CRUZ V SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the
law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\

ABAD, J.

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the
State.

In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public
domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU.

Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for distribution to indigenous
peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.

CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary, et al seeking to stop the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.

The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over
the action SINCE jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. – DENIED

NCIP – filed a MR – GRANTED motion partial reconsideration and dismissed CMU’s action for lack of
jurisdiction.
The RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC said
that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf.

CMU filed for MR – DENIED

Appeal to the CA, the CA dismissed CMU’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, CMU filed for MR denied

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.

HELD: PETITION GRANTED – Proclamation 310 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL - null and void for being
contrary to law and public policy.

The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the
government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there
must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be
made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP
beneficiaries.

To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for
distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted
by law to the DARAB. The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state
colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by
misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP.

These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement
in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and development of this country.

As already stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia
dedicated them for CMU’s use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have
ceased to be alienable public lands.

Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997,
it provided in Section 56 that "property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested"
upon its effectivity "shall be recognized and respected."

In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently,
transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.

Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several tribes belonging to the area’s
cultural communities in the course of the proceedings for the titling of the lands in CMU’s name. Indeed,
eventually, only 3,080 hectares were titled in CMU’s name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162. More than
300 hectares were acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the claims of those tribes.

Sec 12 RA 8371 (IPRA LAW)

SECTION 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or
the Land Registration Act 496. — Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their
individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been
in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for
a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested
by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under
the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually
used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of this
Act.

BEGNAEN V CALIGTAN

Beganaen filed a Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondent Spouses Caligtan for
“Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights” before the Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP at La Trinidad,
Benguet. The RHO dismissed the complaint based on respondent’s argument that the case should have
gone to the council of elders and not through the Barangay Lupon, as mandated by the IPRA law.

Instead of abiding by the Order of the RHO, Begnaen filed against Sps. Caligtan a Complaint for Forcible
Entry with Prayer of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction before the MCTC of Bauko-Sabangan, Mt. Province.

Begnaen alleged that he was the owner of a 125-sqm land situated in Supang, Mt. Province. He claimed
that on 2 occassions, respondents – by using force, intimidation, stealth, and threat – entered a portion of
subject property, hurriedly put up a chicken-wire fence, and started building a shack thereon without his
knowledge and consent.

On the other hand, respondents averred that they owned the area in question as part of the land that they
had purchased from a certain Vicente in 1959 pursuant to age-old customs and traditions. They introduced
improvements evidencing their physical possession. Respondents further contended that when Begnaen’s
father was still alive, he had always respected their boundary wherein a “GIKAD” or old pine tree lumber
was buried and recovered. The gikad established their boundary pursuant to the age-old Igorot customs
and traditions.

The MCTC dismissed the complaint in favor of respndents. The RTC reversed the order saying that it had
jurisdiction over the case of forcible entry. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC rulings and reinstated
the MCTC ruling furthermore stating that the NCIP has original jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON the NCIP has exclusive and primary jurisdiction over all ICC/IP cases.

HELD: NO

After a comprehensive analysis of the classes of jurisdiction, We held that "the NCIP cannot be said to
have even primary jurisdiction over all the ICC/IP cases x x x. We do not find such specificity in the
grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in Section 66 of the IPRA. Neither does the IPRA confer original and
exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs." Furthermore,

That NCIP Administrative Circular 44 expands the jurisdiction of the NCIP as original and exclusive in
Sections 5 and 1, respectively of Rule III x x x is of no moment. The power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment.

It ought to be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law into effect. The administrative regulation must
be within the scope and purview of the law. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot
extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
legislature. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, but must remain consistent with
the law they seek to apply and implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant or to
modify, the law.
At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the
exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within
the legal bounds of rights and remedies. (Emphases supplied)

Futhermore:

The NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over (1) the parties, who are all members of the same ICC,
and (2) the subject property, which is ancestral land. The NCIP-RHO, being the agency that first
took cognizance of petitioner-appellant's complaint, has jurisdiction over the same to the
exclusion of the MCTC. (katamad wala ako mahanap na digest online)

LIM V GAMOSA

PEREZ, J.

Respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Barangay Buenavista, Coron, Palawan filed a
petition before the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) against petitioners for “Violation of
Rights to Free and Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with Prayer
for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO.”

Despite a motion to dismiss being a prohibited pleading under NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03,
petitioners moved to dismiss the petition on the ground, among others, that NCIP lack jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition because petitioners are not members of the ICC/IP. The NCIP, however,
resolved to deny the motion to dismiss. Likewise, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NCIP’s denial and
reasoned out that from the wording of Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP was bestowed with an all-
encompassing grant of jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and that the
requirement in the proviso contained in the section i.e. obtaining certification from the Council of
Elders/Leaders that the parties had exhausted all remedies provided under their customary law prior to the
filing of an action, applied only to instances where both parties were members of an ICC/IP. In all, the
Court of Appeals upheld that when a claim or dispute involves rights of the ICCs/IPs, the NCIP has
jurisdiction over the case regardless of whether the opposing party is a non-ICC/IP.

