Respondent Memorial (LLDC - 019)

TEAM CODE: LLDC - 019
IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
IN THE MATTER OF:
VEER SINGHANIA AND ANR.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...PETITIONERS
v.
THE STATE
........................................................................................................................RESPONDENT
Petition No.___/2021
ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
WRITTEN MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
-[1]-
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sl. CONTENT PG.

No. NO.
LIST of ABBREVIATIONS 3
1.
INDEX of AUTHORITIES 4
2.
STATEMENT of JURISDICTION 8
3.
STATEMENT of FACTS 9
4.
ISSUES RAISED 11
5.
SUMMARY of ARGUMENTS 12
6.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 14
7.
ISSUE 1: Whether a competent court in India has jurisdiction to try the `14
8. present case?
9. ISSUE 2: Whether trial of Veer by the Court in India, for the same charges 20
that he had already faced in Dubai would amount to double jeopardy?
10. ISSUE 3: Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable 30
under Sections 363, 366, 367, 368, 370 and 371 of the Indian Penal Code
and also under Sections 5 and 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,
1956?
11. ISSUE 4: Whether alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange 36
into Indian Currency is contrary to law in India?
12. ISSUE 5: Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable 40
under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and
Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999?
46
13. PRAYER
-[2]-
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Art. Article
Const. Constitution of India, 1950
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
FEMA The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999
F.I.R. First Information Report
EU European Union
IMC Inter-Ministerial Committee
IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860
ITPA Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956
KYC Know Your Customer
No. Number
¶ Paragraph
PMLA Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
RBI Reserve Bank of India
Rep. Report
SC Supreme Court
§ Section
UAE United Arab Emirates
v. versus
-[3]-
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE of CASES
1. Ajay Agarwal vs Union of India 1993 AIR 1637

2. AV Mohan Rao v. M Kishan Rao (2002) 6 SCC 174
3. Baiijunath v. Station House Officer, Nadakkavu and Ors. 2005 (2) KLJ 260
4. Banco De Vizcaya vs. Don Alphons De Borbon [1935] 1 K. B. 140
5. Bannu Mal v. King Emperor (1926) 2 Luck. 249
6. Bhagubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat MANU/GJ/0937/2013
7. Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 682
8. Bindo Ganesh Patil v. State of Maharashtra 2019 (2) Bom CR (Cri)
598
9. Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu v. The State of A.P. MANU/HY/0723/2018
10. Chote Lal v. State of Haryana 1979 Cr. LJ 1126
11. Fiyaz Ahmed v. State of Bihar 1990 Cr. LJ. 2241
12. Folliott v. Ogden 126 E. R. 75
13. Gabbu v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 2461
14. Gaurav Jain v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3021
15. Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
16. Girish Sarvate v. State of A.P. and Anr. 2005 CLJ 729
17. Government of Bombay v. Abdul Wahab (1945) 47 Bom LR 998
18. Govind Kesheo Powar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and ors. 1955 Cri LJ 1275
19. Hari Narayan Rai v. Union of India 2010 SCC OnLine Jhar
475
20. Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others (2006) 6 SCC 736
21. Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of 2020 SCC Online SC
India 275
22. Jitendra Panchal v. Intelligence Officer Narcotics Bureau and Anr. 2008 Cri LJ 974.
23. Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1953 AIR 131
24. Khalil-Ur-Rahman (1933) 11 Ran 213
25. Kharkan v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1965 SC 83
26. Kishan Lal V. Dharamendra Bafna & Anr. AIR 2009 SC 2932
27. Madhu Limaye v. Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 47
28. Md. Jakir Ali v. State of Assam 2007 Cr. LJ 1615
29. Mohammed Safi v. State of West Bengal AIR 1966 SC 69
-[4]-
30. Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2011(1) ACR 17 (SC)

31. Moniram Hazarika v. State of Assam (2004) 5 SCC 120
32. Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466
33. Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India (2018) 11 SCC 1
34. P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement 2019 SCC OnLine SC
1143
35. Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2018) 1 GLR 1
36. Prabodh K. Mehta v. Charuben K. Mehta 2015 (4) ALL MR 724
37. Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi (2013) 9 SCC 293
38. Punnu and Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi) 2018 (1) JCC 657
39. R P Kapur v. State of Punjab 1960 AIR 862
40. Rakhi Mishra v. State of Bihar AIR 2017 SC 4019
41. Ram Kuar v. State (1880) 2 AII 723 (727)
42. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra (1962) 64 Bom LR 780
43. Raulin v. Fischer [1911] 93 2 K.B.
44. Remla and Anr. v. S.P of Police and Ors. 1993 1 KLT 412
45. RP Kapur v. State of Punjab 1960 AIR 862
46. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill 1996 AIR 309
47. Sampat B.G. v. State of West Bengal And Ors. (2000) ILLJ 565 Cal
48. Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana (2010) 8 SCC 714
49. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Aravapally Venkanna & Anr. AIR 2009 SC 1863
50. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah & Anr. AIR 2009 SC 671
51. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gourishetty Mahesh JT 2010 (6) SC 588
52. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Vangaveeti Nagaiah AIR 2009 SC 2646
53. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604
54. State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan AIR 1989 SC 1
55. State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107
56. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotry 1957 AIR 592
57. State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh (2003) 2 SCC, 152
58. State v. Prakash 1977 Cr. LJ 863
59. State of M. P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688
60. T.W. Morgan v. Alfonso J. Devine @ Ollie Devine (1915) 237 U.S. 1153
61. Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar AIR 1958 SC 376
-[5]-
62. Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2005 SC 371
63. Union of India and others v. Susanta Kumar Mukharjee (1977) IILLJ 460 Cal.
64. United States of America v. Inkley [1989] Q.B. 255
65. United States v. Rabinowith (1915) 238 US 78
66. United States v. Vito Lanza (1922) 260 U.S. 314
67. Venkataraman v. Union of India AIR 1954 SC 375
68. Warrender v. Warrender (1834) 9 Bligh NS 89
69. Wolff v. Oxholm 05 Eng. Rep. 1177 (K. B.
1817)
70. Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183
TABLE of BOOKS
1. K.D. GAUR, TEXTBOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE, 6th ed., New Delhi:
Universal Law Publishing, Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2013
2. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6th ed., LexisNexis, 2009.
3. RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 36TH ed., 2020
4. RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 18th
ed., 2007
5. SK SARVARIA, COMMENTARY ON THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT, 2nd ed., 2017.
6. SK SARVARIA, COMMENTARY ON THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MANAGEMENT ACT, 1st ed., 2015.
7. V. N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 10th ed., EASTERN BOOK
COMPANY, 2010
TABLE of STATUTES AND RULES
1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

2. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
3. FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999
4. FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT (REALIZATION, REPATRIATION,
AND SURRENDER OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE) REGULATIONS, 2000
-[6]-
5. FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT (EXPORT AND IMPORT OF

CURRENCY) REGULATIONS, 2000
6. IMMORAL TRAFFIC (PREVENTION) ACT, 1956
7. INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, 2017
8. INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
9. PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002
10. RBI MASTER DIRECTION NO. 17/2016-17 ON IMPORT OF GOODS AND
SERVICES
11. RBI MASTER DIRECTION NO. 2008-2009/72 ON KYC NORMS/ ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING STANDARDS/ COMBATTING OF FINANCING OF
TERRORISM/ OBLIGATIONS OF BANKS UNDER PMLA, 2002
-[7]-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The counsel on behalf of the Respondent humbly submits that the Hon’ble High Court of
Punjab & Haryana does not have the pre-requisite jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash the present petitions. The same shall be further contested
through the averments set forth in the present memorandum.
Section 482 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
“Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice.”
-[8]-
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
On the 31 of December, 2018, Veer Singhania and Rohini Singh got married. On the 5 of
st th
January 2019, they left for their honeymoon to Dubai. During the flight, Veer got into a
conversation with a wealthy oil baron, Sheikh Abdul Tayyar. Sheikh Tayyar was looking to
diversify his holdings, and Veer was in search of a venture capital market. After they finished
speaking, Tayyar invited Veer and his wife to his villa. When they visited the villa, Tayyar
informed Veer that Rohini would not be able to join them, because his family had a
conventional mindset. Rohini left with the three wives. Tayyar invested 7000 bitcoins into
Veers account to start his mobile gateways payment business. When Veer decided to leave, he
asked Tayyar to call his wife, however, Sheikh Tayyar informed him that he did not have a
wife. This was substantiated by Tayyar’s three wives as well as the cab driver who had brought
Veer to his residence. When Veer went to the hotel to collect his wife’s passport, he could not
find his wife’s clothes or belongings. The only evidence that he had was a few pictures on his
mobile phone of him and his wife. Rohini’s father, Bhisham Singh flew to Dubai when her
family was unable to contact her. He lodged a complaint in a Dubai police station against Veer
and the police started investigating the matter. The Dubai police contacted the Chandigarh
police and checked whether Rohini had travelled to the UAE with the Immigration and
Customs Bureau.
PROSECUTION IN DUBAI
Veer was charged under Article 344 of the Penal Code as well as Article 2 of the Federal Law
on Combating Human Trafficking. The Prosecution contended that Veer sold his wife to
Sheikh Tayyar for 7000 bitcoins, and lured her to Dubai under the false pretence of marriage.
The Chandigarh police also claimed that this was a recurring pattern, because Veer had
allegedly sought dissolution of his previous marriage on the ground that his wife disappeared
during the honeymoon. The defence argued that Veer was very much in love with his wife,
which was substantiated by the staff of the hotel. The Court acquitted Veer and ordered an
investigation of the Sheikh, considering that he was a rich and powerful man, capable of bribing
witnesses.
-[9]-
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PROSECUTION IN INDIA
Veer travelled back to India on the 21 of December and was upon arrival was arrested and
st
taken to Chandigarh for questioning. An FIR had been filed by Swapana Singh, Rohini’s
mother under Section 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370 and 371 of the IPC and under Section 5 and
8 of the ITPA, 1956. To pay for his legal fees, Veer transferred 5000 bitcoins to Rahamat
Saeed, a currency broker, for which he received Rs. 46,00,000 in cash. Upon making the
transaction he was arrested for contravention of FEMA, 1999 as well as the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002. Rahamat Saeed’s shop was sealed and all electronic machinery
was seized. A second FIR was filed against Saeed under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 and Sections 3, 4, 7 and 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act,
1999.
-[10]-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
- ISSUE 1 –
Whether competent court in India has jurisdiction to try the present case?
- ISSUE 2 -
Whether trial of Veer by the Court in India, for the same charges that he had already faced
in Dubai would amount to double jeopardy?
- ISSUE 3 -
Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 367,
368. 369, 370 and 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Sections 5 and 8 of the
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956?
- ISSUE 4 -
Whether alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange into Indian Currency is
contrary to law in India?
- ISSUE 5 -
Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Section 4 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999?
-[11]-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court, that it does not have the pre-requisite
jurisdiction to quash the FIR(s) in the present instance. This shall be contested on five limbs;
Firstly, that powers of the High Court under section 482 of the CrPC can be used only under
‘rarest of rare ’circumstances. Secondly, that the allegations made in the FIR(s) prima facie
disclose a triable offence. Thirdly, the facts and circumstances of the case, indicate the
commission of the offence by the accused. Fourthly, there exists no legal bar against instituting
proceedings against the accused. Lastly, the continuation of legal proceedings would not
amount to an abuse of court processes but would actually facilitate in serving the ends of
justice.
ISSUE 2
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the trial of Accused No.1 by the Court in
India after being acquitted in Dubai would not amount to double jeopardy. This is argued on
four limbs. Firstly, that there persists a distinction between Autrefois Convict and Autrefois
Acquit in the context of rights guaranteed to the accused. Secondly, that double jeopardy
applies to the same offence and not to the same facts. Thirdly, that section 188 of the CrPC is
not applicable in the present case. Fourthly, that section 300 of the CrPC is not applicable in
the present case. Lastly, that an acquittal or conviction by a foreign court is not binding on
Indian courts.
ISSUE 3
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Petitioner has committed the alleged
offences under the IPC and the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. Firstly, there is sufficient
evidence to charge Veer under the corresponding provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
i.e Section 360, Section 363, Section 366, Section 367, Section 368, and Section 371.
Secondly, there is also sufficient evidence to charge Veer under the Immoral Traffic
(Prevention Act), 1956. Therefore, Veer can be charged under Section 5 and Section 8 of
ITPA.
-[12]-
ISSUE 4
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court that, the transaction of bitcoins
that took place between Veer and Sheikh Abdul Tayyar, and the exchange of bitcoins into
Indian currency by Veer through Rahamat Saeed, is contrary to certain laws in India. This has
been further contended in two limbs: Firstly, the alleged transaction of bitcoins had been
initiated in contravention of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Secondly, the
alleged transaction of bitcoins and their exchange into Indian currency are in contravention of
the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.
ISSUE 5
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court, that Veer has committed the alleged
offence that is punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. This is further contended in
two limbs: Firstly, Veer has committed the offence of money-laundering by way of the
transaction of bitcoins between Sheikh Abdul Tayyar and him as under Section 3 of PMLA.
Secondly, the transmission of the bitcoins from a foreign account to Veer’s Indian account, and
the exchange into Indian currency, is unauthorised foreign exchange punishable under FEMA.
-[13]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1: WHETHER COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS

JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE
1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court, that it does not have the pre-requisite
jurisdiction to quash the FIR(s) in the present instance. This shall be contested on five limbs;
Firstly, that powers of the High Court under section 482 of the CrPC can be used only under
‘rarest of rare ’circumstances [1.1]; Secondly, that the allegations made in the FIR(s) prima
facie disclose a triable offence [1.2]; Thirdly, the facts and circumstances of the case, indicate
the commission of the offence by the accused [1.3]; Fourthly, there exists no legal bar against
instituting proceedings against the accused [1.4]; Lastly, the continuation of legal proceedings
would not amount to an abuse of court processes but would actually facilitate in serving the
ends of justice. [1.5]
1.1. THE POWERS OF THE HIGH COURT UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CRPC
CAN BE USED ONLY UNDER ‘RAREST OF RARE’ CIRCUMSTANCES
2. In the present case the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana has to adjudicate upon two
petitions filed by Veer and Rahamat Saeed (hereinafter referred to as Accused No.1 and No.2,
respectively) pertaining to quashing of FIR(s) No. 920 and 923. Pursuant to the same, it is
humbly submitted that this Hon’ble Court does not have the prerequisite jurisdiction to try the
case at hand or issue directions pertaining to the quashing of FIR(s) under section 482 of the
CrPC1. The term ‘quashing’, in this regard, is defined to connote either ‘to abate’ or ‘to make
void’2 ; thereby the quashing of an FIR would refer to ceasing the legal machinery pertaining
to a criminal proceeding. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court, at the very outset,
that Section 482 of the CrPC, pertaining to the powers of the court, is inherently vague and has
no explicit reference to the term quashing. The provision by itself does not specifically state
that the High Court has the power to quash criminal proceedings, and also does not list out the
exact, inherent powers of the Court in this regard.
1
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974, § 482 No. 2, Acts of Parliament (India).
2
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed.).
-[14]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
3. Hence, significant reliance has to be placed on precedents in order to aid in the interpretation
of the same.3 While there has been a great deal of inconsistency in the interpretation of this
tumultuous provision under section 482, what can be affirmed is that Courts have agreed that
this power is to be used sparingly4, under exceptional circumstances5 and only in the rarest of
rare cases.6 It is humbly submitted that in the present case, an FIR cannot be quashed as the
case does not come under the ambit of ‘rarest of rare’7 and that quashing of FIR(s) at this
juncture would amount to subversion of the legal process.
4. In order to elaborate, more comprehensively, on the matter at hand, the Apex Court laid
down a set of further aspects that must be satisfied in order to determine the veracity of a prayer
for the quashing of criminal proceedings. In the case of Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of
Delhi 8, the court laid down the following prerequisites: Firstly, that the material is indubitable
and of impeccable quality; Secondly, that the aforementioned material is sufficient to dismiss
the assertions of the complaint; Thirdly, the material cannot be justifiably refuted by the
complainant by any reasonable measure; Lastly, whether proceeding to a trial would culminate
in the abuse of court process that would be counterintuitive to serving the ends of justice.
5. It is submitted that no material of an impeccable or irrefutable nature has been adduced by

the accused in this regard, which would be of such nature that the respondents would be unable
to reasonably refute it at all. Furthermore, quashing of the FIR at this juncture would in fact be
more counterintuitive to the ends of justice, as there exists reasonable probability that the
accused was involved with the disappearance of his wife, as a similar pattern of behaviour has
also been expressed by him in the past.9 The Supreme Court has affirmed10 , in addition to the
factors stated above, that an FIR can be quashed against an individual if the case belongs to
either of the three classes: (i). There is a legal bar against the continuation of the criminal
proceedings, or (ii). A prima facie case cannot be made out by even collective analysis of the
allegations that the individual is allegedly charged with, or (iii). There is no evidence to prove
or evenly remotely corroborate the allegations and charges listed in the FIR
3
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466.
4
Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, (2006) 6 SCC 736.
5
Rakhi Mishra v. State of Bihar, AIR 2017 SC 4019.
6
Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, 1996 AIR 309.
7
Girish Sarvate v. State of A.P. and Anr., AIR 2006 SC 2461.
8
Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2013) 9 SCC 293.
9
¶ 8, Moot Proposition.
10
R P Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 AIR 862.
-[15]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
6. The case of the accused in this regard does not fall under any of these classes as, there exists
no legal bar by virtue of any statute or enactment that would prevent his trial. The facts and
circumstances at hand are sufficient to show that a prima facie case does in fact exist and all
the evidence of the allegations and past history of the accused indicate that there is a possible
nexus between him and the disappearance of his spouse. Therefore, the dismissal of
proceedings and the quashing of an FIR at this stage would be inherently premature and would
disproportionately counterbalance the scales of justice.
1.2. THAT THE ALLEGATIONS MADE IN THE FIR(S) PRIMA FACIE DISCLOSE
A TRIABLE OFFENCE
7. In the present case, the Accused No.1 has been charged under Sections 363, 366, 367, 368,
369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5, 8 of the Immoral Traffic
(Prevention) Act, 1956, vide FIR No. 920.11 Accused No. 1 and No. 2 have been charged under
Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Sections 3, 4, 7 and 13 of the
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, vide FIR No. 923.12 At the time of framing of
charges, it is only pertinent to show whether or not a prima facie case can be made out on the
basis of the following; firstly, that there has been the commission of an offence and secondly,
that there is a possibility of involvement of the accused in the same.13 At this pre-trial stage the
evidence need not be gone into meticulously14, and it is immaterial whether the case is based
on direct or circumstantial evidence. 15
8. It is humbly submitted that Accused No.1 is being charged with the offences of abduction
and kidnapping of his wife, and a prima facie case is made out pursuant to the same. Accused
No. 1 and his wife visited the UAE on a trip, post which she was found missing under
suspicious circumstances. The accused was the individual who was ‘last seen’ with his spouse
just prior to her disappearance; and the fact that he had been in a previous marriage, his spouse
had also gone missing under similar circumstances further buttresses the prima facie case
against. This has been evidenced by the facts which reiterate that a criminal case was filed
against him at the previous juncture for his acts.16
11
12
13
Sampat B.G. v. State of West Bengal And Ors., (2000) ILLJ 565 Cal.
14
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gourishetty Mahesh, JT 2010 (6) SC 588.
15
State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1.
16
¶ 8, Moot Proposition
-[16]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
9. Moreover, all of the essential ingredients for the offences of kidnapping, abduction or
trafficking have been categorically satisfied, to the extent of forming a prima facie case as
against the accused. With regard to the second FIR, bitcoin is not recognized as legal tender
either by the Reserve Bank of India, and neither has it been elevated to that stature by the Apex
Court. The facts clearly indicate that the bitcoin was received by the accused right at the exact
same time and place wherein his wife allegedly went missing.17 Furthermore, it is the same
bitcoin which the accused has now maliciously laundered and tried to convert into legal tender.
Notwithstanding the same, it is humbly submitted that it is not the onus of the High Court to
embark on an enquiry into the probability or reliability of the evidence at hand18; this is matter
to be delved into by the Trial Court. The High Court must only ascertain as to whether or not
a prima facie case is made out, if yes, then it cannot quash the proceedings prematurely.
1.3. THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, INDICATE THE

