O.

Rights of the Accused

307. People vs. Valdez

DOCTRINE: Article 48 of which states that in complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Thus, in Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents, the prescribed penalties for
malversation and falsification should be taken into account.

FACTS: State Auditors of the CA conducted a post-audit of the disbursements of expenses of

Valdez, a former mayor of Bacolod. It found that receipts were falsified to enable Valdez to
claim reimbursements from the government amounting to 274,306.75 Php.

Valdez was charged with eight cases, four of which were in violation of R.A. 3019 and complex-
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents. The
Ombudsman recommended "no bail."

A Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail. She argued that
three cases are bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying circumstance
was alleged and ISL was applicable. On the contrary, petitioners contend that ISL is
inapplicable because the charge constituting the complex crime have the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, bail is discretionary.

A warrant of arrest was issued. Valdez refiled his Motion with Prayer to Recall/Lift Warrant of
Arrest. This was granted.

ISSUE: Whether Valdez is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

RULING: YES. Article 48 of which states that in complex crimes, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Thus, in
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents, the prescribed
penalties for malversation and falsification should be taken into account.

Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public funds or property if the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,
aside from perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. On the other hand, the penalty
of prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for falsification committed
by a public officer. Considering that malversation is the more serious offense, the imposable
penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents if the
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

The term “punishable” should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty.

The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined therein
which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the “prescribed
penalty.” For instance, under Article 249 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further,
the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the
commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This
penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the “Imposable penalty”. In the case of homicide
which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its
maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also
called a straight penalty) which is the “penalty actually imposed” on a convict, i.e., the prison
term he has to serve.

Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00, the “prescribed
penalty” is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an accused who is charged with a
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the
prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to
point that in charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of the
complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the subject
of separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support
the charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense
proven.

For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents that involves an amount in excess of
P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a summary hearing on bail application is,
therefore, unnecessary. Consistent with Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 (2006), an affirmative
relief may be obtained from the court despite the accused being still at- large. Except in petition
for bail, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs sought by the defendant
(such as a motion to set aside no bail recommendation and to fix the amount of bail in this case)
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even
considered as inherently grievous, odious and hateful.

To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the constituent
offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law.
When committed through falsification of official/public documents, the RPC does not intend to
classify malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659. If truly a non-
bailable offense, the law should have already considered it as a special complex crime like
robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide, and kidnapping with murder or
homicide, which have prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.

It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same only
after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust for Us to
give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused person’s constitutional right to bail

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is Denied.

Valdez
Topic: O. Rights of the Accused
#308. Gov't of Hongkong v. Olalia (2007)

DOCTRINE: If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should
not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of
the person detained is not in issue.

FACTS:
 Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with 3 counts of the offense
of “accepting an advantage as agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong.
 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC Manila a petition for the
extradition of Muñoz. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and
that Muñoz is a high “flight risk.”
 Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing and the case was raffled off to
another judge. Thus, Muñoz filed an MR, which was granted.
 Hong Kong filed an urgent motion to vacate said Order, but it was denied. Hence, the R65
petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N Muñoz, a potential extradite is entitled to post bail

RULING: YES. An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of
a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

Records show that Muñoz was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated
until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he
had been detained for over 2 years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right
to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court
to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. It is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise
behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight
of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive
from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. Therefore,
an extraditee should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given
the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction.

"Clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. This
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance
of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is dismissed. [In this case, Muñoz is not a flight risk. Consequently, this
case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether he may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."]
Baba
Topic: Rights of the Accused
309. Alejano vs. Cabuay 468 SCRA 188 , August 25, 2005

DOCTRINE:
● The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of
a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally
deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders
the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate.
● The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful
restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess
● American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre- trial detainees’ non-
privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. Hence, when a detainee places
his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his
letter to possible inspection by jail officials. A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable
expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.
● However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that
prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the
contents without violating the inmates’ right to correspond with his lawyer.
FACTS:
● Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
(“Oakwood”), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati
City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive
devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their
support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
● Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the
explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
● On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all
the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP
Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident.
● On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the
Regional Trial Court.
● On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court. (Designated and raffled to the CA.) They complained that their lawyers are not
 allowed to visit them “at any time.” (allowed only during visiting hours). Petitioner
Trillanes’ letter was also opened and read by the respondents.
● CA denied the petition. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already
charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is
unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment, the
legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
● The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an
abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint,
which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
● Whether the writ of habeas corpus should be issued
● Whether the opening and reading of the letter is allowable
RULING:
NO, IT SHOULD NOT BE.
● The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to
inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to
determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry
reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If,
however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings
terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither
can it substitute for an appeal.
● Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where there
is deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary.
● However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient.
The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is
void as to the excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains
high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire
proceedings.
● What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP
Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees —their
clients—any time of the day or night. Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional
rights upon confinement.16 However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes
 their rights more limited than those of the public.17 RA 7438, which specifies the rights
of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the
detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of
the detainee and prevent his escape.
● In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are
reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing
the escape of all detainees.
● While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the
detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly
shows that there is no impairment of detainees’ right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels
could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m.
The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-
punitive response to valid security concerns.

YES, IT IS ALLOWABLE.
● American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre- trial detainees’ non-
privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. Hence, when a detainee
places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly
exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. A pre-trial detainee has
no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail. However, incoming
mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials
can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents
without violating the inmates’ right to correspond with his lawyer. The inspection of
privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.
● In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
letters.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied.
Cadiz
Topic: Rights of the Accused (Right to Bail)

310. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) (2015)

GR No. 213847

DOCTRINE: Bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill
this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s
interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring
the accused’s presence at trial.
FACTS:

 The Ombudsman charged Juan Ponce Enrile and several others with plunder with the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
 On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered
and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police General Hospital. Thereafter,
Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail,
claiming that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with
plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously
considered.
 The Sandiganbayan denied the motion because it is premature for the Court to fix the
amount of bail since the Court has not yet made a determination that the evidence of guilt
against accused Enrile is not strong.

ISSUE/S: Whether Enrile is allowed to bail

RULING: Yes, he is granted bail.

The right to bail is provided by Sec. 13, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution:

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both
his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.

Likewise, the Director of UP PGH has testified that Enrile "is actually suffering from
minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," that
may later progress to advance stages.
Granting this provisional liberty to Enrile will enable him to have his medical condition properly
addressed, aid in his adequate preparation for his defense and guarantee his appearance in
court for trial.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the
accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health
and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED.

Chua
Topic: Bill of Rights – Rights of the Accused
311. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (2016)

DOCTRINE: Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is
the reason precisely why the probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor to be
taken into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases. The exception to the
fundamental right to bail should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of
evasion of prosecution. Apparently, an accused's official and social standing and his other
personal circumstances are considered and appreciated as tending to render his flight
improbable.

FACTS: The People, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman, filed a motion for reconsideration to assail the Decision ordering the provisional
release of Enrile upon posting of a cash bond. They argue that the decision is contrary to the
principles on the right to bail since the crime charged was punishable by reclusion perpetua,
making bail a matter of judicial discretion, and not a matter of right. They argue that his age and
fragile state of health are not compelling justifications for admission to bail, and that Enrile
should not be given preferential treatment.

ISSUE: Whether Enrile was correctly granted the right to bail

RULING: Yes. There is no reason to reverse the prior decision.

The People were not kept in the dark as to Enrile’s health condition, and had reasonable
opportunity to oppose the allegations of his advanced age and the unstable health, as heard in
the Sandiganbayan. There was no preferential treatment or undue favor as there was both legal
and factual basis for the grant of Enrile’s plea for provisional liberty on bail. Records
demonstrated that the risks of flight were low, and considering his advanced age and poor
health, past and present disposition of respect for the legal processes, the length of his public
service, and his individual public and private reputation, he should not be denied bail.
Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that one of the conditions of bail is for the
accused to "appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or these Rules. The
principal factor considered in bail fixing, to the determination of which most factors are directed,
is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment. The
Court has given due regard to the primary but limited purpose of granting bail, which was to
ensure that the petitioner would appear during his trial and would continue to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to answer the charges levelled against him.

Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal prosecution
without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be
presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing the commission
of a crime. The notion that bail is required to punish a person accused of crime is, therefore,
fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of admission to bail is not a device for keeping
persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. The spirit of
the procedure is rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial with all the safeguards has
found and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted this conditional privilege, the individuals
wrongly accused could be punished by the period or imprisonment they undergo while awaiting
trial, and even handicap them in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and
preparing a defense. Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring his presence at trial.

DISPOSITIVE: Motion for reconsideration is dismissed.

Cyril Qui v. People of PH
GR 196161, September 26, 2012, Velasco, J

DOCTRINE:
In People v. Fitzgerald, “[A]s for an accused already convicted and sentenced to an
imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on
prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the circumstances under Sec. 5,
paragraphs (a) to (e) of Rule 114.

FACTS:
Qui was charged with two counts of violating RA 7610 (Child Abuse). Later, RTC convicted and
sentenced her to “two equal periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of 5 years, 4
months and 21 days of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to 7 years, 4
months and 1 day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum”.

After filing a perfected notice of appeal, Qui filed an urgent petition/application for bail pending
appeal in CA, which the OSG opposed on the ground that Qui is a flight-risk especially when
she failed to attend several hearings before RTC. Thus, CA denied the application, as well as
Qui’s MR.

Thus, present petition for review on certiorari: (1) absence of conditions justifying denial of bail
under Section 5 of Rule 114; (2) conviction is for a bailable offense and the evidence of guilt
against her is not strong; (3) presumption of innocence must apply since the case is pending
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether Qui is entitled to bail pending appeal

RULING:
NO. Section 5, Rule 114 (when bail is discretionary):

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by

death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of
a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the

crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of
that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the
allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.

Indeed, the undisputed fact that Qui did not attend the hearings before the RTC, which
compelled the trial court to issue warrants for her arrest, is undeniably indicative of Qui’s
propensity to trifle with court processes. This fact alone should weigh heavily against a grant of
bail pending appeal. To add, the fact of transferring residences without informing her bondsman
and the trial court can only be viewed as Qui’s inclination to evade court appearance, as
indicative of flight, and an attempt to place herself beyond the pale of the law

Thus, after one is convicted by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and with it, the
constitutional right to bail, ends

PETITION DENIED.
Jackson

Topic: O. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

313. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, RTC, Br. 121, Caloocan City in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-69655 to 56 for Child Abuse, 543 SCRA 196 (2008)

DOCTRINE: Judge’s conviction by the Regional Trial Court does not necessarily warrant her
suspension while her appeal from such conviction is pending—until the judgment has attained
finality, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Facts:
Respondent Judge Adoracion Angeles was convicted for two counts of child abuse under R.A.
7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco wrote then Chief Justice Panganiban
requesting for the immediate suspension of the respondent pending the administrative
complaint. OCA filed the administrative complaint and recommended suspension, which was
upheld by the SC Second Division.

Judge Angeles argued that she was deprived of due process and that the decision in the
criminal cases against her has not yet become final as her appeal was currently pending before
the Court of Appeals, and that the acts for which she was convicted are totally alien to her
official functions and have nothing to do with her fitness and competence as a judge.

Issue: W/N grounds exist to preventively suspend Judge Angeles pending the resolution of the
administrative case? No.

Ruling: No.
Conviction in a criminal case will not automatically warrant a finding of guilt in an administrative
case. Mere existence of pending criminal charges against the respondent lawyer cannot be a
ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter (Nuñez v. Astorga, February 28, 2005). The
fact of respondent’s conviction does not necessarily warrant her suspension. Since her
conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet
attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Any administrative complaint against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating
eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent
judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment.
The OCA and SSP Velasco failed to prove that there are other lawful grounds to support the
preventive suspension other than the fact of conviction still on appeal.

Judge Angeles however was reprimanded and sternly warned for her use of intemperate
language in her pleadings. SSP Velasco was also warned that he should be more circumspect
in the statements made in his pleadings.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
314. PEOPLE vs. CAOILI
G.R. No. 196342. August 8, 2017

FACTS:
 First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Nasayao filed an Information against Caoili,
charging him with the crime of rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article
266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and R.A.
No. 7610
 After trial, RTC held Caoili guilty of rape by sexual assault for inserting his finger into
the victim’s (his daughter) vagina
 The CA held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by sexual assault, what the trial
court should have done was to direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information
charging the proper offense, and after compliance therewith, to dismiss the original
Information.
 The appellate court found it "imperative and morally upright" to set the judgment aside
and to remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110, in
relation to Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
 The OSG assails the CA Decision in this petition arguing that the crime of rape through
sexual assault is necessarily included in the crime of rape through sexual intercourse
charged in the information and embraced in the same article, hence, no new information
was needed to be charged

ISSUE: Whether based on the variance doctrine, Caoili can be convicted of rape by sexual
assault even if the crime charged in the information is rape by sexual intercourse since rape by
sexual intercourse necessarily includes the crime of rape through sexual intercourse

RULING: No. The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime
proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged, is embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which reads: 

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When

there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
 proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged
which is included in the offense proved.

By jurisprudence, however, AN ACCUSED CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION WITH RAPE

BY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE CANNOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF RAPE BY SEXUAL
ASSAULT, EVEN THOUGH THE LATTER CRIME WAS PROVEN DURING TRIAL. This is
due to the substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape.

People v. Abulon finds application: In view of the material differences between the two modes of
rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the
charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge,
appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven,
without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

The Court, thus, takes this occasion to once again remind public prosecutors of their
crucial role in drafting criminal complaints or Information. They have to be more judicious
and circumspect in preparing the Information since a mistake or defect therein may not render
full justice to the State, the offended party and even the offender.

However, the Court held that Caoili can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct
under Section 5(b) or RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.):
 Victim was below 18 years of age, (she was 14)
 Caoili’s acts were clearly “lascivious conduct” within the meaning of the law

Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article 266-A of the
RPC and R.A. No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., lascivious conduct under Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610, which was the offense proved, because it is included in rape, the offense
charged.

OTHER MATTERS:

Guidelines for Public Prosecutors in Designating the Proper Offense In Cases of

Lascivious Conduct:

Accordingly, for the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court takes this
opportunity to prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper
offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in
determining the imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the offense,
and in determining the imposable penalty;
 2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be
“Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.” Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period;
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below
eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to
fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition, the crime should be designated as “Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,” and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua.

Notes on the Substantial Differences between Rape by Sexual Intercourse and Rape by
Sexual Assault

Rape by Sexual Intercourse Rape by Sexual Assault Sexual Abuse

Art. 266-A par 1.
“organ rape” or “penile rape”
(1) that the offender is a man;
(2) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and
(3) that such act is accomplished
by using force or intimidation
(4) rape is committed through
penile penetration of the vagina
Rape by sexual intercourse is a
crime committed by a man
against a woman, and the
central element is carnal
knowledge.
Art. 266-A par. 2
“instrument or object rape”
“gender free rape”
ELEMENTS
(1) the offender may be a
man or a woman;
(2) the offended party may
be a man or a woman;
(3) that the act of sexual
assault is committed by
inserting his penis into
another person’s mouth or
anal orifice or by inserting
any instrument or object
into the genital or anal
orifice of another person;
and that the act of sexual
assault is accomplished by
using force or intimidation,
among others.
Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610
Special Protection of
Children against Abuse,
Exploitation and
Discrimination Act
(1) The accused commits
the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
(2) The said act is
performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male
or female, is below 18
years of age.

PENALTY
Reclusion perpetua Prision mayor Reclusion temporal in its
medium period to Reclusion
perpetua, fine

Separate Concurring Opinion, J. Peralta

Lopez
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Bill of Rights; Rights
of the Accused

315. Re Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, 652 SCRA 1 (2011)

DOCTRINE: The indication of “serious risks” posed by live media coverage to the accused’s
right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and
Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information. The
rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable
cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and
which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and
exacting regulations. In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall
not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and
allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings.

Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges,
petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair
trial must pass the “totality of circumstances” test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and
Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial,
and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-
free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice
resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people, including 32 journalists and media practitioners,
were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-
related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident
which came to be known as the “Maguindanao Massacre” spawned charges for 57 counts of
murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused. The cases were then being
tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the RTC QC inside Camp
Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.

Almost a year later, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from
various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before the Court praying
that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording
devices be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.

In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong
Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 as a
special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending
cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number
of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside
the court.

President Benigno Aquino, by letter addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out “in
support of those who have petitioned this Court to permit television and radio broadcast of the
trial.” The President expressed “earnest hope that this Court will, within the many considerations
that enter into such a historic deliberation, attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion
and humaneness, such a petition merits.”

Collectively, petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage
of court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV
and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon Aquino’s Libel Case and the 2001
ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder
Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings, they contend, violate the
doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and
outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.

ISSUE: WON the live media coverage of the Ampatuan case may be allowed

RULING: YES, the Court partially granted pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of
the trial court proceedings, subject to the enumerated guidelines.

A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced with the same
task of striking that delicate balance between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary
rights. The indication of “serious risks” posed by live media coverage to the accused’s right to
due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has
left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information.

The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable
cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and
which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and
exacting regulations. In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall
not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied
rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance
with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised
in these administrative matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying
principles upheld in the two previous cases.

The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm— “a trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of
serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainments to
so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and
serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated.” The observation that
“massive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and
destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum” stands.
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case. It held that “the propriety of granting
or denying the instant petition involves the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental
rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control
its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.”

Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas, which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited,
was borne out of the dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations for the possible
infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members are not necessarily schooled in the
law, are different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of evidence. To petitioners,
Estes also does not represent the most contemporary position of the United States in the wake
of latest jurisprudence and statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the
District of Columbia, allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness.

Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United
Kingdom’s Supreme Court are filmed, and sometimes broadcast. The International Criminal
Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the internet.

On the media coverage’s influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out that
Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion.
They point out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been mostly supported by
studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the particular matter
dealing with Filipinos. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of
trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines
the right to a fair trial must pass the “totality of circumstances” test, applied in People v.
Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a
judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not
tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Even before considering what is a “reasonable number of the public” who may observe the
proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already
necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of
the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend
or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting
at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.

The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all
the interested parties, whether complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if
the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness
the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only
solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a
transparent, open and public trial.

In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases, the Court lays down the similar guidelines toward addressing the concerns
mentioned in Aquino and Estrada.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is partially granted.

Murao
Topic: Rights of the Accused

317. Harry Go, Jane Go, Jerry Ngo, and Tonny Ngo v. People and Highdone Co. Ltd.
(2012)

DOCTRINE: To take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the
very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his
right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.

FACTS:
Petitioners Harry Go, Jane Go, Tonny Ngo, and Jerry Ngo were charged for the crime Other
Deceits for defrauding private respondent Highdone Co. into executing a mortgage over their
Bataan factory for P20,892,010, even if the factory had already been mortgaged and foreclosed
by Chinabank. The prosecution’s complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, flew from Cambodia to
attend a hearing but due to an alleged lung infection, his doctors no longer allowed him to travel
back for the taking of his deposition.

The MeTC of Manila granted the prosecution’s motion to take Li Luen Ping’s deposition upon
showing a medical certificate proving his lung infection.

The RTC reversed the MeTC decision on the ground that taking of depositions of witnesses in
criminal cases mandates the Constitutional rights of accused to meet witnesses face to face,
thus, the Rule on taking depositions in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily.

The CA upheld the MeTC decision holding that petitioners still have every opportunity to cross-
examine Li Luen Ping during oral examination through counsel or a consular officer.

ISSUE/S: W/N the CA erred in allowing the taking of Li Luen Ping’s deposition?

RULING: YES. Under Section 15, Rule 119 a witness for the prosecution who is too sick or
infirm to appear at trial or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of return may be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. In the instant case, the CA
allowed the taking of Li Luen Ping’s deposition before a Philippine consular official in Laos, in
direct contravention of Section 15, Rule 119 and the Constitutional rights of the accused to a
public trial and to confront witnesses face to face. With face-to-face confrontation different from
the opportunity to cross-examine in the absence of a trial judge, the prosecution’s motion should
not have prospered.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. CA decision REVERSED.

Olivo
Topic: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
318. Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan (2015)

DOCTRINE: Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of
the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to
appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment. It is
not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court
to “provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.” This
provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases — delay
arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.

FACTS:
Petitioners Reynaldo Jaylo (Jaylo), William Valenzona (Valenzona) and Antonio Habalo
(Habalo), together with Edgardo Castro (Castro), were officers of the Philippine National Police
Western Police District placed on special detail with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The team conducted a buy-bust operation, but during the course of which, a shooting incident
happened. This led to the filing of informations before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioners
for conspiracy in the murder of De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera.

The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty of homicide. During the promulgation of

the Sandiganbayan’s judgment on 17 April 2007, none of the accused appeared despite notice.
The court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal
docket. The bail bonds of the accused were cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued.

The counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
Decision. The Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of
the warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused. In an Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration, counsel for the three accused urged the Sandiganbayan to give due course to
and resolve the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but to no avail. The Sandiganbayan issued
the second assailed Resolution and ruled that for the failure of the three to surrender and move
for leave to avail themselves of a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from the date of
promulgation, the judgment has become final and executory, and no action on the motion for
reconsideration can be taken. It then reiterated its order to implement the warrants for the arrest
of the three.

Petitioners argue that Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights like the filing of a motion for reconsideration provided under
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1606.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners lost their right to file a motion for reconsideration.

RULING: Yes, the petitioners lost their right to file a motion for reconsideration.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to appear
at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available
against the said judgment.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court states: xxx

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of
said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latter’s representative, the
accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment. Notice of
the schedule of promulgation shall be made to the accused personally or through the bondsman
or warden and counsel.

The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused despite notice.
The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket
and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or through counsel. The
court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to
appear was without justifiable cause.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it
determines the availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When
the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they
lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Petitioners’ argument, that the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant, and
not merely a remedy “available in [the] Rules,” as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, is untenable.

Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a
statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with
and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly
comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that “[a] petition
for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment.” In Social Security Commission v. Court of
Appeals, we enunciated that the term “may” denotes a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an
option. Those granted this opportunity may choose to exercise it or not. If they do, they must
comply with the conditions attached thereto.

Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 15 days from the
promulgation or notice of the judgment, the movant must also comply with the conditions laid
down in the Rules of Court, which applies to all cases and proceedings filed with
the Sandiganbayan.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court
to “provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.” This
provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases — delay
arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.

In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their
cases. Surely they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED.

P. Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

Ong
Writ of Habeas Corpus

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG

SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX,
BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO

Doctrine: Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to
mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is
continuously being illegally detained.
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the
issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the
person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final
decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a
warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a
petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
Facts:

Salibo was in Saudi Arbia for the hajj pilgrimage for November 7, 2009 to December 19,2009

August 3, 2010

Salibo was suspected of being Butukan S. Malang who was one of those who were accused of
57 counts of murder for participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacere
Salibo presented himself to the Datu Hofer Police station to clear his name
 He alleged that he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. He presented his passport, boarding
passes and other documents
At first, they assured salibo that they would not arrest him but they apprehended him and tore of
page 2 of his passport which evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia
 He was then detained for 3 days in the Datu Hofer police station
 He was then detained a further 10 days in the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group in Cotabato City and was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, in
Taguig City
Salibo filed with the CA an urgent petition for habeas corpus
 The CA issued the writ where the writ was returnable to the RTC of Pasig City( Taguig
Hall of Justice)
The RTC granted the petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release

 The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged “under any resolution,
information, or amended information.
 The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge
Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused.
 He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of
Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of
his liberty under process issued by a court.
The CA reversed the decision and dismissed the petiton for habeas corpus
  The CA found that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest
 The CA stated that Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest since there was a valid arrest.

Issue: Whether Salibo Should be released

Held: Yes, he should be released

the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. "The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent
with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty
The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."
"Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
Habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a
remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of
scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other
processes.
The difference between the writ and the decision on the petition for the issuance of the
writ
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of
the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly
restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court
determines the legality of the restraint.
 A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.
 The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot
and academic.
In this case however, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an
offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221,
Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and
accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in
connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant.
Petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and
to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the
presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense
that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
 The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo
without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of
law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
There is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009
when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.

A Certification from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi
Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A
Certification from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia
on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the
Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.c
To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty.
Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not
Butukan S. Malang.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon
City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig, is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from
detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby
NOTED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
320. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo

Doctrine: incorporated into the Mexican Constitution in 1847. Spread across the Western
hemisphere and eventually to the Philippines. It provides for swift relief because of the summary
nature of its proceedings. Only substantial evidence is required.

Facts: Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006,
several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all
the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend
as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he
passed by the barangay hall.

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and
army boots, entered their house and roused him.
They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond,
not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He
was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He
was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the
road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. He
recognized the men who took him.

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being
blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity,
he learned their names.

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit
beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the
person beside him as his brother Reynaldo’s. The van stopped several times until they finally
arrived at a house.

There, the brothers were repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned about their knowledge
of the NPA.

Sometime in the third week of detention, Raymond attempted to escape. He discovered that
they were in Fort Magsaysay (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). He was however recaptured and
tortured. Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted for 3 and a half months.

● One day, Rizal Hilario took the Manalo brothers to Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and
then beaten up. They remained there for one or two weeks.

● Then they were brought to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan to meet Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palparan, Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division.

o Gen. Palparan told the Manalo brothers to tell their parents to not go to rallies
and hearings regarding their disappearance. Instead, they should help in the
capture of “Bestre”.

o Respondents were then brought to their parents’ house to deliver Palparan’s

message. Their parents agreed out of fear.

Manalo brothers were given medicine named “Alive”. Gen. Palparan said that this would make
them feel better, but the real effect was drowsiness and a heavy feeling after waking up.

After 3 months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson. He was ordered to clean
outside the barracks of the Army Rangers. There, he met Sherlyn Cadapan, a UP student who
was also abducted, tortured and raped by the military.
Reynaldo was brought to Camp Tecson a week later. Other captives (Karen Empeño and
Manuel Merino) also arrived.
o All the captives were chained every night. They were told that their families would be
killed if they escaped.

o Cadapan, Empeño and Merino would later on be killed. Merino would even be
burned.

o November 22, 2006 – the captives were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry
Battalion in Limay, Bataan. They were continually beaten and made to do chores.

o Here, respondents witnessed how soldiers killed an old man suspected of harboring
the NPA and also of an Aeta who was subsequently burned.

The captives were then brought to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. They were brought
back to Limay on June 2007 by Caigas, the commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion.

June 13, 2007 – Respondents were brought to Pangasinan to farm the land of Caigas. Here,
they started to save their earnings to aid in their escape. When they saved 1000 pesos, they
were able to acquire a cellphone.

August 13, 2007 – Reynaldo and Raymond Manalo were able to escape and board a bus
bound for Manila.

The respondents were able to corroborate each other’s affidavits.

Dr. Benito Molino also corroborated the accounts of the Manalo brothers. He specializes in
forensic medicine. He conducted a medical exam on the respondents

After their escape. The scars and wounds of respondents were consistent with their account of
physical injuries inflicted on them. He followed the Istanbul Protocol in the medical exam.

Petitioners also submitted affidavits

Gen. Palparan and M/Sgt. Hilario filed their affidavits late.

Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall and witness for the petitioner, conducted an
investigation on May 29, 2006, from 8am to 10pm.

All 6 persons (CAFGU members) implicated in the abduction denied the allegation. They had
alibis (some were building a chapel, some were just at home)

Discovered that “Ka Bestre” is actually Rolando Manalo, elder brother of the respondents.
Recommendation was for the dismissal of the case.

Issue: Whether the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly given.

YES. Promulgated in October 24, 2007. First time that the Supreme Court exercised its
expanded power in the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules to protect the people’s
constitutional rights (life, liberty, property). Coverage of which is confined to:

● Extralegal killings – killings committed without due process of the law

● Enforced disappearances – an arrest, detention or abduction by the government; refusal
of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts places him outside the protection of the
law

“Amparo” literally means protection in Spanish. Writ of Amparo originated in Mexico (Yucatan
State). Eventually incorporated into the Mexican Constitution in 1847. Spread across the
Western hemisphere and eventually to the Philippines. It provides for swift relief because of the
summary nature of its proceedings. Only substantial evidence is required.

There is still a threat to the life, liberty, and a violation of their right to security of the
Manalo brothers because their captors, whom they escaped from, still remain at large.
● Right to security is in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
● It is the right to enjoyment of life.

Three ways of exercising right to security:

o Freedom from fear.
▪ Enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 3
⮚ Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
⮚ It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means
“freedom from fear.
▪ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 9 (1)
⮚ Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
❖ “Freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life,
liberty or security is the actionable wrong.  Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. (PH is a signatory to
both conventions)
o Guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
▪ Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees against search
without warrant
▪ ELKs and EDs involve Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe
invasion of bodily integrity.
▪ It constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the
dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will
o Guarantee of protection of one’s right by the Government
 ▪ The writ of amparo, is built into the guarantees of the right to life and
liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right
to security of person under Article III, Section 2.
▪ Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of ELKs and EDs
as well as their families
▪ Right to security of persons can exist independently of the right to liberty.
(the court cited several cases here, Delgado Paez v. Colombia; Bwaya v.
Zambia; Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea)
▪ They have a positive duty to protect right to liberty and not just a
prohibition for arbitrary deprivation of such rights. (ECHR in Kurt v.
Turkey)

The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo brothers is apparent. This threat vitiates their free
will because they are forced to limit their movements and activities. Threats to liberty,
security, and life are actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.

The military failed to provide protection for the respondents. They were even the ones who
actually tortured them. The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was limited, superficial
and one-sided.

“In sum, we conclude that respondents’ right to security as “freedom from threat” is violated by
the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation
and protection on the part of the military.”

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

NOTES: History of the Amparo Rule

The adoption of the Amparo Rule is a result of the two-day National Consultative Summit
on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July
16-17, 2007.
o It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate
rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights

● “Amparo” literally means “protection” in Spanish

o Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with
the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico. 
 o It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in
particular cases but prevents them from using this power to make law for the
entire nation.

● This concept evolved into the (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom,
equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of
the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants’ rights derived from the agrarian reform process.

● In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally
adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under
military juntas.

● In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of
amparo, several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter.  The
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse
Clause, provides for the judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.”  The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and
amparo administrativo.  Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus
found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

Valdez
Topic: P. Privilege of The Writ of Habeas Corpus
#Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis (2009)

DOCTRINE: The Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form
requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence.
Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their
defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must
show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victim's constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the
investigating authorities to appropriately respond.

FACTS:
 Engr. Morced Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor
for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo,
Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong, an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat on
October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
 Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the
following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no
longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at ~12:30 PM and
even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text
message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts
and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.
 On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of
Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a
sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’
disappearance.
 More than a month later, Mary Jean Tagitis (wife) filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with
the CA. The petition was directed against:
o Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army;
o Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, PNP;
o Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, (CIDG);
o Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response;
o Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and
o Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
 Mary Jean said that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who
could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not
produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military who do not
want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men. According to
reliable information she received, Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence
operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
 She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in
Jolo, seeking their help to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police
that her husband was not missing but was with another woman having good time
somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband.
 Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters –
Police Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the
National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no positive
results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial
help from friends and relatives.
 She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors, their
 intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
 On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set
the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified
return within 72 hours from service of the writ.
 In their verified Return, the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’
alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did
not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and
were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they exhausted all
means, particularly taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and
to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.
 The CA confirmed that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under
the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA
held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also
labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that
the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis. The CA thus
extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr.
Morced Tagitis.

RULING: YES. The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced

disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.

Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this
definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.

There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct
evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing
his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed
conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police
authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen
again.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others:
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading,
the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually
acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these
information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In
this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners
apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing
a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component
parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private
action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are
present.

The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the
State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the
actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its
statement of a cause of action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as
required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings
for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the
requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s
direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that
necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case,
the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition
sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. The failure to attach the required affidavits was fully
cured when Tagitis and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on
January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the
petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.

PH Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof." Although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of
the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, “as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the
component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special
laws.”

Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful
through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly
compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To
state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if only procedurally – in a
situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the
threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.

The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are
undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less
than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that
the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses,
our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated
until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the
disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper
case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.

During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (in Paris, France on February 6, 2007, "enforced disappearance" is considered
to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.

In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque
III, it’s held:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force
of domestic law.

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of
the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.

Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government

apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to
investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective.

Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance

The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties
form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. These
difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose involvement is alleged –
investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the
evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.

1. There may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. In

addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are
 usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own
lives.
2. Deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility;
the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance
3. The element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the
enforced disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced
disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights.

The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.

The use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal
system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is
expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the
hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal
or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination
by the adverse party.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some
government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the
haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government
and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what
they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that
at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments,
particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance
that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and
quoted, evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded
government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed
Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is dismissed. [To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, this case is referred
back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may
deem appropriate to conduct.]
Baba
Topic: Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Writ of Amparo, Writ of Habeas Data
322. Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis 612 SCRA 685 , February 16, 2010

DOCTRINE:
 While the need for substantial evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be observed
where appropriate for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security.
This flexibility, we noted, requires that "we should take a close look at the available
evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence-even of those
usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence-taking into account
the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
admissibility requirement."
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The petitioners argue that there was no
sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure unequivocally points
to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the
petitioners contend that this Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information
given to Col. Kasim by a personal intelligence “asset” without any other evidence
to support it. The petitioners also point out that the Court misapplied its cited cases
(Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, and Timurtas v.
Turkey) to support its December 3, 2009 decision; in those cases, more than one
circumstance pointed to the complicity of the government and its agents. The
petitioners emphasize that in the present case, the respondent only presented a
“token piece of evidence” that points to Col. Kasim as the source of information
that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for having been suspected as a
“terrorist supporter.” This, according to the petitioners, cannot be equated to the
substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
ISSUE/S:
 Whether there is substantial evidence for a writ of amparo
RULING:
YES, THERE IS.
 Contrary to the petitioners’ claim that our conclusions only relied on Col. Kasim’s report,
our Decision plainly and pointedly considered other evidence supporting our conclusion,
particularly the consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the
disappearance of Tagitis; the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report
of the disappearance; and the conduct of haphazard investigations that did not translate
into any meaningful results.
 Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the
evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered
inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the
circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the
substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the
admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and
 relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the
totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the
other available evidence in the case.
 At the risk of repetition, we stress that other pieces of evidence point the way towards
our conclusion, particularly the unfounded and consistent denials by government
authorities of any complicity in the disappearance; the dismissive approach of the police
to the report of the disappearance; and the haphazard handling of the investigation that
did not produce any meaningful results. In cruder but more understandable language,
the run- around given to the respondent and the government responses to the request
for meaningful investigation, considered in the light of the Kasim evidence, pointed to the
conclusion that the Tagitis affair carried a “foul smell” indicative of government complicity
or, at the very least, an attempt at cover-up and concealment. This is the situation that
the Writ of Amparo specifically seeks to address.
 While the need for substantial evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be
observed where appropriate for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty
and security. This flexibility, we noted, requires that “we should take a close look
at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of
evidence—even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules
of evidence—taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of
reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement.”
DISPOSITIVE: MR is denied.
Cadiz
Topic: Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

323. Republic vs Cayanan (2017)

GR No. 181796

DOCTRINE: The Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the writ of amparo as remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In order to be issued, the petitioner shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. In
proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may be impleaded; otherwise,
the rule on the writ of amparo may be rendered ineffective or toothless. There may be occasions
when the remedy of the writ of amparo can be made effective only through the State and its
agencies.

FACTS:

 On July 9, 2007, Pablo Cayanan, a used car dealer, and Ronaldo F. Perez, a fixer, were
forcibly taken by a group of armed men led by SPO2 Rolando Pascua without warrant of
 arrest. Perez was later released but Cayanan has not been seen nor heard from since
then.
 A petition for habeas corpus was filed in behalf of Cayanan by his wife alleging that
Cayanan was illegally detained at CIDG, Camp Crame. It was later converted to amparo
proceedings. Perez executed a sworn affidavit describing the abduction but later
recanted his statement. SPO2 Pascua submitted a counter-affidavit in which he denied
the allegations and claimed that he was also abducted in the same incident by unknown
men.
 The RTC issued the writ of amparo, ordering the CIDG Director to conduct further
investigations and for SPO2 Pascua to appear before the proper forum. The CIDG
however appeals the RTC’s judgment, arguing that the applicant for the writ failed to
prove by substantial evidence the involvement of CIDG in the disappearance of
Cayanan because Perez recanted his affidavit; that the CIDG is only required to exercise
ordinary diligence and that it has already discharged its duty under the Rules when it
submitted its return with certifications that CIDG was not detaining Cayanan. Lastly, the
CIDG contends that the issuance of the writ violated Pascua’s right to presumption of
innocence.

ISSUE/S: Whether there is substantial evidence to justify the issuance of the writ of
amparo

RULING: Yes, Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence.

In amparo petitions, the Court allows for flexibility in considering the evidence presented,
including hearsay evidence which may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may
require for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty, and security.

First, the sinumpaang salaysay executed by Ronaldo Perez, an eyewitness no less, detailed the
events of the abduction of Pablo, was consistent and credible in itself. He recounted how the
abductors perpetrated the abduction and identified one of the perpetrators by name – SP02
Rolano Pascua. The recantation has no evidentiary value for being general and bereft of details
of what really happened if the abduction did not occur. Other witnesses also identified Pascua
as the person leading the abductors.

Second, SP02 Pascua’s claim that he was also a victim of the said abduction falls because he
did not furnish details of the abduction that would have have given to the investigators firm leads
to quickly comer the perpetrators as well as to determine and locate the whereabouts of Pablo.
His omission as fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie his part in the abduction by
issuing a blanket denial. He could not even mention the type and the color of the vehicle that he
and Pablo were supposedly ordered to board. Such inability was uncharacteristic of a veteran
police officer like him.
Third, CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence. Under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the investigations conducted by the CIDG and
the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the
efforts to ascertain Pablo's whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return by the
CIDG is non-compliant in that regard. Here, the return only attached passive certificates issued
by its operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not detained by them. It should have
specified and described the efforts expended and the progress of the search of Pablo, is any
was really conducted. CIDG should have exerted greater effort at complying with both the letter
and spirit of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in light of Perez's sinumpaang salaysay having fully
placed the responsibility for the abduction and disappearance of Pablo right at the very
doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp Crame. It is disheartening for us to see the CIDG's investigation
having been limited to Pascua despite the circumstances justifying a broader inquiry.

The issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair SP02 Pascua’s right to presumption of
innocence. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar
to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not
determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the
aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or
security. The presumption of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the
accused with due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to adduce
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED.

Chua
Topic: Bill of Rights – Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
324. De Lima v. Gatdula (2013)

DOCTRINE: The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It
aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.

FACTS: On Feb. 27, 2012, Magtanggol Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila directed against Justice Secretary Leila M. De
Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National
Bureau of Investigation “to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush
incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against him in relation to the alleged
ambush incident.”
During the proceedings, the RTC judge required the filing of an Answer, applying the Rules of
Summary Procedure, and later asked the parties to instead file their respective memoranda. In
its “Decision”, the writ was granted, along with reliefs of temporary protection, production and
inspection orders in relation to evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the
attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. Petitioners assail the Decision through
a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Amparo was properly issued

RULING: No, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo was tainted with irregularities.

The insistence on filing an Answer was inappropriate, as the Return is the proper responsive
pleading. The Rules on Summary Procedure only applies to MTCs for certain civil and criminal
proceedings, whereas a writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. There should not have been a
hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and filing of a Return, as without a
Return, the issues could not have been properly joined. More importantly, a memorandum is a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, and cannot substitute for a Return. A
Return frames the issues subject to a hearing, whereas a Memorandum synthesizes the claims,
and is usually a final pleading required before a case is submitted for Decision. Lastly, the
“Decision” was not the Judgment under Sec. 18 of the Rule on Writ of Amparo, as it provided for
mere interim reliefs.

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called

the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached
affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the
violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security. A judgment which simply
grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1âwphi1 It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.

DISPOSITIVE: The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order
denominated as "Decision". A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply
dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. Thus,
the Court, in the interest of justice, resolves to (1) nullify the Orders, and (2) direct the Judge to
determine within 48 hours whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of
the petition and its attached affidavits.

NOTES: Procedure in a Petition for Writ of Amparo

The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the
right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on
the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address
concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to
afford swift but decisive relief.17 It is initiated through a petition18 to be filed in a Regional Trial
Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19 The judge or justice then
makes an "immediate" evaluation 20 of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits
submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed".21 After evaluation, the judge has the
option to issue the Writ of Amparo22 or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the
petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or
security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the
issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The
court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for
more permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.

The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of
court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. 24 Unlike an Answer, the
Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also
required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.

If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions
they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence
related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify
witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the
cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice
that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders
before a competent court.25 Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can
calibrate the means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will
be due to the petitioner.

There will be a summary hearing26 only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the
petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be
done ex parte.27 After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from
the time the petition is submitted for decision. 28

If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. 29 The judgment should contain
measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in
the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to
verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject
to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. 30 After the measures have served their purpose,
the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life,
liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment.
Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent
case be filed – either criminal or civil.31 Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the
extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of
constitutional rights.
Edgardo Navia, Ruben DIO, and Andrew Buising v. Virginia Pardico, in behalf of Benhur
Pardico, GR 184467, June 19, 2012, Del Castillo, J

DOCTRINE:
The petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation. The same Rule may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an
amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element.

FACTS:
One night, Asian Land Strategies (Asia Land Corp.) visited the house of Lolita Lapore where
two guards (Buising and Dio) got out of Asia Land’s vehicle to look Lolita’s son Bong and a
certain Benhur Pardico (Ben). The guards claim that a complaint was lodged against Bong and
Ben for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Later, Bong, Lolita and Ben were
asked to go to the security department of Asia Land Corp. for further investigation. The
supervisor of the guards, Navia, arrived thereat.

After the investigation at the security office, Lolita and Bong were released, leaving Ben for
further questioning. According to the security guards, Lolita signed two release forms. The first
one stating that they (Lolita and Bong) were released without harm upon leaving the security
office and another form, stating that Ben was released, when the guards visited Lolita’s house
again. A few weeks later, the security guards were invited to the police station to coordinate with
Virginia Pardico regarding her missing husband.

Virginia filed the present petition for writ of amparo before RTC Malolos, which was granted,
along with a temporary protection order. The RTC Order provided the issuance of the writ of
amparo and that the security guards must produce the body of Ben. After summary hearing,
RTC granted the petition.

After denial of MR, the security guard petitioners filed the present petition. They assail the
sufficiency of the amparo petition, finding lack of violation of the party’s life, liberty and security.

ISSUE:
Whether the amparo petition is proper

RULING:
NO. It is fatally defective.
The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be
impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching
command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also
embodied in our fundamental law

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant
extralegal killing sand enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an
expeditious and effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity. The Rule does not define extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. This omission was intentional because the Revision Committee chose to allow
it to evolve through time, jurisprudence and laws*. In probing enforced disappearance cases,
courts should read the Rule in relation to RA 9851. Thus, the elements are as follows:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition;
and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or apolitical organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

The same Rule may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be
held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here,
petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Malolos City and their
principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity.

The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated
in Virginia’s amparo petition

In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is essential to

establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. Even if the person sought to
be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity,
still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.
In the case at bar, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision and
their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government
and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police,
military or governmental operation.
Hence, issuance of a Writ of Amparo is NOT proper.

Notes:
History of the definition of enforced disappearances –

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v.Tagitis when this Court
defined enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted
principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance’s definition of enforced disappearances, as “the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.”

Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about
after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851, which defined enforced or involuntary
disappearances.

Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49 where Justice Brion wrote in his Separate Opinion
that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, “the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural
law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on
a concrete statutory definition as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is.”
Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851.

Jackson

Topic: P. PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

326. Pador v. Arcayan, 693 SCRA 192 (2013)

DOCTRINE: To be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial
evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission.

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador
was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008, respondents
Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for
marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioner Nerlo and Rey Pador received
invitation letters for a conference from respondent barangay captain Arcayan. They referred the
invitation letters to their counsel, who advise them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply
to Barangay Captain Arcayan.
When the Arcayan received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and
refused to sign a receipt document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the reaid, the
sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to receive their
letter-reply – as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusation, and possible
violence from respondents – gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security and
necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo. After examining the contents of the petition and
the affidavits the RTC issued the writ and directed the respondent to make a verified return.
Respondent filed a verified return. The RTC then heard the petition. On 3 July 2008. It issued
the assailed resolution finding that the petitioners’ claims ware based merely on hearsay,
speculation, surmises and conjectures and that respondents had sufficiently explained the
reason behind the issuance of letter of invitation. It thereafter proceeded to deny the petitioners
the privilege of the writ of amparo.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is entitled to the privilidge of writ of Amparo

RULING: No. To be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioner must prove by substantial
evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission. The alleged intrusion upon petitioners’ ampalaya farm is an insufficient
ground to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it was
merely a violation of petitioners’ property rights.

The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to extraordinary rise in the numbers
of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security. As an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to those Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition for Review is DENIED

327. G.R. No. 193652. August 5, 2014.

Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY
CARAM, petitioner, vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA
YANGCO, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became
pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina
mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to
complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted
through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at a hospital in Marikina. Sun and Moon
shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily
surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally
Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina
and supervised trial custody was then commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she
wanted her family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD
Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally
available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after
Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority
and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining
parental authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD: NO, the Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as
there was no enforced disappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section
3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

 2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization;

3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give

information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD
officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the
DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition
that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing.
There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as
the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and
the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission
is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate
the quality of life.

PETITION is DENIED.

NOTES:

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 568 SCRA 1
(2008), this Court held:
[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances
or to threats thereof.

“Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are
“attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such persons outside the protection of law.

Q. Self-Incrimination

Lopez
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Bill of Rights; Self-
incrimination

328. Jesus Disini v. Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al.

DOCTRINE: In petitioner Disini’s case, respondent Republic, acting through the PCGG, offered
him not only criminal and civil immunity but also immunity against being compelled to testify in
any domestic or foreign proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases identified in the
Immunity Agreement, just so he would agree to testify. Trusting in the Government’s honesty
and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play,
which is the essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise.

FACTS: Respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), wanted petitioner Jesus Disini to testify for his
government in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States
District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects
Company and others filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce
Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio Disini, as an executive in the
latter's companies. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of
the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminio's companies, had been attended
by anomalies.

Respondent Republic and petitioner Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement under which
Disini undertook to testify for his government and provide its lawyers with the information,
affidavits, and documents they needed for prosecuting the two cases. Acknowledging Disini's
concern that the Republic could become a party to yet other proceedings relating to the matters
subject of his testimony, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two cases, it shall not
compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the
Republic against Herminio.

The pertinent terms of the immunity read:

1. The parties acknowledge that the Republic of the Philippines is or may become a
party to other proceedings relating to circumstances as to which Jesus P. Disini may
have knowledge. The Republic of the Philippines by this instrument agrees that it shall
not compel the testimony of Jesus P. Disini in any proceeding, domestic or foreign, other
than this civil matter and these arbitration proceedings and, in the event this civil matter
or any portion thereof is referred for arbitration, then and in that event, in said arbitration
proceedings resulting from said reference.

2. The Republic of the Philippines agrees that is shall not institute, prosecute or maintain
any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding, audit or investigation against Jesus
Disini, for or in connection with (a) any conduct directly or indirectly relating to or arising
out of the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant in Bataan, Philippines or
Jesus Disini's former employment by Herminio Disini or any company in which Herminio
Disini owned any interest prior to July 1, 1984; or (b) any claim or matter, civil, criminal
or administrative, known or unknown, arising under the Internal Revenue Code of the
Philippines, which exits as of the date of this agreement; and it further agrees that it shall
not use, directly or indirectly, against Jesus Disini, any information, lead or document
obtained from him pursuant to this agreement.

3. Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio Disini a defendant in any of the
above-referenced matters, or in any resulting arbitration proceeding, or any other
proceeding ancillary to said matters, the Republic of the Philippines shall not call Jesus
Disini to testify as a witness in said matters on any claim brought by the Republic of the
Philippines against Herminio Disini. Nothing herein shall affect Jesus Disini's obligation
to provide truthful information or testimony.

Petitioner Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon application of
respondent Republic, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents before
that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini filed a motion to
quash the subpoena, invoking his immunity agreement with the Republic, but respondent
Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena.

PCGG issued a Resolution revoking and nullifying the Immunity Agreement between petitioner
Disini and respondent Republic insofar as it prohibited the latter from requiring Disini to testify
against Herminio. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied Disini's motion to quash subpoena,
prompting the latter to take recourse to this Court.

ISSUE: WON Jesus Disini may be compelled to testify against Herminio

RULING: NO, Jesus Disini cannot be compelled to testify against Herminio. The Republic may
not revoke the Agreement at this late stage as it will run afoul of the rule that a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits.

The Court has ruled that the scope of immunity offered by the PCGG may vary. It has discretion
to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and
his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this
case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. The language
of Section 5, E.O. 14, said the Court, affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of
that criminal immunity.

In petitioner Disini’s case, respondent Republic, acting through the PCGG, offered him
not only criminal and civil immunity but also immunity against being compelled to testify
in any domestic or foreign proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases
identified in the Immunity Agreement, just so he would agree to testify. Trusting in the
Government’s honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the
principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its
promise.

The Republic of course points out that the immunity from criminal or civil prosecution that
Section 5 of E.O. 14 authorizes does not cover immunity from giving evidence in a case before
a court of law. But in reality the guarantee given to petitioner Disini against being compelled to
testify in other cases against Herminio constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal
prosecution. If Disini refuses to testify in those other cases he would face indirect
contempt, which is essentially a prosecution for willful disobedience of a valid court
order, a subpoena. His refusal to testify will warrant the imposition against him of the
penalty of fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or
both fine and imprisonment. Here, petitioner Disini’s refusal to testify as ordered by the
Sandiganbayan is certain to result in prosecution for criminal contempt. It constitutes criminal
contempt since guilt would draw a penalty of fine or imprisonment or both.

A contract is the law between the parties. It cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual
consent. This applies with more reason in this case where petitioner Disini had already
complied with the terms and conditions of the Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic
to revoke the Agreement at this late stage will run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise
cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted.

Manotok
Topic: Self-Incrimination

329. US v. Balsys (1998)

DOCTRINE: The coverage of the constitutional right against self-incrimination does not cover
foreign prosecution.

FACTS:
Respondent Aloyzas Balsys, a resident alien, obtained admission to the country in 1961 under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, on an immigrant visa and alien registration issued at the
American Consulate in Liverpool. In his application, he said that he had served in the Lithuanian
army between 1934 and 1940, and had lived in hiding in Plateliai, Lithuania, between 1940 and
1944.

When the Office of Special Investigations of the Criminal Division of the United States
Department of Justice issued a subpoena requiring Balsys to testify at a deposition, he
appeared and gave his name and address, but he refused to answer any other questions, such
as those directed to his wartime activities in Europe between 19401945 and his immigration to
the United States in 1961. In response to all such questions, Balsys invoked the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, claiming that his answers could
subject him to criminal prosecution. He did not contend that he would incriminate himself under
domestic law, but claimed the privilege because his responses could subject him to criminal
prosecution by Lithuania, Israel, and Germany.

ISSUE/S: Whether a criminal prosecution by a foreign government not subject to this

country's constitutional guarantees presents a "criminal case" for purposes of the
privilege.

RULING: NO. The Court holds that concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the
Self- Incrimination Clause.

The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "no person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Balsys initially relies on the
textual contrast between the Sixth Amendment, which clearly applies only to domestic criminal
proceedings, and the Fifth, with its broader reference to "any criminal case," to argue that "any
criminal case" means exactly that, regardless of the prosecuting authority. But the argument
overlooks the cardinal rule to construe provisions in context. Because none of the other
provisions of the Fifth Amendment is implicated except by action of the government that it binds,
it would have been strange to choose such associates for a Clause meant to take a broader
view. Further, a more modest understanding, that "any criminal case" distinguishes the Fifth
Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause from its Clause limiting grand jury indictments to "capital,
or otherwise infamous crime[s]," provides an explanation for the text of the privilege. Indeed,
there is no known clear common-law precedent or practice, contemporaneous with the framing,
for looking to the possibility offoreign prosecution as a premise for claiming the privilege.
In the precursors of this case, the Court concluded that prosecution in a state jurisdiction not
bound by the Self-Incrimination Clause is beyond the purview of the privilege. The Court's
precedent turned away from this proposition once, in Malloy v. Hogan, where it applied the
Fourteenth Amendment due process incorporation to the Self-Incrimination Clause, so as to
bind the States as well as the National Government by its terms. It immediately said, in Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n of N. Y. Harbor that Malloy necessitated a reconsideration of Murdock's
rule. After Malloy, the Fifth Amendment limitation was no longer framed for one jurisdiction
alone, each jurisdiction having instead become subject to the same privilege claim flowing from
the same source. Since fear of prosecution in the one jurisdiction now implicated the very
privilege binding upon the other, the Murphy opinion sensibly recognized that if a witness could
not assert the privilege in such circumstances, the witness could be "whipsawed" into
incriminating himself under both state and federal law, even though the privilege was applicable
to each. Such whipsawing is possible because the privilege against self-incrimination can be
exchanged by the government for an immunity to prosecutorial use of any compelled inculpatory
testimony. Such an exchange by the government is permissible only when it provides immunity
as broad as the privilege. After Malloy had held the privilege binding on the state jurisdictions as
well as the National Government, it would have been intolerable to allow a prosecutor in one or
the other jurisdiction to eliminate the privilege by offering immunity less complete than the
privilege's dual jurisdictional reach. To the extent that the Murphy Court undercut Murdock's
rationale on historical grounds, its reasoning that English cases supported a more expansive
reading of the Clause is flawed and cannot be accepted now.

Murphy discusses a catalog of "Policies of the Privilege," which could suggest a concern broad
enough to encompass foreign prosecutions. However, the adoption of such a revised theory
would rest on Murphy's treatment of English cases, which has been rejected as an indication of
the Clause's meaning. Moreover, although Murphy catalogs aspirations furthered by the Clause,
its discussion does not weigh the host of competing policy concerns that would be raised in a
legitimate reconsideration of the Clause's scope. Contrary to Balsys's contention, general
personal testimonial integrity or privacy is not a reliable guide to the Clause's scope of
protection. Fifth Amendment tradition offers, in practice, a conditional protection of testimonial
privacy. Since the judiciary could not recognize fear of foreign prosecution and at the same time
preserve the Government's existing rights to seek testimony in exchange for immunity (because
domestic courts could not enforce the immunity abroad), extending the privilege would change
the balance of private and governmental interests that has been accepted for as long as there
has been Fifth Amendment doctrine. Balsys also argues that Murphy's policy catalog supports
application of the privilege in order to prevent the Government from overreaching to facilitate
foreign criminal prosecutions in a spirit of "cooperative internationalism." Murphy recognized
"cooperative federalism"-the teamwork of state and national officials to fight interstate crime-but
only to underscore the significance of the Court's holding that a federal court could no longer
ignore fear of state prosecution when ruling on a privilege claim. Since in this case there is no
counterpart to Malloy, imposing the Fifth Amendment beyond the National Government, there is
no premise in Murphy for appealing to "cooperative internationalism" by analogy to "cooperative
federalism." The analogy must, instead, be to the pre-Murphy era when the States were not
bound by the privilege. Even if "cooperative federalism" and "cooperative internationalism" did
support expanding the privilege's scope, Balsys has not shown that the likely costs and benefits
justify such expansion. Cooperative conduct between the United States and foreign nations may
one day develop to a point at which fear of foreign prosecution could be recognized under the
Clause as traditionally understood, but Balsys has presented no interest rising to such a level of
cooperative prosecution.

DISPOSITIVE: Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

R. Cruel and Inhumane Punishment

Murao
Topic: Cruel and Inhuman Punishment

330. Corpuz v. People (2014)

DOCTRINE: Despite the apparent injustice brought by the range of penalties for crimes against
property and the Constitutional prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment, courts are
resigned to the duty to implement and apply the law. Under Par. 2 of Art. 5 of the RPC, courts
can only submit a statement to the President through the DOJ, of the reasons that induce the
court to believe that the punishment should be made subject of penal legislation.

FACTS:
In 1991, Lito Corpuz met with Danilo Tangcoy who was in the money lending business with
casino patrons. Tangcoy allowed Corpuz to sell a ring, two bracelets, and a necklace amounting
to Php 98,000 on a commission basis evidenced by a receipt signed by Corpuz. The parties
agreed that Corpuz would remit the proceeds of the sale to Tangcoy or return the same if left
unsold within 60 days. The problem ensued when Corpuz never remitted the proceeds of the
sale to Tangcoy or returned the unsold jewelry.

For his part, Corpuz reasoned that he never dealt with Tangcoy but they were mere collecting
agents for one Antonio Balajadia. According to Corpuz, he had acquired a loan from their boss
through a blank document he signed and it was that document that Tangcoy turned to the
receipt. Corpuz also posited that he did not even come into contact with the jewelry.

The RTC and CA convicted Corpuz of Estafa and sentenced him for imprisonment for a
minimum of 4 years and 2 months to 14 years and 8 months as a maximum.

ISSUE/S: W/N the CA erred in its decision?

RULING: NO. Factual Findings of the appellate court are generally conclusive and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. Here, The prosecution sufficiently proved all elements of
estafa with abuse of confidence such:
(a) Money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, on commission,
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return the
same;
(b) Misappropriation or conversion of money or property by the offender or denial of such
receipt;
(c) Misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
(d) There is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

As to the penalty, the SC’s Third Division deliberated on the question of the continued validity of
penalties imposed on persons convicted of crimes involving property, which the legislature
pegged to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted RPC. Since the
members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first
impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc where several amici curiae were
invited to give their academic opinions.

Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set
by law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days- 8 years of prision mayor would be increased by 7 years.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED.

S. Double Jeopardy

Olivo
Topic: Double Jeopardy
331. People v. Velasco (2000)

DOCTRINE: The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are as follows: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. It bears repeating that
where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the
trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-
acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and
cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy,
whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
A shooting incident took place which claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and seriously injured his
brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also
shot. As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations—one (1) for homicide and two (2) for
frustrated homicide—were originally filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato
Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged
bodyguard of the mayor.

However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading
the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with
violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth
Information had to be filed.

The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of
the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of
illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government
before the Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused
Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the
judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if
judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should
be rectified by a reexamination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review
of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged
that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with
a verdict of guilt.

The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal culpability of
private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial court should not be
considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy, for it is
now settled constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits
a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is
required should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have
been sourced from Ameri-can constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly
the case of Kepner v. United States, and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not
follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to
take the same directional course.

ISSUE: Whether elevating the issue of criminal culpability of Galvez, despite acquittal by the
trial court, should be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy.

RULING: Yes. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of
mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.

The doctrine that “double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial” may apply only when the
Court finds that the “criminal trial was a sham” because the prosecution representing the
sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. The Court in People v.
Bocar rationalized that the “remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the
lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.” The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an
acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into “the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness
over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x
x” Thus Green expressed the concern that “(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in
at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent, he may be found guilty.”

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is “part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction.” The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts
of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for “repose,” a desire to know the exact extent of
one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to
insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be
found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial completed by
a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence
determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society’s
awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of
government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the
accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court’s appreciation and evaluation in
esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that
respondent judge considered the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of
the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory,
location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the
prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence
evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and
passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of excess
or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable
by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise
of jurisdiction.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

Ong
Double Jeopardy
People v Sandiganbayan ( 4th Division)

Doctrine:

Once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any
further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed
in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.

But in this case , a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is
void, does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal

Facts:

Villapando won the May 11, 1998 elections for Municipal mayor of San Vicente , Palawan
The relative of his wife Tiape also ran for mayor in Kitcharo, Agusan Del Norte but lost
 Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of San Vicente on July 1, 1988
( less than a year later after the elections)
 Villapando also employed the services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and
Development Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor for a period of six
months from January 1, 1999 to June 30, 1999 for a monthly salary of ₱26,953.80.
(also, less than a year later after the elections)
Feb 4 , 2000
 Maagad and Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation for Article 244,
Unlawful appointments of the RPC with the Sandiganbayan
 Tiape died on July 26, 2000
October 28, 2003

During the trial in the Sandiganbayan Villapando filed a demurrer to evidence

The demurer to evidence was granted and Villapando was acquitted
 Losing candidates are not included in the one year prohibition of appointment as
provided for in Sec. 6, Art. IX-B of the Constitution and Sec. 94 (b) of the Local
Government Code
 The qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the government is
provided by law.

 the law that provides for the legal qualification for the position of municipal administrator
is Section 480, Article X of the Local Government Code, to wit:

 "Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties.–(a) No person shall be

appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local
government unit concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree
preferably in public administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized
college or university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its equivalent. He must
 have acquired experience in management and administration work for at least five (5)
years in the case of the provincial or city administrator, and three (3) years in the case of
the municipal administrator.

The 4th division ruled that a temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack of
legal qualification.
 A person who possessed the required legal qualifications for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one year
prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not be
temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or
all of the required legal qualifications imposed by law.

Issue: Whether there was a valid acquittal

Held: No, there was not

Section 6, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Section 94 of the Local Government Code provides:

SECTION 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost in
Election. - (a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective or
appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election
shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or
any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. — Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint
to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefore, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

The 4th Division decision stated that here is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the
appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.
There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation. On the contrary, legal
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means disqualification
under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election
to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Double Jeopardy:

People v. Sandiganbayan

That once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any
further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed
in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory
construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is
the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void,
does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding
the basic rules of statutory construction resulting in its decision granting Villapando’s Demurrer
to Evidence and acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare its decision null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2004 of the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent
Alejandro A. Villapando’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful
appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, for further
proceedings.

333. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro

DOCTRINE: The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Art. 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded the Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Art. 365.

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision, Ivler was charged before the MeTC with 2 separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of Ponce’s husband and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

- Petitioner posted a bail. In the first case, he pleaded guilty and was meted out the
penalty of public censure.

- Invoking the conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in the second case
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.

- The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses.

ISSUE: W/N Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent

Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense

HELD: YES. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Art. 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded the Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Art. 365.

Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence
under Art. 365 lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.

One Case That Did Not Apply The Rule: El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona: The Court
allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same
reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. By the line
of cases that ruled otherwise, the doctrine here is deemed impliedly overruled.

Conflict with Art. 48 of RPC: The accused should not be tried for Art. 365 in relation to Art. 48.
Prosecutions under Art. 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Art. 365 for each consequence alleged and proven.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2

February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We
DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar
pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double
jeopardy.

T. Ex Post Facto
Valdez
Topic: T. Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
#334. Salvador v. Mapa, Jr. (2007)

DOCTRINE: An ex post facto law has been defined as one: (a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such
action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c)
which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in
order to convict the defendant; (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only
but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that
which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

FACTS:
 FVR issued AO 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans.
 Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc.
(PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
 After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the
Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under
Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known
cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI
was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.
 Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and
representing the PCGG, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for
violation of Secs. 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 against the respondents.
 The Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution, dismissing the complaint. The
Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of preliminary
investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint holding that the offenses charged had
already prescribed. The acts complained of were committed before the issuance of BP 195
on March 2, 1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is 10 years as provided
in Sec. 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
 The subject financial transactions between 1978-1981 transpired at the time when there was
yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or categorizing them as Behest or
Non-Behest Loans.
 The Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992
under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated
November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in
determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of
 charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws
which are proscribed by the Constitution.
 The Committee filed a MR, but the Ombudsman denied it thereafter.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the crime defined by Sec. 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 has already prescribed at
the time the petitioner filed its complaint.
2. Whether or not administrative order no. 13 and memorandum order no. 61 are ex-post facto
laws.

RULING:

1. NO. The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, thus:
It is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of
R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus,
the Committee is correct that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.

Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses,
and since discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the
Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not
yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.

2. NO. In any event, AO 13 and MO 61 are not ex post facto laws.

The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable
doubt. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one:

(a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
done criminal, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed; or
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
(e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty
or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or
(f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation
of amnesty.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws.

The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of
this definition. AO 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. MO 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest
loans. Not being penal laws, AO 13 and MO 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws.
There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is dismissed.

Baba
Topic: Bill of Attainder, Ex-post facto law
335. Valeroso vs. People 546 SCRA 450 , February 22, 2008

DOCTRINE:
 A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a
guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These are
the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.
 Implied in this ruling: imprisonment > fine
FACTS:
 On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal
Investigation Division, Central Police District Command, received a dispatch order from
the desk officer. The order directed him and three (3) other policemen to serve a warrant
of arrest issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso
in a case for kidnapping with ransom.
 After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking
his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team proceeded to the
Integrated National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Que zon City, where they saw
petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. They put him under arrest, informed him
of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a
Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 5231511 with five (5) live ammunition.
 Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended. It provides that
o “[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
 acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition.”
 RTC found him guilty. CA affirmed.
 P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the
offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6,
1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now states:
o “SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.—The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.”
ISSUE/S:
 Whether the new penalty must be applied

RULING:
YES, IT IS FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED
 A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that
favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive
effect. These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on
effectivity of laws.
 According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the offender, “but
founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
combination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on
political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.”
 Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision
correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied. The Supreme Court still found him guilty of illegal possession.
Cadiz
Topic: Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

336. Republic vs Cojuangco, Juan Ponce Enrile, Clara Lobregat, et al. (2012)
GR No. 139930
DOCTRINE: Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of the State
to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees is not barred
by prescription, laches, or estoppel. But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal
cases such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of
offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.

FACTS:

● This is a case about the recovery of ill-gotten wealth during the Marcos era and resolves
the issue of prescription. Respondents Cojuangco, Enrile, et al incorporated the United
Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM) with an authorized capital stock of P100 million divided
into one million shares with a par value of P100 per share. The incorporators subscribed
to 200,000 shares worth P20 million and paid P5 million.
● On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the Coconut
Industry Investment Fund to invest not more than P500 million from the fund in the
equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers.
● On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million
shares without par value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock stated that the
incorporators held one million shares without par value and that UCPB subscribed to 4
million shares worth P495 million.
● On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors approved another
amendment to UNICOM's capitalization. This increased its authorized capital stock
to one billion shares.

About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the OSG filed a complaint for violation of R.A. 3019
against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before PCGG. The
OSG alleged that UCPB's investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no track
record of operation. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman.

On March 15, 1999, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum, stating
that the action has already prescribed. The Ombudsman ruled that UCPB's subscription to the
shares of stock of UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was the proper point at which the
prescription of the action began to run. When the crime was committed in 1979, Section 11 of
R.A. 3019 provided for prescription of 10 years.

Petitioner maintains that right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. And, assuming that the
offense charged is subject to prescription, the same began to run only from the date it was
discovered, or after the 1986 EDA Revolution.

ISSUE/S: Whether respondents' alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already
prescribed.

RULING: Yes, it has already prescribed.

R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed in
accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326, which provides:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment

In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the
discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that the government, as aggrieved party, could
not have known that those loans existed when they were made. Both parties to such loans
supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against the government. They could only have been
discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from
office. And, prior to that date, no person would have dared question the legality or propriety of
the loans.

Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is questioned here is
not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the
simple expedient of suppressing their documentations. What is rather involved here is UCPB’s
investment in UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco,
supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld
from the curious or from those who were minded to know like banks or competing businesses.

The OSG made no allegation that respondent members of the board of directors of UCPB
connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment. The OSG makes no
allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPB's investment in UNICOM during martial
law at the President's or anyone else's instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever
been hurled at the SEC with reference to corporate transactions of whatever kind during martial
law since even that regime had a stake in keeping intact the integrity of the SEC as an
instrumentality of investments in the Philippines.

And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the UCPB
investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second element that the action could not have
been instituted during the 10-year period because of martial law does not apply to this case.
The last day for filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after
martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions for a sufficiently long
time yet it let those four years of the remaining period of prescription run its course before
bringing the proper action.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED.

Chua
Topic: Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder

337. BOCEA v. Teves (2011)

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue
targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in
proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.

High-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of RA 9335 and its IRR, and in order
to comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District
Performance Contracts (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-file
employees to sign. However, BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet
due to the Government’s own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses,
the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic factors. BOCEA claimed
that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract, while
majority did not sign.

Contending that the enactment and implementation of RA 9335 are tainted with constitutional
infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, Bureau of Customs Employees
Association (BOCEA), an association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs
(BOC), filed the present petition before the Supreme Court, arguing that ts members and other
BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required
quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure,
and at their and their respective families’ prejudice.

Respondents, through the OSG, countered that RA 9335 and its IRR did not violate the right to
due process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees, since security of tenure
is not a guarantee of perpetual employment, and that RA No. 9335 and its IRR provided a
reasonable and valid ground for dismissal, and that such separation from service may only be
made upon compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether RA 9335 is unconstitutional due to (1) undue delegation of legislative power;
(2) violation of equal protection of law; (3) violation of security of tenure; (4) violation of due
process; and (5) being a bill of attainder.

RULING: No. RA 9335 is constitutional.

(1) There was no undue delegation of legislative power, as the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by RA 9335. The limits for the fund and the
conditions under which employees may be removed for falling short of the target by at
least 7.5% were provided for under the law. The declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with
public interest, and is a sufficient standard for the delegation of power.

(2) RA 9335’s expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation

capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives
and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

(3) RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot
be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after
due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a
reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by
at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service
laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations
and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

(4) The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side. The
concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue
collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly
give due consideration to all relevant factors that may affect the level of collection. In the
same manner, exemptions were set, contravening BOCEA’s claim that its members may
 be removed for unattained target collection even due to causes which are beyond their
control. Moreover, an employee’s right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right to
appeal is not deprived of him. In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case
cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his constitutional
right to due process.

(5) R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to
inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for
the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences
thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the
concerned employee are amply protected.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied.