7 Ambil v. Comelec

8/31/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 344
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ambil, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
*
G.R. No. 143398. October 25, 2000.
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION, FORMERLY SECOND
DIVISION), and JOSE T. RAMIREZ, respondents.
Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; The Supreme Court has no power to

review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
Division of the Commission on Elections.—“We have interpreted this
provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.” This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not
of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme
Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.
Same; Same; Same; The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of
the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court,
now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.—The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec
en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now
expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires
that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate
remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement
constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
_____________
* EN BANC.
359
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 359
Same; Same; Same; A decision, order or resolution of a division of the

Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for
reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.—In like manner, a decision, order or
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016ce72c5e200b578707003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/21
resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en
banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a
motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
Same; Same; Same; The exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases,
dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of the
petition, do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration
is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en
banc.—Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case
within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in division cannot dispense with the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order
of the Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not
reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration having
been filed and resolved by the Division. The instant case does not fall under
any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing
with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth,
the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the
Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; The Court cannot assume that the
Comelec will promulgate a void resolution and violate the Constitution and
the law; It must be assumed that the members of the Commission in Division
or en banc are sworn to uphold and will obey the Constitution.—There is
nothing irregular about the order of promulgation of the resolution in the
case, except in the mind of suspicious parties. Perhaps what was wrong in
the order was the reference to the memorandum of the two commissioners
that was not necessary and was a superfluity, or excessus in linguae. All the
members of the Division were incumbent Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and had authority to decide the case
in the Division. What appears to be patently null and void is the so-called
Guiani resolution if it is the one to be promulgated. We cannot assume that
the Comelec will promulgate a void resolution and violate the Constitution
and the law. We must assume that the members of the Commission in
Division or en banc are sworn to uphold and will obey the Constitution.
360
Judgments; One who is no longer a member of the Commission at the

time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part
in that resolution or decision, much more could he be the ponente of the
resolution or decision.—A final decision or resolution becomes binding
only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no
longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or
resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or
decision. Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision.
The resolution or decision of the Division must be signed by a majority of
its members and duly promulgated. Commissioner Guiani might have
signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement from office, but when he
vacated his office without the final decision or resolution having been
promulgated, his vote was automatically invalidated. Before that resolution
or decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no valid resolution or
decision to speak of.
Same; It is jurisprudentially recognized that at any time before
promulgation of a decision or resolution, the ponente may change his mind.
—It is jurisprudentially recognized that at any time before promulgation of a
decision or resolution, the ponente may change his mind. Moreover, in this
case, before a final decision or resolution could be promulgated, the ponente
retired and a new commissioner appointed. And the incoming commissioner
has decided to take part in the resolution of the case. It is presumed that he
had taken the position of his predecessor because he co-signed the request
for the promulgation of the Guiani resolution.
Administrative Law; Judicial Review: Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies; Exceptions; Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him.—In a long line of cases, this
Court has held consistently that “before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.” “This is
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion for
reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special civil action
for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the latter can convincingly
show that his case falls under any of the following exceptions to the
361
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 361
rule: (1) when the question is purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention is
urgent, (3) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage,
(4) where the controverted acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high
government official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter, and
seeks when, the issue for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot.”
DE LEON, JR., J., Dissenting:
Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; A thorough analysis of the

challenged actions of the COMELEC First Division reveals clearly that the
instant petition falls under the exception for not only is there a great
necessity to resolve the election protest case with utmost dispatch inasmuch
as another election is fast approaching but, in addition, the challenged
order is a patent nullity.—A thorough analysis of the challenged actions of
the COMELEC First Division reveals clearly that the instant petition falls
under the exception for not only is there a great necessity to resolve the
election protest case with utmost dispatch inasmuch as another election is
fast approaching but, in addition, the challenged order is a patent nullity.
Besides, the case of Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, Br. XXXIX relied
upon in the majority opinion is not applicable for in that case the questions
tendered were not pure questions of law.
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; The COMELEC Commissioners are
not infallible—they can and do commit errors; When a judge or a member
of the collegiate court, who had signed or registered his vote, has vacated
his office at the time of the promulgation of a decision or resolution, his vote
is automatically withdrawn or cancelled.—The COMELEC Commissioners
are not infallible. They can and do commit errors and in the case at bench
they in fact gravely abused their discretion for they violated the elementary
doctrine that for a judgment to be valid, it must be signed and promulgated
during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. Thus, when a judge or a
member of the collegiate court, who had signed or registered his vote, has
vacated his office at the time of the promulgation of a decision or resolution,
his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled. The rationale for this rule
is well-elucidated in the landmark case of Araneta v. Dinglasan.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
362

De Lima-Bohol & Menez Law Offices for petitioner.

