LAGMAN V.

MEDIALDEA
FACTS:
 On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole
island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein.
 On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law
declaration (as required by the Constitution).
 The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the
report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and
might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless
violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
DECISION: Yes

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceedings” covered by Article VII, Section 18 (3), of the
Constitution
 Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus

RATIO DECIDENDI:
 YES. Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis. The
jurisdiction of the Court is not restricted to the cases enumerated to Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The only
requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen.
 Under Section 18 of Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any
citizen may file it. The provision also limits the issue to the sufficiency of factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive of his emergency powers.
 Cullamat, et al. claim to be “suing in their capacities as citizens of the Republic.” Similarly, in the Mohamad, et al.
all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal age, and residents of Marawi City." However, Lagman, et
al. did not categorically mention that they are suing as citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly elected
Representatives. That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of Congress. In any case, the Court
can take judicial cognizance of the fact that Lagman, et al. are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine
citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as representatives. Therefore, they are considered as suing in
their own behalf as citizens of this country
 The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 18 refers to any action
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the
Chief Executive’s emergency powers.

 YES. The President, with the facts available to him, deduced that there was an armed public uprising, the
culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its
territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative. This is sufficient to satisfy the
standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
 The factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or suspension of writ of habeas corpus are “(1) actual
invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power”. Without the concurrence of the
two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is
actual rebellion or invasion.
 The Court held that a review of the facts leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation
No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President satisfactorily
discharged his burden of proof.
LACSON V. SECRETARY PEREZ
FACTS:
 On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an “angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons” assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital
Region.
 She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.

 Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,” which allegedly gave a
semblance of legality to the arrests, the four petitions were filed before the Court. Prior to resolution, the “state
of rebellion” was lifted in Metro Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional

RULING:

 The Supreme Court ruled that, in a proper case, the Court may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
 As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons
in connection with the rebellion. He states that what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement
officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38.
 With this declaration, petitioner’s apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
 In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so
warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of
rebellion.
 It is to be noted that in many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need
to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
 The President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may
be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property.
IBP V. ZAMORA
FACTS:
 Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1.WoN the President commited grave abuse of discretion in calling out the marines
1.WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.

RULING:
 In the case at bar, it is admitted that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-
Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to
call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
 While it is agreed that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the
Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and
promotion general welfare.
 The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander in chief
powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence.
The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

2.The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

3. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines
and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in
the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

DAVID V. ARROYO
FACTS:
In 2006, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, citing the
powers vested upon the President by virtue of Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution commanding the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by her personally or upon her direction.

PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from
“illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII … do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP
1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power
for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based
on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
The Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to
exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by
it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules
that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can
he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no
power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of
an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

KULAYAN V. TAN
FACTS:
  The case arose when the petitioners in this case assailed the validity of Proclamation No. 1 and its
implementing guidelines, issued by the Provincial Governor of Sulu, Abdusakur Tan. It was issued, declaring a
state of emergency in the province of Sulu, due to a kidnapping incident of three members of the
international Committee of the Red Cross describing is as a terrorist act under RA 9372 (Humanity Security
Act).
 He also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) bestowing upon a Provincial
Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made disasters and calamities.
 According to petitioners it is in violation of Sections 1 and 18 Article VII of the Constitution granting the
President the sole authority to exercise emergency and calling out powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of President?

DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of
the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else.
 Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof.
 While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is,
at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader.
 The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the
President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to
direct military operations and to determine military strategy.
 Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but
the ultimate power is his.
 Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the
assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
 The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation
of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

GUDANI V. SENGA
FACTS:
  The case arose when the senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 elections
and the surfacing of Hello Garci tapes.
 In line with this, former President Arroyo issued Executive Order 464, enjoining officials of the executive
department including military establishment from appearing in legislative inquiries without her consent.
 AFP Chief of staff then issued a memorandum prohibiting them from appearing before the Senate Committee
without approval.
 Despite this the two appeared before the Senate and were relieved of their assignments, and subjected
before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them
from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
 Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice.
 At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official
whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President.
 If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance
of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty
to faithfully execute.

 SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from
testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

 At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to
conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the
President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or
actualize.

 The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the
military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing
before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the
courts.

LLAMAS V. ORBOS
FACTS:
  Governor Ocampo of Tarlac was found guilty of graft and corruption and was suspended for office for 90 days;
 Due to this, his vice-governor, Llamas, assumed office but in sess than two months, Executive Secretary Orbos
issued a Resolution granting executive clemency. Ocampo re-assumed the governorship of the province.
 Llamas filed a petition and questioned the said Resolution. Contending that executive clemency could be
granted by the President only in criminal cases and not in administrative cases.
 According to him, the phrase "after conviction by final judgment" as found in Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution applies solely to criminal cases.

Issues:
1. May the president grant executive clemency in administrative cases?
2. Has there been a final judgment?
3. Was petitioner's constitutional rights to due process violated when he was not notified of the pardon?

HELD:
1. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII Section 19 of the constitution. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President,
with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish.
a. If executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically
excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases. One
example of which is Sec. 43 of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may commute or remove
administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, the intent of
the constitutional commission is to give the president the power to grant executive clemency and is not to be limited in
terms of coverage, except as already provided in the constitution.

There is no reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. If the President can
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason
can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when it says the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, it
refers only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the
government.

2. Yes. There has been a final judgment because upon acceptance of the presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to
have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Consequently, Ocampo's acceptance of the presidential pardon
"serves to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision final.

3. No. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, assuming that petitioner
was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary.

Note: Conviction by final judgment is now necessary before parole or pardon could be extended. (Section 19, Article
VII of the Constitution, People vs. Casido; People vs. Salle)

PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
  The petition seeks compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 According to them, the ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of
the Senate.
 Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit said copy to the Senate to allow it to exercise its
discretion with respect to ratification of treaties.
 Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under
treaty law and customary international law.

Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made
their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.

ISSUE:

 W/N the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence; or

 Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute even without the signature of the President.

HELD:
 The court held that our system of government, the President is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations.
 Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states.

 Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for
the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.” The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the
legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive.

 It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to
the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

 Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured
its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has
been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by the Court via a writ of mandamus.

 The Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond
its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute
to the Senate.

BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
  The PH and the USA forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized the use of installations in the PH
territory by US military personnel.
 To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the PH and US entered into a Mutual Defense
Treaty wherein the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces,
public vessels, and aircraft
 However the PH Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which
would have extended the presence of US military bases in the PH.
- With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted were held in
abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of
America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
 RP and US discussed the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA and Pres. Ramos approved
the VFA, which was signed by Sec. Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.
 President Estrada ratified the VFA, and acting through Executive Secretary Zamora, officially transmitted to
the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
 Petitioners – as legislators, NGOs, citizens and taxpayers – assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute
to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
ISSUE:
(1) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution

RULING:
(1) The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate
extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21,
Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

• Section 21 Article 7 of the Constitution lays down the General Rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective.
• To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article 7 will find applicability with
regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the senate.

• Section 25 Article 18 is a special provision wherein the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to
render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines.
 It is baseless to argue that Section 25, Article 28 is inapplicable to mere temporary agreements for the reason
that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base.
- The Constitution makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent”.
- We find nothing in Section 25, Article 28 that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed
permanently in the PH. When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not distinguish.

BAYAN MUNA V. ROMULO

FACTS:
  The petition in this case seeks to nullify the Non-Surrender Agreement concluded by and between the
Philippines (RP) and the USA.
 Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the ICC with "the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and crimes of aggression) of international concern . . . and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions."
 Ambassador Francis sent a US Embassy Note to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms
of the non-surrender bilateral agreement between the USA and the RP.
 DFA Secretary agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with the US government.
 The Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" (current or former Government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party) of the RP and US
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
 Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and
prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
 For their part, respondents question petitioner's standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement,
being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for
reasons detailed in their comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement.

ISSUE:
WoN the Agreement is valid, binding, and effective without the concurrence by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
members of the Senate

RATIO:
• Senate Concurrence Not Required
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded
between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two
or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." International agreements may be in the form of
(1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are
similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a
narrower range of subject matters than treaties

Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed
that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement aspect.

As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive agreement,
because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the
Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory
enactment.
Considering the above discussion, the Court need not belabor at length the third main issue raised, referring to the
validity and effectivity of the Agreement without the concurrence by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate. The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the obligatory effect of
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate:
. . . [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of
these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.

LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
  Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the
United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part in "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002.
 The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involve the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.
 The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in
reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New
York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin
Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001.
 Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.

ISSUE: W/N the “Balikatan 02-1” joint training exercise violate the Constitution and the VFA

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new
petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed
aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court
nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of
which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the
approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that
United States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular,
from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos
governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The
Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context
of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to
Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the
supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an
alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in
negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and intent of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as
the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants may not
engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality,
"Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-
defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter
thereby becomes crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements
to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of
Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations
powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on
Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in
general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the
doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not
superior, to national legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or
that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.

NICOLAS V ROMULO
FACTS:
  This case stemmed from the fact that Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, a member of the United States Armed
Forces, was convicted of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.
 Even prior to conviction, pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) the United States requested for the
custody of Smith while the case was still pending and the same was granted.
 After his conviction, an agreement was entered into by the Foreign Affairs Secretary Romulo and former
United States Ambassador Kenney – which was known as Romulo-Kenney Agreement
 By virtue of the Romulo-Kenney Agreement, Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and brought to a facility
for detention under the control of the United States government.
 The agreement’s validity was questioned by several petitioners contending that the Philippines should have
custody of Smith on the premise that the VFA is not valid and binding, as the Senate of the United States did
not ratify the same.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the visiting forces agreement is valid and binding considering that it was not ratified by the senate
of the united states.
2) Whether or not the Romulo-Kenney agreement is valid.
RULING:

1) YES. First, as held in the case of Bayan vs. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Senate of the Philippines and
has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by duly authorized representative of the
United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate
does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. Second, the
earlier RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the
Philippine Senate and the United States Senate. Hence, the VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the
joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty.
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA
to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act within 60 days of its
ratification.

2) NO. The Supreme Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody in the
provisions of the VFA. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the
following provision of the VFA, to wit:

Article V Criminal Jurisdiction

Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences
in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.

It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly
states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that
the detention shall be “by Philippine authorities”. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22,
2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the
VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities”.

ADDITIONAL MATTER DISCUSSED:

The Supreme Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin vs. Texas, which held
that treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are
self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.

The Supreme Court holds that:

a) The VFA is a self-executing agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because
the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.

b) The VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act in as much as it is the very purpose
and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification
be immediately implemented.

c) The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952.

SAGUISAG V. OCHOA
FACTS:
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v.
Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.

Petitioners claim the Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a
treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on
foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of
telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.

The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the Decision that
EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT because it provides
a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S.
military bases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.

RULING:

Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that the VFA and MDT did
not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:

1. Agreed Locations

2. Rotational presence of personnel

3. U.S. contractors

4. Activities of U.S. contractors

We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The very nature of
EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a class of agreement that
is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with
which they are concluded.

As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted
scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or
agreements.

They are concluded

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.

The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.

International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements, ranging from
the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn instrument – to engagements concluded in modern,
simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.

An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis
d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum
of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.

Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an
executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and
executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate
concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very important features that
distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under
serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the
Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create
new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts
of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative
participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable
conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently.
Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of
international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an executive
agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole web of Philippine
law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA
deserves treaty status under the law.

We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime through
the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to enhance our military capability in the
face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.

PANGILINAN V. CAYETANO
Facts:
The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty that established the International Criminal Court, where the gravest crimes
under international law are prosecuted. Since 1996, under President Ramos’ presidency, the Philippines has participated
in thecourt's establishment, taking an active role in the deliberations as a member of the Drafting Committee. On
December 28, 2000, the Philippines, through then President Estrada, signed the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. President Estrada's act of signing the Rome Statutesignified the Philippines' intent to be bound by the
provisions of the treaty, subject to thedomestic requirements for its validity and enforceability.On December 11, 2009,
with Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute still pending, thenPresident Arroyo signed into law Republic Act No. 9851,
otherwise known as the Philippine Acton Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
AgainstHumanity. Republic Act No. 9851 replicated many of the Rome Statute's provisions.Senate concurrence to the
Rome Statute was obtained following President Aquinoelection. On August 23, 2011, the Senate, with a vote of 17-1,
passed Resolution No. 546 — enabling the Philippines' consummate accession to the Rome Statute.On August 30, 2011,
the Philippines deposited the instrument of ratification of the RomeStatute. On November 1, 2011, the Rome Statute
entered into force in the Philippines. Thecountry was the 16th state party to belong to the Group of Asia-Pacific State
Parties in theInternational Criminal Court.On June 30, 2016, President Aquino's term ended and President Duterte took
his oath aschief executive.On April 24, 2017, Atty. Jude Sabio filed a complaint before the International CriminalCourt
pertaining to alleged summary killings when President Duterte was the mayor of DavaoCity. On June 6, 2017, Senator
Trillanes and Representative Alejano filed a "supplemental communication" before the International Criminal Court with
regard to President Duterte's drugwar.

On February 8, 2018, the Office of ICTC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda commenced the preliminary examination of the
atrocities allegedly committed in the Philippines pursuant to theDuterte administration's "war on drugs."On March 15,
2018, the Philippines announced that it was withdrawing from theInternational Criminal Court. President Duterte
claimed that the country never became a state party to the Rome Statute since the treaty was not published in the
Official Gazette.On March 16, 2018, the Philippines formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal fromthe International
Criminal Court to the United Nations. Enrique Manalo, the PermanentRepresentative of the Republic of the Philippines
to the United Nations in New York, depositedthe Note Verbale to Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the
United Nations'SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres.On March 17, 2018, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
received the notificationfrom the Philippine government.Herein petitioners assail the validity of the Philippines’
withdrawal from the ICJ.Issues:1.Whether or not petitioners have sufficiently discharged their burden of showing that
thiscase is justiciable?2.Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a NoteVerbale
delivered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, andeffectual?3.Whether or not the
Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute places the Philippinesin breach of its obligations under international law?
4.Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome statute will diminish theFilipino people's protection under
international law; and even if it does, whether or notthis is a justiciable question?Ruling:I. No. Petitioners insist that the
protection of human rights will be weakened, yet their contentions are mere surmises. Ample protection for human
rights within the domestic sphereremain formally in place. It is a canon of adjudication that "the court should not form a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."Contrary to petitioners'
claim, these cases do not deal with the results of the ongoing preliminary examination by Prosecutor Bensouda. Article
127 of the Rome Statute covers that.54 Neither at issue here is whether a future president may decide to re-enter the
Rome Statute and secure the requisite Senate concurrence. It is possible that whatever the results in these casesare, a
future administration under a new president can make that decision.The Petitions are moot. They fail to present a
persisting case or controversy that impelsthis Court's review. In resolving constitutional issues, there must be an
"existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory."On March 19,
2019, the International Criminal Court itself, through Mr. O-Gon Kwon,the president of the Assembly of States Parties,
announced the Philippines' departure from theRome Statute effective March 17, 2019. Any discussion on the
Philippines' withdrawal is, at this juncture, merely a matter of theory.II.Yes. Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides
mechanisms on how a state party maywithdraw from it:a.A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of theUnited Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the
date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date. b.A State shall not be discharged, by
reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arisingfrom this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any
financial obligationswhich may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Courtin connection
with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which thewithdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and
which were commenced prior to the dateon which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way
thecontinued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by theCourt prior to the date on which
the withdrawal became effective.The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in accordance with
themechanism provided in the treaty. The Rome Statute itself contemplated and enabled a StateParty's withdrawal. A
state party and its agents cannot be faulted for merely acting within whatthe Rome Statute expressly allows.Treaty-
making is a function lodged in the executive branch, which is headed by the president. Nevertheless, a treaty's effectivity
depends on the Senate's concurrence, in accordancewith the Constitution's system of checks and balances.While Senate
concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, nosimilar express mechanism concerning
withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is provided in the Constitution or any statute. Similarly, no
constitutional or statutory provisiongrants the president the unilateral power to terminate treaties. This vacuum
engenders thecontroversy around which the present consolidated Petitions revolve.Having laid out the parameters and
underlying principles of relevant foreign concepts,and considering our own historical experience and prevailing legal
system, this Court adopts the
following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawalfrom international
agreements.First, the president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or shedetermines to be
contrary to the Constitution or statutes. Thus, a valid treaty or internationalagreement may be effective just as a statute
is effective. It has the force and effect of law. Still,statutes enjoy preeminence over international agreements. In case of
conflict between a law anda treaty, it is the statute that must prevail.Second, the president cannot unilaterally withdraw
from agreements which were enteredinto pursuant to congressional imprimatur.Third, the President cannot unilaterally
withdraw from international agreements wherethe Senate concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must
also be made with itsconcurrence.At no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority
towithdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on adetermination that
they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such determination musthave clear and definite basis; any wanton,
arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal iscorrectible by judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances
attending Congress's injunctionon the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's specification of the
need for itsconcurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president and may prevent him or her from
proceeding with withdrawal.III. No. The Philippines aspired to the establishment of an international criminal court
thatwould dispense justice efficiently and effectively; an institution that was ineffective inaddressing the problem of
impunity of the perpetrators of the most heinous violations of the lawsof humanity would not serve justice or help to
maintain international peace and security. The position of the Philippines, consistent with its constitutional and legal
traditions, was based onthose considerations and on its desire to uphold the current evolution of international law.IV.
No. This fear of imagined diminution of legal remedies must be assuaged. TheConstitution, which embodies our
fundamental rights, was in no way abrogated by thewithdrawal. A litany of statutes that protect our rights remain in
place and enforceable.Republic Act No. 9851, or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against InternationalHumanitarian Law,
Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, echoes the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute. It was signed
into law on December 11, 2009, two years beforethe Senate concurred with the Rome Statute. Republic Act No. 9851
covers rights similarly protected under the Rome Statute. Consequently, no new obligations arose from our
membershipin the International Criminal Court. Given the variances between the Rome Statute and RepublicAct No.
9851, it may even be said that the Rome Statute amended Republic Act No. 9851.
It has been opined that the principles of law in the Rome Statute are generally accepted principles of international law.
Assuming that this is true and considering the incorporationclause, the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute
would be a superfluity thus, ultimatelyineffectual. The Philippines would remain bound by obligations expressed in the
Rome Statute.Treaties may become the basis of customary international law. While States which arenot parties to
treaties or international agreements are not bound thereby, such agreements, if widely accepted for years by many
States, may transform into customary international laws, inwhich case, they bind even non-signatory States.Thus,
petitioners' concern that the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute abjectlyand reversibly subverts our basic
human rights appears to be baseless and purely speculative. Alltold, the consolidated Petitions are dismissed for failing
to demonstrate justiciability.The unfolding of events, including the International Criminal Court's acknowledgment of
withdrawal even before the lapse of one year from initial notice, rendered the Petitions moot,removing any potential
relief from this Court's sphere.Mechanisms that safeguard human rights and protect against the grave offenses sought
to be addressed by the Rome Statute remain formally in place in this jurisdiction. Further, theInternational Criminal
Court retains jurisdiction, over any and all acts committed by governmentactors until March 17, 2019. Hence,
withdrawal from the Rome Statute does not affect theliabilities of individuals charged before the International Criminal
Court for acts committed up tothis date.As guide for future cases, this Court recognizes that, as primary architect of
foreign policy, the President enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties which are bona fidedeemed contrary
to the Constitution or our laws, and to withdraw in keeping with the national policy adopted pursuant to the
Constitution and our laws.However, the President's discretion to withdraw is qualified by the extent of
legislativeinvolvement on the manner by which a treaty was entered into or came into effect. The Presidentcannot
unilaterally withdraw from treaties that were entered into pursuant to the legislative intentmanifested in prior laws, or
subsequently affirmed by succeeding laws