1. People vs.

Perfecto October 4, 1922

2. De Leon vs. Esguerra August 31, 1987
3. Francisco vs. HR November 10, 2003
4. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS February 3, '97
5. Tañada vs Cuenco February 28, 1957
6. Peralta vs. Director of Prisons November 12, '45
7. Gamboa vs. Teves June 28, 2011
8. Tañada vs. Angara May 2, 1997
9. Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. July 30, 1998
10. Laguna Lake Dev. Authority vs. CA 12-7-95
11. MMDA vs. Residents of Manila Bay 12-18-08
12. Lambino vs. COMELEC October 25, 2006
13. Gonzales vs. COMELEC November 9, 1967
14. Tolentino vs. COMELEC October 16, 1971
15. Carpio vs. Executive Secretary Feb. 14, 1992
16. Mendoza vs. PNP June 21, 2005
17. Magallona vs. Ermita July 16, 2011
18. CIR vs. Campos Rueda October 21, 1971
19. Reagan vs. Com. of Internal Revenue 12-27-69
20. Lee Hong Hok vs. David 12-27-72
21. Laurel vs. Misa March 28, 1946
22. Peralta vs. Director of Prisons Nov. 12, 1945
23. Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh Sep. 17, 1945
24. Macariola vs. Asuncion May 31, 1982
25. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan July 21, 2003
26. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. Aquino May 22, 1986
27. Estrada vs. Desierto March 2, 2001
28. Bacani vs. NACOCO November 29, 1956
29. Government of Philippines Islands vs.
El Monte de Piedad December 13, 1916
30. In Re Letter of Associate Justice Puno A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA June 29, 1992People v. Perfecto, G.R. No.
L-18463, October 4, 1922
PEOPLE V. PERFECTO, G.R. NO. L-18463, OCTOBER 4, 1922

Facts:
On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacionregarding the
disappearance of certain documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate. The
article of Mr. Perfecto suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official concealment by the
Senate since the missing documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil
companies. This resulted to a case being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. He was
found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an appeal in
the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore.

Issue:
Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty over the Philippines?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were representative of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new
theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the old laws. No longer is there a
Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only in bated
breath.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown
have no place under the American flag.

Judgement is REVERED and the defendant and appellant ACQUITTED.

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners
as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain
of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and
that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office
shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and
shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and
that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of
six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay
officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period
which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating
respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and
effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed
to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided
for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes."
The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient
in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which
are not truly political in nature.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, G.R. NO. 122156 | FEBRUARY 3, 1997
Facts:

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation. The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” is to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding, only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number
of shares at P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner wrote to respondent GSIS offering to match the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. It
even subsequently tendered a manager’s check to pay for the shares, which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

Petitioner filed a case before the Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes par., Art. XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people . To all intents
and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm.

Respondents argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to
Operate, there must be existing laws “to lay down conditions under which business may be done .”

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which
only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive
marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the
nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses
a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.
2. Whether or not Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony

Held:

1. Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.

2. Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural
Center of the 1930’s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government . it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded
the traditional Philippine hospitality.

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. During
World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the
American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the
two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the
site of a failed coup d’etat where an aspirant for vice-president was “proclaimed” President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations
of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.

Other matters discussed: Doctrine of constitutional supremacy

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contrac t.
TAÑADA AND MACAPAGAL V. CUENCO, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-10520, FEBRUARY 28, 1957

[CONCEPCION, J.]

FACTS: Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J.
Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from
continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action. Petitioners likewise prayed that
judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and
that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary injunction permanent.

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and
validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of
the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants
and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative
defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in
choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal

ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?

HELD: NO.

[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether
the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes” in the
Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary
authority” in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the
judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the
legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine
whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal
issue raised by the parties herein.
DE LEON VS DIRECTOR OF PRISON, 31 Phil 60
G.R. No. L-10038, March 31, 1915
Criminal Case Digest

Facts:

1. That some time prior to the 11th day of January, 1904, the said Marcelo de Leon and others were charged with the
crime of illegal detention, were arrested, tried, found guilty of said crime, and sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial
court;

2. From the sentence of the lower court Marcelo de Leon, together with the others, appealed to this court where, after a
consideration of the cause, the sentence of the lower court was modified and he (Marcelo de Leon) was sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of eighteen years of reclusion temporal, with the legal accessory penalties, and to pay the costs;

