III.

COMMON CARRIER OF PASSENGERS

Nature of Responsibility

Isaac v. A.L. Ammen,- Nalla

G.R. No. L-9671, Aug. 23, 1957

Facts:
On May 31, 1951, Cesar Isaac, herein appellant boarded Bus no. 31 of A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., going to Pili
Camarines Sur. But before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a pick-up type vehicle coming from the opposite
direction. Due to the collision, plaintiff'-appelant’s left arm was completely severed and the severed portion fell inside the
bus. Plaintiff was immediately rushed to the hospital and underwent surgical operation. Defendant paid all the medical
expenses of the plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action against defendants for damages alleging that the collision which
resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and recklessness of the bus driver, thus
defendant incurred culpa contractual arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff safely to his
destination.

As their defense, defendant argued that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was due entirely to the fault or negligence of
the driver of the pick-up and of the plaintiff himself. Further, the collision was an accident defendant could not foresee, or,
though foreseen, was inevitable. The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that the collision occurred due to the
negligence of the driver of the pick-up and, even when the bus driver exerted effort to avoid it, the same cannot be avoided.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:
WON herein defendant is liable.

Held:
No. Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 govern in so far as the relation between a common carrier and its passenger is concerned.
From those legal provisions, the Court made the following restatement of the principles governing the liability of a common
carrier: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is breach if it fails to exert
extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at
fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercise d
extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.

The Court ruled that, while the position taken by appellant appeals more to the sense of caution that one should observe
in a given situation to avoid an accident or mishap, such however cannot always be expected from one who was placed
suddenly in a predicament where he was not given enough time to take the course of action as he should under ordinary
circumstances. One who is placed in such a predicament cannot exercise such coolness or accuracy of judgment as is
required of him under ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected to observe the same judgment, care
and precaution as in the latter. For this reason, authorities abound where failure to observe the same degree of care that
as ordinary prudent man would exercise under ordinary circumstances when confronted with a sadden emergency was held
to be warranted and a justification to exempt the carrier from liability. Thus, it was held that "where a carrier's employee
is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must
be taken into account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be required to exercise in the
absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like
circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best judgement the case renders possible does
not establish lack of care and skill on his part which renders the company, liable. Considering all the circumstances, we are
persuaded to conclude that the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and
in our opinion this relieves appellee from legibility under our law.

Note: evidence showed that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left
arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took
place. It is for this reason that the collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing
him a great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is guilty of contributory negligence.
LA MALLORCA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL.- Pelaez
G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
BARRERA, J.

Facts:
Mariano Beltran, together with his wife and three daughters, Milagros, Raquel and Fe, boarded the Pambusco bus owned
by La Mallorca. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in
accordance with La Mallorca’s rules and regulations. The bus reached Anao where Mariano and his family get off. He led
his family to a shaded spot on the side of the road about four or five meters away and returned to the bus in to get his
other bayong, but his daughter Raquel followed him unnoticed.

While Mariano was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong, the bus, whose
motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward to resume its trip despite the fact that the
conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left
behind by Mariano. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters
from the point where Mariano and his family had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano immediately jumped from the running board without getting his bayong
from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and
children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground,
her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in
which she rode earlier together with her parents.

The trial court found La Mallorca liable for breach of contract of carriage. On appeal, La Mallorca claimed that there could
not be a breach of contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger
of the bus involved in the incident and, therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the CA sustained
this theory, it nevertheless found the La Mallorca guilty of quasi-delict.

Issue:
Whether or not La Mallorca is responsible for the death of Racquel despite the fact that the child was no longer a passenger
of the bus when she died.

Held:
Yes. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger
alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable
time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.

In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions
person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to
transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the
engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter
was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers
near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to
the protection under their contract of carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, La Mallorca can be held liable for the
negligence of its driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Antonia Maranan vs. Pascual Perez- Plaza
GR no. L-22272, June 26, 1967

Facts:

(1) Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez was stabbed and killed by
the driver Simeon Valenzuela. Simeon Valenzuela was found guilty of the crime homicide in a criminal case by the
trial court.

(2) On the other hand, Antonia Maranan, the mother of Rogelio Corachea instituted a civil case for damages on the
ground of breach of contract of carriage against Pascual Maranan.

(3) Pascual Maranan denied absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers citing the case of Gillaco
vs. Manila Railroad Co. 97 Phil. 884, wherein the Court ruled on the non-liability of the common carrier.

Issue:
W/N Pascual Perez, taxicab owner and operator should be responsible for damages which the passenger incurred?

Held:
YES. The SC ruled that the Civil Code provision on common carrier’s responsibility rest either: (1) the doctrine of respondeat
superior or (2) the principle that it is an implied duty to transport the passengers safely, the second view is the one which
is upheld by the majority and also by the later cases. Likewise the second view poses three cogent reasons such as the
following:

(1) The special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by
the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed law , from violence and insults at the hands of the strangers and other
passengers but above all from the acts of the carrier’s own servants charged with the passenger’s safety;
(2) Said liability of the carrier for servant’s violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the
servant’s hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of
protecting the passenger with utmost care prescribed by law;
(3) As between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier’s
employees against passenger, since it is and not the passenger has power to select and remove them.

In other words it is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier’s
orders. The carrier’s liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed
by its own employees.
G.R. No. L-28256 March 17, 1982
SEVERO DEL CASTILLO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO JAYMALIN MANUEL SABIT and BITRANCO and A. L. AMMEN TRANS. CO., INC., defendants-
appellees. - Caballero

Facts:
Mario del Castillo, a deaf-mute, son of Severo del Castillo, and a paying passenger of Bicol Transportation Company
(Bitranco), operated by A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. (ALATCO), fell upon alighting from Bus No. 624 of said
companies and died as a result. An action for the recovery of damages for Mario's death was filed by Severo, against the
driver and conductor of the bus, and the transportation companies. The transportation companies traversed the complaint
by stating that the passenger bus involved was owned by Bicol Transportation Co. alone; that the two companies had
always exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees; and that the proximate cause of Mario's
death was his recklessness and gross negligence in jumping out of the bus while in motion.

Issue:
WON Bitranco and ALATCO are liable for damages for the death of Mario.

Ruling:
Yes. They are jointly and severally liable for damages. Common carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers
(Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). This liability includes the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. It appears
proven that the defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was their duty to observe according to Articles
1733 and 1755. The conductor was apprised of the fact that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. With this knowledge
the conductor should have taken extra-ordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. In this he failed.
Vasquez v. CA - Camasura
G.R. No. L-42926, September 13, 1985

Facts:
When the interisland vessel MV ‘Pioneer Cebu’ left the Port of Manila in the early morning of 15 May 1966 bound for Cebu,
it had on board the spouses Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo and a 4-year old boy, Mario Marlon Vasquez, among her
passengers. The MV ‘Pioneer Cebu’ encountered typhoon ‘Klaring’ and struck a reef on the southern part of Malapascua
Island, located somewhere north of the island of Cebu and subsequently sunk. Said passengers were unheard from since
then.

Pedro Vasquez and Soledad Ortega are the parents of Alfonso Vasquez. Cleto Bagaipo and Agustina Virtudes are the parents
of Filipinas Bagaipo. Romeo Vasquez and Maximina Cainay are the parents Mario Marlon Vasquez. Due to the loss of their
children, they sued for damages before the CFI of Manila (Civil Case 67139). Filipinas Pioneer Lines Inc. defended on the
plea of force majeure, and the extinction of its liability by the actual total loss of the vessel. After proper proceedings, the
trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment and absolved Filipinas Pioneer from any and all liability.
Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
WON the crew failed to observe extraordinary diligence.

Held:
Yes. While the typhoon was an inevitable occurrence, yet, having been kept posted on the course of the typhoon by weather
bulletins at intervals of 6 hours, the captain and crew were well aware of the risk they were taking as they hopped from
island to island from Romblon up to Tanguingui. They held frequent conferences, and oblivious of the utmost diligence
required of very cautious persons, they decided to take a calculated risk. In so doing, they failed to observe that
extraordinary diligence required of them explicitly by law for the safety of the passengers transported by them with due
regard for all circumstances and unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to the tragic mishap. They failed to
overcome that presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases of death or injuries to passengers.

Construction of “moot and academic” ruling of the Board of Marine Inquiry; Court disagreeswith Board’s
conclusion
While the Board of Marine Inquiry, which investigated the disaster, exonerated the captain from any negligence, it was
because it had considered the question of negligence as “moot and academic,” the captain having “lived up to the true
tradition of the profession.” While the Court is bound by the Board’s factual findings, the Court disagreed with its conclusion
since it obviously had not taken into account the legal responsibility of a common carrier towards the safety of the
passengers involved.

Contention on limited liability rule as per Yangco vs. Laserna

With respect to the submission that the total loss of the vessel extinguished its liability pursuant to Article 587 of the Code
of Commerce as construed in Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330 [1941], suffice it to state that even in said case, it was held
that the liability of a shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon. Despite the total loss of the
vessel therefore, its insurance answers for the damages that a shipowner or agent may be held liable for by reason of the
death of its passengers.

Requisites for caso fortuito

To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event must be
independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and that (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.” In
the language of the law, the event must have been impossible to foresee, or if it could be foreseen, must have been
impossible to avoid. There must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.
Calalas v. CA - Ceballos
G.R. No. 122039 31-May-00

Facts:
Sunga was riding a jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. She was seating on an “extension seat,” which is a wooden
plank. The jeepney stopped 2 meters from the shoulder of the highway because a passenger was to alight. Sunga alighted
the jeepney in order for the other passenger to alight. During the unloading of the passenger, an Isuzu truck, owned by
Salva and driven by Verena, hit the left rear portion of the jeepney which injured Sunga. Sunga filed an action for breach
of contract and recovery of damages as she stopped pursuing her course in Physical Education due to the defect in her left
leg. The RTC ruled that Salva, the owner of the Izusu Truck, was liable for damages as it was the proximate cause of the
incident. The RTC also took conizance of a civil case filed by Calalas against Salva wherein Salva was held liable for the
damages to Calalas’ jeep. The CA reversed the decision, finding Calalas liable for breach of contract of carriage.

Issue:
WON Calalas’ was liable to Sunga.

Held:
Yes, since he was not able to disprove the presumption of being negligent.

The Court held that Sunga’s cause of action was the breach of contract of carriage. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code creates a
contract between the common carrier and the passenger wherein it is the obligation of the common carrier to transport the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due respect for all the circumstance. Whenever death or injury to passengers arises, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code creates a
presumption that the common carriers are negligent and failed to observe extraordinary diligence. The presumption arises
upon the happening of the accident and it became a duty of Calalas to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in
the care of his passengers. It was proved that the jeepney driver was negligent because the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about2 meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of
the highway in a diagonal angle, a clear violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.

The contention of Calalas that it was a fortuitous event is untenable, as above stated, the jeepney was not parked properly,
thus the jeepney driver contributed to the happening of the accident
Presumption of Negligence
Bachelor Express v. CA G.R. No. 85691 23-Jul-90- Clark

Facts:
A bus owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the
death of passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
The bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City; that while in Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger;
that about 15 minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and
panic among the passengers; that when the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found
lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries
which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by
the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents filed a complaint for "sum
of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera.
Petitioner alleged that the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their respective places of destination except
Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the bus without the knowledge and consent.

The trial court dismissed the complaint which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners asseverate that they were not negligent in the performance of their duties and that the incident was completely
and absolutely attributable to a third person, the passenger who ran amuck, for without his criminal act, Beter and Rautraut
could not have been subjected to fear and shock which compelled them to jump off the running bus. They argue that they
should not be made liable for damages arising from acts of third persons over whom they have no control or supervision. .
In effect, the petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law, states that the vehicular
incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which
the common carrier did not have any control.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable for negligence?

Held:
YES. The liability of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage. Ornominio Beter and
Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus,
suffered injuries which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor
Express, Inc. is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in
accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic
among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling
off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed
another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure.

A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence,
or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible
to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the
obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor or of
his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the
accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries
resulting from such accident.
The bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop;
the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked
and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in
accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found
in the law governing common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure
of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the
failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as
warranted by law.
Breach of Contract of Carriage
Singson v. CA
G.R. No. 119995 18-Nov-97- Dalisay

Facts:
On 26 August 1988 SINGSON commenced an action for damages against CATHAY before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur due to unbooked flight from San Franciso to Los Angeles upon the premise of detached flight coupon no. 5 from
San Francisco to Hongkong. CATHAY denied these allegations and averred that since petitioner was holding an "open-
dated" ticket, which meant that he was not booked on a specific flight on a particular date, there was no contract of carriage
yet existing such that CATHAY's refusal to immediately book him could not be construed as breach of contract of carriage.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty of gross negligence. On
appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding that there was gross negligence amounting to
bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages, and
the attorney's fees as well.

Issue:
Whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner.

Held:
CATHAY undoubtedly committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm petitioner's flight reservation back to the
Philippines on account of his missing flight coupon. The round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself
a complete written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It has all the elements of a complete written
contract, to wit:

The contract of carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to
transport the passenger to his destination. Only the performance of the other half of the contract — which was to transport
the passenger back to the Philippines was left to be done.

First, The ticket coupon corresponding to the San Francisco-Hongkong flight was missing either due to the negligence of
CATHAY's agents in improperly detaching petitioner's flight coupons or failing to issue the flight coupon for San Francisco-
Hongkong in the ticket booklet;

Second, petitioner and his cousin presented their respective ticket booklets bearing identical itineraries to prove that there
had been a mistake in removing the coupons of petitioner.

Third, petitioner was directed by CATHAY to go to its San Francisco office and make the necessary verification concerning
the lost coupon himself
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD. vs.
SPOUSES DANIEL VAZQUEZ and MARIA LUISA MADRIGAL VAZQUEZ
G.R. No. 150843, March 14, 2003- Lozada

Facts:
Spouses Vasquez were booked on a business class on Cathay Pacific Airways (Cathay) for their flight from Hongkong to
Manila. They are frequent flyers and thus were given a membership in Cathay’s Marco Polo Club, where members enjoy
several privileges, such as priority for upgrading of booking without any extra charge whenever an opportunity arises.

When boarding time was announced for their flight to Manila, Ms. Chiu of Cathay informed spouses Vasquez that their
accommodations were upgraded from business class to first class at no extra cost. Spouses Vasquez refused since they
want to be with their companions who are seated in the Business Class since they were going to discuss business matters
during the flight. Ms. Chiu told them that if they would not avail themselves of the privilege, they would not be allowed to
take the flight.

Upon reaching Manila, spouses Vasquez instituted an action for damages against Cathay.

Issue:
Is an involuntary upgrading of an airline passenger’s accommodation from one class to a more superior class at no extra
cost a breach of contract of carriage that would entitle the passenger to an award of damages?

Held:
YES. Undoubtedly, a contract of carriage existed between Cathay and the Vazquezes. They voluntarily and freely gave
their consent to an agreement whose object was the transportation of the Vazquezes from Manila to Hong Kong and back
to Manila, with seats in the Business Class Section of the aircraft, and whose cause or consideration was the fare paid by
the Vazquezes to Cathay.

There was a breach of contract not because Cathay overbooked the Business Class Section of the Flight but because the
latter pushed through with the upgrading despite the objections of the Vazquezes.

It turned out that the Business Class was overbooked in that there were more passengers than the number of seats. Thus,
the seat assignments of the Vazquezes were given to waitlisted passengers, and the Vazquezes were upgraded from
Business Class to First Class.

But, just like other privileges, such priority could be waived. The Vazquezes should have been consulted first whether they
wanted to avail themselves of the privilege or would consent to a change of seat accommodation before their seat
assignments were given to other passengers. Normally, one would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for it would mean
a better accommodation. But, whatever their reason was and however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had every right to
decline the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they had booked for and which was designated in
their boarding passes. They clearly waived their priority or preference when they asked that other passengers be given the
upgrade. It should not have been imposed on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay
breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes.
G.R. No. 142305 December 10, 2003
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED vs Andion Fernandez - Lucas
(Topic: Breach of Contract of Carriage/ Fortuitous Event as a Defense)

Facts:
Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano here in the Philippines and abroad. At the time of the incident, she was availing
an educational grant from the Federal Republic of Germany, pursuing a Master’s Degree in Music majoring in Voice. She
was invited to sing before the King and Queen of Malaysia on February 3 and 4, 1991. For this singing
engagement, an airline passage ticket was purchased from petitioner Singapore Airlines which would transport her to Manila
from Frankfurt, Germany on January 28, 1991. From Manila, she would proceed to Malaysia on the next day.It was
necessary for the respondent to pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe and to rehearse with her pianist for the
performance.
The ticket: Frankfurt Germany to Singapore – departure 1:45pm at 01/27/1991, arrival 8:50am the next day.Singapore to
Manila – departure 11am at 1/28/1991, arrival at 2:20pm same day.
However, her flight arrival to Singapore from Frankfurt is at 11 am, hence she, with 25 more passengers, were not able to
catch the 11am flight (SG to Manila). She was told by the lady upon approaching the latter, that there were no more flights
available except HK to MNL which will require her to pay, otherwise, she has to stay at SG. She managed to contact her
mother and her family in friends in SG for her stay.
The next day, she approached the counter with label "Immediate Attention To Passengers with Immediate Booking." There
were around 4-5 passengers at the counter, she approached the male employee and the latter said to her "Can’t you see I
am doing something." She explained her situation to him who replied "It’s your problem, not ours." She never made it to
Manila and was forced to take a direct flight from Singapore to Malaysia, through the efforts of her mother and the travel
agency, which the former even went to Malaysia to bring her wardrobe, incurring 50k pesos expenses. Her performance
was below par due to her bad experience in SG. She suffered anxiety, embarrassment, fear, humiliation and even developed
acute urticarial. She filed an action against SG Air (no mention unsa na action), RTC ruled in her favour, awarding 50k
actual damages, 250k moral, 100k-exemplary. CA – affirmed. Hence this petition.

Petitioner in defense alleged fortuituous event, that t he delay was due to the Inclement weather prevented the petitioner’s
plane coming from Copenhagen, .The plane could not take off from the airport as the place was shrouded with fog. This
delay caused a "snowball effect" whereby the other flights were consequently delayed. The plane carrying the respondent
arrived in Singapore two (2) hours behind schedule.

Issue:
1. WON SG Air violated Contract of Carriage?
2. WON SG Air failed to observe extraordinary care?
3. WON SG Air acted in Bad faith?
4. WON SG Air is not liable as the delay was due to fortuitous event? No.
Held: (Issue 1-3) All yes.
1. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage
arises. In an action for breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier
was at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-
performance by the carrier. Since SG Air did not transport her on the specified terms on the ticket, it clearly breached
contract of carriage.
2. SG Air was not without recourse to enable it to fulfill its obligation to transport the respondent safely as scheduled as far
as human care and foresight can provide to her destination. A witness names Bob Khkimyong said that she must have been
transferred to another airline such as Lufthansa to bring her from Frankfurt to SG to be able to catch the Manila flight.
Petitioner and 25 more passengers must have been inquired if they are amenable to stay overnight in SG or take another
flight in Manila.

3. Yes. Bad faith means a breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. Self-enrichment or fraternal
interest, and not personal ill will, may well have been the motive; but it is malice nevertheless. Their act of not letting her
use company’s phone to make calls to Manila and the rude attitude of employees manifest bad faith on the part of SG Air.

4. No. Tagged as a premiere airline as it claims to be and with the complexities of air travel, it was certainly well-
equipped to be able to foresee and deal with such situation.
Japan Airlines (JAL) vs. Michael Asuncion and Jeanette Asuncion (Asuncions)- Misterio
G.R. No. 161730, January 28, 2005

Facts:
Respondents Asuncions left Manila onboard the Japan Airlines bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stopover in
Narita and an overnight stay in Hotel Nikko Narita. Upon arrival in Narita, an employee of JAL endorsed their applications
for a shore pass and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is required of a foreigner aboard a
vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port of call for not more than 72 hours. However, due to
some inconsistencies, they were denied a shore pass by the Japanese Immigration, and were brought instead to the Narita
Airport Rest House where they stayed overnight (instead of Hotel Nikko).

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against JAL claiming a breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner denied the
allegation averring that the refusal of the Japanese immigration to issue a shore pass is an act of state which JAL cannot
interfere. Consequently, it cannot impose upon the immigration authorities that respondents be billeted at Hotel Nikko
instead of the airport resthouse.

Issue:
Whether or not JAL is guilty of breach of contract.

Held:
No. The Court ruled that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the duty
to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty does not extend to checking
the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness
of the entries therein. The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered
with even by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein respondents. As
such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of respondents’ shore pass applications.

NOTE:
When does a contract of carriage arises?

When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage
arises and the passenger has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date and it becomes
the carrier’s obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination.
Northwest v. Chiong,
G.R. No. 155550, Jan 31, 2008- Nalla

Facts:
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent of
TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOcean’s vessel M/V Elbia at
the San Diego, California Port. For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San Diego,
California with a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. Three (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure.
Marilyn Calvo, Philimare’s Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiong’s seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiong’s passport was duly
stamped, after complying with government requirements for departing seafarers. Chiong then proceeded to Northwest
check-in counter. But one Northwest personnel informed him that his name did not appear in the computer’s list of confirmed
departing passengers. He was directed to speak to a “man in barong” standing outside the check-in counter but said man
demanded US$100.00 in exchange of a boarding pass. Without said amount, Chiong was not allowed to board thus was
unable to work by April 1, 1989. It was discovered that Chiong’s name was crossed out and substituted with “W. Costine”
in Northwest Air Passenger. Hence, Chiong filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled in favor of
Chiong, which was affirmed by the CA in toto.

Issue:
WON lower courts erred in finding Northwest liable for breach of contract of carriage.

Held:
No.The Court was in complete accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that Northwest breached the contract of
carriage with Chiong, and as such, he is entitled to compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and costs of suit. Although initially, the burden of proof was with Chiong to prove that there was a breach of contract of
carriage, the burden of evidence shifted to Northwest when Chiong adduced sufficient evidence to prove the facts he had
alleged. At that point, Northwest had the burden of going forward to controvert Chiong’s prima facie case. As the party
asserting that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, Northwest then had the burden of evidence to establish its claim.
Regrettably, Northwest failed to do so.
Clearly, the categorical declaration of Chiong and his other witnesses, coupled with the PCG stamp on his passport and
seaman service record book, prevails over Northwest’s evidence, particularly the Flight Manifest. For its failure to support
competent evidence, the ineluctable conclusion was that Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong.
A contract of carriage, in this case, air transport, is primarily intended to serve the traveling public and thus, imbued with
public interest. The law governing common carriers consequently imposes an exacting standard of conduct. As the aggrieved
party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by Northwest, as carrier,
in order to be awarded compensatory and actual damages. Moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees were also
awarded.
JAPAN AIRLINES vs. JESUS SIMANGAN- Pelaez
G.R. No. 170141; April 22, 2008

Facts:
Jesus Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto Simangan, in UCLA School of Medicine in Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. After having obtained an emergency U.S. visa, Simangan purchased a round trip plane ticket
from Japan Airlines (JAL) and was issued the corresponding boarding pass. His plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority
and personal articles were subjected to rigid immigration and security procedure. After passing through said immigration
and security procedure, he was allowed by JAL to enter its airplane to fly to Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan.

While inside the airplane, JAL's airline crew suspected Simangan of carrying a falsified travel document and imputed that
he would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan. The stewardess asked Simangan to
show his travel documents. Shortly after, the stewardess along with a Japanese and a Filipino haughtily ordered him to
stand up and leave the plane. Simangan went to JAL's ground office and waited there for three hours. Meanwhile, the plane
took off and he was left behind. Afterwards, he was informed that his travel documents were, indeed, in order.

Displeased by the turn of events, Simangan filed an action for damages against JAL. JAL justifies its action by arguing that
there was "a need to verify the authenticity of respondent's travel document." It alleged that no one from its airport staff
had encountered a parole visa before. It further contended that Simangan agreed to fly the next day so that it could first
verify his travel document, hence, there was novation. It maintained that it was not guilty of breach of contract of carriage
as Simangan was not able to travel to the United States due to his own voluntary desistance.

Issue:
Whether or not JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage.

Held:
Yes. The Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight on a certain date, a
contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If
he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage.

Apart from the fact that respondent's plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles already passed the
rigid immigration and security routines, JAL, as a common carrier, ought to know the kind of valid travel documents
respondent carried. As provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances." Thus, We find untenable JAL's defense of "verification of respondent's documents" in its
breach of contract of carriage.

It bears repeating that the power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered
with even by JAL.

In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such contract and
its non-performance by the carrier through the latter's failure to carry the passenger safely to his destination. Respondent
has complied with these twin requisites.
Northwest Airlines Inc. vs. Spouses Edward Heshan and Nelia Heshan and Dara Ganessa Heshan
GR no. 179117, February 3, 2010- Plaza

Facts:

(1) Edward Heshan purchased 3 roundtrip tickets from Northwest Airlines Inc. for him, his wife and daughter for
their trip from Manila to St. Louis, Missouri, USA and back to attend an ice skating competition where his
daughter was to participate.

(2) On their way back to Manila with connecting flight from St. Louis to Los Angeles, they arrived at the airport 3
hours before the flight and had their luggage checked in, when its turn to present the ticket, the customer
service agent told them to step aside and wait to be called again.

(3) They were able to board the plane without the boarding pass but learned that there is only one seat available
and they were asked to occupy the folding seat intended for the crew. Upset with the situation, they
disembarked and later endorsed to and carried by Trans World Airways to Los Angeles.

(4) The Spouses Heshans filed and action against Northwest Airlines for breach of contract of carriage.

Issue:
W/N Northwest Airlines Inc. breached the contract of carriage?

Held:
YES. The Court held that when an airline issues ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a
contract of carriage arises. The passenger then has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that
date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of carriage.

It is shown from the facts that Heshans’ flight was confirmed on that date and on flight 972 but upon boarding Northwest
Airline it was turned out that only one seat left for the 3 of them which forced them to disembark and take another flight.
Heshan had confirmed reservation for the said flight and such they were entitled of the right under the contract to be
accommodated in the flight, regardless of whether they had selected their seats in advance or not. In fact they arrived at
the airport early to make sure of their seating together. Under the circumstances an award of moral damages should be
granted in their favor.
Fortuitous Event as a Defense
G.R. No. L-19495 February 2, 1924
HONORIO LASAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellant.-Caballero

Facts:
Smith was the owner of a public garage and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from the one point to
another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. He undertook to convey Lasam, Et. al. from San
Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by a
licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur allowed his assistant, Remigio Bueno, to
drive the car. Bueno held no driver's license, but had some experience in driving, and with the exception of some slight
engine trouble while passing through the town of Luna, the car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River
when defects developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance
of about half a kilometer, the car left the road and went down a steep embankment. In going over the bank of the road,
the automobile was overturned and Lasam, et al. were pinned down under it. Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions
and a "dislocated" rib , but his wife, Joaquina Sanchez, received serious injuries, among which was a compound fracture of
one of the bones in her left wrist. She also appears to have suffered a nervous breakdown from which she had not fully
recovered at the time of the trial.

Issue:
WON the breach of the contract of carriage was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore, the defendant was liable
in damages.

Held:
Yes. It is not a fortuitous event, therefore Smith is not excused from his liability. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source
of Smith’s legal liability is the contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry Lasam, et
al. safely and securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the
failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: No one
shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the
cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability.

Caso fortuito was defined as an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen, such as floods,
torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, insurrections, destructions, destruction of buildings by unforseen
accidents and other occurrences of a similar nature. In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia
Juridica Española says: "In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the
following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must
be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor."

As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of
his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once apparent that this
element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions
which could not have been foreseen. As far as the records shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the
automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito. In this case, the passengers had no
means of avoiding the danger or escaping the injury.
Necesito v. Paras
G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958- Camasura

Facts:
A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering a wooden bridge,
its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a breast-deep creek. The mother drowned
and the son sustained injuries. These cases involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son and
the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.

Issue:
Whether or not the knuckle’s failure can be considered a fortuitous event.

Held:
No. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence
of its driver. That is not caso fortuito.

The SC found that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure
up to the “utmost diligence of a very cautious person” as “far as human care and foresight can provide” and therefore the
knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.

Note:
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered
in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The
rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective
equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has.
Yobido v. CA
G.R. No. 286921 17-Oct-97- Ceballos

Facts:
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children, Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy,
Surigao del Sur, a Yobido bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left front
tire of the bus suddenly exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree which
resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers. Thereafter, a complaint for breach of
contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees was filed by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of
the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified that 1. the 42-seater bus was not full as
there were only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat;
2. the bus was running at a speed of "60 to 50" and that it was going slow because of the zigzag road.
3. the left front tire that exploded was a "brand new tire" that he mounted on the bus on April 21, 1988 or only five (5)
days before the incident. The Trial Court dismissed the action for lack of merit, but the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
reversing that of the lower court

Issue:
Whether the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event.

Held:
No. A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations must
be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or
loss.
There is no reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners' contention that they are
exempted from liability because the tire blowout was a fortuitous event that could not have been foreseen, must fail. It is
settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso
fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. Accordingly, the challenged decision is affirmed subject
to modification that petitioners shall additionally pay herein, respondents P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation.
The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly
mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for
quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days' use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an
accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would
exempt the carrier from liability for damages.

It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary measures considering partially dangerous
condition of the road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that it was
not negligent. Petitioners should have shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier such as
conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicle's parts. As the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It may be impracticable,
as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each and every part of its vehicles before each trip, but we
are of the opinion that a due regard for the carrier's obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical
tests to determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safety of the
passengers."

It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor, Salce, that the bus was running at "60-50"
kilometers per hour only within the prescribed lawful speed limit. However, they failed to rebut the testimony of Leny
Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down. These contradictory facts must,
therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the presumption of negligence of the carrier in the law.
FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., G.R. No. L-55300, March 15,1990- Clark

Facts:
City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal among others were then passengers of a Philippine airline flight from Davao bound for
Manila which was hijacked by members of the MNLF. After a battle between the military and the hijackers, the surviving
passengers and crew were ultimately liberated but not without casualty and injuries. Hence, the filing of various civil cases
for damages. The RTC however dismissed the complaints finding that all the damages sustained in the premises were
attributed to force majeure.

Issue:
WON hijacking or air piracy during martial law and under the circumstances, is a caso fortuito or force majeure which
would exempt an aircraft from payment of damages to its passengers.

Held:
Yes. The special circumstances in this case would make the hijacking a force majeure which would exonerate
PAL from payment of damages to its passengers. Although under the civil code, whenever a passenger dies or is injured,
the common carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently and it is upon the common carrier
to overcome such presumption of negligence. In cases like this, the carrier must show that he had observed the
required extraordinary diligence or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. Caso fortuito or force majeure,
by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated,
as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening
is not impossibility to foresee the same (Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, 21 SCRA 279 [1967]).

In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a person from liability under Article 1174
of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following elements must
concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debto r
or the obligor);
(b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

In the case at bar:

1. the failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged by
members of the MNLF who were not in any way connected to PAL, hence, independent of the will of PAL. (First
Element)

2. Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident which could have been avoided had there
been a more thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of baggages. But they were not in the position to avoid the
same because when the incident in question occurred (during Martial Law), there was already a military take-over of airport
security and it was the AFP and not PAL who were in charge in the frisking of passengers and the inspection
of the baggages. (Second Element)

3. The military take over during martial law ultimately rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations in a
normal manner (Third Element) and 4.)obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the performance of duty taken
over by the AFP to the exclusion of the former (Fourth Element).

The existence of force majeure having been established, PAL in this case is exempted from payment of
damages. It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence (Philippine National
Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it must be shown that the carrier had observed the
required extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide or
that the accident was caused by a fortuitous. Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be responsible for
those "events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable.
Pilapil v. CA
G.R. No. 85691 22-Dec-89- Dalisay

Facts:
Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's bus bearing N o. 409 at San
Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M. While said bus No. 409 was in due course negotiating the
distance between Iriga City and Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone
at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye resulting to its impairment. Thereupon, petitioner instituted
before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I an action for recovery of damages sustained as a result of
the stone-throwing incident. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner Jose Pilapil. Upon appeal by the defendant before
the CA it reversed the lower courts decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Alatco transportation Co. is not liable for the damages.

Held:
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a
common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely
undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.

Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passenger transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. While the law requires the highest degree
of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against
them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

Petitioner contends that respondent common carrier failed to rebut the presumption of negligence against it by proof on its
part that it exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers.

First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable presumption. It gives
in where contrary facts are established proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law
or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.

Second, while as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of their
passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined when intervening acts of
strangers is to be determined directly cause the injury, while the contract of carriage Article 1763 governs.

The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to
prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them.
Japan Airlines vs. CA, Enrique Agana et.al – Lozada/Plaza
GR no. 118664, August 7, 1998
TOPIC: FOUTUITOUS EVENT as a DEFENSE/DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

Facts:
(1) Private respondents boarded Japan Airlines (JAL) flight in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. As an
incentive for traveling on the said airline, the flights were to make overnight stopover at Narita, Japan at the
airlines expense.

(2) On the following day when due for Manila, Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines erupted, ashfall blanketed Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering inaccessible to airline traffic, JAL booked the flight private
respondents on the next following days. Consequently JAL paid for hotel expenses for their unexpected
overnight stay.

(3) However NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22,1991, the private respondents were forced to
stay in Narita until June 22, 1991 and by these times they paid for their accommodation and meal expenses

(4) Private respondents instituted an action for damages against JAL asserting that JAL failed to live up to its duty
to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers, in other words JAL is obligated to shoulder their
expenses until such time they arrived in their destination.

(5) On one hand JAL averred that airline passwnger have no vested right to these amenities in a case a flight is
cancelled due to “force majeure”

Issue:
W/N JAL has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached
their final destination even if delay were caused by force majeure?

Held:
The Court consistently ruled that a contract to transport passengers is a relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on
the part of the common carrier to live up the exacting standard of care and diligence renders it liable for damages that may
be sustained by the passengers. However this is not an absolute rule because the law expressly provides exemption from
liability particularly in the event caused by force majeure unless it is accompanied by negligence of the common carrier.

Here the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevents the flight of JAL on the schedule date such occurrence is considered force majeure.
JAL has not committed negligence hence it is not responsible for the accommodation of the private respondents during
those times they were stranded.

However, JAL is liable for nominal damages considering that the relation of common carrier and passengers continues until
the latter has been landed at the ports of destination and has left the carrier’s premises. Sadly JAL declassified private
respondents from “transit passenger” to a “new passenger” as a result of which they are obligated to make necessary
arrangements for the next flight to Manila forcing them to stay at the airport waiting for available seats.
Duration of Responsibility

Salud Villanueva VDA. De Bataclan, et al. vs. Mariano Medina

G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957- Misterio

Facts:
A bus of the Medina Transportation, operated by respondent Medina left Cavite to Pasay City. Among the passengers was
Juan Bataclan and his children. While in transit, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zigzag and fell into the
right side of the road. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus while the three passengers including Bataclan,
could not get out of the overturned bus. A group of men, one bringing a lighted torch with him, came to rescue the trapped
passengers. However, upon approaching, a fierce fire started, immediately consumed the bus, and killed Juan Bataclan and
the other passengers trapped.

By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva filed a claim for damages against the respondent.

Issue:
Is respondent Medina guilty of breach of contract of transportation? If yes, as to what degree?

Held:
Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his
agent, the driver. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was over speeding, as testified to by
one of the passengers.

Now, in determining the degree of responsibility of the respondent, the proximate cause for the death of Juan Bataclan and
the other passengers, must first be ascertained. As held in this case, the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the
overturning of the vehicle thru the negligence of respondent and his agent. Were it not for the negligence of the two (for
failing to inspect and change the worn-out tires), the incident could have been prevented. Further, the burning of the bus
wherein some of the passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through the driver
and conductor who were on the road walking back and forth. The failure of the driver and the conductor to have cautioned
or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, constitutes negligence on the part of
the agents of the carrier under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly, Article 1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.

NOTE:
The PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom
LA MALLORCA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL.- Nalla
G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
BARRERA, J.

Facts:
Mariano Beltran, together with his wife and three daughters, Milagros, Raquel and Fe, boarded the Pambusco bus owned
by La Mallorca. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in
accordance with La Mallorca’s rules and regulations. The bus reached Anao where Mariano and his family get off. He led
his family to a shaded spot on the side of the road about four or five meters away and returned to the bus in to get his
other bayong, but his daughter Raquel followed him unnoticed.

While Mariano was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong, the bus, whose
motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward to resume its trip despite the fact that the
conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left
behind by Mariano. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters
from the point where Mariano and his family had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano immediately jumped from the running board without getting his bayong
from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and
children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground,
her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in
which she rode earlier together with her parents.

The trial court found La Mallorca liable for breach of contract of carriage. On appeal, La Mallorca claimed that there could
not be a breach of contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger
of the bus involved in the incident and, therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the CA sustained
this theory, it nevertheless found the La Mallorca guilty of quasi-delict.

Issue:
Whether or not La Mallorca is responsible for the death of Racquel despite the fact that the child was no longer a passenger
of the bus when she died.

Held:
Yes. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger
alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable
time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.

In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions
person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to
transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the
engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter
was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers
near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to
the protection under their contract of carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, La Mallorca can be held liable for the
negligence of its driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO ZAPATOS- Pelaez
G.R. No. L-82619; September 15, 1993

Facts:
Pedro Zapatos was among the 21 passengers of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz
City on 2 August 1975. The routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato. However, just about 15 minutes before landing,
the pilot received a radio message that the airport was closed due to heavy rains and inclement weather and that he should
proceed to Cotabato City instead.

Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options to return to Cebu on flight
560 of the same day and then to Ozamiz City on 4 August 1975, or take the next flight to Cebu the following day, or remain
at Cotabato and take the next available flight to Ozamiz City on 5 August 1975. The Agent likewise informed that only 6
seats were available for Flight 560 and the basis for priority would be the check-in sequence at Cebu. Zapatos chose to
return to Cebu but was not accommodated because he checked-in as passenger No. 9. He insisted on being given priority
but the Station Agent refused his demand since it was not due to PAL's own doing but to be a force majeure. Zapatos tried
to stop the departure of Flight 560 as his personal belongings were still on board but his plea fell on deaf ears. PAL then
issued to Zapatos a free ticket to Iligan city, which the latter received under protest. PAL neither provided Zapatos with
transportation from the airport to the city proper nor food and accommodation for his stay in Cotabato City. The following
day, Zapatos did not use the free ticket and instead purchased a PAL ticket to Iligan City where he hired a car from the
airport to Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, reaching Ozamiz City by crossing the bay in a launch. His personal effects were
no longer recovered.

Zapatos filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of carriage against PAL. PAL asserts that it should not be
charged with the task of looking after the passengers' comfort and convenience because the diversion of the flight was due
to a fortuitous event, and that if made liable, an added burden is given to PAL which is over and beyond its duties under
the contract of carriage. It submits that granting arguendo that negligence exists, it cannot be liable in damages in the
absence of fraud or bad faith; that Zapatos failed to apprise PAL of the nature of his trip and possible business losses; and,
that Zapatos himself is to be blamed for unreasonably refusing to use the free ticket which PAL issued.

Issue:
Whether or not PAL is still responsible to Zapatos despite the occurrence of a fortuitous event.

Held:
Yes. The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with public interest, the law requires common carriers to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In Air France v. Carrascoso, we held that —

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this,
because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation
attended with a public duty . . . . ( emphasis supplied).

The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard required by law.
Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence
did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in
the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again
must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence
in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final
destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim
rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.
Limitation of Liability

G.R. No. L-9907 June 30, 1958

LOURDES J. LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA, defendant-appellant.- Caballero

Facts:
Demetrio Lara, Sr. was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao. Brigido R. Valencia is engaged in the
business of exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession upon instructions of his
chief to classify the logs of Valencia which were about to be loaded on a ship. The work Lara of lasted for six days during
which he contracted malaria fever. Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao asked Valencia if he could take him in his
pick-up as there was then no other means of transportation, to which Valencia agreed, and in that same morning the pick-
up left Parang bound for Davao taking along six passengers, including Lara. Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as
a result he suffered serious injuries. Valencia stopped the pick-up to see what happened to Lara. He sought the help of the
residents of that place and applied water to Lara but to no avail. Lara died.

Issue:
WON Valencia failed to observe ordinary care or diligence in transporting the deceased from Parang to Davao.

Held:
No. There is nothing there to indicate that Valencia has acted with negligence or without taking the precaution that an
ordinary prudent man would have taken under similar circumstances. It should also be noted that defendant was not in
duty bound to take the deceased in his own pick-up to Davao because from Parang to Cotabato there was a line of
transportation that regularly makes trips for the public, and if Valencia agreed to take the deceased in his own car, it was
only to accommodate him considering his feverish condition and his request that he be so accommodated. It should also
be noted that the passengers who rode in the pick-up of Valencia took their respective seats therein at their own choice
and not upon indication of Valencia with the particularity that Valencia invited the deceased to sit with him in the front seat
but which invitation the deceased declined. The reason for this can only be attributed to his desire to be at the back so that
he could sit on a bag and travel in a reclining position because such was more convenient for him due to his feverish
condition. All the circumstances therefore clearly indicate that Valencia had done what a reasonable prudent man would
have done under the circumstances. There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due to an
unforeseen accident accused by the fact that at the time the deceased was half asleep and must have fallen from the pick-
up when it ran into some stones causing it to jerk considering that the road was then bumpy, rough and full of stones.

The finding of the RTC that the pick-up was running at more than 40 kilometers per hour is not supported by the evidence.
This is a mere surmise made by the RTC considering the time the pick-up left barrio Samoay and the time the accident
occured in relation to the distance covered by the pick-up. And even if this is correct, still we say that such speed is not
unreasonable considering that they were traveling on a national road and the traffic then was not heavy. We may rather
attribute the incident to lack of care on the part of the deceased considering that the pick-up was open and he was then in
a crouching position. Indeed, the law provides that "A passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid injury to himself" (Article 1761, new Civil Code), which means that if the injury to the passenger has been proximately
caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.
Bataclan v. Medina
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957- Camasura

Facts:
Shortly after midnight, Juan Bataclan (deceased) was on a bus owned by Medina Transportation (owned by: Mariano
Medina, defendant) travelling from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was speeding through and when
he applied the brakes (after the tires burst) it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some
passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan (deceased) and 3 others. The 4 stranded passengers
called for help. Help arrived soon thereafter and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the
conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire
ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires
of the bus were old.

The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus,
but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the
time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so
damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited
the gasoline so that the damages to be awarded is, not for the death, but for the physical injuries suffered by the victims.

Held:
No. The proximate cause in the case at bar was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available. The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its
conductor because none of them have cautioned or taken steps, with the circumstances present, to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Maranan v. Perez
G.R. No. L-22272 26-Jun-67- Ceballos

Facts:
Simeon Valenzuela, a taxi driver, stabbed and killed his passenger Rogelio. Perez was the owner and operator of the taxi.
Valenzuela was convicted of homicide. Maranan, mother of Rogelio, filed an action to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela. The lower court found Perez liable for damages but the claim against Villanueva was dismissed. Perez contends
that he can only be liable when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty, it is not sufficient that
the act be within the course of employment (respondeat superior).

Issue:
WON Perez is liable for the acts of his driver, Villanueva.

Held:
Yes, he is liable.

The SC held that under the New Civil Code, Art. 1759, it expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults
committed by its employees upon passengers. It is a principle that is upheld by the majority and later cases that the carrier’s
implied duty to transport the passenger safely, thus it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee’s
duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier’s orders.
The carrier’s liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.
Responsibility for Acts of Employees, Strangers and Co-passengers

CORNELIA A. DE GILLACO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY- Clark

G.R. No. L-8034 November 18, 1955

Facts:
Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company
from Calamba, Laguna to Manila. When the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the
MRR happened to be in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was
going to report for duty. Emilio had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas. Because of this, Emilio shot Tomas
with the carbine furnished to him by the MRR for his use as such train guard upon seeing him inside the train coach. Tomas
died. Emilio was convicted of homicide. A complaint for damages was filed by the victim’s widow. Damages were awarded
to the plaintiff, hence the instant petition. Appellant's contention is that, no liability attaches to it as employer of Emilio
because the crime was not committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service and
that no negligence on appellant's part was shown.

Issue:
Whether or not MRR could be held liable for the acts of its employee.

Held:
No. While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the
contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the
carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and
diligence required of it. In the present case, the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the
passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely
unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor
could it reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of
the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the
definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the
given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage
with the deceased was excused thereby.
Bataclan v. Medina
G.R. No. L-10126 22-Oct-57- Dalisay

Facts:
On September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under
a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
Conrado Saylon. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite,
one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or
pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end,
evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce
fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it.

By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the
present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of P87,150. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed
the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

Issue:
Whether the defendant is liable for the burning of the four passengers.

Held:
The defendant carrier is liable. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In the present case
under the circumstances obtaining in the same, the court did not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus. For the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.

The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark. The rescuers had to carry a light with
them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more
natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

According to the evidence, one of the passengers while hospitalized, overheard defendant Mariano Medina, speaking to one
of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already
old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires.

The record of the case before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified
in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be
pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses.
MARANAN vs. PEREZ, ET AL.- Lozada
G.R. No. L-22272 , June 26, 1967
TOPIC:
- Limitation of Liabilities
- Responsibility for Acts of Employees, Strangers, and Co-Passengers (Art. 1759)

Facts:
Rogelio Corachea, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by
the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Subsequently, the driver, Valenzuela, was prosecuted for homicide and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment.

Plaintiff appellant Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed the instant case to recover damages. Defendants Perez and
Valenzuela asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, and claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which
the carrier was not liable. Accordingly, the court a quo ordered carrier Perez to pay damages and ordered the dismissal for
the claim for damages against the driver, Valenzuela.

Issue:
Whether carrier Perez is responsible for the acts of his employee, driver Valenzuela, who has acted without any authority
or against his orders?

Held:
Yes. Art. 1759 provides that: Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or
in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

Under the Anglo-American Law, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests
either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior (the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope
of his authority and duty); or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely (consistent
with Art. 1759). Under this second view, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty,
although the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders.

The three very cogent reasons why the carrier is liable for the acts of its employees are as follows: (1) the special
undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of
the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other
passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability
of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands
the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger
with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk
of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power
to select and remove them.

The dismissal of the claim for damages against the driver, Valenzuela, was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on
breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party thereto. The driver’s civil liability is already covered in the
criminal case for homicide wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs MACARIA BALLESTEROS et al.- Lucas
G.R. No. L-19161 April 29, 1966

Facts:
Respondents were passengers on petitioner's bus, the driver of which was Jose Anastacio. In Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,
Anastacio stopped the bus and got off to replace a defective spark plug. While he was thus engaged, Dionisio Abello,
(auditor assigned at MRC) took the wheel and told the driver to sit somewhere else. The bus proceeded on its way, from
time to time stopping to pick up passengers. Anastacio tried twice to take the wheel back but Abello would not relinquish
it. While the bus was negotiating between Km. posts 328 and 329 (in Isabela) a freight truck driven by Marcial Nocum,
bound for Manila, was also negotiating the same place; when these two vehicles were about to meet, Nocum, tried to evade
several holes on the right lane, where his truck was running, swerved his truck towards the middle part of the road and the
left front fender and left side of the freight truck smashed the left side of the bus resulting in extensive damages to the
body of the bus and injuries to seventeen of its passengers, including Ballesteros. Passengers filed an action against auditor
Abello for being the cause of the accident. RTC ruled that Abello was reckless for driving the bus at a rate of 40-50 kph on
a bumby road at the moment of collision.

Issue:
WON MRC should not be liable as Abello was not his employee?

Held:
Yes. This defense was correctly overruled by the trial court, considering the provisions of Article 1763 of the Civil Code and
section 48 (b) of the Motor Vehicle Law, which respectively provide as follows:

Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilfull acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person to drive the motor vehicle under his control, or
permit a person, sitting beside him or in any other part of the car, to interfere with him in the operation of the motor
vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the steering wheel, or in any other manner take part in the manipulation or
control of the car.

Moreover, Abello drove and stopped twice to pick up passengers when Anastacio (and other personnel) must have taken
over, is a negligence on the part of MRC.
Franklin Gacal, et al. vs. Philippine Airlines, et al.- Misterio
G.R. No. L-55300, March 15, 1990

Facts:
Petitioners spouses Gacal were on board for a flight from Davao to Manila. Among the passengers were members of the
MNLF who hijacked the said plane while on transit. When it landed at the Zamboanga Airport, a battle between the military
and hijackers commenced, leaving 10 passengers and three of the hijackers dead.

Petitioner then filed a complaint for damages against respondent PAL alleging that main cause of the unfortunate incident
is inexcusable negligence of respondent PAL personnel in their failure to frisk the passengers adequately in order to discover
hidden weapons in the bodies of the hijackers.

Respondent PAL averred that in the performance of its obligation to safely transport passengers as far as human care and
foresight can provide, it has exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person with due regard to all circumstances,
but the security checks and measures and surveillance precautions in all flights, including the inspection of baggages and
cargo and frisking of passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and rendered solely by military personnel who under
appropriate authority had assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the Philippines. It concluded that
the incident was caused by fortuitous event, force majeure and other causes beyond the control of respondent PAL.

Issue:
Whether or not PAL should be held responsible for the hijacking of its plane.

Held:
No. As a rule, the source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into said contract,
it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. There is breach of this obligation
if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence
of a very cautious person. However, no person shall be held responsible for events which could not be foreseen or although
it can be foreseen, the same is inevitable. Such is the case of force majeure.

The following elements must be present in order to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from liability:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor);
(b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation
of the injury to the creditor.

Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due
to the skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), without any connection with private respondent, hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its
passengers.

Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been satisfied. Consequently the existence of force majeure
has been established exempting respondent PAL from the payment of damages to its passengers who suffered death or
injuries in their persons and for loss of their baggages.
LRT Authority v. Marjorie Navidad,- Nalla
G.R. No. 145804, Feb. 6, 2003

Facts:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA
LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform
near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard of Prudent Security Agency who assigned in the area, approached
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the
moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. A complaint for damages herein respondent Marjorie Navidad. The trial
court ruled finding Prudent and Escartin liable for damages. CA modified the ruling and exonerated Prudent from liability.

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage
theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the
fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. Hence this case

Issue:
WON Contract of Carriage was already created.

Held:
Yes. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public
policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent,
and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier
or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according
to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the
general rule that negligence must be proved.

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach
of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of
its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of
its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Effect of Contributory Negligence of Passengers

CLEMENTE Briñas vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-30309 November 25, 1983- Pelaez
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts:
Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo were on board of a Manila Railroad Company train bound for Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong,
Quezon. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong, the train slowed down and the conductor Clemente Briñas shouted
'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Martina stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit, carrying Emelita with one hand and holding her
baggage with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. As a result,
stumbled and fell from the train resulting to their instantaneous death. Briñas argued that it was negligence per se for
Martina Bool to go to the door of the coach while the train was still in motion and that it was this negligence that was the
proximate cause of their deaths.

Issue:
Whether or not the contributory negligence of Martina relieved Briñas from liability.

Held:
No. The Court held that the proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement
of Briñas. It was negligence on the conductor’s part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a full three
minutes ahead. This announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said
announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up
speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous announcement of Briñas and the deaths of the victims is
direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. Briñas failed to show any reason why the train suddenly
resumed its regular speed.

Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.
Philippne National Railways vs. CA, Rosario Tupang- Plaza
139 SCRA 87 GR no. L-55347, October 4, 1985

Facts:

(1) Winifredo Tupang is a paying passenger of herein petitioner Philippine National Railways (PNR). Upon passing
the Iyam Bridge at Lucena Quezon, Tupang fell off the train resulting to his death.

(2) Private respondent Rosario Tupang the wife of Winifredo Tupang filed an action for damages for breach of
contract of carriage.

(3) The trial court held PNR liable and ordered to pay for damages including moral damages.

(4) PNR set up the defense of state immunity from suit on the ground that it is a mere agency of the Philippine
government without distinct and separate personality of its own, but the lower court rejected such averment.

Issue:
Is PNR liable for damages and whether or not private respondent is entitled to moral damages?

Held:
Firstly, PNR was created under RA 4156 among which powers are to transact business directly or indirectly necessary to
the attainment of the purpose of the corporation and generally exercises power governed by the corporation law. With
these mandates, it is well established that it divested part of its sovereign capacity considering that it engaged in business.
Therefore PNR may sue and be sued.

Secondly, PNR is a common carrier of passenger and it has the obligation to carry transport passengers in their destination
and to observe diligence in doing so. Death and injury which the passenger may sustain gives rise to a presumption that it
was negligent in the performance of obligation under the contract of carriage. Here, the death of Tupang was due to his
falling off the train and PNR failed to overthrow the presumption laid down by law with clear and convincing evidence,
hence it is liable for damages.

Lastly, it appears that Tupang chose to sit in an open platform between the coaches of the train. Under the circumstance
he should hold tightly on the metal bar to avoid falling, in this case contributory negligence on his part exists wherein the
grant of moral damages is not permitted by the Court.
Dangwa v. CA - Caballero
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991

Facts:
Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. in a reckless and
imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over
its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver,
in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their
respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired. On the other hand, Dangwa
and Lardizabal alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation
of the transportation company and the supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers
of the safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it was the victim's own carelessness and negligence which
gave rise to the subject incident.

Issue:
1. WON Dangwa and Lardizabal are negligent and therefore liable for damages.
2. WON Cudiamat was guilty of contributory negligence.

Held:
1. Yes. It was evident that the subject bus was at full stop when the Cudiamat boarded the same as it was precisely on this
instance where a certain Miss Abenoja alighted from the bus. Moreover, the victim did indicate his intention to board the
bus as can be seen from the testimony of the witness when he declared that Cudiamat was no longer walking and made a
sign to board the bus when the latter was still at a distance from him. It was at the instance when Cudiamat was closing
his umbrella at the platform of the bus when the latter made a sudden jerk movement (as) the driver commenced to
accelerate the bus.

Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the Lardizabal in prematurely stepping on the accelerator
and in not waiting for the passenger to first secure his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of
the bus was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle. Dangwa and Lardizabal utterly failed to observe their duty
and obligation as common carrier to the end that they should observe extra-ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to the circumstances of each case (Article 1733,
New Civil Code).

2. No. The testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both
between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim
boarded the same is correct. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it
suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on
where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
deceased was guilty of negligence.

The contention of Dangwa and Lardizabal that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride
on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration.
When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to
board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of
the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a
passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of
such duty.

It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop
their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they
are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances
while they are doing so.

Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be considered negligent
under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the testimony of the witness, the bus had "just started" and "was still in
slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform. The victim herein, by stepping and
standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining
to such a contractual relation.
Isaac v. Al Ammen - Camasura
101 PHIL 1046, August 23, 1957

Facts:
Cesar Isaac boarded Bus No. 31 from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili, Camarines Sur and seated himself on the left side resting
his left arm on the window and with his left elbow outside the window. Before reaching his destination, the bus collided
with a motor vehicle of the pick-up type coming from the opposite direction, as a result of which plaintiff’s left arm was
completely severed and the severed portion fell inside the bus.

Due to the multiple operation he was in, he incurred expenses amounting to P623.40, excluding medical fees which were
paid by defendant. Plaintiff then brought an action for damages against the defendant.

Defendant set up as special defense that the injury suffered by plaintiff was due entirely to the fault or negligence of the
driver of the pick-up car which collided with the bus driven by its driver and to the contributory negligence of plaintiff
himself. Defendant further claims that the accident which resulted in the injury of plaintiff is one which defendant could not
foresee or, though foreseen, was inevitable.

Issue:
Whether or not Isaac is guilty of contributory negligence.

Held:

A circumstance which militates against the stand of appellant is the fact borne out by the evidence that when he boarded
the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow
outside the window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for this reason that the collision
resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing him a great damage. It is therefore apparent
that appellant is guilty of contributory negligence.

Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man
could have done to avoid the collision. It is true that Isaac’s contributory negligence cannot relieve A.L. Ammen of its liability
but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil Code), but this is a
circumstance which further militates against the position taken by Isaac.

Where a carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a
chance for deliberation must be taken into account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be
required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as an ordinary prudent person
would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best judgment the case
renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his part.

Note:
PUBLIC UTILITIES; PRINCIPLES GOVERNING LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIER. — The following are the principles
governing the liability of a common carrier: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation.
There is a breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is
obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all circumstances;
(3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its
duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.
Liability for Quasi-Delict
Calalas v. CA
G.R. No. 122039, 31-May- 1980 -Ceballos

Facts:
Sunga was riding a jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. She was seating on an “extension seat,” which is a wooden
plank. The jeepney stopped 2 meters from the shoulder of the highway because a passenger was to alight. Sunga alighted
the jeepney in order for the other passenger to alight. During the unloading of the passenger, an Isuzu truck, owned by
Salva and driven by Verena, hit the left rear portion of the jeepney which injured Sunga. Sunga filed an action for breach
of contract and recovery of damages as she stopped pursuing her course in Physical Education due to the defect in her left
leg. The RTC ruled that Salva, the owner of the Izusu Truck, was liable for damages as it was the proximate cause of the
incident. The RTC also took conizance of a civil case filed by Calalas against Salva wherein Salva was held liable for the
damages to Calalas’ jeep. The CA reversed the decision, finding Calalas liable for breach of contract of carriage.

Issue:
WON Calalas’ was liable to Sunga.

Held:
Yes, since he was not able to disprove the presumption of being negligent.

The Court held that Sunga’s cause of action was the breach of contract of carriage. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code creates a
contract between the common carrier and the passenger wherein it is the obligation of the common carrier to transport the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due respect for all the circumstance. Whenever death or injury to passengers arises, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code creates a
presumption that the common carriers are negligent and failed to observe extraordinary diligence. The presumption arises
upon the happening of the accident and it became a duty of Calalas to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in
the care of his passengers. It was proved that the jeepney driver was negligent because the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about2 meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of
the highway in a diagonal angle, a clear violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.

The contention of Calalas that it was a fortuitous event is untenable, as above stated, the jeepney was not parked properly,
thus the jeepney driver contributed to the happening of the accident