PEOPLE V.

BAYOTAS
FACTS:
 Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest,
pending appeal of his conviction.
 The Supreme Court then, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.
 The Solicitor General submitted a comment regarding the civil liability of the offense, stating that the death of
the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability stating People v. Sendaydiego as his basis
 On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in a past decision (People v. Castillo) of the
Supreme Court, civil liability is extinguished if accused dies before the final judgement is rendered.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability

RULING:

 Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. In this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed.

 The reason is that the penalty requires personal service of the sentence. If death occurs, nobody will serve the
penalty for the crime.

 The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the
Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement.
Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the
case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident
that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.
 In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only
survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code
could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death
of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on which cases should civil
liability be extinguished, to wit:
 PETITION DISMISSED.
PEOPLE V. VILLAGRACIA
FACTS:
 Thelma Villasanta arrived in Quezon from Manila, and attended a business in poblacion
 She returned home at night, bringing raw-materials for her basket-weaving business.
o In her house is her husband in the 2nd floor and 2 people working overtime at the ground floor
 After entering, 6 men with cover on their faces barged in the house and brandished firearms and knives
o Her husband and the workers were hogtied, and the men ransacked the house
 When the men left the house, they brought Thelma to a grassy place and removed their masks in the streets.
o Nelson Ledesma, one of the accused proceeded to rape her and the others followed after.
 An information then was filed, charging the accused (Villagracia, Paglinawan, Pastoral, Nixon and Nelson
Ledesma, and Gampa) of the crime of Robbery with Rape
 The accused pleaded not guilty and then the trial ensued.
 However, before judgment was promulgated, Elmer Paglinawan, one of the accused died.
 The trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, appreciating the aggravating circumstances of night time and band

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the death of the accused Paglinawan extinguished his criminal liability

HELD:
 The court held that yes.
 The records show that Elmer Paglinawan was under detention when he died.
 This fact was reported and confirmed by the provincial warden to the trial court, which should have dismissed
the case against the accused.
 Under Article 89 of the RPC, the criminal liability of the offender is totally extinguished by his death as to
personal penalties, while the pecuniary liabilities are extinguished when the offender dies before the final
judgment.
 The case is DISMISSED against the accused Elmer Paglinawan.
PEOPLE V. CASIDO
FACTS:
 Applicants Casido and Alcorin are confirmed members of the CPP/NPA whose killing of Victoriano Mapa was
committed in pursuit of their political beliefs
 Accused applied for and was granted conditional pardon by the President while their appeals were pending
before the Supreme Court.
 After release, they filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the Supreme Court which the latter denied.
 Meanwhile, their applications for amnesty were also favourably acted on by the National Amnesty
Commission.
 "the conditional pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are
void for having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal,"
 The OSG alleged that the accused applied for both amnesty (NAC) and pardon (PCGRP)
 Barrioquinto v. Fernandez: the amnesty then granted the accused appellants “rendered moot and academic” the
question of premature pardon granted to them.

ISSUE: 
 Whether or not the conditional pardon granted to the accused is void

RULING:
 Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by
the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof
 granted to one after conviction
 looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted
  it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon
 "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence"
 Amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice.
 classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,  generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction
 looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense
 While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before
conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid
 The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the
amnesty, but not by the "pardon."

 CASE DISMISSED. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS RELEASED.

ROMUALDEZ V. MARCELO
FACTS:
 Petitioner Benjamin Romualdez is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file
his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
 However, the petitioner contended that his criminal liability was extinguished by way of prescription.
 Respondent Hon. Simeon Marcelo in his capacity as Ombudsman alleged that the prescription was
interrupted due to the absences of the petitioner for being abroad, in accordance with the Revised Penal
Code, applying suppletorily to Act No. 3326.
 The petitioner now claims that the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in filing of
24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of RA 3019, contending that such cases cannot be
revived by the Ombudsman as they were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the prescription period of an offense of a special law may be interrupted by the absence of
the accused for being outside the criminal jurisdiction of the court through Suppletory application of Art 10. of
the RPC.
HELD:
 No, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the absence of the accused from the
Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive period is apparent.
 Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019, Act No. 3326 was already in effect. Section 3 thereof categorically
defines "special acts" as "acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code

 Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the Court was
categorical in ruling that the law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies
 Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive period
shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not
provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period.
Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
 Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act,
or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned
 Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the Philippines as a ground for the
interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act No.
3326
 Special laws should prevail over general ones. Act 3326 specifically applies to special laws, while the RPC
applies to special laws only suppletorily when the latter do not provide the contrary.
 In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant case, were not
interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987.
o As a consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982
prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses
committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May
8, 2002.
o DATE THE CASE IS RESOLVED IS JULY 28, 2006
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS v. DESIERTO
FACTS:
 Initially, the Court dismissed the petition in this case on technical grounds. But, upon petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the petition was reinstated, and the respondents were required to comment on the petition.
 In its Manifestation and Motion of 16 February 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed the
Court that it could not represent the OMBUDSMAN for the following reasons: 
 (a) the Solicitor General is the Vice-Chairman of... petitioner COMMITTEE;
 (b) being an agency of the Government, the COMMITTEE is entitled to be represented by the OSG; and 
 (c) the petition was signed by Associate Solicitor Salvador C. Guevarra, who is presently on detail with
the PCGG, and by Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza of the PCGG, which is also a client of the OSG.
 On 8 October 1992, President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.
 On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the COMMITTEE to
"include in its investigation, inventory, and study all non-performing loans which shall embrace both behest
and non-behest loans.
 According to the report from the COMMITTEE, there were 21 corporations found having behest loans
including Philippine Seeds INC.
 After the handwritten directive from the president, the COMMITTEE filed with the ombudsman a sworn
complaint against Directors of PSI and DBP who approved the loans, for violation of RA 3019.
 The OMBUDSMAN dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription relying on Dinsay which was
decided by the CA.
 He rationated that the questioned transactions were evidence by public instruments and thus the
prescriptive period commenced from the time of the commission of the crime.
 The OMBUDSMAN ruled that the offenses charged had already been prescribed.

ISSUE:
 WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN HOLDING
THAT THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE COUNTED FROM THE DATE OF THE GRANT OF THE
BEHEST LOANS AND NOT FROM THE DATE OF DISCOVERY OF THE SAME BY THE COMMITTEE.
RULING:
 Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Marcos and his cronies accumulated and
which the Government through the PCGG seeks to recover. Besides, even assuming ex gratia that the right to
file criminal charges against the respondents is... prescriptible, the prescriptive period should be counted from
the discovery of the crimes charged, and not from the date of their commission.
 Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act
No. 3326,[19] as amended. which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

 This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to
run on the day it was committed.
 It is impossible for the state to have known the violations of R.A 3019 at the time the transactions
were made. Thus, the prescriptive period should commence from the discovery of the acts and not
from the time of the commission
 Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal action should commence from
the discovery of the offense, the OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
outright Case No. OMB-0-96-0968. It should have first received the evidence from the complainant and the
respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue of the date of discovery of the offense.
FALLO: 
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, and SETTING ASIDE the
resolution of 14 May 1996 and the Order of 19 May 1997 of the public respondent OMBUDSMAN in Case No. OMB-0-
96-0968.

The OMBUDSMAN is hereby directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case OMB-0-96-0968 taking
into account the foregoing disquisitions.

RULING ON THE BOOK:

 the core of the controversy is the Ombudsman’s Resolution holding that prescription had already set-in
effectively barring the institution of charges against the private respondents
 the alleged behest loans, transpired in 1976, thus, the complaint filed after more than two decades
from the commission thereof or on 8 October 1997, was well beyond the 10-year prescriptive period
provided for under the old Republic Act No. 3019
 In resolving the issue of prescription, the following shall be considered:
 the period of prescription for the offense charged
 the time the period of prescription started to run
 he time the prescriptive period was interrupted
 At the outset, the provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution that "the right of the State
to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees
or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppels," has already been settled in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
 the above cited constitutional provision "applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
and not to criminal cases."
 The period of prescription for the crime charged in this petition, committed in 1976 and prior to the
amendment of Republic Act No. 3019, is ten (10) years. 
 the longer prescriptive period of 15-years does not apply in crimes committed prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on 16 March 1982, because, not being favorable to
the accused, it cannot be given retroactive effect
 Prescription of crime shall begin to run from the day of its commission, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
 While we sustain the Ombudsman’s contention that the prescriptive period for the crime charged herein is 10
years and not 15 years, we are not persuaded that in this specific case, the prescriptive period began to run in
1976, when the loans were transacted
 Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment
 The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
  "blameless ignorance" doctrine
 "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action.
 the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has
no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action
 if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run
only from the discovery thereof
 it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from
the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation