LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

1. Distinguish the dual nature or functions of municipal corporations
1. Public or governmental – it acts as an agent of the State for the government of the territory and the
inhabitants within the municipal limits; it exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State.
It aims to attain governmental purposes such as the interest of health, safety and for the advancement
of public good and welfare affecting the public in general.
2. Private or proprietary – it acts in a similar category as a business corporation, performing
functions not strictly governmental or political; it stands for the community in the administration
of local affairs. It acts as a separate entity for its own purposes and not as a subdivision of the
state. Its primary purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecunary profit.
(Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366)
The operation of a public market is not a governmental function but merely an activity
undertaken by the city in its private proprietary capacity. (Figueroa vs. People, 498 SCRA)
Criterion to determine whether corporation is public: The relationship of the corporation to the State,
i.e., if created by the State as its own agency to help the State in carrying out its governmental functions, then it
is public; otherwise, it is private.
Local Autonomy and Devolution
2. What is local autonomy?
ANSWER: It is the granting of more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources to the lower or local levels
of a government system. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make the local government sovereign within the state or an “imperium in
imperio.” (Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52)
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers
over local officers are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. Policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. Municipal governments are still agents of the national government. (Pimentel vs.
Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201)
In affirming the constitutionality of the power of LGU’s to reclassify areas through a zoning ordinance,
the Court ruled: “The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local autonomy is not to force an
interpretation that negates powers explicitly granted to local governments. To rule against the power of LGU’s to
reclassify areas within their jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the
Constitution. As we have noted in earlier decisions, our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.” (SJS vs. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92)
3. What is devolution?
ANSWER: Devolution is the act by which the National Government confers ower and authority upon the various
local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities (RA No. 7160, Section 17[e].

4. Distinguish administrative decentralization from political decentralization.

ANSWER: In administrative decentralization, the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions (provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) in order to broaden the base of
government power. Political decentralization involves abdication of political power in favor of LGU’s declared
autonomous. (Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786)
Mandatory Consultation
05. What are the two requisites that must be met before a national project that affects the
environment and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented?
ANSWER: Under the Local Government Code, two requisites musts be met before a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: 1) prior
consultation with the affected local communities and 2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate
sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project implementation is illegal. (Province of
Rizal vs. Executive Secretary, 477 SCRA 436) Also in Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, 508 SCRA 498, the prior
approval of the local government units affected by the proposed conversion of a Timber License Agreement
(TLA) into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) is necessary before any project or program can
be implemented by government authorities that they may cause depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of
crop land, forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant series.

Creation of LGU’s
06. May a component city be created only by converting “a municipality or cluster of barangays,”
and not by merging two municipalities.
ANSWER: NO. The phrase “A municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city” is
not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Sec. 10 of Art X of the Constitution
allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance
with the criteria established by the Code. The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a
division or merger of exiting local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such
merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. Thus, a city may be created by
merging two municipalities even if one of the said municipalities already qualifies to be upgraded to a
component city. (Cawaling vs. COMELEC, GR Nos. 146319 & 146342, October 26, 2001)
07. Can Congress validly delegate to the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao the creation of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
within its territorial jurisdiction?
ANSWER: I QUALIFY. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays. In fact, Congress has delegated to the
Sanggunian Panlalawigan and to Sangguniang Panlungsod the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
The creation of provinces and cities, however, is another matter. Section 5(3) Article VI of the
Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative” in the House of representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereinafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled to at least one
member..” Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same
reason, a city with population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the
power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a
legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create
a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled
to one representative under Section 5 (30, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to
create legislative district, a power that exclusively belongs to Congress and not subject to any form of
delegation.
08. Is the creation of the Dinagat Islands Province on the basis of the Local Government Code
Implementing Rules and Regulations valid?
ANSWER: In Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010 , the Supreme Court initially declared the
law creating the Province of Dinagat Islands unconstitutional, and the election of officials thereof null and void.
The provision of Article 9 (2) of the Rules and regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
stating “ The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1)
or more islands” is declared null and void. While RA 9355 creating the province complied with the income
requirement specified in the Local Government Code, it failed to comply with either the territorial or the
population requirement for the creation of a province. It has an approximate land area only of 802.12 square
kilometers, more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately 47 islets, and failed to comply with the
land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. Also, the NSO certified that Dinagat Islands had a total
population only of 120,813, which was still below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Moreover,
there was a failure to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother
unit of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the
time of the creation of the new province. However, the above February 10, 2010 Decision was reversed and set
aside by the Supreme Court (April 12, 2011) and ruled that the exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR is valid
and should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC, as Congress shows the clear legislative intent to
incorporate it in the LGC. The IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both
the Executive and Legislative Departments, pursuant to Section 533 of the LGC. The IRR was formulated
amounting not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from the Court, but to
legislative construction as well.
09. How may a component city be upgraded into a highly urbanized city?
ANSWER: Substantive Requisites: (1) A minimum population of two hundred thousand inhabitants and (2) the
latest annual income must be at least fifty million pesos. If a component city shall have met the minimum
requirements for a highly urbanized city, it shall be the duty of the President to declare the city as highly
urbanized city upon: (1) proper application and (2) upon ratification in a plebiscite by the majority of registered
voters therein. (Sec. 453, LGC)
 (2)
Plebiscite
10. Does the changing of status of Santiago from an independent component city to a mere
component city under RA 8528 require that the same be submitted to the people in a proper
plebiscite?
ANSWER: YES. RA 8528 changing the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that said conversion should be submitted to the
people in a proper plebiscite, as required by Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
The conversion involves a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government
units directly affected as well as the people therein. These changes cannot be characterized as insubstantial.
For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under
the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of
Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will
now have to be shared with the province. (Miranda vs. Aguirre, GR No. 133064, September 16, 1999)
11. Can the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the
creation of Sorsogon City be assailed on the ground that the plebiscite required by RA 8806
should be conducted within 120 days from the “approval” of the said Act?
ANSWER: NO. The last sentence of Sec. 10 of Art X mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120
days from the date of effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or
ordinance to fix another date for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the
effectivity of the law. The word “approval” could only mean “effectivity as used and contemplated in Sec. 10 of
the Code. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on Sept 1, 2000, which date, should be the reckoning
point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from date of its approval
(August 16, 2000) when the law has not yet been published. Since publication is indispensable for the effectivity
of the law (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446) the plebiscite can only be scheduled on a date the Act took
effect. (Cawaling vs. COMELEC, GR Nos. 146319 & 146342, October 26, 2001)
12. What is substantial alteration of boundaries?
As the phrase implies, “substantial alteration of boundaries” involves and necessarily entails a change
in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase “boundaries” should
not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political
boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the
LGU’s exercise of corporate powers ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be
“substantial” for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional provision. (Umali v. COMELEC, GR No. 203974,
April 22, 2014)
13. When must a plebiscite be conducted? Which unit shall participate?
Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from the date of the effectivity
of the law, not from its approval The word “approval” could only mean “effectivity” as used and contemplated in
Section of the Code. The completion of the publication of the law (September 1, 2000) should be the reckoning
point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its
approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. Since publication is indispensable for the
effectivity of a law (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446)), a plebiscite can be scheduled only after the law
creating a city took effect. (Cawaling vs. COMELEC, supra)
Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, the Omnibus Election Code, provide the COMELEC the power to set
elections to another date. In Cagas v. COMELEC, GR No. 209185, October 25, 2013, the Supreme Court
upheld the COMELEC’s broad power or authority to fix other dates for a plebiscite, as in special elections, to
enable the people to exercise their rights of suffrage. The COMELEC thus has residual power to conduct a
plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. In election law, the right of suffrage should prevail over
mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites.
General Rule on which unit shall participate: Section 10 of the LGC provides that the creation,
division and merger, abolition or substantial alteration of the boundaries of local government units must be
approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit or units directly affected. In case the
creation is by reason of division of a political unit, the plebiscite for the creation of a new province or
municipality shall include the participation of the residents of the mother provinceor mother municipality in order
to conform to the constitutional requirement. (Padilla vs. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735)
When the law says “the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected” this means that residents
of the political entity who stand to be economically dislocated by the segregation of a portion thereof must have
the right to participate in the said plebiscite… Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the
people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. Thus, BP 885,
creating the Province of Negros del Norte is declared unconstitutional because it excluded the voters of the
mother province from participating in the plebiscite. (Tan vs. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727)
Conversion of municipality into a component city. In the conversion of a municipality into a component
city, however, only the registered voters of the municipality sought to be converted into a component city, shall
participate in the plebiscite.
 (3)
Upgrading of a component city into a highly urbanized city. In Umali v. COMELEC, GR No. 203974,
April 22, 2014, the Supreme Court treats the phrase “by the qualified voters therein” in Section 453 of the Local
Government Code, so that the same will not clash with the explicit provision of Section 10, Article X that the
voters in the “political units directly affected” shall participate in the plebiscite, to mean the qualified voters not
only in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by
such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected by the conversion is a valid
exercise of their right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are designed to uphold the decision of the
majority, regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable how the province can be deprived of the
opportunity to exercise the right to suffrage in a matter that is potentially deleterious to its economic viability
and could diminish the rights of its constituents. To limit the plebiscite to the only voters of the areas to be
partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote
for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of the
majority rule.
Economic impact of conversion. A component city’s conversion into an HUC and its resultant
autonomy from the province is a threat to the latter’s economic viability. The income criterion for a component
city to be converted into an HUC is higher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The
ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the province’s operations
as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs. Moreover, the
quality of services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming austerity measures.
Political impact of conversion. Duties, privileges and obligations will attach if it is converted into an
HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general supervision of the province and be under the direct
supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight because the complex and varied
problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic activity require greater autonomy. The
provincial government stands to lose the power to ensure that the local government officials act within the
scope of its prescribed powers and functions, to review the executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to
approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. The appeal process for administrative case
decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be modified accordingly. Likewise, the registered voters
of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials.

Powers of LGU’s
14. What are the regulatory powers of the National Government Agencies (NGA’s) transferred or
devolved to the LGU’s include the following:
ANSWER: 1) the reclassification of agricultural lands – DAR to cities & municipalities
2) enforcement of environmental laws – DENR to all LGU’s
3) inspection of food products and quarantine – DOH to cities & municipalities
4) the enforcement of the National Building Code – DPWH to cities & municipalities
5) the processing and approval of subdivision plans - HLURB to cities and municipalities
6) the operation of tricycles- LTFRB to cities & municipalities
7) the establishment of cockpits and holding of cockfights - Philippine Gamefowl Commission to
cities & municipalities

The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which
is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country’s natural resources. (League of Provinces
of the Philippines v. DENR,GR No. 175368, April 11, 2013))
In Pimentel v. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012, petitioners argued that the P21 Billion CCTP
Budget be directly allocated to the LGU’s so that it would have enhanced the delivery of basic services and not
result in the “recentralization” of basic governmental functions. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed DSWD’s
full control over the identification of beneficiaries in the CCTP and the manner by which the services are to be
delivered or conditionalities are to be complied with. This is not contrary to the precepts of local autonomy.
15. Can a City Mayor validly order a police raid on commercial establishments in the guise of
inspecting or investigating them and close them down and suspend or revoke their licenses
and permits?
ANSWER: NO. While the power of the mayor to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary
power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these
licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of those licenses and permits.
Similarly, the power to refuse to issue licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the pre-
requisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising
these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be
heard. (Lim vs. CA, 387 SCRA 149)
Likewise, even as the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits, he has no power to order a
police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments.
(4)
Finally, a mayor has no authority to close down a business establishment without due process of law – there is
no provision in the Local Government Code or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly or impliedly
granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and
even if there is, such provision would be void. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must
always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the right of people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. (Id.)
16. State whether or not the following city ordinances are valid and give reasons in support of
your answers:
(1) An ordinance authorizing the establishment, operation and maintenance of three cockpits
within its territorial jurisdiction.
(2) An ordinance which forbids the running of nightclubs, massage parlors, karaoke bars and
similar business establishments and instructs its owners/operators to wind up business
operators.
(3) An ordinance declaring a particular thing as nuisance per se and order its condemnation, or
declaring a gas station a nuisance per se.
(4) Ordinances prohibiting the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals, including those
already existing, and allowing the operation of only one common terminal located outside
the city proper but within its territorial jurisdiction.
(5) An ordinance requiring all market stall occupants to fill up and submit the necessary
application forms which contained the terms and conditions for the occupation and operation
of the stalls, and if approved, the application would serve as the lease contract.
(6) An ordinance appropriating public funds to undertake the widening, repair and improvement
of the sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision.
(7) A zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the oil depot is situated from industrial
to commercial and that the continued operation of the businesses of oil companies in their
present location will no longer be permitted.
ANSWERS: (1) NO. It is the Sangguniang Bayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize
and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and
commercial breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction. But its discretion is limited by PD 449, the
Cockfighting Law of 1974, in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such
cities or municipalities have population of over 100,000, in which case two cockpits may be established.
Cockfighting is a valid matter of police regulation, as it is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims
of enhancing national productivity and self-reliance – limitation on the number of cockpits in a given municipality
is a reasonably necessary means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling cockfighting, for clearly
more cockpits equals more cockfight. A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution and any
statute. Ordinance No. 7 contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits in a city. (Tan vs. Perena,
452 SCRA 53)
(2) NO. The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional an ordinance revoking all permits and
licenses previously issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets, dance halls and prohibiting the issuance of new
permits and licenses for such kind of business in the municipality. The Local Government Code authorizes the
local government units to exercise police power yet this power does not include the power to
prohibit the establishment of businesses which are not per se illegal. LGU’s can only regulate but cannot
prohibit, the ordinance is ultra vires and unconstitutional. (Dela Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569)
In City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an
ordinance which forbids running of nightclubs, sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars and similar
business establishments, and instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations as it amounts to a
closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property and is practically confiscatory. An ordinance
which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of property without just compensation. Private property which is
not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without just compensation.
(3) NO. While a Sanggunian is empowered under the Local Government Code to enact ordinances
declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisances, it cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find as a fact, that a particular thing
is a nuisance with such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor it can authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of a Sanggunian. (AC Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Frabelle Corp., 506 SCRA 625)
In Parayno vs. Jovellanos, 495 SCRA 85, it was held that a gas station business could not be
considered a nuisance which a municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising police power. The
abatement of nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not
a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence it cannot be closed
down or transferred summarily to another location.
(5)
(4) NO. The subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city
proper, franchise for which was granted to Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc. The assailed ordinances are
characterized by overbreath – they go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Bus
terminals per se do not impede or help impede the flow of traffic. In the subject ordinances, the scope of
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The operation of bus terminals is a
legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of
the community. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via and ordinance, without
judicial proceedings.
(5) YES. It was within the ambit of the Sanggunian’s authority in the exercise of police power to regulate
the enjoyment of the privilege to lease the market stalls. The enactment of the ordinance was a valid exercise of
such governmental authority to regulate the possession and use of the public market and its facilities. The lease
and occupation of a stall in a public market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege governed by laws and
ordinances. The operation of a market stall by virtues of a license is always subject to the police power of the
city government. This power could be exercised anytime to change the provisions of the contracts or even
abrogate them entirely, for the protection of general welfare. Such an act did not violate the non-impairment
clause which is anyway subject to and limited by the paramount police power. (Lucero vs. City Government of
Pasig, 508 SCRA 23)
(6) NO. Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money shall be appropriated or applied
for private purposes. This is in consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local
government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes. The use of LGU funds for the widening
and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful and it directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160.
(Albon vs. Fernando, GR No. 148357, June 30, 2006)
(7) YES. The enactment of the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. Its purpose is to
promote sound urban planning ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of residents of Manila. The
Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of terrorist attack of the Pandacan oil terminals. Based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property
is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individual’s right to property, the
former should prevail. (Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92)
Expropriation
17. What is the procedural requisite that must be first observed by an LGU before exercising the
power of eminent domain? What is the rationale of such requisite?
ANSWER: One condition required for the proper exercise of power of eminent domain by municipal corporation
is that a valid and definite offer must first be made to the owner and such offer was not accepted. Unless
such a requirement is satisfied, the expropriation of any private property is considered infirm and can be
challenged as invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain. (Section 19, LGC) The purpose of the
requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. It
permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and
enjoyment of the property. Single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. (Jesus is Lord
Christian School Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig, MM, 466 SCRA 235)
A letter offered to prove the municipality’s desire or intent to acquire a property for a right of way does
not prove that the LGU made definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road
before filing the complaint for expropriation. In the absence of competent evidence that indeed, the municipality
made a definite and valid offer to all co-owners of the property, the declaration in the ordinance that the property
owners were notified of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road is not in compliance
with Section 19 of the LGC. (Ibid.)
18. Pursuant to a resolution approved by the Sangguniang Bayan, the Municipality of
Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation of two parcels of land belonging to VM Realty
Corporation. The corporation argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, because it
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code.
Decide.
ANSWER: Section 19 of the Local Government provides that a local government unit may pursuant to an
ordinance exercise the power of eminent domain In this case the mayor sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the Sanggunian Bayan. Thus, there was no compliance with
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a law-
making-body on a specific matter. The two are enacted differently. A third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan. (Municipality of Paranaque vs. VM Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 676) The ordinance must be enacted
prior to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain with the proper court, and not after the court shall have
determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled. (Heirs of Suguitan vs. City of
Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137) (6)

19. In the event that an LGU exercises the power of eminent domain, when must just
compensation be determined?
ANSWER: Just compensation shall be determined as of time of actual taking. While Section 4 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of filing of the complaint for
expropriation, such law cannot prevail over Section 19 of RA 7160 which is a substantive law. (The City of Cebu
vs. Dedamo, 380 SCRA 754)
Local Taxation and Fiscal Administration
20. Can an LGU close a commercial bank operating within its territorial jurisdiction for failure to
pay real estate taxes?
ANSWER: NO. A rural bank not engaged in any illegal or immoral activities does not warrant its outright closure
by the municipal government for its failure to pay annual business tax. The order of closure violated the bank’s
right to due process. The violation of a municipal ordinance does not empower a municipal mayor to avail of
extrajudicial remedies. The appropriate remedies to enforce payment of delinquent taxes or fees are provided
for in Section 62 of the Local Tax Code. (Rural Bank of Makati vs. Municipality of Makati, 443 SCRA 602)
21. Name two fundamental principles of local fiscal administration
ANSWER: Among the fundamental principles governing the financial affairs, transactions and operations of the
LGU’s are:
1. No money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation ordinance or
law;
2. Local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes;
Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money shall be appropriated or
applied for private purposes. This is in consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal
administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes. The
use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful and it
directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160. Only the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled with local government
funds. (Albon vs. Fernando, 494 SCRA 141, GR No. 148357, June 30, 2006)
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
22. What is the nature and limitation of the power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to settle
boundary dispute among adjoining municipalities within the province?
ANSWER: The power of the provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an administrative nature –
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. It
is a power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities. The power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to settle boundary disputes is limited to
implementing the law creating the municipality and, any alteration of boundaries not in accordance with the law
is not implementation but amendment of the law, which would exceed their authority. Thus, the agreement
between the municipalities of Jimenez and Sinacaban (embodied in a resolution of a provincial board
declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality) is invalid as it would effectively amend EO No. 258
creating the Municipality of Sinacaban. It is contrary to the technical description of the territory of a municipality
as per EO 258, and therefore not binding. The Supreme Court declared that the RTC was correct when it
ordered a relocation survey to determine to which municipality the barangays belonged. (Municipality of
Jimenez vs. Baz, 265 SCRA 182)
23. What tribunal is conferred jurisdiction by law to settle the boundary dispute 1) involving
municipalities or component cities of different provinces and 2) between the Municipality of
Kanaga and Ormoc City, an independent component city, both of the Province of Leyte?
ANSWERS: 1) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. (Section 118©, LGC) The RTC
cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no petition that was filed and decided by
the Sanggunian panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC assume original
jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since the LGC allocates such power to the sanggunian panlalawigans of
Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. (Calanza vs. PICOP, GR No. 146622, April 24, 2009)2) Section 118(d) of
the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute
with a highly urbanized city, not an independent component city. While Kanaga is a municipality, Ormoc is an
independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118(d) does not apply to them.
Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes between a
municipality and an independent component city of the same province, the general rule governing jurisdiction
should be used.
 The applicable provision is found in Section 19 (6) of BP 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by RA 7691, which provides the Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. (Municipality of Kanaga vs. Madrona, 402 SCRA 330)
(7)
LGO/LGUs and Private Counsel
24. a) May a local government official secure the services of private counsel in an action filed
against him in his official capacity?
b) May a local government unit be represented by a private attorney?
ANSWERS: a) In resolving whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel in
an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be
considered, as where the complaint contained other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due
from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. (Mancenido vs. CA, 330 SCRA 419))
a) The general rule is that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in law suits.
(Municipality of Pililia, Rizal vs. CA, 233 SCRA 484). The rationale for the prohibition is to relieve the LGU of the
burden of hiring a private attorney. Likewise, the interest of the municipality would be best protected if a
government lawyer handle its litigations. It is also expected that the municipal attorney and fiscal would be
faithful and dedicated to the LGU’s interests. Furthermore, civil service employees, such as a government
lawyer could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty. (Province of Cebu vs. IAC, 147
SCRA 447) For cities, Section 481(a) of the Local Government Code mandates the appointment of a city legal
officer, who is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the city or
any of its officials is a party. A local government unit represented by private counsel as only public officers
may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers. Hence,
the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Pro bono
representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed. (Asean
Pacific Planners vs. City of Urdaneta, GR No. 162525, September 23, 2008)
b )However, by way of exception, local government units may be represented by a private attorney only when
the provincial fiscal is disqualified from representing a particular municipality, as in the following instances: when
the jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies with the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; when in a case
involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is involved as a creditor, heir,
legatee, or otherwise. (Mancenido vs. CA, 330 SCRA 419)
25. Can a City Mayor file suits for the recovery of funds and property on behalf of the city even
without prior authorization from the Sanggunian?
ANSWER: YES. The rule is that a suit is commenced by the local chief executive. In City of Caloocan vs. CA,
489 SCRA 45, it was held that the mayor has the authority to file suits for the recovery of funds and property on
behalf of the city even without prior authorization from the sanggunian. This conclusion is strengthened by the
fact that nowhere in the enumerated powers and duties of the sanggunian can one find the requirement of such
prior authorization in favor of the mayor for the purpose of filing suits on behalf of the city .
Succession
26. Mayor CALI, who belongs to Lakas Party died during his incumbency. Vice Mayor AQUI, also of
Lakas Party succeeded to the mayorship. Thereafter, by operation of law, highest ranking
Councilor TAMA of Reforma Party, assumed the position of Vice-Mayor. Councilor LALA, a
Lakas Party member, is the No. 8 councilor. The Provincial Governor appointed NAVA, a
Reforma Party member, to fill in the vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan.
a) Who among the three, created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian: Vice-Mayor AQUI,
Councilor TAMA, or Councilor LALA?
b) Is the appointment of NAVA to fill up the vacancy in the Sanggunian valid? Reasons.
ANSWERS: a) The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the members
formerly occupying the next higher rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes
enumerated, and the term “last vacancy” is thus used in Section 45 of the Local Government Code, to
differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. In this case, with the elevation of TAMA who
belonged to Reforma Party, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be
filled up with someone who belongs to the political party of TAMA. To argue that the vacancy created was
that formerly held by the 8th Sanggunian member, a Lakas Party Member, would result in the increase in that
party’s representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of Reforma Party.
b) YES. The appointment of NAVA to fill up the vacancy in the Sanggunian is valid. The reason behind
the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the
Sanggunian is to maintain party representation as willed by the people in the election. Otherwise, Reforma
Party’s representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. (Navarro vs. CA, 355 SCRA 672)
Ordinance-making
27. What are the limitations on the exercise of police power by an LGU? What are the requisites
for the validity of a municipa lordinance?
ANSWERS: The following are limitations on the exercise of powers under the general welfare clause:
1. Express grant by law (e.g., Secs. 16, 391, 447, 458 and 468, LGC)
2. Exercisable only within the territorial limits of the local government unit, except for protection of water supply.
3. Equal protection clause. (The interests of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the exercise of the power.
(8)
4. Due process clause. (The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals.)
5. Must not be contrary to the Constitution and the laws.
The following are the requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance:
1. must not contravene the Constitution and any statute;
2. must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. must nor prohibit, but may regulate trade which is not illegal per se;
5. must not be unreasonable; and
6. must be general in application and consistent with public policy. (Solicitor General vs. MMA, 204
SCRA 837; Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994 and Tatel vs. Municipality of
Virac, 207 SCRA 157)
7. must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. (Langcao vs. City of Cebu, 440 SCRA 279 and
City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308))
28. On its first regular session, may the Sanggunian transact business other than the matter of
adopting or updating its existing rules or procedure? Can an ordinance be enacted in one day?
ANSWERS: YES. All the Local Government Code requires is the “on its first regular session xxx the
Sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules or procedures.”(Section 50, LGC) and by
resolution, fix the day, time and place of its regular sessions (Section 52, LGC). There is nothing in the
language thereof that restricts the matters to be taken up during the first regular session merely to the adoption
of updating of the house rules. If it were the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local council to such
matters, then it would have done so in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is no such intent.
(Malonzo vs. Zamora, 311 SCRA 224) An ordinance may be enacted in one day because the Local Government
Code does not prohibit the same, unlike in Congress where a bill must undergo three readings on separate
days. (Ibid.)
29. May an incumbent Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside
over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)?
ANSWER: NO. Being the acting governor, the Vice-governor cannot simultaneously exercise the duties of the
latter, since the nature of the duties of the Provincial Governor calls for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding vacancy in the office
of the Vice-governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event
constitutes an “inability” on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice-governor) to preside over the SP
sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Sec. 49(b) of the Local Government Code – the
election of a temporary presiding officer from among themselves. The continuity of the Acting Governor’s (Vice-
governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. (Gamboa vs.
Aguirre, GR No. 134213, July 20, 1999)
30. Can an acting presiding officer of a Sanggunian be allowed to vote? How is the required
quorum in the Sanggunian computed?
ANSWERS: NO. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes of the presiding officer could not
have greater power than that possessed by the latter who can vote only in case of tie. While acting as presiding
officer, a Board Member my not, at the same time be allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member,
including that of voting even when there is no tie to break. The entire membership, including the presiding
officer and ex-officio members must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. (Zamora vs. Caballero, 420 SCRA 384)

31. How may an ordinance be approved? What are the grounds for veto of an ordinance? Is
item veto allowed? How can a vetoed ordinance become a law?
ANSWER: An ordinance shall be approved by the local chief executive by affixing his signature in each and
every page thereof. The grounds for veto are: (1)the ordinance is ultra vires, or (2) that it is prejudicial to public
welfare. The governor or mayor may veto any item in the following cases: (1) Appropriations ordinance (2)
Ordinance adopting a local development plan and public investment program (3) Ordinance directing the
payment of money or creating liability.
A vetoed ordinance can become a law: (1) The sanggunian may override the veto by two-thirds vote
of all its members. (2 )Failure of the Local Chief Executive to communicate the veto to the sanggunian within
15 days in the case of a province and 10 days in the case of city or municipality. The ordinance shall be
deemed approved as if he signed it.
Enforcement of Ordinance
32. What is the nature of the duty of the LCE’s to enforce local ordinance?
ANSWER: The Local Government Code imposes upon the city mayor the duty “to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
ordinances as long as they have not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. (Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, 517 SCRA 657)
(9)
Recall election
33. How is recall initiated? What are the limitations and prohibitions on the conduct recall
elections? When does recall become effective?
ANSWER: RA 9244 effectively amended Section 70 of the LGC and thus, eliminated the preparatory recall
assembly as one of the modes of initiating recall and provided a new procedure in the conduct of recall initiated
through the written petition of registered voters according to the following schedule: 25% - where the voting
population of LGU does not exceed 20,000; at least 20% but not less than 5,000 - for LGU’s with at least 20,000
but not more than 75,000 voting population; at least 15% but not less than 15,000 for LGU’s with at least 75,00
but not more than 300,000 voting population; and at least 10% but not less than 45,000 for LGU’s with over
300,000 voting population.
Recall Election. The official sought to be recalled is automatically a candidate. (Sec. 71)
Prohibition against resignation. The official sought to be recalled cannot resign while the recall process
is in progress. (Sec. 73)
Limitations. An official may be subject of recall only once during his term. No recall shall take place
within one year from assumption of office or one year before the regular local election. (Sec. 74) The phrase
“regular election” should be construed as referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
official sought to be recalled will be contested. (Paras vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49)
Another limitation is the prohibition to conduct recall election within one year from the date of
assumption of office of the official concerned. The purpose of this limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for
judging the performance of an elective local official. As long as the election is held outside the one year period
from assumption from office of the local official sought to be recalled, the preliminary proceedings to initiate
recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of said local official. (Claudio vs. COMELEC,
331 SCRA 388)
Municipal Liability
34. What is the controlling factor so that a municipality or city can be held liable for damages
under Article 2189 of the Civil Code?
ANSWER: For liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it is sufficient that a province, city or
municipality has control and supervision thereof. The power of a municipality to regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of mater or sewer and other pipes within its territorial jurisdiction can only
mean that a municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over excavations.
Such liability attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national road or municipal
road, for as long as the drilling and excavation is made on a national road or municipal road, for as long as the
same is within its territorial jurisdiction. (Municipality of San Juan MetroManila vs. CA, 466 SCRA 78)
Powers of Vice Governor
35. What are the powers that may be exercised by a Provincial Vice Governor? Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, is there still a union between the executive and legislative
branches in various local government units?
ANSWERS: In Atienza vs. Villarosa, 458 SCRA 385, it was held that the Vice Governor, as presiding officer of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has administrative control of the funds of the said body and it is he who has the
authority to approve disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The power of the Vice Governor to approve disbursement vouchers necessarily
includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same applying the doctrine of necessary
implication. In the same case, the Supreme Court also ruled that the Provincial Governor has no authority to
appoint officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The union of executive and legislative ,
except in the barangay level, has been disbanded under the Local Government Code of 1991. For this
purpose, the Provincial Governor and City and Municipal Mayors are no longer the presiding officers of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan, respectively. However, the
Punong Barangay remains to be the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Barangay.
Municipal Contracts
36. What are the conditions under which a local chief may enter into a contract involving
expenditure of public funds in behalf of the local government unit?
ANSWER: The conditions are the following: (1) the local government unit must have the power to enter into the
particular contract; (2) there must be a prior authorization of the Sangguniang concerned (Section22 c, LGC), a
legible copy of the contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the capitol, or the city, municipal or
barangay hall; (3) there must be an appropriation therefore and a certificate of availability of funds by the local
treasurer; (4) the contract must conform to the formal requisites of written contracts prescribed by law; and if a
province is a party to a contract conveying title to real property, the contract must be approved by the President
or if a party is a party to the contract conveying real property or any interest in it or creating a lien upon it, the
contract must be approved by the provincial governor. (Revised Administrative Code, Sections 2068 and 2196)
(10)

Three consecutive terms limit

37. What are the two conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the three
consecutive terms limit for local elective officials?
ANSWERS: (1) The two conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the three consecutive
terms limit are: (1) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311
SCRA 602; Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574; Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473 and Abundo vs.
COMELEC, GR No.201716, January 8, 2013))
38. ONG was declared by the Board of Canvassers as winner for a mayoralty position in the
1992 elections. He assumed office but was ordered unseated six months later by virtue of a
successful election protest filed by ALEGRE. He ran again in 1995 and 1998 for the same
position and won and served his terms.
(1) Is he eligible to run again for mayor in the 2001 elections?
(2) Would your answer be the same if during the 1992 elections, the order unseating
him was issued after the expiration of his term?
(1) YES. Though proclaimed as winner by the Board of Canvassers, he is not considered duly elected
for that particular term because he was unseated. Voluntary
renunciation of a term of office does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of
the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from the office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602)
(2) NO. In Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473, the Supreme Court held that Ong’s assumption as mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Sur from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, constitutes “service of full term” and should be
counted as full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the Constitution. While Ong’s
opponent “won” in an election protest in the 1998 mayoralty race, and therefore was the legally elected mayor,
that disposition was without practical and legal use and values, having been promulgated after the term of
the contested office has expired. Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty
derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly elected mayor in 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from the start to finish of the term,
should be legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
In Rivera vs. COMELEC, GR 167591ans GR 170577, May 9, 2007, since respondent Morales was
elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, and assumed the position and served as mayor until June
30 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that he was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the
RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him as mayor. Such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Whether as “caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the
powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on indefinitely.”
39. CONDE was elected Mayor of the Municipality of La Trinidad in the elections of 1995, 1998
and 2001. He fully served his first two terms, and during his third term, the municipality was
converted into a component City if La Trinidad. The city charter provided for a hold-over and
so without interregnum CONDE went on the serve as the Mayor of the City of La Trinidad. Is
CONDE eligible again to run for City Mayor in the 2004 elections?
ANSWER: NO. While a new component city which was converted from a municipality acquires a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality, this does not mean however, that for the purpose
of applying the constitutional provision on term limits, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed
as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. Where a person has been elected for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such three-year term the
municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the city charter interrupting his term until the end of
the three-year term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city mayor thereof,
there being no break in the continuity of the term. Accordingly, the municipal mayor is barred from running for
city mayor under the three-term limit rule. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574)
This prohibition also applies to the office of a punong barangay of a municipality merged with another
municipality to create a city as a new political unit. The territorial jurisdiction of such barangay is the same as
before conversion and the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. The voters who voted for the punong
barangay are the same group of voters. The prohibition applies to prevent him from running as punong
barangay for the fourth time, there being no break in the continuity of the terms. (Laceda vs. Limena, GR No.
182867. November25, 2008)
40. Distinguish voluntary renunciation from office from involuntary severance from office.
ANSWER: No severance From Office. Where an elective official was elected for 3-consecutive terms but was
the subject of a preventive suspension by the Ombudsman for several months during one of his terms, such
suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his
office during this period. (Aldovino v. COMELEC, December 23, 2009)
(11)

Voluntary Renunciation From Office. A Punong Barangay who had already completed two consecutive
terms of office and ran for a third term in the Barangay elections of 2002, and while serving his third term as
Punong Barangay, he subsequently ran and won and assumed the position of a Sangguniang Bayan member,
has effectively abandoned the position of a Punong Barangay and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment,
like resignation, is voluntary. When he voluntarily relinquished his office as a Punong Barangay, there is
voluntary renunciation of said office. (Bolos vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184082, March 17, 2009))

Involuntary Severance From Office. SFP was elected and served three consecutive term as municipal
councilor. During his second term, he succeeded as vice-mayor due to the retirement of the incumbent vice-
mayor. His assumption as vice-mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his office as municipal
councilor resulting an interruption in his second term of service. It was held that it could not be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law, hence qualified to run again as
municipal councillor. (Montebon vs. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50)

40. EDWARD was elected City Mayor of Puerto Princesa in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, where he fully served all the three consecutive terms. In the 2001 elections he ran for
governor of Palawan but he lost in such electoral race. A year after, a recall election for
City Mayor of Puerto Princesa was called by the COMELEC. Is EDWARD eligible to run for
City Mayor without violating the constitutional provision on term limit?
ANSWER: YES. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the
third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms.
Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. (Socrates vs.
COMELEC, 2002, 391 SCRA 457)
41. What is the effect of interruption of service on the three-term limit rule?
ANSWER: In Abundo v. COMELEC, GR No. 291716, January 8, 2013, the Court held that the two-year period
during which Abundo’s opponent was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which
effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. Pending the favorable resolution
of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. For two years, Abundo was a
private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. An elected official who was belatedly
declared as winner and assumed office for only a short period of term is declared eligible by the Court, because
he was deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents and that an injustice may be committed
against the people of Viga by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders.
Practice of Profession
42. VGR, a lawyer and a Punong Barangay and Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa,
presided over the conciliation proceedings in an ejectment case. The parties to the case
were not able to amicably settle their dispute. Then one of the parties sought his legal
assistance and handled her case. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counter claim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal.
Is he liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
ANSWER: NO. The Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left the government service in connection “with any
matter in which he intervened while in said service.” Accordingly, as Punong Barangay, he was not forbidden to
practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of
his Department (DILG Secretary), as required by civil service rules and regulations, particularly Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. In acting as a counsel for a party without first securing the required
written permission, he not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules
which is a breach of rule 1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility. (Catu vs. Rellosa, AC No. 5738,
February 19, 2008)
Vacancies and Succession
I. Permanent Vacancy
This type of vacancy arises when the local elective official 1) dies 2) permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office 3) fills a higher vacant office 4) refuses to
assume office 5) fails to qualify 6) removed from office 7) voluntarily resigns 8) Retirement
1. Governor and Mayor - succession by the
 a. Vice Governor and Vice Mayor
Where the office is vacated by an ineligible candidate whose Certificate of
Candidacy was invalid at the time of filing, the eligible candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and
who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility. (Jalosjos v.
COMELEC, 193314, June 25, 2013)
(12)
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the LGC cannot apply in instances when a
de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de
facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the LGC. There is no
vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal
right to assume the position. (Ibid.)
b. Sanggunian members according to ranking
2. Punong Barangay – succession by the
a. Highest ranking sangguniang member
b. Second Highest ranking sangguniang barangay member
3. Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained to
the number of registered voters in each district, and not merely on the number of voters who actually
voted. (Victoria vs. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269).
4. Ties will be resolved by drawing of lots. (Sec.44)
5. Sanggunian
a. Provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities – appointment by the
President
b. Component city and municipality – appointment by governor
c. Under paragraph (a) of Section 45 of the Local Government Code, it is the Provincial
Governor who fills any permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan by appointment.
(Farinas vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396))
The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the
members formerly occupying the next higher rank which in turn also had become vacant by
any of the causes enumerated, and the term “last vacancy” is thus used in Section 45(b) of
the Local Government Code, to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. In
Navarro vs. CA, 355 SCRA 672, with the elevation of Tamayo who belonged to Reforma
Party, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be
filled up with someone who belongs to the political party of Tamayo. To argue that the
vacancy created was that formerly held by the 8th Sanggunian member, a Lakas Party
Member, would result in the increase in that party’s representation in the Sanggunian at the
expense of Reforma Party.
Thus, the appointment of Navarro to fill up the vacancy in the Sanggunian is valid.
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain party representation as willed by
the people in the election. Otherwise, Reforma Party’s representation in the Sanggunian
would be diminished.
d. Sangguniang barangay – appointment by mayor
e. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the political party of the
member who caused the vacancy. (Farinas vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396) If the member does
not belong to any party, the appointee shall be recommended by the sanggunian. (Ibid.)
Neither petitioner nor respondent is entitled to the vacant seat in the Sangguniang
Bayan. While petitioner was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended
by the Sangguniang Bayan. Such recommendation is a condition sine qua non for the validity
of the appointment. Although respondent was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan, it
was the municipal mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him. (Ibid.)
f. The appointee for the sangguniang barangay shall be recommended by the sangguniang
barangay.
g. Vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian shall be filled
by the official next in rank of the organization. (Sec. 45)
II. Temporary vacancy
This vacancy arises when an elected official is temporarily incapacitated to perform their
duties due to legal or physical reasons such as physical sickness, leave of absence, travel abroad or
suspension from office.
1. When the governor, mayor or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties, the
vice governor, vice mayor, or ranking sangguniang barangay member shall exercise his powers except
 the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees, which can only be exercised after 30 working
days.
Since the Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in case of temporary
vacancy in the position of vice governor, because of the exigencies of public service, the President,
through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may extend a temporary appointment to
remedy the situation. The President is authorized by law to make temporary appointments to vacant
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appointive positions. In the absence of a contrary provision, there is no reason why this cannot be
applied to this case. The appointment of petitioner is in accordance with the intention of the LGC,
which provides that in case of permanent vacancy in the office of the vice governor, the member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes shall assume office. The
contention the it’s the SP who should make the appointment has no merit. As between the President,
who has supervision over local governments, and the members of the SP, who are junior to the vice
governor, the former should prevail. Even if the President has no power to appoint petitioner, at the
very least he is a de facto officer and is entitled to compensation. (Menzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251)
3. When the local chief executive is traveling within the Philippines, but outside of his jurisdiction for not
more than 3 consecutive days, he may designate an officer-in-charge. The authorization shall specify
the powers of the officer-in-charge except the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees.
3. If the local chief executive does not issue the authorization, the vice governor, vice mayor, or highest
ranking sangguniang barangay member shall assume his powers on the fourth day of his absence.
(Sec. 46)
4. A Vice-governor who is concurrently an acting governor is actually a quasi-governor. For the purpose
of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed a non-member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for the time being. (Gamboa v. Aguirre, GR No. 134213, July 20, 1999)

Disciplinary Action for Local Elective Officials

1. Grounds
a. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
b. Culpable violation of the Constitution.
c. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty.
d. Commission of an offense involving moral turpitude or punishable by at least prision mayor.
e. Abuse of authority.
f. Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive working days, except sanggunian members.
g. Application for, or acquisition of, citizenship or residence or immigrant status of another
country.
h. Other grounds in this Code and other laws.
For disorderly behavior and absence without justifiable cause for four consecutive sessions, a
member of the Sanggunian may be censured, reprimanded, excluded from the session, suspended for
not more than 60 days, or expelled. Suspension or expulsion shall require concurrence of at least two-
thirds of all sanggunian members. A member sentenced by final judgment to imprisonment for at least
one year for a crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically expelled. (Sec.50, LGC))
In the performance of his duties, the Mayor should act within the confines of the law and not
resort to the commission of a felony – a public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the
enforcement of the law and ordinances. (Maderazo vs. People, 503 SCRA 234)
2. Filing of complaints – Jurisdiction (Political Disciplinary Authority)
a. Elective provincial or city officials – Office of the President
b. Elective municipal official – sangguniang panlalawigan, whose decision may be appealed to
the President
c. Elective barangay official – sangguniang panlungsod or bayan, whose decision shall be final.
(Sec. 61, LGC))
3. No investigation shall be held and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within 90 days before
any local election. (Sec. 62, LGC)
4. Preventive suspension
a. Political Disciplinary Authority
i. Official of province, highly urbanized city or independent component city – President
ii. Official of component city or municipality – Governor with recommendation of the
Sanggunian Panlalawigan
iii. Barangay official – Mayor with recommendation of the Sanggunian
Bayan/Panlungsod
b. Grounds
i. Strong evidence of guilt.
ii. Probability that continuance in office can influence or endanger safety of records.
 c. Duration
i. Single suspension – 60 days
ii. Several suspension – 90 days within a year
d. Effect on salary: The respondent official preventively suspended from office shall receive no
salary during such suspension; but, upon subsequent exoneration and
reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary including such emoluments
accruing during such suspension. (Sec. 64, LGC)
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In criminal cases, a 90-day preventive suspension imposed by the Sandiganbayan
on a local elective official instead of the maximum 60 days provided by Section 63 of the
Local Government Code is not flawed where the same was based on Section 13 of RA
3019, malversation of public funds being an offense involving fraud against government
funds and is clearly included among crimes contemplated under that section. The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in
which the criminal charged is filed. The provision pendent lite applies to all persons indicted
upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials. It
applies to a Municipal mayor, a Governor, a Congressman. It is mandatory for a court to place
under preventive suspension a public officer accused before it. (Nicart vs. Sandiganbayan,
495 SCRA 73)
5. Right to Due Process.
The respondent has the right to appear and defend in person or by counsel, to confront the
witnesses against him, and to compulsory process to require the attendance of witnesses and
production of evidence in his favor. (Sec. 65, LGC)
In Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279, the Supreme Court ruled that the denial of the motion of
the Governor for formal investigation is erroneous. His right to formal investigation is spelled out in
Administrative Order No. 23. He has the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel,
the right to confront the witnesses and the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the
production of documentary evidence. The right of the Governor to formal investigation was not
satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers.
6. Decision
To render a decision in administrative cases involving elective officials, the decision of the
Sanggunian must be in “writing and stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such
decisions. (Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616) The so-called “decision’ of a member of a Sanggunian
cannot be regarded as decision of the Sanggunian for lack of signatures of the requisite majority.
(Ibid.)
7. Penalty and Power to Remove
a. The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent, or a period
of 6 months for every administrative offense, nor bar his candidacy as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office.
b. Removal from office shall bar candidacy of the respondent for any elective office. (Sec. 66)
The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials since
such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last
paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. (Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA
55)
Likewise, in Pablico vs. Villapando, 385 SCRA 601, it was held that the power to
remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence,
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the rules and regulations implementing the Local Government
Code insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office erring
elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the
Local Government. Such grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove
elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that
prepared the rules and regulations. No such regulation may alter, amend or contravene a
provision of law, such as the Local Government Code.
The law on suspension and removal of elective public officials must be strictly
construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is
vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary
public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of
suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining
authority. When the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the
power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to
remove. (Ibid.)
The removal from office of local elective officials must not be tainted with partisan
politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that
power in a more impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government units are not
 deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from
imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal. (Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don
Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, NV vs. Punong Barangay Martinez, GR 170626, March 3,
2008)
8. Administrative Appeal
a. Period – 30 days
b. Appellate authority:
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i. Sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and sangguniang bayan –
sangguniang panlalawigan
ii. Sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
and independent component cities – President
iii. President – final (Sec. 67, LGC)
c. Execution
The decision shall be executory pending appeal and the respondent shall be
considered as under preventive suspension should he win the appeal. In the event that the
appeal results in exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during
the pendency of the appeal.(Sec. 68, LGC)
The decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are
immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the
decisions were rendered mandated them so. In sum, the decisions of the Office of
the President are final and executory. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but the
parties may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay
the execution of the decision, Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate
execution. (Calingin vs CA, 434 SCRA 173)
The phrase “final and executory” in Sections 61c, 67 and 68, respectively, simply
means that the administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The
decision is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal the adverse
decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may
be. (Don vs. Lacsa, GR 170810, August 7, 2007)
9. Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman(Non-Political Disciplinary Authority)
Under RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies including members of the cabinet, local governments, government -
owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except those who may be removed only
by impeachment. On the other hand, RA 7160, the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan have disciplinary authority over elective barangay official. Thus,
the Office of the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the local government units over
administrative cases against elective local officials. (Laxina vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 471 SCRA
542)
Power to Impose Preventive Suspension. RA 6770 empowers the Ombudsman to impose a
preventive suspension of a longer period of not more than six (6) months. All appeals from the
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local
Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory
application. (Gov. Lapid vs. CA, 334 SCRA 738) NOTE: The Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman
has since been amended to include provisions on execution pending appeal.
10. Effect of Reelection
The Doctrine of Condonation of Misconduct of Public Officers Committed During a Previous
Term is of American origin introduced in the Philippines in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija, 106 Phil 446 (1959). Known as the Doctrine of Condonation, it expresses that an elective public
official who has been reelected to his position cannot be removed administratively for acts
committed during his previous term because, by reelecting the public officer into office, the electorate
has been deemed to have condoned or forgiven his acts during the previous term and the public officer
becomes immune from removal by way of administrative charges.
A Provincial Governor cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases against petitioner. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos 212 SCRA 768)
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers
underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public
officers which positively recognized, acknowledged and declared that “public office is a public trust.”
Accordingly, “public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people.” Hence, the Court in
Morales v. Court of Appeals and Binay Jr. GR Nos.2007105, November 10, 2015, effectively
abandoned the doctrine which is wholly within the prerogative of the Court with a clarification that such
abandonment should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. --oo0oo--
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