5 SUNTAY III V COJUANGCO SUNTAY  Trial court rendered a decision, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
GR # 183053 administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate because the court held that to
June 16, 2010
By: MARTIN
Topic: The Succesional Bar (ART. 992)
Petitioners: EMILIO SUNTAY III
Respondents: ISABEL COJUANGCO SUNTAY
INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO SUNTAY
FAMILY RELATIONS: CRISTINA(DECEDENT)+ FEDERICO(GRANDPARENTS)= EMILIO SUNTAY I
(FATHER, PREDECEASED HIS PARENTS) Married ISABEL COJUANGCO which they begot 3
children (ISABEL[RESPONDENT], EMILIO II, MARGARITA). Emilio’s I marriage to Isabel
Cojuangco got annulled. EMILIO THEN HAD 2 ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (PETITIONER EMILIO
III AND NENITA) with 2 different women. FEDERICO ADOPTED THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
when EMILIO I AND CRISTINA DIED.
FACTS:
 After the death of Cristina (Decedent), Respondent filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:
o “At the time of the decedent’s] death, the [decedent] left an estate of
real and personal properties, with a probable gross value of
P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the surviving
heirs of the decedent are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving
spouse (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, legitimate granddaughter; (3)
Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, , legitimate granddaughter and (4) Emilio
Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson”
 Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel,
Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:
o “Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her
estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as
part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be
accorded legal preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and
her family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than
thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was
incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[Emilio I]
namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Tañedo; that he is better situated to
protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of
his wife, he was already the one who managed their conjugal properties;
that the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly
overstated (; and that Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are
in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
 Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son,
Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf, in the event he
would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of administration.
 Emilio III filed his Opposition-In- Intervention, which essentially echoed the
allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead,
Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
 In the course of the proceedings, Federico died.
appoint Isabel would be against the wishes of the decedent and that they have a
strained relationship for 30 years
 Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III,
and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
decedent, Cristina
 The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus,
barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate
mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was
merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latter’s
appointment as administrator of the decedent’s estate, cannot be appointed as the
administrator of the decedent’s estate because Jurisprudence has consistently held
that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab
ntestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus,
Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred
over respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the
decedent
ISSUE: Whether ART. 992 of the Civil Code applies as to bar petitioner from being appointed
administrator of the Decedent’s Estate (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in the administration
of the decedent’s undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed facts
and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the
wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite
the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between
Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as
forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her
death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
 It is clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of
Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent,
considering that the CA even declared that “under the law, Federico, being the
 surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership.”
 Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate:
o “SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
 To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
 If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
 If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.”
 However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant
facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the
selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.In the
main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a
joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s,
Cristina’s, estate.
 Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs,
including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo,
but who was adopted by Federico, and the 2 siblings of respondent Isabel,
Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative
heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which
forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one
direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
 Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the
successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent,
does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary.
Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the
decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and
trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent’s
husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters of
administration.
 We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the
law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code,
beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
o “In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of
that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and
mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own
Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and
998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to
pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that
while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from
representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the
illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we
shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue
enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must
be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles
995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis-à-vis illegitimate children.”
 Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
o “The law of intestacy is founded on the presumed will of the deceased
Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads
sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants,
and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to
those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would
have done so had he manifested his last will. Lastly, in default of anyone
called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or
affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be
given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the
welfare of humanity.”
 Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not
distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of
this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
 Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from
making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of
the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on
who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be
settled.
 Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
o “The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although
the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the
deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the
proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate
which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.”
 Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:
 o “Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
 No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.”
Dispositive Portion
Petition Granted. Letters of Administration granted to both the respondent and petitioner