5TH HPNLU INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022

5TH HPNLU INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022
TC-68
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MELUHA
W.P. (CIVIL) NO. ____\ 2022
IN THE MATTER OF
Rohan & Ors. Petitioner 1

v.
Government of Meluha Respondent
The Phantom & Anr. Petitioner 2

v.
Government of Meluha Respondent
U/Art. 32 of The Constitution of Meluha, 1950
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1
TABLE OF CONTETS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………………….2

INDEX OF AUTHORITY …………………………………………………………………...3
CASES ………………………………………………………………...…………………..3
STATUTES ………………………………………………………………............................4
BOOKS………………………………………………………………...…………………...5
ONLINE DATABASE ………………………………………………………………..........6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ……………………………………………………….7
STATEMENT OF FACTS ……………………………………………………………….....8
ISSUES RAISED ………………………………………………………………....................10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS …………………………………………………………11
ISSUE 1
ISSUE 2
ISSUE 3
ISSUE 4
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ………………………………………………………………13
CONTENTION 1: Jurisdiction: Does the Supreme Court of Meluha have the jurisdiction to
hear and decide the matter?…………………………………………………………………13
1. No requirement for exhaustion of local remedies
2. Matter of Public interest
CONTENTION 2: Constitutionality of Section 124A of Meluha Penal Code (MPC): Whether
Section 124A of MPC infringes the fundamental rights under Article 19 and Article 21 of the
Constitution of Meluha.……...………………………...........………………………………14
1. Definitional Ambiguity and Archaic Nature
2. Misuse of the law
3. Redundancy of the law
4. Violation of fundamental rights enshrined under Art.19 and 21 of the Constitution of
Meluha
5. International References

2
CONTENTION 3: Does criticism of the government amount to an act of sedition as per
Section 124A of Meluha Penal Code (MPC)? ………………………………………………20
1. Whether or not the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of Sedition under
Section 124a of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are fulfilled
CONTENTION 4: Was the banning of newspapers a constitutionally valid act of the
Government of Meluha? ……………………………………………………………………24
1. The freedom of press is a fundamental right incorporated under the scheme of
Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of Meluha.
2. Printing and publication of facts is an essential figure of Freedom of press and the
same shall be protected with utmost progressivism.
3. The government by banning two national newspapers has violated the general
public’s Right to know and acquire information.
PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………………30

1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
S.no. Abbreviation Full Form

1. AIR All India Reporter
2. Anr. Another
3. Cr.P.C. Criminal Procedure Code
4. Edn. Edition
5. Hon'ble Honourable
6. No. Number
7. Ors Others
8. Sec. Section
9. SC Supreme Court
10. SCC Supreme Court Cases
11. ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights
12. ¶ Paragraph
13. i.e That is
14. Ltd. Limited
15. OUSS Oriental University of Social Studies
16. Ran. Ranchi
17. S. Section
18. SC Supreme Court
19. SCC Supreme Court Cases
20. SCR Supreme Court Report
21. u/s Under Section
22. V. Versus
23. & And

2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES REFERRED
1 Prem Chand Garg v. Excise AIR 1963 SC 996

Commissioner
2 Daryao v. The State of Uttar AIR 1961 SC 1457.
Pradesh
3 Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. AIR 1970 SC 898
Munshi
4 Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar AIR 1963 SC 1295
Pradesh
5 Romesh Thappar v. The State AIR 1950 SC 124
of Madras
6 Union of India v. Paul AIR 2003 SC 4622
Manickam
7 Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State AIR 1987 SC 1159
of Gujarat
8 P. N. Kumar v. Municipal (1987) 4 SCC 609.
Corporation of Delhi
9 State of Uttar Pradesh v. AIR 1958 SC 86.
Mohammad Nooh
10 Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam 2010 (1) SCC (Cri.) 721.
Pasha
11 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of AIR 1962 SC 955.
Bihar
12 State of Madras v. V. G. Row 952 AIR 196.
13 Indirect Tax Practitioners (2010) 8 SCC 281.

Assn. v. R. K. Jain
14 he Secretary, Ministry Of (1995) 2 SCC 161.
Information and Broadcasting

3
v. Cricket Association Of
Bengal
15 Bennett Coleman & Co. v. (1972) SCC 788.
Union of India
16 Nazir Khan & Ors. v. State of AIR 2003 SC 4427.
Delhi
17 Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan AIR 1947 PC 82.
Bhalerao
18 S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal & 17 2010 5 SCC 600.
Anr.
19 Abrams v. United States 18 250 US 616 (1919)
20 Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. 962 3 S.C.R. 842 at 866.
Union of India
21 Shreya Singhal v. Union of Writ Petition (Criminal)
India No.167 Of 2012.
22 Brij Bhushan vs State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
23 Union of India v/s Association (2002) 5 SCR 294.

for Democratic Reforms
24 Indian Express Newspapers 1986 AIR 515.
v/s Union of India
25 Re Daily Zemmedar AIR 1947 Lah 340.
26 Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129.
27 Sharma v. Srikrishna AIR 1959 SC 395.
28 Bennett Coleman v. State of (1975) Cr LJ 211

Jammu and Kashmir
29 Vinod Dua v. Union of India & (2005) 6 SCC 1 (2014) 2 SCC 1.
Ors
30 Sanskar Marathe v. The State Cri.PIL 3-2015
of Maharashtra
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (ACT NO.37 of 1969)

Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (Act No. 6 of 1978)

4
National Security Act (Act No. 6 of 1978).

Indian Penal Code, 1860
Constitution of India, 1950
BOOKS
S. No. NAME
1. Code of Criminal Procedure (in 2 Vols.), B.B.Mitra, revised by Justice S.R.Roy
2. Indian Penal Code – RatanLal and DheerajLal Volume 1
3. Indian Penal Code – Ratanlal And DheerajLal Volume 2
4. Ram Jethmalani – On Indian Penal Code Volume 1 and 2
5. The Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC), Ratanlal&Dhirajlal, with a Foreword
Justice M.N.Venkatachaliah
6. The Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC), 21th edition, 2014
7. Commentary On Constitutional Law, Durga Das Basu, Volume 2, 2008, 8th
Edtion
8. Commentary On Constitutional Law, Durga Das Basu, Volume 3, 2007 Edition
9. Shorter Constitution of India, Durga Das Basu, Volume 1, 2010, 14th Edition
10. Human Rights in Constitutional Law, Durga Das Basu, 2008, 3rd Edition
11. Universal’s Criminal Manual, 2014
12. Commentary on the Constitution of India, Durga Das Basu, 1989

5
13. Introduction to the Constitution of India, Durga Das Basu, 2002 Edition
ONLINE DATABASE
1. Manupatra www.manupatra.com
2. SCC Online www.scconline.in
3. Indian Kanoon www.indiakanoon
4. JSTOR www.jstor.org
5. Indian Kanoon www.indiakanoon

6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE APPELLANTS APPROACH THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MELUHA

UNDER THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MELUHA, 1950.
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MELUHA, 1950-
“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2)
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution”
“The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this
Part”

7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Meluha,
the facts of the present case are summarised as follows:
THE PARTIES
The parties to the case are as follows-
P-1 Rohan Petitioner
P-2 NGO Pragati Petitioner
P-3 The Phantom Petitioner
P-4 The Voice Petitioner
R-1 State of Meluha Respondent
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

• Around the 73rd Independence Day of Meluha, its capital city was recovering
from riots between two religious groups and was under night curfew and its
ruling party PRP or People’s Respect Party was going through pressure to
restore normalcy.
• A central university located outside the capital city, Oriental University of
Social Studies aka. OUSS, decided to celebrate ‘Independence Day’ Week and
organize various competitions for the same.
• In the National Debate Competition, Rohan and Mirza who were students of
OUSS. Believing it to be the perfect opportunity to voice out their thoughts they
gathered around 1000 students among other people and took the opportunity to
give a speech in the playground of the campus where they picked up on the
matter of the atrocities being committed against a certain group of people and
blamed the present Government for the same. He also blamed them for the riots
in the capital city.
• Clips of Rohan’s speech went viral and also gained media attention. It also led
to a crowd of thousands to enter the OUSS campus.
• Mr. Rohan, Mr. Mirza and a few others also raised slogans to free Kashimpur
which is an integral Part o Meluha. This was followed by Mr. X climbing the
stage and trying to lower the Meluhan flag and raise the flag of a neighbouring

8
country, which was allegedly associated with the terrorist activities in

Kashimpur.
• Mr. X was stopped by both Mr. Rohan and Mr. Mirza before he could hoist the
neighbouring country’s flag, this event was broadcast live throughout the
country on social media platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook.
• The following day Mr. Rohan, Mr. Mirza and Mr. Sahil created memes and
drew pictures of the Cabinet and the parliament building in a degrading manner
which was widely circulated and shared on Twitter and also published in the
leading National Dailies of Meluha which also did them a risk business that day.
• In another clip Mr. Rohan was heard saying, “Time for change has arrived. We
were waiting for this day. This government needs to be kicked out. If they don’t
quit, we bring them down. War is on the horizon. There is no other way to
protect ourselves.”, which led to violence, protests and public outbursts.
CURRENT STATUS
• The President of the youth wing of PRP filed a criminal complaint under
Sections 124A, 121, 120B, 34, 153 and 505 of Penal Code of Meluha and also
under Section 2 of The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971
against Rohan, Mirza, Sahil and others in the local lower court for which they
didn’t appear when summoned.
• The Government of Meluha banned the publication of two leading national
dailies ‘The Phantom’ and ‘The Voice’ who gave wide coverage to the issue,
citing the law and order situation.
• Mr. Rohan and an NGO, Pragati, challenged the constitutionality of Section
124A of the MPC, stating it to be violative of Art. 19(1) (a) and Art. 21 of the
Constitution of Meluha before the Supreme Court of Meluha. Interim relief was
sought for a stay on arrest and quashing of the proceeding before the lower
court.
• The two leading dailies, ‘The Phantom’ and ‘The Voice’, approached the
Supreme Court under Article 32 for appropriate relief.

9
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
Jurisdiction: Does the Supreme Court of Meluha have the jurisdiction to hear and decide the
matter.
ISSUE 2
Constitutionality of Section 124A of Meluha Penal Code (MPC): Whether Section 124A of
MPC infringes the fundamental rights under Article 19 and Article 21 of the Constitution of
Meluha.
ISSUE 3
Does criticism of the government amount to an act of sedition as per Section 124A of
Meluha Penal Code (MPC)?
ISSUE 4
Was the banning of newspapers a constitutionally valid act of the Government of Meluha?

10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Jurisdiction: Does the Supreme Court of Meluha have the jurisdiction to hear and
decide the matter.
There is no infringement of fundamental right nor were such violations imminent. Also,
the instant Public Interest Litigation has been filed with a view to abuse the process in
order to protect the covert interests of the petitioners. Hence, the petitioners do not have
a locus standi, as, this petition is just a misuse of the provisions of a public interest
litigation and is merely being used as a "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest
litigation" or "politics interest litigation".
2. Constitutionality of Section 124A of Meluha Penal Code (MPC): Whether Section

124A of MPC infringes the fundamental rights under Article 19 and Article 21 of
the Constitution of Meluha.
The Fundamental rights under Art. 19 and 21 have always been of an essential nature
and of paramount importance. Hence the situation with regard to the nature of these
fundamental rights have not changed, save for the anticipation that Meluha’s
democracy has matured in the last sixty years, to the extent that this right should be
even more zealously guarded today. The Supreme Court, as the custodian and guarantor
of the fundamental rights of the citizens, has the duty cast upon it of striking down any
law which unduly restricts the freedom of speech and expression.
3. Does criticism of the government amount to an act of sedition as per Section 124A
of Meluha Penal Code (MPC)?
Rohan and others have merely criticised the ruling regime and highlighted matters of
national importance such as atrocities against minorities, Inflation, national integrity
etc. In their mode of demonstration, they unequivocally lacked the intention to commit
any seditious act in any manner. They have justifiably exercised their right to free
speech and expression as granted by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of Meluha.

