ARTHUR TE versus COURT of APPEALS & LILIANA CHOA

G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CA committed a serious error in refusing to suspend the Legal (Criminal and Administrative)
proceedings despite the pendency of the Civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage.

2. Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion and committed an error of law in not holding that the
demurrer to evidence should have been given due course.

3. Whether or not CA committed a serious legal error in not holding that the trial Judge a quo should have
inhibited himself.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals 10 th Division
dated August 31, 1994.

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988.
They did not live together after their marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Until April 21, 1989, when
Choa gave birth to a girl, Te stopped visiting her.

On May 20, 1990, Te contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella while his marriage with
respondent Choa continues.

When Choa learned about the second marriage of Te with Santella, on August 9, 1990, she filed a complaint
affidavit charging Te with bigamy. Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, Te filed an action for annulment of his marriage to
respondent Choa, on the ground that he was forced to marry her. Choa also filed with PRC an administrative case
against petitioner Te and Shantella for the revocation of their respective Engineering licenses on the ground that they
committed acts of immorality.

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with
leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioners
counsel during the hearings of said case. However, the trial court denied petitioners demurrer to evidence on the ground
that the prosecution for bigamy case had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused. The RTC also
denied petitioners motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.

Petitioner Te then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court judge. He also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of PRC (PRC Board), where his
Administrative case was filed, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of marriage and criminal case for bigamy. The Board denied the said motion, the petitioner then filed with
the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari for the said case.

Court of Appeals upheld the RTCs denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioners failure to show any concrete
evidence the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioners’
motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. The CA likewise
affirmed the RTCs denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner. Neither did the CA find grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Boards Order denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case.

RULING:
For the 1st issue: The CA did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage
did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said
civil case is terminated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of marriage had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioners’ innocence or guilt in the criminal case of bigamy, since all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. The prevailing rule is found
in Art. 40 of the Family Code which states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be envoked for
purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgement declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law,
a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative
proceedings before the PRC Board. Sec. 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that: the filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the
courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the
same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding
of the latter case. The board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its
decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

For the 2nd issue: The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. In this case, the
Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the
demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and
second, petitioners allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same.

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioners misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence
in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he
is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer
was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to
determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.

For the 3rd issue: Since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly
mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound
discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, Legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Thus, it was not mandatory that
the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.