3. On the 19th day of November, 1909, the Honorable W. Cameron Forbes, Acting Governor-General, extended to the
defendant a conditional pardon

4. That the plaintiff, Marcelo de Leon, was transferred to the Iwahig Penal Colony, but for some reason or other was later
transferred again to Bilibid;

5. That on the 17th day of November, 1913, the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison, Governor-General, issued a
conditional pardon to the plaintiff, the condition being that he should not be guilty of any crime or infraction of the law,
the punishment for which should be a year or more of imprisonment, during the rest of the unexpired time of his
sentence of imprisonment already imposed;

6. On the 15th day of June, 1914, by a letter from the Honorable Ignacio Villamor, Executive Secretary, to the Director of
Prisons, it appears that the Governor-General, by reason of representations made to him by the prison authorities,
directed the cancellation of the conditional pardon signed by him under date of November 17, 1913;

7. The said conditional pardon of His Excellency the Governor-General of the 17th of November, 1913, had never been
delivered nor communicated to the plaintiff, neither had the same been accepted by him

Issues: Whether or not the conditional pardon should be granted to the convict if it is not yet been delivered or accepted
by the convict?

Held: Conditional pardon is certainly a contract between two parties: the Chief Executive, who grants the pardon, and
the convict, who accepts it. It does not become perfected until the convict is notified of the same and accepts it with all
its conditions.

Pardon was neither delivered nor accepted before it was canceled by the order of the Governor-General. The same being
canceled before delivery or acceptance, it was without force or effect and the petition for the writ of habeas corpus based
upon the same must be denied.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs
Gamboa vs Teves
G.R. No. 176579 June 28, 2011

Facts: On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT a franchise and the right to engage in
telecommunications business. In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT
stockholder, sold 26 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by several
persons, including Roland Gapud and Jose Campos, Jr. Subsequently, PHI became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three
Deeds of Assignment executed by PTIC stockholders Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by
PHI were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines. Since PTIC is a
stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or
about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT. With the sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7
percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11, Article
XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent.

Issue: Whether or not the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the common shares of PLDT, a public utility.

Held: Yes. Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any
such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be
owned by Filipino citizens.

Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the beneficial ownership and the controlling interest.

Clearly, therefore, the forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of
stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares. Furthermore, ownership of record of shares will not suffice but it must be shown that the legal and
beneficial ownership rests in the hands of Filipino citizens. Consequently, in the case of petitioner PLDT, since it is already admitted that the voting
interests of foreigners which would gain entry to petitioner PLDT by the acquisition of SMART shares through the Questioned Transactions is
equivalent to 82.99%, and the nominee arrangements between the foreign principals and the Filipino owners is likewise admitted, there is, therefore,
a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation. This is exercised through
his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the
articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However,
preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other matters, on
the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. In fact, under the
Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in
any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote
in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of
the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities.

As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred
shares is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70
of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56%
of the preferred shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only
22.15%.62 This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly
violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility.

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners,
vs.

EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the
prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public
officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices
concerned therewith.

They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or
impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine
sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress
of the Philippines.

Held:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty, particularly the legislative power
granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification
of the agreement.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to
restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration
of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international
agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states,
like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit
the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such
widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation
of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of
rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in
fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no
nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs
and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of
laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN CASE DIGEST (G.R. NO. 101083, JULY 30, 1993)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which
is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192
expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause
of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the
Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be
invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

GR NO. 120865-71; DEC. 7 1995

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia,
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said
region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing
privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of
1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that
the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and
developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to
issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on
matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
MMDA V. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY (CASE DIGEST)
GR No. 171947-48
18 December 2008

TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus, PD1152

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the
Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila
Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents?
2. Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean
and clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or
conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that these government agencies are enjoined, as a
matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.

LAMBINO VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 174153 OCTOBER 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4
and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the
people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The
framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and
pass it around for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is
a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied
in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear
the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when
they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to
revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the
initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC NOVEMBER 9, 1967

Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the
House of Representatives passed the following resolutions, (1) increasing the number of seats in the lower house from
120 to 180, (2) calling for a constitutional convention, and (3) allowing members of the Congress to run as delegates to
the constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats. Congress passed a bill, which, approved by the President on
17 June 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections on 14
November 1967.