Narciso A. Tadeo co-counsel for petitioner.
Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin & Martinez
Law Offices for private respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order seeking to nullify the order dated June 15, 2000 of the
1
Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, giving notice
to the parties of the promulgation of the resolution on the case
entitled Jose T. Ramirez, Protestee, versus Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.,
Election Protest Case No. 98-29, on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 in the
afternoon and to prohibit the respondent Commission on Election
2
from promulgating the so called “Guiani ponencia”
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez
were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar, during
3
the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board
of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected
Governor, Eastern Samar, having obtained 46,547 votes, the highest
number of votes in the election returns.
On June 4, 1998, respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934
votes, the second highest number of votes, filed with the Comelec,
4
an election protest challenging the results in a total of 201
5
5
precincts. The case was assigned to the First Division (formerly
6
Second), Commission on Elections.
______________
1 Petition, Annex “A,” Rollo, p. 36.

2 Which is legally invalid, infra. Petition, Rollo, pp. 5-6.
3 Petition, Rollo, p. 10.
4 Petition, Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 39-45.
5 Docketed as EPC Case No. 98-29.
6 Composed of Comm. Julio F. Desamito, presiding, Comms. Japal M. Guiani and
Luzviminda G. Tancangco, members.
363
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 363

On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and

signed a proposed resolution in the case. To such proposed
ponencia, Commissioner Julio F. Desamito dissented. Commissioner
Luzviminda G. Tancangco at first did not indicate her vote but said
that she would “wish to see both positions, if any, to make her (my)
7
final decision.”
In the meantime, on February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani
retired from the service. On March 3, 2000, the President of the
Philippines appointed Commissioner Rufino S. Javier to the seat
vacated by Commissioner Guiani. Commissioner Javier assumed
office on April 4, 2000.
On or about February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and respondent
Ramirez received a purported resolution promulgated on February
14, 2000, signed by Commissioner Guiani and Tancangco, with
Commissioner Desamito dissenting. The result was in favor of
respondent Ramirez who was declared winner by a margin of 1,176
8
votes. On February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, declared
that the thirteen-page resolution “is a useless scrap of paper which
should be ignored by the parties in this case there being no
9
promulgation of the Resolution in the instant case.”
On March 31, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order
setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPG Case No.
10
98-29) on April 6, 2000, at 2:00 in the afternoon. However, on
April 6, 2000, petitioner Ambil filed a motion to cancel
promulgation challenging the validity of the purported Guiani
resolution. The Comelec, First Division, acting on the motion, on the
11
same date, postponed the promulgation until this matter is resolved.
On June 14, 2000, two members of the First Division, namely,
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier, sent
a joint memorandum to Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, presiding
Commissioner, stating:
_________________
7 Petition, Annex “K,” Rollo, p. 95.

8 Petition, Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 46-58.
9 Petition, Annex “H,” Rollo, p. 88.
10 Petition, Annex “L,” Rollo, p. 96.
11 Petition, Annex “N,” Rollo, p. 104.
364

“Pursuant to your recommendation in your April 18, 2000 Memorandum to

the Commission En Banc that this case be submitted for a reconsultation by
the members of the First Division, it is our position that we promulgate as
soon as possible the Guiani Resolution of the case. This is notwithstanding
the Jamil vs. Comelec (283 SCRA 349), Solidbank vs. IAC (G.R. No. 73777)
and other doctrinal cases on the issue. After all, this Commission stood pat
on its policy that what is controlling is the date the ponente signed the
questioned Resolution as what we did in promulgating the case of Dumayas
vs. Bernal (SPC 98-137).
“In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the
promulgation of the subject resolution and let the aggrieved party challenge
it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or
12
through a certiorari case before the Supreme Court.
On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through

Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, issued an order setting the
promulgation of the resolution in the case on June 20, 2000, at 2:00
13
o’clock in the afternoon.
Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, on June
14
19, 2000, petitioner interposed the instant petition.
Petitioner Ambil seeks to annul the order dated June 15, 2000
setting the promulgation of the resolution of the case (EPC Case No.
98-29) on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon, and prohibiting the
Comelec, First Division, from promulgating the purported Guiani
resolution and directing the Comelec, First Division, to deliberate
anew on the case and to promulgate the resolution reached in the
15
case after such deliberation.
On June 20, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent Comelec from implementing the June 15, 2000
order for the promulgation of the resolution set on June 20, 2000 at
2:00 in the afternoon. At the same time, the Court directed the
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
16
notice.
_______________
12 Petition, Annex “B,” Rollo, pp. 37-38, at p. 38.

14 Petition, Rollo, pp. 3-34.
15 Petition, Rollo, pp. 6-7.
16 Rollo, p. 132.
365
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 365

17
17
On July 10, 2000, respondent Ramirez filed his comment.
Respondent Ramirez admitted that the proposed resolution of
Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid after his retirement on
18
February 15, 2000. He submitted that Comelec, First Division, its
membership still constituting a majority, must elevate the protest
19
case to the Comelec en banc until resolved with finality.
In his comment filed on August 29, 20
2000, the Solicitor General
interposed no objection to the petition.
At issue in this petition is whether Comelec, First Division, in
scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case
No. 98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We find the petition without merit.
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review
decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as
follows:
“Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the
commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
21
receipt of a copy thereof.” [emphasis supplied]
“We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
22
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.” This decision must be a
_______________
17 Rollo, pp. 150-169.

18 Comment, Rollo, at p. 152.
19 Comment, Rollo, at p. 153.
20 Rollo, pp. 330-334.
21 Article IX, Section 7, 1987 Constitution.
22 Loong v. Commission on Elections, 305 SCRA 832, 852 [1999], citing Filipino
Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 [1985]; Aratuc v.
Commission on Elections, 88 SCRA 251, 270 [1979].
366

23
final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
24 25
division certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The
Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
26
Commission on Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en
banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, now expressly 27 provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration
28
is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide
by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of
29
the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the
Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for
reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion
30
for reconsideration is mandatory. Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987
Constitution provides as follows:
______________
23 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, 244 SCRA 41, 45 [1995].
24 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, supra.
25 Bolaong v. Comelec, First Division, 220 SCRA 745, 749 [1993].
26 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, supra, Note 23, citing
Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections, 212 SCRA 307 [1992]; Ong Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, 216 SCRA 806 [1992].
27 Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, supra Note 22, p. 270; Dario v. Mison, 176
SCRA 84, 111 [1989].
28 Solis v. National Labor Relations Commission, 263 SCRA 629, 634 [1996].
29 Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 186, 193 [1999].
30 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, supra, Note 21; Ong v.
Commission on Elections, 216 SCRA 806 [1992]; Kho v. Commission on Elections,
344 Phil. 878; 279 SCRA 463 [1997]; Garvida v. Sales, 271 SCRA 767 [1997].
367
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 367

“Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two

divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. [emphasis supplied]
Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec provide that a

decision of a division may be raised to the en banc via a motion for
31
reconsideration.
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of
32
Governor, Eastern Samar. It is within the original jurisdiction of
33
the Commission on Elections in division. Admittedly, petitioner
did not ask for a reconsideration of the division’s resolution or final
34
decision. In fact, there was really no resolution or decision to speak
35
of because there was yet no promulgation, which was still
scheduled on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court from an order of
“promulgation of the Resolution of this case” by the First Division
36
of the Comelec.
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election
case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in division cannot
dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision,
resolution or final order of the Division of the Commission on
Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en banc
without such motion for reconsideration having been filed and
resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion
for
_______________
31 Rule 3, Section 5(c) Comelec Rules of Procedure.

32 Petition, Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 39-45.
33 Constitution, Article IX-C, Sec. 3; Garvida v. Sales, supra, Note 30.
34 Opinion of Justice Sabino R. De Leon, Jr., p. 7.
35 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 433 [1949].
368

37
reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the
exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the
case to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is
38
reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.
39
We are aware of the ruling in Kho v. Commission on Elections,
that “in a situation such as this where the Commission on Elections
in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an
action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of
the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer
the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible
under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.” This is the case
relied upon by the dissenting justice to support the proposition that
resort to the Supreme Court from a resolution of a Comelec Division
40
is allowed. Unfortunately, the Kho case has no application to the
case at bar. The issue therein is, may the Commission on Elections
in division admit an answer with counter-protest after the period to
41
file the same has expired? The Comelec First Division admitted the
answer with counter-protest of the respondent. The Supreme Court
declared such order void for having been issued with grave abuse of
42
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. However, an
important moiety in the Kho case was not mentioned in the dissent.
It is that the Comelec, First Division, denied the prayer of petitioner
for the elevation of the case to en banc because the orders of
admission were mere interlocutory
_________________
37 Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 292 SCRA 452, 457-458 [1998], cited in Opinion of
Justice De Leon, Jr.; Jariol v. Commission on Elections 270 SCRA 255, 262 [1997].
38 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, supra, Note 23.
39 Supra, Note 30, at p. 888. At that time, ponente was Chairman, Commission on
Elections.
40 Reply to Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pardo (now the majority opinion).
41 Kho v. Commission on Elections, supra, Note 30, at p. 881.
42 Ibid., at p. 888.
369
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 369

43
orders. Hence, the aggrieved party had no choice but to seek
recourse in the Supreme Court. Such important fact is not present in
the case at bar.
We must emphasize that what is questioned here is the order
dated June 15, 2000, which is a mere notice of the promulgation of
the resolution in EPC Case No. 98-29. We quote the order in
question in full, to wit:
“Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC RULES OF

PROCEDURE, and the Joint Memorandum of Commissioners Luzviminda
G. Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier to the Presiding Commissioner of the
First Division dated 14 June 2000 paragraph 5 of which states:
‘In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation of
the subject resolution and let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for
Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before
the Supreme Court.’
the promulgation of the Resolution in this case is hereby set on Tuesday,

June 20, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon at the Comelec Session Hall,
Intramuros, Manila.
No further motion for postponement of the promulgation shall be
entertained.
The Clerk of the Commission is directed to give the parties, through their
Attorneys, notice of this Order through telegram and by registered mail or
personal delivery.
“SO ORDERED.
“Given this 15th day of June, 2000 in the City of Manila, Philippines.
FOR THE DIVISION:
[Sgd.] JULIO F. DESAMITO
44
Presiding Commissioner”
There is nothing irregular about the order of promulgation of the

resolution in the case, except in the mind of suspicious parties.
Perhaps what was wrong in the order was the reference to the
_______________
43 Ibid., at p. 883.
370

memorandum of the two commissioners that was not necessary and

was a superfluity, or excessus in linguae. All the members of the
Division were incumbent Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and had authority to decide the case in the
Division. What appears to be patently null and void is the so-called
Guiani resolution if it is the one to be promulgated. We cannot
assume that the Comelec will promulgate a void resolution and
violate the Constitution and the law. We must assume that the
members of the Commission in Division or en banc are sworn to
uphold and will obey the Constitution.
Consequently, the Guiani resolution is not at issue in the case at
bar. No one knows the contents of the sealed envelope containing
the resolution to be promulgated on June 20, 2000, simply because it
has not been promulgated!
It may be true that the parties received a copy of what purports to
45
be the Guiani resolution, declaring respondent Jose T. Ramirez the
victor in the case. Such Guiani resolution is admitted by the parties
and considered by the Commission on Elections as void. The
Solicitor General submitted an advice that the same resolution is
deemed vacated by the retirement of Commissioner Guiani on
46
February 15, 2000. It cannot be promulgated anymore for all legal
intents and purposes.
We rule that the so-called Guiani resolution is void for the
following reasons:
First: A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it
is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a
member of the Commission at the time the final decision or
resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution
47
or decision. Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution
or decision. The resolution or decision of the Division must be
signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior
to his retirement from office, but when he vacated his office with-
________________
45 Petition, Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 46-58.

