Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (2000)
Petitioners: Isagani Cruz
Respondents: Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Topic: Territory, People, and Government - Territory
SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) or
RA 8371 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
However, due to a tie vote (7-7) after due deliberation and re-
deliberation, the petition was dismissed. (Thus, the separate
opinions are more important in this case).
FACTS: See issues.
ISSUE/S:
 Most important issue: WoN Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7,
8, and 57, and 58 of RA 8371/IPRA and its IRR are
unconstitutional for unlawfully depriving the State of its
ownership over lands of the public domain, minerals,
and other natural resources therein, violating the
regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution
o Justice Kapunan: NO.
 Said provisions affirming the ownership by
indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands
and domains by virtue of native title
(definition: lands held in private ownership
since time immemorial) do not diminish the
State’s ownership of lands within the public
domain, because said ancestral lands and
domains are considered as private land, and
never to have been part of the public domain,
following the doctrine laid down in Cariño v.
Insular Government.
 Section 3(a) does not confer or recognize any
right of ownership over the natural resources
to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is definitional and
not declarative of a right or title.
 Section 57 only grants “priority rights” to
ICCs/IPs in the utilization of
natural resources and not absolute ownership
thereof. The State retains full control over the
exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through the imposition of
requirements and conditions for the utilization
of natural resources under existing laws, such
as the Small- Scale Mining Act of 1991 and
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Neither
does the grant of said rights exclude non-
indigenous peoples from undertaking the
same activities within the ancestral domains
upon authority granted by the proper
governmental agency.
o Justice Puno: NO.
 Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs.
The classification of lands in the public
domain under Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution does not include ancestral lands
nor ancestral domains.
 The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over
both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by
torrens title under the Public Land Act and the
Land Registration Act with respect to
ancestral lands only. Both modes presume or
recognize the land as private and not public.
 The right of ownership to ancestral domain
under Section 7(a) involves “lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting
 and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains”,
not “waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources”
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. Ownership therefore of natural
resources remain with the State.
 Small-scale utilization of resources in Section
7(b) is also allowed under paragraph 3,
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
 Finally, the large-scale utilization of natural
resources in Section 57 of RA 8371/IPRA is
allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution since only
“priority rights” (which does not necessarily
mean ownership rights) are given to
ICCs/IPs.
 WoN Sections 51 to 53, 59, 52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of RA
 However, by including “natural resources”,
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing
Rules goes beyond Section 7(a) and therefore
unconstitutional.
o Justice Panganiban: YES.
 Section 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral
domain encompasses natural resources
found therein], and 3(b) [defines ancestral
lands as those possessed by ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial] contravene Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, which declares
that the State owns all lands of the public
domain, minerals, and natural resources –
none of which, except agricultural lands, can
be alienated. In addition, mere possession or
utilization of land, however long, does not
automatically convert them into private
properties.
 IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to
ancestral lands and domains.
 IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes the State’s power
under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution
of full control of natural resources in ancestral
lands and ancestral domains in favor of
ICCs/IPs, who may exercise these rights
without any time limit. In addition, they are
also given the right to negotiate directly the
terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources under Section 7(b), a right
vested by the Constitution only to the State.
o Justice Vitug: YES. Sections 7 and 57 go beyond
the context of the fundamental law and virtually
amount to an undue delegation, if not an
unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a
significant area of the country and its patrimony.
8371/IPRA, defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, violate the due process clause of the
Constitution
o Justice Kapunan: NO. The fact the NCIP is
composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not
mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover,
the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph
2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution.
o Justice Puno: Not discussed.
o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to
await specific cases filed by those whose rights may
have been injured by these provisions.
o Justice Vitug: YES, but only on making customary
 law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The second
paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the
Constitution allows Congress to provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains. I do not see this
statement as saying that Congress may enact a law
that would simply express that customary laws shall
govern and end it there. No discussion on the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP.
 WoN Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which
provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP
to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination, infringes upon the Presidents
power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
 Seven Justices voted to grant the petition
o Justice Kapunan: NO, since said provision as well
as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP
under the Office of the President, and therefore under
the President’s control and supervision with respect to
its administrative functions. However, insofar as the
decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers are concerned, the same are
reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the
NLRC and the SEC.
o Justice Puno: Not discussed.
o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to
await specific cases filed by those whose rights may
have been injured by these provisions.
o Justice Vitug: Not discussed.
NOTES:
 Seven Justices voted to dismiss the petitions
o Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and
Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
o Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining
all challenged provisions of the law with the exception
of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57
of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted
as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
o Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely
on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
o Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)
(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA.
o Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justice Vitug also mentioned that the
petitioners have standing to raise the issue, as it is of
transcendental importance.
o Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.