EXERCISE TEST

1.) Sec 6(1) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 exempts from tax
liability “vegetables, green or dried commonly known as subji, tarkari or
sak” when not sold in sealed containers. The Sales Tax Authorities levied
sales tax on “ginger” that is sold by one Mr. Deshpande who was the dealer
and vegetable vendor. The authorities claim that ginger cannot be called a
vegetable as it is used just to enhance the taste of food, is used for adding
flavour, and therefore does not qualify as vegetable in the strict
understanding of the term.
The question before the court is with respect to the issue as to whether
ginger falls within the category of goods described as vegetables, green or
dried, commonly known as ‘subji, tarkari or sak’. The word ‘vegetable’ has
not been defined by the Act.

2.) The Street Offences Act, 1960 was passed to clean up the streets to enable
people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by
prostitutes.
The Preamble of the Act reads: ‘Whereas with a view to putting a check on
the growing menace of prostitution and street solicitations and removing all
hindrance in the smooth use of the public streets it is expedient to make
provisions for the protection of persons using the street from nuisance
caused due to prostitution.’
Section 54 of the Act provides that “it shall be an offence for a common
prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public places for the purposes of
prostitution”. Sec. 5 provides punishment of imprisonment for two years for
anyone found guilty under Section 54 of the Act.
 ‘G’, a prostitute standing in a balcony, projects her solicitations addressed to
‘B’ and his friends who were walking in the street. ‘G’ is charged under the
aforesaid Act. She takes the plea that she was not soliciting “in a street” as
she was not physically present in the street.

3.) One Shri. P.K. Singh established an iron and steel manufacturing factory in
1972 in the name of Rainbow Steels Limited in Meerut (U.P). There were
more than 5000 employees working in the factory premises. As the
production and supply of iron and steel grew manifold, and the profits
increased; the owner decided to wind up his business (owing to his age and
health concerns) and he sold the factory, along with its associate auxiliaries,
components and accessories in proper working condition to the appellant in
the year 2015.
In exercise of the power under section 3A of the U.P.Sales Tax Act, 1992
the State Government, issued a notification dated May 30, 2016 which
provided that the turnover in respect of “old, discarded, unserviceable or
obsolete machinery, stores or vehicles etc.” shall be liable to tax at the point
of sale at the rate of five %.
The appellant was imposed a tax by the Commissioner of Sales Tax as he
regarded the factory and the machinery as “old”, and is thereby covered
within the ambit of Sec.3A.
4.) The Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 is a legislation dealing with matters
with respect to levying of Sales Tax and Excise Duty on several goods
manufactured and sold in the State of Punjab. The Schedule to this Act lists various
entries and enlists some articles separately whereas some articles are grouped
together in a single entry.
Entry 16 of the Schedule to the said Act reads ‘cosmetics, perfumery and toilet
goods, excluding tooth paste, tooth powder, kumkum and soap’.
Mr. Ajeet, is a manufacturer of dhoop and agarbatti. While assessing the turnover,
the concerned officials bracketed his products i.e. dhoop and agarbatti as falling
within the head of ‘perfumery’ in Entry 16 due to the fragrance or scent element
present in such dhoop or agarbatti, thus imposing the said tax on the manufactured
goods. Perfumery has nowhere been defined in the Act. Mr. Ajeet states that dhoop
and agarbatti cannot be brought within the ambit of perfumery and thereby the
matter has been brought before the Court.
Apply the relevant principles of statutory construction, to the afore-stated facts in
the light of case law while interpreting the word ‘perfumery’ and decide the matter.

5.) The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961(hereinafter the Act) was enacted
following consistent reportage of Bride-burning and dowry deaths. This propelled
the Ministry of Women and Child Welfare to address the situation with utmost
urgency thereby leading to the present Act. The Statement of Objects & Reasons of
this Bill provided: The object of this bill is to prohibit the evil practice of giving
and taking of dowry. This Act provides: -
Sec.2 Definitions (i) “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or
agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to a marriage to the
other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by
any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before
[or any time after the marriage] [in connection with the marriage of the said
parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
However, looking into the proportions in which the menace had continued to
plague the society, combined with other forms of domestic abuse inflicted on
women, the National Commission for Women and other women’s NGOs felt the
need for a legislation which primarily focuses on the victims of such violence and
protects the aggrieved women. This propelled the need for a comprehensive
legislation to curb the menace of Domestic Violence against women and thus to
keep up with this goal the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 was passed. This Act aimed to address all forms of violence that women face
in a domestic relationship from men. As per the language of this Act, the
perpetrator is a man and victim is a woman in a domestic relationship. This Act
was designed to provide for civil remedies like compensation, right to shelter etc.
to the aggrieved woman.
Section 2(h) of the 2005 Act states: “dowry” shall have the same meaning as
assigned to it in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
In 2014, on the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the Houses of
Parliament, some amendments were made in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in
several of its sections including in the definition of “dowry”. By virtue of this
amendment, the definition of dowry was made wider and more stringent to cover
cases of abuse.
The question that therefore arose in the present case was whether the 2014
amendment to the Act will also amend the definition of dowry in the 2005
legislation as well?
6.) The Jammu & Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957 (hereinafter
the Act) has been enacted for the delimitation of Constituencies for the purpose of
elections to the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council; the conduct of
elections; the qualifications and disqualifications for membership of the Houses of
Legislature; the corrupt practices and other offences at or in connection with such
elections.

