Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Post Employment Transitory and Final Provisions of The Labor Code
Post Employment Transitory and Final Provisions of The Labor Code
YES.
Article 294 (now, Article 195[280]) of the Labor Code provides that an
employee is deemed regular when he has been engaged to perform
activities which are deemed usually necessary and desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except (i) where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee or (ii) where the work or services
to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment if for the
duration of the season.
In this case, the Court held that Sykes was able to prove both
requisites.
Noblejas averred that the company did not act on his letter-request,
so he sought an audience with Capt. Terrei on March 16, 2010.
During the meeting, an altercation between them ensued. He claimed
that after that incident, Capt. Terrei instructed Ferrez to dismiss him
from employment. In their position paper, respondents submitted that
they could not be adjudged guilty of illegal dismissal because there
was no positive and overt act of dismissing Noblejas from
employment.
The Court finds it odd that, instead of clarifying from Capt. Terrei what
he heard from Ferrez, Noblejas immediately instituted an illegal
dismissal case against the respondents the day following the alleged
incident and never reported back for work since then.
Transfer
MORALES VS HARBOR CENTRE POST TERMINAL
FACTS: On 16 May 2000, petitioner Jonathan V. Morales (Morales)
was hired by respondent Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI)
as an Accountant and Acting Finance Officer with a monthly salary
of P18,000.00. Regularized on 17 November 2000, Morales was
promoted to Division Manager of the Accounting Department, for
which he was compensated a monthly salary of P33,700.00, plus
allowances starting 1 July 2002.
Subsequent to HCPTI’s transfer to its new offices at Vitas,
Tondo, Manila on 2 January 2003, Morales received an inter-
office memorandum dated 27 March 2003, reassigning him to
Operations Cost Accounting, tasked with the duty of “monitoring
and evaluating all consumables requests, gears and equipment”
related to the corporation’s operations and of interacting with its sub-
contractor, Bulk Fleet Marine Corporation.
Morales wrote Singson (admin manager), protesting that his
reassignment was a clear demotion since the position to which he
was transferred was not even included in HCPTI’s plantilla. For the
whole of the ensuing month Morales was absent from work and/or
tardy. Singson issued to Morales a 29 April 2003 inter-office
memorandum denominated as a First Warning.
In view of the absences Morales continued to incur, HCPTI issued
a Second Warning dated 6 May 2003 and a Notice to Report for Work
and Final Warning dated 22 May 2003.
LABOR ARBITER: Morales was not constructively dismissed
NLRC: Morales’ reassignment was a clear demotion despite lack of
showing of diminution of salaries and benefits.
CA rendered the herein assailed decision, reversing the NLRC’s 29
July 2005 Decision, upon the following findings and conclusions: (a)
Morales’ reassignment to Operations Cost Accounting was a valid
exercise of HCPTI’s prerogative to transfer its employees as the
exigencies of the business may require; (b) the transfer cannot be
construed as constructive dismissal since it entailed no demotion in
rank, salaries and benefits; and, (c) rather than being terminated,
Morales refused his new assignment by taking a leave of absence
from 4 to 17 April 2003 and disregarding HCPTI’s warnings and
directives to report back for work.
ISSUE: WON Morales was constructively dismissed
HELD: YES
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work
because “continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in
rank or a diminution in pay” and other benefits. Aptly called a
dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to
appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if
an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer
becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could
foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment. In cases of a transfer of an employee, the rule is settled
that the employer is charged with the burden of proving that its
conduct and action are for valid and legitimate grounds such as
genuine business necessity and that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. If the employer cannot
overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s transfer shall be
tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.
Morales was subsequently reassigned by HCPTI “from managerial
accounting to Operations Cost Accounting” on 27 March 2003,
without any mention of the position to which he was actually being
transferred. That the reassignment was a demotion is, however,
evident from Morales’ new duties which, far from being
managerial in nature, were very simply and vaguely described as
inclusive of “monitoring and evaluating all consumables
requests, gears and equipments related to [HCPTI’s]
operations” as well as “close interaction with [its] sub-contractor
Bulk Fleet Marine Corporation.”
Morales’ demotion is evident from the fact that his reassignment
entailed a transfer from a managerial position to one which was not
even included in the corporation’s plantilla.
ISSUES:
HELD:
XII
Authorized causes:
Dismissal due to redundancy
Presentation of the new table of the organization and the certification of the
Human Resources Supervisor that the positions occupied by the
retrenched employees are redundant are inadequate as evidence to
support the college’s redundancy program.
Floating status:
Held: YES. Petitioner admits relieving respondent from his post as security
guard on 10 December 2005. There is also no dispute that respondent
remained on floating status at the time he filed his complaint for illegal
dismissal on 16 June 2006. In other words, respondent was on floating
status from 10 December 2005 to 16 June 2006 or more than six months.
Petitioner’s allegation of sending respondent a notice sometime in January
2006, requiring him to report for work, is unsubstantiated, and thus, self-
serving.
The Court agrees with the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and Court of
Appeals that a floating status of a security guard, such as respondent, for
more than six months constitutes constructive dismissal. In Nationwide
Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama, the Court held:
In the controversy now before the Court, there is no question that the
security guard, Serrano, was placed on floating status after his relief
from his post as a VIP security by his securityagency’s client. Yet,
there is no showing that his security agency, petitioner Exocet, acted
in bad faith when it placed Serrano on such floating status. What is
more, the present case is not a situation where Exocet did not recall
Serrano to work within the six-month period as required by law and
jurisprudence. Exocet did, in fact, make an offer to Serrano to go
back to work. It is just that the assignment—although it does not
involvea demotion in rank or diminution in salary, pay, benefits or
privileges—was not the security detail desired by Serrano.
In fact, even during the meeting with the Labor Arbiter, Exocet offered
a position in the general security only to be rebuffed by Serrano. It
was as if Serrano obliged Exocet to look for a client in need of a VIP
security—the availability of which is obviously not within Exocet’s
control, and by nature, difficult to procure as these contracts depend
on the trust and confidence of the client or principal on the security
guard.
The third element substantiates the contention that the employee has
indeed been suffering from a disease that: (1) is prejudicial to his
health as well as to the health of his co-employees; and (2) cannot be
cured within a period of six months even with proper medical
treatment. Without the medical certificate, there can be no authorized
cause for the employee’s dismissal. The absence of this element thus
renders the dismissal void and illegal.
In the current case, we agree with the CA that Dr. Lee’s psychiatric
report substantially proves that Deoferio was suffering from
schizophrenia, that his disease was not curable within a period of six
months even with proper medical treatment, and that his continued
employment would be prejudicial to his mental health. This
conclusion is further substantiated by the unusual and bizarre acts
that Deoferio committed while at Intel’s employ.
The Labor Code and its IRR are silent on the procedural due process
required in terminations due to disease. Despite the seeming gap in
the law, Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the IRR expressly states that
the employee should be afforded procedural due process in all cases
of dismissals.
Held: Arlene was illegally dismissed. The Court held that Fuji failed to
comply w/ the req. of substantive and procedural due process
necessary for her dismissal since she was a regular Ee. Arlene didn’t
sign the non-renewal contract voluntarily and it was mere subterfuge
by Fuji to secure its position that it was her choice to renew her
contract.
XIII.
Consequences of termination
GENUINO V NLRC
DOCTRINE:
“If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the
finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the
right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund
the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be
deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was
entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective
bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the
employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then
the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services
rendered without need of refund.”
GARCIA V PAL
DOCTRINE:
AGABON VS NLRC
Doctrine: Failure to meet the required due process of twin notice rule and
hearing in cases falling under valid dismissal due to just cause, the
employee is entitled to 50k as nominal damages.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari was not rendered moot despite
petitioner's satisfaction of the judgment award, as the respondent had
obliged himself to return the payment if the petition would be granted.
GAPYAO V ROSARIO
Held: Private R’s late husband is the Ee of the P. The most telling
indicia of this relationship is the Compromise Agreement executed by
petitioner and private respondent. It is a valid agreement as long as
the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver
voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he or she was entering
into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily
entered into is personal and specific individual consent. Once
executed by the workers or employees and their employers to settle
their differences, and done in good faith, a Compromise Agreement is
deemed valid and binding among the parties.[
Petitioner entered into the agreement with full knowledge that he was
described as the employer of the deceased. This knowledge cannot
simply be denied by a statement that petitioner was merely forced or
threatened into such an agreement. His belated attempt to
circumvent the agreement should not be given any consideration or
weight by this Court.
Held: The dismissal is valid and complied with the substantial and
procedural due process. Dwelling on the substantive aspect of
Esguerras dismissal, We have held that there are two (2) classes of
positions of trust the first class consists of managerial employees, or
those vested with the power to lay down management policies; and
the second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians
or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions,
regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.
