Topic: Presidency

#82 Lagman v Medialdea (2017)

FACTS:
September 4, 2016
Proclamation No. 55, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in
Mindanao, was issued.
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, “declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao,” in
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
“xxx in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law xxx”
May 25, 2017
Within the 60-days timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, President Duterte
submitted a written report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and
lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the
high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted.
These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the
government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against
the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties
the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals, brought about undue
constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel, particularly in the
performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the civilians
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role
it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the
possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
The President ended his Report in this wise:
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-
going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued
implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled
Representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police authorities conducted
briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of
martial law.
After the submission of the report, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 expressing full
support to the proclamation of martial law as they deemed it to be satisfactory, constitutional,
and in accordance with the law.
The House of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 1050 expressing their full
support to the same.               
Petitioner Lagman, petitioner Cullamat and Petitoner Mohamad filed separate petitions that
under the Paragraph 3, Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the declaration of
martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi
City or in any part of Mindanao.
It argues that acts of terrorism do not constitute rebellion, since there is no proof that its
purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from its allegiance to the Philippines.
June 12, 2017
Respondents’ consolidated comment was filed as required by the Court.
The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the petitioners to
prove that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis.
It thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to shift the burden of proof when they asked the
Court "to compel [the] respondents to present proof on the factual basis"of Proclamation No.
216.
For the OSG, "he who alleges must prove “and that governmental actions are presumed to be
valid and constitutional.
The OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed from the trajectory or
point of view of the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the decision
was made.
It argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined not based on the facts
discovered after the President had made his decision to declare martial law because to do so
would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an impossible standard

ISSUES:
1) Are the petitions (GR No. 231658, 231771, and 231774) the “appropriate proceeding
covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution? 
YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it
should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Under the said paragraph, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on
standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers.
The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court
has to promulgate its decision.
The Supreme Court is the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Likewise, any action commenced by any citizen to
demand the factual basis of the said proclamation should be denominated as a petition to be
resolved by the Supreme Court.
“The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof xxx”
2) Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
NO. Due to the urgency of the situation, the President cannot be able to verify the accuracy and
veracity of all the facts and information reported to him. In case of actual invasion or rebellion,
there is a need for immediate response and time is paramount in situations necessitating the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, accurate, and
precise, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient
factual basis. Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at
hand during the declaration or suspension.
b. required to obtain favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National
Defense;
NO.  According to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President is not subject to
any condition to obtain a recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National
Defense or other high-ranking officials. The President can declare martial law as long as the
following requirements are present: invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it.
The power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President as the Commander-in-Chief,
subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of the Court. Therefore, lack of
recommendation even from the Secretary of National Defense will not compromise the
sufficiency of the declaration’s factual basis.
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported
YES. The President is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the proclamation’s factual basis, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of
declaration, which can be found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by
him to Congress. Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or
suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the
time of the declaration.
3) Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actual
actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately?
YES. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different, but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the
power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of
Congress.
4) Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
YES. The series of violent attacks committed by the ISIS-backed Maute Group, their brazen
display of DAESH flags, and their attempt to establish a DAESH wilayat or province in Marawi
constitute a clear and open attempt to remove from the allegiance of the Philippine
Government, the city of Marawi, a part of Mindanao, and deprive the Chief Executive of his
power, authority, and prerogatives to enforce laws of the land and to maintain public order and
safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion. Hence, the factual basis for the
Proclamation No. 216 is sufficient.
a. What are the parameters for review?
Based on Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the parameters for the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are invasion or
rebellion, and when public safety requires it.
b. Who has the burden of proof?
The basic rule is that he who alleges must prove his case. The burden lies with the petitioners to
prove that the Proclamation No. 216 lacks factual basis. (Rule No. 131: Burden of proof and
presumptions, Rules of the Court) Otherwise, the President’s actions are presumed to be valid
and constitutional.
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
Probable cause is the allowable standard of proof for the President.
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that
there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was
committed or is being committed.
5) Does the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involve the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law?
NO. Judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his
graduated powers be availed of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative
that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
“Graduation of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by which the Commander-in-Chief must adhere to.” 
6) Is the Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;
NO. Inclusion of "other rebel groups" does not make Proclamation No.216 vague when viewed
in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to
"other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its
Whereas clauses.
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region?
NO. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under
the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human
rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the
Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is
reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
7) Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the
President to Congress sufficient bases:
a. for the existence of actual rebellion;
YES. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao region?
YES. The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion to
determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. The Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City,
the only Islamic City of the South, thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all
roads in Mindanao. Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging
point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Moreover, the President's duty
to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual
rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
8) Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus?
YES. Rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed.

Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. While rebellion is one of the predicate crimes
of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements. For the validity of
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
there must be a concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it.
9) Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016;
NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55. Among the three extraordinary
powers of the President, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police
action. The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. “The power to call is fully
discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts within permissible
constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.
b. Also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless
violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
NO. Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts
of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the
unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared
unconstitutional.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated
Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.