For ensuring the veracity of the details of the candidate, presented in the petition
the Act provided for some specific provisions.

Section 89(3) of the Act reads: “Every election petition should be accompanied by
as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and
every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be
true copy of the petition”.
Under Section 94(1) of the Act, “The High Court shall dismiss an election petition
which does not comply with the provisions of Section 89 or Section 90 or Section
125.”
At the general election held in the year 1977 to elect members to the Legislative
Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the appellant and the respondent
were candidates for the seat to be filled from the Handwara Assembly
Constituency. The respondent was declared as the successful candidate by the
Returning Officer. Thereafter the appellant filed a petition before the High Court of
Jammu and Kashmir challenging the validity of the respondent’s election on
various grounds. The respondent raised a preliminary objection to the election
petition that the copy of the election petition had not been attested by the appellant
himself under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition as required by
Section 89 (3) of the Act but by his advocate on behalf of the appellant. The
respondent contended that the petition was liable to be dismissed in view of
Section 94 of the Act which provided that the High Court should dismiss an
election petition which did not comply with the provisions of Section 89 or Section
90 or Section 125 of the Act.
The question before the court is with respect to the standard of compliance as
required by Section 89(3) of the Act.

7.) One Mr. Satyarthi was the editor of an English newspaper “Searchlight” based in
Ahmedabad. During the monsoon session of the Gujarat State Legislative Assembly, Mr.
Satyarthi published a speech, in its entirety of a Minister that was delivered by him in the State
Assembly. The editor was called upon by the Secretary of the Gujarat Legislative Assembly to
show cause before the Committee of Privileges of the Assembly why appropriate action should
not be taken against him for the breach of privileges of the Speaker and the Assembly for
publishing in its entirety a speech delivered in the Assembly by a member thereof, portions of
which were directed to be expunged (removed) by the Speaker.
Mr. Satyarthi sought relief before the Court contending that it was a violation of his fundamental
right to freedom of speech and expression protected by Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution and that
as an editor of a newspaper he was entitled to all the benefits of the freedom of the Press. The
Office of the Secretary relied on Art. 194(3) of the Constitution and claimed that the proceedings
in the House as those in the British House of Commons were not usually meant to be published,
and in circumstances it was not permissible to publish the parts of a speech which were directed
to be expunged (removed) and, therefore formed no part of the official report and such
publication was in clear breach of the privileges of the Assembly.
For the reference of the examinees:
Art. 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression to every citizen and that also includes
freedom of press.
Art.194 (3) provides for special powers, privileges and immunities for the Speaker as well as
members of Parliament and State Legislative Assembles.
Sec.194 as: “Powers, privileges, etc, of the House of Legislatures and of the members and
committees thereof”
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a
State, and of the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as
may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall be those
of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of
Section 26 of the Constitution forty fourth Amendment Act, 1978.
Apply the relevant principle(s) of statutory construction in the light of case law and decide the
matter.

8.) Under the power conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1946, the Central Government issued an Order called “The Cotton Textiles (Control) Order,
1948”. Clause 20 of the Order, reads thus:
20 (1) The textile Commissioner may from time to time issue directions in writing to any
manufacturer or class of manufacturers regarding the classes or specifications of cloth or yarn,
and the maximum or the minimum quantities thereof, which they shall or shall not produce
during such periods as may be specified in the directions, and they shall comply with such
directions.
(2) In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sub-clause (1) the Textile Commissioner
may have regard to the capacity of the producer to produce cloth and yarn of different
descriptions or specifications and to the needs of the general public.
In the present case, the Textile Commissioner issued a notification that prohibited the printing of
any border on sarees etc. however, the Commissioner did not specify the period of such
prohibition. (It was for an indefinite period).
The above notification was challenged by M/s Sagar Textile Mills before the court as according
to them, the failure to specify the ‘period’ amounts to a violation of the Clause 20.
In the light of the afore-stated facts and principles of statutory construction, construe the
meaning and essence of the word ‘may’ in Clause 20 giving reasons and citing appropriate case
law and decide the matter.

9.) In order to remove the disability imposed by some customs or usages on certain classes
of Hindu against entry into Hindu Public Temples, State X enacts a law under Art 25(2)(b) of the
Constitution and opens the entry to any such temple to all sections of Hindus.

The trustees of a denominational Hindu temple resist the application of such law on the ground
that their temple had been built for the benefit of particular Hindu Sect. They contend that under
Art 26(b) of the Constitution, they have a right to manage their affairs in the matters of religion
which includes right to entry as well and hence it is violative of their fundamental right.

Apply the most appropriate rule of interpretation to the above given facts and decide the matter
with the help of case law.
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