Camsur case & the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy

e controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other

commissioner v. standard written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
insurance. doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
Greatest common factor

Mmda v. viron The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.

Cam sur Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order
or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute,
and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.

Reyes v ortiz The first paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to determine
any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of
his rights and duties thereunder.

Galicto case was merged in the same item as reyes v. ortiz. So instead of 6 cases there are 7 cases here.

Case title What was What was cited in the Book Relevant Rulings
asked by Atty.
Pague

THE VISAYAN PACKING Is compulsory Riano: a petition for declaratory relief
CORPORATION, Petitioner, counter claim may entertain a compulsory counterclaim
allowed? as long as it is based on or arising from
the same transaction, subject matter of
See riano the petition. It was ruled that there is
v. citation next nothing in the nature of a special civil
column. action for declaratory relief that
proscrives the filing of a counterclaim
THE REPARATIONS based on the same transaction, deed, or
contract subject of the complaint.
COMMISSION and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Sa case:
G. R. No. L-29673. November
12, 1987.
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a
special civil action for declaratory relief
that proscribes the filing of a
NARVASA, J counterclaim based on the same
transaction, deed or contract subject of
the complaint. A special civil action is
after all not essentially different from an
ordinary civil action, which is generally
governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of
Court, except that the former deals with
a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But
It is indeed the rule, embodied in Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
that a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.
In other words, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of
a separate action but should be asserted in the same suit involving the
same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it. The omission is not
however irremediable or irreversibly fatal. The Rules provide that when a
pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or
excusable negligence, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court,
set up the counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment before judgment. 7
Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be
abated upon a plea of auter action pendant or litis pendentia, 8 and/or
dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata. 9 Res adjudicata may be
pleaded as a ground for dismissal if the opposing party’s claim, involving
the same transaction or occurrence as the counterclaim, has already been
adjudicated on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the
judgment has become final; this, on the theory that what is barred by
prior judgment are not only the matters squarely raised and litigated, but
all such other matters as could have been raised but were not.

R. No. 137794 August
11, 2010
ERLINDA REYES and
ROSEMARIE
MATIENZO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ,
Presiding, Branch 49,
Metropolitan Trial Court,
Caloocan City; SPOUSES
BERNARD and FLORENCIA
PERL, represented by
Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN
MUCIO; HON. JUDGE VICTORIA
ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding,
Branch 124, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City and
SEGUNDO
BAUTISTA, Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J
the identity between their fundamental
nature is such that the same rules
governing ordinary civil suits may and do
apply to special civil actions if not
inconsistent with or if they may serve to
supplement the provisions of the peculiar
rules governing special civil actions.
Is the list of Riano:
subject to be
tested  This Court, in Lerum v.
exclusive? Yes Cruz,44 declared that the subject
(see next matters to be tested in a petition for
column) declaratory relief are exclusive, viz:
Under this rule, only a person who
is interested "under a deed, will,
contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute or ordinance,
may bring an action to determine
any question of construction or
validity arising under the
instrument or statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder." This means that the
subject matter must refer to a
deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or to a statute or
ordinance, to warrant declaratory
relief. Any other matter not
mentioned therein is deemed
excluded. This is under the principle
of expressio unius est exclussio
alterius.
 A petition for declaratory relief
cannot properly have a court
decision as its subject matter. In
Tanda v. Aldaya [98 Phil. 244
(1956)], we ruled that:
[A] court decision cannot be
interpreted as included within the
Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have
been dismissed and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory
relief suits, by way of an amended answer. This was not done. The actions
proceeded separately and were decided on the merits. The final verdict
was that the declaratory relief suits instituted by VISPAC were
unmeritorious, quite without foundation and, in the light of all the relevant
facts, appear to have been initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct and
delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of
which was decreed in the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and
taking account of the not inconsiderable length of time that the case at
bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to substantial justice to
pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on
compulsory counterclaims. Rules of procedure are after all laid down in
order to attain justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the achievement
of that goal. Form cannot prevail over substance.
Petitioners insist that this is mainly a petition for declaratory relief. Section
1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by
a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
The foregoing section can be dissected into two parts. The first paragraph
concerns declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special civil action
by any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive
order or regulation to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and
for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The second paragraph
pertains to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an
action to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a sale
with a right to repurchase.
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter
to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, a statute, executive order or regulation, or any
government regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,44 declared that the
subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory relief are
exclusive.
purview of the words "other written
instrument," as contended by
appellant, for the simple reason
that the Rules of Court already
provide for the ways by which an
ambiguous or doubtful decision
may be corrected or clarified
without need of resorting to the
expedient prescribed by Rule 66
[now Rule 64].47
in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,45 wherein this Court stressed
that court orders or decisions cannot be made the subject matter of a
declaratory relief, thus:
Judge Querubin's query is not an action for declaratory relief. Section 1 of
Rule 64 [now Rule 63] of the Rules of Court provides the requisites of an
action for declaratory relief. In interpreting these requisites, the Court has
ruled that:
xxxx
The letter of Judge Querubin pertained to final orders and decisions of the
courts that are clearly not the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory
relief. Thus, the requisites prescribed by the Rules of Court in an action
for declaratory relief are not applicable to the letter of Judge
Querubin.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
Then again in a recent ruling of this Court, it was emphasized:
A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as
its subject matter. In Tanda v. Aldaya [98 Phil. 244 (1956)], we ruled
that:
[A] court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of
the words "other written instrument," as contended by appellant, for the
simple reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by
which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified
without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now
Rule 64].47
Despite this procedural remedy available to them, petitioners, under the
pretext that they were in a quandary as to their rights under the Injunction
order of the Quezon City RTC, directly filed the instant case here.
Petitioners did not bother to proffer a compelling reason for their direct
resort to this Court. This procedural faux pas proves fatal. The Court’s
exhortation against taking a procedural shortcut cannot be
overemphasized. In Ortega v. The Quezon City Government, 49 the Court
accentuated:
At all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no
statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and
exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only
questions of law.
Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if
far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, there
allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that she is entitled to such a wri
judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, e
when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exception
compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the ex
of this Court's primary jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

H. R. No.
193978 February 28,
2012
JELBERT B.
GALICTO, Petitioner,
vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his
capacity as President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; and FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of
Budget and
Management, Respondents.
BRION, J.
Is the Riano: it is procedurally inappropriate to
executive question the validity of an executive order
order issued issued by the president of the philippines
by the through a petition for certiorari. A
president petition for declaratory relieff under rule
subject of rule 63 is the proper recourse since the
65? no it must issuance of the executive order is not a
be rule 63. see judicial or quasi judicial act. A petitino for
next column. declaratory relief is likewise the remedy
to set aside an executive order issued by
a city mayor who issued the executive
order in connection sith his executive
functions.
“Under the Rules of Court, petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and
mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an
EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari
and prohibition is an incorrect remedy;
instead a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the
proper recourse to assail the validity of
EO 7.
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any
person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument,
whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity
To make matters worse, petitioner Matienzo obviously availed of the instant decla
relief to substitute for a petition for certiorari, a remedy which she sadly lost by inact
must be recalled that on December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124 d
Matienzo’s motion to suspend proceedings.50 She moved for reconsideration, but the
was denied on May 14, 1998.51 She received the Order denying her motio
reconsideration on June 9, 1998.52 She had 60 days therefrom to question the same b
the Quezon City RTC. It was only on March 25, 1999 that petitioner Matienzo assaile
order denying her motion for reconsideration, albeit wrongly before this Court.53 From
it can be inferred that petitioner Matienzo’s recourse is a belated attempt design
salvage her lost opportunity to assail the order denying her motion to suspend procee
A. Certiorari is not the proper remedy.(see riano qoute then continue
reading here)
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this
petition for certiorari.
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial
prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites
must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
arising, and for a declaration of his rights
or duties, thereunder. (Emphases ours.)
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City
Mayor of Manila16 is a case in point.17 In
Liga, we dismissed the petition for
certiorari to set aside an EO issued by a
City Mayor and insisted that a petition for
declaratory relief should have been filed
with the RTC.”
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the
power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties
are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate
upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies …
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights
are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine
the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by
the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the
assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the
questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and
executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari,
in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality
or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved.18

Likewise, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti

Terrorism Council,19 we similarly dismissed the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9372, otherwise
known as the "Human Security Act of 2007," since the respondents therein
(members of the Anti-Terrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.

