CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY.

PUNO

Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

No person may be imprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in a civil proceeding, either as a substitute for
satisfaction of a debt or as a means of compelling satisfaction; but a person may be imprisoned as a penalty for
a crime arising from a contractual debt and imposed in a proper criminal proceeding.

What is a "poll tax?"

A poll tax can be understood as the cedula tax or residence tax. The Constitution does not prohibit the cedula
tax but it prohibits imprisonment for non-payment of the cedula or residence tax.

A poll tax may also be understood as a tax the payment of which is made a requirement for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. The imposition of a poll tax in this sense is prohibited by Article V, Section 1, which disallows
"literacy, property, or other substantive requirement for the exercise of suffrage

1. Lozano vs. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986

Facts:

In this case petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 or the Bouncing Check Law which
punishes a person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing that at the time of issue he has no sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the said check.

Petitioner argued that the BP 22 is unconstitutional for it conflicts with the constitutional provision of Bill of Rights which
states that “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax”. Petitioners insist that, since the offense
under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank,
the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not
the act of issuing it.

Issue:

Whether or not BP 22 is not a valid exercise of the police power and transgressed the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt?

Ruling:

No, BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and it transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.

BP 22 was enacted in order to punish the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonoured upon
its presentation for payment and it is not the non-payment of an obligation. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the
legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest.

To sum it up, BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt.

Q. B.P. 22, the anti-bouncing check law, is challenged on the ground that it violates the prohibition of
imprisonment for nonpayment of contract.

The gravamen of the offense is not the non-payment of a debt but the putting into circulation of a worthless
check.

ISSUE: Constitutionality of BP 22

Argument: BP 22 penalizes the failure of the person to satisfy his debt.

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

The SC disagreed. BP 22 penalizes the issuance of worthless check, not the failure to pay the debt or obligation.
Because it should be avoided. (General welfare discussion)

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Jeopardy
- To put someone imperil or endanger.

Right against Double Jeopardy

- When a person is charged with an offense and that case is terminated by acquittal or conviction or any
manner terminated without the express consent of the accused, then, that person cannot be charged for
the same or identical offense.

What are the requisites for a valid defense of double jeopardy?*

Under present law, to raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, three requisites must be shown:
1. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
2. the first jeopardy must have terminated;
3. the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

*These three requisites provide a convenient division for the discussion of the subject.

(1) When does jeopardy of punishment attach?

Jeopardy attaches:
1. Upon a good indictment,
- Meaning the complaint and information is valid
2. Before a competent court,
3. After arraignment,
4. After plea.
(People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933))

(2) How is first jeopardy terminated?

1. By acquittal
- Two types:
a. Because of reasonable doubt
- The prosecution failed to overcome the burden of proof – proof beyond reasonable
doubt
b. Based on evidence, it is clear that there is no crime or he was not the author of the
crime
2. By Final Conviction
- All appellate remedies have been availed of or the accused did not appealed
3. By dismissal WITHOUT express consent of the accused
4. By “dismissal” on the merits
- Ex. Speedy trial or speedy disposition of the case
- Does not reached the promulgation of the case.

Dismissal WITH express consent of the accused:

Ex. 1. If Prosecution does not appear, the counsel for the accused can move for the dismissal of the case
because of the lack of interest of the complainant.

When is the second offense charged the same as the first offense?
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

- In order to determine whether the two charges are identical one test used is what is sometimes referred
to as:

“The same evidence test:"

- Whether the evidence needed in the one case will support a conviction in the other.

*First offense and second offense are not identical. If the same, prohibited.

Appeals and Motion for Reconsideration

- Because of the principle of double jeopardy, once a person is acquitted, any appeal or motion for
reconsideration is bar.
- any type of acquittal (Ex, insufficiency of evidence, the accused did not really commit the crime, or
the dismissal on the merits)
- You can only appeal a civil aspect of the case but the conviction cannot be questioned.
- Civil liability or damages

1. People of the Philippines vs. Ylagan, G.R. No. 38443, November 25, 1933.

FACTS:
Elisea Ylagan, appellee. was charged with the crime of physical injuries. Upon arraignment, she pleaded not
guilty; whereupon the private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal
of the case, which motion was granted by the court. Defense counsel said nothing about the dismissal.

Eleven days later, another information was filed charging her with the same offense. Upon arraignment, she
entered a plea of double jeopardy, based on Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court sustained
the plea and dismissed the case.

The government appeal from the order of dismissal contending that the previous case brought against the
appellee was dismissed with her consent, on the theory that the phrase "without the consent of the accused",
used in section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should be construed to mean "over the objection of the
accused" or "against the will of the accused"

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is in double jeopardy?

RULING:
Yes, the defendant is in double jeopardy.

Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

"A person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, for which
he has been previously brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined, when
the case is dismissed or otherwise terminated before judgment without the consent of the accused."

Hence, a defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following
conditions: (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has
been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or information.

In this case, Ylagan in a criminal prosecution is already placed on trial in (1) the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, (2) upon a valid complaint filed in the justice of the peace court of Batangas, (3) she was already
arraigned, and (4) she pleaded not guilty to the information.

Hence, when another information is filed against her in the same justice of the peace, charging the same
defendant with the same offense of serious physical injuries, she is in double jeopardy.

In the contention of the Government, the Court held that The phrase "without the consent of the accused" used
in section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against
the will of the accused". The sound rule is, that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the
dismissal of the case does not constitute a consent within the meaning of said section. The right not to be put in
jeopardy a second time for the same offense is as important as the other constitutional rights of the accused in
a criminal case. Its waiver can not, and should not, be predicated on mere silence.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

2. Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93475, June 5, 1991.

FACTS:
Petitioner herein were driving a owner type-jeep and allegedly hit and bumped Ernesto Reyes and two others
which resulted to physical injuries and incapacitated the victims to perform their customary labor. Moreover, the
petitioner abandoned his victim and failed to help or render assistance to them without justifiable reason. Thus,
a criminal complaint of Reckless Imprudence under Art. 365 and Abandonment of one's victim under par. 2 Art.
275 was filed against him. He was convicted for the crime of Abandonment of one's victim prior to the arraignment
of criminal complaint of Reckless Imprudence under Art. 365. The conviction was then appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the latter affirmed the decision of the lower court. Thus, this petition before the supreme court.

He primarily contends that since he is already facing criminal complaint for reckless imprudence, which offense
carries a heavier penalty, he could no longer be charged for Abandonment of one's victim.

ISSUE: WON the filing of criminal complaint for reckless imprudence and abandonment of one’s victim violates
the right against double jeopardy.

RULING:
No. Filing a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence and Abandonment of One’s Victim does not violate the
petitioner’s right against double jeopardy. The Court held that the protection against double jeopardy is only for
the same offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar
prosecution under the other.

The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The Crime of Reckless Imprudence
falls under Criminal Negligence of Title Fourteen while the crime of Abandonment falls under Chapter Two Crime
Against Security of Title Nine. The former is committed by means of culpa while the latter is by means of dolo.

The court furthered that Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.

Thus, the filing a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence and Abandonment of One’s Victim does not violate
the petitioner’s right against double jeopardy.

One act can produce 2 or more criminal liabilities.

In this case, aside from reckless imprudence, there is abandonment. Both are penalized by RPC.

Ex. Estafa v BP 22 is not the same. Different elements

A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a
dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other

3. People of the Philippines vs. Relova, G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987.

FACTS:
Petitioner, City of Batangas as represented by People of the Philippines, herein filed a complaint against the
respondent Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974 for the unauthorized installations
of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant.
Due to the illegal installation, a cost of electricity amounting to P 41,062.10 was incurred to the petitioner. The
alleged violation was discovered in February 1975 but the complaint was filed only in February 1976. Thus, the
respondent Manuel Opulencia filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground of prescription. The lower
court granted the motion and the case was dismissed.

Fourteen days later the prosecutor filed another information against the respondent for the crime of theft of
electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. The
respondent filed a motion to quash on the ground that the information filed is violative of his rights against double
jeopardy. The Court of First instance ruled in favor of the accused and dismissed the case. Thus, this petition
before the court.

ISSUE: WON the second information filed against the respondent violates his right against double jeopardy
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RULING:

Yes. The second information filed against him pertaining to theft of electric power under Art. 308 violates his right
against double jeopardy.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that If an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. If the two charges are
based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of
double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the
informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense,
even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.

The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be
regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily
included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.
Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the
first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent
harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another
are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Since, the initial
offense was dismissed on the basis of prescription, criminal liability arising therefrom shall be extinguished.

Thus, the filing of the second information filed against the respondent violates his right against double jeopardy.

When the identity of the first and second offense is the same.

The second sentence of Section 21 does not require that the second prosecution be for the same offense.
It is enough that it be for the same act. "The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show
that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence.

lt is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of
offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as
the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in
such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for
the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent
harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another
are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.

4. People of the Philippines vs. Balisican, G.R. No. L-26376, August 31. 1966.
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy.

FACTS:
On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
The information alleged: that on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos
Norte, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death.

To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by
counsel. At his counsel de officio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove
mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-
defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered
himself voluntarily to the police authorities.

On March 6, 1965, on the basis of the testimony, the court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused.
The appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. CA then found that the trial court erred in acquitting the
accused of the offense charged despite the latter's plea of guilty when arraigned.
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ISSUE:
WON the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

RULING:
NO. According to a jurisprudence, it is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double
jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however,
he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-
defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating
his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct
that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no
standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy
with respect to the appeal herein.

Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution
any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly
acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and
void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.

It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below already gave credence to the
testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial
judge, we deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of
the same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the defendant, trial with presentation
of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter, No costs.

Q: A, after having pleaded guilty, is allowed to present evidence in mitigation. The evidence he presents,
however, amounts to complete self-defense and the court acquits him. Prosecuted a second time for the same
offense, he pleads double jeopardy. Decide.

A: The defense of second jeopardy is not proper because the presentation of evidence of complete self-defense
amounted to SL withdrawal of his original plea. Audi since no new plea was entered, there was no first jeopardy.
People v. Balisican, August 31,1966.

The existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. Where the accused had first entered a plea
of guilty and subsequently he was allowed to testify in order to prove mitigating circumstances and he said that
he acted in complete self-defense, said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty, and the court
should have required him to plea anew on the charge, or at least it should have directed that a new plea of not
guilty be entered for him. This not having been done, there was no standing plea at the time the court
rendered its judgment of acquittal, and it follows that there can be no double jeopardy with respect to
the present appeal.

5. Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013.

FACTS:

The Philippines was assigned to be the host for the 12 ASEAN Leaders Summit. In preparation for this event
th

DPWH entered into contracts with FABMIK Construction Company to rehabilitate the streetlights of Mandaue-
Mactan Bridge 1 with an estimated cost of 83,950,000. On its own pocket and credit facilities, FABMIK paid first
all the expenses.

After the ASEAN summit, a letter complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention
Office, Ombudsman Visayas for the overpriced street lights. Braza, the President of FABMIK (Contractor) was
impleaded as one of the accused. A preliminary investigation was made and probable cause was found to indict
the respondents for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [RA NO. 3019] Section 3(g). It was found
that the lampposts installed were indeed highly overpriced after a comparison of costs of the materials.

Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel abroad and subsequently entered a plea of
not guilty (Conditional arraignment). Braza filed a motion for reinvestigation on the grounds that the findings of
overpricing were bereft of factual and prevailing market prices of the lampposts and OMB Visayas directed a
reinvestigation of the case. After concluding the reinvestigation, the OMB Visayas upheld the finding of probable
cause but modified the charge in the information from violation of RA NO. 3019 Section 3(g) to Section (e). Braza
filed for the dismissal of the case invoking Double Jeopardy and right to speedy trial. He asserts that double
jeopardy would still attach even if the first information charged an offense different that charged in the second
information since both charges arose from the same transaction or same set of facts.
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SANDIGANBAYAN CONTENTION: SB denied and issued a resolution stating that he would not be placed in
double jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the second information because his previous arraignment
was conditional. Even if he was regularly arraigned Double Jeopardy still won’t set in because the second
information charged an offense different from, and which did not include or was necessarily included in, the
original offense charged.

ISSUE:

W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the withdrawal of the information
in violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy?

RULING:

No. The petition lacks merit. Braza’s arraignment under the first information was conditional in nature. In
the June 6, 2008 Order of Sandiganbayan, it states the condition that in case the present Information will be
amended as a result of the pending incidents, Braza cannot invoke his right against double jeopardy and he shall
submit himself in arraignment under such Amended information. Braza accepted the conditional arraignment,
therefore estopped from assailing its conditional nature. Therefore, the relinquishment of his right to invoke
double jeopardy had been convincingly laid out.

Assuming that there was a valid and unconditional plea, Braza, still cannot plausibly rely on the principle
of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the second information because the offense charged therein is
different and not included in the offense charged under the first information. There is simply no double jeopardy
when subsequent information charges another and different offense although arising from the same at or set of
facts. Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. The essential elements of Sec 3(g) is different and not
included in Sec 3(e). For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one offense should ideally encompass or
include those of the other. What the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to the identity of elements in the
two offenses.

6. Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010.

Facts:

Ponce filed two separate offenses against Ivler for the vehicular collision happened in August 2014, namely: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property.

Ivler pleaded guilty to the first offense while he filed a motion to quash the second information invoking his right
against double jeopardy. Metc refused to quash the second information. Ivler elevated the matter to RTC but it
likewise denied. Hence, this petition

Issue:

Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under Double jeopardy has been violated

Ruling:

Yes, the second offense filed against Ivler is constitutionally impermissible under the Double jeopardy Clause

In the case of People vs Buan the court ruled that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense
of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof.

The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.

In reckless imprudence cases, there is no criminal intent but it being replaced with negligence. Double Jeopardy
is extended to Quasi-Offenses.

The SC ruled that the trial court committed an error in splitting the 2 cases.

Criminal Negligence cases cannot be splitted.

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7. Melo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-3580, March 22, 1950

Facts: Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on December
27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife
and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance
for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same
period of time. On December 29, 1949, at eight o’clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds.
Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the following day,
January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The
accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied
by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further
entertaining the amended information.

Issue: WON the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy was violated

Ruling: No. When the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the
simple reason that in such a case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy. "Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant
is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes
a new and distinct offense the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

What is the rule on "supervening facts?"

A. This is another exception to the requirements of sameness of offense. In Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950),
Chief Justice Moran said that the rule for the determination of identity of offenses "did not apply . . . when
the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in
such a case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent." Id. at 769. "[W]here after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and together with the
facts existing at the time, constitute a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." Id. at 769-70 citing 15 AM.JUR. 66. People v. Buling, L-
13315, April 27, 1960, however, added the qualification that where the exact nature of the injury could have
been discovered, but was not, because of the incompetence of the physician, the subsequent discovery
of the real extent of the injury would not be a supervening fact which could warrant the application of the
Melo doctrine.

The rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—"Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes f or which the def endant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy
if indicted for the new offense.

If the first and second offense is in existent at the time of first prosecution, then there is double jeopardy.

If the second offense is not existent at the time of first prosecution, then there is no double jeopardy.

In this case, the first prosecution is for frustrated homicide, then the victim was died. At the time the
information is filed, the victim is still alive. But since the victim died, the the information can be changed.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

8. People of the Philippines vs. Buling, G.R. No. L-13315, April 27, 1960.
DOCTRINE:
Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes
the character of the offense and together with the facts existing at the time, constitute a new and distinct
offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
FACTS:
Accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for inflicting wounds on a person which,
according to the complaint, would require medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days. Having pleaded
guilty, he served his sentence fully. Later, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused
charging him with serious physical injuries, the information alleging that the same wounds inflicted by the
accused would require medical attendance for a period from 1 1/2 months to 2 1/2 months. It appears that a
different physician examined the offended party anew, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the offended party
which had been wounded, which method of examination was not adopted by the first physician. The second
physician's certification was the basis of the second complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution and conviction of the accused for less serious physical injuries a bar to the
second prosecution for serious physical injuries.
RULING:
Yes, it is a bar.
If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second examination was made, that
fracture must have existed when the first examination was made.
Therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the
original action, which would justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.

People v. Buling, L-13315, April 27, 1960, however, added the qualification that where the exact nature of
the injury could have been discovered, but was not, because of the incompetence of the physician, the
subsequent discovery of the real extent of the injury would not be a supervening fact which could warrant
the application of the Melo doctrine.

In this case, the court said that there is a double jeopardy. The injury should have been already existent at the
first time, hence, it was not a supervening event.

9. People of the Philippines vs. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2005.
DOCTRINE:
After trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial
resulting in a denial of due process.

FACTS:
Chief Inspector Muyot was charged with Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 7659 after 489 grams of shabu was found on his house by virtue of a search warrant. Muyot
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged during the arraignment. After trial on the merits, Judge Tria-Tirona
rendered a decision acquitting Muyot on grounds of beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioner appealed, contending that Judge Tria-Tirona, in acquitting Muyot, committed grave abuse of discretion
by ignoring material facts and evidence on record which, when considered, would lead to the inevitable
conclusion of the latter's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner prays for the nullification and the setting aside
of the decision acquitting Muyot claiming that Judge Tria-Tirona abused her discretion in disregarding the
testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs.

ISSUE:
WON the government can appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused after trial on the merits without violating
the constitutional precept against double jeopardy

RULING:
NO. An acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court
level or before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. Only when
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as
represented by the prosecution, were denied due process.

There being no mistrial in the case before us, the Court found that there is no need to reexamine the evidence,
because if we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation
of the accused right against double jeopardy.

The state filed a petition for certiorari.

They asked the SC to review the evidence submitted in that case. When you are asking the SC or any appellate
court to reappreciate evidence, that is an appeal. A petition for certiorari only deals with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Anytime the appellate court is asked in criminal proceeding to review the decision of acquittal it tantamounts to
an appeal and it places the person to second jeopardy that is violative to constitutional right.

10. Lejano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011.

FACTS:
The SC reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo
Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, Lauro G. Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the
prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the
miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."

ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered.

RULING:
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double
jeopardy. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for
the crime of which he has already been absolved.

There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged
against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he
has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would
eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional
and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of
jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

Although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for
reconsideration under such exceptions. He has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting
grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed.

Just like an appeal, even the filing of a motion for reconsideration is already considered putting a person in
second jeopardy that is violative to the constitutional guarantee.

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

Q. What is an ex post facto law? A. An ex post facto law has been defined as one —
a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal,
and punishes such action; or
b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
it was committed;
d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74
(1903);
e) Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

f) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty

Does the ex post facto clause prohibit all retrospective laws?

- No. It prohibits only retrospective penal laws.

When is a law a penal law?

- A law is penal when it prescribes a criminal penalty imposable in a criminal trial. However, a law is also
a penal law if it prescribes a burden equivalent to a criminal penalty {e.g., disqualification from the practice
of a profession) even if such burden is imposed in an administrative proceeding.

Q. What is a bill of attainder?

- A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. If the punishment be less
than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties." The same case, however, also affirmed that, "Within
the meaning of the Constitution bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties."

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A BILL OF ATTAINDER

1. There must be a law;
2. the law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily ascertainable members of a group;
3. the penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial.

1. In Re Kay Villagas Kami Inc., G.R. No. 32485, Octobber 22, 1970.

FACTS:

Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., is a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation. It filed a
declaratory relief for the determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's
rights and duties.

It is assailing section 8 of R.A. NO. 6132 because it violates the due process clause, right of association,
and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.

ISSUE:

W/N the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law.

RULING:

No. The provision is not an ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is one which:.

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;

(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;

(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and

(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

The constitutional inhibitions refer only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true
that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto.
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2. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101724, July 3, 1992.

Facts:

Two letter of complaint were filed by Gelacio questioning the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still
the provincial attorney in 1976 of free patent for the lot situated in Agusan del Sur to Governor Paredes.

On August 10, 1989, information for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed in
Sandiganbayan. Paredes filed a Motion to Quash Information alleging that his constitutional right to due process
had been violated by the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.

The Sandiganbayan grants the motion on the basis of RA 3326 which provides for the computation of the
prescriptive period beginning from the day of the commission of the violation of law.

Petitioner filed a petition arguing that RA 3019 was already amended by BP 195 which increase the prescriptive
period from 10 to 15 was approved in 1982.

Issue:

Whether or not may still be prosecuted for violation of RA 3019 committed in 1976

Ruling:

No. The new 15-year prescriptive period for violations of the Anti-Graft Law pursuant to BP 195 cannot be given
retroactive effect.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by
increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment or a violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the “crime” which was
committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused.

It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11,
R.A. 8019 which was an essential element of the “crime” at the time he committed it.

Whether BP 195 can be given a retroactive application that would extend the prescriptive period for the filing of
the case.

In this case, the prescriptive period would be extended from 10 to 15 years. So if applied, he can still be applied
for the charge offense.

The SC said that to apply retroactively, it will become ex post facto law.

3. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999.

FACTS:

11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate
which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain in Quezon City by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Canson of the
PNP.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired was a
summary execution or a rub out and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the incident. This panel later
absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the incident, with a
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. However, a review board led by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Villa modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against 26 respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in 11 informations for murder before the
Sandiganbayan.

A motion for reconsideration was filed to the Ombudsman's action. After conducting a reinvestigation, the
Ombudsman filed11 amended information before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as
an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused was dropped
from the case.

All the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 2 Par. a and c of
Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with SG27 or higher, or PNP officials with
the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended information
has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

In a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
RTC, QC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has
the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with
the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by the petitioner and some of the accused.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, House Bill No. 2299 and No. 1094, as well as
Senate Bill No. 844, were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 Par. a and c of R.A. No. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides
that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof." Petitioner argues that:

xxx
"b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the
peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet
commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be
remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try
them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
xxx

ISSUE: Whether or not the R.A. 8249 may be considered an ex-post facto law.

RULING:

NO. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249.

In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one — (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than when it was committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed, (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the defendant, (e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences,
alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that which
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which
when done was lawful; (g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Ex
post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. R.A.8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive
law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and
provide for their punishment. R.A.7975, which amended P.D.1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction,
its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly
a procedural statue, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.8249 cannot be challenged
as unconstitutional.

Q: Pursuant to R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan transferred the Kuratong Baleleng case to the RTC for lack
of jurisdiction. R.A. No. 8249 amended R.A. No. 7975 in further defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Pursuant to the new Act, the Sandiganbayan took cognizance of the case. Petitioner and intervenors argue that
the statute's retroactive application to the Kuratong Baleleng case constitutes an ex post facto law for it deprives
them of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had
allegedly acquired under R.A. No. 7975. Decide.

In general, ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. No. 8249 is not a penal law, but a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. The contention that the new law diluted their right
to a two-tired appeal is incorrect because "the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can
be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. No. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law." L
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

The nature of the law being questioned is not penal law, hence, not an ex post facto law.

4. People of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972.

Facts:
Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or Anti Subversion Law by instigating, recruiting,
inciting others to rise up and take arms against the Government with the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Philippines. Respondents then moved to quash the charges and alleged that the said law is
Bill of Attainder. The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other similar "subversive organization.

Issue:
Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder?

Ruling:
No, the anti Subversion Law does not partake in a bill of attainder. under Article III, section 22 of the Constitution
states that “No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted.” The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and
thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation,
it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term “Communist Party of the Philippines' 'was issued solely for definitional
purposes. In fact, the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to “any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors.” Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists
in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that
their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive
character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force
deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the need for
prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expression and belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under
the Act.We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime or remaining a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines or of any other subversive association: we leave this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby
remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.

Is the Anti-Subversion Law or R.A. 1700 a bill of attainder?

No. No one is made to suffer under this law except after conviction in a trial by a proper court