People of the Philippines vs.

Bayotas

G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239)

Facts:

The Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court
on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant,
on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that
the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in
a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute.
It reads, in part: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished-
Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict,
as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment; With reference to Castillo's criminal liability,
there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is

extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of
the term "final judgment."

Issue:
 Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguished his civil liability.

Ruling:

Yes, the Court decided on this case through stating the cases

of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said that
civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred
before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil
liability is extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the
case.

There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further,
the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that the rule established was that the
survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict. In the
Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it
states that civil liability will only survive if death came after the
final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the
Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused
while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on
which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit: Death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore,
Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely
on the act complained of.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004

Facts:
This is a petition for review under rule 45 of the rules of court assailing
resolutions of CA. Petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the RTC of
San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed. On
July 1994 accused Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty. The court ruled that rabbit bus lines shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused in the event of the accused insolvency.
Evidently, the judgment against the accused had become final and
executory. Then the accused jumped bail, worth mentioning that rule 8,
rule 124 of the rules of court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. The counsel for accused hired by rabbit bus lines
filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. The CA
ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of
the civil action arising from the offense. Making the subsidiary civil
liability of the bus line becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of
its accused-employee may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused?
Ruling:
No, petition has no merit. Appeal in Criminal Cases: Section 1 of rule
122 of the 2000 revised rules of criminal procedures states "any party
may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy"
Appeal by the accused who jumps bail: Section 8 of rule 124 provides:
"the court appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during pendency of the appeal" The accused
cannot be accorded right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15days from
notice of the judgment against them. They cannot seek relief from the
court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. Finality of a
decision in a criminal case: Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which we quote: "A judgment of conviction may,
upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right
to appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender
to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.
Civil Actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. but rabbit
bus line is not a direct party to the criminal case. While they may assist
their employees, the employer cannot act independently on their own
behalf, but can only defend the accused. Waiver of constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy: an appeal from the sentence of the
trial court implies a waiver and throws the whole case open to a review
by the appellate court.
Effect of absconding on the appeal process: the accused impliedly
withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and he is deemed to have his right
to appeal waived. Thus, conviction is now final and executory.
Subsidiary Liability upon finality of judgment: employer’s liability in a
finding of guilt against its employee is subsidiary.
No deprivation of due process: employer became subsidiary liable only
upon proof of the employee's insolvency and the right to appeal was lost
due to the bail of the accused employee not the court. Petition denied.

Air France vs. Carascoso, et al

G.R. No. L-21438             September 28, 1966
Facts:
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a “first class” round
trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in “first class”, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the “first class” seat that he
was occupying because there was a “white man”, who, the Manager
alleged, had a “better right” to the seat. When asked to vacate his “first
class” seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant’s Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man” and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his “first class” seat in the plane.
Issue:
Whether there is a breach of contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso that would hold Air France liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public
duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action as we have said, is placed upon
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier, a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner
to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no
such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up
the matter.
The court, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is
admissible in evidence. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil
Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages, in
contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant
should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso
from his first-class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition
to moral damages; The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The
grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys'
fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but
just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. We do not intend to
break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised, as it was
here, should not be disturbed. Questioned as excessive are the amounts
decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary
damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these
amounts is primarily with the trial court. The Court of Appeals did not
interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give
our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the
reasonableness thereof.
Andamo, et al vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Facts:
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation, built through its agents, water paths, water conductors and
contrivances including an artificial lake within its land inundated and
eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andiamo’s land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed
away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction
On July 1982, spouses instituted a criminal action and filed a civil case
for damages. The CA affirmed trial court issued an
order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in
the related Criminal Case. The spouses contend that the trial court and
the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated
on a quasi-delict

Issue:
Whether or not there is quasi-delict even if done in private properly

Ruling:
Yes, all the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public
domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned,
the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the
water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of
a third person."  SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so
as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause
injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Article
2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Whether it
be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that
his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter

Castro vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. NO. 180832: July 23, 2008
Facts:

On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed

Tan's son, Justin Albert, a Grade 12 student, for violating the terms of
his disciplinary probation. Upon Tan's request, RIS reconsidered its
decision but imposed "non-appealable" conditions such as excluding
Justin Albert from participating in the graduation ceremonies.

Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education (Dep-

Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private Schools,
Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code against RIS. He
alleged that the dismissal of his son was undertaken with malice, bad
faith and evident premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found
that RIS' code violation point system allowed the summary imposition of
unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law). The
system therefore violated due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it.
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit
Justin Albert without any condition. Thus, he was able to graduate from
RIS and participate in the commencement ceremonies held on March 30,
2003.

After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow

parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that he
was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal
capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant headmaster.

Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told
him that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their personal
capacities. Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against petitioner
on August 21, 2003.

The prosecution essentially tried to establish that petitioner depicted Tan

as a "dangerous person." Ching testified that petitioner warned her that
talking to Tan was dangerous. Tan, on the other hand, testified that
petitioner's statement shocked him as it portrayed him as "someone
capable of committing undesirable acts." He added that petitioner
probably took offense because of the complaint he filed against RIS in
the Dep-Ed.

For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan

despite the latter's complaint against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he
admitted conversing with Ching whom he considered as a close
acquaintance on the telephone a few days after RIS' 2003
commencement exercises, petitioner asserted that he never said or
insinuated that Tan or talking to Tan was dangerous. On cross-
examination, however, he did not categorically deny the veracity of
Ching's statement.

The MeTC found that Ching's statements in her affidavit and in open
court were consistent and that she did not have any motive to fabricate a
false statement. Petitioner, on the other hand, harbored personal
resentment, aversion and ill-will against Tan since the Dep-Ed
compelled RIS to readmit his son. Thus, the MeTC was convinced that
petitioner told Ching talking to Tan was dangerous and that he uttered
the statement with the intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and
professional reputation.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for
certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment.
Ruling:
Yes, no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.13 This constitutional mandate is echoed in Section 7 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court which provides: Section 7. Former conviction
or acquittal; double jeopardy. ' When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or in information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment
(2) before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea
has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.14 Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the
trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy.15
The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,16 when there
was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in
a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The rationale behind this
exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse
of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void.
Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC's finding on the nature of
petitioner's statement, that is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral
defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC's "erroneous" evaluation and assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties.
What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those
involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law). However, a
court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot review the public respondent's
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment
cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only
correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave
abuse of discretion.

Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in
taking cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual
findings of the RTC. The court therefore reinstate the RTC decision so
as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL vs. COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. no. 111127, July 26, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Fabre and his wife were the owners of 1982 model Mazda
minibus. They were using the said vehicle as a school bus service for
children in Manila. They hired Cabil as their driver. On November 2,
1982, private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship
(WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of members of
young adult ministry from Manila to La Union and back. While
travelling, they met an accident. The bus hit a fence and a coconut tree
that caused passengers to be injured including respondent Antonio.
The WWCF and Antonio then filed a criminal complaint against the
driver, the trial court decided in favor of respondents. All evidence
presented showed the negligence of the defendants ultimately resulted to
the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for the injuries suffered by the
respondents based on culpa contractual and/or culpa aquiliana.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court ruled that damages should be awarded based on the
theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or
culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana
holding that the relation of passenger and carrier is “contractual both in
origin and nature,” nevertheless “the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort. In both sources of obligation, the existence of negligence of
petitioners must be determined. In this case, Cabil drove his bus
negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on
record. Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence
gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were
themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Thus, the finding of the Court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176
and 2180 for quasi delict fully justify that they are guilty of breach of
contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.

Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
Facts:
Respondent, Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas. The jeepney was already filled with
passengers so she was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a
wooden stool at the back of the door. As she was seated at the rear end
of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Unfortunately, a truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured.
Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise
the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other
hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the truck.
RTC’s decision: Absolved Calalas of liability and ruled that Salva as
third-party defendant was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.
CA’s decision: reversed RTC’s ruling on the ground that Sunga’s cause
of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that
the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the
Civil Code. It also dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent passenger is bound by the ruling in Civil
Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for
quasi-delict.
Ruling:
No. The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party in a
pending case was never a party in a previous one. And besides, the
issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver
Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is
liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as
culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation.

Cinco vs. Canonoy, et al (90 SCRA 369)

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Facts:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City
Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit.
Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo
Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case,
counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111,
Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides: (b) After a criminal
action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered;

The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970,
ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970,
petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging
that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for

certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as
damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil
action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the
criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and,
therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective
inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus

Issue:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action
Ruling:
Yes, Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a

separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in
Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding

article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have
to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from crime.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt

beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot
be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated
civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow
a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is
such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. The court’s view of the law is more
likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a
matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and
similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with
which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all
cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten
and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct

responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be
carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting
from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that
they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should
reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their
poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa,
"It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fail
upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director." Many jurists also base this
primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation
of the principal by the agent.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate
this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its
full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.

It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-

delict. The concept of quasi delict as enunciated in Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but
also damage to property.  It makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed,
the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm, it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not
limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples
of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance
is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible
for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to
persons or property.
Far East vs. CA, 241 SCRA 671
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
Facts:

Sometime in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for,

and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East
Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) at its Pasig Branch. Upon his
request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent
Clarita S. Luna.

In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith
informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit
of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures
and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card,
along with the principal card, as a Hot Card or Cancelled Card in its
master file.

On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend,

a Filipino-American, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant
of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis
presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly
had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card
Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in
cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by
this incident.

In a letter, dated 11 October 1988, private respondent Luis Luna,

through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages.
Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's
apologies to Luis. In his letter, dated 03 November 1988, Festejo, in
part, said: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost,
FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its
unauthorized use (such as tagging the card as hot listed, as it is always
our intention to protect our cardholders. An investigation of the case
however, revealed that FAREASTCARD failed to inform you about its
security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Bank's
Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have
been you who was presenting the card at that time for which reason, the
unfortunate incident occurred.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.

Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed
in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault which is
presumed of the common carrier.

Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally

inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the
trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any
deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private
respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give
personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or
bad faith.

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a

wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different
from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or ill will.

Issue:
Whether or not the award of moral damages made by the court a quo,
affirmed by the appellate court, to be inordinate and substantially devoid
of legal basis.
Ruling:
Yes, the exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration
is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article
1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the
deceased passenger to demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil. 84,
Resolution on motion to reconsider, September 11, 1958. But the
exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where
the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable
unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We
think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does
not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the
part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of
such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of
Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore,
without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as
required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the
law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the
obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the
time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or
wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. It
is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary,
that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220
they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad
faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to
amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's
bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the
contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-
delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit
the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-
existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine,
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly
govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute
an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test whether a
quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract can be
stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two
parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort
by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the
application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private
respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual
relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of
cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.

Calalas vs. Sunga, 332 SCRA 356 (2000)

G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

Facts:

Respondent, Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated

by petitioner Vicente Calalas. The jeepney was already filled with
passengers so she was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a
wooden stool at the back of the door. As she was seated at the rear end
of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Unfortunately, a truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured.

Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging

violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise
the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other
hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the truck.

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party

defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver
of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a
contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed
to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate
court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.

Issue:

Whether or not the award of moral damages to Sunga is not supported

by evidence.

Ruling:

No, the argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict
ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle of res judicata does not apply.

Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the
same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his
driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation.

Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly

established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. 2 In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that
the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck
was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause
is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving
breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such
a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of
carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard
to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in
cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides: Art. 1733. Common
carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and
1756. Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that in this case, there is no legal basis for
awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of
the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in
open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a
nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The
fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital
does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his
injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena
that he was the one at fault for the accident. they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.

Picart vs. Smith, Jr. (37 Phil 809)

G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918

Facts:

On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over
said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared
the bridge, he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of
his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge,
he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man
on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity
of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the
right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to
get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided
it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine.
In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant,
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse;
but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge,
got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider
was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability

Picart has appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a

civil obligation to repair the damage done

Ruling:
Yes, the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The
question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a

result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in
a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man
in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed
on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by
an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.

Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

A.C. No. 4058 March 12, 1998

Facts:

For five (5) years up to the time of his death, Jose Bernardo managed a
stall at the Baguio City meat market. On 14 January 1985 at around 7:50
in the morning, Jose together with other meat vendors went out of their
stalls to meet a jeepney loaded with slaughtered pigs in order to select
the meat they would sell for the day. Jose was the very first to reach the
parked jeepney. Grasping the handlebars at the rear entrance of the
vehicle, and as he was about to raise his right foot to get inside, Jose
suddenly stiffened and trembled as though suffering from an epileptic
seizure. Romeo Pimienta who saw Jose thought he was merely joking
but noticed almost in disbelief that he was already turning black. In no
time the other vendors rushed to Jose and they discovered that the
antenna of the jeepney bearing the pigs had gotten entangled with an
open electric wire at the top of the roof of a meat stall. Pimienta quickly
got hold of a broom and pried the antenna loose from the open wire. But
shortly after, Jose released his hold on the handlebars of the jeep only to
slump to the ground. He died shortly in the hospital. Cause of his death
was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain congestion
with petechial hemorrhage, brain bilateral pulmonary edema and
congestion and endocardial petechial hemorrhage and dilation.
In its decision dated 15 August 1994, the trial court ruled in favor of the
Bernardos and ordered BENECO to pay them damages.  Both petitioner
and private respondents herein appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 5
November 1996 the appellate court promulgated its Decision which
BENECO now assails contending inter alia that the appellate court
gravely erred in ordering BENECO to pay damages in light of the clear
evidence that it was third-party defendant Canave's fault or negligence
which was the proximate and sole cause, or at least the principal cause,
of the electrocution and death of Jose Bernardo.

