since it composed of
three distinct penalties. Thus, prision correccional in its maximum period, which is the lightest of the
three, shall be minimum period of this prescribed penalty. Prision mayor in its minimum period, which is
the next penalty, shall be the medium period. Prision mayor in its medium period, which is the most
severe, shall be the maximum period. In sum, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period prescribed for robbery shall be broken down as follows:

Minimum: Prision correccional in its maximum period

(4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years)
Medium: Prision mayor in its minimum period
(6 years and 1 day to 8 years)
Maximum: Prision mayor in its medium period
(8 years and 1 day to 10 years) See: People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008, En
Banc, People vs. Barrientos, G.R. No. 119835, January 28, 1998, En Banc, People vs. Castillo, G.R. No.
L-11793, May 19, 1961, En Banc, People vs. Diamante, G.R. No. 180992, September 04, 2009, and
People vs. Lumiwan, G.R. Nos. 122753-56, September 07, 1998. Reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua prescribed for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is a
complex penalty since it composed of three distinct penalties. Applying Article 77, par. 1, this
complex penalty can be broken down as follows:

Minimum: Reclusion temporal in its medium period

(14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months)
Medium: Reclusion temporal in its maximum period
(17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years)
Maximum: Reclusion perpetua
See: People vs. Morante, G.R. No. 187732, November 28, 2012

d. Penalty without specific legal form – Reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua prescribed for
mutilation under Article 262 is a penalty without a specific form (People vs. Romero, G. R. No. 112985,
April 21, 1999). The duration of its periods is not fixed by Article 76. This penalty cannot be divided into
three equal portions in accordance with Article 65 since it has an indivisible component, and that, is
reclusion perpetua. It is not a complex penalty under Article 77, par. 1 since it merely composed of two
distinct penalties. Thus, its periods shall be determined in accordance with Article 77, par. 2, which
provides that the periods shall be distributed, applying for analogy the prescribed rules. Applying Article
77, par. 1 by analogy, the maximum period shall be formed out of the most severe penalty, and that is,
reclusion perpetua. Applying Article 65 by analogy, the duration of reclusion temporal shall be divided
into two equal portions and minimum and medium periods shall be formed from each portion. Applying
Article 77, par. 2, reclusion temporal toreclusion perpetua is broken down as follows:

Minimum: Lower half of reclusion temporal

12 years and 1 day to 16 years
Medium: Higher half of reclusion temporal
16 years and 1 day to 20 years
Maximum: Reclusion perpetua

See: People vs. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013; People vs. Romero, G. R. No.
112985, April 21, 1999; Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 159950, February 12, 2007; and People
vs. Oliva, G.R. No. 122110, September 26, 2000 Reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua prescribed for malversation under Article 217 is a penalty without specific
form. The duration of its periods is not fixed by Article 76. This penalty cannot be divided into
three equal portions in accordance with Article 65 since reclusion perpetua component is not
divisible. It is not a complex penalty under Article 77, par. 1 since it merely composed of two
distinct penalties. Thus, its periods shall be determined in accordance with Article 77, par. 2.
Applying this provision, the maximum period shall be formed out of the most severe penalty,
and that is, reclusion perpetua. The duration of reclusion temporal in its maximum period shall
be divided into two equal portions, and minimum and medium periods shall be formed from each
portion. In sum, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua is broken down
as follows:

Minimum: Lower half of reclusion temporal in its maximum period

17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8 months
Medium: higher half of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years
Maximum: Reclusion perpetua

See: Estepa vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 59670, February 15, 1990, Torres vs. People, GR No. 175074,
August 31, 2011, Cabarlo vs. People, G.R. NO. 172274, November 16, 2006; Mesina vs. People, G.R.
No. 162489, June 17, 2015, Bersamin.

37. Special mitigating circumstance - Accused was found guilty of parricide punishable by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. Applying rules for application of indivisible penalties (Article 63), the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be applied if there are two mitigating circumstance. The penalty
cannot be lowered to reclusion temporal, no matter how many mitigating circumstances are present. The
special mitigating circumstance is found in rules for application of divisible penalties (Article 64), which
is not applicable because the penalty is not divisible (People vs. Takbobo, G.R. No. No. 102984, June 30,
1993). The Takbobo principle is also applicable if the penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed
is a single indivisible penalty such as reclusion perpetua. If there are three mitigating circumstance and
one aggravating circumstance, special mitigating circumstance for purpose of graduating the penalty shall
not be appreciated. Although there are two remaining mitigating circumstances after applying the off-set
rule, the penalty shall not be lowered by one degree because the appreciation of special mitigating
circumstance requires that there is no aggravating circumstance.

38. Off set rule - Only ordinary aggravating and mitigating circumstances are subject to the offset rule.
Privileged mitigating circumstance of minority cannot be offset by ordinary aggravating circumstance
(Aballe vs. People, G.R. No. L-64086, March 15, 1990). If privileged mitigating circumstance and
ordinary aggravating circumstance attended the commission of felony, the former shall be taken into
account in graduating penalty; the latter in applying the graduated penalty in its maximum period (People
vs. Lumandong, GR NO. 132745, March 9, 2000, En Banc). Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating
circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance (People vs. Macariola, G.R. No.
L-40757 January 24, 1983). The circumstance of treachery, which qualifies the killing into murder,
cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance voluntary surrender (People vs. Abletes and
Pamero, GR NO. L-33304, July 31, 1974).

39. Penalty of offense under special law - The penalty for possession of dangerous drugs is 12 years and
1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. The court cannot impose a straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day since
the application of indeterminate sentence law is mandatory (unless the accused deserves a lenient penalty
by confessing pursuant to the Nang Kay principle). Applying the Islaw, the minimum indeterminate
penalty shall not be less than 12 years and 1 day while the maximum shall not exceed 20 years. Thus, the
court can sentence the accused to suffer 15 years of imprisonment as minimum to 18 years as maximum
(Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No.195005, September 12, 2011; Escalante vs. People, G.R. No. 192727,
January 9, 2013). Under Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019
is imprisonment for not less than 6 years and 1 month and not more than 15 years. Applying the Islaw, the
minimum indeterminate penalty shall not be less than 6 years and 1 month while the maximum shall not
exceed 15 years. Thus, the court can sentence the accused to suffer 6 years and 1 month of imprisonment
as minimum to 10 years as maximum (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 177105-06, August 12, 2010,
Bersamin).

40. Mandatory application of the Islaw - The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
mandatory to both the Revised Penal Code and the special laws (Romero vs. People, G.R. No. 171644,
November 23, 2011). However, the Supreme Court, in People vs. Nang Kay, G. R. No. L-3565, April 20,
1951, has provided an exception. In this case, the accused pleaded guilty to offense where the law
prescribed a penalty of 5 to 10 years imprisonment. The court sentenced the accused to suffer 5 years of
imprisonment. The Supreme Court sustained the penalty. Fixing the penalty at the minimum limit without
applying Act No. 4103 is favorable to the accused since the accused shall be automatically released upon
serving 5 years of imprisonment. Applying Act No. 4103 would lengthen the penalty because the
indeterminate maximum penalty must be necessarily more than 5 years (People vs. Arroyo, G.R. No.
L-35584-85, February 13, 1982). However, the Nang Kay principle is not applicable where the crime is
punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The application of ISLAW is always mandatory if the penalty
is prescribed by RPC since it is favorable to the accused. It is favorable to the accused since in fixing the
minimum penalty, the prescribed penalty under the Code shall be lowered by one degree. On the other
hand, in fixing the minimum penalty for offense under special law involved in the Nang Kay case, the
prescribed penalty shall not be lowered (People vs. Judge Lee, Jr, G.R. No. 66859, September 12, 1984).
The Nang Kay principle is not also applicable where the accused does not deserve a lenient penalty. In
Batistis vs. People, G.R. No. 181571, December 16, 2009, the SC through Justice Bersamin said the
Nang Kay exception is not applicable where there is no justification for lenity towards the accused since
he did not voluntarily plead guilty, and the crime committed is a grave economic offense because of the
large number of fake Fundador confiscated.

41. Adoption of the technical nomenclature of the Spanish penalty - RPC is not generally applicable
to malum prohibitum. However, when a special law, which punishes malum prohibitum, adopts the
technical nomenclature of the penalties in RPC, the provisions under this Code shall apply (People vs.
Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994) such as: (1) Article 68 on the privilege mitigating circumstance of
minority; (2) Article 64 on application of penalty in its minimum period if there is a confession; and (3)
Article 160 on special aggravating circumstance of quasirecidivism. RA No. 7080 and RA No. 10591
adopt the nomenclature of the penalties in RPC. Hence, minority, confession (Jacaban vs. People, GR No.
184355, March 23, 2015; Malto vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007) or quasi-recidivisim
shall be considered in plunder and illegal possession of loose firearm. Under Section 98 of RA No. 9165,
the provisions of RPC shall not apply except in the case of minor offenders. Hence, if the accused is a
minor, privilege mitigating circumstance of minority (People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,
2011; People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005,
September 12, 2011), confession or quasi-recidivisim (People vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27,
1997) shall be considered in crime involving dangerous drugs. In this case, life imprisonment shall be
considered as reclusion perpetua. If the accused is an adult, these circumstances shall not be appreciated.
If the special law (such as RA No. 6235 on hijacking and RA No. 3019 on corruption) did not adopt the
technical nomenclature of penalties in RPC, the latter shall not apply. Mitigating circumstance of
confession shall not be appreciated since the penalty not borrowed from RPC cannot be applied in its
minimum period. The crime has not attempted or frustrated stage since penalty not borrowed from RPC
cannot be graduated one or two degrees lower. Mitigating circumstance of old age can only be
appreciated if the accused is over 70 years old at the time of the commission of the crime under RA No.
3019 and not at the time of promulgation of judgement (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 177105-06, August
12, 2010, Bersamin). Moreover, this the mitigating circumstance of old age cannot be appreciated in
crime punishable by RA No. 3019 since this law did not adopt the technical nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code.

42. Subsidiary penalty - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine, he shall be subject to
a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum
wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial
court (Article 39 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10159).

43. Multiple sentences - When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Thus, convict could serve simultaneously
arresto mayor and fine, prision correccional and perpetual absolute disqualification, or reclusion perpetua
and civil interdiction. In sum, while lingering in prison, convict could pay fine, return the property
confiscated, be disallowed to cast his vote or to act function as a public officer. When the culprit has to
serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them successively if the nature of the penalties will not permit
simultaneous service. Convict must serve multiple penalties successively: (1) where the penalties to be
served are destierro and imprisonment; and (2) where the penalties to be served are imprisonment.
However, the successive service of sentences is subject to the three-fold rule and 40-year limitation rule.

