SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF FUELS AND ENERGY ENGINEERING

NAME: MHANGARA DELIGHT TAKUDZWA

REG NO: C14124222N
ASSIGNMENT NO: ONE
COURSE CODE: CUFE 513

QN: REVIEW THE INTERNATIONAL PROTOCOLS, SUMMITS AND CONVENTIONSTO

COMBATE CLIMATE CHANGE [100 MARKS]
 1. INTRODUCTION
Apart from the fact that it is physically impossible for anyone state to extent control over the
atmosphere, there is also a deeper meaning to the term global commons, namely that there is an
interconnectedness between the planet’s ecosystems that goes beyond state borders (Pretorius). The
interdependence of the global commons and their various resources are especially an evident when it
comes to global climate change. Global climate change became an issue of political concern in the
1980s when scientists correlated the increase of emission of greenhouse gasses due to human
activities in the atmosphere with climate changes and concluded that future climate disasters may be
awaiting humanity if levels of greenhouse gasses do not stabilize (Bonn, 2002). The current political
and institutional framework that exists to address a global problem such as climate change does not
reflect the planetary interdependence. Mechanisms that are born from the idea of collective
stewardship over the commons are necessary to address climate change. Several mechanisms of this
sort have been established with respect to global climate change, notably the United Nations
Convention on Global Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (Pretorius). One of the
vulnerability areas that are impacted by climate change is that of water. In this regard, the potential
success of climate change protocols are dependent on their ability to institutionalize international
cooperation in mitigating climate change and therefore preventing the adverse effects thereof on water
resources, as well as creating cooperation with respect to adapting to climate change.

Climate change is one of the most significant threats facing the world and according to the American
Meteorological Society, there is a 90 percent probability that global temperatures will rise by 3.5 to
7.4 degrees Celsius in less than one hundred years, with even greater increases over land and the poles
(Bulletin, 2011). These minor shifts in temperature could trigger widespread disasters in the form of
rising sea levels, violent and volatile weather patterns, desertification, famine, water shortages, and
other secondary effects including conflict (Bulletin, 2011). In November 2011, the International
Energy Agency warned that the world may be fast approaching a tipping point concerning climate
change, and suggested that the next five years will be crucial for greenhouse gas reduction efforts.
Avoiding the worst consequences of climate change will require large cuts in global greenhouse gas
emissions. Humans produce greenhouse gases by burning coal, oil, and natural gas to generate energy
for power, heat, industry, and transportation. Deforestation and agricultural activity also yield climate
changing emissions. While the world’s climate has always varied naturally, the vast majority of
scientists now believe that rising concentrations of “greenhouse gases” in the earth’s atmosphere,
resulting from economic and demographic growth over the last two centuries since the industrial
revolution, are overriding this natural variability and leading to potentially irreversible climate change
(Bonn, 2002). Based on first scientific insights on climate change, policy makers agreed in 1992 on
a UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since then, the UNFCCC has been the
basis for climate negotiations with the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the Marrakech Accords (2001) and the
Cancun Agreements (2010) as major milestones. This Knowledge Package explains how climate
policy making has increasingly become part of socio-economic development planning
(https://climatepolicyinfohub.eu/, n.d.).
1. 1980 -1990s: Global warming as an emerging policy issue - UN Climate Convention 1
2. 1995 - 2005: Agreement on climate policy commitments and toolbox - the Kyoto Protocol
3. 2005 -2010: Stronger links between climate and development
 2. The Different Climate Change Protocols, Summits and conventions Operating in the
International System
The Montreal Protocol which was primarily established to protect the ozone layer, it can also be seen
as a precursor to the international efforts focusing specifically on climate change for three reasons.
Firstly, the Montreal Protocol covers some of the greenhouse gasses that cause global climate change,
secondly its focus is also on the atmosphere as a global commons and thirdly, the process that led to
the negotiation and subsequent renegotiation of the Montreal Protocol has provided a paradigm for
future global environmental agreements where the scientific basis for action is initially uncertain, as
is the case with climate change. The problem of ozone depletion attracted political concern from as
early as the 1970s when it was proposes that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are an increasingly versatile
class of industrial chemicals and are broken down in the stratosphere to release catalysts (Chlorine
atoms), which destroy ozone. As a result increased levels of ultra violet radiation reaches the Earth’s
surface and in turn causes increases in skin cancers and other health and environmental damages.
However, there was at least a 10-year period of intense scientific confusion. The discovery of the hole
in the ozone over Antarctica and the confirmation that it resulted from CFCs stimulated the
international efforts in the 1980s. At a meeting of 33 countries and the European Commission in
Washington in 1977 the Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer was established, which met
annually up to 1985 and prepared reports for policymakers on ozone research. In 1985, after several
efforts by first Norway and then the Toronto Group (consisting of the US, Canada, the Nordics,
Austria and Switzerland) to get countries to include control measures of CFCs in an international
agreement, the Vienna Framework Convention was signed. It did not include control measures, but
empowered the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to convene working groups that would
negotiate a protocol to be signed in 1987. Such as protocol was indeed signed in Montreal and
substantially amended in 1990 in London and in 1992 in Copenhagen (Bonn, 2002). The Montreal
Protocol stipulates that the production and consumption of compounds that deplete ozone in the
stratosphere, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halogens, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform, are
to be phased out by 2000 (2005 for methyl chloroform) (Pretorius). The protocol also puts measures
in place that would assist developing countries in phasing out CFCs. These are:
 an ozone fund that would pay the incremental costs of developing countries in meeting their
control obligations; and
 a pledge that technology necessary to meet their obligations will be available to developing
countries on fair and favourable terms.
The Protocol therefore recognized that industries in developing countries were not responsible for the
problem, but could nullify international efforts to rectify the problem if they do not intend to phase
out their emissions of ozone depleting gasses. The technical and financial incentives to join were
strengthened by provisions that would restrict trade with non-parties to prevent signatories
circumventing control measures and to ensure that non-parties do not take advantage of parties’
compliance (Pretorius). The Montreal Protocol was based on several principles that added to its
success at institutionalizing cooperation to solve a global problem, namely:
 The lack of certainty was not employed as a restraint on prudent action. To deal with
uncertainty, the principle of a ‘framework’ that established the problem and an international
commitment to address it in a subsequent protocol emerged. The protocol would be designed
in such a manner that it could be updated and amended to respond to scientific changes. Thus
 the principle of an interim protocol that took precautionary action despite uncertain science
was established;
 The regulatory approaches that set timetables for the limitations of ozone depleting substances
sent a signal to the market to stimulate research and development into substitutes for these
substances;
 In relation to target setting the protocol induced the idea of regions and countries setting
targets that go beyond what is legally required of them, not so much as a sign of altruism, but
to gain commercial advantage; and
 From the beginning of the negotiations, it was acknowledged that some form of North-South
compensation was to take place.
In other words, the Protocol acknowledged principles of environmental integrity, cost effectiveness
and equity. The negotiation process also benefited from the fact that public opinion was sufficiently
mobilized in the major CFC producing and consuming countries to provide an incentive to solve the
problem. In the US, the company that co-invented CFCs, Dew Point, spent millions annually to
develop substitutes that would not have the damaging effects on the ozone
(www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate change/international-agreements-climate action/,
n.d.). The US public reduced their consumption of CFC drastically and the US government banned
the use of CFCs in spray cans before any international initiatives required it.
In 1988, the WMO and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) established the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in order to bundle scientific knowledge into an intergovernmental
scientific panel under the auspices of the UN. In 1989, UNEP and the WMO initiated the preparations
for negotiations on a framework convention on climate change. The idea was that this convention
would contain basic principles and agreements, which could subsequently be worked out in further
detail through amendments and protocols. During 1990 and 1992, negotiations took place during five
sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change (INC) (unfccc.int/kyoto protocol, n.d.). A key challenge during the negotiations, was to agree
on a global responsibility for the global climate and climatic impacts and how this responsibility could
or should be differentiated between countries based on historical GHG emission patterns and socio-
economic welfare levels. The latter concept has become known as the principle of 'common but
differentiated responsibilities'. The INC negotiations produced a text, which was adopted on 9 May
1992, ahead of the UN Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), as the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The ultimate objective of the Convention is to achieve a stabilisation of
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere "at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system (Bonn, 2002).

The international political response to climate change began with the adoption of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 (Bulletin, 2011).The UNFCCC,
signed in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, constitutes the
foundational climate agreement that has provided the platform for most subsequent international
climate agreements. The UNFCCC, for example, birthed both the Kyoto Protocol and Paris
Agreement. In June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, world leaders and citizens of 176 countries gathered to
agree on ways of working together to preserve and enhance the global environment. Negotiations to
develop the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) began in 1991 and, in June 1992
at the "Earth Summit", the Convention was opened for signature. It entered into force on March 21,
1994 following ratification by 150 countries. The main objective of this important climate change
treaty is to achieve the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to
ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner. It acknowledged the existence of human-induced climate change and gave
industrialised countries the major part of responsibility for combating it but without specifying how,
no funding and emission target for parties top the convention (Henrike Peichert).
In December 1997, delegates to the third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto,
Japan, agreed to a Protocol of the UNFCCC that commits industrialized countries and countries in
transition to market economy so as to achieve emission reduction targets. These countries, known as
Annex I parties under the UNFCCC, agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six greenhouse gases
by an average of 5.2% below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, with specific targets varying from
country to country (Bonn, 2002). In practice, industrialised countries obtained emission quotas,
which set an upper limit on their annual GHG emissions. Countries could increase their quotas
through collaboration with other countries, either in the form of emission reduction projects from
which carbon credits could be bought, or through purchase of parts of other countries’ quotas (in case
other countries’ actual emissions were lower than their quotas). Project collaboration with carbon
credit trading among industrialised countries was called Joint Implementation (JI). Projects between
industrialised and developing countries were arranged under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). The direct trade between countries of parts of emissions quotas was arranged as international
emissions trading (https://climatepolicyinfohub.eu/, n.d.). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on
16 February 2005 and now has 193 parties. At the end of 2005, the first steps were taken to consider
long term issues. Convening in Montreal, Canada, the first session of the CMP decided to establish
the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
(AWG-KP ) on the basis of Protocol Article 3.9, which mandates consideration of Annex I parties’
further commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period. COP 11
agreed to consider long-term cooperation under the Convention through a series of four workshops
known as “the Convention Dialogue,” which continued until COP 13. Although the protocol came
into force was soon derailed by the failure of some of the world’s biggest polluters, notably the US,
to ratify it (Henrike Peichert). Hence, the negotiations towards the Kyoto Protocol (1995-1997) had
been slow as countries struggled with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.
For instance, industrialised countries doubted the usefulness of a protocol without commitments for
rapidly developing countries such as China, India, Mexico and Brazil. Even shortly before the
negotiations in Kyoto, the US Congress adopted the Byrd-Hagel resolution instructing US negotiators
not to agree on a protocol without ‘meaningful participation’ by the developing country Parties. Such
a text would be considered harmful for US economic interests. Eventually, the US delegation accepted
a quantified emission reduction commitment, even though developing countries were exempted from
such commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was never ratified by the US Congress
and, in March 2001, the newly elected US President George W. Bush decided to withdraw US support
from the protocol according to his view (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate
change/international-agreements-climate action/, n.d.).
Despite the US withdrawal, other countries, with a leading role for the EU, managed to keep the
Kyoto process on-going throughout 2001, partly by allowing industrialised countries more room for
counting sequestration of carbon in soils and trees and agreeing on more flexible compliance
procedures. Although these concessions were criticised for reducing the environmental integrity of
the Kyoto Protocol, they secured the support of important industrialised countries such as Russia,
Canada, Japan and Australia. Among the key milestones of the ongoing negotiations was the
Marrakech Accords of November 2001, which defined detail modalities and procedures for
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and its policy instruments (unfccc.int/kyoto protocol, n.d.).
Another milestone was the ratification of the protocol by the Russian Federation in November 2004,
so that it could enter into force.

Immediately after the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, a new round of negotiations
started on its continuation beyond 2012. As the Kyoto Protocol had not been ratified by all
industrialised countries (e.g., USA), two negotiation tracks emerged. In 2005, at the first meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) was established. In 2007, as part of the Bali Plan of
Action (COP13), the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG LCA) was
established with participation of all UNFCCC Parties, including the USA (Pretorius)
(https://climatepolicyinfohub.eu/, n.d.). Parties established the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) with a mandate to focus on key elements of long term cooperation
identified during the Convention Dialogue:
 mitigation,
 adaptation,
 finance,
 technology and
 a shared vision for long-term cooperative action
It was a long-term vision which set timelines for the negotiations towards reaching a successor
agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, due to expire in 2012 (unfccc.int/kyoto protocol, n.d.). Based on
two negotiating tracks under the Convention and the Protocol, the Roadmap set a deadline for
concluding the negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009 (Bulletin, 2011).

The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, took place in December 2009. The
event was marked by disputes over transparency and process. During the high-level segment, informal
negotiations took place in a group consisting of major economies and representatives of regional and
other negotiating groups. Late in the evening of 18 December, these talks resulted in a political
agreement: the “Copenhagen Accord,” which was then presented to the COP plenary for adoption.
Over the next 13 hours, delegates debated the Accord. Many supported adopting it as a step towards
securing a “better” future agreement. However, some developing countries opposed the Accord,
which they felt had been reached without transparent and democratic negotiating process (Bulletin,
2011). Ultimately, the COP agreed to take note of the Copenhagen Accord. It established a process
for parties to indicate their support for the Accord and, during 2010, over 140 countries did so. More
than 80 countries also provided information on their national emission reduction targets and other
mitigation actions. On the last day of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, parties also
agreed to extend the mandates of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP, requesting them to present their
respective outcomes to COP 16 and COP/MOP 6. Although Copenhagen, Denmark, did not result in
the adoption of a new agreement, the COP21 summit recognised the common objective of keeping
the increase in global temperature below 2°C (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate
change/international-agreements-climate action/, n.d.). Furthermore, industrialised countries
undertook to raise $100 billion per year by 2020 to assist developing countries in climate-change
adaptation and mitigation, barring which poor countries had threatened to scupper any deal. That
pledge became more tangible with the establishment of the Green Climate Fund in Cancun, Mexico,
in 2010 (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate change/international-agreements-climate
action/, n.d.).
Following four preparatory meetings in 2010, the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun,
Mexico, took place from 29 November to 11 December 2010. By the end of the conference, parties
had finalized the Cancun Agreements, which include decisions under both negotiating tracks. Under
the Convention track, Decision 1/CP.16 recognized the need for deep cuts in global emissions in order
to limit global average temperature rise to 2°C. Parties also agreed to consider strengthening the
global long-term goal during a review by 2015, including in relation to a proposed 1.5°C target. They
took note of emission reduction targets and nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs)
communicated by developed and developing countries, respectively (FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1
and FCCC/ AWGLCA/2011/INF.1, both issued after Cancun). Decision 1/CP.16 also addressed other
aspects of mitigation, such as measuring, reporting and verification (MRV); reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD-
PLUS) (Pretorius) (Bonn, 2002). Parties also agreed to establish several new institutions and
processes, such as the Cancun Adaptation Framework and the Adaptation Committee, as well as the
Technology Mechanism, which includes the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). On finance, Decision 1/CP.16 created the Green
Climate Fund (GCF), which was designated to be the new operating entity of the Convention’s
financial mechanism and is to be governed by a board of 24 members. Parties agreed to set up a
Transitional Committee tasked with the Fund’s detailed design, and established a Standing
Committee to assist the COP with respect to the financial mechanism. They also recognized the
commitment by developed countries to provide US$30 billion of fast-start finance in 2010-2012, and
to jointly mobilize US$100 billion per year by 2020 (Bulletin, 2011). Under the Protocol track,
Decision 1/CMP.6 included agreement to complete the work of the AWG-KP and have the results
adopted by the CMP as soon as possible and in time to ensure there will be no gap between the first
and second commitment periods. The CMP urged Annex I parties to raise the level of ambition of
their emission reduction targets with a view to achieving aggregate emission reductions consistent
with the range identified in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). Parties also adopted Decision 2/CMP.6 on land use, land-use change and forestry
(LULUCF). The mandates of the two AWGs were extended to the UN Climate Change Conference
in Durban.
The Cancun Agreements were considered a success as it managed to show a new direction for future
climate negotiations. Up until Copenhagen, negotiations had attempted to formulate an overall GHG
emission reduction target, based on science (i.e. IPCC) in combination with the precautionary
principle of the UNFCCC, with individual country targets. Copenhagen and Cancun had shown that
climate policy making might be more acceptable for countries if climate actions are embedded in
domestic sustainable development objectives, especially when aiming at actively involving
developing countries in global climate policy making (Henrike Peichert). For example, the Cancun
Agreements contain a decision that developing countries will take nationally appropriate mitigation
actions [NAMAs] in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology,
finance and capacity-building, aimed at achieving a deviation in emissions relative to business as
usual emissions in 2020 (Bulletin, 2011). Finally, 'Cancun' was an important step as it
(https://climatepolicyinfohub.eu/, n.d.):
  Elaborated on how capacity building and financial support to developing countries could be
arranged;
 Offered guidelines for reducing GHG emissions through avoided deforestation and reduced
land degradation; and
 Established the Technology Mechanism for support of development and transfer of
technologies for mitigation and adaptation to developing countries

In 2011, three official UNFCCC negotiating sessions were held in the lead up to Durban. In April,
the two AWGs convened in Bangkok, Thailand. The AWG-LCA engaged in procedural discussions
on its agenda, finally agreeing on an agenda for its subsequent work. Under the AWG-KP, parties
focused on key policy issues hindering progress. Two months later, negotiators gathered in Bonn,
Germany, for sessions of the SBI, SBSTA, AWG LCA and AWG-KP (Bulletin, 2011). SBSTA
agreed to a new agenda item on impacts of climate change on water and integrated water resources
management under the Nairobi Work Programme. No agreement was reached on other proposed new
items, such as blue carbon and rights of nature and the integrity of ecosystems, and a work programme
on agriculture (www.ecologic.eu, n.d.). Under the SBI, work was launched on national adaptation
plans, and loss and damage, as mandated by the Cancun Agreements. The agenda item relating to
MRV remained in abeyance. Proposed new items related to the impacts of the implementation of
response measures also featured prominently. The focus of the AWG-KP in Bonn was on outstanding
political issues and conditionality set by various Annex I countries for taking on new commitments
during a second commitment period. Despite initial opposition from developing countries, parties
also undertook technical work, including on LULUCF, the flexibility mechanisms and
methodological issues. Under the AWG-LCA, substantive work began based on Decision 1/CP.16.
Parties worked on adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building, shared vision, review of the
global long-term goal, legal options, and diverse issues related to mitigation. Parties agreed that notes
prepared by the facilitators of the AWG-LCA informal groups be carried forward to the third part of
AWG-LCA in Panama. While progress was reported on some issues, many felt that the outcomes
were relatively modest (www.ecologic.eu, n.d.).

The AWG-LCA and AWG-KP reconvened from 1-7 October 2011 in Panama City, Panama. The
AWG-KP concentrated on outstanding issues and further clarifying options concerning mitigation
targets, the possible nature and content of rules for a second commitment period, and the role of a
possible second commitment period within a balanced outcome in Durban (Bulletin, 2011). Under
the AWG-LCA, negotiators engaged in extended procedural discussions based on Decision 1/CP.16
and the Bali Action Plan. Parties worked on adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building, shared
vision, review of the global long-term goal, legal options, and diverse issues related to mitigation.
The outcome for most of the informal group discussions was some form of text forwarded to Durban
as a basis for further discussion.
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