Issue: Whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution pursuant to
Section 1 Article XV.

Decision: The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of
legislative power to Congress. Pursuant to Section 1 Article XV, “The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.” The said resolutions are null and void because the Congress may not avail of both amending
and calling a convention at the same time and the election must be a special election not a general election for
amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification.

TOLENTINO V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150; OCTOBER 16, 1971

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On
September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together
with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and
prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:

1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue of whether or not a resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The
jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.

2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1
of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or
 plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to
the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.

CARPIO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FEB. 14, 1992

o power of administrative control

o power of executive control

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning the
constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.

RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly
contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall
be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

ISSUEs:
o Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
o Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the
President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

HELD:
Power of Administrative Control

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of
control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest
clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power of the President to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of
them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by
his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.
Power of Executive Control

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or
process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security
of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here
state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed
Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief
is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military.”
G.R. No. 139658 June 21, 2005
PO3 WILLIAM M. MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD and THE DISTRICT DIRECTOR,
SOUTHERN POLICE DISTRICT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, respondents.
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us for resolution is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 12, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46387, entitled "The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Regional
Appellate Board (RAB) and District Director, Southern Police District, Philippine National Police (PNP), Petitioners,
versus Hon. Fernando B. Gorospe, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, and PO3
William M. Mendoza, Respondents."

This case stemmed from the affidavit-complaint for illegal arrest, illegal detention, physical injuries, and robbery filed
by Teodoro V. Conti against PO3 William M. Mendoza, now petitioner, and PO2 Angelita Ramos. Both were
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On the basis of the complaint, P/Chief Superintendent Orlando H. Macaspac, then District Director of the PNP
Southern Police District Office (SPDO), National Capital Region, administratively charged petitioner and PO2
Ramos with grave misconduct quoted as follows:

"That on or about 2:30 a.m., 21 February 1993, inside the HI-PITCH Disco Club located at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay
City, two (2) above-named respondents forcibly arrested one Teodoro Conti y Viceran, Floor Manager of Nikko’s
Music Lounge and at gunpoint brought the victim to the Office of the District Special Operations Unit (DSOU). While
inside said Office, PO2 RAMOS ordered the victim to remove his gold necklace, then forced him to swallow it. When
the victim resisted, PO2 RAMOS struck him with the butt of the gun and subsequently inserted the barrel of the gun
to the mouth of the victim. Thereafter, both the above-named respondents mauled the victim, thereby inflicting
multiple injuries on the face of the latter. Furthermore, the respondents placed the victim inside a detention cell and
took his money amounting to NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (₱970.00), including three (3) pieces of jewelry:
gold necklace, wrist watch, and gold bracelet."

Petitioner and PO2 Ramos submitted their joint-affidavit denying the charge.

On April 15, 1993, after conducting a summary proceeding, PNP Regional Director Oscar T. Aquino rendered a
Decision finding the two policemen guilty as charged and ordering their dismissal from the service.

Claiming that they were denied due process, the two police officers interposed an appeal to the Regional Appellate
Board (RAB) of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), National Capital Region.

On August 23, 1993, the RAB rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the PNP Regional Director.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that he "was not able to participate in the clarificatory
hearing." However, the RAB, in its Resolution dated December 17, 1993, denied his motion for lack of merit.
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati City a petition for certiorari,
docketed as Special Civil Case No. 96-074. In his petition, he alleged that he was denied due process and prayed
that the RAB Decision dated August 23, 1993 and Resolution dated December 17, 1993 be annulled.

The RAB, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion to dismiss the petition, contending that
petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies; that before seeking judicial intervention, he should have first
appealed the RAB Decision to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), then to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC); and that contrary to petitioner’s claim, he was accorded due process during the
administrative proceedings before the RAB.

In its Order dated April 21, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit, holding that "as an
exception to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party may go directly to the court where x x x the
controverted acts were allegedly performed without or in excess of jurisdiction for utter disregard of due process."3

The RAB filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC in an Order dated September 26, 1997.

Thereafter, the RAB, again assisted by the OSG, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari4 alleging that the
RTC, in denying the motion to dismiss, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Despite due notice, herein petitioner did not file his comment thereon.

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and dismissed Special Civil Action No. 96-074 filed with the RTC.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed with this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, in rendering its challenged Decision, "committed grave error of law" in
dismissing Special Civil Action No. 96-074 on the ground that he failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

The petition must fail.