Petitioners thus filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE.

Does the NCIP have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case?

HELD.

NO. SECTION 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
where opposing party is a non-ICC/IP. This provision reflects IPRA’s emphasis of customs and customary
law to govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs. In fact, even the IPRA itself recognizes that customs and
customary law cannot be applied to non-ICCs/IPs since ICCs/IPs are recognized as a distinct sector of the
Philippine society.

The limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP, confined only to a special cause involving ICCs/IPs, can only
be exercised under the limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.

Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, emphasizes the primacy of customs and customary law in the lives of the members of
the ICCs/IPs:
 “Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as
a source of law x x x. [I]n the absence of any applicable provisions in the Civil Code, custom,
when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies
to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law.
The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and
recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.”

Once again, the primacy of customs and customary law sets the parameters for the NCIP’s limited
and special jurisdiction and its consequent application in dispute resolution. Demonstrably, the proviso in
Section 66 of the IPRA limits the jurisdiction of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs where both parties are ICCs/IPs because customs and customary law cannot be made to apply
to non-ICCs/IPs within the parameters of the NCIP’s limited and special jurisdiction.

Clearly, the phraseology of “all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs” does not necessarily
grant the NCIP all-encompassing jurisdiction whenever the case involves rights of ICCs/IPs without regard
to the status of the parties, i.e, whether the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The NCIP’s Resolution is reversed and set aside and respondents
may refile their complaint against petitioners in a court of general jurisdiction.

TUNGED V STA LUCA REALTY

The Heirs of Tunged are members of the Ibaloi Tribe who seek to protect their vested rights in the subject
property under the IPRA and the environmental laws against the earthmoving activity of the respondents.
The RTC dismissed the case outright because the RTC, sitting as an environmental court, mistakenly
believed that the NCIP has jurisdiction over said complaint and that the petitioners had no legal personality
to file the petition as the RTC believed that the petitioners have admitted through their complaint that their
right to said property wasn’t yet established. The SC reverses the RTC decision because the NCIP had no
jurisdiction over the matter and that the cause of action wasn’t grounded on the recognition of their
ownership but rather on the enforcement of vested rights under the IPRA. Furthermore, the SC declared
the petitioners to have sufficient legal personality as the successors of Tunged as they have proven such
through documentary and testimonial evidence.

ISSUE: WON the NCIP has jurisdiction over the complaint.

RULING: NO.

 NCIP has no jurisdiction

o Sec 66 of the IPRA and the case cited above show that there are 2 conditions before the
NCIP may take cognizance of the dispute
 Exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties
 Compliance with the precedent through certification by the council of elders
o These 2 conditions can only be complied with when the disputing parties are of the same
ICC/IP
o If 1 of the disputing parties is a non-IP/ICC, then said party is not bound by the customary
laws as contemplated by the IPRA
o Thus, the proper courts of justice will take cognizance
 RTC has jurisdiction
o Action is not one for a claim of ownership nor issuance of Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title
o Petitioners have already stated that the petition for Identification, delineation and recognition
 of their ancestral claim is already pending with the NCIP
o Their Cause of action is grounded upon alleged earthmoving activities of respondents
 These activities allegedly violate their rights under IPRA and PD 1586 and cause
irreparable damage to the environment life and property
o The case falls under the RTC jurisdiction sitting as a special environmental court
 Petitioner’s entitlement to their claim is irrelevant.

BENIN V TUASON

ZALDIVAR, J.

The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three
parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint,
located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality
(now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of
land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his
father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had
possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully,
cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom;
that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed
on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of
Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein
plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared
said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429;
that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and
subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after
having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses
thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other defendants were
ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of
the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The
other defendants were all declared in default.

HELD:
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their
being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil
Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two
parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and
successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case
No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land
described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in
interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931. It will be noted that in Civil Case
No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of
land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest
of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base
their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their
complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso
Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their
claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on
their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in
1931.

Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara,
Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) should apply not
only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against
Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623,
respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find
that the plaintiffs do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by
Elias Benin. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right
different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No Q-156. And,
also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different from
that claimed by Pascual Pili.

The court sited the Santiago case which states that, (T)he mere fact that
appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings
that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914
does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree.
The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the
whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the
ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who
appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned
by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's
predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever
character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the
certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal
encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17
and cases cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the
registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the
registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed
from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of
such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.

The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

LOPEZ V QUERUBIN ( no digest)