COMMISSION OF THE OFFENCE ALLEGED BY THE ACCUSED
10. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the facts and circumstances of the
case at hand all directly converge at the guilt of the accused. It is reiterated that the sudden and
spontaneous marriage of the accused with the victim, her disappearance on their honeymoon
trip, the deposit of bitcoins received at the exact same moment and at the exact same place
where her disappearance transpired, and the alarming history of the accused who had
undertaken similar acts in the past all corroborate the same. Section 482 is not an instrument
that can be misused by the accused to side-step or short-circuit the prosecution and result in its
sudden death19. The existence of crystallized charges that have been levied on the accused, for
these offences, along with a direct nexus between the facts, circumstances and charges, indicate
that an investigation and trial into the matter should be ordered as per the due process of the
law.
11. Ultimately, the acceptability of the variegated materials sources of evidence to fasten
culpability on the accused persons is a matter of trial20 Charges can be framed against the
accused if the material shows the possibility of commission of a crime, as opposed to meeting
a higher threshold of showing certainty.21 The power of the High Court under section 482 of
17
¶ 3, 4 Moot Proposition.
18
Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, 1996 AIR 309.
19
State of v. Vangaveeti Nagaiah, AIR 2009 SC 2646.
20
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah & Anr, AIR 2009 SC 671.
21
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Aravapally Venkanna & Anr, AIR 2009 SC 1863.
-[17]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
the CrPC should not be exercised to stifle legitimate prosecution.22 The quashing of an FIR
must be under exceptional circumstances only23. Hence, a quashing of the FIR and a dismissal
of the criminal proceedings in its entirety would be inherently pre-mature and would be greatly
counterintuitive to the ends of justice being met.
1.4. THAT THERE EXISTS NO LEGAL BAR AGAINST INSTITUTING

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE ACCUSED
12. The High Court can exercise its powers under section 482 of CrPC to quash proceedings
only when there is an express legal bar against trying the accused in a court of law.24 It is
humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that there exists no legal bar either in a statute or
enactment which would prevent proceedings from being instituted as against the accused in the
present case.25 That Article 20(2) of the Constitution deals with the aspect of autrefois convict
and not autrefois acquit and is hence not applicable in this case. Furthermore, double jeopardy
applies to the same offence and not to the same facts.26 There have been no violations of section
188 of the CrPC and section 300 of the CrPC. The issue of double jeopardy would not arise as
the previous trial of the accused took place in Dubai, UAE; and any form of decrees, order or
acquittals by a foreign court are not ipso facto binding on the courts in India.27 Thus, in the
absence of any possibility of double jeopardy, the accused can and must be tried in India. The
quashing of criminal proceedings can be done only under exceptional circumstances28 and in
the absence of the same in the present case, the accused is liable to be subject to the established
trial procedure.
1.5. THAT THE CONTINUATION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS WOULD NOT

AMOUNT TO AN ABUSE OF COURT PROCESSES BUT WOULD ACTUALLY
FACILITATE IN SERVING THE ENDS OF JUSTICE
13. It is humbly submitted that due to the existence of a prima facie case and with all facts and
circumstances pointing towards the guilt of the accused; the continuation of the due process of
the law would actually upheld justice, which is the raison de etre of our legal system.
22
Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, MANU/HY/0723/2018.
23
R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 AIR 862.
24
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604.
25
Madhu Limaye v. Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47.
26
Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2011(1) ACR 17 (SC).
27
Prabodh K. Mehta v. Charuben K. Mehta, 2015 (4) ALL MR 724.
28
Kishan Lal v. Dharamendra Bafna & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2932.
-[18]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
Furthermore, it is submitted that the powers to quash criminal proceedings in relation to non-
compoundable offences under Section 320, CrPC must be exercised sparingly. It has been
affirmed by the Apex Court that such powers must be exercised in matters which have an
overwhelming and predominantly civil character, or for those offences arising out of
commercial transactions or family disputes. 29
14. In order to be quashed the criminal cases must have a predominant civil flavour, particularly
the offences arising from mercantile, financial, civil, commercial, partnership or transactions
of that nature wherein the wrong is inherently restricted to a few individuals in a private or
personal nature.30 The power of High Court must not be used to quash proceedings in serious
offences which could have a deleterious impact on society.31 It is submitted that offences of
kidnapping, abduction, trafficking are grave offences of a heinous nature and cannot be
quashed before the matter reaches trail.
15. The mechanical quashing of FIR(s) in the present case would be a grave error especially in
lieu of the gravity of the offences that the accused have been charged with. These are offences
against the society as a whole and is not restricted merely to the personal disputes between
individuals. In the present case, the aspect of a previous criminal case being registered against
the accused has to also be delved into, as this along with other facts and circumstances, clearly
indicates as to how quashing of criminal proceedings would be greatly counterintuitive.
29
State of M. P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688.
30
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303.
31
Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2018) 1 GLR 1.
-[19]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 2: WHETHER TRIAL OF- ISSUE – THE COURT IN INDIA, FOR

VEER 2BY
THE SAME CHARGES THAT HE ALREADY FACED IN DUBAI, WOULD
Whether charges framed by the Sessions Judge of Neerpur are maintainable?
AMOUNT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
16. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the trial of Accused No.1 by the Court
in India after being acquitted in Dubai would not amount to double jeopardy. This is argued on
five limbs. Firstly, that there persists a distinction between Autrefois Convict and Autrefois
Acquit in the context of rights guaranteed to the accused [2.1]; Secondly, that double jeopardy
applies to the same offence and not to the same facts. [2.2]; Thirdly, that section 188 of the
CrPC is not applicable in the present case. [2.3]; Fourthly, that section 300 of the CrPC is not
applicable in the present case, [2.4]; Fifthly, that an acquittal or conviction by a foreign court
is not binding on Indian courts. [2.5]
2.1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUTREFOIS CONVICT AND AUTREFOIS ACQUIT
17. The doctrine of double jeopardy can be traced to the Latin maxim 'nemo debet bis vexari'.
This maxim is literally translated to mean that a man should not be put in peril twice for the
same offence. Blackstone has even referred to this universal maxim of the common law of
England that no man ought to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same
offence. The principle has been recognized in the existing law in India and is crystallized under
various provisions as shall be illustrated below.
18. It is humbly submitted that this right not to be punished more than once for a similar offence
has existed for a significant period of time in Indian criminal jurisprudence through statutory
provisions. The guarantee against Double jeopardy could be found in Section 26 of the General
Clauses Act and Section 403 (1) of the CrPC 1898, which was later amended and now this
provision resides under Section 300 of the CrPC, 1973. It is submitted that the Courts in India
have recognized that the primary object of criminal proceedings is to ensure a fair trial of the
accused persons and it has been revered as quintessential component of justice everywhere. 32
Pursuant to the same, audi alteram partem, been considered a fundamental rule of natural
justice. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) lays down the
32
Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376.
-[20]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
provision of fair trial and in India, Article 20 of the Constitution along with section 300 of the
CrPC acts as a safeguard of the rights emerging from fair trial. 33
19. There are two maxims associated with ‘nemo debet bis vexari’. They are autrefois convict
and autrefois acquit. Article 20(2) of the Constitution covers only autrefois convict and not
autrefois acquit.34 It therefore only partially deals with the prohibition on double jeopardy. It
reads that “No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once”.
The said provision apotheosizes the principle that an individual must not be tried twice for the
same offence by an equally competent court, and the procedural defence of double jeopardy
would guarantee the same. However, it only recognizes the principle of autrefois convict.
Article 20(2) would not apply when there is no punishment for the offence during an earlier
35
prosecution. In that respect, the provision under Section 300 has a broader ambit as it also
embraces the concept of autrefois acquit. The protection against autrefois acquit, however, is a
statutory right and not a fundamental right.
20. Thus, in the present case the accused cannot claim the exercise of constitutional guarantees
under Article 20, as he was not punished under the offence that he was charged with. He will
be restricted to only his statutory rights, and over the due course of arguments it shall be
illustrated as to how the protection under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is also not
applicable.
2.2. THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY APPLIES TO THE SAME OFFENCE AND NOT TO
THE SAME FACTS
21. While the doctrine of double jeopardy protects a person from being tried and punished
twice for the same offence; it does not protect the accused from being tried for different
offences arising out of violation of different laws by the same set of facts. It is humbly
submitted that the Apex Court, has affirmed the same in its ruling in the case of Monica Bedi
v State of Andhra Pradesh. 36 In the said case, the Court affirmed that while the accused had
been tried under Article 256 of the Portuguese Penal Code, it would not vitiate her trial in India
under section 419, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. This Court opined that though the
33
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14 &15, Dec. 16, 1966, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
34
Venkataraman v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 375.
35
Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1953 AIR 131.
36
Monica Bedi v. State of A.P., 2011(1) ACR 17 (SC).
-[21]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
facts were the same, here they were categorized under two distinct offences. Hence, if the
offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable.
22. It is submitted that where the legislature provides that on the same facts, proceedings can
be instituted under two different provisions the penalties provided under those provisions are
also distinct. The obvious intention of the legislature is to treat the two provisions and
proceedings arising from the same as distinct as well. Hence, if there are two distinct and
separate offences with differing ingredients under two different enactments, a double
punishment is not barred. 37 This principle along with the test of identity has also been espoused
by the United States Supreme Court in its ruling in the Rabinowith case38 and in T.W. Morgan
v. Alfonso J. Devine39 where it ruled that if both charges relate to and grow out of one
transaction it does not make it a single offence if it is defined by two distinct statutes. In United
States v. Vito Lanza40 , pertaining to National and State Sovereignties, the U.S. Supreme Court
also affirmed that two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources are capable of
dealing with the same subject matter without interference by the other. Each government shall
have a mandate, in determining what shall be an offence against its peace and dignity, in
exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
23. The Hon’ble Apex Court of India has reiterated that emphasis must be placed not on the
facts or the mere allegations in the two complaints. This would be a rather superficial approach;
rather the focus must be on the ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a
person is charged.41 There will be a bar on a second prosecution and the consequential
punishment thereunder, only when it is 'the same offence', that is they must be identical in all
respects. If, however, the offences are distinct42, then notwithstanding that the allegations of
fact in the two complaints might be substantially similar, the double jeopardy doctrine cannot
be invoked.43 Hence, it is clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and
punishment and in such an event the protection of double jeopardy cannot always be resorted
to. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted more than once even on substantially same
facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form
the same offence.
37
State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, 1989 AIR 1.
38
United States v. Rabinowith, (1915) 238 US 78.
39
T.W. Morgan v. Alfonso J. Devine @ Ollie Devine, (1915) 237 U.S. 1153.
40
United States v. Vito Lanza, (1922) 260 U.S. 314.
41
State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, (1961) 3 SCR 107.
42
State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 152.
43
Ibid.
-[22]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
24. This was again delved into by the Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Swarup v. State of
Maharashtra where it affirmed that a charge under Section 161 of the IPC is different from the
offence of criminal misconduct punishable under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988. 44 This is even though some of the ingredients of the two offences may be common.
On a similar note, when an individual was convicted in the United States under its drug laws
and on the same set of facts tried in India under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985, it was held that the application of the principle of double jeopardy would
not be available since the offences in USA and India are inherently distinct and separate. 45
25. Hence, the same set of facts can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an
omission can simultaneously amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at the same
time constitute an offence under any other law. The test is whether the former offence and the
offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one
are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on are the same in the
46
two trials. Thus, in the present case the accused is charged with Article 344 of the Penal
Code and also Article 2 of the Federal Law on Combating Human Trafficking of the UAE and
sections 363, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5, 8 of
the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. While the offences might appear to have a certain
degree of intersectionality, they are inherently distinct as the have different ingredients,
different penal sanctions and have been passed by two sovereigns who have vastly differing
legal systems and codifications. Hence, the accused cannot seek the defence of double jeopardy
in the present case.
2.3. THAT SECTION 188 OF THE CrPC IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT
CASE
26. It is humbly submitted that section 188 of the CrPC is not applicable to the case at hand.
Section 3 and 4 of the IPC are considered to be the substantive law and Section 188 is the
47
procedural law. Section 188 of the CrPC has the following essentials, if an offence is
committed outside India by a citizen of India, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence
as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found. The proviso
44
Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682.
45
Jitendra Panchal v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Bureau and Anr., 2008 Cri. LJ 974.
46
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, (2nd ed.).
47
Remla and Anr. v. S.P of Police and Ors., 1993 1 KLT 412.
-[23]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
also states that no offence shall be inquired into or tried in India without the sanction of the
Central Government.
27. At the very outset, it is pertinent to state that the matter involving the accused in the India,
was in the pre-trial phase, that is the investigative phase. Section 188 refers to sanction for
48
inquiry and trial, not investigation. Investigation and inquiry are distinguished from each
49
other under Section 2(h) and 2(g) of the Code. It has been noted by the Apex Court that
sanction is not a condition precedent to take cognizance of the offence. If need be it could be
obtained before the trial begins.50 Hence the requirement of government approval does not
come into play when a complaint is first lodged with officers in India, but rather when the
matter goes to trial.
28. If an offence is committed by an Indian citizen outside the territory of India, the person will
be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in India. 51 Section 3 of the IPC states that any person
will be liable under the Code for offences committed outside India in a similar manner as if the
52
offence had been committed within the territory of India. Section 4 of the IPC extends the
operation of the Code beyond the boundaries of India.53 If an offence is committed by an Indian
citizen in another country, the provisions of the IPC will be applicable. “Offence” would refer
to an act or omission punishable by any law for the time being in force.54 The accused must be
guilty of some offence in the territory of India. In the case at hand the actions of the accused
would possibly fall under Sections 363, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and
also under Section 5, 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. These sections
correspond with Article 344 of the Penal Code of Dubai and also Article 2 of the Federal Law
on Combating Human Trafficking.
29. Article 344 of the Penal Code specifies that if any person kidnaps, detains, or deprives a
person of his or her freedom by whatever means and whether by himself or through an
55
intermediary will either be punished with life imprisonment or death penalty. Article 2 on
the Federal Law on Combating Human Trafficking states that whoever commits human
trafficking as specified by Article 1 of the Federal Law, will be punished with temporary
48
Ibid.
49
Supra note 1, § 2(h) and 2(g).
50
Ajay Agarwal vs Union of India, 1993 AIR 1637.
51
AV Mohan Rao v. M Kishan Rao, (2002) 6 SCC 174.
52
Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 3 No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
53
Ibid, § 4.
54
Supra note 1, § 2(n).
55
Federal Law No. 3/1987 Concerning Promulgating Penal Code, art. 344.
-[24]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
imprisonment up to 5 years and will have to pay a fine of no less than hundred dirhams. The
penalty of life imprisonment is extended to the perpetrator if he the spouse of the victim or if
the committed crime is transnational. 56
Article 1 of the Federal Law defines “human
trafficking” as “selling persons, or offering persons for sale”. Soliciting persons and
57
transferring persons using fraud and deception is included in Article 1(b). Article 1(3)
specifies that human trafficking would include all forms of human trafficking, engaging a
person in prostitution, servitude, forced labour, coerced service, quasi-slavery practices etc. 58
30. The sections that the accused was charged with in India while having certain commonalities
with the Articles of the Federal Law on Combatting Human Trafficking as well as the Penal
Code of Dubai, the do not pass the ‘test of identity’ illustrated above since the ingredients of
the same are not identical. The provisions of the IPC, as shall be illustrated hereunder, amount
to distinct offences as they have different ingredients, differing quanta of penal sanctions and
have been promulgated as legislations of two distinct sovereign States.
31. Section 360 provides the definition of kidnapping in India. Section 363 provides
punishment for kidnapping which may extend up to seven years. 59 Section 366 elaborates on
60
kidnapping a woman to force her into marriage. Section 367 states that any person who
kidnaps a woman to subject her to grievous harm, slavery or the unnatural lust of another person
61
shall be punished with imprisonment up to ten years. If a person wrongfully conceals or
keeps a kidnapped person in confinement the person shall be punished in the same way as if he
had kidnapped the person, according to Section 368. 62 Buying or selling a person as a slave is
punishable under Section 370 with imprisonment which may extend to seven years. 63 Section
371 states that any person who habitually deals with slaves will be punished with imprisonment
for life or imprisonment which may extend to ten years. 64
32. Furthermore, Section 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 states that any person
who procures or takes a person for the sake of prostitution shall be punished for seven years to
56
Federal Law No. 51 of 2006 on Combatting Human Trafficking Crimes, art. 2 Nov. 9, 2006, ARE-2006-L-
78234.
57
Ibid., art. 1(b).
58
Ibid, art. 1(3).
59
Supra note 52, § 363.
60
Ibid., § 366.
61
Ibid., § 367.
62
Ibid., § 368.
63
Ibid., § 370.
64
Ibid., § 371.
-[25]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
65
fourteen years. Section 5(3)(b) states that the offence is triable in the place that the person
was induced to go to. 66 Section 8 makes illegal seducing or soliciting a person for the purpose
of prostitution by words gestures or wilful exposure. The punishment may extend to one year.67
33. Thus, a comprehensive comparison between the two does affirm that they are in fact distinct
offences, hence the accused can be tried under them and cannot avail of the procedural defence
of double jeopardy. Furthermore, as illustrated above, the sanction of the Central Government
is required, if at all, only at the commencement of the trial, and since the case at hand is only
at the investigative pre-trial phase, this would also be inapplicable as such.
2.4. THAT SECTION 300 OF THE CRPC IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT
CASE
34. Section 300 of the CrPC is wider in ambit than Article 20(2) of the Constitution and
incorporates both the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. These pleas are taken as
a bar to criminal trial on the ground that the accused person had been once already charged and
tried for the same alleged offence and was either acquitted or convicted. The pre-requisites for
the applicability of the said provision are- firstly, the person had to be tried by a competent
Court for the same offence; secondly, he was convicted or acquitted at the trial; and thirdly,
such conviction or acquittal is in force.68
35. It is humbly submitted that for the applicability of this Section, firstly a competent court
should try the accused and record its verdict of acquittal or conviction. Furthermore, it
mandates that in order to stop the second prosecution and the consequential punishment the
offence in question and the facts must be the same as well. Section 300 of the CrPC, therefore,
does not bar trial of different offences which may result from the commission or omission of
69
the same act, it is only restricted to same offences. If the charge on the second trial,
corresponds to a different offence, then the aforementioned section is not applicable and trial
is not barred by the same.
36. Section 300 of the CrPC would be applicable only when the offences that the accused is
subsequently charged with is identical, in all respects, to the former offence. Here as well the
65
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 5 No. 104, Acts of Parliament, 1956 (India).
66
Ibid., §5(3)(b).
67
Ibid., §8.
68
Government of Bombay v. Abdul Wahab, (1945) 47 Bom LR 998; Mohammed Safi v. State of West Bengal,
AIR 1966 SC 69; Kharkan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 83.
69
State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 152.
-[26]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
same standard for determining identity is applicable where one must not compare the
allegations made in the complaints, but rather the essential ingredients of the offences in
question. Section 300 of the Code bars the trial for same offences and not different offences
which may result from the commission or omission of the same set of acts. Furthermore, section
300 does not apply to cases where there was only one trial for several offences, in which the
accused was acquitted. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotry70,
it was held that the offences under section 409 of the IPC and under section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act were distinct and separate. Hence, there could be no objection to
a trial and conviction under section 469 of the Code even if the accused had been acquitted
under section 5(2) of the Act.
37. Further, if the accused has been tried under the IPC and the Arms Act, 1959 and has been
acquitted in the latter case for want of the proper sanction, such acquittal does not bar the
prosecution under Section 302 IPC, on the same set of facts. It is submitted that the expression
‘other offence’ under Section 330 of the CrPC is interpreted to include minor offences and
findings for which a different charge from one made against the accused might have been made
under Section 221(1) for which he might have been convicted under Section 221(2) of the
71
CrPC. In the present case the charges levied on the accused are not minor or auxiliary
offences and hence do not come under the purview of the term ‘other offence’, they are in fact
distinct offences. Since the doctrine of double jeopardy protects a person from being tried and
punished twice for the same offence but not from different offences arising out of violation of
different laws by the same set of facts, the bar under section 300 of the CrPC is not applicable
and the accused can be tried again in India as per the procedure established by law.
2.5. THAT AN ACQUITTAL OR CONVICTION BY A FOREIGN COURT IS NOT