11
Furthermore, the chain of events implies that it is not the speeches that has triggered
the law and order situation, rather it is the hyper-sensitivity of the youth wing of the
ruling party that has caused the destruction. Therefore it is submitted before the court
that neither Petitioner 1 had the requisite intention nor their actions fulfilled the
ingredients of the offence of sedition to be charged under S. 124A.. Therefore, they are
not liable to be charged under section 124A.
4. Was the banning of newspapers a constitutionally valid act of the Government of

Meluha?
It is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble Court that the act of Government banning two
national dailies i.e., The Phantom and the Voice, is a constitutionally invalid act. Not
only has the Government violated the Right to freedom of speech and expression of the
Press but also the Right to know of the general public. Printing and publication of the
news and facts of contemporary history is the essential right of the press which can only
be restricted in terms of the concept of ‘Reasonable Restriction’ as enshrined in Article
19 (2). The newspapers acting as a responsible media house have truly reported on
matters of national importance. It is evident from the facts that the subsequent violence
and arson is caused not by the publication of news but by the militantism of the youth
wing of the ruling party. Hence, the act of banning by the Government citing ‘Public
Order’ is an unwarranted and an illegal step.

12
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. JURISDICTION: DOES THE SUPREME COURT OF MELUHA HAVE THE

JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE MATTER.
1.1 No requirement for exhaustion of local remedies
¶1. It is humbly submitted that the right to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
Meluha in case of violation of fundamental rights is itself a fundamental right enshrined
in Art. 32 of the Meluhan Constitution. In the case of Prem Chand Garg v. Excise
Commissioner1, it was held that this right is absolute and may not be impaired on any
ground. Further, unlike in Art. 226, the remedy provided by Art. 32 is a fundamental
right and not merely a discretionary power of the Court, as stated in various cases such
as Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh2, and Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi3.
It is also submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Meluha has, on multiple
occasions, such as in cases Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh4, Romesh Thappar
v. The State of Madras5, expressly rejected an argument that called for exhaustion of
local remedies.
¶2. Cases such as Union of India v. Paul Manickam6, Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of
Gujarat7, & P. N. Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi8,. require the exhaustion
of local remedies before approaching the Court under Art. 32. However, it is submitted
that this Hon'ble court must not be constrained by these decisions as this self-imposed
restraint is merely a rule of convenience and discretion9 and does not oust the
jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 3210.
1 Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996.

2 Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457.
3 Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898.
4 Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
5 Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
6 Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622.
7 Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1159.
8 P. N. Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1987) 4 SCC 609.
9 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86.
10 Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha, 2010 (1) SCC (Cri.) 721.

13
¶3. These cases are per incuriam as they were rendered in ignorance of previous
decisions by higher benches of this Hon'ble Court that expressly rejected such a rule,
specially given the socio-political situation of Meluha. It is also to be noted that Art.
32(4) specifically provides that this right may not be suspended except by a
constitutional provision.
“The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution11”
1.2 Matter of Public interest
¶4. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that petitioner has no personal
interest in the litigation and the petition is not guided by self-gain or for gains of any
other person/institution/body and that there is no motive other than of public interest
in filing the writ petition. In the case of S.P Gupta v. Union of India it was stated that
“..... in case of any breach of fundamental rights of such persons or determinate class
of persons [an application for appropropriate direction, order, or writ] in this court
under Art. 32 of the Meluhan Constitution seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong
or legal injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons.”
¶5. According to the Crime Records Bureau of Meluha there has been an alarming rise
in sedition cases in the past year12. Through Section 124A of MPC, fundamental rights
enshrined under both Art. 19 (1)(a) and Art. 21, which are also the constituents of the
‘Golden Triangle13’ of the Meluhan Constitution, are being infringed. Freedom of press
is popularly considered to be the 4th pillar of democracy. The Petitioners, who are also
the leading dailies, ‘The Phantom’ and ‘The Voice’ have done so after diligently
analysing the socio-political scenario of Meluha, with the sudden spike in sedation
cases and the blatant infringement of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution
of Meluha which establishes that the petition is in the matter of Public Interest.
2. WHETHER SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION ENSHRINED
UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(a) AND ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
11 Art. 32(4)
12Moot Prop. ¶ 9
13 Fundamental rights enshrined under Art. 14 (Right to Equality), Art. 19 (Right to Freedom) and Art.
21 (Right to Life and Liberty) constitute the ‘Golden Triangle’ of the Constitution.

14
2.1 Definitional Ambiguity and Archaic Nature
¶6. Section 124-A of the India Penal Code is as follows:
“Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to
excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be punished
with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.14”
¶7. It is humbly presented before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Meluha that the underlying
purpose of the restriction. It is submitted that when the section was originally inserted into
the MPC, its purpose was to protect the British colonial power from any expressions of
contempt, hatred or discontent; it was liberally employed to silent political dissent and
suppress Meluhan Nationalist sentiments. Post-independence, however, the underlying
purposes of Section 124-A, the restriction imposed on Article 19(1)(a) are accepted to be
preventing ‘public violence’ and ‘public disorder’. the court in Kedarnath also could not have
examined. Section 124A shedding the presumption as to its constitutionality. It is only as
recently as in 2018 in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, that the court found that pre-
constitutional legislations have no legal presumption of constitutionality.
¶8. Coming to the issue of 'ambiguity' it is respectfully submitted to the Supreme Court that in
the landmark judgement for sedition, Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar15 did not go far
enough in reading down the section. Retaining ‘intention’ and ‘tendency’ as basis for criminal
liability means that these inherently subjective terms can be used to penalise those who
have not caused any violence or public disorder.
2.2 Misuse of the law
¶9. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Meluha that according to the
National Crime Records Bureau Report, 2014 [Crime In India Year 2014, NCRB,
https://ncrb.gov.in/en/crime-india-year-2014] as many as 47 sedition cases were reported in
2014 alone, across nine Indian states. Many of these cases did not involve violence or
incitement to violence, which is a prerequisite for a sedition charge. It is submitted that as
per the NCRB figures total of 58 persons were arrested in connection with these cases, but
the government has managed only one conviction.
¶10. It is submitted that though a very small number of sedition cases leads to actual
conviction, it causes harassment of individuals till the time judgement comes out,
which in various cases takes many years to come. Meanwhile, persons charged
14 Indian Penal Code 1860 § 124A.

15 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.

15
with sedition have to live without their passport, are barred from government
jobs, and must produce themselves in the court at all times as and when
required. A person so charged also has to spend money on regular legal fees.
The charges have rarely stuck in most of the cases, but the process itself
becomes the punishment.
¶11. It is submitted that when this interpretation, as defined by Kadar Nath’s case is applied,
there are two “scenarios” where a person could be guilty of sedition;
FIRST SCENARIO- When a person takes an action which actually results in violence or
public disorder.
This person is guilty of sedition.
SECOND SCENARIO- When the words or acts of a person does not
actually result in any violence or public disorder, however the authorities feel that the words
or acts had this “tendency”, or that the person had had the subjective “intention” to cause
this mischief.
This person is also guilty of sedition.
¶12. It is submitted that the use of sedition in the Second Scenario is not use, but rather
misuse – which has been used in Meluha to suppress democratic debate, criticism of the
government and the advocacy of new ideas.
2.3 Redundancy of the law
¶13. It is humbly presented before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Meluha that the Petitioners
do not in any way dispute the importance and necessity of preventing public violence and
public disorder.
¶14. The most common argument in favour of sedation is that it is necessary for national
safety. The petitioners humbly put forward why the section is redundant in nature. Firstly
they wish to emphasise that they are not a threat to national security or the public order in
Meluha. It is very important at this stage to make clear exactly whose interests declaring
sedition unconstitutional would protect.
¶15. It must be emphasized that preventing the prosecution of terrorists or others who pose
actual security threats is not the aim, nor will it be the consequence. Other laws in Meluha
can sufficiently deal with security threats without having to employ section 124-A i.e terrorists
would not go free if sedition is done away with.
¶16. If a person wages war, attempts to wage war or conspires to wage war against the
government of Meluha here will be punished under sections 121, which states-

16
"Whoever, wages war against the Government or attempts to wage such war, or abets the
waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be
liable to fine.16"
¶17. Or 121A which states
"Whoever within or without India conspires to commit any of the offences punishable by
section 121, or conspires to overawe, by means of criminal force or the show of criminal
force against the Government shall be punished17"
¶18. and 122 of the MPC, respectively.
"Whoever collects men, arms or ammuni-tion or otherwise prepares to wage war with the
intention of either waging or being prepared to wage war against the Govern-ment of India
shall be punished18"
Therefore sedition is not necessary for the protection of national security or the public order
of Meluha.
¶19. It is also submitted that the landmark judgement on sedation, the Kedar Nath Case19,
didn't look into the aspect of necessity of the law in order to justify it Apart from the sections
in the Meluhan Penal Code, there are various other legislations in Meluha which deal with
the same issues.
¶20. In 1969, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act20 was passed to provide for the more
effective prevention of certain unlawful activities. ‘Unlawful activity’ is very broadly defined
as-
"Any action including acts, words, either spoken or written, signs or any visible
representation which is intended, or supports any claim to bring about on any ground
whatsoever… the cession or succession of any part of India… or which incites any individual
or group of individuals to bring about such cession or succession or which disclaims,
questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Meluha"
Under Section 2 (o) (iii) of the act, the definition of unlawful activity was broadened further to
include any activity ‘which causes or is intended to cause disaffection against Meluha’
¶ 21. ‘Unlawful association’ is also broadly defined by s 1 (g) as anyone who encourages or
aids persons to undertake ‘unlawful activities’, or encourages or aids persons to undertake
any activity punishable under Section 153A or Section 153B of the MPC.
16 Indian Penal Code 1860 § 121.

17 Indian Penal Code 1860 § 121A.
18 Indian Penal Code 1860 § 122.
19 Supra Note 15.
20 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (ACT NO.37 of 1969)

