Art. II Sec.

3 Civilian Supremacy

Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the
protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity
of the national territory.

Art. VII,Section 18.

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within
twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from
its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the
suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Art. XVI Section 5.

1. All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
2. The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for
people's rights in the performance of their duty.
3. Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a
prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the
military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
4. No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or any of their subsidiaries.
5. Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.
6. The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all
provinces and cities as far as practicable.
7. The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times
of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.
ALIH VS. CASTRO

Facts: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the
compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out
ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The
following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and
photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also
confiscated. The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized
returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights The respondents admitted that the
operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and
that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the
assassination of the city mayor.

Issue: Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the
petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible
as evidence against them.

Held: The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners
did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be
protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no
showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or
fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. The items
seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any
proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and
so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said
evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis). However, as to the issue on finger-
printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the
court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As
Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

ARTICLE II

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

Posse commitatus

This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his
community. Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or town who were charged with the
maintenance of peace and good order were bound, ex oficio, to pursue and to take all persons who had
violated the law. For that purpose, they might command all the male inhabitants of a certain age to
assist them.
 attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when and by which the people of the town
(pueblo) may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation
of peace and order. It is an exercise of the police power of the state.

PEOPLE vs. LAGMAN

G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893

FACTS:
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two
appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and
unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year,
even though they had been required to do so. The two appellants were duly notified to appear
before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service but still did not register up to
the date of the filing of the information.

Appellants argue that they did not register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a
brother eight years old to support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military
learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.

The Court of First Instance sentenced them both to one month and one day of imprisonment, with
the costs.

ISSUE:
Whether the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was constitutional by virtue
of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that:

SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

HELD:
YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein.

In US cases, it was stated that the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a
consequence of its duty to defend the State; and, that a person may be compelled by force to take his
place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.

What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstances of the appellants do not
excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because they can
obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).

People vs. De Sosa

In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are
charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law.
It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in
1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April
of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that
these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the
Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said
appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.

Chavez vs. Romulo

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising
crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

Petitioner Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR(Permit to Carry Firearms outside
of residence) has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
guidelines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional Whether or not the
right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In evaluating a due
process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest
exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is
neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
that: “Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.” xxx In
our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident
from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief
of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may
impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following the
American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right
protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated
fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee
takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is
not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in
Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”

Art.II Sec. 6, Separation of church and state

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Reinforced by:

Sec.5, Art.III (Freedom of religion clause)

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.

Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-C (Religious sect cannot be registered as political party)

Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms
of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

Sec.5 (2), Art. VI (no sectoral representative from the religious sector)

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sec. 29 (2),Art. VI (Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefit)

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.

Exceptions:

Sec. 28 (3),Art VI (Churches, parsonages, etc. actually,directly and exclusively used for religious
purpose shall be exempt from taxation)
Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

Sec. 3 (3),Art.XIV (Optional religious instruction for public elementary and high school students)

At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to
their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by
instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or
wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.

Sec. 4 (2), Art. XIV (Filipino ownership requirement for educational institutions, except those
established by religious groups and mission boards)

Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be
owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino
equity participation in all educational institutions. The control and administration of educational
institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines.

Taruc vs. Bishop dela cruz

FACTS: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del
Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest,
respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the
transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the
records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs,
thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political
camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another
parish.Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages
with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the RTC.They contended that their
expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

ISSUE: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?

RULING: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter

best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is
not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary
and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to
just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization
except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil
court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession
of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

Estrada vs. Escritor

Respondent was administratively charged with immorality for living with a married man not her
husband. As members of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their
conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living
together, they executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” before their religious elders.
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, the
constitution’s religion clauses prescribe not strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality
recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests, but at the same time, strive to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest, in
applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been
burdened. There is no doubt that between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief
and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious belief
and practice and family on the other, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. The second step is
to ascertain repondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Repondent appear to be sincere in her religious
belief and practice, and is not merely using the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid
punishment for immorality. This being the case of first impression, the parties were not aware of the
burden of proof they should discharge in the court’s use of the “compelling state interest” test. It is
apparent that the state interest it uphold is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by
maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. However, there is nothing in the
memorandum to the court that demonstrate how the interest is compelling that it should override the
respondent’s plea of religious freedom, nor is it shown that means employed by the government in
pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious exercise. The case was ordered
remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator for the application of this test.

Art. II Sec. 7 Independent foreign policy and nuclear-free Philippines

The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.

Espina vs. Zamora

FACTS:

The case at bar deals with the question of constitutionality of Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000
Republic Act 8762) which was signed by President Joseph Estrada on March 7, 2000.

Unlike its predecessor Republic Act 1180, which absolutely prohibits foreign nationals from engaging in
retail trade business in the Philippines, the questioned law allows the said foreign trade placing them
under 4 categories. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 as it is a clear
violation of Section 9, 19 and 20 of Article II of the Constitution. The petitioners stressed that the presence
of foreign nationals would result in alien control and monopoly of the retail trade.

On the other hand, the respondents contended that the petitioners have no legal standing to file the
petition. Aside from that, the Constitution mandates the mere regulation but not the prohibition of
foreign investments in the country.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. The Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 is not unconstitutional.

The Court emphasized that the petitioners indeed has no legal standing to file the petition as there is no
clear showing that the implementation of R.A. 8762 prejudices the petitioners or inflicts damage on them,
either as taxpayers or as legislators. Legal standing is one of the requisites necessary before one could
validly attack the constitutionality of a certain law. Legal standing implies that one must have personal
and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that
law.

Also, Section 9, 19 and 20 of Article II are not self- executing by nature, thus, are not judicially demandable.
The said sections in Article II highlight the necessity of having a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs. However, the objective of the provisions is to
simply prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. With the assailed provision, Filipinos continue
to have the right to engage in the kind of retail business which the law in question has permitted the entry
of foreign investors.

The Legislative acknowledges that indeed it is integral to primarily promote the welfare of Filipino
investors as mandated by the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is equally important that holistic economic
growth must be assured for the overall development of our country’s trade industry. This can be done by
allowing entry of foreign investors that will be allowed to engage in businesses regulated by the provisions
of R.A. 8762.

Bayan vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved
the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard. Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate
approved it by (2/3) votes. Cause of Action: Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of
the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the
petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in
the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it must be
duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for
that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires
for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?

HELD: Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however,
the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole
purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate. The
Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25,
Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Lim vs. Executive Secretary

Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1.”
They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance
the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American
counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s
objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to
reaffirm. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.

Issue: Whether “Balikatan 02-1” activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?

Ruling: To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel
to engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel
must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any
political activity. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos
governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties’
intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms,
which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account
alongside the aforesaid context. It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of
the word .’activities” arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a
certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for
purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques
of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to
assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school
houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy
to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .’Balikatan 02-1,” a “mutual anti-
terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,” falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable
activities in the context of the agreement.