While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion
and rulemaking authority we are granted under the Constitution,20 and
set aside procedural considerations to permit parties to bring a suit before
us at the first instance through certiorari and/or prohibition,21 this liberal
policy remains to be an exception to the general rule, and thus, has its
limits. In Concepcion v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),22 we
emphasized the importance of availing of the proper remedies and
cautioned against the wrongful use of certiorari in order to assail the quasi-
legislative acts of the COMELEC, especially by the wrong party. In ruling
that liberality and the transcendental doctrine cannot trump blatant
disregard of procedural rules, and considering that the petitioner had other
available remedies (such as a petition for declaratory relief with the
appropriate RTC under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in
this case, we categorically ruled:

The petitioner’s unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading Rule 65,
given the way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach
to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual
capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of
other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of Court
provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioner’s approaches
constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative reading and
application of the Rules of Court, we nevertheless resolve that the petition
should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the Rules. The
transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound,
cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure,
particularly when remedial measures were available under these same
rules to achieve the petitioner’s objectives. For our part, we cannot and
should not – in the name of liberality and the "transcendental importance"
doctrine – entertain these types of petitions. As we held in the very recent
case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different perspective, our
liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused.23 [emphasis
supplied]

Others:

B. Petitioner lacks locus standi.

 C. The petition has a defective jurat.

D. The petition has been mooted by supervening events.

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the
present case has already been rendered moot by these supervening
events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that
suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of
GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the
provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of
directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor
of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.

Xxx

All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as
well as its patent formal and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any
reason for the Court to resolve the other issues raised in the certiorari
petition.

G.R. No. 176579 June What is the Riano: At the outset, petitioner is faced with a procedural barrier. Among the
28, 2011 ruling? SEE remedies petitioner seeks, only the petition for prohibition is within the
NEXT COLUMN. original jurisdiction of this court, which however is not exclusive but is
WILSON P. concurrent with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
GAMBOA, Petitioner, The court (SC) has no original and (continue reading riano qoute);
vs. exclusive jurisdiction over a petition
FINANCE SECRETARY for declaratory relief. However
MARGARITO B. TEVES, exceptions to this rule have been
FINANCE UNDERSECRETARY recognized. Thus, where the petition In the present case, petitioner seeks primarily the interpretation of the
JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND has far reaching implications that term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. He prays that
COMMISSIONER RICARDO should be resolved, it may be treated this Court declare that the term "capital" refers to common shares only,
ABCEDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL as one for mandamus. and that such shares constitute "the sole basis in determining foreign
COMMISSION ON GOOD equity in a public utility." Petitioner further asks this Court to declare any
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN ruling inconsistent with such interpretation unconstitutional.
THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIR
In the case it is written this wise: The interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY,
OF THE PRIVATIZATION Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national economy. In
COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI fact, a resolution of this issue will determine whether Filipinos are masters,
SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., or second class citizens, in their own country. What is at stake here is
The actions for declaratory
LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS whether Filipinos or foreigners will have effective control of the national
relief,10injunction, and annulment of sale
DIRECTOR OF METRO PACIFIC economy. Indeed, if ever there is a legal issue that has far-reaching
are not embraced within the original
ASSET HOLDINGS INC., implications to the entire nation, and to future generations of Filipinos, it
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On this
CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. is the threshhold legal issue presented in this case.
ground alone, the petition could have
PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE been dismissed outright. The Court first encountered the issue on the definition of the term "capital"
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in the case of Fernandez v.
COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS
Cojuangco, docketed as G.R. No. 157360.16 That case involved the same
CAPACITY AS MANAGING
While direct resort to this Court may be public utility (PLDT) and substantially the same private respondents.
DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC
justified in a petition for Despite the importance and novelty of the constitutional issue raised
CO., LTD., PRESIDENT
prohibition,11 the Court shall therein and despite the fact that the petition involved a purely legal
NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF
nevertheless refrain from discussing the question, the Court declined to resolve the case on the merits, and instead
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR
FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and
PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF
THE PHILIPPINE STOCK
EXCHANGE, Respondents.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD and
ARNO V. SANIDAD, Petitioners-
in-Intervention.
CARPIO, J.:
grounds in support of the petition for
prohibition since on 28 February 2007,
the questioned sale was consummated
when MPAH paid IPC ₱25,217,556,000
and the government delivered the
certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares.
However, since the threshold and purely
legal issue on the definition of the term
"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution has far-reaching implications
to the national economy, the Court treats
the petition for declaratory relief as one
for mandamus.
In Salvacion v. Central Bank of the
Philippines,13 the Court treated the
petition for declaratory relief as one for
mandamus considering the grave
injustice that would result in the
interpretation of a banking law. In that
case, which involved the crime of rape
committed by a foreign tourist against a
Filipino minor and the execution of the
final judgment in the civil case for
damages on the tourist’s dollar deposit
with a local bank, the Court declared
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960, exempting foreign currency deposits
from attachment, garnishment or any
other order or process of any court,
inapplicable due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. The Court held
that "injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused x x x" that would "negate Article
10 of the Civil Code which provides that
‘in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.’" The Court therefore
required respondents Central Bank of the
Philippines, the local bank, and the
accused to comply with the writ of
execution issued in the civil case for
damages and to release the dollar deposit
of the accused to satisfy the judgment.
In Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor,14 the Court similarly
denied the same for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.17There,
petitioner Fernandez assailed on a pure question of law the Regional Trial
Court’s Decision of 21 February 2003 via a petition for review under Rule
45. The Court’s Resolution, denying the petition, became final on 21
December 2004.
The instant petition therefore presents the Court with another opportunity
to finally settle this purely legal issuewhich is of transcendental
importance to the national economy and a fundamental requirement to a
faithful adherence to our Constitution. The Court must forthwith seize such
opportunity, not only for the benefit of the litigants, but more significantly
for the benefit of the entire Filipino people, to ensure, in the words of the
Constitution, "a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos."18 Besides, in the light of vague and confusing
positions taken by government agencies on this purely legal issue, present
and future foreign investors in this country deserve, as a matter of basic
fairness, a categorical ruling from this Court on the extent of their
participation in the capital of public utilities and other nationalized
businesses.
Despite its far-reaching implications to the national economy, this purely
legal issue has remained unresolved for over 75 years since the 1935
Constitution. There is no reason for this Court to evade this ever recurring
fundamental issue and delay again defining the term "capital," which
appears not only in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, but also in
Section 2, Article XII on co-production and joint venture agreements for
the development of our natural resources,19 in Section 7, Article XII on
ownership of private lands,20 in Section 10, Article XII on the reservation
of certain investments to Filipino citizens,21 in Section 4(2), Article XIV
on the ownership of educational institutions,22 and in Section 11(2),
Article XVI on the ownership of advertising companies.
The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term "capital." Does
the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to
common shares or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total
of common and non-voting preferred shares)?
Xxx
We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term
"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares
of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present
case only to common shares,41 and not to the total outstanding capital
stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
Xx
brushed aside the procedural infirmity of
the petition for declaratory relief and
treated the same as one for mandamus.
In Alliance, the issue was whether the
government unlawfully excluded
petitioners, who were government
employees, from the enjoyment of rights
to which they were entitled under the law.
Specifically, the question was: "Are the
branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government,
including government owned or
controlled corporations included among
the four ‘employers’ under Presidential
Decree No. 851 which are required to pay
their employees x x x a thirteenth (13th)
month pay x x x ?" The Constitutional
principle involved therein affected all
government employees, clearly justifying
a relaxation of the technical rules of
procedure, and certainly requiring the
interpretation of the assailed presidential
decree.
In short, it is well-settled that this Court
may treat a petition for declaratory relief
as one for mandamus if the issue involved
has far-reaching implications. As this
Court held in Salvacion:
The Court has no original and exclusive
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief. However, exceptions to this rule
have been recognized. Thus, where the
petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved,
it may be treated as one for
mandamus.15
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to
control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting
rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have
the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall
include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the
control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right
to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors.
This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. As revealed in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock
or controlling interest of a corporation.
Xxx
Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, "controlling
interest" in the corporation. Reinforcing this interpretation of the term
"capital," as referring to controlling interest or shares entitled to vote, is
the definition of a "Philippine national" in the Foreign Investments Act of
1991.
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the
Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment,
such as the development of natural resources and ownership of land,
educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing.
Xx
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term
"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares)

G. R. No. 167391
June 8, 2011
PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT
AND HOUSING
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
MAXIMO BONIFACIO,
CEFERINO R. BONIFACIO,
APOLONIO B. TAN, BENITA B.
CAINA, CRISPINA B. PASCUAL,
ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA,
TERESITA S. DORONIA,
CHRISTINA GOCO AND
ARSENIO C. BONIFACIO, in
their capacity as the surviving
heirs of the late ELEUTERIA
RIVERA VDA. DE
BONIFACIO,Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
What is the
ruling? (this is
weird because Riano: In riano but no citation:
the person
answered that
“declaratory
it was ruled that the judgment in a petition for declaratory relief can be the second requisite in an action for
relief have no
carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay damages or perform quieting of title requires that the deed,
executory
any act as when the petitioner’s complaint is captioned as quieting of title claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
process as in
and damages, but all that the petitioner prayed for is for the court to claimed to be casting cloud on his title
ordinary civil
uphold the valisity of its titles as against that of respondent. must be shown to be in fact invalid or
actions” I
inoperative despite
havent’s read
its prima facie appearance of validity or
that in the
legal efficacy. Article 476 of the Civil
case or books In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title after it Code provides:
to pertain to was served a notice to vacate but before it could be dispossessed of the
philville, and subject properties. Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
maam did’nt 43034, had earlier set aside the Order which granted partial partition in
comment. favor of Eleuteria Rivera and the Writ of Possession issued pursuant Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on
thereto. And although petitioner’s complaint is captioned as Quieting of title to real property or any interest
Title and Damages, all that petitioner prayed for, is for the court to uphold therein, by reason of any instrument,
the validity of its titles as against that of respondents’. This is consistent record, claim, encumbrance or
with the nature of the relief in an action for declaratory relief where the proceeding which is apparently valid or
judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
parties to pay damages or to perform any act ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet the title.
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder.
Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under An action may also be brought to prevent
a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, a cloud from being cast upon title to real
or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged property or any interest therein.
breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief
gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached
the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the Thus, the cloud on title consists of: (1)
need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they any instrument, record, claim,
lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
commission of wrongs. apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may
be prejudicial to the title sought to be
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud quieted. The fourth element is not
upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there present in the case at bar.
is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is
apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action,
the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their
proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said
immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the
benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt
 over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce
any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.

Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding quasi

in rem.56 In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named a defendant
and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with
the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are
intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular
parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or
interests of all possible claimants. The judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties who joined in the action.

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites
must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

gR. No. 170656
August 15, 2007
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
and BAYANI FERNANDO as
Chairman of the Metropolitan
Manila Development
Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC., respondent.
CAR
PIO MORALES, J.:
Did the court in riano, the case was summarized
find justiciable in pg 162-165;
controversy?
Yes.. see
discussion at
the next 2 Riano: The following are the
columns essential requisites for a
declaratory relief petition: (a) there
must be a justiciable controversy;
(b) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests
are adverse; (c) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (d)
the issue invoked must be ripe for
judicial determination(continue
reading at next column).
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O.
would have an adverse effect on
respondents. The closure of their
bus terminals would mean, among
other things, the loss of income
from the operation and/or rentals of
stalls thereat. Precisely,
respondents claim a deprivation of
their constitutional right to property
without due process of law.
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when
an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties,
all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will
help in ending the controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable when it is
translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.
In the present cases, respondents’ resort to court was prompted by the issuance
of the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause of the E.O. sets out in clear strokes the
MMDA’s plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located
along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access
to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of
mass transport terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of
common bus terminals for north- and south-bound commuters. For this
purpose, Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to
allocate funds of not more than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to
cover the cost of the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O.
was made effective immediately.
The MMDA’s resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the
contrary notwithstanding, is also evident from telltale circumstances, foremost
of which was the passage by the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003
expressing its full support of the immediate implementation of the Project.

Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to
"remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila
Respondents have thus amply and an urgent need to integrate the different transport modes." The 7th
demonstrated a "personal and
 substantial interest in the case such
that [they have] sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of
[the E.O.’s]
enforcement."31 Consequently, the
established rule that the
constitutionality of a law or
administrative issuance can be
challenged by one who will sustain
a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
Whereas clause proceeds to mention the establishment of the North and South
terminals.
As alleged in Viron’s petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail
Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is already in
progress. The MMDA, in its Answer28 and Position Paper,29 in fact affirmed that
the government had begun to implement the Project.
It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what
is merely conjectural or anticipatory.
Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the
MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents’ bus terminals would be
foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for
declaratory relief which, under Section 1, Rule 6330 of the Rules of Court, must
be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.

G.R. No. What is the Not in the We further indicate that even assuming, arguendo, that the RTC had jurisdiction to act on the petition in Civil Case No. 14-
219340, ruling? book 1330, it nevertheless misappreciated the propriety of declaratory relief as a remedy.
November 07,
2018 An action for declaratory relief is governed by Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.16 It is predicated on the attendance
of several requisites, specifically: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
COMMISSION See instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof
ER OF underlined are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there
INTERNAL must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5)
REVENUE, Peti the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms
tioner, v. STA of action or proceeding.1
Did the
NDARD
respondent
INSURANCE
have the
CO.,
right to file The third, fourth, fifth and sixth requisites were patently wanting.
INC., Respond
declaratory
ent.
relief?
BERSAMIN, J.:
Maam: no Firstly, the third requisite was not met due to the subject of the action (i.e. statute) having been infringed or
it has lost transgressed prior to the institution of the action.18 We observe in this regard that the RTC seemed to believe that the tax
its right to assessments issued had merely created a liability against the respondent as the taxpayer, and that its suit for declaratory
file relief was but consistent with protesting the assessments. The RTC's belief was absolutely devoid of legal foundation,
declaratory however, simply because internal revenue taxes, being self-assessing, required no further assessment to give rise to the
relief. See liability of the taxpayer.19
3rd column
Specifically, the assessments for DST deficiencies of the respondent for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, as imposed pursuant
to Section 184 of the NIRC were the subject of the respondent's petition for declaratory relief. Said legal provision states:

Section 184. Stamp Tax on Policies of Insurance Upon Property. - On all policies of insurance or other instruments by
whatever name the same may be called, by which insurance shall be made or renewed upon property of any description,
including rents or profits, against peril by sea or on inland waters, or by fire or lightning, there shall be collected a
documentary stamp tax of Fifty centavos (P0.50) on each Four pesos (P4.00), or fractional part thereof, of the amount of
premium charged: Provided, however, That no documentary stamp tax shall be collected on reinsurance contracts or on any
instrument by which cession or acceptance of insurance risks under any reinsurance agreement is effected or recorded.

What was being thereby taxed was the privilege of issuing insurance policies; hence, the taxes accrued at the time the
insurance policies were issued. Verily, the violation of Section 184 of the NIRC occurred upon the taxpayer's failure or refusal
to pay the correct DST due at the time of issuing the non-life insurance policies. Inasmuch as the cause of action for the
payment of the DSTs pursuant to Section 10820 and Section 184 of the NIRC accrued upon the respondent's failure to pay
the DST at least for taxable year 2011 despite notice and demand, the RTC could not procedurally take cognizance of the
action for declaratory relief.

Secondly, the apprehension of the respondent that it could be rendered technically insolvent through the imposition of the
iniquitous taxes imposed by Section 108 and Section 184 of the NIRC,21 laws that were valid and binding, did not render
the action for declaratory relief fall within the purview of an actual controversy that was ripe for judicial determination. The
respondent was thereby engaging in speculation or conjecture, or arguing on probabilities, not actualities. Therein lay the
prematurity of its action, for a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.22

Admittedly, the respondent sought in the RTC the determination of its right to be assessed the correct taxes under Section
108 and Section 184 of the NIRC by contending said tax provisions to be invalid and unconstitutional for their unequal
treatment of life and non-life insurance policies. The respondent cited R.A. No. 10001 and House Bill No. 3235 in support of
its contention. Obviously, the challenge mounted by the respondent against the tax provisions in question could be said to
be based on a contingency that might or might not occur. This is because the Congress has not yet addressed the difference
in tax treatment of the life and non-life insurance policies. Under the circumstances, the respondent would not be entitled to
declaratory relief because its right - still dependent upon contingent legislation - was still inchoate.

Lastly, the respondent's adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA for the DST deficiency for taxable year 2011 was not
the action for declaratory relief but an appeal taken in due course to the Court of Tax Appeals. Instead of appealing in due
course to the CTA, however, it resorted to the RTC to seek and obtain declaratory relief. By choosing the wrong remedy, the
respondent lost its proper and true recourse. Worse, the choice of the wrong remedy rendered the assessment for the DST
deficiency for taxable year 2011 final as a consequence. As such, the petition for declaratory relief, assuming its propriety
as a remedy for the respondent, became mooted by the finality of the assessment.

With not all the requisites for the remedy of declaratory relief being present, the respondent's petition for declaratory relief
had no legal support and should have been dismissed by the RTC.
gR. No. 219340, Not in riano Action for declaratory relief was procedurally improper as a remedy

We further indicate that even assuming, arguendo, that the RTC had jurisdiction to act on the petition in
November 07, 2018 Civil Case No. 14-1330, it nevertheless misappreciated the propriety of declaratory relief as a remedy.

An action for declaratory relief is governed by Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.16 It is predicated
on the attendance of several requisites, specifically: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2)
REVENUE, Petitioner,
the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3)
v. there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.17
STANDARD INSURANCE CO.,
INC., Respondent. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth requisites were patently wanting.

BERSAMIN, J.:

Firstly, the third requisite was not met due to the subject of the action (i.e. statute) having been infringed
or transgressed prior to the institution of the action.

Secondly, the apprehension of the respondent that it could be rendered technically insolvent through the
imposition of the iniquitous taxes imposed by Section 108 and Section 184 of the NIRC,21 laws that were
valid and binding, did not render the action for declaratory relief fall within the purview of an actual
controversy that was ripe for judicial determination. The respondent was thereby engaging in speculation
or conjecture, or arguing on probabilities, not actualities. Therein lay the prematurity of its action, for a
justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.

Lastly, the respondent's adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA for the DST deficiency for taxable year
2011 was not the action for declaratory relief but an appeal taken in due course to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Instead of appealing in due course to the CTA, however, it resorted to the RTC to seek and obtain
declaratory relief. By choosing the wrong remedy, the respondent lost its proper and true recourse. Worse,
the choice of the wrong remedy rendered the assessment for the DST deficiency for taxable year 2011
final as a consequence. As such, the petition for declaratory relief, assuming its propriety as a remedy for
the respondent, became mooted by the finality of the assessment.

With not all the requisites for the remedy of declaratory relief being present, the respondent's petition for
declaratory relief had no legal support and should have been dismissed by the RTC.