17
Again it can be seen that conduct meeting the requirements for sedition would fall within the
purview of this Act.
¶22. Under Section 3(b)(ii) of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act21 ‘the maintenance
of public order” is broadly defined, and included “making preparations for using, or
attempting its use, or using, or instigating, inciting, or otherwise abetting the use of force
where such preparation, using, attempting, instigating, inciting, provoking or abetting,
disturbs or is likely to disturb public order”
¶23. Section 8 (1) of the National Security Act22 which was passed in 1980, gives the Central
Government or the State Governments the power to detain persons if satisfied that it was
necessary to do so to prevent him from ‘acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of
Meluha… or the security of Meluha’.[Section 3 (1)(a)] or to detain a person under Section 3
(2) of the Act to prevent him from "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the
State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order’
This legislation would clearly also cover the same material offences as section 124A of the
Meluhan Penal Code.
2.4 Violation of fundamental rights enshrined under Art.19 an 21 of the Constitution of
Meluha
¶24. It is humbly present before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Meluha that about 60 years
ago, the Hon’ble Court in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar23 held that Section 124-A of
MPC imposed a reasonable restriction on Art. 19(1)(a) which states that
“all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression”24
falling within the ambit of Article 19(2) which allows ‘reasonable restrictions’.
¶25. The section might have been suitable 60 years ago, but it no longer passes
constitutional muster today. In the current social, legal and political scenario of Meluha with
rapid increase in Sedition cases and the blatant misuse of the section, given these material
changes, sedition now constitutes an unreasonable restriction on Article 19(1)(a).
¶26. As per accepted constitutional principles, in considering the reasonableness of laws
imposing restrictions on fundamental right, a court should take into account various factors,
these are: the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed; the underlying purpose of
the restrictions imposed; the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby;
the disproportion of the imposition; and the prevailing conditions at the time25.
21 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (Act No. 6 of 1978)

22 National Security Act (Act No. 6 of 1978).
23 Supra Note 15.
24 Supra Note 15.
25 State of Madras v. V. G. Row 952 AIR 196.

18
¶27. It is submitted that the situation with regard to these factors has materially changed,
both legally and factually, since the Supreme Court’s adjudication of this issue in 1962.
Freedom of expression and right to life is an essential pillar of democracy and also an
integral part of the Golden Triangle of the Meluhan Constitution. As established, Section
124A restricts the freedom of expression of the people of Meluha, it forces them to adapt to
the unjust ways of the government in fear of being punished under the Section on
confronting or standing up against the government. It therefore also infringes their
fundamental right enshrined under Art. 21 of the Meluhan constitution.
¶28. In the case of Indirect Tax Practitioners Assn. v. R. K. Jain26 the hon'ble Supreme Court
of Meluha stated that “change through free speech is basic to our democracy, and to prevent
change through criticism is to petrify the organs of democratic Government.” the court also
held that freedom of expression is not only politically useful “but that it is indispensable to the
operation of a democratic system27”.
¶29. In another landmark judgement, the hon'ble court also stated that “the freedom of
expression is a preferred right which is always very zealously guarded by the Supreme
Court28”
¶30. In the case Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India29 the hon'ble court laid down the
importance of free expression.
“Free expression is necessary:
(1) for individual fulfillment,
(2) for attainment of truth,
(3) for participation by members of the society in political or social decision making
(4) for maintaining the balance between stability and change in society.30”
¶31. Considering that in the case of Javed Habib vs The State31, the HC of Delhi described
the criticism of the government as the 'hallmark of democracy' and that in Kedar Nath Singh
v. State of Bihar32 it was expressly stated by the hon'ble court that the “freedom of
expression is the sine quo non of democracy.”
2.5 International References
26 Indirect Tax Practitioners Assn. v. R. K. Jain, (2010) 8 SCC 281.

27 Ibid.
28 The Secretary, Ministry Of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association Of Bengal (1995) 2
SCC 161.
29 Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) SCC 788.
30 Ibid.
31 Javed Habib vs The State, (2007) 96 DRJ 693.
32 Supra Note 15.

19
¶32. It is submitted by the Petitioners that it is necessary that this issue be re-adjudicated by
this Hon’ble Court in 2021. International law requires that established restrictions on freedom
of expression should be reassessed and reviewed periodically. International law places the
onus on the governments to prove that any restrictions on the freedom of expression are
valid. India is thus obligated to review this restriction.
¶33. It is also submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Meluha that it has been
explicitly recognized by the Human Rights Council of the United Nations General Assembly
that Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of democratic rights and freedoms and the
exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression is one of the essential foundations
of a democratic society.
¶34. The Human Rights Council has also recognized that the effective exercise of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression is an important indicator of the level of protection of other
human rights and freedoms in member states. When other human rights violations occur in
states, typically freedom of expression is restricted by governments in a bid to cover up other
atrocities and governmental failures.
3. DOES CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT AMOUNT TO AN ACT OF

SEDITION AS PER SECTION 124A OF MELUHA PENAL CODE (MPC)?
¶35. It is most modestly submitted before the Hon'ble seat that no offence of sedition was
committed by Rohan, Mirza, Sahil and others; all understudies of Political Science (Hons.) in
the Department of Political Science of OUSS and thusly area 124A of IPC in this specific case
establishes a preposterous limitation to their right side to the right to speak freely and
articulation.
¶36. It is fundamental to stress here that popular government isn't another name of
majoritarianism, in actuality it is a framework to incorporate each voice, where thought of each
individual is tallied, regardless of the quantity of the general population backing that thought.
In a vote based system, it is regular that there will be unique and clashing translations of a given
record of an occasion. Not just perspectives which comprise the greater part are to be
considered, and yet, contradicting and basic sentiments ought to likewise be recognized. Free
discourse is ensured in light of the fact that it is important to accomplish some more
noteworthy, frequently extreme, social great.

20
¶37. In Nazir Khan & Ors. v. State of Delhi 33, the court stated that: “Sedition has been
described as disloyalty in action, and the law considers as sedition all those practices which
have for their object to excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to create public disturbance, or to
lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or the Government, the laws
or constitutions of the realm, and generally all endeavours to promote public disorder.”
3.1 Whether or not the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of Sedition under
Section 124a of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are fulfilled?
¶38. Rohan and Mirza gave a speech in the playground of the campus where they picked up on
the matter of the atrocities being committed against a certain group of people and blamed the
present Government for the same. Rohan in his speech said “People have elected a government
of fools. They are incapable of protecting us. Inflation is at an all-time high. Time has come to
take matters into our hands and these corrupt politicians should be hanged publicly. We need
a new political regime.” Rohan blamed the government for the riots in the capital city of
Meluha and attributed the failure to the communal manners of the government. Rohan in one
of his clips says "We should rebel against the Government and crush their phony arrangements
until the point when they quit and our security is ensured, else we will take up arms against this
Government."
¶39. Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 defines the offence of Sedition. The word
sedition does not occur in the body of the section. It finds place only as a marginal note to the
section which is not an operative part of the sedition, but simply states the name by which the
offence defined in the section is known.34 The following are the essential ingredients of the
section, viz.,
1. Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred; or
2. Exciting or attempting to excite disaffection against the Government of India;
3. Such act or attempt may be done (a) by words, either spoken or written, or (b) by
signs, or (c) by visible representation; and
4. The act must be intentional.
¶40. It is, in particular, emphasized that the explanation to section 124A of the Indian Penal
Code itself states that:
33 Nazir Khan & Ors. v. State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 4427.

34 Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, AIR 1947 PC 82.

21
“Such a disapprobation of the measures of the Government as is compatible with a disposition

to render obedience to the lawful authority of the Government, and to support the lawful
authority, of the Government, against unlawful attempts to subvert or to resist that authority,
is not disaffection. Therefore the making of comments on the methods of the Government,
with the intention of exciting only this species of disapprobation, is not an offence within
this clause.”
¶41. Explanation 1 to the section sets out the scope of disaffection and Explanations 2 and 3
state what is not considered seditious intention as indicated under the English Law. That is to
say, criticism of Government measures and administrative and other actions of the
Government, if done without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or
disaffection towards the Government established by law, is not sedition.
¶42. The petitioners have only made an endeavour to bring into light the corrupt practices of
the elected representatives of the people who aren‟t doing an iota of what they were elected
for. Union territory of Melhua is recovering from riots which is a testament to the Government's
narrative of inciting communal bigotry and lapse of security. Rohan and others have merely
highlighted the matters of national importance such as atrocities against minorities, Inflation,
national integrity etc. In their mode of demonstration, they unequivocally lacked the intention
to commit any seditious act in any manner. In the exercise of their right to free speech and
expression as granted by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of Meluha, they have criticised
the ineffectiveness of the policies of the Government and have in no manner incited any kind
of rebellion against the Government.
¶43. Furthermore, in the case of Kedarnath v. State of Bihar35, it was clearly stated that words,
deeds or writings constituted an offence under section 124A only when they had the intention
or tendency to disturb public tranquillity to create public disturbance or to promote disorder.
This requisite intention is clearly missing in this case. After the pronouncement in the case of
Kedar Nath (Supra) by the Supreme Court, public disorder has been considered to be a
necessary ingredient of section 124A IPC by the courts.
¶44. Moreover, in the case law of Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India36 , a
Constitution Bench of this Court said freedom of speech and expression of opinion is of
paramount importance under a democratic constitution. In a separate concurring judgment
35 Supra Note 15.

36 Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India, 962 3 S.C.R. 842 at 866.

22
Beg,J. said, in Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors v. Union of India & Ors37, that the freedom of
speech and of the press is the ark of the covenant of democracy because public criticism is
essential to the working of its institutions.
¶45. Equally, in S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal & Anr, 38this Court stated, that the importance of
freedom of speech and expression though not absolute was necessary as we need to
tolerate unpopular views. This right requires the free flow of opinions and ideas essential to
sustain the collective life of the citizenry. While an informed citizenry is a pre-condition for
meaningful governance, the culture of open dialogue is generally of great societal importance.
¶46. This last judgment is important in that it refers to the “market place of ideas” concept that
has permeated American Law. This was put in the felicitous words of Justice Holmes in his
famous dissent in Abrams v. United States39, thus:
“But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”
¶47. The slogans raised by Rohan. Mirza and others are mere approbations which are being
raised against the atrocities and vicious narratives of the Government. They had merely made
an attempt to put it in the deaf ears of the Government, the shoddy administration that is doing
inadequate for the welfare of its people. Moreover, for the offence of sedition to be committed
it is very necessary that the people who are being addressed, to get incited but the counsel
would like to bring it to the notice of the Hon‟ble bench that no such scenes have been seen or
reported in or outside the campus of the university.
¶48. The verbatim of the criticisms might sound inflammatory and seditious to a sensitive
hyper-nationlistic individual. But the test to keep in mind here is the test of reasonability i.e.,
Whether or not the speeches or slogans would have excited enough contempt for a reasonable
man to raise an armed rebellion against the government. The answer to which in the present
case is No. If we look at the factual developments in regards to the estimating the after-effects
of the “seditious speeches”, three developments come to fore - 1) Wide media coverage of the
37 Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors v. Union of India & Ors.,16 1973 2 S.C.R. 757 at 829
38 S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal & Anr.,17 2010 5 SCC 600.
39 Abrams v. United States,18 250 US 616 (1919),

23
event after which 2) There were several protests both in favor and against the OUSS event 3)
The news angered the youth wing of the ruling regime when it started protesting aggressively
all over the country and and sporadic violence and arson took place in various cities.
¶49. It appears primarily that the major violence and arson happened after the youth wing of
the ruling party took offence of the event. It is highly improbable to conclude that the youth
wing got motivated by the speeches and in that fit they decided to express its discontent against
its very own ruling party via aggressive protests. It would be a short amiss to say that the
speeches successfully excited contempt amongst the youth wing enough so that they went
against their own ruling party to bring them down. What this chain of events implies is that it
is not the speeches that has triggered the law and order situation, rather it is the hyper-ensitivity
attitude of the youth wing of the ruling party that has caused the destruction.
¶50. Also, in the present case, it becomes really important to figure out the difference between
advocacy, approbation and incitement. This difference was highlighted in the case law of
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India40, which states that:-
“There are three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach of this most basic
of human rights. The first is discussion, the second is advocacy, and the third is incitement.
Mere discussion or even advocacy of a particular cause however unpopular is at the heart of
Article 19(1)(a). It is only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of incitement
that Article 19(2) kicks in.”
¶51. Therefore, in furtherance of all these judgments, it is pleaded that there was no intention
on the part of Rohan, Mirza and others to incite any group of people against the government of
India as established by law. It is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble court that the subsequent
destruction and violence should be attributed to the youth wing of ruling party as it is their
intolerance and hyper-sesnistivity that has caused sporadic violence and arson throughout
India.
¶52. Therefore it is submitted before the court that neither the petitioner 1 had requisite
intention nor fulfilled the ingredients of requisite actus reus to be encompassed in a criminal
charge. They have not committed the offence of sedition in any manner.
4. WAS THE BANNING OF NEWSPAPERS A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID ACT

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MELUHA?
40 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No.167 Of 2012.

24
4.1 The freedom of press is a fundamental right incorporated under the scheme of Article
19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of Meluha.
¶53. To preserve the democratic way of life it is essential that people should have the freedom
of express their feelings and to make their views known to the people at large. The press, a
powerful medium of mass communication, should be free to play its role in building a strong
viable society. Denial of freedom of the press to citizens would necessarily undermine the
power to influence public opinion and be counter to democracy.
¶54. Freedom of press is not specifically mentioned in article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and
what is mentioned there is only freedom of speech and expression. In the Constituent Assembly
Debates it was made clear by Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, that no
special mention of the freedom of press was necessary at all as the press and an individual or a
citizen were the same as far as their right of expression was concerned.
¶55. The framers of the Indian constitution considered freedom of the press as an essential part
of the freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed in Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
In Romesh Thaper vs State of Madras41s and Brij Bhushan vs State of Delhi42, the Supreme
Court took it for granted the fact that the freedom of the press was an essential part of the right
to freedom of speech and expression. It was observed by Patanjali Sastri J. in Romesh Thaper
that freedom of speech and expression included propagation of ideas, and that freedom was
ensured by the freedom of circulation.
¶56. In Romesh Thapar v/s State of Madras43, Patanjali Shastri,CJ, observed that
“Freedom of speech & of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organization, for
without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of
the process of popular government, is possible.”
¶57. In this case, entry and circulation of the English journal “Cross Road”, printed and
published in Bombay, was banned by the Government of Madras. The same was held to be
violative of the freedom of speech and expression, as “without liberty of circulation,
publication would be of little value”.
41 Supra Note 5.
42
Brij Bhushan vs State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
43 Supra Note 5.

25
¶58. It is, therefore, humbly submitted that the newspapers have a sacrosanct right to publish
and disseminate information44 and the same cannot be impinged upon beyond the vires of
Article 19 (2).
4.2 Printing and publication of facts is an essential figure of Freedom of press and the
same shall be protected with utmost progressivism.
¶59. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Union of India v/s Association for Democratic
Reforms45,
“One-sided information, disinformation, misinformation and non-information, all equally
create an uninformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce. Freedom of speech and
expression includes right to impart and receive information which includes freedom to hold
opinions”.
¶60. In Indian Express Newspapers v/s Union of India46, it has been held that the press plays a
very significant role in the democratic machinery. The courts have duty to uphold the
freedom of press and invalidate all laws and administrative actions that abridge that
freedom. Freedom of press has three essential elements. They are:
1. Freedom of access to all sources of information,
2. Freedom of publication, and
3. Freedom of circulation.
¶61. In Re Daily Zemmedar47, It was stated by the judiciary that the printing and publication
of the news was the essential right of the press. Further, it was also stated by the court that it
is the right of the press to print the facts of contemporary history.
¶62. In Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi48, the court held pre-censorship on publication of any
news or views, unless justified under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India, 1950,
violates freedom of speech and expression. The court struck down the order issued under
Section 7(1)(c), East Punjab Safety Act, 1950, directing the editor and publisher of a
newspaper to submit scrutiny in duplicate before publication. The court rejected the
imposition of pre-censorship as a restriction on the liberty of the press.
44 Union of India v/s Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCR 294.
45 Ibid.
46 Indian Express Newspapers v/s Union of India, 1986 AIR 515.
47 Re Daily Zemmedar, AIR 1947 Lah 340.
48 Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.

26
¶63. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Sharma v. Srikrishna49 that printing of
views not only includes the editors or authors views but also the views of any other people
who have printed the views under the directions of the editor, author or the publisher.
¶64. The right to free press not only includes to publish views but it also includes to dispense
and circulate those views in the entire society as was decided in RomeshThappar, v. State of
Madras50. The freedom of press is infringed not only by a direct ban on the circulation of a
publication, but also an action of the government which would adversely affect the
circulation of the paper.
¶65. Another dimension of the right to press includes the right to comment on public affairs
as was stated by the Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman v. State of Jammu and Kashmir51.
This right the court held is a right to comment on public affairs includes the right to criticize
people holding public post and also to criticize the public policies.
¶66. In Sanskar Marathe v. The State of Maharashtra52, Amit Trivedi is a political cartoonist
and social activist. Through his cartoon, it was argued that he defamed the parliament, the
Constitution of India and the Ashok Emblem. Therefore an FIR was filed for sedition against
him for trying to spread hatred and disrespect against the government by publishing the
cartoon on the ‘India against corruption’ website. The Bombay High Court held that the
citizens have the right to criticise and comment on the government policies and measures
until and unless it does not incite people to violence against the Government established by
law or create public disorder.
¶67. Recently, in Vinod Dua v. Union of India & Ors53, an FIR was lodged against senior
journalist Vinod Dua for sedition, public nuisance, printing defamatory materials and public
mischief by the BJP leader in Himachal Pradesh over a youtube video criticising the Prime
Minister regarding the government’s response to COVID-19. The Supreme Court quashed the
FIR. It was held that
“Every Journalist will be entitled to protection in terms of Kedar Nath Singh, as every
prosecution under Sections 124A and 505 of the IPC must be in strict conformity with the
scope and ambit of said Sections as explained in, and completely in tune with the law laid
down in Kedar Nath Singh”.
49 Sharma v. Srikrishna, AIR 1959 SC 395.

50 Supra Note 5.
51 Bennett Coleman v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1975) Cr LJ 211
52 Sanskar Marathe v. The State of Maharashtra, Cri.PIL 3-2015
53 Vinod Dua v. Union of India & Ors, (2005) 6 SCC 1 (2014) 2 SCC 1.

27
¶68. The act intending to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order, or incitement to
violence should be limited according to the provision’s application.
The newspapers acting as responsible media houses have truly reported on matters of national
importance. They are well within their right to report on matters affecting state security and
public order as held by courts. Reasonable Restriction on the right of Printing and publication
of the news can only be imposed on grounds in Article 19 (2).
¶69. It is evident from the facts that the subsequent violence and arson is caused not by the
publication of news but by the militantism of the youth wing of the ruling party. Hence, the
act of banning by the Government citing ‘Public Order’ is an unwarranted and an illegal step.
Hence, It can not be sustained and justified.
4.3 The government by banning two national newspapers has violated the general
public’s Right to know and acquire information.
¶70. The freedom of 'speech and expression' comprises not only the right to express, publish
and propagate information, it circulation but also to receive information. This was held by the
Supreme Court in a series of judgments that have discussed the right to information in varied
contexts from advertisements enabling the citizens to get vital information about life-saving
drugs, to the right of sports lovers to watch cricket or football and the right of voters to know
the antecedents (social background) of the electoral candidates.
¶71. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Assn. (Association) for Democratic Reforms54
observed that:
One-sided information, disinformation, misinformation, and non-information, all equally
create an uninformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce. Freedom of speech and
expression includes the right to know, receive and impart information which also includes
freedom to hold opinions.
¶72. It is, therefore, humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the Government by their
act of banning the newspapers have attempted to not only to restrict the Freedom of press of
the newspapers but also the Right to know of the citizenry of the country under Article 21.
¶73. The government has acted undemocratically and ultra vires the spirit of fundamental
rights. Further, the government should not be allowed to take the ground of ‘public order’ to
justify the illegality as it is supremely evident from the facts that the major role behind the
54 Supra Note 44.

28
arson and riots was that of the Youth wing. It is henceforth humbly requested that the ban
imposed by the Government be lifted.

29
PRAYER
WHEREFORE IN LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED, &

AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS MOST HUMBLY PRAYED BEFORE THE HON’BLE
COURT, THAT IT MAY GRACIOUSLY BE PLEASED TO ADJUDGE AND DECLARE-
1. The petition filed is is maintainable

2. Section 124A of MPC infringes the fundamental rights under Article 19 and Article 21
of the Constitution of Meluha.
3. Criticism of the government does not amount to an act of sedition as per Section 124A
of MPC.
4. Banning the newspapers was not a constitutionally valid act by the Government of
Meluha.
AND\OR
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT IT DEEMS FIT IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUITY, AND GOOD CONSCIENCE. FOR THIS ACT OF
KINDNESS, THE PETITIONER SHALL DUTY BOUND FOREVER PRAY.
Sd/-
Counsels for the Petitioner

30

5TH HPNLU INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

5TH HPNLU INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

5TH HPNLU INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022

5TH HPNLU INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MELUHA

W.P. (CIVIL) NO. ____\ 2022

Rohan & Ors. Petitioner 1

The Phantom & Anr. Petitioner 2

U/Art. 32 of The Constitution of Meluha, 1950

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………………….2

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

S.no. Abbreviation Full Form

11. ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and

18. SC Supreme Court

19. SCC Supreme Court Cases

20. SCR Supreme Court Report

21. u/s Under Section

23. & And

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1 Prem Chand Garg v. Excise AIR 1963 SC 996

13 Indirect Tax Practitioners (2010) 8 SCC 281.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

23 Union of India v/s Association (2002) 5 SCR 294.

26 Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129.

27 Sharma v. Srikrishna AIR 1959 SC 395.

28 Bennett Coleman v. State of (1975) Cr LJ 211

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (ACT NO.37 of 1969)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

National Security Act (Act No. 6 of 1978).

1. Code of Criminal Procedure (in 2 Vols.), B.B.Mitra, revised by Justice S.R.Roy

2. Indian Penal Code – RatanLal and DheerajLal Volume 1

3. Indian Penal Code – Ratanlal And DheerajLal Volume 2

4. Ram Jethmalani – On Indian Penal Code Volume 1 and 2

5. The Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC), Ratanlal&Dhirajlal, with a Foreword

6. The Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC), 21th edition, 2014

7. Commentary On Constitutional Law, Durga Das Basu, Volume 2, 2008, 8th

8. Commentary On Constitutional Law, Durga Das Basu, Volume 3, 2007 Edition

11. Universal’s Criminal Manual, 2014

12. Commentary on the Constitution of India, Durga Das Basu, 1989

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

2. SCC Online www.scconline.in

3. Indian Kanoon www.indiakanoon

5. Indian Kanoon www.indiakanoon

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

THE APPELLANTS APPROACH THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MELUHA

ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MELUHA, 1950-

“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

country, which was allegedly associated with the terrorist activities in

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

2. Constitutionality of Section 124A of Meluha Penal Code (MPC): Whether Section

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

4. Was the banning of newspapers a constitutionally valid act of the Government of

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1. JURISDICTION: DOES THE SUPREME COURT OF MELUHA HAVE THE

1 Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

2. WHETHER SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL