Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Fllll:~~IAN
ASSOCIATION
JOURNAL
Issue 16 November 1983
MARKET TECHNICIANS ASSOCIATION JOURNAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page
MTAOFFICERS . . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . . . . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . . .. . 6
THE USE OF INTRA-DAY PRICE CHARTS FOR STOCK INDEX FUTURES . .. .. . .. .. . .. . . . .. ... 11
John J. Murphy
PRICEVOLUMEDIVERGENCE .. .. . . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. 35
Henry 0. Pruden, Ph.D.
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February, May, and November.
All papers submitted to the MTA Journal are requested to have the following items as pre-
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Short (one paragraph) biographical presentation for inclusion at the end of the accepted article
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prepared in accordance with the above policies.
It’s no wonder that people question the technicians’ efforts. It’s no wonder that there are fewer
technical analysts than their fundamental cousins. It’s no wonder that the technicians them-
selves have a difficult time grappling with the subject of qualifying one of their own. Or how is
it that you identify ingenuity in relating information and test for common sense? How is it that
you make reference to the ability to discern representative patterns?
This is not to say that the technicians are undisciplined. In fact, the most successful are the
most highly disciplined analysts. It is the seeming inconsistency of the insatiable appetite for
new data and new ways of examining that data with the dogmatic stance of maintaining and
examining a favorite indicator the same way regardless of the situation that proves the rule.
The question is, “What is the rule?” The answer is, of course, “There are no rules.”
Instead of the centerfold, we have this month the interfold. Several charts, some explained,
some not, are interspersed among the work. Feel free to contribute your most interesting
examples for future issues.
Please note the inclusion of a style sheet designed to improve the professional presentation
of the MTA Journal. It will be extremely helpful if contributors to the Journal follow the simple
rules in this style sheet.
In order to make a previous point, we will break the above rule with the February, 1984 Journal.
The February issue will contain every Market Letter’s market prediction for 1984 that we are
given permission to print. We would like to include at least 50 of these, one page for each. They
will be reproductions of the actual Market Letters, not necessarily in their entirety, but the salient
portions relative to the predictions for the market or individual securities. Everyone’s assist-
ance in contributing or recommending contributors is appreciated.
As with all MTA Journals, this one would not have appeared without the brave souls who spent
the time to write down a coherent examination of an interesting market item. In addition, special
thanks to Pam Hollrah, who again typed every word; Sheldon Hoffman, who continued to improve
the text-editor-to-typeset program; Fred Zaegel, who again applied ink to the paper with perfection;
and most of all, to Sally Ruppert, who once again made it all work together.
James M. Yates
Editor
Since this is a technical audience, I’m sure you’re aware of the need to “close gaps”. I would
like to take about a minute of my allotted time to close a rather large gap in the biography that
was handed out to you.
While it is true that I began as a stock market technician in 1968 and while it is also true that
I went out on my own in 1981 as an independent commodity trading advisor, I would like to
assure you that I did do some work in the intervening 13 years.
Actually, I made the transition to commodities in 1970 with Merrill Lynch’s Commodity Division
where I spent most of the next ten years. I spent about half of that time in the research area,
during which time I served as director of Merrill’s Commodity Technical Analysis Department.
I then made the switch from research to the “real” and more difficult world of trading and be-
came a managed-account trading advisor for the last few years with that firm. Therefore, I have
worked as both a stock and commodity technician and have done both research and trading.
Since I also teach a course on Commodity Technical Analysis at the New York Institute of Fi-
nance, I am often asked if the principles of technical analysis are the same for both stocks and
commodities. That’s actually a difficult question to answer. I would say that the basic concepts
are the same. We use the same charts and rely on most of the same tools and indicators. How-
ever, there are some very profound differences. Perhaps the most profound are the time di-
mension and the nature of the futures contract itself. Since all futures trading is done on margin,
which is usually less than 10% of the value of the underlying contract, leverage becomes an
extremely important factor. Leverage, of course, is a double-edged sword. It can work for or
against you very quickly This is why it is possible to either make or lose large sums of money
in a very short period of time.
This high leverage factor has some important implications for the use of technical analysis in
the futures markets. First, timing becomes extremely important. It is not enough to be right on
the general direction of a given market. It is quite common to be right on the direction of a mar-
ket and still lose money. The specific timing of entry and exit points is absolutely critical to suc-
cessful futures trading. Therefore, futures technicians have been forced to fine tune their technical
tools to a very fine edge. We deal of necessity in a very short time dimension that would prob-
ably surprise most stock market traders.
Another implication is that timing is almost purely technical. In futures trading, more so than in
stocks, some knowledge of technical analysis becomes absolutely essential at some point in
the decision-making process.
Just as an aside here, I should mention that we no longer like to be called “commodity” traders.
We’re now “futures” traders. With the tremendous growth in financial futures, including interest
rates, foreign currencies and stock index futures, the shift in emphasis has been away from
the traditional image of commodities such as corn, soybeans or porkbellies. The term “futures”
is much broader in scope and is the preferred usage in the futures industry today.
What I propose to do is to show you one of the ways that we as futures traders deal with the
short-term trading by the use of intra-day price charts. The charts that I will show you have
been taken from the ADP Comtrend-Videcom system which is a very widely used video re-
trieval system in the futures industry
Figure 1 shows the standard daily high, low and closing bar chart that we’re all most familiar
with. I have chosen to use the June Standard & Poor’s contract for my examples since it is by
far the most actively traded stock index futures contract as measured by volume and open in-
terest.
Most analysts and traders are familiar with the bar chart on a daily basis. I am, therefore, be-
ginning with the chart we are most familiar with, which shows the past 90 days of trading activity
for perspective. The table in Figure 1 shows that is is possible to move into different time di-
mensions depending on what the trader is interested in.
One of the most important things to realize when moving from one time dimension to another
is to always begin with the longer term view and move to the shorter term. It does not work
very well in the other direction. We’re going to look at three different bar charts starting with
Mode 39 showing 90 days, then Mode 37 showing the most recent five days, and then Mode
36 showing only one day Figure 1 shows the last 90 days. Notice the last 5 trading days marked
off by the box. These 5 days are as of two weeks ago, from May 2nd to the 6th. Not too much
detail is shown except for a small dip early in the week and new highs later in the week.
Now let’s look at Figure 2 where we will zero in on those 5 days. Figure 2 is a high, low and
last bar chart with each bar representing fifteen minute intervals. Notice the increased detail.
The near term selloff on Monday, the “double bottom” upside reversal on Tuesday, the trian-
gular consolidation on Thursday and resumption of the uptrend on Friday. Suddenly, support
and resistance levels become clearer and chart patterns begin to appear. Trendline analysis
becomes possible and can be shown to be very effective in identifying trading turns. To the
technical trader, the timing of entry and exit points becomes a good deal easier.
Let’s zero in further and put Tuesday under the microscope. Since Tuesday was the day the
corrective dip terminated, it is the most critical trading day of the week.
Figure 3 shows every 5 minutes of price action. Take note of how well this chart follows stan-
dard charting principles. Notice the almost perfect “double bottom” which was completed with
the breakout over 16250 after 2:15. An even earlier “buy” signal was given about ten minutes
sooner when prices broke through initial resistance at 16220. Notice the large pullback around
3:15 from 16330 which retraced almost exactly 50% of the previous runup and stopped just
above the 16250 breakout level--all standard chart analysis. Elliott Wave advocates will notice
a very clear five-wave advance from 12:15 to the end of the day.
Chartists who see these charts for the first time are often surprised to see how well chart anal-
ysis works on such a short term basis. As a matter of fact, if I didn’t tell you this was a one-day
chart, you would never suspect it from the price action alone, since it could just as easily be a
chart of six months’ action.
The rest of the charts we will look at show the same price action, but in different formats. For
example, Figure 4 shows Tuesday’s action on a “tic” chart. Note all the different Modes avail-
able in each different format. Figures 5 and 6 show “trendline” charts, which are just modifi-
cations of the tic chart which uses an exponential smoothing curve drawn through the tics. I
personally prefer the trendline format. Since I do a fair amount of Wave Analysis, I feel that
waves show up more clearly when the connecting lines are drawn.
The last chart, Figure 7, is an intra-day point and figure chart which I’m sure you’re all familiar
with. Point and figure charts are especially popular among floor traders and those who trade
on a very near term basis. If the trader wishes to plot his or her own charts on graph paper,
another feature will print out the actual prices. The trader can specify any box and reversal size,
and the machine will do the rest. Incidentally, one of the reasons that point and figure charting
is not as widely used in futures trading is that the data is harder to obtain. There are no in-
expensive, commercially-available services that provide the intra-day information. Therefore,
traders are forced to rely on computer printouts which are more expensive and out of the reach
of many individual traders.
What I have attempted to do here today is to discuss one of the most important features of
stock index futures trading, namely the much shorter time horizon, and also to demonstrate to
you one of the most useful tools at our disposal--intra-day price charts.
I will leave you with a couple of positive thoughts on the role of technical analysis as it applies
to futures trading in general. The principles of technical analysis led themselves to virtually any
trading medium, be it in stocks or futures, and to virtually any time dimension as well. With the
proper tools, and sharpened reflexes, the chartist in stocks should be able to make the nec-
essary transition to futures trading. Finally, because of the increased emphasis on timing of
entry and exit points in the trading process, which is purely technical in nature, technical anal-
ysis is even more important in futures than it is in stocks.
All charts are courtesy of ADP Comtrend-Videcom, 25 Third Street, Stamford, CT 06905,
(203) 357-l 611.
FIGURE 1
John J. Murphy entered the investment field in 1968 as a technical analyst for CIT Financial
Corp. Since 1981 he has worked as a consultant on commodity technical analysis under the
name of JJM Technical Advisors. John publishes his own technical market letter specializing
in financial futures, stock index futures, precious metals and energy futures. He is presently
conducting a course on Commodity Technical Analysis at the New York Institute of Finance.
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Roger G. Clarke
Modern portfolio theory has undergone a variety of changes since its foundations were laid in
the early 1960’s. The first attempt of the theory was to simplify and aggregate investor expec-
tations into a model giving a specific relationship between risk and return. Simplifications were
obviously needed to achieve such an ambitious task. But under the assumptions outlined by
Bob Vandell the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) was born -- expected return for an in-
dividual security was shown to depend on the relative price movement between the firm and
the market as a whole or the security’s beta. Subsequently, many have tried to test the model
to see if there was actually any detectable relationship between this measure of risk and the
resulting returns. The results have been encouraging but not totally satisfying. There is some
relationship on average but it is not perfect. Low beta stocks seem to do slightly better than
predicted and high beta stocks seem to do slightly worse.
The investment implications of the initial theory when combined with the notion of efficient mar-
kets suggest that the investor should hold the market portfolio average of stocks and borrow
or lend at the margin to achieve a desired level of risk. A risk averse investor would hold Treas-
ury bills and a little of the market in a portfolio. The less risk averse investor would hold much
more of the market or perhaps even borrow to invest. Though such a choice is theoretically
simple, following that prescription is not very exciting for investors.
Fortunately for active investors and unfortunately for the theory, the conceptual model was not
perfect. It was indeed an ambitious undertaking to try to explain the tradeoffs between risk and
return in one simple package. The more testing that was done the more researchers discov-
ered some unexplained anomalies in the theory between what was observed and what was
expected.
For example, the simple theory did not allow for different marginal tax rates between individ-
uals in the market or different tax treatment for dividends and capital gains. In practice not all
investors were in the same tax bracket, and securities with the same before-tax return would
not have the same after-tax return for all investors. Consequently, it may not be optimal for an
investor to just hold the market portfolio and a riskless asset. The theory did not allow for such
differences.
In addition, the simple theory required that information be freely available to all, that investors
agree as to the risk and return for each security available and that all investors have uniform
horizons for holding the assets. Here again the simple theory would break down when com-
pared with the realities in the marketplace.
Furthermore, the theory was a static construct. All the information relevant for decision-making
was known at the beginning of the time horizon. The marketplace was much more dynamic.
New information was arriving continuously and not all investors would agree on the content
and implications or adjust their portfolio at the same speed. Investors have a wide variety of
psychological profiles and some need more information and assurance before they act.
Finally, the theory required that all assets be easily tradeable. Some individual assets are hardly
tradeable at all. Markets are not always very liquid. Such restrictions have raised a great deal
of controversy as to whether the “market” was well defined and what should be included in it.
In an effort to help us understand the market better adjustments can be made in the theory to
allow for differences in the tax treatment of investment income and for different investor tax
brackets. A variety of other attempts have been made to “fix” the theory in order to make it
more realistic. Such modifications of the theory raise some problems, however. Many modi-
fications can undo the critical underlying theory that holds the relationships together. What re-
sults often lack any notion of general price equilibrium or involve parameters that are not easily
measurable.
Even if the theory were totally consistent and the parameters were well identified, there would
still be some question as to whether good estimates of the important variables can be ob-
tained. In particular, the theory calls for an estimate of beta. Experience has shown us that
there is some noise in estimating this parameter. Estimation is sensitive to the length of the
measurement period. Often 5 years of monthly data is used in the estimation techniques, but
other periods of time could be used which would result in a somewhat different value. There
is also the question of what historical data to use as a proxy for the market and the riskless
rate. Should the S&P 500 be used as the market proxy or some other group? Should 30-day
Treasury bills be used for the riskless rate or go-day Treasury bills? The static theory does not
give much help in settling these questions.
Getting good estimates of the parameters is important because many of the investment strat-
egies depend on screening firms with particular characteristics. For example, a market timing
strategy which shifts funds between low and high beta stocks may not give very satisfactory
results if the supposedly high beta firms as measured initially do not really have high betas.
The investor who uses mdoern portfolio theory confronts many of these measurement issues.
An active program of trying to perform better than the market may look successful or unsuc-
cessful depending on whether there are significant biases in calculating how the portfolio should
have performed because the critical parameters are biased in their measurement or the “mar-
ket” portfolio is not correctly specified. This raises the question of whether we can hope to do
better than the “market” in risk adjusted terms if theory doesn’t give clear signals about what
is important to consider and how those variables relate to performance? Or should we just look
for something that seems to work even if only temporarily regardless of whether it has any the-
oretical foundations? If the latter, can we depend on being right consistently or do we have to
depend on being lucky?
Once we t-r-roveaway from pure theory to practical applications in an effort to explain what works
in the market, we confront many of the same issues a market technician sees. We are looking
for understandable patterns and signals in data, whether it comes fundamentally from prices,
earnings, dividends, etc.
Modern portfolio theory is an approach to organize this search for pattern recognition. It is not
completely successful. There is a great deal of noise and uncertainty in the data used. It is not
the final answer to investment analysis but depending on the analyst’s investment strategy and
philosophy, it may be able to contribute some insights.
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Arthur A. Merrill
A research analyst can understand why an explorer explores. Like a prospector for gold, he
pushes into new territory. Usually he finds no gold, but occasionally he finds pay dirt.
This paper reports on four successful ventures; four new indicators are described.
Two parts (at least) of the descriptive material need explanation. If you are puzzled by any of
the rest of the material, please write.
First, the exponential average is described by a ratio such as 0.67/0.33. The slash mark is merely
a divider between two multipliers. To calculate an exponential for any week, multiply the av-
erage for the preceding week by the number in front of the slash mark. Then multiply the sta-
tistic for the current week by the number following the slash mark. Then add the two results to
get the average for the current week.
Second, the accuracy table needs description. The indicators were tested in every week from
1976 through 1982. The top line of the table reports on the success in forecasting the following
week. The number of times right is in column R, the number of times wrong in column W, and
the percent right in column % R. The last column is a measure of statistical significance. (chi
squared with one degree of freedom.)
The second line reports on success in forecasting whether the Dow was higher or lower five
weeks later. The remaining lines in the table report the longer range success. Did the indicator
forecast the Dow 13 weeks later? 26 weeks later? 52 weeks?
DEFINITION:
This is an index of the difference between the points change in the second hour of the trading
day and the average points change in all hours of the day. It’s a weekly index, so the total points
change in the second hour in a week is divided by the number of days in the week. To get the
average hourly change for all hours, the closing price for the preceding week is subtracted from
the closing price in the current week, and the difference is divided by the number of trading
hours in the week.
To make the index MORE convenient, the average points per hour is multiplied by 1000 and
rounded to the nearest integer. The final index is an exponential average (0.926/0.074) which
approximates a 26 week average.
EXAMPLE:
t500
I
ACCURACY RECORD
1971 to 1982
DJI R W %R CHI SQ
1 166 143 53.72 1.57
5 183 126 59.22 10.15
13 198 110 64.29 24.57 HIGHLY SIG
26 218 83 72.43 59.65 HIGHLY SIG
52 237 60 79.80 104.30 HIGHLY SIG
DEFINITION:
This index measures the difference between resistance to downward swings and resistance
to upward swings. The resistance is measured in thousands of shares (NYSE) required to move
the Dow one point. In order to make a high figure bullish and a low figure bearish, resistance
to rises is subtracted from resistance ‘to declines.
To calculate this index, in each hour of the week calculate points change and not volume.
For all hours in which prices rose, total the points moved in one week and the volume. Divide
thousands of shares total by points.
To get net resistance, subtract rise resistance from decline resistance. The final index is an
exponential average (0.86/0.14) which approximates a 13 week average.
PARAMETERS:
EXAMPLE:
’ @
I ‘I
ACCURACY RECORD:
1971 to 1982
DJI R W % R CHI SQ.
VOLATILITY INDEX:
Proposed by Arthur A. Merrill
Published weekly in TECHNICAL TRENDS
DEFINITION:
This index measures volatility of the DJ Industrials in percent change per day. It’s a weekly in-
dex; daily changes for the week are averaged. To get a measure of the size of the move, rather
than direction, all of the changes are considered positive. To make the index more convenient,
percent change is multiplied by 1000 and rounded to the nearest integer. The final index is an
exponential (0.67/0.33) which approximates a 5 week average.
EXAMPLE:
ACCURACY RECORD:
1971 TO 1982
DJI R W % R CHI SQ.
DEFINITION:
This index compares the trading by members of the stock exchange with trading by the odd
lot group. The ratio of purchases to sales by the member group is divided by the ratio of
purchases to sales by the odd lot group. The sales by members is adjusted by deducting
odd lot sales and adding odd lot purchases:
PARAMETERS:
EXAMPLE:
MTAJournal/November 1983 32
350
@ ‘1
250
ACCURACY RECORD:
1976 TO 1982
DJI R W % R CHI SQ.
1 71 85 45.51 1.08
5 75 81 48.08 0.16 l
13 77 76 50.33 0.00 *
26 58 83 41.13 4.09 PROB. SIG.
52 55 75 42.31 2.78 *
Arthur Merrill was awarded the coveted MTA annual award in 1977. Art is the publisher of
TECHNICAL TRENDS, a statistical stock market service. He pioneered in the study of sea-
sonal patterns of stock prices, and is the author of the book BEHAVIOR OF PRICES ON
WALL STREET, SEASONAL TENDENCIES IN STOCK PRICES, BEAR MARKET CHAR-
ACTERISTICS, and MARKET INDICATORS AND GROWTH COMPANY EARNINGS.
Among the indicators originated by Art is the ratio of ASE to NYSE volume, a device now
used by many technicians as a gauge of speculative activity.
BACKGROUND
A cardinal goal of technical analysis is to “buy low and sell high.” Fulfillment of this goal to its
utmost degree requires some sort of a method for anticipating trend changes in the market so
that buy and sell orders may be placed at or very close to turning points. One widely acknowl-
edged method for anticipating market turns is divergence analysis.
Divergence has long been used as an anticipatory or early warning device for catching trend
reversals as they develop. Within the tenets of the Dow Theory there has been the requirement
of confirmation by both the Transports and the Industrials. It was long ago recognized by Dow
Theorists that a non-confirmation of one average by the other was often the warning of an im-
minent reversal of trend [Stansbury].
Anticipating trend reversals through divergence analysis has developed far beyond comparing
the Dow Transportations to the Dow Industrials. Divergence studies now encompass confir-
mation/non-confirmations between the Industrials and the Advance-Declines, the Industrials
and the Utilities, and especially the Dow Industrials and the New York Stock Exchange Volume.
Finally, price/volume divergence has become the centerpiece of some popular technical sys-
tems [e.g., Granville].
The purpose of this study is to present and interpret empirical data relating price to volume in
an effort to answer the two following questions:
The idea that on-balanced buying and selling of shares as an indicator of “smart money” ac-
cumulation or distribution has a fine pedigree. Jesse Livermore and the other old-time pool op-
erators knew all about manipulating a stock through buying and selling of shares on-balance.
Livermore would mark up a stock by making it active on rallies for the purpose of attracting a
public following. He would accumulate shares on-balance to spur surges in price and volume.
He would then sell on rallies and buy back on reactions, carefully accumulating on-balance
until he started a campaign of distribution as on-balanced selling at the top, which he would
then continue on the way down [Lefevre, pp. 244-2501.
To study on-balanced volume in the strict sense of Mr. Granville’s practice or in the usage of
the old-time pool operators is beyond the scope of this study. What is within the scope of this
study is to use an indicator which belongs to the specie of on-balanced volume. In no sense
should the results of this study be interpreted as a scientific test of the Granville method of on-
balanced volume.
METHOD
Data Collection
Data for this study were collected from the Stock Market Institute [SMI].* Daily price and vol-
ume data were extracted from SMI archives for the period July 1968 to April 1980. The data
were the Wyckoff Wave Index, which is the Institute’s proxy for the New York Stock Exchange’s
price movements. Also collected for the same time period were data for the Optimism-Pes-
simism Index which, for the purposes of this study, will be the indicator of on-balanced volume.
Definitions
Wyckoff Wave: A weighted price index of eight stocks deemed by the Institute to reflect market
leadership.
Around 1968, the components and weights of the Wyckoff Wave were:
Stock Multiplier
Chrysler 6.0
General Electric 4.0
International Business Machines 2.0
Penn Central 5.2
Standard Oil of New Jersey 4.0
Union Carbide 6.0
UAL, Inc. 6.0
U. S. Steel 8.0
Stock Multiplier
Optimism-Pessimism Index (O-P): This is an index which portrays the volume transacted dur-
ing each buying and selling wave of the Wyckoff Wave recorded during the day. Below is the
official SMI procedure for calculating the O-P Index.
The O-P is determined by adding the UP volume and subtracting the DOWN volume. This vol-
ume is added or subtracted with the decimal point placed after the millions column, and the
final zero is eliminated. Therefore, the volume column will be changed as follows to determine
the O-P Index:
I II III IV V VI VII
WAVE TIME DUR PRICE CHN VOL O-P VOLUME O-P
OPENING 2762-l 14
The Figures now contained in the O-P column are then added or subtracted from the O-P In-
dex of the PREVIOUS wave. Hence: the Optimism-Pessimism Index for Wave 1 is:
The O-P Index for the last wave is the final O-P Index for the day, and is the figure which
is used to chart the O-P Index on the vertical line chart of the Wyckoff Wave.
The volume data for calculating the O-P Index is total New York Stock Exchange volume.
Procedure
All Wyckoff Wave movements of 5% or greater were examined to see if the move was pre-
ceded by a divergent relationship between the Wyckoff Wave and the Optimism-Pessi-
mism Index. What was noted was whether the divergence was caused by volume failing to
confirm price, or by price failing to confirm volume, or if the turn was preceded by a joint
confirmation of price and volume.
Somewhat more difficult was an effort to capture instances where divergences did occur
but were not followed by the predicted 5% rise or fall in the price index. Albeit hard to ac-
complish, an effort was made to find and report these whip-saw divergence signals.
Divergences were determined by comparing closing values for price and volume. So long
as they both jointly made a high or a low in an uptrend or a downtrend they were reported
as nondiverging or confirming. When one index or the other moved onto a higher or lower
closing value while the other refused to do so, an upside or downside non-confirmation would
be reported. Considerable leeway was needed in making divergent judgments since there
were sometimes multiple divergences, and sometimes immediately alternating or double
divergences, and sometimes such extreme inharmony between the speed of the move-
ment of the two indices that an essentially divergent relationship was established even though
a strict non-confirmation was missing.
DATA ANALYSIS
An assembly of the pertinent data items is reported in the Appendix. Please note that there
were 80 observations taken over the approximately twelve year period from July 1968 to
April 1980. Answers to the research questions were sought by cross-classifying the data
found in the Appendix. The results are in Tables 1 and 2.
Number of Cases
Price/Volume Turn No-Turn
Divergence I 48 I 7 I
Confirmation I 25 I I
Total number of cases = 80
Table Number 1 shows that most turning points were preceded by a divergent relationship
between the Wyckoff Wave Price Index and the Optimism-Pessimism Volume Index. Di-
vergences preceded market turns by a ratio of almost 2-1 over instances of turns which had
no early warning from divergences. Moreover, when divergences did occur, the observer
could have acted upon these signals with confidence. Only seven cases out of a total of
fifty-five divergent relationships proved to be whip-saws or spurious predictions; good sig-
nals outweighed bad signals by a ratio of about 7-1, which were very favorable odds.
In general, the data in Table Number 1 tend to give an affirmative answer to the question:
“Are turning points in the market foreshadowed by divergence between price and volume?”
The data show divergence preceding turns on a much more than chance basis, though some
analysts may be disappointed because the odds were not overwhelming.
TABLE 2
Bull: Bear:
Turn Turn No
UP Down Turn
Divergent
l-
Price precedes
volume 12 cases 10 cases 6 cases
I
Volume precedes
price
Confirmed
5 cases
19 cases
21 cases
6 cases
1 1 case
In Table 2, one can observe an about even split between price, as measured by the Wyckoff
Wave, preceding volume, as measured by the Optimism-Pessimism Index, and on the other
hand, volume preceding price...there were 22 and 26 instances respectively. So from these
Top turning points did support the hypothesis that volume precedes price. Indeed, a pattern
of a higher closing Wyckoff Wave Price Index unconfirmed by the Optimism-Pessimism
Volume Index was a very reliable guide to anticipating downturns in the market. Not only
did volume non-confirmations (21) outpace price non-confirmations (lo), but also there was
only one instance where an upside non-confirmation by the O-P gave a false signal. Con-
trast this last relationship to the six instances where non-confirmations by the price index
resulted in spurious turn signals. An even closer scrutiny of the data showed that these spu-
rious price-precedes-volume signals were almost all false bottom signals. So while volume
leadership was not universally valid, it did seem much more reliable than price leadership.
CONCLUSIONS
If one cared to generalize based upon the limited sample and restricted scope of this study,
the following tentative conclusions could be drawn:
(1) Divergence as a method for anticipating market turns works about sixty percent of the
time.
(2) Price/volume divergence works best at tops; divergence signals tops about 80% of the
time, while at bottoms divergence is present less than 50% of the time.
(3) In about 40% of the cases there will be no advance warning of a turn emanating from
a divergence between price and volume. Rather price and volume will reconfirm an ex-
isting trend, then just reverse together.
(b) Among the divergent signals, it will be price that more often gives the downside non-
confirmation.
(c) But about 30% of the price signals at bottoms are liable to be whip-saws.
(5) “Volume-precedes-price” is a special case of divergence; volume-precedes-price is a
divergent relationship frequently found at top turning points, but seldom at bottom turning
points.
(6) Volume-precedes-price, while not universally valid, seems more reliable than price
leadership because it flashes fewer false signals.
(7) Divergence is a highly elastic, variable method for comparing price with volume. Antic-
ipating turning points via price/volume divergence is a lot trickier than trend following.
Divergence
Non-Confir- Non-Confir-
mation by mation by
Start End Start End Confirmation Wyckoff Wave O-P Index
7168 3044 X X
7168 at68 3044 2762 X
a/68 10168 2762 3068 X
10168 l/69 3068 2784 X
l/69 2169 2784 2904 X
2169 3/69 2904 2648 X
3169 5169 2648 2851 X*
5169 7169 2851 2407 X
7169 a/69 2407 2548
(Whipsaw signal given in August 1969 by a dow:side non-confirmation
by price.)
3170 3170 2068 2167 X
3170 5/70 2167 1633 X
5170 6/70 1633 1856 X
6170 7170 1856 1625 X
7170 7/70 1625 1788 X
7170 8170 1788 1682
(Along the way up to October high would have occurred a spuriots sell signa1.A
small upward non-confirmation of volume by price took place between 8129 and
914170.)
at70 10/70 1682 2034 X
10170 lo/70 2034 1925
(Whipsaw signal. False bearish upside non-confrmation by the index.)
10170 4171 1925 2594 X
4171 at71 2594 2144 X
a/71 9171 2144 2450 X
9171 11171 2450 2136 X
MTAJournaVNovember1983 41
Dates of Wyckoff Price Level of
Wave Price Movement Wyckoff Wave Divergence Preceding Turn
Divergence
Non-Confir- Non-Confir-
mation by mation by
Start End Start End Confirmation Wyckoff Wave O-P Index
MTAJournaVNovember1983 42
Dates of Wyckoff Price Level of
Wave Price Movement Wyckoff Wave Divergence Preceding Turn
Divergence
Non-Confir- Non-Confir-
mation by mation by
Start End Start End Confirmation Wyckoff Wave O-P Index
MTAJournal/November 1983 43
Dates of Wyckoff Price Level of
Wave Price Movement Wyckoff Wave Divergence Preceding Turn
Divergence
Non-Confir- Non-Confir-
mation by mation by
Start End Start End Confirmation Wyckoff Wave O-P Index
9179 1l/79 2432 2108 X
1 l/79 2180 2108 2432 X
2180 4180 2432 1894 X
TOTALS 25 22 26
REFERENCES
FOOTNOTES
l The author wishes to thank Mr. Craig Smith, Director of Research and the
staff of the Stock Market Institute for generously providing these data.
Dr. Pruden is a member of the MTA, a past president of the Technical Securities Analysts
Association of San Francisco, a Lecturer at Golden Gate University, and a private investor.
1,035-
*******
839- - 4
+ 1982 t 1983
1~492 HIGH
967 LOU 1~177 LAST
SUMMARY
This report is about industry group index movements during six periods of rising and failing
rates of inflation from 1965 to 1983. The report shows that the S&P 400 performed better dur-
ing periods of disinflation than during periods of inflation. It demonstrates that knowledge of
price performances in two previous periods of inflation and two periods of disinflation would
have been helpful in selecting groups to own during a subsequent period of inflation and a sub-
sequent period of deflation. Some conventional wisdom about which groups “benefit” from in-
flation/disinflation is confirmed here. There are also several interesting surprises in the data.
Finally, some suggestions about using these data in forming portfolio strategies are offered.
You read it many times each month: “We think that disinflation beneficiaries should do well in
the present market environment” or, at other times, perhaps, “In this unsettled climate, we ad-
vise overweighting in groups that usually do relatively well during periods of rising rates of in-
flation.” Sometimes these kinds of statements are followed by specific recommendations;
sometimes the writer leaves it to the reader to come up with investments to match the stated
opinion.
A lot of people spend a lot of time trying to figure out precisely which groups or issues will per-
form relatively well during periods of inflation and disinflation. Usually these studies are based
on economic theory and on the way different industries are impacted by the acceleration or
deceleration of the rate of inflation.
This report takes a different approach. It details, for six different periods of inflation and dis-
inflation, the actual price performance of 56 S&P Industry Groups and the S&P Short Maturity
Government Bond Index. The 56 industry groups account for over 80% of the value of the S&P
600. Some of the results appear to mesh with conventional wisdom as to what groups SHOULD
perform the best during inflation and disinflation, but there are some surprises in the data, too.
For example, Gold Mining is supposedly the prime beneficiary of an inflationary period. In fact,
the Gold Mining group did outperform the S&P 400 during two of the three inflationary periods
covered by this study. The surprise is that Gold Mining also outperformed the S&P 400 during
two of the three disinflation periods in the study
Using data generated by price performances during the first two inflation periods, a portfolio
was selected which should have outperformed the S&P 400 during the third inflation period.
It did.
Using data generated by price performances during the first two disinflation periods, a portfolio
was selected which should have outperformed the S&P 400 during the third disinflation period.
It did. In the aggregate, past performance during periods of inflation and disinflation did provide
valuable information about future performance.
With the results of three inflation and three disinflation periods in this report, readers now have
some objective data to go along with what economic theory says should happen. No claim is
made here that changes in the rate of inflation actually caused the price movements reported.
All the report shows is how groups actually performed during various periods of changing rates
of inflation. And the reader must still decide on which side to model his or her portfolio; nothing
in this report predicts when a period of inflation or disinflation will begin or end. That task is
altogether different from the topic of this report, and will be addressed in the near future.
Conventional wisdom, as I understand it, contains several things about stock prices and the
rate of inflation, some of them contradictory:
2. inflation means high interest rates, and the market does not do well against high returns from
fixed income investments.
You can add other pieces of wisdom to this list, I’m sure. During the period of this study, De-
cember 1965 - July 1983, the stock market did better during disinflation periods than during
inflation periods. Table 1 illustrates these tendencies quite clearly
The six periods studied are shown on the charts of the S&P 400 which follow. Disinflation pe-
riod 3, 1980-1983, is subdivided into three periods, A, B, and C, as shown on the chart.
-.i, :.,
/ II 59 1 IU sd / I 6i , 63 64 65 66 67 66 69 70 ,u7, , ;,72 / 1.73
6’ I
TABLE 1
INFLATION PORTFOLIO
It is December, 1976. You know that a period of disinflation is ending and that a period of in-
flation is beginning. Armed with that perfect foresight and the knowledge of which groups out-
performed the S&P 400 during each of the two previous inflation periods, you put together a
portfolio which you will hold until the inflation period ends. Table 2 shows your groups, how they
performed, and their mean percent change. On an equally-weighted basis, your groups gained
8% against a 3% gain by the S&P 400.
True, you probably could have earned a lot more than 8% by rolling over Treasury bills from
December 1976 to March 1980, but this report is about inflation, not asset allocation or market
timing. In the aggregate, knowledge of past performances during inflationary periods resulted
in better-than-market performance.
% Price Change
Group From 12/76 to 03/80
Distillers + 35%
Coal, Bitum -35
Containers, M + G -12
Copper +38
Drugs -4
Instrumentation +52
Semiconductors +13
Forest Products -20
Hospital Supplies - 7
Mist Metals +30
Oil Well Eq +93
Paper -25
Soaps -28
Tobacco +4
NG Pipelines +48
NYC Banks -25
Banks Outside NYC -18
Mean + 8%
S&P 400 + 3%
DISINFLATION PORTFOLIO
It is March, 1980. Having successfully weathered the latest attack of inflation, you now know
that a period of disinflation is beginning. You also know which groups outperformed the S&P
400 during each of the last two disinflation periods. You build the portfolio shown in Table 3.
From March, 1980 through July, 1983 (the lowest year-to-year rate of inflation so far in the pe-
riod) your portfolio gained 115% versus a gain of 58% by the S&P 400. Once again, an ac-
curate forecast of the direction of the rate of inflation, and knowledge of past performance has
resulted in great, not to say astonishing, performance.
Because disinflation period 3 included the last leg of a bull market, a bear market, and the first
leg of another bull market, I show in Table 4 the action of the portfolio during subperiods A, B,
and C. During the last leg of a bull market (3/80-l l/80) the portfolio lagged behind the S&P
400, + 24% vs + 30%. In the 1980-l 982 bear market, the portfolio was outstanding. It gained
1% while the S&P 400 was losing 22%. In the first leg of the current bull market (8/82-7/83)
the portfolio gained 75%, vs a 56% gain by the S&P 400.
Table 5 shows the action of all the groups studied, not just the portfolio, between 3180 and
7/83. The groups are listed alphabetically, and their performance rank is also shown.
% Price Change
Group From 03/80 to 07183
Aerospace + 56
Autos ex GM +124
Soft Drinks + 72
Cosmetics + 20
Elec Equip + 77
Major Electrical +114
Household Furn Ap +216
Instrumentation +153
Semiconductors +123
Agri Mach - 19
Constr Mach - 5
Newspapers +196
Radio TV +157
Restaurants +182
Dept Stores +231
Gen Mdse Chains +161
Air Transport +137
Banks Outside NYC + 81
Mean 7 15%
S&P 400 + 58%
Percent Changes
A B C
3/80-l 1 I80 1 l/80-8/82 8182-7183
MTAJournaVNovember1983 53
TABLE 5
Table 6 shows the scores generated by each group during the six periods in the study. You
may be surprised, as I was, to learn that INSTRUMENTATION and SEMICONDUCTORS
are the only groups to beat the S&P 400 during all six periods. Truly, these two groups have
been all-weather groups for many years now.
Table 7 combines the scores from Table 6 just as a matter of interest. I suppose one could
say “If I have no opinion whatsoever of the direction of the rate of inflation, I should just buy,
and hang on to, groups rated 6, 5, and possibly 4, in Table 7.” That is certainly a possible
strategy, but I don’t think you need to have a perfect forecast of the direction of inflation in
order to use the data in Table 6. The inflation/disinflation trends covered in this report lasted
from 24 to 50 months. Even if you are several months late in recognizing a change of trend
(and most of you probably will be late), the data contained in Table 6 should be of some
value to you. There’s no need for a compromise, know-nothing, portfolio, which is really
what is listed in Table 7.
The two portfolios shown earlier could not have been exactly duplicated in the real world.
They were shown to illustrate that some knowledge of performance during four inflation/
disinflation periods would have been useful during two subsequent periods. I hope that these
data, from six periods, will be useful to you in the future.
Note: Standard & Poor’s Corp. has recently renamed two group indexes. The old “Office
and Business Equipment” has become “Computers and Business Equipment.” “Office and
Business Equipment excluding IBM” is now “Computers and Business Equipment exclud-
ing IBM.” In this report, the old names are used except in Table 5.
MTAJournaVNovember1983 55
TABLE 6
Distillers
Copper
Instrumentation
z
3
Autos ex GM
Soft Drinks
Elec Equip
3
3
3
Semiconductors 3 Major Electrical 3
Mist Metals 3 Household Furn Ap 3
Oil Well Eq 3 Instrumentation 3
Tobacco 3 Semiconductors 3
NG Pipelines 3 Newspapers 3
Radio TV 3
Aluminum 2 Restaurants 3
Bldg Matls 2 Dept Stores 3
Coal, Bitum 2 Gen Mdse Chains 3
Containers, M + G 2 Air Trans 3
Drugs 2
Elec Equip 2 Indicator Digest 2
Forest Prod 2 Aerospace 2
Gold Mining 2 Autos 2
Hosp Suppl 2 Brewers 2
Industrial Mach 2 Distillers 2
Oft Eq ex IBM 2 Cosmetics 2
Oil, Domestic 2 Drugs 2
Oil, lntl 2 Foods 2
Paper 2 Gold Mining 2
Newspapers 2 Agri Mach 2
Radio - TV 2 Constr Mach 2
Soaps 2 Publishing 2
NG Distrib 2 Soaps 2
Railroads 2 Tires 2
NYC Banks 2 Tobacco 2
Banks Outside NYC 2 Banks Outside NYC 2
Multi-Line Ins 2 Prop Cas Ins 2
MTAJournaVNovember1983 57
TABLE 7
COMBINED SCORES
FROM TABLE 6 SHOWING
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TIMES EACH GROUP
OUTPERFORMED THE S&P 400
Instrumentation 6 Foods 3
Semiconductors 6 Forest Prod 3
Hosp Suppl 3
Distillers 5 Agri Mach 3
Elec Equip 5 Constr Mach 3
Newspapers 5 Industrial Mach 3
Radio TV 5 lntl Oil 3
Tobacco 5 Paper 3
Publishing 3
Soft Drinks 4 Tires 3
Drugs 4 NG Distrib 3
Household Furn Ap 4 Air Trans 3
Gold Mining 4 Railroads 3
Mist Metals 4 NYC Banks 3
Oil Well Eq 4 Prop-Cas Ins 3
Restaurants 4
Dept Stores 4 Autos 2
Gen Mdse Chains 4 Chemicals 2
Soaps 4 Containers, M + G 2
NG Pipelines 4 Office Eq 2
Banks Outside NYC 4 Office Eq ex IBM 2
Multi-Line Ins 4 Crude Oil 2
Domestic Oil 2
Indicator Digest 3 Food Chains 2
Aerospace 3 Steel 2
Aluminum 3 DJIA 2
Autos ex GM 3
Brewers 3 Short Govts
Bldg Matls 3 Elec Util
Coal, Bitum 3 Telephones
Copper 3 Life Ins
Cosmetics 3
Major Electrical 3
Those who are interested in individual group performances will find the details in this sec-
tion. For each of the six periods, there is a page showing group performances listed in al-
phabetical order and in rank order. These pages were used to compile the scores shown
in Table 6.
A recent list showing the components of each industry group index is at the end of this sec-
tion. It is not completely up-to-date but will serve as a guide to readers who may not be
completely familiar with the S&P universe.
INFLATION 1
INFLATION 1
(continued)
INFLATION 2
MTAJournaVNovember1983 62
BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRICES OVER THE 30 MONTHS FROM 06/72 TO 12/74
INFLATION 2
(continued)
INFLATION 3
INFLATION 3
(Continued)
DISINFLATION 1
DISINFLATION 1
(Continued)
DISINFLATION 2
DISINFLATION 2
(Continued)
DISINFLATION 3
DISINFLATION 3
(Continued)
- 400 INDUSTRIALS - HOSPITALSUPPLIES-Abbott Lab. Amer Hosprtal: Bard (C R J. TEXTILE PROOUCT~Burhngton lndus Colhns. Cone Mrlls
Baxter Travenol tab Becton. Drckrnson. Johnson & Johnson Lowenstem Sprrngs lndustrres Inc Stevens. West Pmnt-
AEROSPACE-Boemg. General Dynamrcs. Grumman. Martm Pepperell
HOTEL-MOTEL-Hrlton Hotels, Hohday Inns: Ramada Inns
Marretta, McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon Rockwell lntl Unded
HOUSEHOLO FURNISHING 6 APPLIANCES-Bassett Furndure TIRES6 RUBBER 600O~Fnestoce Gcodnch. Goodyear. Unnoyai
Technologres.
ind Maytag. Roper Corp Mohasco Corp Whrrlpool, Whrte TOBACCO-Amer Brands Inc Phrhp Morns, Reynolds lndus
ALUMlNUMdlcan Alummum. Aluminum Co of Amer. Karser
Consolrdated lnds Zemth TOYLColeco Inc Mattel Inc Mrlton Bradley. Tonka Corp
Alummum; Reynolds Metals
LEISURETIME-AMF Inc. Brunswrck. Coleman Co Handleman.
AUTOMOBILE-Amer Motors: Chrysler. Ford: Gen Motors.
Outboard Manne
AUTO F’ARTS(Afk?r Market&Champron Spark Plug. Echlrn Kfg
Genuine Parts; Sealed Power Corp
MACHINE TOOLS-Acme Cleveland, Brown & Sharpe. Cmcrnnatr - 40 PUBLIC UTILITIES -
Mrlacron. Cross & Trecker. Monarch Machrne Tool ELECTRIC POWER-Amer El. Pwr. Balt G & E.. Cent & So
AUTO PARTS (Original Equip.&Dana. Eaton: Lrb -Owens-Ford.
MACHINERY ~A~RICULTURAL~AIIIS Chalmers, Deere, Intl. Har- West. Corp Comm Ed : Con Ed : Detroit Ed Duke Power.
TRW Inc., Trmken Corp.
vester, Massey Ferguson Fla Power & Lrght. Middle So Utrl New Eng Elec Sys,
AUTO TRUCKS 6 PARTS-Cummrns Engrne: Fruehauf: Paccar Niagara Mohawk. No. States Pwr. Ohro Ed., Pat G & E., Phrla
NACHINERY (CONSTRUCTION 6 MATERIALS tMNOLlN6~Bucy~us-
IIIC
Erie: Cater. Trac Clark Equrp Hyster Co. Rexnord Inc Elec Pub. Serv E. & G.. Publrc Servrce of Indrana. So. Cahf
BEVERA6ES (BREWERS)-Anheuser-Busch. Coors (Adolph): Ed Southern Co., Texas Utrls.: Va. E. & P: WISC El. Pwr
MACtNNERVDNDUSTRIAL’SPEClALTV~Br~ggs & Stratton. Chrcago
Hedeman (G) Brewmg: Pabst Brew
Pneumatrc. Combustron Eng Cooper Indus.. Ex-Cell-O. Foster NATURAL 6AS DISTRIBUTOR~Bklyn Umon: Columbra. Consol-
BEVERA6ES tOISTILLERS~Brown-Forman Drstrllers, Nab Dust.: Wheeler. Ingersoll-Rand. Joy Mfg. rdated Natural, ENSERCH Corp., Oneok Inc.. Pat Lrght. Peoples
Seagram Ltd.: Walker. Energy
MEIALS MISC.-Amax Inc : Hudson Bay Mng ; INCO Ltd. Phibro
BEVERIIGES (SOFT ORlNKStCoca-Cola: Or Pepper. General Salomon Inc. NATURAL 6115 PIPE LINELAmer Natural Resources: El Paso
Cinema: PepsrCo Inc : Royal Crown Cos Co InterNorth Inc.: Panhandle Eastern: Sonat Inc Texas East
MISCELLANEOUSARA Servrces. AT&T.Apple Computer: Armstmng
BUILDING MATERIALS -American Standard. Crane: Fedders: Corp Texas Gas Trans
World: Black & Decker, Borg-Warner, Cornmg Glass. Eastman
Ideal Basrc, hm Walter: Karser Cement; tone Star Ind Masco: Kodak, Esmark. Fluor Corp. Grllette. Harris Corp. Honeywell TELEPHONE--‘AT&T: Centel Corp : Contl. Tel.: GTE Corp.. Unded
Masomte: Nat? Gypsum; Dane: U.S Gypsum. Inc MCI Commumcahons. Mrnnesota Mmmg, Owens-Coming. Telecommumcatrons
CHEMICAL&Dow: Du Pont (E.I.): Hercules, Monsanto: Stauffer Polarold: Shemrn-Willlams. Srgnal Cos.. Smger. Snap-on Tools:
Chem ; Umon Carbrde. Stanley Works: Tandy
CHEMICALS tMISC&AJhed Corp. Amencan Cyanamrd. Celanese MOBlLEHOME~Fleetwood Enterprrses. Redman Inds.: Skyhne. - 20 TRANSPORTATION -
Corp.: FMC Corp.: Grace (WR.1 &Co.; PPG. Inc Rohm & Haas OFFICE & BUSINESS EtlUIPMENT-Burroughs. Control Data. AIR FREIGHT -Emery Arr Frerght. Federal Express. Trger inter-
CW(BITUMlNOUS&Eastem Gas & Fuel. No Amet Coal: Pdtston. Data General. Datapornt Corp : Drgrtal Equrp.. lntl Bus Mach : natronal
Westmoreland. NCR Corp Pdney-Bowes. Sperry Corp. Storage Tech. Wang AIR TRANSPORT-AMR Corp.: Delta. Northwest. Pan Am. UAL.
COMMUNICATION~E6UIC/MFRS.-M A-Corn Inc Northern Lab Cl B. Xerox Corp Inc
Tefecom.; Rolm Corp.: Screntrfrc Atlanta. OFFSHORE DRILLING-Global Marme. Readrng & Bates, SEDCO; RAILRMDS-Burhngton Northern Inc. CSX Corp : Norfolk Southern
COMPUTER SERVICELAutomahc Data: Computer Sciences: Western Co of North America. Carp, Santa Fe industries. So Pac. Umon Pat Corp
Electromc Data Systems: lymshare. OIL (CRUOE PROOUCERSttoursrana Land & Exploratron; Mesa TRUCKERS-Consol Frerghtways. Overmte Transportatron.
CONGLOMERAlE~GuIf & Western: IC lndus Int’l Tel & Tel.. Pet, Pennzorl Co, Superror 011. Texas 011 &Gas Roadway Servrce: Yellow Frerght Sys.
Litton Indus., Northwest lndus, Teledyne; Tenneco Inc Textron OIL (INTEGRATED-OOMESTlCtAtl. Rrchfreld. Get@ 011. Occrdental lRANSPORWION fMISCELLANEOUSJ4easeway Transportatron.
CONTAINERS (METAL & 6USStAmer. Can, Contl Group, Crown Petroleum, Phrlhps. Shell, Stand 011 Ind Standard 011 Ohio: Ryder System
Cork: Natl. Can: Owens-Ill. Sun Co, Umcal Corp
CONTAINERS (PAPERtBemrs Co : Stone Contamer: Federal, OIL (INTEGRATED-INTERNATIONAL&Exxon Corp Gulf. Mobrl
Maryland Cup. Corp.. Royal Dutch. Stand Or1 Calrf. Texaco. - 40 FINANCIAL -
COPPER-ASARCO Inc.. Newmont Mrmng: Phelps-Dodge SCANAOIAN OIL 6 61s EXPLORATlOtCDome Petroleum. Gulf of BANKS (NEW YORK ClTVbBankers Trust New York. Chase Man-
Canada. Husky 011. lmperral 011 ttd hattan Chemrcal. Cdrcorp: Manufacturers Hanover: Morgan
COSYEllC%Afbertc&lver: Ibon: Chesebrough-Fond’s: Faberge
Inc.: Intl. Flavors & Fragrances: Revlon. OIL WELL EtlUIPMENT AN0 SERVICES-Baker lntl Dresser: f1.P) & Co
Hallrburton: Hughes Tool, McDermott Int’l.: NL Industries: BANKS fOUlSIOE NEW YORK ClTV&BankAmenca; Bank of Boston
ORU6S-Amer. Home; Bristol-Myers: Ldly (El0 Merck: Pfizer.
Schlumberger Corp : Cont‘l Ill. Corp.. Frrst Chrc. Corp.; hrst Interstate Bancorp..
Schenng-Plough; Searte (G. 0.1: SmrthKhne Beckman Corp.
PAPER-Crown Zell.. Int‘l Paper: Krmb-Clark, Mead; St Regrs. Frrst Penn., InterFirst Corp. Mellon Nat1 : NCNB Corp.. Northwest
Squibb Corp.; Sterhng; UpJohn Co.: Warner-Lambert.
Scott, Umon Camp: Westvaco Corp
ELECTRICAL EPUIPMENT-Emerson Electrrc: General Instrum..
Grainger tW W,): McGraw Edrson, Square D: Thomas & Betts POLLUTION CONTROL-Brownmg-Ferns: Peabody Int’l : SCA LIFE INSURANCE-Capkal Holdmg: Jefferson Pilot; Lmcoln National
Servrces. Waste Management Inc.: Zurn Ind Corp., USLIFE Corp.
ELECTRONICS MAJOR COS.--Gen. Elec.; RCA. Westinghouse Elec
PUBLISHINGDun & Bradstreet: Harcoud Brace lovanovrch. MULTI-LINE INSURANCE&tna Life & Cas.: Amencan Int’l Gmup:
ELECTRONICS (IN6lRUMENlAllONJ-Gould Inc.: Hewlett-Packard;
Macmdlan. McGraw-Hrll. Meredrth. SFN Co : Time Inc American General: CIGNA Corp.: CNA Financral. Travelers.
Perkin-Elmer: Tektronix.
PUBLISHING (NEWSPAPERS&Dow Jones: Gannett Co.. Kntght PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE-Chubb Corp.. Contrnental
ELECTRBNIS (SEMlCONOUCTORS/COMWNENTS& Inc : Intel Corp.: St. Paul: Safeco Corp : USF E G Corp.
Rrdder Newspapers. Trmes Mrrror
Corp.: Motorola. Nat’1 Semiconductor: Texas Instruments
RAOIO-TV BROAOCASTERtAmerrcan. CBS Inc.. Caprtal Crtres SAVINGS 6 LMN HOLOING COS.-Ahmanson (H.0 Frrst Charter.
ENTERTAINMENT-Drsney (Walt). MCA MGMUA Entertamment
Comm.. Cox Commumcatron Corp.: Metromedra. Taft. Great Western.
Co.; Warner Communications.
RAILRMO EBUIPMENT-%F Ind., Amsted lndus : Gen. Srg. PERSONALLMN~Benefrcral; Household Int’l Inc
FERTILIZER~Beker Inds.; Frrst Miss. Corp : Intl. Mmerals &
RESTAURANTS-Church’s Frred Chrcken: Denny’s Inc. Marrrott. FINANCIAL-MISC.-Amencan Express; Heller (Walter E ): Merrill
Chem.; Wdliams Cos.
McDonald’s Corp Wendy’s Int’l. Lynch; Transamenca Corp.
FOODS-Amstar Corp : Archer-DameIs-Mrdland: Beatnce Foods,
Borden; CPC Int’l.; Campbell Soup: Carnatron. Consohdated RETAIL STORES tOEPI SlORES&-Afhed Stores: Assocrated: Carter l *BRONERA6E FIRM6-Donaldson Lufkm Jenrette; Edwards fA.G.1;
Hawley Hale Stores; Dayton Hudson: Federated: Macy: May Hutton fE.F) Group, Paine Webber, Inc.
Foods: Dart & Kraft Inc.; Gen. Foods: Gen Mills: Gerber Prod.;
Hemz (HJ.); Hershey Foods: Kellogg: Nabtsco Brands Inc: Dept Mercantde Stores. **INVESTMENT COMPANIES-Adams: Gen. Amer: Lehman:
Morton Simon; Pillsbury; QuakerOats: Ralston Rrrna. Stokely- RETAIL STORES (ORUGbEckerd (Jack): Revco D.S Inc Rrte Madrson, Tri-Cont.
Van Camp; Wrigley (Wm.). Ard: Walgreen Co. *‘INVESTMENT COS. (Bond Funds)-Amerrcan General Bond;
FOREST PRODUCT&Bofse Cascade: Champron lntl : Evans RETAIL STORES (FOOD CHAINS)-Amer. Stores Co.: Great A.&P: lntercaprtal Inc. Sec.: John Hancock Inc Sec.; Masshlutual
Products: Georgra-Pacrfrc: Loursrana-Pac., Potlatch Corp Jewel Compames. Kroger: Lucky Stores, Safeway; Wmn-Drxre Inc. Inv.. Montgomery Str. Inc. Sec.
Weyerhaeuser. RETAIL STORES f6EN. MDSE. CHAINS)-K mart; Penny (1.C.h “REAL ESTATE INVEST-Frrst Union Real Estate, Lomas &
t6AMlN6 COS.-Bally Mfg.: Caesars World: Resorts Int’l (Cl. Al: Sears. Wal-Mart Stores; Woolworth Nettleton Mtge. Inv.; Mass-Mutual Mtge & Realty: Mony Mtg..
Webb (Del. E.T. Wells Fargo Mortge. & Equdy
SHOELBrown Group: Genesco: Interco; Melvdle Carp
6010 MININGASA Ltd ; Campbell Red Lake; Dome. Homestake SUAP~Clomx: Colgate-Palmohve; Procter & Gamble: Undever
Mming. N.V.
HOMEBUILUlN6-Centex Corp.: Kaufman & Broad: U.S. Home STEEL-Armco: Beth Inland. Interfake, Natronal: Republrc: U S. tNot included rn 400 Industrials.
Corp. Steel: Wheehng-Prttsburgh. ‘Not mcluded m Utddy composde.
NOSPllNl YANlGEYENT-Amer. Med. Int’l; Hosprtal Corp. of TEXTN.ES(APPAREL MFRS&Blue Bell: Cluett Rabody: Hartmarx **Not mcluded m Financial composrte.
Amer.: Humana Inc.: Nat’1 Med. Enter. Corp.: Jonathan Logan: Levr Strauss: V.E Carp tSupplementary Groups and Changes on Preceding Page)