44. Three-fold rule - The three fold rule is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty
but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People vs. Escares, G.R. No. L-11128-33,
December 23, 1957; Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987). Thus, the court
cannot dismiss criminal cases in excess of three on the basis of three-fold rule.

45. Modes of criminal extinction – The modes of extinguishing criminal liability are: death of the
offender; service of the sentence; amnesty or absolute pardon; prescription of crime, or penalty; marriage
between the offender and the offended in crimes against chastity (Article 89 of RPC) or in rape; or
forgiveness in marital rape (Article 266-C); and probation (PD No. 968 as amended by RA No. 10707.

a. Reelection - Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of RPC as a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his reelection (Oliveros vs. Villalulz,
G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1974). But a re-elected public official could not be removed for
administrative offense committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of his misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor (Aguinaldo vs.
Santos, G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992). However, the doctrine of condonation of administrative
offense by reason of reelection has been abandoned for being inconsistent to Section 1, Article X1 of the
1987 Constitution on public office is a public trust and public accountability (Morales vs. CA and Binay,
GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015).

b. Novation - Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability but it can extinguish the old
contract, which may be the basis of criminal liability. In estafa through misappropriation, “receiving the
property in trust” is an element thereof. In sum, contract is an ingredient of this crime. Novation may
convert the contract of trust into creditor-debtor situation, or put doubt on the true nature of the original
transaction (People vs. Nery, G.R. No. L-19567, February 5, 1964). In these situations, the accused will
be acquitted for failure to prove the element of “receipt of property in trust.” Thus, novation is a defense
in estafa through misappropriation where the contract of agency is converted into sale (Degaños vs.
People, GR No. 162826, October 14, 2013, Bersamin). However, partial payment and promise to pay the
balance of obligation under contract of agency will not convert it into sale. There is no novation since the
obligation of the accused in making a partial payment is not incompatible to the obligation to give the
proceeds of sale of the property under the contract of agency (Degaños vs. People, supra). Novation
cannot be used as a defense in case where the existence of contract is not an element. In theft case, there
was no contractual relationship or bilateral agreement which can be modified or altered by the parties
(People vs. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924, April 29, 1968, En Banc).In estafa through falsification of
public documents, the liability of the offender cannot be extinguished by mere novation (Milla vs. People,
G.R. No. 188726, January 25, 2012).

c. Death - Death of an accused pending appeal shall extinguish his criminal liability and civil liability
arising from crime (Article 89 of RPC); but not his civil liability arising from a source other than crime
(e.g. quasi-delict, contract, quasi contract or law). Civil liability arising from a source other than crime is
not deemed included in the institution of criminal action. Hence, the private complainant must file
a separate civil action against either the executor or administrator, or the estate of the accused. During the
pendency of the criminal case, the statute of limitations on this surviving civil liability is deemed
interrupted (People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994). However, in violation of BP Blg.
22, civil liability arising from a source other than crime is mandatorily included in the institution of
criminal action. Hence, the court, despite the death of the accused pending appeal, must determine his
civil liability arising from contract (Bernardo vs. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015). In sum,
the private complainant is not required to file a separate civil action based on contract involving a
dishonored check.

d. Pardon - Person, who was pardoned for the crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, cannot run in the
Senatorial race if the terms of the pardon has not expressly restored his right to hold public office (Article
36 of RPC) or expressly remitted the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification (Article 41).
GMA pardoned President Estrada with express restoration of his civil and political rights. Hence, he is
eligible to run as Mayor (Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).

e. Blameless ignorance doctrine - The State and private complainant should not be blame for failure to
institute the case immediately after the commission of the crime if they are ignorant or has no reasonable
means of knowing the existence of a crime. Under "blameless ignorance" doctrine (Section 2 of Act 3326
and Article 91 of RPC), the prescription runs only upon discovery of the crime by offended party or
State through a person in authority or his agent. Considering that during the Marcos regime, no person
would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions involving cronies such as behest loan, it would
be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986
(Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65, September 11, 2013). Hence, the
prescriptive period for violation of RA No. 3019 commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after
the Committee made an exhaustive investigation (Presidential Ad hoc fact-finding committee vs. Hon.
Desierto, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011).

d. Discovery by a witness - Prescription runs only upon discovery of the crime by offended party or
person in authority or his agent. For purpose of prescription of crime, the offended party includes the
person to whom the offender is civilly liable. Thus, the widow of the murdered victim is an offended
party (Garcia vs. CA, G.R. No. 119063, January 27, 1997). Discovery of crime by a mere witness, who is
not an offended party, will not commence the running of prescription.

e. Constructive notice rule - The 10-year prescriptive period for falsification of document shall
commence to run on the date of recording of the falsified deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds because of
the constructive notice rule under the Torren system (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 74226, July 27, 1989).
The 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy shall commence to run on the date of actual discovery of the
bigamous marriage and not from the registration of bigamous marriage in the Office of the Civil
Registrar. The law on Civil Registry and the Family Code, which governed registration of marriage, do
not provide a rule on constructive notice (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, June 14,
1994).

f. Non-actionable crime - As a rule, period of prescription commence to run from the date of discovery
of its commission. However, if the crime is not yet actionable at the time of its commission, period of
prescription will commence to run from the time it becomes actionable. In false testimony, the period of
prescription commences to run from the date of the finality of judgment of a case in which the offender
testified falsely. Prior to the date of finality, the crime is not yet actionable (People vs. Maneja, G.R. No.
47684, June 10, 1941). In violation of BP Blg. 22, the crime is consummated upon the dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001). However, in
violation of BP 22, the four-year period of prescription for such crime commences to run from the date of
the expiration of the five-day period from receipt of notice of dishonor by the drawer. Prior to that date,
the crime is not yet actionable (People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012). It would be
absurd to consider the prescriptive period for false testimony or violation of BP Blg. 22 as already
running before it becomesactionable, and yet, the complainant could not cause its interruption because he
is not yet allowed to file a complaint.

h. Filing of complaint for preliminary investigation - If the crime is punishable by the Revised Penal
Code or a special law, the institution of judicial proceeding(e.g. filing of complaint or information in
court) or executive proceeding (e.g. filing of complaint for preliminary investigation) interrupts the
running of prescription such as the filing of complaint: (1) for violation of BP Blg. 22 in the prosecutor’s
office - People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012;Panaguiton vs. Department of Justice,
G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008; (2) for violation of Revised Securities Act in Securities and
Exchange Commission - SEC vs. Interport Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008; or
(3) violation of RA No. 3019 in the Ombudsman - Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and
174764-65, September 11, 2013. The PCGG has no power to investigate cronies of Marcos for violation
of RA No. 3019 not involving ill-gotten wealth. Such investigation for being void ab initio would not
interrupt the running of prescription (People vs. Romualdez and Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166510, April
29, 2009). If the crime is punishable by an ordinance, only the institution of judicial proceeding shall
interrupt its two-month prescriptive period. The provision in the Rules on Criminal Procedure regarding
the interruption of prescription by institution criminal action is not applicable to violation of ordinance
because it is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Hence, the filing of complaint involving
violation of ordinance for preliminary investigation will not interrupt the running of the prescription
(Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr., GR No. 169588, October 7, 2013).

47. Probation -Probation shall suspend the execution of principal penalty of imprisonment, and
accessory penalty of disqualification (Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, December 01, 2014) but not
the implementation of the civil aspect of the judgment (Budlong, vs. Palisok, GR No. 60151, June 24,
1983). When a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed,
and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be
allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. This
notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation should he seek a review of the modified
decision which already imposes a probationable penalty (Section 4 of PD 968 as amended by RA No.
10707). In Colinares vs. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, the accused, who was convicted
by the lower court of a non-probationable offense of frustrated homicide, but on appeal was found guilty
of a probationable offense of attempted homicide, may apply for probation. In Villareal vs. People, G.R.
No. 151258, December 1, 2014, accused was convicted of homicide, a non probationable crime, by the
trial court. However, the SC found them liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, which is a
probationable crime, because of lack of dolo. They can still apply for probation. Under PD No. 968 as
amended, crimes against public disorder are non probationable. However, under RA No. 10707, crimes
against public disorder such as alarm and scandal and direct assault are now probationable. The period of
probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year shall not exceed
two years, and in all other cases, said period shall not exceed six years. When the sentence imposes a fine
only and the offender is made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of
probation shall not be less than nor to be more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary
imprisonment (Section 14 of PD No. 968).

48. Direct assault – Simple assault (such as punching) upon an agent of a person in authority (e.g. police
officer) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes simple resistance and not direct assault
because there is no intent to defy the law and its representative at all hazard, which is an element thereof
(U.S. vs. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, February 1, 1918; U.S. vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 13083, December 11,
1917; People vs. Lapitan, G.R. No. 38226, November 17, 1933). But serious assault upon agent of a
person in authority while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes direct assault (U.S. vs. Cox,
G.R. No. 1406, January 6, 1904; U.S. vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649, September 6, 1910). Simple assault
(such as punching) upon a person in authority (e.g. mayor or chief of police) while engaged in the
performance of duty constitutes qualified direct assault. The law does not distinguish between serious and
simple “laying of hands” upon a person in authority as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, a simple laying
of hands upon a person in authority constitutes qualified direct assault. The Tabiana principle is only
applicable if the victim is an agent of a person in authority (U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R. No. 13658, November
9, 1918). If the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual performance of duties at the time
of the assault, the motive for the assault is immaterial. Direct assault is committed even if the motive
(such as non-payment of loan) was totally foreign to victim’s official function (Sarcepuedes vs. People,
G.R. No. L-3857, October 22, 1951). The phrase "on occasion of such performance" used in Article 148
of RPC means "by reasonof the past performance of official duty because the purpose of the law is to
allow them to discharge their duties without fear of being assaulted by reason thereof (People vs.
Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, May 31, 1974). Attacking a judge on the street by reason of past
performance of duty (such as citing the accused in contempt) constitutes qualified direct assault (U.S. vs.
vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 6820, October 16, 1911). But attacking a retired judge by reason of past performance
of duty is not direct assault since he is not anymore a person in authority at the time of the assault. Note:
The mandatory retirement age of a judge is 70 year. The status of lawyer as persons in authority remains
even the assault is committed outside the court room as long as it is perpetrated by reason of the
performance of their professional duties (Records of the Batasan, Volume Four, 1984- 1985 of BP Blg.
873, which amended Article 152 of RPC). Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of a person in
authority, who is a victim of direct assault, is liable for direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority, who is a
victim of direct assault, is liable for indirect direct assault. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid
of an agent of person in authority, who is a victim of simple resistance, is liable for physical injuries.

49. Evasion - In evasion of service of sentence, the accused must be a convicted prisoner and not merely
a detention prisoner. In delivery of prisoner from jail, the person, who escaped through the help of the
accused, is either a detention prisoner or convicted prisoner. In infidelity in the custody of prisoner, the
person, who escaped in connivance with or consent of or through negligence of the accused custodian, is
either a detention prisoner or convicted prisoner. Evasion in the service of sentence and delivery of
prisoner from jail are committed by means of dolo. Infidelity in the custody or prisoner is committed by
means of dolo or culpa; if this crime is committed by means of dolo, it is called conniving with or
consenting to evasion; if committed by means of culpa, it is called evasion through negligence. Brother of
a detention prisoner and convicted prisoner bribed the clerk of court to falsify release order and their
custodians to release his brothers. Convicted prisoner but not the detention prisoner is liable for evasion
of service of sentence. Brother and clerk of court are liable for delivery of prisoner from jail with respect
to the escape of detention prisoner and convicted prisoner. Custodians are liable for infidelity in the
custody of prisoners with respect to the escape of detention prisoner and convicted prisoner. Brother is
liable for two counts of corruption of public officer. Clerk of court and custodians are liable for direct
bribery. Clerk of court and brother are liable for falsification of document as principal by direct
participation and as principal by inducement, respectively.

50. Bribery - Plaintiff gave money to the judge, who in consideration thereof subsequently rendered an
unjust decision in favor of the former. The judge is liable of direct bribery and rendering unjust decision,
while the plaintiff is liable of corruption of public officer. But if the plaintiff gave money to the judge,
who subsequently rendered a decision against the former, the crime committed by the judge is indirect
bribery while the plaintiff is liable of corruption of public officer. The judge is not liable of direct bribery
since rendering a decision against the corruptor indicates that the former did not receive the money in
consideration of rendering a decision in favor of the latter. It seems that the plaintiff merely gave the
money to the judge by reason of his position as such.

51. Abortion and infanticide – If the fetus is killed inside the womb of his mother, the crime is abortion
regardless of whether he is viable or not (People vs. Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008; People
vs. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988). If the victim is killed outside the womb of the
mother, the crime is: (1) abortion if the victim is not viable e.g. intrauterine life is less than 7 months
(People vs. Detablan, 40 O.G. No. 9, p. 30; People vs. Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008); or
(2) infanticide, if the victim is viable e.g. his intrauterine life is more than 7 months and his life is less
than 3 day old; or (3) murder if the victim is viable and his life is 3 day old or more. If the accused
maltreated his wife and as a consequence, his wife and unborn child died, the crime committed is
compound crime of parricide and unintentional abortion (People vs. Robinos, G.R. No. 138453, May 29,
2002; People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 95851, March 01, 1995). If the accused maltreated his pregnant
wife and as a consequence, his wife died, and his child was expelled, and died thereafter within 3 days,
the crime committed is compound crime of parricide and infanticide. If the accused maltreated his
pregnant wife and as a consequence, his wife died, and his child was expelled, and died thereafter on the
third day, the crime committed is compound crime of double parricides. In abortion and infanticide,
concealment of dishonor is a special mitigating circumstance that can be appreciated in favor of the
mother and maternal
grandparents but not in favor of the father or fraternal grandparents.

52. Parricide - In parricide, if the victim is his parent or child, the relationship can either be legitimate or
illegitimate; if the victim is the spouse, grandparent or grandchild, the relationship must be legitimate
(People vs. Gamez, GR No. 202847, October 23, 2013). Relationship in parricide is by blood except
where the victim is spouse (Regalado). The qualifying circumstance of relationship in parricide is
personal. Hence, it can be appreciated against the wife but not against a co-conspirator, who is
not related to her husband, the victim (People vs. Bucsit G.R. No. 17865, March 15, 1922).

53. Death under exceptional circumstance -Death under exceptional circumstance is a not crime but a
defense (People vs. Puedan, G.R. No. 139576, September 2, 2002), or an absolutory cause (People vs.
Talisic, G.R. No. 97961, September 05, 1997) since instead of imposing the penalty for parricide, murder
or homicide, the accused shall only suffer destierro, which is just a measure designed to protect accused
from acts of reprisal principally by relatives of the victim (People vs. Araquel, G.R. No. L-12629,
December 9, 1959). Hence, death under exceptional circumstance is not a felony within the contemplation
of Article 4 (People vs. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987) and aggression under exceptional
circumstance is not an unlawful aggression within the contemplation of self-defense (US vs. Merced,
G.R. No. 14170, November 23, 1918). Killing his wife after surprising her in the act of committing
homosexual intercourse with another woman is not death under exceptional circumstance. “Sexual
intercourse” mentioned in Article 247 is different from homosexual intercourse. Killing his mistress after
surprising in the act of committing sexual intercourse with a man is not death under exceptional
circumstance(U.S. vs. Versola, G.R. No. 10759, January 25, 1916). The offender in Article 247 must be a
“legally married person.” Killing his wife under the circumstance indicating that she had just finished
having sexual intercourse with another man is not death under exceptional circumstance. He did not
catch his wife in the very act of sexual intercourse, but after such act (People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No.
46310, October 31, 1939).

54. Death in a tumultuous affray -The elements of death caused in a tumultuous affray are as follows:
(a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose
of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally (Note: If there is conspiracy, this element is not
present; conspirators are liable for homicide or murder; People vs. Corpuz, G.R. No. L-36234 February
10, 1981); (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased (Not: If the killers are identified, this element is not present;
since they are identified, they are liable for homicide or murder; Wacoy vs. People, G.R. No. 213792,
June 22, 2015); and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.

55. Rape – Among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under RA No. 8353 is Section 266-D,
which provides “Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree from
the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving
valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution rape” (People vs. Sabadlab, G.R. No.
175924, March 14, 2012, Bersamin). The legislators agreed that Article 266-D is intended to soften the
jurisprudence on tenacious resistance (People vs. Dulay, G.R. Nos. 144344-68, July 23, 2002). Failure to
shout should not be taken against the victim (People vs. Rivera, GR No. 200508, September 04, 2013;
People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012; People vs. Penilla, GR No. 189324, March 20, 2013).
It is not necessary for the victim to sustain physical injuries. She need not kick, bite, hit or scratch the
offender with her fingernails to prove that she had been defensive (People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 134766,
January 16, 2004).

a. Qualifying circumstance - If the relationship between the accused and the victim of rape is uncle and
niece, the Information must alleged that the offender is “a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree” because there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil degree.
However, a sister brother relationship is obviously in the second civil degree. Consequently, it is not
necessary that the Information should specifically state that the accused is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree of the victim (People vs. Ceredon, G.R. No. 167179, January 28, 2008).
Knowledge of the mental disability of the victim is not an element of rape (People vs. Caoile, GR No.
203041, June 5, 2013) but it is an ingredient of the qualifying circumstance of mental disability, which
must be alleged in the information (People vs. Obogne, GR No. 199740, March 24, 2014; People vs.
Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012). In qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in
rape and special aggravating circumstance in sexual abuse under RA No. 7610, the guardian must be a
person who has legal relationship with his ward. He must be legally appointed was first (People vs. Flores
G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010). The Pruna guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance, are as follows.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother
or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim (People vs. Lupac,
G .R. No. 182230, September 19, 2012, Bersamin).

b. Absorption rule - If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the latter is absorbed by the
former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002). But the doctrine of absorption is not
applicable to rape through sexual assault. Inserting lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal
orifice of the victim and raping her constitutes two counts of rape by sexual assault and rape through
sexual intercourse (People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014). Inserting the penis into the
mouth of the victim and into her genital orifice constitutes rape through sexual assault and organ rape (In
People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013).

c. Variance rule - If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of lasciviousness, the accused
will be convicted of the latter because of the variance rule. Acts of lasciviousness is a lesser crime, which
is necessarily included in the charge of rape. If the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, but
the crime proven is rape through sexual assault, the accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The
variance rule is not applicable since rape through sexual assault is not necessarily included in the charge
of rape through sexual intercourse. The elements of these two crimes are materially and substantially
different. In such case, the accused will be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, which is necessarily
included in the charge of rape through sexual intercourse (People vs. Pareja, GR No. 202122, January 15,
2014; People vs. Cuaycong, G.R. No. 196051, October 02, 2013; People vs. CA, G.R. No.
183652, February 25, 2015).

d. Marital rape - Husband can be held liable for marital rape. Article 266-A of RPC uses the term “man”
in defining rape without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim. Under Article 266-C of
RPC, in case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action. RA No. 8353 has eradicated the archaic notion that
marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus
her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed (People vs.
Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014),

e. Public crime - Rape is no longer considered a private crime or that which cannot be prosecuted, except
upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the offended party of the offender in the
crime of rape will not extinguish the offender's criminal liability (People vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897,
June 06, 2011).

f. Statutory rape - The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where the victim of rape
is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency,
or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape committed against a person "deprived of reason"
(People vs. Dalan, G.R. No. 203086, June 11, 2014, Bersamin).

h. Criminal touching - Touching of either labia majora or labia minora of the pudendum of the victim
by an erect penis of the accused capable of penetration consummates the crime (People vs. Campuhan,
G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000; People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011, Bersamin).
Touching the labia by instrument or object (such as tongue or finger) also consummates the crime of rape
through sexual assault (People vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897, June 6, 2011). In People vs. Nuyok, G.R.
No. 195424, June 15, 2015, Bersamin, the commission of rape can be established by circumstantial
evidence even if the victim, being the sole witness, was rendered unconscious during its commission.
Accused slapped victim and punched her in the stomach. She was rendered unconscious. When she
regained consciousness, she found blood in her panties, and felt pain in her vagina. Accused was
convicted of rape. In People vs. Belgar, G.R. No. 182794, September 08, 2014, Bersamin, the accused
had injected an unknown substance into her belly that had then rendered her unconscious. Upon waking
up, she had found herself lying naked on the ground; she had felt pain in her vagina, which held a red and
white substance in it; and he had been the only person last seen by her before she had passed out. The lack
of direct evidence against him notwithstanding, these circumstances sufficed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because they formed an unbroken chain that unerringly showed Belgar, and no other,
had committed the rape against her. If the offender touches the body of the victim through force, without
touching the labia of her pudendum but with clear intention to have sexual intercourse, the crime
committed is attempted rape. Intent to have sexual intercourse is present if is shown that the erectile penis
of the accused is in the position to penetrate (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014,
Bersamin) or the accused actually commenced to force his penis into the victim's sexual organ (People
vs. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013). For there to be an attempted rape, the accused must
have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed
(People vs. Bandril, G.R. No. 212205, July 06, 2015). If the offender touches the body of the victim
through force, with lewd design but without clear intention to have sexual intercourse, the crime
committed is acts of lasciviousness. Kissing and undressing the victim (People vs. Sanico, G.R. No.
208469, August 13, 2014) or touching her vagina by the hand of the accused (People vs. Banzuela, G.R.
No. 202060, December 11, 2013), touching the breast and thighs of victim and kissing her (People vs.
Victor, G.R. No. 127904, December 05, 2002); or rubbing his penis on the mons pubis of the pudendum
(People vs. Abanilla, G.R. Nos. 148673-75, October 17, 2003) is merely acts of lasciviousness because
intent to have sexual intercourse is not clearly shown, but lewd design is established. In People vs.
Dadulla, G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011, Bersamin, the accused's act of opening the zipper and
buttons of AAA's shorts, touching her, and trying to pull her from under the bed manifested lewd designs,
not intent to lie with her. The evidence to prove that a definite intent to lie with AAA motivated the
accused was plainly wanting, therefore, rendering him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness In Cruz vs.
People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014, Bersamin, touching her genitalia with his hands and
mashing her breasts are "susceptible of double interpretation." These circumstances may show that the
intention of the accused is either to commit rape or simple seduction (or acts of lasciviousness). Since
intent to have sexual intercourse is not clear, accused could not be held liable for attempted rape. Hence,
he is only liable for acts of lasciviousness. If the offender touches the body of the victim without lewd
design or without clear intention to satisfy lust, the crime committed is unjust vexation. In People vs.
Balbar, G.R. Nos. L-20216 & L-20217, November 29, 1967, accused kissed and embraced his co-teacher
while the latter was conducting her class. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of
complainant's students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that the
accused was actuated by a lustful design. The crime committed is merely unjust vexation. In People vs.
Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009, embracing, dragging and kissing in front of her friend
constitute unjust vexation.
56. Perjury - Person cannot be held liable for perjury involving a complaint affidavit for theft based on
the execution of affidavit of desistance. There is no perjury solely on the basis of two contradictory
statements. There must be further evidence that will show which of the two sworn statements is false
(U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil. 902). In a verified answer, accused denied the allegation in the complaint for
collection on his loan obligation. He is not liable for perjury since verification is not required in answer in
a civil case. He cannot be prosecuted for perjury on the basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified
pleading, which is not mandated by law to be verified (Saavedra, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No.
93178, September 15, 1993; Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, G.R. No. L-48088, July 31, 1978). The fact that
subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in RPC does not mean that the direct induction of a
person by another to commit perjury has ceased to be a crime, because said crime is fully within the scope
of provision on principal byinducement (People vs. Pudol, G.R. No. 45618, October 18, 1938). Making
untruthful statement (failure to disclose previous criminal conviction) in a sworn application for the
patrolman examination constitutes perjury (People vs. Cruz, 108 Phil. 255). Making untruthful statement
(failure to disclose pending criminal case) in unsworn PDS constitutes falsification of document (Sevilla
vs. People, G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014). If there are several mistakes the PDS including
those which are not important, accused cannot be convicted of falsification of document since it appears
that failure to disclose pending criminal case is not deliberate. Hence, accused is only liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in falsification (Sevilla vs. People, supra). Making it appears that a person
participated in an act or proceeding where in fact he did not is not the actus reus in perjury. Hence, a
mayor, who made it appear that affiants swore and signed the affidavit before him where in fact they did
not, is liable of falsification of document and not perjury (Lonzanida vs. People, G.R. Nos. 160243-52,
July 20, 2009).

57. Falsification - Falsification of a public document is consummated upon the execution of the false
document. What is punished in falsification of public document is principally the undermining of the
public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. The fact that accused did not
benefit from, or that the public was not prejudiced by the falsified resolution is not a defense (Goma vs.
CA, G.R. No. 168437, January 08, 2009).When the offender commits falsification of public, official or
commercial document as a necessary means to commit malversation (People vs. Barbas, G.R. No. L-
41265, July 27, 1934), estafa (Ilumin vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85667, February 23, 1995; Intestate
Estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010; Ambito vs. People, G.R. No.
127327, February 13, 2009, Tanenggee vs. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013) or theft (People vs.
Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001), the crime committed is complex crime proper under Article
48 of RPC. In De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015, Bersamin, as a bank teller, she
took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her
upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed,
and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her
misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips.
She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding the bank, her employer, in the various
sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of depositors; and falsification of a commercial document, by
forging the signatures of depositor in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned
had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were
complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the
withdrawal slips. When the offender commits falsification of public, official or commercial document as a
means to conceal malversation (People vs. Sendaydiego, G.R. Nos. L- 33252-54, January 20, 1978;
People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 39047, October 31, 1933, En Banc), estafa (People vs. Monteverde, G.R.
No. 139610, August 12, 2002; People vs. Benito, G.R. No. 36979, November 23, 1932) or theft, the
crimes are separate. This is not complex crime proper since one is not a necessary means to commit
another. Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as
one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of estafa
through falsification of documents is committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to
obtain money or goods from another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of
committing estafa. If the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses
of estafa and falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the
customers, said collection which was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous
entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of
her collection which she did not remit to the company. Hence, the accused is liable for separate crimes of
estafa and falsification of document (Patula vs. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, Bersamin).
Other view: If falsification is committed for purpose of enabling the accused to commit malversation
(People vs. Silvanna, G.R. No. L-43120, July 27, 1935; Zafra vs. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014,
Bersamin) or estafa (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 06, 20140) with less risk of being detected,
the accused is liable for complex crime proper. In Zafra vs. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014,
Bersamin, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by receipts issued to the taxpayer, and the
amount for the same receipts in the tax collection reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the
accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was collected from taxpayers
concerned, resulting to the loss of revenue for the government as unearthed by the auditors. Thus, the
accused is liable for complex crime of malversation through falsification of documents. If the falsification
of a private document (demand letter, letter of guarantee) is committed as a means to commit estafa, the
crime committed is falsification only. Under the common element doctrine, the use of damage as an
element in falsification of private document precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of
estafa. Hence, estafa is not committed because the element of damage is not present(Batulanon vs.
People, G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006); U.S. vs Chan Tiao, G.R. No. 12609, October 30, 1917;
People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-34516, November 10, 1931). There is no complex crime of estafa through
falsification of private document. If a person commits falsification of private document to conceal
malversation or estafa, the crime is estafa only. Under the common element doctrine, the use of damage
as an element in estafa precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of falsification. Hence,
estafa is not committed because the element of damage is not present (See: People vs. Beng, 40 O.G.
1913).

58. Malversation - For purpose of malversation, national officer shall be considered as an accountable
officer if he has custody or control of public property by reason of the duties of his office (Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines. The Local Government Code expanded the concept of accountable
local officer. Local officer shall be considered as an accountable officer if he has possession or custody of
local government funds because of the nature of their functions such a treasure or has participated in the
use or application of thereof (Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015) such as a
mayor, whose signature is needed to disburse municipal funds (Manuel vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 158413, February 08, 2012). Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The
dolo or the culpa is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs
from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is still committed (Mesina vs. People, G.R. No.
162489, June 17, 2015, Bersamin).

59. Estafa –In offenses against property (theft or estafa), if the subject matter of the offense is generic
and not identifiable (e.g. money), an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal. However, if the
subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable (e.g. check or jewelry), an error in the designation
of the offended party is immaterial (Senador vs. People, G.R. No. 201620, March 06, 2013). In oral
defamation, a crime against honor, the identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were
directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person injured is material (People vs.
Uba, 106 Phil. 332). Demand is not an element of estafa through misappropriation. Demand is only
important if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation because failure to account for the property in
trust upon demand is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. In this connection, verbally inquired
about the money entrusted to the accused is tantamount to a demand (Asejo vs. People, G.R. No. 157433,
July 24, 2007). On the other hand, demand is not necessary where there is direct evidence of
misappropriation (People vs. Arambulo, G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015). This rule on demand is
applicable to malversation (Munib vs. People, G.R. Nos. 163957-58, April 07, 2009). Where the borrower
is importers acquiring goods for resale, goods sold in retail are often within his custody until they are
purchased. This is covered by trust receipt agreement. Failure to return the unsold good or deliver the
proceeds of sale to the bank is estafa in relation to PD No. 115 (Trust Receipt Law). Where the borrower
is engaged in construction, the materials are often placed under custody of his clients, who can only be
compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay. Since the bank and the contractor know that the return
of the materials is not possible, this is not covered by trust receipt agreement. This transaction becomes a
mere loan, where the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the
goods. The accused is not liable for estafa because of the constitutional provision of nonimprisonment for
nonpayment of debts (Yang vs. People, G.R. No. 195117, August 14, 2013). In other forms of swindling
under Article 316, (1) and (2) of RPC, offender made false representation involving real property and act
of ownership such as selling it, which causes damage to third person. In paragraph 1, the accused
represents that he owned the property, while in paragraph 2, he expressly represents in the deed of
conveyance that the property is “free from encumbrance” (Estrellado-Mainar vs. People, G.R. No.
184320, July 29, 2015) or "como libre". These words "como libre" in the Spanish Penal Code are deemed
incorporated in the RPC (Naya vs. Abing, G.R. No. 146770, February 27, 2003).

60. Theft - To "take" under theft the Revised Penal Code does not require asportation or carrying away
(Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015). It is not an indispensable requisite of theft that a
pickpocket should carry, more or less far away, a wallet taken from its owner (People vs. Mercado, G.R.
Nos. L-45471 and L-45472, June 15, 1938). The term "personal property" in RPC should be interpreted in
the context of the Civil Code. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. Business may be appropriated under Bulk
Sales Law. Thus, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service is a personal
property (Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009). Since asportation is not an element of
theft, a personal property can to be the object of theft as along as it is capable of appropriation although it
is not capable of "asportation" (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015). Intangible property
is not capable of asportation, and yet, it can be an object of theft since is capable of asportation. If the
property is tangible, taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession over the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June
8, 2004). If the property is intangible, taking includes controlling the destination of this property stolen to
deprive the owner of the property (e.g. the use of a meter tampering, use of a device to fraudulently obtain
gas, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity). Using device to control the destination of international
telephone call under the telecommunication system of PLDT without its consent to earn by charging user
of the phone at the expense of PLDT is taking the property of PLDT of providing telecommunication
service (Laurel vs. Abrogar, supra).

a. No frustrated theft - If the bulky goods are taken by the accused inside a compound (such as SM),
theft is consummated even if the accused failed to bring out the stolen goods from the compound, which
makes him unable to freely dispose it. Inability to dispose the stolen property is not an element of theft.
Unlawful taking is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Without unlawful
taking, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. Thus, theft cannot have a frustrated stage
(Valenzuela vs. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007). If the accused is charged with frustrated theft,
he could not be convicted of the crime charged because theft has no frustrated stage. Neither could he be
convicted of consummated theft since it was not alleged in the information. But he could be convicted of
attempted theft because this is a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the charge of frustrated
theft (Canceran vs. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 01, 2015).

b. Theft through misappropriation - Misappropriation of personal property received by the accused

with consent of the owner is theft or carnapping or cattle rustling if his possession is physical or de facto,
or estafa through misappropriation if it is legal or de jure. If the accused received the car from the owner
for repair the possession is physical, and thus, misappropriation thereof is carnapping (Santos vs. People,
G.R. No. 77429 January 29, 1990).If the accused received the property to bring it to a goldsmith for
examination and to immediately return it back to the owner, his possession is physical, and thus,
misappropriation thereof is theft (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921). If the
accused received the property with authority to sell it (Guzman vs. CA, 99 Phil. 703), or money with
authority to use it to buy palays (Carganillo vs. People, G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014), or with
full freedom and discretion on how to use it to facilitate its remittance to BIR as payment of tax and
reduce the amount due (Velayo vs. People, G.R. No. 204025, November 26, 2014), his possession is
juridical. Thus, failure of the agent to return it is estafa (Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 703; Tria
vs. People, G.R. No. 204755, September 17, 2014). A franchise holder must personally operate the motor
vehicle. That is the reason why government regulation prohibits operator of motor vehicle from leasing it.
In the eye of the law the driver of taxi or passenger jeepney under boundary arrangement was only an
employee of the owner rather than a lessee. For being an employee, his possession of the jeepney is
physical (People v. Isaac G.R. No. L-7561, April 30, 1955), and thus, misappropriation thereof is
carnapping (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004) As a rule, the possession of the
employee such as bank teller, collector or cash custodian is only physical possession. Hence,
misappropriation of property is qualified theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the property is
accessible to the employee (People v. Locson, G.R. No. L-35681, October 18, 1932; Matrido vs. People,
G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009; Benabaye vs. People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015; Chua-Burce
vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; Balerta vs. People, G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014).
However, if the employee is an officer of the companywith discretion on how to use property or fund of
the company,his possession is juridical; hence, misappropriation thereof is estafa. Thus, the following
officers are liable for estafa through misappropriation (1) a corporate officer with discretion option on
how to use bending machine without the participation of the corporation(Aigle vs. People, G.R. No.
174181, June 27, 2012); (2) bank President with discretion on how to administer fund (People vs. Go,
G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014), and (3) Liaison Officer of a pawnshop with discretion on how to
secure or renew licenses and permits (Gamboa vs. People, G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014). In robbery
with intimidation of persons, the intimidation consists in creating fear in the mind of a person in view of a
risk or evil that may be impending, real or imagined. Such fear of injury to person or property must
continue to operate in the mind of the victim at the time of the delivery of the money. Threat of
prosecution and confiscation of the logs by DENR officers is an intimidation within the meaning of
robbery (Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009).

c. Lost property - Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner, is liable for theft. If the finder surrenders the property found to a policeman,
who fails to deliver it the owner, the policeman is liable for theft. He acquired the position occupied by
the actual finder. Appropriating the property is of the same character of that made by one who originally
found the same (People vs. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, March 31, 1923).

d. Qualified theft - If the property is not accessible to the employee, taking it is simple theft (Viray vs.
People, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013). On the other hand, if the property is accessible to the
employee, taking it is qualified theft because of the circumstance of abuse of confidence (Yongco vs.
People,G.R. No. 209373, July 30, 2014).

61. Arson – Destructive arson is characterized as heinous crime; while simple arson under PD No. 1613
is a crime manifesting a lesser degree of perversity. Simple arson contemplates the malicious burning of
property not included in Article 320 of the RPC (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July 31, 2013).
Burning of inhabited house or dwelling or personal property is simple arson under Section 3 of P.D. No.
1613 because it is not included in Article 320 of RPC. If the main objective is to kill the victim in a
building, and fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed is murder
only. Murder qualified by means of fire absorbs arson since the latter is an inherent means to commit the
former (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994). Single act of burning the building to kill
two persons constitutes compound crime of double murders (People vs. Gaffud, G.R. No. 168050,
September 19, 2008). One has deliberately set fire to a building is presumed to have intended to burn the
building (People vs. De Leon, G. R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009). Since intent to burn is presumed, intent
to kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to show intent to kill, the accused shall be
convicted of arson with homicide and not murder (People vs. Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061, March 15,
2010). If the main objective is to burn the building, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is arson with homicide, and the resulting homicide is absorbed (People vs. Villacorta,
172468, October 15, 2008). If the objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has already done so, and
arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate
crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994).

62. Bigamy – After the consummation of the crime of bigamy, declaration of nullity of first marriage
and/or second marriage is not a defense on the following grounds: First ground - After the consummation
of bigamy, subsequent declaration of nullity of the first and/or the second marriage is not a defense since
it is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability listed in Article 89 (Jarillo vs. People, GR No. 164435,
September 29, 2009). Bigamy is consummated upon contracting second marriage despite the subsistence
of the first marriage consummates. Once the crime consummates, criminal liability will attach to the
accused and will not be extinguished except through a mode mentioned in Article 89 of RPC as death,
pardon etc. After the consummation of bigamy or celebration of the second marriage, the criminal
liability shall not be extinguished by subsequent events such as declaration of nullity of marriage not
mentioned in Article 89 of RPC. Second ground - To make declaration of nullity of first marriage and/or
second marriage after the consummation of the crime of bigamy as a defense would render the State’s
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape liability for bigamy (Tenebro vs. The Honorable
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004; Walter vs. People, GR No. 183805, July 03,
2013). Third ground - To avoid criminal liability, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage must be
made previous to the consummation of bigamy, which is required by Article 40 of the Family Code that
provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of the first marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense in
bigamy (People vs. Teves, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011). Even though the first marriage was
contracted prior to the Family Code, the rule is the same since Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws (Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010). Article 40 of the Family
Code is only applicable if what is involved is declaration of nullity of the first marriage. Hence, if what is
involved is post-bigamy declaration of nullity of the first marriage, this is not a defense because of the
first, second and third grounds. If what is involved is post-bigamy declaration of nullity of the second
marriage, this is not a defense because of the first and second grounds. Post-bigamy declaration of nullity
of the first or second marriage is not a defense whether the ground for nullity is psychological incapacity
(Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000) or lack of license and affidavit of cohabitation
(Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014, Bersamin) or even though the declaration is
obtained before the filing of the complaint for bigamy (People vs. Odtuhan, GR No. 191566, July 17,
2013).

Exceptions:
1. In People v. De Lara, 3 No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, the second marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license. In this situation, the accused can use the
voidness of the second marriage as a defense in bigamy. The accused did not cause the falsification of
public documents in order to contract a second marriage. He did not fraudulently secure a Certificate of
Marriage, and later used this criminal act as basis for seeking her exculpation. The crime committed is not
bigamy under Article 349 (Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015) but marriage contracted
against the provisions of the law under Article 350 (People vs. Peralta, CA-GR No. 13130-R, June 30,
1955). The De Lara principle is only applicable if the two requisites are applicable: (1) the accused did
not did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage. As a rule,
the accused cannot use the voidness of the second marriage as a defense in bigamy because she
fraudulently secured a certificate of marriage, and that is presenting a falsified affidavit of cohabitation
instead of marriage license (Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015); and (2) the second
marriage is null and void for lack of marriage license; if the first marriage is declared null and void due to
lack of marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, this is not a defense because Article 40 of the Family
Code required declaration of nullity before the celebration of second marriage (Lasanas vs. People, G.R.
No. 159031, June 23, 2014, Bersamin).
2. The principle that “one who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy” is not applicable where the parties merely signed the marriage contract
without marriage ceremony performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration
of nullity. Hence, bigamy is not committed (Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004).
3. X contracted three marriages. His first wife is already dead when X contracted his third marriage.
X is liable for bigamy involving the second marriage on the basis of his first marriage because the first
was existing when the contracted the second. X is not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on
the basis of the first marriage since the first has already been extinguished by reason of death of the first
wife when he contracted the third. X is not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of
the second marriage since the second is null and void for being a bigamous marriage. Other view: X is
liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the second marriage. Although the second is
null and void for being a bigamous marriage, X should have first caused the declaration of nullity of the
second marriage for being bigamous before contracting a third marriage.

63. Illegal marriage – A priest, who performed a marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the couple
had no marriage license, is liable for illegal marriage. The law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and wife (Ronulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014).

64. Libel - Under Article 360 of the RPC, the publisher, and editor of newspaper, shall be responsible for
the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The publisher and
editors cannot disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had
no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication
of Remate, on which the defamatory articles appeared. It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired
in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states that they are liable as if
they were the author (Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008). Comment is not fair if
there is reckless disregard of knowing whether the defamatory imputation is false or not. Hence, the
accused cannot use the fair comment principle as a defense. In Erwin Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032,
September 16, 2008 - Journalists bear the burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession,
even when writing about public figures or matters of public interest. The report made by Tulfo describing
a lawyer in the Bureau of Customs as corrupt cannot be considered as "fair" and "true" since he did not do
research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless.
The articles are not "fair and true reports," but merely wild accusations. He had written and published the
subject articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not.

65. Incriminating an innocent person - As a general rule, planting of evidence to incriminate an

innocent person constitutes the crime of incriminating an innocent person under Article 363 of RPC.
However, if the incriminatory evidence planted is dangerous drugs or unauthorized explosives, loose
firearm or ammunition, the crime committed is planting of evidence under RA 9165 for the dangerous
drug, PD 1866 as amended by RA 9516 for the explosive and RA No. 10591 for loose firearm. If
unlawful arrest is committed to plant incriminatory evidence, the crime committed is complex crime of
incriminating innocent person through unlawful arrest (People vs. Alagao, G.R. No. L-20721, April 30,
1966). If incriminatory evidence is planted to justify an unlawful arrest, the crime committed is complex
crime of unlawful arrest through incriminating an innocent person. But if the incriminatory evidence is
dangerous drugs, explosive or loose firearm, unlawful arrest and planting of evidence are separate crimes.
Complex crime is not committed since planting of evidence, which is punishable under special law,
cannot be made a component of a complex crime. Stealing property and planting the stolen property to
impute to the victim the crime of theft constitutes complex crime of incriminating an innocent person
through theft. Planting of live bullet by NAIA personnel to extort money from a passenger of an airline
constitutes separate crime of planting of evidence and consummated or attempted robbery.

66. Imprudence or negligence – To make a doctor liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide,
it must be shown that he did not treat his patient in accordance with the standard of care and skill
commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. Failure to present
specialist as witness to testify on this standard is fatal to the prosecution of the case (Solidum vs People,
GR No. 192123, March 10, 2014, Bersamin). There are two views on whether culpa is a crime or just a
mode of committing a crime.

First view: Culpa under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code is not a crime but just a mode of committing
a crime. Applying this rule, there are three crimes committed, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, (2) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and (3) reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries. However, single reckless act resulting in homicide and damage to property is a
complex crime (Angeles vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-6494,November. 24,1954). But the slight physical injuries
that resulted from the same recklessness shall be treated as a separate crime. Since this is a light felony, it
cannot be made a component of a complex crime (Lontoc, Jr. vs. Gorgonio, L37396, April 30, 1979;
People vs. Turla, G.R. No. L-26388, February 14, 1927; Gonzaga vs. People, G.R. No. 195671, Jan. 21,
2015; 1983, 2011, and 2012 Bar Exams). Under this view, the motion to quash shall be denied because
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property are separate crimes, and hence, the conviction of the first is
not a bar to the continued prosecution of the second.
Second view: Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes; hence, conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasioffense, regardless of its various consequences. The essence of the quasi-
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus the law
penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty. It does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense criminal
negligence remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions (Ivler vs.
Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010; Quizon vs. Hon. Justice of Peace, July 28,
1955, GR N L-6641; People vs. Buan, L-25366, March 29, 1968; 1952, 1959, 1961 and 2013 Bar
Exams). Under this view, the motion to quash shall be granted because reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, damage to property and slight physical injuries constitute a single crime, and hence, the
conviction of culpable felony involving slight physical injuries is a bar to the continued prosecution of the
same culpable felony involving homicide and damage to property.

67. BP 22 – Settled is the rule that estafa will not lie when the parties waive the negotiable character of a
check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation. For instance, when there is an agreement
between the parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not
encash or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of
deceit is lacking (People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015, Bersamin). In BP Blg. 22,
the fact that the check is not intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank is not a defense. This check
produces the same effect as ordinary check. What the law punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself
and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance
(Cueme vs. People, G.R. No. 133325, June 30, 2000).

a. Knowledge of the payee - When the payee was informed that the checks are not covered by adequate
funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015,
Bersamin). In BP Blg. 22, the facts that the payee had knowledge that he had insufficient funds at the
time he issued the check is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of the offense under this
law. The gravamen of the offense under BP Blg. 22 is the issuance of a bad check; hence, malice and
intent in the issuance thereof are inconsequential (Rigor vs. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17,
2004).

b. No account with the bank - According to the accused, she did not own the check that she issued to
complainant as collateral. He merely borrowed it from a friend. What BP Blg. 22 punished was the mere
act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check. The law
penalizes a person who indulges in the making and issuing of unfunded check on an account belonging to
another with the latter’s consent. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited was really of no
consequence to her incurring criminal liability under BP 22 (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No. 177438,
September 24, 2012, Bersamin).

c. Pre-existing obligation - In order to constitute estafa through issuance of bouncing check, the
postdating or issuing a check must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. In sum, the offender must be
able to obtain property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check (People vs. Reyes,
GR No. 157943, September 4, 2013). Thus, In estafa, the fact that check was issued in payment of pre-
existing obligation is a valid defense (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 154159, March 31, 2005). But in BP
Blg. 22, it is not a valid defense (Ngo vs. People, G.R. No. 155815, July 14, 2004). In BP Blg. 22, the
check involved must be issued to apply on account or for value. Deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa
indicate that “account” refers to pre-existing obligations; while “for value” means an obligation incurred
simultaneously with the issuance of the check.

e. Notice of dishonor – To be guilty of this crime the accused must have used the check in order to
defraud the complainant. However, prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that
the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor (People vs. Reyes, supra). But receipt of notice of
dishonor is not an element of estafa through issuance of bouncing check. The giving of the written
notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the second element of violation of BP Blg. 22
arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the offender due process. The
law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee within five banking
days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been paid. The Court cannot permit a
deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by not giving the proper notice of dishonor (Resterio vs.
People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin). Demand letter was given with the security
guard without proof that it reached accused and through registered mail which was returned with the
notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05". Since there is proof that accused received the notice of dishonor, he
was acquitted. However he is still civilly liable (San Mateo vs. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013).
The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to establish the fact that
written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on the petitioner as the issuer of the check.
Considering that the sending of the written notices of dishonor had been done by registered mail, the
registry return receipts by themselves were not proof of the service on the accused without being
accompanied by the authenticating affidavit of the person who had actually mailed the written notices of
dishonor, or without the testimony in court of the mailer on the fact of mailing (Resterio vs. People, G.R.
No. 177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin). For notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served
on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself
provides that “[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon the
addressee’s written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the addressee’s name on the
proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below it.” In the case at bar, no effort was made to
show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is an
illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this
signature is that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery (Resterio vs.
People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin). The wife of complainant verbally informed
the accused that the check had bounced did not satisfy the requirement of showing that written notices of
dishonour had been made to and received by the petitioner. The verbal notices of dishonor were not
effective because it is already settled that a notice of dishonor must be in writing (Resterio vs. People,
G.R. No. 177438. September 24, 2012, Bersamin). Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of
dishonor is not required where the drawer has no right to expect that the bank will honor the check. Since
bank account of accused was already closed even before the issuance of the subject check, he had no right
to expect the drawee bank to honor his check. Hence, he is not entitled to be given a notice of dishonor
(Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26, 2008, ).The crime involved in Lopez vs. People is estafa
through issuance of bouncing check. However, it is submitted the Lopez principle can be applied to
violation of BP 22.

f. Payment - Payment of check before the filing of information is a defense. The spirit of B.P. Big 22,
which is to protect the stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who
have corrected their mistakes and restituted damages even before charges have been filed against them. In
sum, by making payment of the check before the filing of the information, the purpose of the law has
already been attained. Payment of check after the filing of informationis not a defense. Since there is no
showing of intention to mitigate the bad effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no
equitable reason to preclude the prosecution of accused. In such a case, the letter of the law should be
applied to its full extent (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014). The essence of estafa
through issuance of bouncing check is to punish fraud and not to protect the integrity of the check.
Damage and deceit are elements of estafa, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud.
In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability.
It will merely satisfy the civil liability (Lim vs. People, supra).

g. Suspension of payment - Suspension of payment order issued by SEC before the check was presented
for payment is a defense in BP Blg. 22. Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the
contract is deemed suspended. Thus, the accused has no obligation to fund the check and the complainant
has no right to present it for payment (Gidwani vs. People, GR No. 195064, January 15, 2014).
Suspension of payment order issued by SEC after three months from receipt of notice of dishonor is not a
defense in BP Blg. 22. The accused has the obligation to make good of the check after he received the
letter prior to the issuance of suspension order (Rosario vs. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008).
68. RA No. 7610 - The Family Code prohibits the infliction of corporal punishment by teacher. A
schoolteacher in employing unnecessary violence on her minor student, who even fainted, is liable for
child abuse under RA No. 7610 (Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014, Bersamin).
Accused saw the victim and his companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck
minorvictim at the back with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the
spur of the moment, they are perpetrated without intent to debase his "intrinsic worth and dignity" as a
human being, or to humiliate or embarrass him. Without such intent, the crime committed is not child
abuse under RA 7610 but merely slight physical injuries (Bongalon vs. People, G.R. No. 169533, March
20, 2013, Bersamin).

a. Sexual abuse - Having sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child constitutes child
prostitution if committed for money, profit, or any other consideration (People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos.
132875-76, November 16, 2001); or sexual abuse is committed under coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group. In child prostitution, the victim is called child exploited in prostitution while in sexual
abuse the victim is called child subjected to other abuse (Section 5 of RA No 7610). Coercion is either
physical or psychological. Taking advantage of ascendency as a swimming instructor over student is
psychological coercion (People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October, 7 1998). The assurance of love,
guarantee that she would not get pregnant by using the "withdrawal method" and the promise of marriage
were classified as "psychological coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5 of RA 7610.
Hence, accused is guilty of sexual abuse (Caballo vs. People, GR No. 198732, June 10, 2013). If the child
is 12 years old and above, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 and
rape through sexual assault or acts of lasciviousness, he shall be prosecuted under RA No. 7610 since this
law prescribed a grave penalty (Dimakuta vs. People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015). However, if
the acts constitute sexual abuse and rape through sexual intercourse, he shall be prosecuted under RPC
since this law prescribed a graver penalty. He cannot be prosecuted for compound crime of rape and
sexual abuse because the latter is punishable under special law. He cannot be prosecuted for both rape and
sexual abuse because of the rule on double jeopardy (People v. Matias, G.R. No. 186469, June 13, 2012
and Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013). If the child is under 12 years
old, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual abuse and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the latter shall
be prosecuted penalized as follows: (1) rape through sexual intercourse; (2) acts of lasciviousness with the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (Section 5 of RA No. 7610).Prior to RA No. 8353
(Rape Law), inserting finger into genital orifice is acts of lasciviousness. Hence, reclusion temporal in its
medium period under RA No. 7610 should be imposed. Under RA No. 8353, inserting finger into genital
orifice is rape through sexual assault where the penalty is prision mayor. To impose the lighter penalty
under RPC as amended by RA 8353 is unfair to the victim. It is not the intention of RA No. 8353 to
disallow the imposition of penalty under RA No. 7610 if the victim is child subjected to sexual abuse,
who isunder 12 years of age (People vs. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011). If the crime is
qualified rape through sexual assault, the Chingcase is not applicable since RA No. 8353 prescribed a
grave penalty of reclusion temporal for it (People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011).

69. Terrorism - Terrorism is committing a predicate crime which creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
e.g. demand by Al Queda against the US not to interfere with the affairs of the Muslim (Section of RA
No. 9372). The predicate crimes of terrorism are: Piracy, highway robbery, hijacking, rebellion, coup
e’tat, murder, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, crimes involving destruction, arson, unlicensed
firearm and explosives, violation of Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act and
violation of Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act.

70. Trafficking in person - Accompanying a child and offering her sexual services in exchange for
money constitutes child prostitution. The accused who offered the victim to the one who raped her is not
liable for rape as principal indispensable cooperation since bringing the victim to the rapist is not
indispensable to the commission of the crime of rape (People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854, September 24,
2012). If the accused is regularly offering the sexual service of the child in exchange for money, the crime
committed is not anymore child prostitution. Maintaining or hiring the child as purpose of prostitution
constitutes qualified trafficking in person because the former took advantage of vulnerability of the latter
as a child and as one who need money. Minority is qualifying circumstance (People vs. Casio, G.R. No.
211465, December 03, 2014; People vs. Hirang, G.R. No. 223528, January 11, 2017, Bersamin).
Recruiting without license a person, child or adult, to work as a prostitute abroad constitutes the crime of
trafficking in person and illegal recruitment. Syndicate is qualifying circumstance in both crimes. Even if
the accused is less than three, but the allegation and evidence shows that there are at least three traffickers
and recruiters, syndicated can be appreciated as qualifying circumstance (People vs. Lalli, G.R. No.
195419, October 12, 2011; People vs. Hashim, G.R. No. 194255, June 13, 2012).

71. Illegal recruitment - An employee may be held liable with his employer, if the former actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The employee cannot escape liability by claiming that she
was not aware that before working for her employer in the recruitment agency, she should first be
registered with the POEA. Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Good
faith is not a defense (People vs. Valenciano, G.R. No. 180926, December 10, 2008).

72. RA No. 9165 - Accused were caught by police authorities on board a speedboat carrying shabu. Since
it was not proven that the drugs came from China or foreign country they were convicted of possession of
dangerous drugs, which is necessarily included in the charge of importation (People vs. Chan Liu, G.R.
No. 189272, January 21, 2015). Possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs in a single occasion
constitutes a single offense of possession of dangerous drugs (David vs. People, G.R. No. 181861,
October 17, 2011). For illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug without authority. However, mere
possession of dangerous drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation (Asiatico vs. People, G.R.
No. 195005, September 12, 2011).

a. Use of dangerous drugs - Where residue of dangerous drugs is found and there is a positive
confirmatory test result, the accused should be charged with use rather than possession of dangerous
drugs. This would be in keeping with the intent of the law to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use
and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life (People vs. Matinez, G.R. No.
191366, December 13, 2010). Positive confirmatory test is an element of use of dangerous drugs.
However, the absence of such test cannot be raised as an issue for the first time on appeal (Ambre vs.
People, G.R. No. 191532. August 15, 2012).
b. Attempted sale - Poseur-buyer showed shabu for sale to poseur buyer. The sale was aborted when the
police officers immediately placed accused under arrest. The crime committed is attempted sale (People
vs. Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012).

c. Coordination with PDEA - Lack of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust
operation. Such coordination is not an indispensable requirement in buy-bust operations (People vs.
Mendosa, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012)

e. Seizure and custody - Although non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements would
not automatically render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid, that is true only when there is
a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. Any departure from the prescribed procedure must then still be reasonably
justified, and must further be shown not to have affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated contraband (People vs. Barte, G.R. No. 179749, March 30, 2017, Bersamin).

g. Chain of custody - The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensicchemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked
illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court (People vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689,
March 12, 2014).

h. Plea bargaining - Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any crime involving
dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining. 73. RA No. 3019 – In Giangan vs. People, G.R. No. 169385, August 26, 2015,
Bersamin -Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief that he was then
summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road had just reported to him. A
further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the turning over of the wooden posts to the police
station, manifesting that the accused were acting within the scope of their authority. Good faith means
honest, lawful intent; the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without intent to assist in a
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained of was rendered inconsistent with the
manifest partiality and bad faith that the law punished. He was acquitted of violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA No. 3019 because the element of evident bad faith is not present. In People vs. Reyes, G.R. No.
177105-06, August 12, 2010, Bersamin, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision reinstating the
title of the complainant. Provincial Adjudicator despite knowledge of the CA decision still rendered his
decision in a DARAB Case that completely contradicted the CA decision by invalidating title of the
complainant. He displayed evident bad faith and manifest partiality by arrogant refusal to recognize and
obey the CA decision causing undue injury to the complainant and giving unwaarnted benefits to private
individuals in violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. In usurpation of judicial function, the accused,
who is not a judge, attempts to perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only in a judge.
However, the petitioner's task as Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in a DARAB case to
adjudicate the claims of the opposing parties. As such, he performed a quasijudicial function, closely akin
to the function of a judge of a court of law. He could not be held liable for usurpation of judicial function
were.

a. Arias principle - To apply the Arias rule for purposes of exonerating anaccused or respondent, the
following requisites must be present: (1) that the public officer in approving the release of public fund
must be relying to a reasonable extent on his subordinates (Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28,
2013); (2) that the documents involving the release of funds must be so voluminous so as to preclude him
from studying each one carefully (Santillano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 03, 2010); (3) that
the public officer has no foreknowledge of existing anomaly (Escara vs. People, G.R. No. 164921, July 8,
2005); and that there is not deviation from ordinary procedure in the release of fund, which necessitate
further investigation (Cruz vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005; Rivera vs.
People, G.R. No. 156577, December 03, 2014). City treasurer, city accountant and city administrator
allowed the release of cash advance in favor of a paymaster despite the fact that she has previous
unliquidated cash advances. They are liable because of conspiracy of silence or inaction. Public officers’
omissions to question irregularities indicate a common understanding and concurrence of sentiments
respecting the commission of the offense of causing undue injury to the government through gross
inexcusable negligence. This is called conspiracy by silence (Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967,
January 28, 2013).

b. Inducement by means of money - Under Section 3 (a) of RA No. 3019, a public officer, who
persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, shall be punished for
corruption. However, the deliberation in the Senate regarding the bill on anti-graft shows that the mode
ofcommitting the crime under Section 3 (a) is persuading, inducing or influencing a public officer by
another public officer to commit an offense or to violate rules and regulations by means of consideration,
reward, payment or remuneration (Baviera vs. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, Oct. 12, 2006).
c. Transaction or contract - Section 3 (b) of RA No. 3019 is limited only to contracts or transactions
involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law.
Preliminary investigation is not a contract or transaction within the contemplated of Section 3 (b). Hence,
requesting or receiving money in connection with a preliminary investigation is not a violation of this
provision (Soriano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65952, July 31, 1984; People vs. Sandiganbayan.
and Justice Secretary Perez, G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013, Bersamin).

d. SALN - Failure to file SALN as required by law is a violation of Section 8 of RA No. 6713 and
Section 7 of RA No. 3019 (Concerned Taxpayer vs. Doblada, A.M. No. P-99-1342, June 8, 2005). Since
both laws provide a penalty for failure to file SALN, the offender should only be prosecuted and punished
either under one or the other.

74. Money laundering - Money laundering is committed by any person who, knowing that any monetary
instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity:(a)
transacts said monetary instrument or property;(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires,
possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property;(c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source,
location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or
property;(d) attempts or conspires to commit money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b)
or (c);(e) aids, abets, assists in or counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in
paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above; and(f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he
facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above. Money
laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that a covered or suspicious
transaction is required under this Act to be reported to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC),
fails to do so (Section 4 of RA No. 9160 as amended by RA No. 10365). Unlawful activity refers to any
act or omission or series or combination thereof involving or having direct relation to the following: (1)
piracy, murder, distructive arson, kidnapping for ransom, crimes involving dangerous drugs; (2)
hijacking, carnapping, fencing, robbery, qualified theft, and estafa; (3) bribery and corruption of public
officers, frauds and Illegal exactions, malversation, graft and corruption, and plunder; (4) forgeries and
counterfeiting; and (5) child pornography, photo-video voyeurism, child abuse, crimes involving
explosives and unlicensed firearm, trafficking in person, illegal recruitment, terrorism and conspiracy to
commit terrorism, and financing of terrorism and; smuggling, and illegal gambling.

75. Plunder - The elements of plunder are: First - That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons; (Note: Senator Pogi can be held liable for plunder even if the principal
offender, who masterminded the plunder of pork barrel, is a private individual, the Pork-barrel Queen.
What is important is that Senator Pogi in connivance with Pork-barrel Queen acquired ill-gotten wealth).
On the other hand, Pork-barrel Queen can be held liable for plunder on the basis of conspiracy.
Second - That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts:
1.Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury; (Example: Misuse of funds in the amount P10 million by awarding contract to a close relative,
who is not the lowest bidder; Misuse of funds or fraud disposition of government asset to P100 million by
diverting the construction of road leading to his farm instead of the poblacion). Can the Senator use the
defense in malversation that he is not responsible for the misuse of his PDAP since it is the duty of the
appropriate implementing agency of the government to check that the recipient of the fund is not bogus?
No. Assuming that the duty to check that the recipient of the Senator’s PDAP is not bogus belongs to the
appropriate agency of the government, the Senator is still liable since malversation can be committed
through culpa.
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (Example: Collecting or receiving
commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of P189,700,000.00 which was deposited in the
Jose Velarde account and receiving bi-monthly collections from “jueteng”, a form of illegal gamblingin
the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00 of which was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
(People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007).
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to government (Example:
Ordering the GSIS and the SSS by President Estrada to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation
(People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007); 4. By obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or 6. By
taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; Note: The word “combination” means at least two different predicate crimes;
while the term “series” means at least two predicate crimes of the same kind (Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006). Thus, a single predicate crime amounting to 50 million pesos
is not plunder. The intention of the lawmakers is that if there is only one predicate crime, the offender has
to be prosecuted under the particular crime, which is already covered by existing laws. What is punishable
under the law is "acts of plunder", which means that there should be at least, two or more, predicate
crimes (See deliberation of the Bicameral Committee on Justice, May 7, 1991). Third - That the aggregate
amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00
(Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001). The damages
suffered by the government in diverting the road from the poblacion to the farm of the accused shall not
be considered in determining if plunder is committed. What is important is the amount of ill-gotten wealth
acquired by the public officer and not the amount of damage suffered by the government. In People vs.
Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007 - One of the predicate crimes alleged in
the information is misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. This was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the following predicate crimes were alleged and proven by evidence (1)
series of acts of receiving collections from "jueteng" in the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00; and (2)
series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares Of stock of Belle
Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of
P189,700,000.00. This pattern of criminal acts indicates an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass ill-gotten wealth in the amount of more than P50 million. Estrada was convicted of plunder.
There are two structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: wheel or circle conspiracy and chain
conpiracy. Under the wheel or circle conspiracy, there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"). Under the chain conspiracy, usually
involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication
and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer (Fernan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No.
145927, August 24, 2007). An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy
involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada
and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused
individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19,
2016, Bersamin). In case of several individuals are charged with plunder, the law requires that there must
be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons (GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598,
July 19, 2016, Bersamin). In the Enrile vs. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, if the allegation is
true, the main plunder is Senator Enrile. In People vs. Estrada, the main plunderer is the hub or President
Estrada. If the main plunderer is unidentified, the total amount allegedly acquired by several accused shall
be divided for purposes of determining if the P50 million threshold had been reached. In GMA vs.
People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, ten persons, where charged of amassing, accumulating and
acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating to P365,997,915.00 without identifying the main plunderer. As
such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly
1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth
required for plunder. In this situation, plunder is not committed. If the main plunderer is identified, the
total amount acquired by him and his co-conspirators shall be considered in determining if the P50
million threshold had been reached. For example, if GMA was identified as a main plunder, her acts and
that of the other conspirators in amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating to
P365,997,915.00 shall be considered for purposes of determining if the P50 million threshold had been
reached. In this situation, plunder is committed. In Enrile vs. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015,
it was stated that in the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by Senator, his
assistant, and a private individuals in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed,
acquired or accumulated by them is at least P50 million.

67. Wire-tapping - MMDA officer is extorting money from a driver of a vehicle, who committed
trafficking violation along Edsa. The officer threatened the driver that he will confiscate her driver’s
license unless she will give him P500.00. However, MMDA officer is not aware that his act of extorting
money is being video-recorder by a passenger. The passenger violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Law. The
recording of private conversations without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of RA
No. 4200. The law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private communications. The law is
applicable even if the conversation being recorder pertains to criminal extortion (Mamba vs. Garcia, A.M.
No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001). Passenger is criminally liable for violating law. On the other hand,
MMDA officer is liable for attempted robbery. However, in proving attempted robbery, the driver cannot
use the recording since the same is not admissible in evidence.

66. Hazing - Prior to RA No. 8049, the consent of the victim to hazing and lack of intent to kill will
negate dolo. Hence, the crime committed only reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (Villareal vs.
People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012). Congress instead of amending RPC created a special law
(RA No. 8049) to make hazing malum prohibitum, where consent of the victim and lack of intent to kill is
not a defense and the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem shall not be appreciated (Dungo vs.
People, G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015). The elements of the crime of hazing are: (1) That there is an
initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization; (2) That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or
organization; and (3) That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities
or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury (Dungo vs. People, supra;
People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015). Organization includes companies, PNP, AFP
(People vs. Bayabos). Even the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation
engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law (Dungo vs. People, supra).
Failure to allege that the physical or psychological harm were employed as a prerequisite for admission or
entry into the organization would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term –
in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly
committed and thus a mere conclusion of law (People vs. Bayabos). In hazing, criminal responsibility is
based on (1) actual participation in inflicting physical harm and inducement, (2) presumed participation
(of those who are present during the hazing), (3) the presence of adviser, (4) participation in the planning
(by officers, former officers and alumni of the fraternity); (5) knowledge (of the parent of frat member in
the home of whom hazing occurred, owner of the place commission, and school authorities). In the case
of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements,
occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to
take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof (People vs. Bayabos). The
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As
long as the commission of the offense (hazing) can be duly established in evidence, the determination of
the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal (People vs.
Bayabos). The accused claim that the information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. The information
alleged that the accused during a planned initiation rite and being then officers of APO fraternity used
personal violence upon a neophyte resulting to his death. The "planned initiation rite" as stated in the
information included the act of inducing victim to attend it. Accused not only induced victim to be present
at the resort, but they actually brought him there. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it
not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present (Dungo vs. People, supra).

67. Cybercrime - The following constitute cybercrime offenses: (1) Offenses against the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of computer data and systems; (2) Computer-related offenses; and (3) content-
related offenses (cyber libel, cybersex and cyber child pornography).

68. Confidentiality of computer system - Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of computer data and systems are cybercrime under Section 4 of RA No. 10175. Computer data refers to
any representation of facts, information, or concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer
system including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function and includes
electronic documents and/or electronic data messages whether stored in local computer systems or online.
Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of
which, pursuant to a program, performs automated processing of data. It covers any type of device with
data processing capabilities including, but not limited to, computers and mobile phones. The device
consisting of hardware and software may include input, output and storage components which may stand
alone or be connected in a network or other similar devices. It also includes computer data storage devices
or media. Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems are:
a. Illegal Access – Illegal access refer is committed by any person, who shall access to the whole or any
part of a computer system without right. Ethical hackers are professionals who employ tools and
techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal information.
Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would
insulate him from the coverage cybercrime law on illegal access (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 11, 2014).

b. Illegal Interception – Illegal interception is committed by any person, whoshall intercept by technical
means without right of any non-public transmission ofcomputer data to, from, or within a computer
system including electromagneticemissions from a computer system carrying such computer data.

c. Data Interference – Data interference is committed by any person, who shall intentionally, or
recklessly alter, damage, delete or deteriorate computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses. This is considered as cyber
vandalism.

d. System Interference – System interference is committed by any person, who shall intentionally alter
or recklessly hinder or interfere with the functioning of a computer or computer network by inputting,
transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data or program,
electronic document, or electronic data message, without right or authority, including the introduction or
transmission of viruses.
e. Misuse of Devices – Misuse of devise is committed by any person, who shall use, produce, sell,
procure, import, distribute, or otherwise make available, or possession with intent to use, without right
any of the following: (1) a device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the
purpose of committing any cybercrime; or (2) a computer password, access code, or similar data by which
the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed with intent that it be used for the
purpose of committing any cybercrime;

f. Cyber-squatting – Cyber-squatting is committed by any person, who shall acquire a domain name over
the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, and deprive others from registering the
same, if such a domain name is: (a) similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark
registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration; (b)
identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and (c) acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

69. Computer-related offense - The following are computer-related offenses:

a. Computer-related forgery - Computer-related forgery is committed by any person, who shall input,
alter, or delete any computer data without right resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be
considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or not the data is
directly readable and intelligible; or who shall knowingly use computer data which is the product of
computer-related forgery for the purpose of perpetuating a fraudulent or dishonest design.

b. Computer-related Fraud - Computer-related fraud is committed by any person, who without

authority shall input, alter, or delete computer data or program or interfere in the functioning of a
computer system with fraudulent intent causing damage thereby. The penalty is lower if no damage has
yet been caused.

c. Computer-related identity theft - Computer-related identity theft is committed by any person, who
shall intentionally acquire, use, misuse, transfer, posses, alter or delete identifying information belonging
to another, whether natural or juridical, without right. The penalty is lower if no damage has yet been
caused. Using the name of another person and his pictures in opening a facebook account without
authority constitutes cybercrime offense.

71. Content-related offenses - Content-related offenses includes cyber libel, cybersex and cyber child
pornography. A prosecution for cybercrime offenses shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code or special laws (Section 7). Despite of Section 7, the
offender cannot be prosecuted for cyber libel or cyber child pornography under RA No. 10175 in
additionto libel under RPC or child pornography under RA No. 9775 since this will offend the
constitutional rule on double jeopardy (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 11, 2014).

a. Cyber libel – Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation
to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a new crime since
Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, already punishes it. Online defamation
constitutes “similar means” for committing libel (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335,
February 18. 2014). Cyber libel is an unlawful or prohibited act of libel as defined in Article 355 of
RPC committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the
future. In case libel is committed through use of information and communications technologies, the
penalty for libel under Article 355 of RPC shall be increased one degree higher pursuant to Section 6 of
RA No. 10175. The place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the internet is not
equivalent to the place where the libelous article is “printed and first published”. To rule otherwise is to
allow the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360, and that was the indiscriminate
laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, to harass an accused. At any rate,
Article 360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint for internet libel in their
respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010).

b. Cybersex – Cybersex under RA No. 10175 is committed by any person, who shall wilfully engage,
maintain, control, or operate, directly or indirectly, any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration. The element of "engaging in a
business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The law actually seeks to punish cyber
prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive
prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. The deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of
Congress show a lack of intent to penalize a "private obscene showing between two private persons
although. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014). If the commission of
cybersex involves lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity of a child, the offender may be
prosecuted for child pornography under RA No. 9775 qualified by the circumstance of using computer
system under RA No. 10175. However, the offender cannot be prosecuted for both cybersex and qualified
(or cyber) child pornography because of the rule on double jeopardy (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 203335, February 11, 2014). If the commission of cybersex involves the maintenance of trafficked
victim, the offender may be prosecuted for trafficking in person under RA No. 9208.
c. Cyber child pornography - In RA No. 9208 child pornography is committed by electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, responsible persons are liable for
child pornography under RA No. 9775. RA No. 9775 is comprehensive enough to include cyber
pornography by requiring a child to show her private parts to a client through the internet. If
child pornography is committed through a computer system, the crime committed is cyber child
pornography under RA No. 10175 and the penalty is one degree higher.
72. SPAM - Unsolicited commercial communications is committed by any person, who shall transmit
commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or
offer for sale products and services. Transmission of unsolicited commercial communications is also
known as "spam." In Disini case, the provision of RA No. 10175 prohibiting spam is declared
unconstitutional. It was held that to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. The State cannot rob him of
this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

73. Other cybercrime offense - Other cybercrime offense is also committed by any person who shall
wilfully abet or aid in the commission of any of the cybercrime offenses or any person who wilfully
attempts to commit any of the cybercrime offenses (Section 5). The provision on aiding or abetting
cybercrime in relation to cyber libel, child pornography and unsolicited commercial communication was
declared unconstitutional in the Disini case. The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages. Hence, this provision that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity
since it encroaches upon freedom of speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. A
blogger who originally posted a libellous or child pornographic message is liable for cybercrime. But
netizens, who merely reacted to the defamatory or child pornographic message on the Facebook by
clicking button for "Like," "Comment" or "Share" or on a Tweeter account by retweeting it, are not liable
for aiding or abetting cybercrime. But the provision on aiding or abetting cybercrime in relation to other
cybercrimes such as illegal access, illegal interception, data interference etc. Is declared constitutional.

74. Qualifying circumstance of use of information technology - Use of information and

communications technologies in committing felony or offense under special law is a qualifying
circumstance under Section 6 of RA No. 10175. Under Section 6 of RA No. 10175, the penalty for crimes
punishable under special laws committed through and with the use of information and communication
technologies shall be one degree higher than that provided the law. However, this provision requires the
application of the rules on graduation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. Hence, Section 6 finds
application only if special law involved has adopted the technical nomenclature of the penalties of
Revised Penal Code.