1
TRANSPORTATION QUESTIONS (AQUINO) distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
P9-10
PROBLEMS:
1. X brought seven (7) sacks of palay to the PNR. He paid its freight charges and was issued Way Bill
no. 1. The cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of the train. Without any permission, X boarded
the freight wagon and not the passenger coach. Shortly after the train started, it was derailed. The
freight wagon fell on its side, killing X. There is no evidence that X brought a ticket or paid his fare at
the same time that he paid the freight charges for his cargo. Is X a passenger of PNR?
A: No, X was not a “passenger." X, who was a “stowaway,” was a mere trespasser. Hence, the carrier
assumes no duty of care in favor of X. (1989)
2. City Railways, Inc. (CRI) provides train service, for a fee, to commuters from Manila to Calamba,
Laguna. Commuters are required to purchase tickets and then proceed to the designated loading
and unloading facilities to board the train. Ricardo Santos purchased a ticket for Calamba and
entered the station. While waiting, he had an altercation with the security guards of CRI leading to a
fistfight. Ricardo Santos fell on the railway just as a train was entering the station. Ricardo Santos
was run over by the train. He died. In the action for damages filed by the heirs of Ricardo Santos, CRI
interposed lack of cause of action, contending that the mishap occurred before Ricardo Santos
boarded the train and that it was not guilty of negligence. Decide.
A: The contention of CRI that the heirs have no cause of action is untenable. There was already a
perfected contract to carry Ricardo Santos and the carrier already owed him extraordinary diligence.
The obligation of the carrier to carry Ricardo Santos to his destination was breached, hence, CRI is
liable for culpa-contractual. (2008)
P24-27
CASES:
1. AM Trucking, a small company, operates two trucks for hire on selective basis. It caters to only a
few customers, and its trucks do not make regular or scheduled trips. It does not even have a
certificate of public convenience. On one occasion, Reynaldo contracted AM to transport, for a fee,
100 sacks of rice from Manila to Tarlac. However, AM failed to deliver the cargo, because its truck
was hijacked when the driver stopped in Bulacan to visit his girlfriend. May Reynaldo hold AM as a
common carrier?
Yes. Reynaldo may be held liable as common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both
and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 does not make any
basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. This is also consistent with the definition of public service under
the Public Service Act. (De Guzman v. CA, 168 SCRA 612[1988])
2. Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They
used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in
Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him
out for two weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica's College in
Malate, Manila. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship
Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of ₱3,000.00 through the petitioner’s minibus. The group was scheduled to
leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. However, as several members of the
party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA
until 8:00 o’clock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus. The usual route to Caba,
La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that
petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to
take a detour through the town of Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil
came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described
as “siete.” The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the
speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel
brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and
landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off
the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the
bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It took three persons
to safely remove her from this portion. She was in great pain and could not move.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not
familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the
bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he
was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it
was too late.
Q: Are the petitioners operating as common carriers during the time of the accident?
A: Yes. It does not matter that the bus carried the passengers based on a special agreement and that
the passengers are limited to a certain group. Article 1732 of the NCC makes no distinction between
2
one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does
such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as “a sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully
avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general
public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population. Article 1732 deliberately refrained from
making such distinctions. (Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 111127, July 26, 1996)
(Note that the driver was considered grossly negligence considering the fact that it was raining and
the road was slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on
a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the
terrain. In the same case, petitioners argued that they were not liable because (1) an earlier
departure (made impossible by the congregation’s delayed meeting) could have averted the mishap
and (2) under the contract, the WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. The Court
ruled that neither of these contentions holds water because the hour of departure had not been
fixed and that even if it had been, the delay did not bear directly on the cause of the accident.)
3. On November 12, 1984, Cebu Salvage Corporation (CSC) and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries,
Inc. [MCCII] (as charterer) entered into a voyage charter wherein petitioner was to load 800 to 1,100
metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo at Ayungon, Negros Occidental for
transport to and discharge at Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental to consignee Ferrochrome Phils., Inc.
Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, 1984, petitioner received and loaded 1,100 metric tons of
silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo which left Ayungon for Tagoloan the next day. The
shipment never reached its destination, however, because the M/T Espiritu Santa sank in the
afternoon of December 24, 1984 off the beach of Opol, Misamis Oriental, resulting in the total loss
of the cargo. MCCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment with its insurer, respondent Philippine
Home Assurance Corporation. Respondent paid the claim in the amount of ₱211,500 and was
subrogated to the rights of MCCII. Thereafter, it filed a case in the RTC against CSC for
reimbursement of the amount it paid MCCII. CSC claims that it is not liable insisting that the
agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII hired the vessel from its owner, ALS Timber
Enterprises (ALS). Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, petitioner did not have control and
supervision over the vessel, its master and crew. Thus it could not allegedly be held liable for the loss
of the shipment caused by the sinking of a ship it did not own. Will the action prosper?
A: Yes, the action will prosper. There is a contract of carriage of goods between CSC and MCCII; the
cargo was loaded on board the vessel; loss or non-delivery of the cargo was proven; and petitioner
failed to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss or that it was due to
some casualty or force majeure. The voyage charter here being a contract of affreightment, the
carrier was answerable for the loss of the goods received for transportation.
CSC was the one that contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control over what
vessel it would use. All throughout its dealings with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier.
The fact that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did
not negate its character and duties as a common carrier. The MCCII (respondent’s subrogor) could
not be reasonably expected to inquire about the ownership of the vessels which petitioner carrier
offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it is very difficult and often impossible for the general public
to enforce its rights of action under a contract of carriage if it should be required to know whom the
actual owner of the vessel is. In fact, in this case, the voyage charter itself denominated the
petitioner as the “owner/operator” of the vessel.
The bill of lading was merely a receipt issued by ALS to evidence the fact that the goods had
been received for transportation. It was not signed by MCCII, as in fact it was simply signed by the
supercargo of ALS. This is consistent with the fact that MCCII did not contract directly with ALS.
While it is true that a bill of lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the parties, it
cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and petitioner executed.
Finally, petitioner cannot argue that MCCII should be held liable for its own loss since the
voyage charter stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterer’s account. This deserves scant
consideration. This simply meant that the charterer would take care of having the goods insured. It
could not exculpate the carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage. The law, in
fact, prohibits it and condemns it as unjust and contrary to public policy.
The idea proposed by petitioner is not only preposterous, it is also dangerous. It says that a carrier
that enters into a contract of carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper if it does not own the
vessel it chooses to use. MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue
ALS for reimbursement for its loss. Certainly, to permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility
for the goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging non-ownership of the vessel it
employed) would radically derogate from the carrier’s duty of extraordinary diligence. It would also
open the door to collusion between the carrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting
of liability from the carrier to one without any financial capability to answer for the resulting
damages. (Cebu Salvage Corporation v. Philippine Home Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 150403, January
25, 2007)
3
P29-30
PROBLEMS:
1. Tirso Molina charters a vessel owned and operated by Star Shipping Co., a common carrier, for the
purpose of transporting two tractors to his logging concession. The crane Operator of the shipping
company somehow negligently puts the tractors in a place where they would tilt each other. During
the trip, a strong wind hits the vessel, causing severe damage to the tractors. Tirso Molina sues the
shipping company for damages. The latter cites a stipulation in the charter agreement exempting the
company from liability for loss or damage arising from the negligence of its agents. Tirso Molina
countered by stating that the aforementioned stipulation is against public policy and therefore, null
and void. Is the stipulation valid? Would you hold the shipping company liable?
A: Yes. The stipulation is valid if there was bareboat charter. A common carrier that undertakes to
carry a special cargo or charter to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private
carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid, being
not against public policy. Hence, Star Shipping Company is not liable.
2. During the elections last May, AB, a congressional candidate in Marinduque, chartered the
helicopter owned by Lobe Mining Corporation (LMC) for use in the election campaign. AB paid LMC
the same rate normally charged by companies regularly engaged in the plane chartering business. In
the charter agreement between LMC and AB, LMC expressly disclaimed any responsibility for the
acts or omissions of its pilot or for the defective condition of the plane’s engine. The helicopter
crashed killing AB. Investigations disclose that the pilot’s error was the cause of the accident. LMC
now consults you on its possible liability for AB’s death in the light of the above findings. How would
you reply to LMC’s query?
A: I would reply to LMC that it may not be held liable for the death of AB. A stipulation with private
carrier that would disclaim responsibility for simple negligence of the carrier’s employees is a valid
stipulation. Such stipulation, however, will not hold in case of liability for gross negligence or bad
faith.
3. C Co. shipped 20, 000 bags of soy beans through S/S Melon, owned and operated by X Shipping
Lines, consigned to the Toyo Factory and insured by the Surety Insurance Co., against all risks. C Co.
hired the entire vessel, with the option to go north or south, loading, stowing and discharging at its
risks and expense. The owner and the shipper agree on a stipulation exempting the owner from
liability for the negligence of its agents.
When the cargo as delivered to the consignee, there were shortages amounting to ₱10,500.00.
The insurance company paid for the damage and sought reimbursement from the X Shipping Lines as
carrier. Is the carrier liable?