First, BENECO questions the award of damages by respondent court

notwithstanding a clear showing that the electrocution and death of Jose
Bernardo were directly attributable to the fault and negligence of
jeepney owner Guillermo Canave, Jr.

The records of the case show that respondent court did not commit any
reversible error in affirming the findings of the trial court that BENECO
was solely responsible for the untimely death of Jose Bernardo through
accidental electrocution.

Significantly, on cross-examination, Augusto admitted that the service

drop line that BENECO installed did not end at the point to which it is
attached to the G.I. post. Rather, it passed through a spool insulator that
is attached to the post and extended down to where the service entrance
conductor is spliced with the result that the exposed splicing point is
only about eight feet from the ground level.

There is no question that as an electric cooperative holding the exclusive

franchise in supplying electric power to the towns of Benguet province,
its primordial concern is not only to distribute electricity to its
subscribers but also to ensure the safety of the public by the proper
maintenance and upkeep of its facilities. It is clear to us then that
BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving unprotected and uninsulated
the splicing point between the service drop line and the service entrance
conductor, which connection was only eight feet from the ground level,
in violation of the Philippine Electrical Code.
BENECO theorizes in its defense that the death of Jose Bernardo could
be attributed to the negligence of Canave, Jr., in parking his jeepney so
close to the market stall which was neither a parking area nor a loading
area, with his antenna so high as to get entangled with an open wire
above the Dimasupil store.  But this line of defense must be discarded.
Canave's act of parking in an area not customarily used for that purpose
was by no means the independent negligent act adverted to by BENECO
in citing Manila Electric Co. v. Ronquillo.  Canave was well within his
right to park the vehicle in the said area where there was no showing that
any municipal law or ordinance was violated nor that there was any
foreseeable danger posed by his act. One thing however is sure, no
accident would have happened had BENECO installed the connections
in accordance with the prescribed vertical clearance of fifteen feet.

Second. BENECO avers that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in

awarding P864,000.00 as net income loss for the thirty (30) years
remaining of the life expectancy of the deceased Jose Bernardo, albeit
the trial court found no firm basis for awarding this item of damages.

Contrary to the assertion of BENECO, there is ample basis for the fixing
of damages incurred by the heirs of the deceased. Notwithstanding the
failure of private respondent Bernardo to present documentary evidence
to support her claim, the unrebutted testimony of Rosita Noefe supplied
this deficiency. Indeed, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of
Rosita's testimony considering that she owned the very same stall that
Jose was operating and managing before his death. Her testimony on the
earning capacity of Jose is enough to establish the rationale for the
award.

The discrepancy between private respondent Bernardo's claims

regarding her husband's income as contained in the complaint, where she
alleged that Jose was earning no less than P150.00 a day, and her
testimony during trial that he earned P300.00 daily, could not obviate the
fact that at the time of his death Jose was earning a living as a meat
vendor. Undoubtedly, his untimely death deprived his family of his
potential earnings. The allegation in the complaint fixing his income at
P150.00 a day was corroborated by the unqualified declaration of Rosita
Noefe that he was earning P150.00 to P200.00 a day. Obviously, the
bloated figure of P300.00 given by private respondent Bernardo was an
afterthought perhaps impelled by the prospect of being awarded a
greater sum.

The court now fix Jose's daily gross income at P150.00 or his annual
gross income at P54,000.00. After deducting personal expenses,
household and other family obligations, we can safely assume that his
annual net income at the time of death was P27,000.00 or 50% of his
yearly gross earnings of P54,000.00.

Issue:

Whether or not the exemplary damages should not be awarded as the

amount claimed was not specified in the body nor in the prayer of the
complaint, in contravention of the mandate in Rule 11 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines implementing BP 129 which requires the amount
of damages to be specifically alleged apparently for the purpose of
computing the docket fees.

Ruling:

No, BENECO's contention deserves no merit. The amount of exemplary

damages need not be pleaded in the complaint because the same cannot
be predetermined. One can merely ask that it be fixed by the court as the
evidence may warrant and be awarded at its own discretion

The court is not unaware of the principle laid down in Tacay v. Regional
Trial Court of Tagum where the trial court was ordered to either
expunge the unspecified claim for exemplary damages or allow the
private respondent to amend the complaint within a reasonable time and
specify the amount corresponding docket fees. However, we prefer not
to expunge the claim for exemplary damages and pursue the Tacay lead,
for to delete the claim for exemplary damages would be to give premium
to BENECO's gross negligence while to order the amendment of the
complaint would be to unjustly delay the proceedings and prolong
further the almost fifteen-year agony of the intended beneficiaries.

Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for

the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. It is awarded as a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages are awarded
when the act or omission which caused injury is attended by gross
negligence.  Gross negligence has been defined as negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in
a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as
other persons may be affected. 18

In the instant case, there is a clear showing of BENECO's gross

negligence when it failed to detect, much less to repair, for an
inexcusably long period of (7) years the uninsulated connection which
caused the death of Jose Bernardo. The gravity of its ineptitude was
compounded when it installed the service drop line way below the
prescribed minimum vertical clearance of fifteen (15) feet. Again,
precautionary measures were not taken in wanton disregard of the
possible consequences. Under these circumstances, we find no reason to
disturb the finding of respondent court awarding exemplary damages to
private respondent Bernardo in the amount of P20,000.00.

BENECO also questioned the grant of moral damages and attorney's

fees on the same ground of non-culpability. It is settled that moral
damages are not intended to enrich the complainant but to serve to
obviate his/her spiritual suffering by reason of the culpable action of the
defendant. Its award is aimed at the restoration of the spiritual status quo
ante, and it must be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. As a result
of the accidental death of Jose, his widow Caridad and their three (3)
minor children had to scrounge for a living in order to keep their heads
above water. Caridad had to depend on the generosity of her relatives
which came intermittently and far between and augment whatever she
received from them with her meager income from her small business.
She must have agonized over the prospect of raising her three (3) small
children all by herself given her unstable financial condition. For the
foregoing reasons, we sustain the award of moral damages by
respondent court except as to the amount thereof. In the instant case, we
are of the opinion that moral damages

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Court of Appeals,

et al.

G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989

Facts:

This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the
former Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by private
respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained
in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of
earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by
PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the
open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness
and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident,
respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs
and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent
husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was
shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries
sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence
and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R.
Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor which
undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit
system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte
alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no
manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the
negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. In answer
thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the
accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the
terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with
barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night
along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of
excavations.

On September 25, 1979, the Special Second Division of the Court of

Appeals rendered a decision in said appealed case, with Justice Corazon
Juliano Agrava as ponente, reversing the decision of the lower court and
dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It held that respondent
Esteban’s spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner
PLDT from the claim for damages

On April 30,1980 petitioner PLDT filed an opposition to and/or motion

to dismiss said second motion for reconsideration.  The Court of
Appeals, in view of the divergent opinions on the resolution of the
second motion for reconsideration, designated two additional justices to
form a division of five. On September 3, 1980, said division of five
promulgated its resolution, penned by Justice Mariano A. Zosa, setting
aside the decision dated September 25, 1979, as well as the resolution
dated, January 24,1980, and affirming in toto the decision of the lower
court.
On September 19, 1980, petitioner PLDT filed a motion to set aside
and/or for reconsideration of the resolution of September 3, 1980,
contending that the second motion for reconsideration of private
respondent spouses was filed out of time and that the decision of
September 25, 1979 penned by Justice Agrava was already final. It
further submitted therein that the relationship of Barte and petitioner
PLDT should be viewed in the light of the contract between them and,
under the independent contractor rule, PLDT is not liable for the acts of
an independent contractor. On May 11, 1981, respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated its resolution denying said motion to set aside
and/or for reconsideration and affirming in toto the decision of the lower
court dated October 1, 1974.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent court erred in reversing the aforesaid

decision and resolution and in misapplying the independent contractor
rule in holding PLDT liable to respondent Esteban’s spouses.

Ruling:

No, the findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife
but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and
assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and
prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some
alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the
accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the
public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not
the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of
respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the
placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the
proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have
prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge
PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and
necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his
own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last
clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson
Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had knowledge of
the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence
that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible
for the consequences of his imprudence.

Moreover, the court also sustain the findings of respondent Court of

Appeals in its original decision that there was insufficient evidence to
prove any negligence on the part of PLDT.

The court has for consideration only the self-serving testimony of

respondent Antonio Esteban and the unverified photograph of merely a
portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report of the
incident and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital
where private respondents were allegedly treated have not even been
satisfactorily explained.

Layugan vs. IAC, 167 SCRA 363

G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988

Facts:
Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya,he and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck
which was parked along the right side of the National Highway.
Defendant' struck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the
plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. Due to
said injuries, his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to
walk. Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the
vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant
said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a
brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; that the truck
allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half
of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the
curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the
driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device,-
Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities
of a driver; that before leaving, he checked the truck. The truck
owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck
being repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at
a stop position. From the evidence presented, it has been established
clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by
defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. Serrano also testified that, “When I
was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with
round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function with my
many attempts. I have found out later that the fluid pipe on the
rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function”. Plaintiff
points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the
driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof of
care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked
cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing
the flat tire of the said truck.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant driver Serrano was negligent and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.

Ruling:

No, findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily
be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions
provided by the Court to merit review of the facts.

This is a question of fact. But this case is an exception since: 1) the

finding are grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, or conjecture;
2)the inference made is manifestly mistaken, 3) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and 6) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted on record. Hence, SC entertained
review of the factual question.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Negligence defined as the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that the absence
or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear
and convincing evidence. Whether cargo truck was parked along the
road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into
account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
lamp placed 34m from the back of the truck. But despite this
warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still bumped the rear of
the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident
Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.

Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 118231. July 5, 1996

Facts:

September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin with the assistance of Dr. Doris
Teresita Sy who was also a Resident Physician at the same Hospital, C.I.
and O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses performed a
simple cesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros Oriental
Provincial Hospital and after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first
Child, Rachel Acogido. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained confined at the
Hospital until September 27, 1988 during which period of confinement
she was regularly visited by Dr. Batiquin. On September 28, 1988 Mrs.
Villegas checked out of the Hospital and on the same day she paid Dr.
Batiquin, thru the latter’s secretary, the amount of P1,500.00 as
professional fee.

Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal
pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her
appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter’s polyclinic who
prescribed for her certain medicines which she had been taking up to
December, 1988.

In the meantime, Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical Certificate by Dr.

Batiquin on October 31, 1988 certifying to her physical fitness to return
to her work on November 7, 1988. On the second week of November,
1988 Mrs. Villegas returned to her work at the Rural Bank of Ayungon,
Negros Oriental.

The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs.
Villegas no end and despite the medications administered by Dr.
Batiquin. When the pains become unbearable and she was rapidly losing
weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child’s Hospital in
Dumaguete City on January 20, 1989.

The evidence of Plaintiffs shows that when Dr. Ma. Salud Kho
examined Mrs. Villegas at the Holy Child’s Hospital on January 20,
1989 she found Mrs. Villegas to be feverish, pale and was breathing fast.
Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the
umbilicus which she suspected to be either a tumor of the uterus or an
ovarian cyst, either of which could be cancerous. She had an x-ray taken
of Mrs. Villegas chest, abdomen and kidney. She also took blood tests of
Plaintiff. A blood count showed that Mrs. Villegas had infection inside
her abdominal cavity. The results of all those examinations impelled Dr.
Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to which the
latter agreed.

The petitioners emphasize that the private respondents never reconciled

Dr. Kho’s testimony with Dr. Batiquin’s claim on the witness stand that
when Dr. Batiquin confronted Dr. Kho about the foreign body, the latter
said that there was a piece of rubber but that she threw it away. Although
hearsay, Dr. Batiquin’s claim was not objected to, and hence, the same is
admissible but it carries no probative value. Nevertheless, assuming
otherwise, Dr. Batiquin’s statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho
found a piece of rubber near private respondent Villegas’s uterus. And
even if we were to doubt Dr. Kho as to what she did to the piece of
rubber, i.e., whether she threw it away or sent it to Cebu City, we are not
justified in distrusting her as to her recovery of a piece of rubber from
private respondent Villegas’s abdomen. On this score, it is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some
facts and disbelieve his testimony with respect to other facts. And it has
been aptly said that even when a witness it found to have deliberately
falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of
his uncorroborated testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof
deemed worthy of belief may be credited
It is here worth nothing that the trial court paid heed to the following
portions of Dr. Batiquin’s testimony: that no rubber drain was used in
the operation, and that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin’s
gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing
her gloves. Moreover, the trial court pointed out that the absence of a
rubber drain was corroborated by Dr. Doris Sy, Dr. Batiquin’s assistant
during the operation on private respondent Villegas. But the trial court
failed to recognize that the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and Sy were
denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive
testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Of course, as the
petitioners advocate, such positive testimony must come from a credible
source, which leads the court to the second assigned error.

While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured

Dr. Kho’s testimony, a reading of the said testimony reveals no such
infirmity and establishes Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was
frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. Furthermore, no motive
to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her
trustworthiness unimpaired. The trial court’s following declaration
shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. Kho
handled the piece of rubber, it was not prepared to doubt Dr. Kho’s
credibility, thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. Kho’s
trustworthiness.rob1s virtual 1aw library

According to the court, this is not to say that she was less than honest
when she testified about her findings, but it can also be said that she did
not take the most appropriate precaution to preserve that "piece of
rubber" as an eloquent evidence of what she would reveal should there
be a "legal problem" which she claims to have anticipated.

Issue:

Whether or not ipsa loquitor is applicable in this case.

Ruling:
Yes, this doctrine, res ipsa loquitur stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care.

The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that

defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant’s exclusive control, and
that the accident was one which ordinary does not happen in absence of
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence
of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the
accident happened provided the character of the accident and
circumstances attending it led reasonably to belief that in the absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused
injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the
alleged wrongdoer.

Under this doctrine the happening of an injury permits an inference of

negligence where the plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the
injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive
control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such
that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care
had been used.

In this case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present.
First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents
were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause
of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas’s
body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the
intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which
could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus,
it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the
cesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this
regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from
resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable
for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent
Villegas’s abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

As a final word, this Court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the
medical profession plays in the lives of the people, and State’s
compelling interest to enact measures to protect the public from" the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma."
Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients "with the
greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill."
Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of
Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession’s rigid ethical code and
in contravention of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in the
general, and members of the medical profession, in particular.

Castilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vasquez, Jr., et al.

G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999

Facts:

On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So

Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña
Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic
in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other
hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no.
GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car
out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he
made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad

collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.

On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It

was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party
(Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills,
professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the

accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action
for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose
Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action,
Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the
medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa
Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and
petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay
jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of P8,000.00 for
burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2) Cebu
Doctor's Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and
hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27 July 1989 until fully paid,
plus the costs of litigation.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's
death was caused by the negligence of petitioner's employee who was
driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home
from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for
the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the
fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article
2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They
moreover argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount
of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was
borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceased's
wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out
that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds:
(1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the Court of
Appeals by registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement of the dates of the
expiration of the original reglementary period and of the filing of the
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.

For its part, respondent Cebu Doctor's Hospital maintains that petitioner
CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent
death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home
from taking snacks after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although
the incident occurred when ABAD was not working anymore "the
inescapable fact remains that said employee would not have been
situated at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner to
do overtime work." Moreover, since petitioner adopted the evidence
adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latter's employer, inveigle itself
from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by the records of the
case, which it failed to refute.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of

any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin
Abad.
Ruling:

Yes, Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not
engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said
provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.

Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The

phrase "even though the former is not engaged in any business or
industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that
it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting
within the scope of his assigned task.

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine

what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise;
and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged
in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts
of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the
occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses
negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned
task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage
and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the
employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as
they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of
their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different
hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.

The court do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.

The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the

employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle.

Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity
require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.

Caedo, et al. vs. Yu Khe Thai, et al.

G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

Facts:

Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning
of March 24, 1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San
Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several members of his family
were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car
of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two
cars were traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead
of the Cadillac was a carretela. Defendant’s driver did not notice it until
he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the
carretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of
passing by the carretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream
of the carretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded
obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid
the collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred just the
same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff brought
an action for damages against both the driver and owner of
the Cadillac car. There was no question that defendant’s driver was
negligent and liable.

In the meantime, the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the
opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping
altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left
in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear
bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off
and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane,
where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen
the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac
would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble, beat
the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or
else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either
way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was
moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu
Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw
the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve
to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite
lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was
insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of
the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the
unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by
going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken
at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved
shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael
Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages
suffered by the plaintiffs.

Issue:
Whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily
liable with the driver.

Ruling:

No, In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo
had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been
employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over
ten years. During that time, he had no record of violation of traffic laws
and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be
imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must
be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident,
that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which
not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to
act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The
car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The
road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There
was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He
had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became
aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve
meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute
negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did
see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden
decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that
another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time
element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe
Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The
thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden
warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the
situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence
of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is,
to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a
uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers.
In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire
other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or
endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to
appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are
continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent
omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the
prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily
so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly
equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of
skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test
of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to
do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in
order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent
a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught
with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who,
by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be
effectively proscribed.

BLT Bus co. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.

G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988

Facts:

The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas
Bus Company, BLTB, for brevity driven by Armando Pon and Bus No.
404 of Superlines Transportation Company (Superlines, for brevity)
driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway traversing Barangay
Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon in the afternoon of August 11, 1978, which
collision resulted in the death of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and
Romeo Neri and in several injuries to Nena Rosales (wife of Anecito)
and Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046. The
evidence shows that as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the bend of
the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as Bus No. 404 of
Superlines was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus,
Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt to
slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his proper lane. It was
an unsuccessful try as the two buses collided with each other.

Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the
deceased Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri instituted
separate cases in the Court of First Instance of Marinduque against
BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers praying for
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs. Criminal
cases against the drivers of the two buses were filed in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon.

Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and
Dasco, denied liability by claiming that they exercised due care and
diligence and shifted the fault, against each other. They all interposed
counterclaims against the plaintiffs and crossclaims against each other.

After trial on the merits, the lower court exonerated defendants

Superlines and its driver Dasco from liability and attributed sole
responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon, and ordered them
jointly and severally to pay damages to the plaintiffs. Defendants BLTB
and Armando Pon appealed from the decision of the lower court to
respondent appellate court which affirmed with modification the
judgment of the lower court as earlier stated.

Issue:

Whether or not the intermediate appellate court erred in adjudging that

the actions of the private respondents are based on culpa contractual.
Ruling:

No, Petitioners' contentions deserve no merit. A reading of the

respondent court's decision shows that it anchored petitioners' liability
both on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana, to wit:

The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and
injuries to two of the passengers of BLTB was the negligence of the
driver of the BLTB bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus by
overtaking a Ford Fiera car as he was negotiating the ascending bend of
the highway; Exhibit 6 Superlines, which was divided into two lanes by
a continuous yellow strip. The driver of the BLTB bus admitted in his
cross-examination that the continuous yellow line on the ascending bend
of the highway signifies a no-overtaking zone. It is no surprise then that
the driver of the Superlines bus was exonerated by the lower court. He
had a valid reason to presuppose that no one would overtake in such a
dangerous situation. These facts show that patient imprudence of the
BLTB driver.

It is well settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose
of overtaking another vehicle in ordinary situation has the duty to see
that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.

Before attempting to pass the vehicle ahead, the rear driver must see that
the road is clear and if there is no sufficient room for a safe passage, or
the driver ahead does not turn out so as to afford opportunity to pass, or
if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that
he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed
so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if
necessary. The above rule becomes more particularly applicable in this
case when the overtaking took place on an ascending curved highway
divided into two lanes by a continuous yellow line. Appellant Pon
should have remembered that:

When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is

special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver
has not the right to drive on the left-hand side relying upon having time
to turn to the right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction
comes into view.

Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving

a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. In failing to observe these simple
precautions, BLTB's driver undoubtedly failed to act with the diligence
demanded by the circumstances.