46 Comment, Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 330-334, at p. 333.
47 Jamil v. Commission on Elections, 283 SCRA 349, 372 [1997].
371
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 371

out the final decision or resolution having been promulgated, his

48
vote was automatically invalidated. Before that resolution or
decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no valid resolution or
49
decision to speak of.
Second: Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., Clerk of the First
Division, Commission on Elections, denied the release or
promulgation of the Guiani resolution. He disowned the initials on
the face of the first page of the resolution showing its promulgation
on February 14, 2000, and said that it was a forgery. There is no
record in the Electoral Contests and Adjudication Department
(ECAD) of the Commission on Election that a “resolution on the
50
main merits of the case was promulgated.”
Third: By an order dated February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First
Division, disclaimed the “alleged thirteen (13) page resolution” for
being “a useless scrap of paper which should be ignored by the
51
parties” there being no promulgation of the resolution in the case.
Fourth: It is unlikely that Commissioner Tancangco affixed her
signature on the Guiani resolution. On the date that it was
purportedly promulgated, which was February 14, 2000, the
Division issued an order where Commissioner Tancangco expressed
her reservations and stated that she wished to see both positions, if
52
any, before she made her final decision.
A final decision or resolution of the Comelec, in Division or en
banc is promulgated on a date previously fixed, of which notice
shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys
53
personally or by registered mail or by telegram.
It is jurisprudentially recognized that at any time before
promulgation of a decision or resolution, the ponente may change
54
his mind. Moreover, in this case, before a final decision or
resolution could be promulgated, the ponente retired and a new
commissioner
_____________
48 Ibid.
49 Araneta v. Dinglasan, supra, Note 35, at p. 433.
50 Petition, Annex “J,” Rollo, pp. 91-94.
51 Petition, Annex “H,” Rollo, p. 88.
52 Petition, Annex “K,” Rollo, p. 95.
53 Rule 18, Section 5, Comelec Rules of Procedure.
54 Jamil v. Commission on Elections, supra, Note 47.
372

appointed. And the incoming commissioner has decided to take part

in the resolution of the case. It is presumed that he had taken the
position of his predecessor because he co-signed the request for the
55
promulgation of the Guiani resolution.
If petitioner were afraid that what would be promulgated by the
Division was the Guiani resolution, a copy of which he received by
mail, which, as heretofore stated, was not promulgated and the
signature thereon of the clerk of court was a forgery, petitioner could
seek reconsideration of such patently void resolution and thereby the
56
case would be elevated to the Commission en banc.
Considering the factual circumstances, we speculated ex mero
motu that the Comelec would promulgate a void resolution.
“The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks
57
upon it is without rudder or compass.” We must not speculate that
the Comelec would still promulgate a void resolution despite
knowledge that it is invalid or void ab initio.
Consequently, the filing of the instant petition before this Court
was premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust adequate administrative
remedies available before the COMELEC.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that
“before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should
be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s
58
cause of action.”
“This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A
motion for reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to the viability of
________________
55 Petition, Annex “B,” Rollo, pp. 37-38, at p. 38.

56 Rule 3, Section 5(c), Comelec Rules of Procedure [1993].
57 People v. Ganan, 265 SCRA 260, 290 [1996].
58 Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 198 219 [1998],
citing Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167 [1997].
373
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 373

a special civil action for certiorari, unless the party who avails of
the latter can convincingly show that his case falls under any of the
following exceptions to the rule: (1) when the question is purely
legal, (2) where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) where its
application may cause great and irreparable damage, (4) where the
controverted acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high
government official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter,
and seeks when the issue for non-exhaustion of administrative
59
remedies has been rendered moot.”
“This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that
the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the
principal of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a
battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one
and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of
the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when
the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the president bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there
are
_________________
59 Jariol v. Commission on Elections, 336 Phil. 990, 997; 270 SCRA 255, 262
[1997].
374

60
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.” The
administrative authorities must be given an opportunity to act and
61
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. Only
after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be
62
allowed.
This case does not fall under any of the exceptions and indeed, as
heretofore stated, the exceptions do not apply to an election case
within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in Division.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity.
“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to a party’s cause
of action and a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a
63
dismissal based on lack of cause of action.”
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for
prematurity.
The Court orders the Commission on Elections, First Division,
to, resolve with all deliberate dispatch Election Protest Case No. 98-
29 and to promulgate its resolution thereon adopted by majority vote
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
The temporary restraining order issued on June 20, 2000, is
hereby lifted and dissolved, effective immediately.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima,

Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Mendoza and Quisumbing, JJ., We join in
the dissent of Mr. Justice De Leon.
_________________
60 Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, 175-177 [1997]; Aquino-Sarmiento
v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515, 520-521 [1991].
61 Jalandoni v. Drilon, G.R. Nos. 115239-40, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA 107;
University of the Philippines v. Catungal, Jr., 272 SCRA 221 240-241[1997].
62 Dimatulac v. Villon, 297 SCRA 679, 708 [1998]; citing Ledesma v Asuncion,
278 SCRA 656 [1997].
63 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, 266
SCRA 404, 417 [1997], citing Baguioro v. Basa, 214 SCRA
375
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 375

Kapunan, J. I certify that Mr. Justice Kapunan voted for this

ponencia during the deliberation on 17 October 2000. Davide, Jr.,
C.J.
Buena, J., No part, relationship to party.
De Leon, Jr., J., See dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
With due respect, I dissent from Mr. Justice Bernardo P. Pardo’s

ponencia which denies the petition in the case at bench.
Ordinarily, according to the ponencia, the Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari any interlocutory order of a Division
1
of the COMELEC. The decision of the COMELEC division must
be reviewed by the COMELEC en banc via a motion for
reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to
2
the Supreme Court on certiorari.
3
However, in the 1997 case of Kho v. Commission on Elections,
4
this Court declared that “[I]n a situation where the Commission on
Elections in division commits grave abuse of discretion or acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders
relative to an action pending before it and the controversy does not
fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party
is NOT to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc but to
elevate it to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.”
Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure reads as
follows:
_______________
1 Decision, p. 6.
2 Decision, p. 7.
3 Challenging the orders issued by the then COMELEC First Division relating to
the admission of the answer with counter-protest of Emilio A. Espinosa, then
Provincial Governor of Masbate, to the election protest of Antonio T. Kho, despite
being filed beyond the reglementary period, thus, all interlocutory orders (279 SCRA
463 [1997]).
4 Speaking though Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr.
376

“Section 2. The Commission en banc.—The Commission shall sit en banc in

cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a
vote of a majority of the members of the Commission, or in all other cases
where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote
of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to
an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the
Commission en banc.”
Like the Kho case, it does not appear that the case at bench is one of
the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it
shown that the present controversy is a case where a division is not
5
authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First
Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the
Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the
circumstances shown above, cannot be the proper forum under
which the matter concerning the assailed order can be referred to.
Furthermore, there are settled exceptions to the rule that a motion
for reconsideration must first be filed before a certiorari petition may
be instituted. Among these are: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from
an order of arrest is urgent and the
______________
5 Section 5©, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. x x x

xxx
©. Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be
resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division
which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. (Italics supplied)
377
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 377

granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
6
purely of law or where public interest is involved.
A thorough analysis of the challenged actions of the COMELEC
First Division reveals clearly that the instant petition falls under the
exception for not only is there a great necessity to resolve the
election protest case with utmost dispatch inasmuch as another
election is fast approaching but, in addition, the challenged order is a
patent nullity. Besides, the case of Reyes v. RTC of Oriental
7
Mindoro, Br. XXXIX relied upon in the majority opinion is not
applicable for in8 that case the questions tendered were not pure
questions of law.
The majority opinion states that “[t]here is nothing irregular
about the order of promulgation of the resolution in the case, except
in the mind of suspicious parties. Perhaps what was wrong in the
order was the reference to the memorandum of the commissioners
that was not necessary and was a mere superfluity, or excessus in
liguae. All the members of the division were incumbent
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
had authority to decide the case in the Division. What appears to be
patently null and void is the so-called Guiani ponencia if it is the
one to be promulgated. We cannot assume that the COMELEC will
promulgate a void resolution and violate the Constitution and the
law. Consequently, the Guiani resolution is not at issue in the case at
bar since no one knows what the content of the sealed envelope
containing the resolution to be promulgated because it had not been
9
promulgated.”
_________________
6 Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [Third Division], 292 SCRA 452, 457-458 [1998]
citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 568, 574, 575 [1997].
7 244 SCRA 41 [1995].
8 The Court, through Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, held that “where the
questions raised involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in
light of the facts of the case, the questions tendered are not pure questions of law.”
Id., p. 45.
9 Decision, p. 11.
378

But the majority opinion misses precisely the point. The

assumptions are controverted by the facts as clearly found and
reflected in the records of the case at bench. The Joint
10
Memorandum dated June 14, 2000, of COMELEC Commissioners
Tancangco and Javier of the First Division, is material to the petition
at bench. The pertinent contents of the said Joint Memorandum are
quoted hereunder, thus:
“x x x
1. We are constrained to call your attention on the subject in response

to Protestant Ramirez’s numerous motions for early resolution of
the pending incident and to set for promulgation the Division
Resolution of the case (a total of 50 motions as of June 1, 2000).
2. It may be noted that the pending incident referred to by the
Protestant was the supposed promulgation last April 6, 2000 of the
First Division Resolution of EPC No. 98-29 (Ramirez vs. Ambil) as
penned by Commissioner Japal M. Guiani. The scheduled
promulgation did not materialize because Protestee’s counsel
challenged the validity of the Guiani Resolution.
3. It took the Commission three (3) months to schedule the Guiani
ponencia for supposed promulgation on 6 April 2000 and said
incident has been pending resolution for the past two (2) months
now.
4. Pursuant to your recommendation in your April 18, 2000
Memorandum to the Commission En Banc that this case be
submitted for a reconsultation by the members of the First Division,
it is our position that we promulgate as soon as possible the Guiani
Resolution of the case. This is notwithstanding the Jamil vs.
Comelec (283 SCRA 349), Solidbank v. IAC (G.R. No. 73777) and
other doctrinal cases on the issue. After all, this Commission stood
pat on its policy that what is controlling is the date the ponente
signed the questioned Resolution as what we did in promulgating
the case of Dumayas v. Bernal (SPC 98-137).
5. In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the
promulgation of the subject resolution and let the aggrieved party
challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the
Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before the
11
Supreme Court, x x x”
______________
10 See Note No. 3.

11 Rollo, pp. 37-38
379
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 379

The said Joint Memorandum clearly dictated that the ponencia of

retired Commissioner Guiani is the very resolution to be
promulgated. To sustain the promulgation of the Guiani resolution,
Commissioners Tancangco and Javier erroneously contended that
“what is controlling is the date the ponente signed the questioned
Resolution as what we did in promulgating the case of Dumayas v.
Bernal (SPC 98-137).” The said case of Dumayas v. Bernal however
cannot be relied upon by the Commissioners since the same is not a
final decision. It is the subject of a petition for certiorari pending
12
resolution before this Court.
The COMELEC Commissioners are not infallible. They can and
do commit errors and in the case at bench they in fact gravely
abused their discretion for they violated the elementary doctrine that
for a judgment to be valid, it must be signed and promulgated during
13
the incumbency of the judge who signed it. Thus, when a judge or
a member of the collegiate court, who had signed or registered his
vote, has vacated his office at the time of the promulgation of a
decision or resolution, his vote is automatically withdrawn or
14
cancelled. The rationale for this rule is well-elucidated in the
15
landmark case of Araneta v. Dinglasan, wherein this Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, stated:
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a

decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision.
As above indicated, the true decision of the Court is the decision signed by
the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and
promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by
a member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be
subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be
promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the
Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this
Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve their freedom
of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that
they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of
their most mature reflection and delibera-
________________
12 Under G.R. Nos. 141952-53.

13 People v. Labao, 220 SCRA 100, 102-103 [1993].
14 Jamil v. Commission on Elections, 283 SCRA 349, 371-373 [1997].
15 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949].
380

tion. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and

promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the
deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon
no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve
for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for
designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is
16
that decision binding unless and until duly signed and promulgated.
In the case of Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v.

17 18
Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court further ratiocinated:
x x x [A]t any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by

the ponente. Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already
signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and register a
qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated.
A promulgation signifies that on the date it was made the judge or judges
who signed the decision continued to support it.
If at the time of the promulgation, a judge or a member of a collegiate
court has already vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn.
This was what happened in the Araneta case, where Justice Gregorio
Perfecto’s signature on the original decision was disregarded when be died
before it could be promulgated. The decision remained valid, however,
because it was still supported by a majority of the Supreme Court then, and,
no less importantly, Justice Perfecto was not the ponente.
The ponente in a collegiate court should remain a member thereof at the
time his ponencia is promulgated because, at any time before that, he has
the privilege of changing his opinion for the consideration of his colleagues.
As a rule, his recommendations are accepted in recognition of the special
study he is supposed to have made of the case after his designation as its
ponente. It is important that he be incumbent at the time the decision is
promulgated, in the event he may want to make last-minute changes therein
with the approval of the other members. Obviously, he cannot exercise this
privilege if he is no longer in office.
It is on this justification that, as a matter of practice (and of courtesy),
this Court defers promulgation of a decision written by a member on official
leave until his return. The author is afforded an opportunity to
______________
16 Id., p. 433.
17 189 SCRA 433 [1990].
18 Speaking through Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz (now retired).
381
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 381

suggest to the rest of the Court any change he may want to make in his
ponencia before it is officially pronounced.
Applying the above rules, we hold that the questioned ponencia died
19
with the ponente and consequently could not be promulgated thereafter.
Applying the foregoing principle to the case at bench, when

Commissioner Guiani retired on February 15, 2000, he ceased to be
a commissioner of the COMELEC where he sat in judgment; and
thus, also “retired” and terminated are all his authority to decide any
case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon.
Otherwise stated, he had lost entirely his power and legal authority
to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement.
Incidentally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
Comment dated August 29, 2000, in substance, interposed no
objection to the petition.
I therefore vote to grant the petition.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—In line with the plenitude of its powers and its function
to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must be deemed
possessed of authority to annul elections where the will of the voters
has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. It would be
unreasonable to state that the COMELEC has a legal duty to
perform and at the same time deny it the wherewithal to fulfill that
task. (Sanchez vs. Commission on Elections, 114 SCRA 454 [1982])
Certiorari is the proper remedy to question any final order, ruling
and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, while, contrariwise,
administrative orders of the COMELEC are not, as a general rule, fit
subjects of a petition for certiorari. (Loong vs. Commission on
Elections, 305 SCRA 832 [1999])
——o0o——
______________
19 Consolidated Bank, supra, at 438-439 (Emphasis supplied).
382
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7 Ambil v. Comelec

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8/31/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 344

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; The Supreme Court has no power to

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 359

Ambil, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; A decision, order or resolution of a division of the

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ambil, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Judgments; One who is no longer a member of the Commission at the

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 361

Ambil, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

DE LEON, JR., J., Dissenting:

Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; A thorough analysis of the

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Lima-Bohol & Menez Law Ofﬁces for petitioner.

1 Petition, Annex “A,” Rollo, p. 36.

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 363

On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and

7 Petition, Annex “K,” Rollo, p. 95.

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Pursuant to your recommendation in your April 18, 2000 Memorandum to

On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through

12 Petition, Annex “B,” Rollo, pp. 37-38, at p. 38.

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 365

“Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

17 Rollo, pp. 150-169.

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 367

“Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two

Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec provide that a

31 Rule 3, Section 5(c) Comelec Rules of Procedure.

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 369

“Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC RULES OF

the promulgation of the Resolution in this case is hereby set on Tuesday,

There is nothing irregular about the order of promulgation of the

370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

memorandum of the two commissioners that was not necessary and

45 Petition, Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 46-58.

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 371

out the ﬁnal decision or resolution having been promulgated, his

372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

appointed. And the incoming commissioner has decided to take part

55 Petition, Annex “B,” Rollo, pp. 37-38, at p. 38.

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 373

374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima,

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 375

Kapunan, J. I certify that Mr. Justice Kapunan voted for this

DE LEON, JR., J.:

With due respect, I dissent from Mr. Justice Bernardo P. Pardo’s

376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Section 2. The Commission en banc.—The Commission shall sit en banc in

5 Section 5©, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. x x x

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 377

378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

But the majority opinion misses precisely the point. The

1. We are constrained to call your attention on the subject in response

10 See Note No. 3.

VOL. 344, OCTOBER 25, 2000 379