A: X Shipping Lines is not liable if there was bareboat charter. X Shipping Lines agreed to carry a
special cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. Hence, the New Civil
Code provisions on common carriers cannot be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as
a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the ship owner from liability for the
negligence of its agents is not against policy and is deemed valid.
P32
PROBLEM:
1. While at sea, the captain of vessel A received distress signals from vessel B, and vessel A
responded and found vessel B with engine failure and drifting off course. Upon acceptance by vessel
B of vessel A’s offer, vessel A connected two lines to vessel B and towed it safely to port. There was
no grave marine peril because the sea was smooth and vessel B was far from the rocks. In a suit for
compensation for towage, who are entitled to recover, the owner, the crew, or both? Give brief
reasons. (1979 Bar)
A: The shipowner of the towing vessel is entitled to compensation. What is involved in the present
case is towage and not salvage. Hence, contract is between the owner of the towing vessel and the
shipowner of the vessel that is being towed. Services are rendered by the towing vessel for which it
is entitled to compensation. It would be different if the case involves salvage where the members of
the crew of the vessel that performed the salvage are entitled to compensation. However, there is
no salvage in the present case but a contract of towage.
P54-55
PROBLEMS:
1. A is the registered owner of a truck for hire. He sold the truck to B and possession was
immediately delivered to B who operated the same. The truck however, remained
registered in the name of A. While operating the truck, B's driver ran over a child who died
thereafter. The heirs of the child sued A for damages. A's defense is that he cannot be held
liable as he had already sold the truck to B and it was B's driver who was responsible for the
accident. Decide with reasons.
A: A is liable to the heirs of the victim. Under the registered owner rule, the registered
owner remains to be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third
persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of any
unregistered sale of the vehicle.
2. A was driving a jeepney registered in the name of B. The jeepney, while being driven
negligently by A, hit and injured X, so X sued B for damages. The defense of B was that he
sold the jeepney to C and that X should sue C. Rule on B's defense, with reasons.
4
A: The defense of B is untenable and he is liable to X. Under the registered owner rule, the
registered owner remains to be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer.
As to third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of
any unregistered sale of the vehicle. Hence, B, being the registered owner, continues to be
the owner of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons. (1979)
3. Mr. Villa, a franchise holder and registered owner of a truck for hire, entered into a lease
contract with Mrs. Santos for the lease by the latter of said truck. The lease contract was
not brought to the knowledge of the LTFRB and was therefore not approved by the Land
LTFRB. One stormy night, the said truck was speeding along EDSA, skidded and ran over X
who died on the spot. The parents of X brought an action for damages against Mr. Villa for
the death of their son.
a.) Will the action against Mr. Villa prosper? Reasons.
b.) What recourse, if any, does X have?
A. a.) Yes, the action against Mr. Villa will prosper. Under the registered owner rule, the
registered owner remains to be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer.
As to third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of
any unregistered sale of the vehicle. This is especially true in cases involving holders of
franchises. The holders of franchises are liable to the public even if their vehicles are leased
to another without prior approval of the appropriate government agency. (MYC Agro-
Industrial v. Caldo, 131, SCRA 10; Jereos v. CA, 117 SCRA 795).
b.) An action for quasi-delict can also be maintained by the heirs of X against Mrs. Santos
and/or the driver of the vehicle. The driver may also be charged criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
4. Johnny owns a Sarao jeepney. He asked his neighbor Van if he could operate the said jeep
under Van's certificate of public convenience. Van agreed and, accordingly, Johnny
registered his jeep in Van's name.
On June 10, 1990, one of the passenger jeepneys operated by Van bumped Tomas.
Tomas was injured and in due time, he filed a complaint for damages against Van and his
driver for the injuries he suffered. The court rendered judgment in favor of Tomas and
ordered Van and his driver, jointly and severally liable, to pay Tomas actual and moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs.
The sheriff levied on the jeepney belonging to Johnny but registered in the name of
Van. Johnny filed a third-party claim with the sheriff alleging ownership of the jeepney
levied upon and stating that the jeepney was registered in the name of Van merely to
enable Johnny to make use of Van's certificate of public convenience.
May the sheriff proceed with the public auction of Johnny's jeepney?
Yes, the sheriff may proceed with the auction sale of the jeepney. The vehicle remains to be the
property of the registered owner despite the alleged transfer to another. As regards the public and
third persons, the vehicle is considered the property of the registered operator. (Santos v. Sibug, 104
SCRA 520 [1990])
P66
PROBLEM:
1. A, in Manila, shipped on board a vessel of B, chairs to be used in the movie house of
consignee C in Cebu. No date for delivery or indemnity for delay was stipulated. The chairs,
however, were not claimed promptly by C and were shipped by mistake back to Manila,
where it was discovered and re-shipped to Cebu. By the time the chairs arrived, the date of
inauguration of the movie house passed by and it had to be postponed. C brings an action
for damages against B claiming loss of profits during the Christmas season when he
expected the movie house to be opened. Decide the case with reasons.
A: C may sue B for the loss of his profits provided that ample proof thereof is presented in court.
The carrier is obligated to transport the goods without delay. The carrier is liable if he is guilty of
delay in the shipment of cargo, causing damages to the consignee. (1979)
P70
PROBLEM:
1. If a shipper, without changing the place of delivery changes the consignment of consignee
of the goods (after said goods had been delivered to the carrier), under what condition will
the carrier be required to comply with the new orders of the shipper?
A: Article 360 provides that if the shipper should change the consignee of the goods without
changing their destination, the carrier shall comply with the new order provided the shipper
returns to the carrier the bill of lading and a new one is issued showing the novation of the
contract. However, the shipper must pay all expenses for the change. (1975)
5
P77
PROBLEMS:
1. Maria boarded a passenger truck owned by Metro Transit and driven by Juan. While the
truck was proceeding to its destination, it fell into a ravine and several passengers, including
Maria were killed. The truck was insured under a Common Carrier's policy with Island
Insurance Company. State the liabilities, if any, of Metro Transit to the heirs of Maria.
A: Metro Transit is liable to the heirs of Maria for breach of contract of carriage. It is clear
that there was breach of contract of carriage because the passenger died while riding the
carrier. The fact that death or injury was caused gives rise to the presumption of negligence.
(1968)
2. A shipped 100 pieces of plywood from Davao City to Manila. He took a marine insurance
policy to insure the shipment against loss or damage due to "perils of the sea, barratry, fire,
jettison, pirates and other such perils." When the ship left the port of Davao, the shipman in
charge forgot to secure one of the portholes, through which sea water seeped during the
voyage, damaging the plywood. A filed a claim against the insurance company which
refused to pay on the ground that the loss or damage was due to a peril of the sea or any of
the risks covered by the policy. It was admitted that the sea was reasonably calm during the
voyage and that no strong winds or waves were encountered by the vessel. How would you
decide the case? Explain.
A: The insurer validly refused to pay because the proximate cause of the damage to the
plywood was not the perils or risks insured against but rather the negligence of the shipman
in charge in forgetting to secure one of the portholes of the ship. However, a can recover
his damages from the shipowner or ship agent of said vessel, for not having exercised
extraordinary diligence on vigilance over goods. (1983)
P83-86
PROBLEMS:
1. Peter hailed a taxicab owned and operated by Jimmy Cheng and driven by Hemie Cortez.
Peter asked Cortez to take him to his office in Malate. On the way to Malate, the taxicab
collided with a passenger jeepney, as a result of which Peter was injured, i.e., he fractured
his left leg. Peter sued Jimmy for damages, based upon a contract of carriage, and Peter
won. Jimmy wanted to challenge the decision before the Supreme Court on the ground that
the trial court erred in not making an express finding as to whether or not Jimmy was
responsible for the collision and, hence, civilly liable to Peter. He went to see you for advice.
What will you tell him? Explain your answer.
A: I will counsel Jimmy to desist from challenging the decision. The cause of action of Peter
is culpa contractual, hence, the carrier's negligence is presumed. The presumption arises
because there is no question that there was a contract of carriage between Peter and the
carrier and Peter was injured while under the care of the said carrier. Consequently, the
burden of proof rests on Jimmy to establish that despite an exercise of utmost diligence the
collision could not have been avoided. (1990)
2. In an action grounded on the contract of carriage, is there a need for the court to make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it liable for
claims in behalf of the injured or deceased passengers? Explain.
A: No, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in
the case of death or injuries to passengers. The burden is upon the carrier to prove that he
observed the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all
circumstances. (1982)
3. In a court case involving claims for damages arising from death and injury of bus
passengers, counsel for the bus operator files a demurrer to evidence arguing that the
complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiffs did not submit any evidence that the
operator or its employees were negligent. If you were the judge, would you dismiss the
complaint?
A: No, I will not dismiss the complaint provided that there was proof of the death of and/or
injury to passengers. Negligence on the part of the carrier is presumed the moment the
passenger with whom the carrier had a contract is injured. The burden is on the common
carrier to prove that he has a valid defense. (1997)
4. Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner and consignee of two cases of books, shipped in good
order and condition at New York, U.S.A., on board the defendant's steamship President
Garfield, for transport and delivery to the plaintiff in the City of Manila, all freight charges
paid. The two cases arrived in Manila on September 1, 1927, in bad order and damaged
condition, resulting in the total loss of one case and a partial loss of the other. The loss in
one case is Php. 1,630.00, and the other Php. 700.00, for which he filed his claims, and
defendant has refused and neglected to pay, giving as its reason that the damage in
question "was caused by sea water". Is the defendant liable to the plaintiff?
A: Yes, the defendant is liable. The defendant having received the two boxes in good
condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it
received them. From the time of their delivery to the defendant in New York until they are
delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the control and supervision of the
defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The defendant having admitted that the
boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the burden of proof then shifted,
and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the damage was caused
6

by reason of some fact which exempted it from liability. As to how the boxes were
damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of
the defendant and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the
plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused
would force him to call and rely upon the employees of the defendant's ship, which in legal
effect would be to say that he could not recover any damage for any reason. That is not the
law.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have
some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition,
and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves
upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason
of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left
without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
And the evidence for the defendant shows that the damage was largely caused by
"sea water," from which it contends that it is exempt under the provisions of its bill of
lading and the provisions of the Article 361 of the Code of Commerce.
In the final analysis, the cases were received by the defendant in New York in good
order and condition, and when they arrived in Manila, they were in bad condition, and one
was a total loss. The fact that the cases were damaged by "seawater", standing alone and
within itself, is not evidence that they were damaged by force majeure or for a cause
beyond the defendant's control. The words "perils of the sea," as stated in defendant's brief
apply to "all kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding," and
among other things, it is said: "Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are
within the expression," and "where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the
shipowner is excused". "Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in
both words 'peril' or 'accident' ". (Amado Mirasol v. The Robert Dollar Co., G.R. No. L-29721,
March 27, 1929)
turned the wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-
over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. The forceful drop of the vehicle on the
floor of the road broke and split it into two parts. Both driver Padilla and passenger Jose
Marcial K. Ochoa were injured and rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue Medical
Center, Ochoa was not as lucky as Padilla who was alive. He was declared dead on arrival
from the accident. The death certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon
City cited the cause of his death as vehicular accident. G&S argues that it is not liable
because the collision was allegedly unforeseen since its driver had every right to expect that
the delivery van would just overtake him and not hit the side of the taxi. Is G&S liable?
A: Yes, G&S is liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial. What is clear from the records is that there
existed a contract of carriage between G & S, as the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab,
and Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a common carrier, G & S "is bound to
carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." However,
Jose Marcial was not able to reach his destination safely as he died during the course of the
travel. "In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is
negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This
statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence." Unfortunately, G&S miserably failed to overcome this presumption
because it is clear that the accident which led to Jose Marcial's death was due to the
reckless driving and gross negligence of G&S' driver, Padilla, thereby holding G&S liable to
the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of contract of carriage. (Heirs of Marcial K. Ochoa v.
G&S Transport Corporation, G.R. Nos. 170071 and 170125, March 9, 2011)

5. It appears that sometime in the evening of March 10, 1995, at the Manila Domestic Airport,
the late Jose Marcial K. Ochoa boarded and rode a taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a
passenger vehicle for hire owned and operated by defendant corporation under the
business name "Avis Coupon Taxi" (Avis) and driven by its employee and authorized driver
Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to Teacher's Village, Diliman, Quezon City. At about
11:00 p.m., the taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue [EDSA], in front of
Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed. While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan)
fly-over, it overtook another cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a
ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the
fly-over and the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its
speed, its driver (Padilla) was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla
7
P91-94
PROBLEMS AND CASES:
1. S shipped goods from Australia on board a foreign vessel owned and operated by X shipping
company, based in Australia and represented in the Philippines by R. The goods were
consigned to T of Manila and insured by U against all risks. Upon arrival in Manila Bay, the
goods were discharged from the vessel to a lighter owned by the Bay Brokerage Co. When
delivered to and received by T, the goods were found to have sustained losses or damages.
Evidence disclosed that the damage occurred while the goods were in the custody of the
carrier. The insurance company paid the amount of the loss but sought reimbursement
from X and/or R. R disclaimed any liability alleging that he is a mere agent of X, and having
acted as agent of a disclosed principal is, therefore, not liable. What is the liability, if any, of
Bay Brokerage Co.?
A: Bay Brokerage Co. has no liability. The facts indicate that the goods were not yet
delivered to the brokerage company when they were damaged. Even if the said company
can be considered a common carrier, its duty starts only upon delivery of the goods.
2. Star Shipping Lines accepted 100 cartons of sardines from Master to be delivered to 555
Company in Manila. Only 88 cartons were delivered, however, these were in bad condition.
555 Company claimed from Star Shipping Lines the value of the missing goods, as well as
the damaged goods. Star Shipping Lines refused because the former failed to present a bill
of lading. Resolve with reasons the claim of 555 Company.
A: The claim of 555 Company must prosper. The carrier breached its obligation to safely
transport the goods to its destination. The fact that the shipper was not able to present the
bill of lading is not a bar to recovery. The contract of carriage was already perfected and
effective despite the absence of the bill of lading. (2005)
3. Delsan received on board MT Larusan a shipment consisting of 1,986.627 k/l Automotive
Diesel Oil (diesel oil) at the Bataan Refinery Corporation for transportation and delivery to
the bulk depot in Bacolod City of Caltex Phils., Inc. (Caltex). On August 7, 1984, the shipment
arrived in Bacolod City. Immediately thereafter, unloading operations commenced. The
discharging of the diesel oil started at about 1:30 PM of the same day. However, at about
10:30 PM, the discharging had to be stopped on account of the discovery that the port bow
mooring of the vessel was intentionally cut or stolen by unknown persons. Because there
was nothing holding it, the vessel drifted westward, dragged and stretched the flexible
rubber hose attached to the riser, broke the elbow into pieces, severed completely the
rubber hose connected to the tanker from the main delivery line at sea bed level and
ultimately caused the diesel oil to spill into the sea. To avoid further spillage, the vessel’s
crew tried water flushing to clear the line of the diesel oil but to no avail. In the meantime,
the shore tender, who was waiting for the completion of the water flushing, was surprised
when the tanker signaled a “red light” which meant stop pumping. Unaware of what
happened, the shore tender, thinking that the vessel would, at any time, resume pumping,
did not shut the storage tank gate valve. As all the gate valves remained open, the diesel oil
that was earlier discharged from the vessel into the shore tank backflowed. Due to non-
availability of a pump boat, the vessel could not send somebody ashore to inform the
people at the depot about what happened. After almost an hour, a gauger and an assistant
surveyor from the Caltex’s Bulk Depot Office boarded the vessel. It was only then that they
found out what had happened. Thereafter, the due immediately went ashore to see to it
that the shore tank gate valve was closed. The loss of diesel oil due to spillage was placed at
113.788 k/l while some 435,081 k/l thereof backflowed from the shore tank. As a result of
spillage and backflow of diesel oil, Caltex sought recovery of the loss from Delsan, but the
latter refused to pay. Delsan argued that it should not be held liable for the loss of diesel oil
due to backflow because the same had already been actually and legally delivered to Caltex
at the time it entered the shore tank. Is the argument tenable?
A: No. Delsan’s argument that it should not be held liable for the loss of diesel oil due to
backflow because the same had already been actually and legally delivered to Caltex at the
time it entered the shore tank holds no water. It had been settled that the subject cargo
was still in the custody of Delsan because the discharging thereof has not yet been finished
when the backflow occurred. Since the discharging of the cargo into the depot has not yet
been completed at the time of the spillage when the backflow occurred, there is no reason
to imply that there was actual delivery of the cargo to the consignee. Delsan is straining the
issue by insisting that when the diesel oil entered into the tank of Caltex on shore, there
was legally, at that moment, a complete delivery thereof to Caltex. To be sure, the
extraordinary responsibility of common carrier lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation
until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to
a person who has the right to receive them. The discharging of oil products to Caltex Bulk
Depot has not yet been finished, Delsan still has the duty to guard and to preserve the
cargo. The carrier still has in it the responsibility to guard and preserve the goods, a duty
incident to its having the goods transported.” (Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. American
Home Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 149019, August 15, 2006, 530 Phil. 332)
4. On April 4, 1989, BM shipped on board the vessel Nen Jiang, owned and operated by CO.
Shipping Co. Represented by its agent WALLEM. 3,500 boxes of watermelon valued at US
$5,950.00 covered by Bill of Lading No. HKG 99012 and exported through Letter of Credit
No. HK 1031/30 issued by National Bank of Pakistan and 1,611 boxes of fresh mangoes with
a value of US$14,273.46 covered by Bill of Lading No. HKG 99013 and exported through the
Letter of Credit No. HK 1032/30 also issued by PAKISTAN BANK. The Bills of Lading
contained the following pertinent provision: “One of the Bills of Lading must be
surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order. The shipment was
8
bound for Hongkong with PAKISTAN BANK as consignee and Great Prospect Company of
Kowloon, Hong Kong (hereinafter GPC) as notify party.” The goods were delivered to GPC
without the bills of lading.
a) Can carrier validly deliver the goods to GPC?
b) Did the common carrier validly deliver the goods without the bill of lading or
bank guarantee?
A: a) Yes, the goods can be validly delivered to GPC. The extraordinary responsibility of the
common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee
or to the person who has a right to receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills
of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party. However, in the export invoices
GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his
demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This
premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer
which, conformably with Article 1736 had, other than the consignee, the right to receive
them was proper.
b) Yes. The carrier submitted in evidence a telex dated April 5, 1989 as basis for delivering
the cargoes to GPC without the bills of lading and bank guarantee. The telex instructed the
delivery of various shipments to the respective consignees without need of presenting the
bill of lading and bank guarantee per the respective shipper’s request since “for prepaid
shipt ofrt charges already fully paid.” Petitioner was named therein as shipper and GPC as
consignee with respect to Bill of Lading Nos. HKG 99012 and HKG 99013. To implement the
said telex instruction, the delivery of the shipment must be to GPC, the notify party or real
importer/buyer of the goods and not the Pakistani Bank since the latter can very well
present the original Bills of Lading in its possession. Likewise, if it were the Pakistani Bank to
whom the cargoes were to be strictly delivered, it will no longer be proper to require a bank
guarantee as a substitute for the Bill of Lading. To construe otherwise will render
meaningless the telex instruction. After all, the cargoes consist of perishable fresh fruits and
immediate delivery thereof to the buyer/importer is essentially a factor to reckon with.
Besides, GPC is listed as one among the several consignees in the telex (Exhibit 5-B) and the
instruction in the telex was to arrange delivery of A/M shipment (not any party) to
respective consignees without presentation of OB/L and bank guarantee. (Benito Macam v.
Court of Appeals, et al,. G.R. No. 125524, August 25,1999)
P97-104
PROBLEMS AND CASES:
1. X, an 80-year old epileptic, boarded the S/S Tamaraw in Manila going to Mindoro. To
disembark, the passengers have to walk through a gangplank. While negotiating the
gangplank, X slipped and fell into the waters. X was saved from drowning and was brought
to a hospital but after a month died from pneumonia. Except for X, all passengers were able
to walk through the gangplank. What is the liability of the owner of S/S Tamaraw?
A: The owner of S/S Tamaraw is liable for the death of X. Failure to exercise utmost
diligence in the safety of passengers is presumed the moment the passenger did not reach
his destination. In the present case, X was still a passenger when he fell into the waters
because he was only disembarking from the vessel. Hence, the presumption against the
carrier is operative. It is up to the carrier to prove its exercise of utmost diligence.
Moreover, it is well-settled that if, in the use of a gangplank, a passenger falls off
and is injured, the carrier is liable for the injuries sustained irrespective of the cause of the
fall if a sufficient gangplank would have prevented the injury. (1989)
2. A bus of GL Transit on its way to Davao stopped to enable a passenger to alight. At that
moment, Santiago, who had been waiting for a ride, boarded the bus. However, the bus
driver failed to notice Santiago who was still standing on the bus platform, and stepped on
the accelerator. Because of the sudden motion, Santiago slipped and fell down, suffering
serious injuries. May Santiago hold GL Transmit liable for breach of contract of carriage?
A: Yes. Santiago may hold GL Transit liable for breach of contract. It is well-settled that,
motor vehicles like passenger jeepneys and buses are duty bound to stop their conveyances
a reasonable length of time in order to and passengers an opportunity to board and enter,
and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden
starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they do so. (Dangwa Transportation Co.,
Inc. v. CA, et al., GR. No. 95582, October 7, 1.991, 202 SCRA 574) Obviously, the driver of the
bus did not exercise utmost diligence in affording Santiago reasonable opportunity to board
the bus. (1996).
3. On October 14, 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station (operated by LRTA) after purchasing a
“token” (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform
near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area (who was an
employee of Prudent Security Agency) approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fisttfight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment
that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. The
moving train struck Natividad, and he was killed instantaneously. Are LRTA and Prudent
liable?
A: Yes, LRTA is liable but Prudent is NOT liable. The law requires common carriers to carry
passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so
obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. In
9
the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would
be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be
proved.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake
the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage.
With respect to Prudent, if at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the
Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the
part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable
on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is
primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee. Unfortunately, there is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor
(Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly
proven. Hence, Prudent cannot be made liable. (Light Railway Transit Authority vs. Marjorie
Navidad, GR. No. 145804, February 6, 2003)
4. On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for
the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on at
Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. It was alleged that on March 25, 1985, while petitioner
Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a
reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and
safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However,
instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad
faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and
cargo to their respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital
where he expired.
The place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both
between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded
the same. The victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward
and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on
where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge
that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his
intention to board the same. Is the argument tenable? Is the carrier liable?
A: The carrier is liable. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had
no knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not
manifested his intention to board the same is not tenable. When the bus is not in motion
there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to
board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus
stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he
was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a
breach of such duty.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by
railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time
in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for
injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of
their conveyances while they are doing so.
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding
the same cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances.
In this case, the bus had “just started” and “was still in slow motion” at the point
where the victim had boarded and was on its platform.
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to attempt to board a train
or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the
attempt to board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact
that passengers board and slight from a slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common
experience and both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of
such an ordinary practice
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already
considered a passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a
contractual relation. Hence. it has been held that the duty which the carrier of passengers
owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting
therefrom.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to
bring the gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a
patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even
be stigmatized as callous indifference. (Dangwa Transportation Co. vs. Court of Appeals, GR.
No. 95582, October 7, 1991)
10
5. On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their
minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2
years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga),
owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao,
Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggage
containing their personal belongings. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-
brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets covering the full fares of the
plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both
were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant’s rules and
regulations.
After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the
passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off.
With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their
baggage, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano
led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or
five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get
his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed
him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the
bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats
near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly Started
moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor
has not given the driver the customary Signal to start, since said conductor was still
attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was
again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where
the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion. Mariano Beltran Immediately jumped
from the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the
side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At
that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying
prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than
his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with
her parents.
Is the carrier liable?
A: Yes, the carrier is liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be
pointed out that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their
children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for
disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had to
return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left
under one of the seats of the bus. There can be no controversy that as far as the father is
concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the
relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For,
the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after
alighting from the car, aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from
the car. The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by
the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her
safety under the contract of carriage also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by
the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. And, what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station
platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his
destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company’s premises, but before
actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot,
and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his
brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a
passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages
which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was,
must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board
of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to
run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this
instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the
circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent had exercised the “utmost
diligence” of a “very cautions person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not
put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave
him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the
passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was
not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier,
entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated,
herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Article 2180
of the Civil Code. The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the
claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that “the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs’ daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent.”
This allegation was also proven when it was established during the trial that the driver, even
before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on
11
the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of
proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant
employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found,
petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged pecuniarily
liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran. (La Mallorca v. Court appeals, GR. No. L-
20761, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 739)
6. The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V
Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for
Manila, having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. ‘B’). On May 12,
1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the
pier. Instead of using said gangplank, Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which
was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to
the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. ‘2') between the third party
defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator
Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said
vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel.
While the crane Was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from
said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were Still loaded in the vessel,
went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to
the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the
side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later
expired three days thereafter, on May 15, 1976. the cause of his death according to the
Death Certificate being “hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic
bone lacerating the urinary bladder." Is the carrier liable? Was Viana still a passenger at the
time of the accident?
A: Yes. the carrier is liable for the death of the victim. The victim was still a passenger at
that time. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock
or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger
has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all
the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for
his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that
the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person
remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
The victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When
the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had
every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only
to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time
to claim their baggage. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in
petitioner’s premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was
possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure
in the case of petitioner’s vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that
time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still
deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
There is no showing that petitioner was extra-ordinarily diligent in requiring or
seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to
subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal
evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate the “utmost diligence of very cautious
persons” to be exercised “as far as human care and foresight can provide” which is required
by law of common carriers with respect to their passengers. (Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, GR. No. 84458, November 6. 1989. 179 SCRA 95)
P117
PROBLEMS:
1. Do syndicated Ores have the right to insist that the vessel may carry the cargo to the US per bill of
lading, or that the ship owner hire a substitute vessel to complete the contracted voyage in
accordance with the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in the carriage of goods?
A: It depends. The captain shall be obliged to charter at his expense another one in good condition
to carry the cargo to its destination if the vessel became unseaworthy during the voyage. Under
Article 657 of the Code of Commerce, if the captain should not furnish through indolence or malice,
a vessel to take the cargo to its destination, the shippers may charter one at the expense of the
captain/shipowner.
2. While in Hong Kong, X shipped on the S/S Burma Maru for Manila 500 cages of fine yellow colored
canaries which he intended to sell in his pet shop here. The shipment is worth P4,000. Due to lack of
proper facilities in the hold of the ship, all the birds dies during the trip. Under the provisions of the
COGSA, what is the liability of the carrier?
A: The owner of S/S Burma Maru is liable for the damage caused by the death of the birds during the
trip. Section 3 of the COGSA provides that the carrier is obligated to make the holds of the ship fit for
the cargo that it is accepting. Obviously, the carrier failed to comply such obligation.