Petitioners also contend that "a common carrier is not an absolute

insurer against all risks of travel and are not liable for acts or accidents
which cannot be foreseen or inevitable and that responsibility of a
common carrier for the safety of its passenger prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code is not susceptible of a precise and
definite formulation." Petitioners' contention holds no water because
they had totally failed to point out any factual basis for their defense
of force majeure in the light of the undisputed fact that the cause of the
collision was the sole negligence and recklessness of petitioner Armando
Pon. For the defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the
accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively without human
intervention.

Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

GR No 1719 1907

Facts:

This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro
laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting
iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the
Malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in
this work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails,
each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards
to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the
plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides.
According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by
a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the
tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the
plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the
knee.

This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident
happened through the negligence of the defendant. The detailed
description by the defendant's witnesses of the construction and quality
of the track proves that if was up to the general stranded of tramways of
that character, the foundation consisting on land of blocks or crosspieces
of wood, by 8 inches thick and from 8 to 10 feet long laid, on the surface
of the ground, upon which at a right angle rested stringers of the same
thickness, but from 24 to 30 feet in length. On the across the stringers
the parallel with the blocks were the ties to which the tracks were
fastened. After the road reached the water's edge, the blocks or
crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped by timbers extending
from one side to the other. The tracks were each about 2 feet wide and
the two inside rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It was
admitted that there were no side pieces or guards on the car; that where
no ends of the rails of the track met each other and also where the
stringers joined, there were no fish plates. the defendant has not
effectually overcome the plaintiff's proof that the joints between the rails
were immediately above the joints between the underlying stringers.

The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which
was the immediate occasion of the accident, is not clear in the evidence,
but is found by the trial court and is admitted in the briefs and in the
argument to have been the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under
the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. The
superintendent of the company attributed it to the giving way of the
block laid in the sand. No effort was made to repair the injury at the time
of the occurrence. According to plaintiffs’ witnesses, a depression of the
track, varying from one half inch to one inch and a half, was thereafter
apparent to the eye, and a fellow workman of the plaintiff swears that
the day before the accident he called the attention of McKenna, the
foreman, to it and asked by simply straightening out the crosspiece,
resetting the block under the stringer and renewing the tie, but otherwise
leaving the very same timbers as before. It has not proven that the
company inspected the track after the typhoon or had any proper system
of inspection.

In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to

show a breach of duty on its part in failing either to properly secure the
load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway
or to maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair
the roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the
failure of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its
condition, that the judge below based his judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not the company is liable.

Ruling:

Yes. the negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what

extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two
particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First, that having noticed the depression in the track he continued his
work;
Second, that he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as
to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American
rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they
not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the
workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made
known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of
this particular load. On this contradiction of proof, the court think that
the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent
of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the
disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in
some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary
cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those
acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing
under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages that is,
the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an
employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal
action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative
primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having
been taken; the civil action may proceed to judgment; LIABILITY OF
EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to
his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted
in Philippine jurisprudence; and FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua
cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule,"
exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the
negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in
Philippine jurisprudence. 

Afiada vs. Hisole (85 Phil 67)

G.R. No. L-2075   November 29, 1949
Facts:

This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal.

The complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was
employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a
fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March
21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his
injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force
majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon
him for support. Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of action, and the motion
having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal.

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil
Code, which reads: the possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should
escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise
from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.

Issue:
Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker.
Ruling:
Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage
caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if
he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code.
Claiming that the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends
that the article 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to the
caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been
negligent or at fault.

In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of
the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which
he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.

In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his

Commentaries the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline
which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said
tribunal declared to be "a veritable accident of labor" which should come
under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 of the Civil Code.
The present action, however, is not brought under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, there being no allegation that, among other things,
defendant's business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of
P20,000. As already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article
1905 of the Civil Code. but action under that article is not tenable for the
reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be based on
article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or
negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that
caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those
points.
Spouses Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District (104 Phil 397)

G.R. No. L-7664   August 29, 1958

Facts:
Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its
Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for
which a nominal fee is charged. 14-year-old Dominador Ong drowned
while swimming in one of those pools.
Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was drowned in one of its
swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own
negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its
employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under
the circumstances.
In the evening of July 5, 1952, the incident was investigated by the
Police Department of Quezon City and in the investigation boys Ruben
Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr. gave written statements. On the following
day, July 6, 1952, an autopsy was performed by Dr. Enrique V. de los
Santos, Chief, Medico Legal Division, National Bureau of Investigation,
who found in the body of the deceased the following: an abrasion on the
right elbow lateral aspect; contusion on the right forehead; hematoma on
the scalp, frontal region, right side; a congestion in the brain with
petechial subcortical hemorrhage, frontal lobe; cyanosis on the face and
on the nails; the lung was soggy with fine froth in the bronchioles; dark
fluid blood in the heart; congestion in the visceral organs, and brownish
fluid in the stomach. The death was due to asphyxia by submersion in
water.
Issue:
Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to
recover damages.
Ruling:
No, there is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all
necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or
prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown
that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy
roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The
bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear
visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area
certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee
employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for
that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. There is a male
nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen
resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in
case of emergency.

The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved
from the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything
possible to bring him back to life, from manual resuscitation to calling
for a doctor. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is
humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong
and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.

The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article

2080 of the new Civil Code. The first article provides that “whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done.” Such fault or
negligence is called quasi-delict. Under the second article, this
obligation is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable
negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming
damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the
fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or
of one of his employees.

Also, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be used against the
respondent. The court do not see how this doctrine may apply
considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the
big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor
Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to
drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what
happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of
last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears
that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. Or, “As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the
last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person
which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences of the accident.”

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool
and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in
violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the
pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as
soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the
body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in
order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the
application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability
to appellee.
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged
is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the
party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

Ferrer, et al. vs. Ericta, et al

G.R. No. L-41767 August 23, 1978

Facts:

In a complaint for damages against respondents, dated December 27,

1974 but actually filed on January 6, 1975, and assigned to the Sala of
respondent Judge, it was alleged that defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis
Pfleider, residents of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, were the owners or
operators of a Ford pick-up car; that on December 31, 1970, in the
streets of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, their son, defendant Dennis
Pfleider, who was then only sixteen years of age, without proper official
authority, drove the above-described vehicle, without due regard to
traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution
to prevent injury to persons or damage to property, and as a consequence
the pickup car was overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff
Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein, which injuries
paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at
different hospitals for more than two years; that as a result of the
physical injuries sustained by Annette, she suffered unimaginable
physical pain, mental anguish, and her parents also suffered mental
anguish, moral shock and spent a considerable sum of money for her
treatment. They prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse them for
actual expenses as well as other damages.

In due time, defendants filed their answer, putting up the affirmative

defense that defendant Dennis Pfleider exercised due care and utmost
diligence in driving the vehicle aforementioned and alleging that
Annette Ferrer and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not
passengers in the strict sense of the term, but were merely joy riders and
that, consequently, defendants had no obligation whatsoever to
plaintiffs.