It is significant to note that petitioner, as stated earlier, did not file his comment on the RAB’s petition for certioraribefore
the Court of Appeals. And when the said court rendered the assailed Decision granting the petition and dismissing
petitioner’s petition in Special Civil Action No. 96-074, he again did not interpose a motion for reconsideration thereof. He
did not even explain why he failed to do so. Certainly, this is not the normal actuation of a party who claims so aggrieved
by an adverse court decision. Such omissions by petitioner indicate that his cause lacks merit and his appeal is frivolous.

The importance of a motion for reconsideration cannot be overemphasized. We have held that such motion is a "plain,"
"speedy," and "adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. 5 The filing of a motion for reconsideration
will give the court the opportunity to either (a) correct the error/s imputed to it or (b) clarify and strengthened its ruling on
the issue and hopefully convince the movant of his wrong position. In either case, the controversy ends right there, thus
preventing unnecessary and premature resort to appellate proceedings. 6Consequently, we cannot countenance
petitioner’s disregard of this procedural norm and frustrate its purpose of attaining speedy, inexpensive, and orderly
judicial proceedings.

Coming now to the merits of the case, Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as "The Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," provides:

"SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. – The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and
executory; Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the Regional Director or by the PLEB involvingdemotion
or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt of
the copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving
demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof: Provided, furthermore, That, the Regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the
appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the Regional Appellate
Board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however,
to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary." (Underscoring supplied)

It is clear from the above provisions that the Decision of the PNP Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the
administrative penalty of dismissal from the service is appealable to the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party
may then appeal to the Secretary of the DILG.
Here, petitioner did not interpose an appeal to the DILG Secretary.

It bears emphasis that in the event the Secretary renders an unfavorable decision, petitioner may still elevate his case to
the Civil Service Commission.

Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution provides that the State shall establish and maintain one police force which shall
be civilian in character. Consequently, the PNP falls under the civil service pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B, also of
the Constitution, which states:

"Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."

Corollarily, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:

"SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. – The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall
apply to all personnel of the Department [DILG]."

Section 47 of the Civil Service Law7 provides inter alia that in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is
appealable to the Civil Service Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the Department and finally to the
Commission.

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is fatal to his cause. It is elementary that where, as here, a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should first be resorted to.8
We thus find that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, did not commit a reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision dated August 12,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46387 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State
pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was
amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied
with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as
‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of
States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic
waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a
vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its
sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total
maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.
CIR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA
October 21, 1971

FACTS:
Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Maria Cerdeira. Cerdeira is a Spanish national,
by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco up to her death. At the time of her
demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The CIR then issued an assessment for
state and inheritance taxes of P369,383.96. Rueda filed an amended return stating that intangible personal properties
worth P396,308.90 should be exempted from taxes. The CIR denied the request on the ground that the law of Tangier is
not reciprocal to Section 122 (now Section 104) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The case was elevated to the CTA which sided with Rueda. The CTA stated that the foreign country mentioned in Section
122 "refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international
law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law
allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by
our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code."

ISSUE: Whether the exemption is valid.

RULING:

YES.
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus:
"That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of
his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the
laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from
transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country."
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's
formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. A foreign
country is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a
government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, the CIR has not successfully made out a
case. The Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, like Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, PETITIONER VS
COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Facts:

The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation
Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base
Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac
car which valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported, petitioner requested the Clark Air Base
Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of
the United States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.

On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby
Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to
Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale executed in Manila.

The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption which the petitioner was
entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income
tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought refund from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a
case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest.

Issue:
Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by respondent from petitioner.

Ruling:
The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. Its laws govern therein and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain
their status as native soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not disappear.
The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases
Agreement which states that a “national of the US serving or employed in the Philippines in connection with the
construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason such
unemployment is not to be taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one clearly derived the Phil.
Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendering the petitioner liable
of the income tax arising from the sale of his automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our
territory to tax.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS CASE DIGEST: LEE HONG KOK V. DAVID (1972)

Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)

 Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution

 Imperium v. Dominium

 legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government

FACTS:

 Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of
award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958,
covering Lot 2892.

 On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued
on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.

 Land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
have always sustained the public character for having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to peittioners contention that
it is accretion)

 The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case

ISSUES:

1. W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO

2. W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES

HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot arising from the
grant made in his favor by respondent officials)
 Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The legality of the grant is a question
between the grantee and the government. Private parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for
the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the
cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.

 Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government

 Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered
property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is
granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of 5 years.
ANASTACIO LAUREL VS ERIBERTO MISATOPIC: SOVEREIGNTYCITATION: G.R. NO. L-200

MARCH 28, 1946

FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipinocitizen who adhered to the enemy
giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized byarticle 114 of the revied penal code for the reason 1) that the sovereignty of thelegitimate government in
the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and 2)that
there was a change ofsovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspendedandthat there was a change of
sovereignty over the Phil Islands.

RATIO:

A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance,which consists in fidelity and obedience, to his government or
sovereign. It cannot be equated to the qualified or temporary allegiance w/c a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives. In the same way, such foreigner
remains liable to prosecution for treason against his own government or sovereign, to which he owes absolute and
permanent allegiance. This absolute and permanent allegiance is not severed by enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government is not transferred to the occupier, a theory adopted in the Hague Convention of 1907.
Thus, it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government.

The existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence at least during the period of
‘suspension’. What may be suspended is the exercise of rights of sovereignty with the passing of control of the
government to the occupant. However, the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force laws unless in
conflict with laws and orders of the occupier. Such laws and orders must come within the limitations prescribed by the
Hague convention, meaning that such action must be

(1) demanded by the exigencies of military service;

(2) necessary for the control of the inhabitants; and

(3) necessary for the safety and protection of his army.

If the contrary were true, invaders would be able force the citizens, without fear of prosecution for treason, to be party to
the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own independence and repressing the exercise of their own
sovereignty—to commit a political suicide.

Because the question of sovereignty is a purely political question, its determination by the legislative and executive
departments of any government conclusively binds the judges as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the
country.

By virtue of Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution, which states that “all references in such laws to the
Government…shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution”, the crime of treason was made applicable not only to the sovereignty of the United States but also to the
sovereignty of the Government of the Philippines.
The change in form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with
the crime of treason committed during Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the
same sovereign people.

WILLIAM F. PERALTA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, GR NO. L-49, 1945-11-12

Facts:

Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production,
procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries... was prosecuted for the crime of robbery

He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced... to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of... which
are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of
America, and therefore, null and void... that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve... the political purpose
of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."... he City Fisc

The City Fiscal of Manila... submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal

Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created,
and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent... necessity, according to
the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure
established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the

Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision
of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without... due process of law.

Issues:

The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of
the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ... summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly,
the validity of the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation;
and thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on... said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration
therein of the Commonwealth Government.

Ruling:

"The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other
government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the

Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its
authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation... of
October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, 'under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the
"Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the... peoples' will nor
the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer
the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people,... before its military occupation and
possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means
recognized in the law of nations."

(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to
be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is... well established
in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the
laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the... usages of nations. The authority
thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the
conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the... occupied district."

A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he
admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless,... so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for
the maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is
administered as well as the laws regarding... procedure." (Oppenheim'si International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p. 349.)
It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner,
imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or... competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.

In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released
forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH 1945

FACTS

Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the CFI of Manila. After the liberation of the Manila
and the American occupation, respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines.

ISSUES

I. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the
American occupation.

II. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and
judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.

III. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in the courts at
the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces

HELD

AFFIRMATIVE. [A]ll acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid. If [the governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments], the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments,
which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership
of General Douglas MacArthur.

II

NEGATIVE. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies
established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation.

[I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase
“processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international
law.

[T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied
by an enemy, during the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the
military forces of invasion and occupation, it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a
representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army,
did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early
period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907.

III

AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own
hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect.

[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated
but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.
This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.”
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting
forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.

MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION

Standard

A.M. 133-J/114 SCRA 77, 31 May 1982

DEFINITION AND DIVISIONS OF POLITICAL LAW

FACTS

A decision in a civil case was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Leyte for lack
of an appeal from the parties involved. Among the parties thereto was herein petitioner Macariola. Subsequently,
respondent and his spouse conveyed their shares and interests in one of the properties mentioned in the project partition
in said case which respondent previously handled. Petitioner alleges that respondent judge violated Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce prohibiting the members of the Judiciary who are in active service to engage in commerce or have any
direct administrative or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts or
provinces in which they discharge their duties.

ISSUE

Whether or not Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has legal and binding effect thus holding respondent liable for a
violation thereof.

HELD: NO.

Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and, therefore, cannot apply to the respondent, then
Judge of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

Although incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, said provision
partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers
and employees, like justices and judges.

The Supreme Court stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States (US) and later on from
the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because there is a change of sovereignty. The political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those
of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by the affirmative act of the new
sovereign.
REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 104768, JULY 21, 2003
Facts:

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No.
1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R.
Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). Later, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation
on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned “Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.” The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together
with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized firearms, jewelry, and land titles.

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (“RA No. 1379”) against
Ramas. The complaint was amended to include Elizabeth Dimaano, the alleged mistress of Ramas, as co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his
public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as
a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.” The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because there was an illegal search
and seizure of the items confiscated, among others.

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure “on March 3,
1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.” Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative
at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were “taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.” Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February
1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had
already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies
and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

Issue:

Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal

Held:

The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were NOT legal.

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3
dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.“ The
resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except
treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government.
Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all
sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by
mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill
of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution.
No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights
during the interregnum.

The protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remained in effect during the interregnum.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR and the UDHR,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good
faith compliance with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires each signatory
State “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present ICCPR.” Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”

The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the UDHR did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only
a UDHR, the Court has interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding
on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the UDHR.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the ICCPR or the UDHR is another matter and is
not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the UDHR as part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the ICCPR. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution.
As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and
orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional
Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted
to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers
were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The
directives and orders should not have also violated the ICCPR or the UDHR. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a
judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these
items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these
items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team
exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they
must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the
lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold
these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO

G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986

FACTS:

President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power
of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
2. Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Rulings:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding that petitioners did not
have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause of action.

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon
C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and
law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people are the judge.

The Supreme Court further held that:

 The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
 It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)
G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

FACTS:

 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President.
 Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
 House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress.
Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella.
 Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
 When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11
senators.
 January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding
lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine
to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
 January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election
for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes,
together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of
Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our
support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave
a similar stunning announcement.
 January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner
and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
 January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the
Presidency.
 February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."
 February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:
 Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
 Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
HELD:
 Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
 In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or
not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
 Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

 An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
 them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as
Acting President xxx.
 What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
 In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision
that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
BACANI VS NACOCO
G.R. No. L-9657 November 29, 1956

Facts:
Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant
Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of
the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their
fees.

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A.
Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said
amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt
from the payment of the fees in question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25
per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity
within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:
Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of government, make them a
part of the Government of the Philippines.

Discussions:
NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”.
The term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are
imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs.
Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers
and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those
which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by
way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.

Rulings:
No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal
or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products
and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the
coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the
provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned
(sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.

PARENS PATRIAE: THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS EL MONTE DE PIEDAD G.R. NO. L-9959

Facts:
On June 3, 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippine Islands, which was then under the Spanish Crown, that
devastated lot of civilians. Therefore n Oct. 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain,
to distribute the money voluntarily contributed by donors. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board
allotted $365703.50 to the various sufferers name in its resolution.
These were later distributed in accordance with the above mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a
balance of $365.403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1,
1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the first month, directed its treasured to turn over Monte de Piedad the sum of
$80,000 of relief fund in its installment of 20,000 each. These amounts received on the following dates: February 15, March 12,
April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of Monte de Piedad.
The Attorney General in representation of the Philippine Islands, a file of claim for the $80000 together with interest, for
the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May, 3,
1912 by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial in the lower court,
judgment was entered in honor of the plaintiff currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and cost of cause.
The Monte de Piedad then contended that the present Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground that the obligation of
the former was wiped out when their was a change of sovereignty.

Issue: Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has capacity to file a suit against the Monte de Piedad for the
recovery of the said amount.

Ruling: Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine Government being the guardian of the “rights of the people” can
represent the legitimate claimants of the beneficiary and therefore has the capacity to file a suit against the appellant. The
Philippine Government is not merely a nominal party that’s why it can bring and prosecute this action by exercising its sovereign
powers. The supreme court then held the right of the government to file the case.

IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO A.M. NO. 90-11-2697-CA JUNE 29, 1992

Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to
the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first
appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982.
The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
"An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was then appointed as appellate
justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb.
1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created.
When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening
Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking
changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the
provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino.
The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano
who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the
court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue:
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to seniority
enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.
Held:
The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive
reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined
as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as
as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. A government
as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US,
Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise
of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority.