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Reinterpreting India's Rise Through The Middle Power Prism
Reinterpreting India's Rise Through The Middle Power Prism
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Asian Journal of Political Science
Vol. 19, No. 1, April 2011, pp. 7495
India’s spectacular rise in recent years has been the source of hyperbolic theorising and
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speculation on its major power status. Middle power theory offers a set of dynamic
analytical parameters which allow for re-evaluating India’s global influence and
identifying both strengths and weaknesses of its power projection and resources. Placing
emphasis on themes of Third World leadership, good international citizenship, multi-
lateral activism, bridge-building diplomacy, and coalition-building with like-minded
states, the middle power concept can encapsulate key aspects of India’s contemporary
agency and account for structural dynamics which constitute a reformist world-view
through the reconfiguration of the Indian state within the existing world order. Overall,
middlepowermanship delineates fundamental continuities in India’s foreign policy
tradition, epitomises India’s existing position in the neoliberal world order, while
providing a good indication of the directions India will take on the global stage in the
short and medium-term.
Introduction
India has been on a path of forging a high-profile power status since the days of the
Cold War, demonstrating an impressive record in terms of gross domestic product
(GDP) growth, military capacity, high-tech production and exports, labour force
potential, and a rapidly expanding service sector. In what could be understood as a
discourse of hyperbolism, academic analysts, policy-making communities, and
journalists have been quick to note these impressive changes and celebrate India’s
transformation, attempting to estimate the year when, according to different
ISSN 0218-5377 (print)/ISSN 1750-7812 (online) # 2011 Asian Journal of Political Science
DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2011.568246
Asian Journal of Political Science 75
structure and agency, thus failing to locate India’s rise within a wider systemic
context. It has been suggested in this respect that India’s rise must be assessed in
relation to the extent to which increases in material capabilities have caused an
equivalent transformation in the country’s global influence (Cooper and Fues, 2008).
Moving beyond the assumption that shifts in material capabilities can automatically
trigger a process of power enhancement at the global stage triggers additional
questions on India’s ability to influence decision-making processes at the multilateral
level, its performance in shaping international outcomes and other state’s preferences
beyond its immediate environment, and the degrees of recognition and institutio-
nalisation of its authority and legitimacy within international regimes. Even after
widening, however, the scope of enquiry to include these parameters, ‘the net
outcome is a sense of fluidity with regard to India’s rank as a power and the
conclusion that India belongs to the class of countries that are always emerging but
never quite arriving’ (Mitra, 2003: 401).
To overcome these analytical gaps and capture the often controversial dimensions
of India’s status as a rising power, this article will attempt to demonstrate that India’s
role in the contemporary world order can be optimally asserted by the middle power
concept. The concept allows for distinguishing both strengths and weakness of India’s
globalist agency, shifting the analytical focus beyond material-statistical calculations
to theorise behavioural, normative and ideational parameters. The middle power
orientation has deep roots in the Indian foreign policy tradition, embedding many
aspects of India’s contemporary agency, and providing important indications of how
India will move in the short- and medium-term. Middle power theory allows us to
account for India’s contemporary influence to the appropriate measure, without
assuming a priori short-term ascendance to great power status, and eluding the
teleological assumption that India’s emergence constitutes by itself a process of great
power transformation. Middlepowermanship should not be misinterpreted as static
state taxonomy, categorising India in a group of middle-ranking powers with similar
capacity, but rather comprising a dynamic and adaptable framework which delineates
76 C. Efstathopoulos
the forms of influence India is exerting in the world order while highlighting the
limitations of its transformational agency. In the sections that follow, key elements of
middlepowermanship will be identified to draw the behavioural and structural
parameters of India’s role in the world order. The overall approach taken suggests that
while individual characteristics may constitute necessary but not sufficient indicators
of middlepowermanship, their ensemble can be understood as a strong indication of
a middle power orientation.
countries. Its relevance has been broader however as the concept has served as a
critical prism for interpreting the rise of states on the verge of transformation as late
1980s Japan and post-apartheid South Africa, and delineate the limits of these states’
transformational agency (Cox, 1996; Van Der Westhuizen, 1998). The middle power
concept is increasingly relevant as contemporary analyses on the systemic impact of
emerging powers have often over-relied on material capabilities, dominated by the
neo-realist logic of drawing exclusively from indicators such as nuclear capacity and
GDP growth to map the new poles of the world order. Changes in the global
distribution of power however cannot be simply encompassed by the unipolarity/
multipolarity nexus; the institutional and ideational power of emerging powers on
the global stage must also be accounted for (Young, 2010), and in this direction,
middle power perspectives can provide significant insights.
Material capabilities are certainly important in identifying middle-ranking powers,
but do not constitute a sufficient indicator of a middle power orientation. In the
most elaborate statistical definition of middle powers to date, Ping identifies nine
indicators through which middle powers can be most accurately statistically
identified (Ping, 2005). These are: population, geographic area, military expenditure,
GDP, GDP real growth, value of exports, gross national income per capita, trade as a
percentage of GDP and life expectancy at birth (Ping, 2005: 6672). Ping notes,
however, that normative and behavioural criteria must also be addressed to have a
complete picture of middle power statecraft. Possessing sufficient material capabil-
ities therefore determines to a degree which types of foreign policy are feasible and
what middle powers ‘can do’; they also affect the expectations of other states and
allow middle powers to assess their own options (Stairs, 1998: 274275). As Stairs
(1998: 275) notes however, ‘having middle power capabilities is a ‘‘necessary’’
condition, but not a ‘‘sufficient’’ one’ in order to play a more assertive role. Cox
(1996: 244) has accordingly stressed that possessing ‘middle-range’ military and
economic capabilities is essential for realising the middle power potential but ‘not an
adequate predictor or disposition to play’ the middle power role. In this respect,
Asian Journal of Political Science 77
while countries such as South Africa and Iran may be considered as comparable in
terms of material capabilities or regional preponderance, the diverse international
image they project requires for placing them into different categories, with South
Africa classified as a middle power due to the high international prestige it enjoys
after apartheid.
Middle powers are often distinguished from other intermediate or regional powers
possessing material capabilities of the same range from the type of internationalist
influence they are able and willing to exert (Flemes and Nolte, 2010: 56). Middle
powers are therefore able to transcend regional boundaries and project a globalist
influence which allows them to shape regime formation and decision-making
outcomes within global governance. Behavioural patterns are often prioritised in
order to identify the special category of intermediate powers which are able to pursue
internationalist policies. Analytical focus is therefore placed on drawing a ‘common-
ality of behaviour’ among states considered as middle powers and identifying those
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behavioural parameters which are unique to middle powers in the global system
(Ping, 2005: 5152). Cooper et al. (1993: 19) originally defined the behaviour of
middle powers as ‘their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international
problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes,
and their tendency to embrace notions of ‘‘good international citizenship’’ to guide
their diplomacy’. By performing distinct diplomatic roles such as catalyst, mediator,
facilitator, manager and bridge-builder, middle powers tend to provide forms of
intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership which are distinguished from the
structural leadership of major powers and which allow them to secure niche issue-
areas in international regimes (Cooper et al., 1993: 24).
Middle power altruism in advocating ‘good international citizenship’ and superior
normative values is a contented issue and cannot be taken at face value. Middle
powers may essentially pursue, however, what Black (1997: 103) describes as
‘cosmopolitan interests in a more just world order’, where the middle power self-
interest coincides with the humanitarian principles and collective interests of
progressive international community. The tendency to frame foreign policy in the
context of ‘good international citizenship’ is an indispensable element of middle
power behaviour and may be practiced through strategies such as combative and veto
diplomacy which place moral considerations above the routine constructive
engagement functions that middle powers perform (Cooper, 1997; Lightfoot,
2006). The ability to project distinct forms of leadership and good international
citizenship typically constitute the primary ideational resources middle powers
deploy to generate influence at the global stage.
In order to maximise the bargaining power that they potentially lack at the
unilateral level, middle powers tend to concentrate their functions at the multilateral
level and specifically within international organisations. Multilateralism allows
middle powers to overcome the constraints they face at the unilateral and bilateral
level and ‘punch above their weight’, especially within international organisations
which provide the legal, normative and moral authority to operationalise the
78 C. Efstathopoulos
functions middle powers perform, and facilitate their mediatory and managerial roles
due to institutional structures which promote processes of consensus-building,
diplomatic engagement and conflict-management (Henrikson, 1997). The tendency
towards multilateralism is often interlinked with coalition-building initiatives with
like-minded states expected to generate maximum leverage for the middle power
project. Coalition-building presents an opportunity to exercise strength through
numbers and socialise a number of allies, potentially including other middle powers,
into collective bargaining schemes which allow for greater resistance against the
coercive pressure of major powers. Incentives of third parties for joining middle
power coalitions derive from the symmetrical relations which are expected to
determine interaction among ‘like-minded’ allies and which sharply contrast with
relations of domination prevalent in major power coalitions (Higgott and Cooper,
1990; Lee, 1999: 21).
In contrast to their ability to ‘punch above their weight’ at the multilateral level,
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middle powers face complex conditions at the regional level which determine
considerably their condition of middlepowermanship. Whereas traditional middle
powers like Australia and Canada have been relatively more detached from their
regional environment, Southern middle powers are more entangled in dynamics of
regional hegemony and antagonism, and are inclined to provide leadership in
projects of regional integration to manage these tensions (Jordaan, 2003: 172).
Southern middle powers use regionalist projects as platforms for reconstituting their
status and role, and attempt to shape regionalist projects along lines of multilateral
organisation which facilitate the diffusion of middle power activism (Belanger and
Mace, 1997). The regional level may serve as platform for playing the role of bridge-
builder, interlocutor and mediator between North and South, expected by major
powers to act as pivotal peacemakers and peacekeepers, and representatives of the
demands of weaker states within their regional spheres of influence.
The middle power concept allows for greater space for agency as states can
transcend constrains in the distribution of material capabilities through ideational
resources. Critical perspectives have noted however that the shape of middlepower-
manship is greatly conditioned by systemic forces. Although middle power
reconfiguration can be facilitated by structural change as evident by the emergence
of multiple power centres in the post-Cold War era, middle powers do not actively
seek to trigger such a process of transformation and destabilisation from which they
may benefit as middlepowermanship is generally incompatible with systemic
revisionism. The assumptions informing middlepowermanship dictate performing
‘a role supportive of the hegemonic global order’ where conflict mediation is essential
for neutralising crises which threaten system stability, diffusing polarisation caused
by self-interest manifestations, and creating conditions where nations participate in
the management of hegemonic order through consent rather than coercion (Neufeld,
1995). Middlepowermanship may be supportive of the existing order even in the
absence of hegemonic dominance as middle powers may step in to fill the leadership
vacuum and maintain system stability (Cox, 1996: 243). Middle powers therefore
Asian Journal of Political Science 79
operate as ‘stabilisers’ and ‘legitimisers’ of the world order because of their limited
capacity for effecting structural change and their potential exposure to changes in the
global hierarchy of nations in periods of instability, and because their position of
relative superiority at the multilateral or the regional level propels them to act along
the diplomatic lines of conflict management to ensure the smooth function of the
prevailing hegemonic order (Jordaan, 2003: 166169).
With preferences for order and stability always applying, different forms of
internationalism may be pursued for different types of middle powers such as liberal,
reform and radical internationalism (Pratt, 1990: 910). Western middle powers have
tended to follow a liberalistaccommodative agenda which aims at the eradication of
any revisionist forces against the existing world order, protecting their core position
in the global political economy and neutralising the demands of competing
peripheral powers for the redistribution of existing spheres of influence (Jordaan,
2003: 176). Southern middle powers, in contrast, project a reformist agenda
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foreign policy-making circles which perceived that India had to engage in a more
realistic fashion with the global distribution of power to materialise its quest for
major power status. The emergence of a strategic realist culture became particularly
evident with the rise to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National
Democratic Alliance government (19982004) and the adoption of more assertive
diplomatic strategies deemed appropriate to materialise India’s national goals
(Sridharan, 2006: 80). Two particular areas reflect the turn to a realist strategic
culture: the 1998 nuclear tests and the Indo-US rapprochement. The nuclear tests
were largely a result of the way in which the BJP interpreted the international balance
of power and regional security conditions. The perceived failure of the non-
proliferation regime, which aimed to maintain a global ‘nuclear apartheid’ and
disarm India while allowing Pakistan to advance its nuclear capacity, were all
conditions perceived to constitute an extremely threatening environment. The
nuclear tests were also a product of the BJP’s own realist world-view which
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understandings generated in the global South through such historical and cultural
osmoses socially construct an image as leader of the developing world and ‘voice of the
voiceless’ which allows India to project a moral authority and legitimacy that
transcends regional boundaries (Narlikar, 2007: 989). India’s bargaining tactics
consistently invoke this image, combining a mix of hard-line strategies, G-77-bloc
mobilisation exercises, assertiveness in pursuing combative diplomacy to defend the
interests of the South, and a commitment to Nehruvian values and universalistic moral
against pressures from developed countries, all of which allow India to exert substantial
veto-power by blocking agreements in certain issue areas (Narlikar, 2007). Third World
status also facilitates the diffusion of India’s intellectual leadership by providing ideas
for global governance in the areas of trade, agriculture, development, and human rights
which are widely accepted in developing countries.
India’s ideational resources entail core elements of good international citizenship,
often mirrored in the tendency to project a responsible power stance through
constrained use of military force, emphasis on constructive engagement, negotiation,
and ‘risk-averse’ crisis management, and a willingness to fulfil its expected duties in
sustaining global peace, order and stability (Mohan, 2006: 2830; Pardesi, 2007: 226).
The politics of good international citizenship is practiced in areas such as
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and democracy-promotion activism. India’s
steadily pro-active role in UN peacekeeping operations and its commitment in
engaging with the complex conditions of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War
environment emerged as a key aspect of its foreign policy agenda. India’s activism is
particularly evident in its high participation in UN operations and its place as one of
the largest troop contributors in peacekeeping missions, above traditional middle
powers like Canada, Norway and Sweden (Krishnasamy, 2003). India’s involvement
in countries such as Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia
has been conducted in a way which verifies the country’s peacekeeping values in
terms of experience, credibility, neutrality, and humanitarianism, and demonstrates
solidarity with developing nations (Bullion, 1997).
Asian Journal of Political Science 83
India’s emergence as a prominent donor state in recent years has sharpened the
normative edge of its ‘moralpolitik’, allowing for practicing a diversified assistance
programme which, in the historical context of Nehruvian and Gandhian values, is
well received in recipient countries (Six, 2009: 11151117). Repaying a large part of
its debt and becoming a creditor, India has substantially increased its assistance
through the provision of bilateral assistance to neighbouring countries, the creation
of schemes such as the India Development Initiative in 2003, the provision of disaster
relief in cases such as the Indian Ocean tsunami that hit Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the
Maldives, the hosting of refugees, and the increase of its contribution to international
organisations such the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UN specialist
agencies (Price, 2005). India’s diversified aid programme has been especially directed
to Africa, promoting energy technical and cooperation through initiatives such as the
Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM 9), cancelling the
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While ambivalence has characterised India’s engagement with major powers, its
relations with states perceived to belong closer to the middle power category have
progressed on a much more solid ground. At the bilateral level, India’s diploma-
tic advancement in improving ties with traditional and emerging middle powers like
Australia, Canada, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa has been expressed with much
assertion (Bonnor, 2008; Ghosh, 2008; Hirst, 2008; Rubinoff, 2002; Shrivastava,
2008). Beyond the bilateral level, coalition-building with middle powers has resulted
in a number of significant initiatives which aim to promote reform in international
institutions by combining the bargaining power of like-minded states.
The IndiaBrazilSouth Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum established in 2003
provides a prime example of middle power alliance-building, forming a flexible
transcontinental structure for coordination of the three middle powers and sett-
ing the precedence for a new SouthSouth cooperation seeking to reform the existing
institutional architecture (Alden and Vieira, 2005). The coalition’s founding
document, the Brasilia Declaration, reflects basic attributes of middle power
reformism, declaring commitment to sustaining global peace and security through
a reformed UN, recognising globalisation as a ‘positive force of change’ which has
generated growth, employment, and development, but needs to be managed through
good governance mechanisms in order to become more inclusive and equitable
(IBSA, 2003). The IBSA forum also presented new possibilities for containing
hegemonic unilateralism through moderate diplomacy and coordination with
like-minded states (Flemes, 2007), while opening up the path for more effective
coalition-building against developed countries in the Doha Round of World Trade
Organization (WTO) negotiations. The G-20 coalition played a high-profile role at
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003 as it combined the bargaining
power of leading middle powers from the global South and marked the emergence of
new type of alliance building combining bloc and issue-based diplomacy (Narlikar
and Tussie, 2004). Under the leadership of India and other Southern powers, the
G-20 succeeded in outmanoeuvring US/EU structural leadership and advancing an
86 C. Efstathopoulos
alternative framework proposal of agricultural liberalisation which served the
interests of developing countries in the areas of market access, domestic support
and export subsidies, and exposed the false rhetoric of developed countries. Although
the Cancun Ministerial collapsed, the legitimacy and authority of India and other
G-20 leaders were substantially enhanced, shifting the distribution of power in the
WTO informal decision-making system and augmenting India’s bargaining leverage.
The G-4, finally, comprising of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India, has acted as an
informal group campaigning for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.
Beyond profile-raising, its success has been limited as it has triggered the opposition
of a number of states while India has shown inconsistency in relation to its demand
for a veto seat and has been unable in this case to rally massive support from the
developing world (Cooper and Fues, 2008: 299300).
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the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and promoting special and differential
treatment, and exercising pressure on the North to eradicate protectionist barriers
and implement the agenda of liberalisation they claim to adhere to.
Contrary to favourable conditions for multilateral activism, India faces in its South
Asian environment complex conditions re-constitutive with its form of middlepo-
wermanship. On one level, establishing conditions of regional predominance by
means of coercion and consent is a default option for Southern powers with global
ambitions. In recent years, India has embarked in a concentrated effort to ‘break out
of the South Asian strategic box’ and establish spheres of influence in the broader
continental area, or ‘extended neighbourhood’, reaching out to Central Asia, Middle
East, the Indian Ocean and the ASEAN states and promoting geo-strategic and geo-
economic interests in trade, energy, military and security issues (Ganguly and
Pardesi, 2009: 14; Scott, 2009). In terms of regional integration, India’s role has been
the catalyst for advancing the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) and its trade body, the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), although
with an often reluctant pace and arguably with less vigour than other Southern
middle powers like Brazil and South Africa in their respective regionalist projects.
While possessing regional power capabilities, India’s physical preponderance
continuously generates collective understandings of enmity and antagonism in a
historically polarised environment. The geo-strategic triangle between India, Pakistan
and China constructs an intersubjective psychology of antagonism in the interactions
of the three states, obliging India to constantly engage in realist exercises of counter-
balancing, military build-up, and counter-insurgency, and often transferring the
realist power game to India’s smaller neighbours.
India’s regional entanglement reproduces a middle power orientation through
negative and positive dynamics. First, India is severely constrained in pursuing great
power politics at the global level as long as it is tied down to a competitive
environment which forces India to focus on regional objectives and distracts
attention from concentrating on formulating a grand strategy. As India appears
88 C. Efstathopoulos
unwilling or incapable of moving beyond ‘reluctant hegemony’ and deploying
its material capabilities to fully resolve tensions in its immediate neighbourhood
and achieve status quo predominance, the fluid regional environment continues to
disrupt any major power aspirations (Mitra, 2003). Under such conditions,
middlepowermanship offers a way out of South Asian entanglement, allowing for
transcending regional power politics through policy-making options that escape the
zero-sum game logic of balance of power politics, and transferring emphasis on
issues, agendas and resources where India has an advantage over its neighbours such
as soft power, moral leadership, democracy promotion, multilateral expertise, and a
distinct cultural quality to act as a civilisational power. Against regional complexities,
multilateral activism may serve to institutionalise India’s pre-eminence at the global
level, consequently generating collective understandings which constitute India as a
credible bridge-builder between the North and South Asia and gaining the
recognition of Asian states that India can act as representative of their interests in
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international regimes.
political and economic organisation (McDowell, 1997: 5963). While the material
gains and costs this approach entailed is a matter of debate, counter-hegemony
allowed India to project an alternative vision of international order which challenged
the very foundations of the US liberal architecture. From the early 1980s onwards, the
ideational and material bases of counter-hegemony were gradually dismantled
through international socialisation to the norms of the neoliberal doctrine and
reintegration with the structures of the global political economy marked by major
international and domestic processes such as India’s participation in Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) between 1986 and 1994, and
the launch of economic reforms in 1991 (Ford, 2003; Srinivasan and Tendulkar,
2003). The processes of state restructuring and internationalisation generated a new
diplomatic orientation where the world-vision of establishing an alternative system of
governance was abandoned and replaced by a discourse of active participation in
neoliberal institutions to reverse India’s marginalisation.
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Conclusion
Three reasons can be put forward why the middle power path may be expected to
continue epitomising India’s world-view and diplomatic conduct in the short and
medium-term. First, India’s moral leadership in the global South which derives from
non-aligned cosmopolitanism and good international citizenship serves as the
platform for India’s normative influence and as prism through which India growing
capabilities may be viewed as attributes of a responsible and credible power. As
middlepowermanship allows for fully sustaining this base of legitimacy and authority
while cautiously engaging with the North, India will seek to maintain this balance.
Second, balance of power politics at the regional and global produce multiple stand-
offs and appear unlikely to open up paths towards strategic partnerships and
offensive counter-balancing, pushing India in the direction of ‘playing another game’
altogether where it is possible to transcend material conditions and act through the
norms, values and principles of international society and multilateralism. Building a
good international citizen status facilitates interaction with like-minded Western and
especially Southern middle powers through coalition-building initiatives which
reflect many parameters of India’s own world-view and foreign policy agenda.
Finally, the construction of a discourse of reformism inevitably produces policy-
making platforms in India’s domestic institutions favouring compromise and
constructive engagement, feasible to be attained without massive political costs
only through hybrid forms of diplomacy where conformism and combative
bargaining behaviour can coexist. In a fluid global environment where the major
92 C. Efstathopoulos
issues of development, inequality, and poverty dictate the reform of the international
institutional architecture towards incorporating the values of justice, fairness and
equality, the normative space for the new middle power politics provides in the
foreseeable future an ideal level playing field for fulfilling India’s global role.
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