Esguerra held the position of Cost Control Supervisor and had the
duty to remit to the accounting department the cash sales proceeds
from every transaction she was assigned to. This is not a routine task
that a regular employee may perform; it is related to the handling of
business expenditures or finances. For this reason, Esguerra
occupies a position of trust and confidence a position enumerated in
the second class of positions of trust. Any breach of the trust imposed
upon her can be a valid cause for dismissal.
PGAEU V NLRC
ISSUE:
Petitioner insists that she was not properly apprised of the specific
grounds for her termination as to give her a reasonable opportunity to
explain. This is because the Prerequisite Notice and Notice of
Termination did not mention any valid or authorized cause for
dismissal but rather merely contained general allegations and vague
terms.
As she was served with a notice apprising her of the changes against
her and also a subsequent notice informing her of the management's
decision to terminate her services alter respondents found her written
response to the first notice unsatisfactory, petitioner was clearly
afforded her right to due process.
Held: No. The law doesn’t req that an intention to terminate one’s
employment should be included in the 1st notice. Its enough that Ee
are properly apprised of the charges brought against them so they
can properly prepare their defenses. Its only during the 2nd notice that
the intention to terminate one’s employment should be explicitly
stated.
The existence of an actual formal trial type hearing, altho preferred,
isn’t absolutely necessary to satisfy the Ee’s right to be heard. P was
able to present her defenses and only upon proper consideration of it
did R send the 2nd memo terminating her employment. Since R
complied w/ the 2 notice req, no procedural defect exists in P’s
termination.
In the instant case, the first notice issued by petitioner fell short of the
requirement of the law because it merely referred to the section of the
company rule allegedly violated by private respondent. The notice
failed to specify the penalty for the charges which is dismissal, and to
indicate the precise act or omission which constituted as the ground
for which dismissal is sought.
SARONA VS NLRC
Clearly, the law intends the award of backwages and similar benefits
to accumulate past the date of the Labor Arbiter's decision until the
dismissed employee is actually reinstated. But if, as in this case,
reinstatement is no longer possible, this Court has consistently ruled
that backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal dismissal
until the date the decision becomes final.
In fine, this Court holds Royale liable to pay the petitioner backwages
to be computed from his dismissal on October 1, 2003 until the finality
of this decision. Nonetheless, the amount received by the petitioner
from the respondents in satisfaction of the November 30, 2005
Decision shall be deducted accordingly.
Half-Month Pay Per Year of Service, but in no case less than One
Month Pay, if separation is due to:
In this case, respondent would have been liable for reinstatement and
payment of backwages. Reinstatement, however, was no longer
feasible because, as found by the LA, respondent had already
ceased operation of its business. Thus, backwages and separation
pay, in the amount of one month for every year of service, should be
paid in lieu of reinstatement.
Finality of decision
Pp. 1043-1091
Cases:
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the
employer be made under a just or authorized causes.
ISSUE:
W/N the Serrano ruling which declared the subject Section 10
of RA 8042 unconstitutional can be given retroactive application
in the present case;
W/N RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 restoring
the subject clause in Section 10 of RA 8042 being amendatory
in nature can be applied retroactively.
RULING: The SC held that the Serrano ruling can be given
retroactive application as resolved in Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s
Management in the interest of equity and that the Serrano ruling is an
exemption to the doctrine of operative fact. Moreover, the
SC held that the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022 cannot be
given retroactive effect not only because there is no express
declaration of retroactivity of the law, but because the retroactive
application will result in an impairment of right that had accrued to the
respondents by virtue of the Serrano Ruling. The SC reiterated that
all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
application, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
them retrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily
implied from the language used. The petition is DENIED.
Held: Settle is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters w/in their jurisdiction,
are generally accorded not only with respect but even finality by the
courts when supported by substantial evid, e.i., such amount of
relevant evid wc a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. Likewise, factual findings arrived at by a trier of
facts, who is uniquely positioned to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses appearing before him and is most competent in judging the
credibility of the contending parties, are accorded great weight and
certitude.
At the outset, the Court notes that the petition is fatally defective. The
issue it presents is factual, not legal.
As the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Sebuguero applies to
this case, the consequences arrived at in Sebuguero also apply. Lay-
off is essentially retrenchment and under Article 283 of the Labor
Code a retrenched employee is entitled to separation pay equivalent
to one (1) month salary or one-half (12) month salary per year of
service, whichever is higher.
HALAGUENA VS PAL
Held: Yes regular court has jurisdiction of DR. The subject of litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the
RTC. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the
jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
A.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the
latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her
employment with the former." Article 287, as amended, allows for
optional retirement at the age of at least 60 years old.
B.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term ‘one half
(1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth
(1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more
than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.