Private respondents filed a motion to set aside the order of default and
subsequent pleadings on the ground that defendants' failure to appear for
pre-trial was due to accident or excusable neglect. This was opposed by
petitioners on the ground that the said pleading was not under oath,
contrary to the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules, and that it
was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit showing that the
defendants have a good defense. In view of this, the motion of private
respondents was denied by respondent Judge. On the same date,
respondent Judge rendered judgment against private respondents,
finding that the minor Dennis Pfleider, was allowed by his parents to
operate a Ford pick-up car and because of his reckless negligence caused
the accident in question, resulting in injuries to Annette, and ordering the
defendants, as a result thereof, to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs
the following amounts: P24,500.00 for actual expenses, hospitalization
and medical expenses; P24,000.00 for actual expenses for the care,
medicines of plaintiff Annette for helps from December 31, 1970 to
December 31, 1974; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages; P5,000.00 for attorney's fees; and costs of suit.

A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently filed by

defendants-private respondents, alleging that their defense of
prescription has not been waived and may be raised even at such stage of
the proceedings because on the face of the complaint, as well as from the
plaintiff's evidence, their cause of action had already prescribed.

The Opposition to the above supplemental motion interposed by

plaintiffs-petitioners averred that: the defense of prescription had been
waived while the defense that the complaint states no cause of action is
available only at any time not later than the trial and prior to the
decision; inasmuch as defendants have been declared in default for
failure to appear at the pretrial conference, they have lost their standing
in court and cannot be allowed to adduce evidence nor to take part in the
trial, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court; and
the motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration are pro
forma because the defenses raised therein have been previously raised
and passed upon by respondent court in resolving defendants' motion to
set aside order of default. Being pro forma, said motion and
supplemental motion do not suspend the running of the thirty-day period
to appeal, which was from August 5, 1975, when defendants received a
copy of the decision, to September 4, 1975, and hence the decision has
already become final and executory. Plaintiffs-petitioners accordingly
prayed that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the judgment in their
favor.

Issue:

Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private

respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.

Ruling:

No, the court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground of

prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer of the
plaintiff. Thus, this Court held that where the answer does not
take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant's
claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in the
answer does not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. It was
explained that the defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense
raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading.

In Philippine National Bank v. Perez, et al., which was an action filed by

the Philippine National Bank on March 22, 1961 for revival of a
judgment rendered on December 29, 1949 against Amando Perez,
Gregorio Pumuntoc and Virginia de Pumuntoc pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 39 of the rules of court the defendants were declared in default for
their failure to file their answer. There upon, the plaintiff submitted its
evidence, but when the case was submitted for decision, the court a
quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of
action had already prescribed under Articles 1144 and 1152 of the Civil
Code. The plaintiff in said case, contending that since prescription is a
defense that can only be set up by defendants, the court could not motu
proprio consider it as a basis for dismissal, moved to reconsider the
order, but its motion was denied. When the issue was raised to this
Court,

The court ruled that it is true that the defense of prescription can only be
considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant
and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because
the defendants had been declared in default, but such rule does riot
obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which
plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of
limitations.

Kramer, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (178 SCRA 518)

G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989

Facts:
The record of the case discloses that in the early morning of April 8,
1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto
Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque
to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the
boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia
Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines,
Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking
with it its fish catch. After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed
their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the
Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the
purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime

The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch
was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private
respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the
collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a
subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard
dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia
Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine
officer.

After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective
marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast
Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of
determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision. The Board
concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent
who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The
findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision
of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982
wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended
from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.

The petitioners contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and

characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and
experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can
properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of
the prescriptive period was told by the filing of the marine protest and
that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when
the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia
Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period
under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said
date. The petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was
filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably filed.

The Court finds reason in the argument of the plaintiff that marine
incidents have those 'peculiarities which only persons of special skill,
training and exposure can rightfully decipher and resolve on the matter
of the negligence and liabilities of parties involved and inasmuch as the
report of the Board of Inquiry admittedly came out only on April 29,
1982, the prescriptive period provided under Art. 1146 of the Civil Code
should begin to run only from that date. The complaint was filed with
this Court on May 10, 1985; hence the statute of limitations cannot
constitute a bar to the filing of this case

Issue:

Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners

against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred
by the statute of limitations.

Ruling:

Yes, it is clear that the cause of action of private respondent, the herein
petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer accrued from the
occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages
were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from which
relief from the court is presently sought. Private respondents should have
immediately instituted a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict
within four years from the said marine incident because its cause of
action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision. For
this reason, he could cite the negligence on the part of the personnel of
the petitioner to exercise due care and lack of diligence to prevent the
collision that resulted in the total loss of their boat.

The court can only extend scant consideration to respondent judge's

reasoning that in view of the nature of the marine collision that allegedly
involves highly technical aspects, the running of the prescriptive period
should only commence from the finality of the investigation conducted
by the Marine Board of Inquiry and the decision of the Commandant,
Philippine Coast Guard, who has original jurisdiction over the mishap.
For one, while it is true that the findings and recommendation of the
Board and the decision of the Commandant may be helpful to the court
in ascertaining which of the parties are at fault, still the court is not
bound by said findings and decision. Indeed, the same findings and
decision could be entirely or partially admitted, modified, amended, or
disregarded by the court according to its lights and judicial discretion.
For another, if the accrual of a cause of action will be made to depend on
the action to be taken by certain government agencies, then necessarily,
the tolling of the prescriptive period would hinge upon the discretion of
such agencies. Said alternative it is easy to foresee would be fraught
with hazards. Their investigations might be delayed and lag and then
witnesses in the meantime might not be available or disappear, or certain
documents may no longer be available or might be mislaid.

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; an
obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can
be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. From the foregoing
ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the
last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of
an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time
when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the
collision of two vessels the four-year prescriptive period must be
counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait
for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine
Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the
other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in
Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the
aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such
negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other
vessel.

Gotesco vs. Chatto, et al (210 SCRA 18)

G.R. No. L-87584 June 16, 1992

Facts:

In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-
year-old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie
"Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco
Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then,
were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing
the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling
of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and
pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl
under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the
street, they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined
and treated for one (1) day. The next day, they transferred to the UST
hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5
to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Due to
continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to
Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the
Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for
about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook
County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times. Defendant tried to avoid
liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was
done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer
from any structural or construction defect.

Issue:

Whether or not Gotesco is liable.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's
balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because
its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give
any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense,
it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force
majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong
could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. As early
as eighty-five (85) years ago, this Court had the occasion to define force
majeure. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the
collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real
reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either
he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the
respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but
an architect who had not even passed the government's examination.
Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to
the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial
court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to
construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this
finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the
accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes
denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time
of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily
discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping
and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr.
Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of
the accident. His answers to the leading questions on inspection
disclosed neither the exact dates of said. inspection nor the nature and
extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building
were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and
certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were
no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever
inspected at all. It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of
public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and
amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed,
the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that
he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by
ordinary or reasonable means. This implied warranty has given rise to
the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and
exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have
happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a
presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant.

National Power Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al

G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993

Facts:

National Power Corporation (NPC) maintains a hydroelectric plant in

the Angat River, Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor. Meanwhile
Rayo et al were residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan.

On the evening of October 26, 1978, NPC allegedly caused the

inundation of a town in Norzagaray when it released water through the
spillways of the Angat Dam at the height of typhoon “Kading” as the
Dam’s water level went beyond the maximum limit. The flooding
resulted to the drowning of the members of the household of Rayo,
together with their animals; their properties were also washed away. The
release of water was made despite NPC’s knowledge of the impending
typhoon, as early as October 24 and its monitoring of the water level.
Rayo et al filed four separate complaints for damages against NPC.

In its answer, NPC argued that the damage caused to Rayo was due to a
fortuitous event, among others. The CFI absolved NPC for lack of
sufficient and credible evidence. The CA reversed, holding NPC and
Chavez jointly and severally liable to Rayo et al. The SC affirmed; NPC
is liable.

Issue:

What was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by Rayo et al?

Ruling:

This issue was already raised in an earlier case involving the same
incident, whereby the SC held that the proximate cause of the damage
was NPC’s negligent act. This ruling was binding on the Court. Also, the
Court found to reason to review the factual findings of the CA.

NPC was duly warned of the typhoon as its coming was published in
headlines of a newspaper of national circulation. There were also radio
announcements regarding the same. Yet NPC maintained a water level
beyond maximum despite its knowledge of the safe level. From October
24, until the Dam’s water release on the evening of October 26, the
water level was maintained at maximum with very little opening of the
spillways. Furthermore, the “early warning notice” given by NPC were
also found insufficient: 1) it did not prepare or warn the residents of the
volume of water to be released, they should have been advised to
evacuate, and 2) it was not given to the proper municipal officials for
dissemination, but rather to a policeman.

On the merits, the SC held that NPC cannot invoke the force majeure or
the act of God doctrine to exempt itself from liability since it was not
entirely free from fault – one of the requisites for the application of Art.
1174 CC, to wit: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation
of the injury to the creditor.

If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there

concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided
for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage,
the obligor cannot escape liability. The principle embodied in the act of
God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When
the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part
the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active
intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby
humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts
of God.
Ramos vs. Pepsi, (19 SCRA 289)

G.R. No. L-22533     February 9, 1967

Facts:

On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. of the P.I and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of
Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the
car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA.
Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son
and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven
by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15,
1961, finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had
not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio,
solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs P2,638.50 actual damages;
P2,000.00 moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and,
P1,000.00 attorney's fees, with costs. Not satisfied with this decision, the
defendants appellee to the Court of Appeals.

The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of

defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first
hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that
when he was hired as a driver, they had size him by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience,
physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take
the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First, theoretical
examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which
he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the
Safety Council. In view hereof, the court is of the sense that defendant
company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
choice or selection of defendant driver.
Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing portion of the decision
under review by taking issue with the testimony of Anasco upon which
the findings of due diligence aforestated are rested. Thus, it is now
contended that Añasco being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and
interested witness; and that his testimony is not believable.

It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would raise herein an issue of

fact and credibility, something as to which this Court has consistently
respected the findings of the Court of Appeals, with some few
exceptions, which do not obtain herein.

Issue:

Whether or not PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the negligent act of its
driver.

Ruling:

Yes, Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia: The owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. The
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. From this article two things are
apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that
in selection and supervision, he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability.
As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not duly proved by
PEPSI-COLA is only due diligence in the selection of its driver. And,
parenthetically, it is not surprising that appellants thus confine their
arguments to this aspect of due diligence, since the record as even
appellants' brief reflects in quoting in part the testimony of PEPSI-
COLA's witness would show sufficient evidence to establish due
diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its drivers, including
Bonifacio.

Appellants' other assignment of errors are likewise outside the purview

of this Court's reviewing power. Thus, the question of whether PEPSI-
COLA violated the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and rules and
regulations related thereto, not having been raised and argued in the
Court of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein for the first time. 6 And
the matter of whether or not PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the
negligent act of its driver is a factual issue not proper herein.

Gatchalian vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger,

respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La
Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the
bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union,
"a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and,
shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of
the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several
passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were
promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union, for
medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to
have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead,
specifically described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion,
elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral surface, leg, left.
The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part
of respondent common carrier. In her direct examination, petitioner
Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle went off the road and
into a ditch, a snapping sound was suddenly heard at one part of the bus.
One of the passengers, an old woman, cried out, "What
happened?" ("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver replied,
nonchalantly, "That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The
driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus.
Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same
"snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This
could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or
mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound"
which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed
to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good
operating condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of
passengers dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious
continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and
safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the
mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry
of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the
physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part
of respondent and his driver.

The first item in that claim relates to revenue which petitioner said she
failed to realize because of the effects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner
maintains that on the day that the mini-bus went off the road, she was
supposed to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a
substitute teacher's job, a job which she had held off and on as a "casual
employee." The Court of Appeals, however, found that at the time of the
accident, she was no longer employed in a public school since, being a
casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off.
Her employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic,
contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In
view of her employment status as such, the Court of Appeals held that
she could not be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by
reason of the accident. Such was the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals, a finding entitled to due respect from this Court. Petitioner
Gatchalian has not submitted any basis for overturning this finding of
fact, and she may not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or
conjecture.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a valid waiver of the cause of action had been
made by petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes, a waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms
thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a
right vested in such person. The degree of explicitness which this Court
has required in purported waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v.
Samar Express Transit, where the Court in reading and rejecting a
purported waiver said:

It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital,

appellees were asked to sign as, in fact, they signed the document
Exhibit I wherein they stated that in consideration of the expenses which
said operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper medical
treatment, the court hereby manifest their desire to waive any and all
claims against the operator of the Samar Express Transit.

Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will

readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim
damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their
contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they expressed
a desire to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making
an actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by
appellant must be clear and unequivocal.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common
carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a
common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, the court must
construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common
carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to
law, morals, public policy or good
customs.  To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by
an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this
case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render
that standard unenforceable. The court believe such a purported waiver
is offensive to public policy.

Petitioner Gatchalian also argues that the Court of Appeals, having by

majority vote held that there was no enforceable waiver of her right of
action, should have awarded her actual or compensatory and moral
damages as a matter of course.

The court noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in

protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common
carrier. In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory
presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted
negligently unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. In fact, because of this statutory
presumption, it has been held that a court need not even make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier in order
to hold it liable.  To overcome this presumption, the common carrier
must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to
prevent the injuries.

Prepared by: Adwana C. Miranda

March 14, 2021