BINDING ON INDIAN COURTS
38. It is humbly submitted that a while a conviction of an Indian citizen by a foreign court for
the offence committed in that country can be taken note of by the Courts or Authorities in India,
it is not ipso facto binding on them.72 In fact, it is completely up to the discretion of the Court
to identify, based on the facts and circumstances at hand, if it wishes to be bound by such a
judgement.73 Lord Loughborough in Folliott v. Ogden74 stated that Courts are not bound even
70
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotry, 1957 AIR 592.
71
State v. Prakash, 1977 Cr. LJ 863.
72
Prabodh K. Mehta v. Charuben K. Mehta, 2014 (6) Bom C R 784.
73
Ibid.
74
Folliott v. Ogden, 126 E. R. 75.
-[27]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
to take notice of a foreign judgment in a criminal case. This was in consonance with Buller J.,
who stated that the penal laws of other foreign countries, are strictly local, and affect nothing
more than they can reach, and can be seized by virtue of their authority. The same doctrine was
also affirmed by Lord Ellen-Borough in Wolff v. Oxholm75, and by Lord Brougham in
Warrender v. Warrender76 where the lex loci aspect of criminal jurisdiction was delved into.
39. It is a general principle that the penal laws of one country do not have a binding effect on
another country and the same has been affirmed in multiple cases pursuant to the same.77 Hence
any consideration or deliberation upon a ruling by a foreign court on a criminal proceeding
must be independent and will always be on a case-by-case basis. The applicability of the same
shall only be ascertained after analysing the effects of the foreign judgement and order of
conviction or acquittal thereunder.
40. Hence it is an established principle of common-law criminal jurisprudence that, courts of

no country can be mandated to execute the penal laws and sanctions of another. The judgments
and order of conviction or acquittal by a foreign court, for the offence committed in that
country, does not have a binding value on the courts in India.78 The court of one sovereign
State would not directly or indirectly execute the decree of the court of another sovereign State.
Hence, if the court of one country is compelled to take note of decree of the court of another
country, it would amount to an indirect enforcement of decree of the foreign court.
41. Hence, to ascertain the relevance of a decree or order from a foreign court, for any criminal
proceeding, the court must dwell upon certain pre-requisites such as, firstly the nature of the
proceedings; secondly the nature of conviction or acquittal thereof; thirdly the purpose as to
why the said order was passed against the accused; fourthly the effect and consequences of
apply the foreign decree.
42. The Hon’ble Court in the case Prabodh K. Mehta v. Charuben K. Mehta referred to a
plethora of judgements and affirmed that decrees or order by foreign courts are not ipso facto
79
binding on Indian courts. It was affirmed that courts in India have the sole prerogative to
exercise their discretion in considering facts of the criminal proceeding and a variety of factors
75
Wolff v. Oxholm, (1817) 6 M.
76
Warrender v. Warrender, (1834) 9 Bligh NS 89.
77
Banco De Vizcaya v. Don Alphons De Borbon, [1935] K. B. 140; United States of America v. Inkley, 1989 1
Q. B. 255; Raulin v. Fischer, 2 Kings Bench 1911.
78
Govind Kesheo Powar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1955 Bom 236; Union of India and Ors. v.
Susanta Kumar Mukharjee, 1977 II L. L. J. 460.
79
Prabodh K. Mehta v. Charuben K. Mehta, 2014 (6) Bom C R 784.
-[28]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
involved therein, before deciding to be bound by the judgement as such. Therefore, it is humbly
submitted that the decree of acquittal passed by the court in Dubai, in favour of the accused, is
not binding ipso facto upon the Indian courts. Owing the same, the accused is liable to be tried
under the established system criminal proceedings in India, and cannot use the procedural
defence of double jeopardy to side-step the same as this would be prejudicial to the ends of
justice.
-[29]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 3: WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCES

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 363, 366, 367, 368, 370 AND 371 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE AND ALSO UNDER SECTION 5 AND 8 OF THE
IMMORAL TRAFFIC (PREVENTION) ACT, 1956?
43. It is humbly submitted that the Petitioner has committed the alleged offences under the
IPC and ITPA, 1956. Firstly, there is sufficient evidence to charge Veer under the
corresponding provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [3.1]; i.e Section 360 [3.1.1],
Section 363 [3.1.2], Section 366 [3.1.3] Section 367, [3.1.4] Section 368 [3.1.5] and Section
371 [3.1.6]. Secondly, there is also sufficient evidence to charge Veer under the Immoral
Traffic (Prevention Act), 1956. [3.2] Therefore Veer can be charged under Section 5 of ITPA
[3.2.1] and can also be charged under Section 8 of ITPA. [3.2.2]
3.1 VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCES UNDER THE IPC
44. It is submitted that there is sufficient evidence to charge Veer under Sections 363, 366,
367, 368 and 371 of the IPC.
3.1.1 VEER HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 360 OF THE

INDIAN PENAL CODE AND MUST BE PUNISHED UNDER SECTION 363
45. There are two ingredients that must be fulfilled under Section 360. Firstly, there must be
conveyance of the person beyond India. Secondly, the conveyance must be without the consent
of the person in question, or of someone who is legally authorized to consent on behalf of such
person. 80 A person must not merely be conveyed to another place but must be taken to his or
her final destination. The offence would be incomplete upon reaching the foreign country, and
would only be complete once the person reaches the final destination. 81 Additionally, a person
may be so conveyed as much by using force, as by inducing him to give consent through fraud
and deception. 82
46. Section 90 of the IPC specifies that consent is vitiated if it is obtained under fear or injury,
or under a misconception of fact. Consent is an active decision to permit the doing of the act
80
81
KD GAUR, COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (3rd ed., 2019) at 1008.
82
Supra note 52 § 90.
-[30]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
complained of and there must be knowledge of the nature and consequences of the act. 83 An
act of helplessness on the face of inevitable compulsions is not consent in law. 84 It requires
voluntary participation by the victim after assessing the significance and moral quality of the
act. 85 The first element of the offence was complete once Rohini was conveyed to the final
destination, Dubai. The second element has also been fulfilled because Rohini did not consent
to travel to Dubai for the purpose in question. She consented to go on a honeymoon with Veer
to Dubai however she was unaware that she was going to possibly be sold to Sheikh Abdul
Tayyar.86 Her consent was therefore only restricted to travelling to Dubai for her honeymoon,
and was obtained through fraud and deception.
47. Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code provides punishment for kidnapping. If a person is
kidnapped from India or from lawful guardianship, the person will be punished with
imprisonment which will extend to seven years and will also be liable to pay a fine. 87 Thus,
considering that Veer has possibly committed an offence under Section 360, he may be liable
to be punished under Section 363.

INDIAN PENAL CODE
48. Section 366 states that the kidnapping or abduction of a woman to compel her to marry or
have intercourse with another person is a cognizable offence. 88 The offence has the following
ingredients. Firstly, there must either be kidnapping or abduction. Secondly, the kidnapping or
abduction must be with the intent that the woman may be compelled to marry a person against
her will, or knowing that it will be likely that she will be forced to marry any person against
her will. The purpose of the kidnapping could be to force her into having sexual intercourse.
The person may criminally intimidate the woman, abuse authority, or induce her to go from
any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or
seduced to illicit sexual intercourse with another person. It is immaterial whether the woman
in question is married or not. 89 The word “seduced” means that the woman is induced to submit
83
Lock, (1872) LR 2 CC R 10,11.
84
Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714.
85
Md. Jakir Ali v. State of Assam, 2007 Cr. LJ 1615.
86
87
88
Ibid., § 366.
89
RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, (36th ed., 2020).
-[31]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
to sexual intercourse at any point of time. 90 The accused can only be punished once it is proven
that the offence has been committed under Section 366. 91 The actual abduction must be
accompanied with an intention to commit or facilitate any of the acts mentioned in the section.92
49. If the intent of the accused is established, the offence is deemed to have been completed,
whether or not the purpose has come to fruition or not, and whether or not the woman consented
to the marriage or illicit intercourse. 93 The first element has been fulfilled, because Rohini was
abducted. 94 There is also a reasonable basis to adduce that the second element has also been
fulfilled, because Veer could have known that it would be likely that she would be forced to
marry or illicit sexual intercourse with another person. His first wife also disappeared under
suspicious circumstances during the honeymoon, which could mean that he is a habitual
trafficker. 95

INDIAN PENAL CODE
50. According to Section 367, whoever kidnaps or abducts a person in order to subject such
person to slavery or to the unnatural lust of another person or to commit grievous hurt can be
punished with imprisonment up to ten years, and may also be liable to pay a fine. 96 There must
be an intention of the accused to commit the act during the time of the kidnapping. 97 There are
three ingredients. Firstly, that the accused kidnapped or abducted the person. The accused, Mr.
Veer, kidnapped Rohini and took her to Dubai under the false guise of a honeymoon. Secondly,
the accused must have abducted the person to subject him or her to grievous hurt, slavery or to
satisfy the unnatural lust of any person. Rohini may have been abducted to subject her to
slavery or to satisfy the unnatural lust of Sheikh Abdul. Thirdly and finally, the accused must
have known that the said person was likely to be subject to grievous hurt, slavery, or unnatural
lust. In all probability, Veer was aware of the fact, or knew that it would be likely that his life
would be subject to slavery or unnatural lust.
90
Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, (1962) 64 Bom LR 780.
91
Gabbu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 2461.
92
Chote Lal v. State of Haryana, 1979 Cr. LJ 1126.
93
Khalil-Ur-Rahman, (1933) 11 Ran 213; Moniram Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2004) 5 SCC 120.
94
95
96
Supra note 52, § 367, IPC.
97
K D GAUR, TEXTBOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE, (6TH ED., NEW DELHI: UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING,
CO. PVT. LTD., 2013) at 1032.
-[32]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

INDIAN PENAL CODE
51. According to Section 368 of the Indian Penal Code whoever knowing that any person has
been kidnapped or abducted wrongfully conceals or confines such person shall be punished in
the same manner as if he had kidnapped the person with the same intention or knowledge, or
for the same purpose as that with or for which he conceals or detains such person in
confinement.98 This section does not apply to the principal offender but to any person who
99
attempts to conceal the kidnapping or abduction. There are three ingredients that must be
fulfilled. The person in question must be kidnapped. The accused must know that the person in
question has been kidnapped. If the accused has such knowledge, he must have concealed the
100
information or confined the person. There is reason to suspect that Veer concealed the
information that his wife had been kidnapped by Abdul Tayyar. Veer entered into a transaction
with Abdul Tayyar on the flight to Dubai, and there is no certainty as to what the purpose of
the transaction was for.101 Additionally, Veer may have feigned concern about the
disappearance of his wife in order to evade suspicion from the police.

INDIAN PENAL CODE
52. Section 370 of the IPC refers to the “trafficking of persons”. Whoever for the purpose of
exploitation recruits, transports, harbours, transfers or receives a person by using threats, force
or coercion, by abduction, by practicing fraud or deception, by abuse of power or by
inducement commits the offence of ‘trafficking’. 102 “Exploitation” in Section 370 also refers
to prostitution. 103 Explanation 1 also states that exploitation includes any act of physical
exploitation or sexual exploitation, slavery, or practices similar to slavery or servitude.
Explanation 2 states that the consent of the victim is immaterial in determining whether or not
the offence has been committed. A “slave” can be defined as a person with no right or status,
who is treated as the mere property of another. 104 The trafficking in this situation possibly
occurred through fraud and deception. Had Veers wife known that she would be trafficked and
98
99
Bannu Mal, (1926) 2 Luck. 249; Fiyaz Ahmed v. State of Bihar, 1990 Cr. LJ. 2241.
100
RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, (36th ed., 2020).
101
Moot Proposition, ¶ 2
102
103
Bhagubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, MANU/GJ/0937/2013.
104
Ram Kuar v. State, (1880) 2 AII 723 (727).
-[33]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
sold to the Sheikh, she would not have travelled to Dubai. He transported her to Dubai using
fraud and deception and under the pretence that it was a “honeymoon”. He may therefore be
punished under Section 370(2) with rigorous imprisonment between 7 years to 10 years and he
may also be liable to pay a fine. 105

INDIAN PENAL CODE
53. Section 371 refers to the habitual buying and selling of slaves. Whoever imports, exports,
buys, sells, traffics or deals with slaves shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with
imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding ten years. The said person shall
also be liable to pay a fine.106 Veers wife had already disappeared during his honeymoon 6
years ago. 107 This would lead to a presumption that Veer habitually engaged in trafficking,
which would justify a charge being filed against him under Section 371.
3.2 VEER HAS NOT COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCES UNDER

IMMORAL TRAFFIC (PREVENTION) ACT, 1956
54. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Veer has committed the alleged
offences under ITPA, 1956, specifically under Section 5 and 8 of the Act.
3.2.1 VEER HAS VIOLATED SECTION 5 OF THE IMMORAL TRAFFIC
(PREVENTION) ACT, 1956
55. “Prostitution” is defined under Section 2(a) of the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act
(Hereinafter referred to as ‘ITPA’) as the ‘sexual exploitation of abuse of persons for
commercial purposes or for consideration in money or in any other kind.’ 108 Prostitution is not
confined to the offering of the body for sexual intercourse.109 After the amendment of the Act,
the term prostitution has been interpreted very widely. 110 Section 5 of ITPA pertains to the
procurement, inducement, or taking of a person for the purpose of prostitution.111 Section
5(1)(c) of the ITPA states that any person who takes or attempts to take a person or causes a
person to be taken, from one place to another with a view to his or her carrying on, or being
brought up to carry on prostitution shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term of
105
Supra note 52, § 370(2).
106
Ibid., § 371.
107
108
Supra note 62, § 2(a).
109
Gaurav Jain v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3021.
110
Baiijunath v. Station House Officer, Nadakkavu and Ors., 2005 (2) KLJ 260.
111
Bindo Ganesh Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 (2) Bom CR (Cri) 598.
-[34]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
between three to seven years. However, if the person is taken against their will, the term of
punishment may extend to fourteen years.112 They may be a fine up to Rs. 2000.Thus, if a
person is forced into prostitution, against their volition it is an offence under Section 5(1)(c)113.
56. Veer may have entered into a commercial transaction to sell his wife to the Sheikh, and it
is reasonably ascertainable that the transaction led to her sexual exploitation or abuse, thus
fulfilling the constituent elements under Section 2(a). 7000 bitcoins were transferred into his
account to start the mobile gateway payment service that he was building. 114 This may be
evidence of the commercial transaction entered into by Mr. Veer to sell his wife into
prostitution. Although Veer intended to make it seem as though his wife had been abducted, a
similar incident had occurred in the past. He had sought dissolution of his marriage on the
ground that his wife disappeared during the honeymoon. 115 Additionally, Veer had only known
Rohini for two weeks before they got married. 116 All the evidence would indicate that Veer
committed an offence under Section 5 of ITPA and brought Rohini to Dubai with the intention
of selling her into prostitution.
3.2.1 VEER HAS VIOLATED SECTION 8 OF THE IMMORAL TRAFFIC

PREVENTION ACT
57. Section 8 of ITPA refers to seducing or soliciting for prostitution. It may occur in any public
place. According to Section 8(a) the soliciting may be using words, gestures or wilful exposure
of the other person or in any other way. It is an attempt or an endeavour to attract the attention
of another person for the purpose of prostitution. The punishment will be a term which extends
to six months or a fine of Rs. 500 or both. If the offence has been committed by a man, in this
case, Mr. Veer, the term of imprisonment can be between 7 days to three months. 117 Mr. Veer
solicited to Sheikh Abdul Tayyar through the usage of words. This was an attempt to attract
his attention for the purpose of prostitution of his wife. The taxi driver claims to have no
knowledge of driving Rohini to Sheikh Abdul Tayyar’s house, however, the Sheikh may have
paid the driver and the staff of the hotel. 118 There is also a possibility that Mr. Veer was aware
of what the Sheikh was doing. Therefore, Veer has possibly violated Section 8 of ITPA.
112
Supra note 65, § 5(1)(c).
113
Punnu and Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi), 2018 (1) JCC 657.
114
Moot Proposition, ¶ 3.
115
116
117
118
-[35]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 4: WHETHER ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND ITS

EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN CURRENCY IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN INDIA?
58. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court that, the transaction of bitcoins
that took place between Veer and Sheikh Abdul Tayyar, and the exchange of bitcoins into
Indian currency by Veer through Rahamat Saaed, is contrary to certain laws in India. This has
been further contended in two limbs: Firstly, the alleged transaction of bitcoins had been
initiated in contravention of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter
referred to as “PLMA”) [4.1.]; Secondly, the alleged transaction of bitcoins and their exchange
into Indian currency are in contravention of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999
(hereinafter referred to as “FEMA”) [4.2].
4.1. THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION OF BITCOINS IS IN CONTRAVENTION OF

PMLA
59. The alleged transaction in question, took place by way of Sheikh Abdul Tayyar transferring
7000 bitcoins into Veer’s business account in India.119 It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court
that this transaction in terms of bitcoins are proceeds of crime120 derived from the offence of
human trafficking121 that Veer and Sheikh Abdul Tayyar were indulged in. These proceeds of
crime have been projected as untainted property122 by employing bitcoins. Additionally, Veer
had continued to hold these proceeds of crime, and was involved in the process and activity in
connection with these proceeds projecting the same as untainted property, it would be
considered as an offence of money-laundering under PMLA.123 Further, Veer has indirectly
attempted to indulge; knowingly assisted and, was a party to the activity connected with the
proceeds of the activities inclusive of acquiring, possessing, using and claiming the bitcoins to
be untainted property, to be utilised for his business initiatives.124 It is submitted that Veer was
aware and a party to the human trafficking activities that Sheikh Abdul Tayyar was indulged
in. The bitcoins, proceeds of these illicit activities, were acquired by way of the transaction of
7000 bitcoins upon trafficking Veer’s wife Rohini. The bitcoins were in his possession post his
119
120
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, § 2(u), No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India).
121
Schedule, Part A, ¶ 4, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section 2(u), Explanation, Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002.
122
123
Hari Narayan Rai v. Union of India, 2010 SCC OnLine Jhar 475.
124
Supra note 120.
-[36]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
return to India, and had tried to use these bitcoins as a means of paying the bail granted by
exchanging into Indian currency125, and had projected these proceeds of crimes to be a mere
business transaction to fund the development of his mobile-payment gateways.126
60. It would be pertinent to observe that bitcoins, that fall well-within the purview of Virtual
Currency, are characterised by anonymity and pseudonymous nature.127 The Reserve Bank of
India (hereinafter referred to as, “RBI”), by way of a press-release statement, has expressed
the concerns associated with trading of virtual currency.128 The Financial Stability Board
established by the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, highlighted the
concerns associated with the usage of virtual currency, to shield the illicit activity and money
laundering.129 The Financial Stability Report of RBI, had analysed the challenges that virtual
currency schemes had posed, and specifically emphasised upon the anonymous nature of the
virtual currency that associates it with the risk of money-laundering.130 Moreover, the
challenges pertaining to cryptocurrency are in terms of a high possibility of usage for illicit
activities; anonymous nature; and, their utilisation for money laundering.131 Technology has
the immense potential to permit anonymous transfer of the funds internationally, resulting in it
being tedious to detect every transaction that follows the initial purchase of the currency.132
Certain observations of the US Secret Services, pertain to the characteristics of virtual currency
inclusive of ability of moving illicit proceeds from one country to another quickly; low
volatility which results in lower exchange risk; widespread adoption in the criminal
underground and reliability.133
61. It is thereby humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that bitcoins, that fall well-within
the purview of virtual currency, is characterised by the afore-mentioned features. These
features further the potential of the offence of money-laundering, which is contrary to the
provisions of PLMA. The virtual currency has been regarded not just as goods or commodities
but also real money, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.134 Thus, Veer by acquiring and
125
126
127
MICHEAL S. SACKHEIM, NATHAN A. HOWELL, THE VIRTUAL CURRENCY REGULATION REVIEW, (2018) at,
144 – 156.
128
RBI Press Release Statement, 2013.
129
FSB Chair Letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 13 th March, 2018.
130
Financial Stability Report, Reserve Bank of India, December, 2015.
131
Annual Report, “Cryptocurrency: Evolving Challenges”, Reserve Bank of India (2017 – 2018).
132
FATF Report, Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, October 2015.
133
FATF Report, Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, October 2015.
134
Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India, 2020 SCC Online SC 275.
-[37]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
possessing these proceeds of crime, 7000 bitcoins, and projecting them as untainted property
under the pretext of a business initiative funding, has committed the offence of money
laundering.
4.2. THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION AND EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN CURRENCY

IS IN CONTRAVENTION OF FEMA
62. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the transaction of the 7000 bitcoins
by Sheikh Abdul Tayyar from Dubai, to Veer’s business account in India135, and the exchange
of these bitcoins into Indian currency through Rahmat Saaed dealing in bitcoins136, are in clear
violation of the provisions of FEMA. The Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods
and Services) Regulations, 2015, treats ‘goods’ and ‘software’ at par, and defines the latter, to
be inclusive of ‘computer programme, database, drawing, design, audio/video signals, any
information by whatever name called in or on any medium other than in or on any physical
medium’.137 In accordance with the test laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India,
bitcoins satisfy the requirements of software to be considered as a good: “capable of
abstraction, consumption, use and, capable of transmission, transfer, delivery, storage,
possession, buying and selling.”138 It is hence contended that, bitcoins could be interpreted as
software, as regulated by FEMA. Further, bitcoins could fall well-within the ambit of foreign
exchange, and foreign currency, upon them having been transacted from either the jurisdiction
of Italy or UAE, wherein, there is no express prohibition on trading through virtual currencies,
as fungible goods.
63. It would be highly pertinent to observe that this alleged transaction of bitcoins is bound to
be regulated by the Master Direction issued by the RBI to regulate the import of goods and
services.139 Since the transfer of the bitcoins were directly made into the account of Veer,
through bitcoins, without adhering to these guidelines specifically governing the non-physical
imports of software, data through internet or datacom channels, of being certified by the
Chartered Accountant that such software has been received by the importer.140 Furthermore,
the banks must also advise the importers to keep the Custom Authorities informed of the
135
136
137
Regulation 2(viii), Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2000.
138
Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2005 SC 371.
139
Master Direction 17, Import of Goods and Services, FED Master Direction No. 17/2016-17.
140
C. 7. 3. (i), Master Direction 17, Import of Goods and Services, FED Master Direction No. 17/2016-17.
-[38]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
imports that are initiated under the afore-mentioned regulation of the Master Direction.141 The
primary requirement for a valid foreign exchange and transaction is an authorised person, who
is an authorised dealer142, and RBI is empowered to authorise and revoke such authorisation,
which is granted upon an application being made to deal in foreign exchange.143 Herein, Sheikh
Abdul Tayyar and Veer were not authorised persons to deal with foreign exchange.144 Veer had
also possessed and held such foreign exchange of bitcoins in violation of FEMA.145
64. Furthermore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, upon being accorded
the nature of real money, in case of exchange of the bitcoins into Indian currency, the
repatriation146 is subject to certain rules and regulations, that govern the process. This exchange
of bitcoins is subject to such repatriation of foreign exchange being dealt with by an authorised
dealer as defined under FEMA.147 Such foreign exchange upon not being converted into Indian
currency, through an authorised dealer is subject to be surrendered148, and in this case, Rahamat
Saeed is not an authorised dealer empowered by RBI, such repatriation is in contravention of
these Regulations. Thereby, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Veer had
attempted to maliciously convert the proceeds of crime into legal tender, through Rahamat
Saaed, who assisted in doing so, despite not being an authorised dealer to do the same.
141
C. 7. 3. (ii), Master Direction 17, Import of Goods and Services, FED Master Direction No. 17/2016-17.
142
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 2(c), No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India).
143
Ibid., § 10.
144
Ibid., § 3.
145
Ibid., § 4.
146
Ibid., § 2(y).
147
Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation, Repatriation and Surrender of Foreign Exchange) Regulations,
2000, Gazette of India, pt. II, sec. 3, sub-sec. (i) (May 2000).
148
Ibid., regulation 5.
-[39]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 5: WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AND SECTION 13 OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999?
65. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court, that Veer has committed the alleged
offence that is punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. This is further contended in
two limbs: Firstly, Veer has committed the offence of money-laundering by way of the
transaction of bitcoins between Sheikh Abdul Tayyar and him as under Section 3 of PMLA
[5.1.]; Secondly, the transmission of the bitcoins from a foreign account to Veer’s Indian
account, and the exchange into Indian currency, is unauthorised foreign exchange punishable
under FEMA [5.2.].
5.1. THAT THE TRANSACTION OF BITCOINS BETWEEN VEER AND SHIEKH

ABDUL TAYYAR CONSTITUTES THE OFFENCE OF MONEY LAUNDERING
UNDER PMLA
66. Money Laundering is an offence directed against society, nation and economy; these
economic offences are offences of gravity, irrespective of the quantum of sentence. 149 It is
submitted before this Hon’ble Court, that the transaction of the bitcoins between Veer and
Sheikh Abdul Tayyar, from the latter’s account to the former’s account in India150, constitutes
the offence of money laundering, as defined under the PMLA. The offence of money-
laundering, encompasses certain requisite essentials that ought to be fulfilled, in order to
constitute the offence.151 It is contended that, Veer has indirectly attempted to indulge in the
activity that is connected with the proceeds of the crime.152 Veer has been in possession of the
proceeds of the crime and acquiring them, and has also projected it to be an untainted
property.153 The proceeds of the crime, that were knowingly acquired by Veer, were derived
from the criminal activity of human trafficking that Mr. Sheikh Abdullah was indulged in, as
this offence is a scheduled offence as under PMLA.154 155 Since, this activity connected with
149
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143.
150
151
152
Ibid.
153
Ibid , § 3(i).
154
Ibid., § 2(u).
155
Ibid., schedule, part A, ¶ 4.
-[40]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
the proceeds of the crime is a continuing activity, it continues till the time the person is in
possession of such proceeds of the crime, which in the present case was till 29th December,
2019, in his business account, a part of which was transferred to Rahamat Saaed.156
Furthermore, this offence of money-laundering committed by Veer could fall well-within the
ambit of the offence of cross-border implications.157 Since the transfer of the proceeds of the
crime in the form of bitcoins, had been transferred to Veer’s account in India, by Sheikh Abdul
Tayyar’s account in Italy, upon directly indulging the offence of human trafficking by
trafficking his wife Rohini, for an amount of 7000 bitcoins, it is submitted that Veer has
committed this offence in Dubai and transferred such proceeds of the crime to India.158
67. The modus operandi for the commission of the offence of money-laundering, takes place
in the phases of placement, layering and integration.159 160In the placement stage, the proceeds
of the crime are transformed into a convenient and less suspicious form, and are placed into
the mainstream financial system of the economy.161 It is submitted that in the present case, the
proceeds of the crime, have been transferred in the form of bitcoins, which are characterised
by the nature of anonymity162, and volatility163, in comparison to cash which would be a heavy
amount instead to conceal the criminal activity that was behind the transfer of such a hefty
amount, to Veer’s account under the pretext of funding for a business initiative.164 Technology
has the immense potential to permit anonymous transfer of the funds internationally, resulting
in it being tedious to detect every transaction that follows the initial purchase of the bitcoins,
specifically.165 Moreover, the observations of the US Secret Services, pertain to the
characteristics of virtual currency inclusive of ability of moving illicit proceeds from one
country to another quickly; low volatility which results in lower exchange risk; widespread
adoption in the criminal underground and reliability.166 In the stage of layering, the placed and
concealed proceeds are transferred electronically through various other entities, and
jurisdictions, which in this case was attempted by Veer by transferring the bitcoins to Rahamat
156
157
Supra note 120, § 2(ra).
158
Ibid.
159
JYOTI TREHAN, CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING – THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE, (2004).
160
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143.
161
DENNIS COX, HANDBOOK OF ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING, 2014.
162
Annual Report, Cryptocurrency: Evolving Challenges, Reserve Bank of India, 2017-2018.
163
Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, IMF Staff Discussion Note, Dong He et al., 7, 16, 17
(2016).
164
165
FATF Report, Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, 2015.
166
Ibid.
-[41]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
Saeed for exchange of a part of it into Indian currency, by disguising this money trail to be for
the purpose of payment of legal defence.167 The phase of integration, is where the layered funds
are integrated into the financial system by way of investing into and as legitimate commercial
and financial instruments.168 Factually, the bitcoins that were transacted and initiated by Sheikh
Abdul Tayyar, had been layered and integrated in his accounts in Italy and Dubai.169 Thus, the
legitimate source of the transaction of these bitcoins is unknown, and concealed. Thereby, by
attempting to pay the legal defence by exchanging a part of the bitcoins in his business account
into Indian currency, Veer had attempted to legitimise the proceeds of the crime. Furthermore,
upon observing the chain of events preceding this, it could be inferred that Veer clearly had the
intention of investing these proceeds of the crimes into developing a payment gateway
application in furtherance of his business initiatives or into the venture capital market that he
was constantly in search of as a serial entrepreneur.170 Businesses which deal with venture
capital also run at a risk of higher money laundering. 171
68. Thereby, the Counsel on behalf of the Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble
Court that Veer, had the knowledge of the illicit human trafficking that Sheikh Abdul Tayyar
was involved in, since their initial interactions, and assisted him in trafficking his wife, Rohini,
for which he received 7000 bitcoins, which is conclusively considered as proceeds of the
scheduled crime172 under PMLA. Furthermore, the presumption173 raised against the accused,
which in the present case is Veer, must be rebutted by him, and proved that the property in
question is not “proceeds of crime”.174 The State is entitled to deprive any person of the
property that is not legally approved, and such deprivation would be justified, to prohibit the
person from enjoying such ill-gotten wealth.175 Thereby, the police officials and the officers in
charge of the economic crimes were right in the raids and arrests176 that were conducted, since
they had a reason to believe177 that the offence could have been conducted, by way of the
alleged transaction of bitcoins, following which Veer’s wife had been trafficked and gone
167
168
JYOTI TREHAN, CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING – THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE, (2004).
169
170
171
Jay Jhaveri, AML/KYC issues in M&A and VC/PEI, Operational Risk Forum, https://www.world-
check.com/media/d/content_pressarticle_reference/OperationalRiskV1N12006.pdf
172
K. Sowbhagya v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 282.
173
174
Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1.
175
Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3 SCC 183.
176
177
-[42]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
missing. Thereby, it is submitted before this Hon’ble Court, that it would be rightful and in the
interests of justice to render the punishment as prescribed under Section 4 of PMLA for the
commission of the offence of money-laundering.
5.2. THAT THE TRANSACTION AND EXCHANGE OF BITCOINS INTO INDIAN

CURRENCY IS IN VIOLATION OF FEMA
69. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the transaction of bitcoins from
Sheikh Abdul Tayyar’s account, to Veer’s business account in India, is a cross-border transfer,
inclusive of import of “software”, in the form of bitcoins. Additionally, the further exchange
of these bitcoins into Indian currency, is violative of the provisions of FEMA. The prime
requisite of any transaction involving foreign exchange is an “authorised person”, who is vested
with the authority to deal in foreign exchange or foreign securities.178 It is submitted that as
under Section 10 of FEMA, neither Sheikh Abdul Tayyar nor Veer fall within the purview of
an authorised person to have dealt with the transaction of bitcoins, to Veer’s business account
in India. The Reserve Bank of India, is empowered to authorise a person to indulge in such
foreign exchange transactions179, and this alleged transaction clearly does not fall within the
ambit of such authorisation. Thereby, the validity of such transaction of bitcoins under FEMA
could be questioned.
70. Foreign Exchange brings within the scope of its definition under FEMA, “deposits, credits
and balances payable in any foreign currency”.180 While the source of the transaction of the
bitcoins remains ambiguous, drawing from the factual matrix, it would be pertinent to observe
that the transaction of the bitcoins were initiated by Sheikh Abdul Tayyar either from his
account in Italy (Venice) or from UAE.181 It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the
transaction of bitcoins in either of the afore-mentioned jurisdiction is defined and regulated,
even in the absence of a statutory law governing cryptocurrency. In Italy, the definition of
“virtual currencies” is wide, and as follows: “a digital representation of value, which has not
been issued or backed by a central bank or a public authority and which is not necessarily
pegged to a legal tender, but which is used as a means of exchange for the purchase of goods
and services or for investment purposes, and may be transferred, stored or negotiated
178
Supra note 142, § 2(c).
179
Ibid., § 10.
180
Ibid., § 2(n)(i).
181
-[43]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
electronically”.182 The Court of Florence had characterised cryptocurrencies held in e-wallet

as “fungible goods”.183 Whilst, in the UAE, Bitcoin is brought within the purview of virtual
asset, that could function as a medium of exchange, without the designation of legal tender.184
Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had clarified that virtual currencies could be
regarded as real money beyond goods and commodities.185 Upon extensively analysing the
status of virtual currencies and bitcoins in these jurisdictions, it is humbly contended before
this Hon’ble Court that the exchange of these bitcoins would be covered under the definition
of foreign exchange as foreign currency, and ought to be regulated under the provisions of
FEMA. Furthermore, the definition of currency186, has been extended to be inclusive of any
instrument that can be used to create financial liability.187 In the present case, bitcoins could be
considered to have been used to create financial liability, under the pretext of them being an
investment for Veer’s business initiative. Thus, this falls well-within the scope of regulation of
FEMA.
71. Additionally, and most importantly, drawing relevance to the nature of bitcoins, that is
transferred electronically188 and virtually, bitcoins could also fall well-within the ambit of
‘software’ that could be regulated by the FEMA Regulations. This phrase, “software has been
defined to be inclusive of “computer program, database, drawing, design, audio/video signals,
any information by whatever name called in or on any medium other than in or on any physical
medium”.189 The Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations,
2000, draw an equivalence of goods to software, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
observed the same, on another instance.190 Thereby, the import of this software into an Indian
business account is subject to the Master Direction of Reserve Bank of India on Import of
Goods and Services, that have not been adhered to in the present case at hand.
72. There is an express prohibition on individuals from dealing in foreign exchange and
receiving any payment by any person resident outside India, from an unauthorised person.191
Furthermore, in the present case, the transfer of bitcoins into Veer’s account was a form of
182
Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, European Union, 2017.
183
Court of Florence, Ruling no. 18 of 2019.
184
Financial Services Regulatory Authority, Guidance – Regulation of Virtual Asset Activities in ADGM.
185
Supra note 134.
186
Supra note 142, § 2(h).
187
Definition of Currency, Notification No. FEMA 15 /2000/RB (India).
188
New Payment Products and Services Guidance, Financial Action Task Force, 2013.
189
Regulation 2(viii), Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations, 2000.
190
Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 (33) PTC 652 (SC).
191
Supra note 142, § 3, Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.
-[44]-
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
lending under the pretext of funding for business initiatives. This ‘lending’ is prohibited, and
ought to be engaged in by an authorised dealer under Section 10(1) of FEMA.192 Thus, Sheikh
Abdullah was not an authorised dealer to have transferred the bitcoins to Veer’s account in
India, and this foreign exchange is invalid as under Section 3 of FEMA. Further, Veer is also
expressly prohibited under FEMA, from acquiring, holding and possessing this foreign
exchange of bitcoins that were situated outside India193 prior to such transaction. The import
of foreign currency, without the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India is
prohibited.194 The import of foreign exchange into India in any form other than currency notes,
bank notes and travellers’ cheques are subject to the condition that on the arrival of the person,
would make a declaration to the Custom Authorities in Currency Declaration Form.195 It is thus
submitted that, Veer has not duly abided by the afore-mentioned regulation, and could be
inferred as an unauthorised foreign exchange. This would attract appropriate penalty under
Section 13 of FEMA.
73. It would be pertinent to observe that Veer upon importing the bitcoins to his account in
India, has further attempted to repatriate the realised foreign exchange by contravening various
obligations under FEMA, by selling the foreign exchange in exchange for rupees,196 however
this has not been sold to an ‘authorised person’.197 It is submitted that Rahamat Saeed could
not be considered to be an authorised person, to be dealing with the exchange of the bitcoins
into Indian currency, upon not being authorised by the Reserve Bank of India.198 This being an
essential requisite for the exchange of bitcoins into Indian currency, the exchange of bitcoins
into Indian currency by Veer through Rahamat Saeed199 is in violation of Foreign Exchange
Management (Realisation, Repatriation and surrender of Foreign Exchange) Regulations,
2000, and FEMA, and would attract the appropriate penalty under Section 13 of FEMA200.
192
Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing or Lending in Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000, Gazette of
India, pt. II, sec. 3, sub-sec. (i) (May 2000).
193
194
Regulation 5, Foreign Exchange Management (Export and Import of Currency) Regulations, 2000, Gazette
of India, pt. II, sec. 3, sub-sec. (i) (May 2000).
195
Ibid., regulation 6.
196
197
Supra note 142, § 2(y).
198
Ibid., § 10(1).
199
200
-[45]-
INTERNAL NATIONAL RANKING ROUNDS, 2020 - 2021
PRAYER
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited the Counsel for
the Respondent prays that the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana of will grant in
favour of the Respondent and be pleased to direct, declare and adjudge that:
1. The Courts in India do have jurisdiction to try the accused in the present case.
2. The trial of Veer by the Sessions Court, for the same charges that he had already
faced in Dubai, would not amount to Double Jeopardy.
3. Veer has committed the alleged offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 367,
368, 370 and 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5, 8 of the Immoral
Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.
4. The alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange into Indian currency is
contrary to the law in India.
5. Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management
Act, 1999.
AND/OR
Pass any other order as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity
and good conscience.
All of which is most respectfully submitted and humbly prayed.
Place: Chandigarh COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

Sd/-
-[46]-

Respondent Memorial (LLDC - 019)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Respondent Memorial (LLDC - 019)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

TEAM CODE: LLDC - 019

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

IN THE MATTER OF:

VEER SINGHANIA AND ANR.

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

WRITTEN MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Sl. CONTENT PG.

Const. Constitution of India, 1950

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

FEMA The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999

F.I.R. First Information Report

IMC Inter-Ministerial Committee

IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860

ITPA Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956

KYC Know Your Customer

PMLA Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

RBI Reserve Bank of India

UAE United Arab Emirates

1. Ajay Agarwal vs Union of India 1993 AIR 1637

30. Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2011(1) ACR 17 (SC)

TABLE of STATUTES AND RULES

1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

5. FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT (EXPORT AND IMPORT OF

Section 482 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

ISSUE 1: WHETHER COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS

5. It is submitted that no material of an impeccable or irrefutable nature has been adduced by

1.3. THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, INDICATE THE

1.4. THAT THERE EXISTS NO LEGAL BAR AGAINST INSTITUTING

1.5. THAT THE CONTINUATION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS WOULD NOT

ISSUE 2: WHETHER TRIAL OF- ISSUE – THE COURT IN INDIA, FOR

2.1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUTREFOIS CONVICT AND AUTREFOIS ACQUIT

2.5. THAT AN ACQUITTAL OR CONVICTION BY A FOREIGN COURT IS NOT

40. Hence it is an established principle of common-law criminal jurisprudence that, courts of

ISSUE 3: WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCES

3.1.1 VEER HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 360 OF THE

3.1.2 VEER HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 366 OF THE

3.1.3 VEER HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 367 OF THE

3.1.4 VEER HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 368 OF THE

3.1.5 VEER HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 370 OF THE

3.1.6 VEER HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 371 OF THE

3.2 VEER HAS NOT COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCES UNDER

3.2.1 VEER HAS VIOLATED SECTION 8 OF THE IMMORAL TRAFFIC

ISSUE 4: WHETHER ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND ITS

4.1. THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION OF BITCOINS IS IN CONTRAVENTION OF

4.2. THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION AND EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN CURRENCY

ISSUE 5: WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

5.1. THAT THE TRANSACTION OF BITCOINS BETWEEN VEER AND SHIEKH

5.2. THAT THE TRANSACTION AND EXCHANGE OF BITCOINS INTO INDIAN

electronically”.182 The Court of Florence had characterised cryptocurrencies held in e-wallet

All of which is most respectfully submitted and humbly prayed.

Place: Chandigarh COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

You might also like