1.

Parafiaque vs CA – 268 SCRA 727

G.R. No. 111538 February 26, 1997
Facts:
Plaintiff is a private corporation organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with principal place of business of
(sic) Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Parañaque, Metro Manila, while defendant
Catalina L. Santos, is of legal age, widow, with residence and postal
address at 444 Plato Street, Ct., Stockton, California, USA, represented
in this action by her attorney-in-fact, Luz B. Protacio, with residence and
postal address at No, 12, San Antonio Street, Magallanes Village,
Makati, Metro Manila, by virtue of a general power of attorney.
Defendant David A. Raymundo, is of legal age, single, with residence
and postal address at 1918 Kamias Street, Damariñas Village, Makati,
Metro Manila, where they (sic) may be served with summons and other
court processes.
Upon the very face of the plaintiff's Complaint itself, it therefore
indubitably appears that the defendant Santos had verily complied with
paragraph 9 of the Lease Agreement by twice offering the properties for
sale to the plaintiff for 1.5 M. The said offers, however, were plainly
rejected by the plaintiff which scorned the said offer as
"RIDICULOUS". There was therefore a definite refusal on the part of
the plaintiff to accept the offer of defendant Santos. For in acquiring the
said properties back to her name, and in so making the offers to sell both
by herself (attorney-in-fact) and through her counsel, defendant Santos
was indeed conscientiously complying with her obligation under
paragraph 9 of the Lease Agreement This is indeed one instance where a
Complaint, after barely commencing to create a cause of action,
neutralized itself by its subsequent averments which erased or
extinguished its earlier allegations of an impending wrong.
Consequently, absent any actionable wrong in the very face of the
Complaint itself, the plaintiff subsequent protestations of collusion is
bereft or devoid of any meaning or purpose.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in

toto the ruling of the trial court, and further reasoned that: Appellant's
protestations that the P15 million price quoted by appellee Santos was
reduced to P9 million when she later resold the leased properties to
Raymundo has no valid legal moorings because appellant, as a
prospective buyer, cannot dictate its own price and forcibly ram it
against appellee Santos, as owner, to buy off her leased properties
considering the total absence of any stipulation or agreement as to the
price or as to how the price should be computed under paragraph 9 of
the lease contract.

Hence this petition. Subsequently, petitioner filed an "Urgent

Motion for the Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Hold Respondent David A. Raymundo in Contempt of
Court." 9 The motion sought to enjoin respondent Raymundo and his
counsel from pursuing the ejectment complaint filed before the barangay
captain of San Isidro, Parañaque, Metro Manila; to direct the dismissal
of said ejectment complaint or of any similar action that may have been
filed; and to require respondent Raymundo to explain why he should not
be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping. The ejectment suit
initiated by respondent Raymundo against petitioner arose from the
expiration of the lease contract covering the property subject of this
case. The ejectment suit was decided in favor of Raymundo, and the
entry of final judgment in respect thereof renders the said motion moot
and academic.

Issue:
Whether or not the aforequoted complaint alleging breach of the
contractual right of "first option or priority to buy" states a valid cause of
action.
Ruling:
 No, the court do not agree with respondents' contention that the
issue involved is purely factual. The principal legal question, as stated
earlier, is whether the complaint filed by herein petitioner in the lower
court states a valid cause of action. Since such question assumes the
facts alleged in the complaint as true, it follows that the determination
thereof is one of law, and not of facts. There is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 

At the outset, petitioner concedes that when the ground for a

motion to dismiss is lack of cause of action, such ground must appear on
the face of the complaint; that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of
action, only the facts alleged in the complaint and no others should be
considered; and that the test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a
petition or complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether, admitting
the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same
in accordance with the prayer of the petition or complaint.

A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a

right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right, and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 12

In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to

support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint
does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause
of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits
of the case. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather
than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite
or uncertain. 
2. Santos vs CA – 337 SCRA 67

G.R. No. 120820             August 1, 2000

Facts:

The spouses Fortunato and Rosalinda Santos owned the house and
lot consisting of 350 square meters located at Lot 7, Block 8, Better
Living Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, as evidenced by TCT (S-
11029) 28005 of the Register of Deeds of Paranaque. The land together
with the house, was mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc., to
secure a loan of P150,000.00 maturing on June 16, 1987. Sometime in
1984, Rosalinda Santos met Carmen Caseda, a fellow market vendor of
hers in Pasay City and soon became very good friends with her. The duo
even became kumadres when Carmen stood as a wedding sponsor of
Rosalinda's nephew.

On June 16, 1984, the bank sent Rosalinda Santos a letter

demanding payment of P16,915.84 in unpaid interest and other charges.
Since the Santos couple had no funds, Rosalinda offered to sell the
house and lot to Carmen. After inspecting the real property, Carmen and
her husband agreed. The other terms and conditions that the parties
agreed upon were for the Caseda spouses to pay: (1) the balance of the
mortgage loan with the Rural bank amounting to P135,385.18; (2) the
real estate taxes; (3) the electric and water bills; and (4) the balance of
the cash price to be paid not later than June 16, 1987, which was the
maturity date of the loan.

The Casedas gave an initial payment of P54,100.00 and

immediately took possession of the property, which they then leased out.
They also paid in installments, P81,696.84 of the mortgage loan. The
Casedas, however, in 1987. Notwithstanding the state of their finances,
Carmen nonetheless paid in March 1990, the real estate taxes on the
property for 1981-1984. She also settled the electric bills from
December 12, 1988 to July 12, 1989. All these payments were made in
the name of Rosalinda Santos. In January 1989, the Santoses, seeing that
the Casedas lacked the means to pay the remaining installments and/or
amortization of the loan, repossessed the property. The Santoses then
collected the rentals from the tenants.

In February 1989, Carmen Caseda sold her fishpond in Batangas.

She then approached petitioners and offered to pay the balance of the
purchase price for the house and lot. The parties, however, could not
agree, and the deal could not push through because the Santoses wanted
a higher price. For understandably, the real estate boom in Metro Manila
at this time, had considerably jacked up realty values.

On August 11, 1989, the Casedas filed Civil Case No. 89-4759,
with the RTC of Makati, to have the Santoses execute the final deed of
conveyance over the property, or in default thereof, to reimburse the
amount of P180,000.00 paid in cash and P249,900.00 paid to the rural
bank, plus interest; as well as rentals for eight months amounting to
P32,000.00, plus damages and costs of suit.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS

JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S APPEAL
INTERPOSING PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAW.

Ruling:

Yes, On the first issue, petitioners argue that, since both the parties and
the appellate court adopted the findings of trial court, no questions of
fact were raised before the Court of Appeals. According to petitioners,
CA-G.R. CV No. 30955, involved only pure questions of law. They aver
that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to hear, much less decide, CA-
G.R. CV No. 30955, without running afoul of Supreme Court Circular.

There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or

difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts, and there
is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. But we note that the first assignment of
error submitted by respondents for consideration by the appellate court
dealt with the trial court's finding that herein petitioners got back the
property in question because respondents did not have the means to pay
the installments and/or amortization of the loan. The resolution of this
question involved an evaluation of proof, and not only a consideration of
the applicable statutory and case laws. Clearly, CA-G.R. CV No. 30955
did not involve pure questions of law, hence the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction and there was no violation of our Circular No. 2-90.

Moreover, we find that petitioners took an active part in the

proceedings before the Court of Appeals, yet they did not raise there the
issue of jurisdiction. They should have raised this issue at the earliest
opportunity before the Court of Appeals. A party taking part in the
proceedings before the appellate court and submitting his case for as
decision ought not to later on attack the court's decision for want of
jurisdiction because the decision turns out to be adversed to him.

3. Republic vs Neri – 424 SCRA 676

G.R. No. 139588             March 4, 2004

Facts:

The petitioner alleged inter alia that it is the true owner of a parcel
of land of the public domain surveyed as Lot No. 2821 (subject lot)
containing an area of 1,055,684 square meters or 105.5684 hectares
situated in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioner also alleged that the
Bureau of Forest and Development had classified the subject lot as
alienable and disposable; as such, it was under the direct executive
control, administration and disposition of the Director of the Bureau of
Lands. Despite the fact that the Solicitor General and the Director of the
Bureau of Lands were not served copies of the respondents’ application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in LRC Case No. N-531, in
violation of Section 51 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the said case
was set for initial hearing on June 18, 1975. The petitioner also averred
that although the survey plan of the subject lot, Plan (LRC) SWO-150,
was processed and approved by the Land Registration Commission, it
was not submitted to the Director of the Bureau of Lands for re-
verification and approval as required by Sections 2 and 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 239. As such, according to the petitioner, the court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the property.

The petitioner prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be

rendered nullifying the proceedings in LRC No. N-531, as well as the
court’s decision therein, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner as well as the property subject matter of the case. According to
the petitioner, this is in view of the court’s failure to comply with
Section 51 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which mandates that a copy
of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title should be
duly served on the Director of the Bureau of Lands; and the private
respondents’ failure to comply with Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239,
which requires the plan to be re-verified and approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands, in this case, Plan (LRC) SWO-150. The petitioner
prayed OCT No. 0662 issued in favor of the private respondents be
declared null and void.

In their answer, the private respondents averred that the subject lot
had been theirs and their predecessors’ private and exclusive property
for more than fifty years, and that OCT No. 0662 covering the same was
issued in their favor on September 20, 1976. The private respondents
contended that the duty to comply with the requirement under Section 51
of CA No. 141, that the Solicitor General through the Director of the
Bureau of Lands be served a copy of the application for the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, devolved upon the clerk of
court of the land registration court. They also averred that a report on the
pre-verification and approval of Plan (LRC) SWO-150 had been
forwarded by the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands to the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. Moreover, Plan (LRC) SWO-150
covering the subject lot had been duly processed and approved by the
Land Registration Commission. According to the respondents, even if
there were deficiencies on the part of the administrative officials in
complying with the procedures relative to land registration, the same
was not jurisdictional, but merely a procedural flaw. As such, the failure
of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission to
comply with the law did not result in nullifying the proceedings in LRC
Case No. N-531. Finally, the respondents countered, the action of the
petitioner had long since prescribed.

Issue:

whether the RTC erred in rendering the decision without a full-blown

trial, based solely on the pleadings of the parties and the documents
appended to their memorandum and whether the decision of the trial
court was made in accordance with law.

Ruling:

Yes, the court agree with the petitioner that the trial court erred in
rendering judgment in favor of the private respondents and that the CA
committed a reversible error in affirming the same.

The CA ruled that the petitioner was burdened to prove that the
issuance of OCT-0662 was marred by irregularities. It further held that a
title issued under the torrens system of registration is presumed valid,
and unless until the petitioner adduced competent and strong evidence to
prove otherwise, government officials such as the personnel of the CFI
and the Land Registration Commission and the Director of the Bureau of
Lands are presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with
law. According to the CA, the petitioner failed to adduce such evidence.
The appellate court took note that the private respondents even appended
documentary evidence to their memorandum showing compliance with
the statutory requirement.

For its part, the petitioner contends that as defendants in the trial
court, it was the burden of the private respondents to prove the existence
of a fact that the land registration court had acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition and over the persons of the respondent
therein; conversely, the private respondents, as applicants therein, were
obliged to adduce in evidence the survey plan approved by the Director
of the Bureau of Lands as required by P.D. Nos. 239 and 1529.
According to the petitioner, there is no presumption in favor of the
jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction, such as a land registration
court. It contends that where the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the
existence of facts, it has no right or power to proceed or act upon a
pleading which does not substantially set forth such facts.

4. Royal Cargo vs DFS – 573 SCRA 414

G.R. NO. 158621 : December 10, 2008
Facts:

From the evidence offered by the parties and their admissions in

their respective pleadings, the Court has clearly gathered that the
plaintiff herein petitioner and the defendant herein respondent are
domestic corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines.
Petitioner is an international freight forwarder, which offers trucking,
brokerage, storage and other services to the public, and serves as conduit
between shippers, consignees, and carriers for the transportation of
cargos from one point of the globe to another. Respondent, on the other
hand, is one of the concessionaires of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). It is principally engaged in the importation and local
sale of duty-free sporting goods and other similar products. Sometime in
October 1993, the respondent engaged the services of the petitioner to
attend and undertake the former's brokerage and trucking requirements.

Between the period from April to July, 1994 petitioner rendered

trucking, brokerage, storage and other services to the respondent in
connection with the latter's importation business, and as a consequence it
incurred expenses for brokerage forms, stamps, notarial fees, arrastre
charges, wharfage fees, storage charges, guarding fees, telegrams, LCL
charges, photostat copies, trucking charges, processing fees, ocean
freight charges, collection fees, brokerage fees, insurance premiums, and
10% VAT, which amounted to the total of P248,449.63, which the
[respondent] fails and refuses to pay despite petitioner's demands.

Respondent filed its Answer with Counterclaim 4 contending that,

except for a single occasion which happened sometime in May 1994, it
never engaged the services of petitioner for the importation of various
products and that it is under no legal obligation to heed the demand of
plaintiff. As counterclaim, respondent alleged that petitioner owes it the
sum of P200,000.00 representing the value of the imported goods
respondent lost by reason of the gross negligence as well as illegal
activities of petitioner in the transshipment of respondent's goods.
Respondent also sought to recover the amount of P44,710.00 which it
gave to petitioner as payment of the taxes and customs duties for the
goods it respondent imported but which were not paid by petitioner.
Respondent prayed for the grant of actual, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees and cost of suit.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE LIES
WITH THE DEBTOR TO PROVE THAT PAYMENT HAS BEEN
MADE.
Ruling:
 Yes, as to the first issue raised, the settled rule is that one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the creditor
alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the onus rests on the debtor
to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation
has been discharged by payment. Where the debtor introduces some
evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as
distinct from the general burden of proof - shifts to the creditor, who is
then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.
Since respondent claims that it had already paid petitioner for the
services rendered by the latter, it follows that the former carries the
burden of proving such payment.

5. Juaban vs Espina – 548 SCRA 588

G.R. No. 170049               March 14, 2008

Facts:

The personality of appellant Rene Espina to sue in his personal

capacity finds basis in the Agreement to Sell and to Buy. It is readily
apparent in the Agreement that he has been designated as the "Second
Party", in his personal capacity, and not as agent or representative of a
corporate entity. On the other hand, the Deed of Sale which was
subsequently executed, is based on the aforesaid Agreement. Therefore,
there is no gainsaying that appellant Rene Espina has a personal interest
in the case.

Respondents’ right to the subject properties is based on the 31

January 1997 Agreement to Sell and to Buy executed between the Heirs
of Bancale and respondent Espina. Hence, the said Agreement is the
very source of the right, the violation of which constituted the cause of
action in respondents’ complaint for injunction before the court a quo. It
was respondent Espina who entered into the Agreement, and his rights
as a party to the said contract were not extinguished just because he
designated his co-respondent CDPI as vendee of the subject properties,
pursuant to the authority given to him in paragraph 5 thereof. Among
respondent Espina’s rights as a party to the Agreement is his right to the
full realization of the purpose of the contract, which in this case, would
be the transfer of the ownership of the subject properties from the Heirs
of Bancale either to him or to his designated vendee. The public auction
sale of the subject properties to petitioners would not only prevent the
intended transfer of ownership under the Agreement, but would also
render inutile respondent Espina’s designation of respondent CPDI as a
vendee. Moreover, it was undisputed that respondent Espina advanced
₱2,000.000 to the Heirs of Bancale, which formed part of the
consideration for the ensuing sale of the subject properties. There was no
proof that respondent Espina had already been reimbursed for the said
amount. Having paid part of the purchase price for the subject
properties, then respondent Espina has an interest therein.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the
court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of
law or fact that has been raised in the court and which is within the
issues framed by the parties.

Ruling:

Yes, the rule, however, does not relate to the nature of the issues
that may be raised on appeal by the aggrieved party, whether issues of
fact or issues of law, or the mode of appeal of the aggrieved party from a
final order or resolution of the trial court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; it merely provides the nature of the issue appellant may
include in his assignment of error incorporated in his Brief as appellant.
It may happen that the appellant may have raised in the trial court errors
of fact or law or both, and need not include all said issues in his appeal
in the appellate court. The appellant has the right to choose which issues
of law he or she may raise in the CA in addition to factual issues already
raised.

A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the

truth or falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a reevaluation of the
credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is
factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which
does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law,
the resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an
appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact
is best left to the appellate court. All doubts as to the correctness of the
conclusions of the appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA
unless it commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.

6. Pp vs Marcos – 212 SCRA 748

G.R. No. 106639 May 31, 1995

Facts:

The antecedent facts leading to the filing of the Information against

the accused: On 26 February 1990, Sgt. Amos Foncardas, a NARCOM
agent and team leader of the operations team, 9th Narcotics Regional
Unit, Zamboanga City, received a report from a resident of Sto. Niño
that a certain Saturnino Solon alias "Mekang" was peddling marijuana in
Sto. Niño. On 28 February 1990 after carrying out surveillance
operations on Solon, Sgt. Foncardas instructed Sgt. Pedro S. Mamuad,
Jr., to conduct a test-buy. As a result, Sgt. Mamuad, Jr., was able to
purchase two (2) sticks of marijuana from Solon. The successful test-buy
prompted Sgt. Foncardas to organize the actual buy-bust operation.
 In their defense, Solon and Sali denied peddling marijuana
cigarettes. They claimed that they were illegally arrested by the
NARCOM agents. Appellant Solon testified that in the afternoon of 1
March 1990 while he and co-appellant Sali were on their way home,
they were suddenly accosted by two (2) persons on board a motorcycle
who identified themselves as NARCOM agents. Another person, Sgt.
Mamuad, Jr, arrived and immediately searched them. The search yielded
nothing. They were then taken to the NARCOM headquarters in Upper
Calarian but were not investigated. Solon also denied having sold two
(2) hand rolled marijuana sticks to Sgt. Mamuad, Jr., on 28 February
1990, the day of the alleged test-buy. Appellant Sali for his part
corroborated the testimony of Solon, adding that nothing was taken from
him when he and Solon were searched immediately after their arrest. 

Issue:

Whether or not both appellants were arrested without any valid ground.

Ruling:

No, the claim of both appellants that they were arrested without
any valid ground cannot be given credence. Their defense of denial or
frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of The
Dangerous Drug Act.  Such denial cannot prevail over their positive
identification as peddlers of marijuana, as well as over the detailed and
unshaken testimonies of the apprehending officers who caught them red-
handed. Besides, it has not been shown that the government agents had
any ulterior motive to testify falsely against appellants. 

There is nothing unusual with selling prohibited drugs to complete

strangers openly and in public places.  The Court has decided a number
of cases where the buy-bust operation was undertaken in such public
areas as markets and billiard halls even in broad daylight.  Drug pushers
do not confine their nefarious trade to known customers. Complete
strangers are accommodated provided they have the money to pay.
There was no need to present the informant in court since the sale of the
marijuana was adequately proven by the prosecution witnesses who
were members of the buy-bust team, particularly the poseur-buyer.  At
best the testimony of the informant if presented would be merely
corroborative.

7. Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs Pasag – 522 SCRA 410

G.R. NO. 155483 : April 27, 2007
Facts:

The instant case arose from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity

of Documents and Titles, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
Reconveyance, Partition and Damages filed by petitioners at the
Urdaneta City RTC of Pangasinan against respondents. Petitioners
alleged a share over three (3) properties owned by respondents, which
formed part of the estate of petitioners' deceased grandparents, Benito
and Florentina Pasag. They averred that Benito and Florentina Pasag
died intestate, thus, leaving behind all their properties to their eight
children Pedro, Isidro, Basilio, Severino, Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita, and
Fortunata. However, Severino, the predecessor of respondents, claimed
in an affidavit of self-adjudication that he is the sole, legal, and
compulsory heir of Benito and Florentina Pasag. Consequently, he was
able to appropriate to himself the properties covered by Original
Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. 2983 and 1887. Thereafter, Severino
executed a deed of absolute sale over the said properties in favor of his
daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha. Moreover, petitioners alleged
that Severino used the same affidavit of self-adjudication to secure a free
patent over an agricultural land that had long been under the possession
of Benito and Florentina Pasag.

In denying the material allegations in the Complaint, respondents

averred in their Answer that the properties left behind by the spouses
Benito and Florentina Pasag had already been partitioned among their
eight (8) surviving children. They claimed that the parcels of land
covered by OCT Nos. 2983 and 1887 are Bonifacio's share of which he
later on renounced in a Quitclaim Deed in favor of his brother, Severino.
As regards the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-20607, respondents
asserted that the said land had been in Severino's possession and
occupation since 1940, thus, giving him the right to apply for and be
granted a free patent over it. Having complied with the requirements of
law, Severino's title had now become indefeasible.

Issue:

Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals committed reversible

error in affirming the Decision of the Court a quo despite the gross
negligence of their counsel thus depriving their rights to due process.

Ruling:

No, the petition has no merit.

Waiver of the Offer of Evidence

The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no

evidence which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is
necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties
at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or
purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the
other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and
object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate
court will not be required to review documents not previously
scrutinized by the trial court.

Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in
Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one's
evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a
considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an
offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so
would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a
court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail
the speedy administration of justice.

8. Pp vs Santito – 201 SCRA 87

G.R. No. 91628               August 22, 1991

Facts:

Appellants seek the reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Toledo City, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case No. TCS-
792, finding them guilty of robbery with homicide and sentencing them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to restitute jointly and
severally the amount of P10,000.00, to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the amount of P30,000.00 and to pay compensatory damages
representing funeral expenses in the amount of P23,240.00 and moral
damages of P10,000.00. They were, however, "given full credit of their
preventive imprisonment provided they complied with the rules and
regulations for convicted prisoners.

That on or about the 20th day of January 1987 at 8:00 o'clock in

the evening, more or less, inside the church plaza of Poblacion,
Municipality of Balamban, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another by means of violence
against and intimidation upon persons, with intent to gain did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
without the consent of the owner thereof, cash in the amount of
P10,000.00, Philippine currency, belonging to Paulino Rosario, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner in the amount aforestated; that by
reason or on occasion of said robbery and for the apparent purpose of
enabling the accused to take, steal and carry away the amount
aforementioned, the herein accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another in pursuance of their intention to rob and
to gain, with intent to kill, did then and there treacherously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon said Paulino Rosario by inflicting
several injuries which resulted his instantaneous death.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED

IN GIVING CREDENCE TO SUPPOSED EYEWITNESSES'
ACCOUNTS DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN
THEIR TESTIMONIES vis-a-vis THE ENTRY IN THE POLICE
BLOTTER, AND THE INCREDIBILITY OF THEIR TESTIMONIES.

Ruling:

No, The Court is satisfied from its evaluation of the evidence that
the trial court acted correctly in finding appellants guilty as charged.
That appellants acted in conspiracy in the commission of the special
complex crime is evident from their proven coordinated acts before,
during and after the perpetration of the offense.

It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of

witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect
because it is the trial court that has the direct opportunity to observe
them on the stand and detect if they are telling the truth or lying in their
teeth. The assessment is accepted as correct by the appellate court is
indeed binding upon it in the absence of a clear showing that it was
reached arbitrarily. Thus, the principle is firmly settled that the
consequent findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to such a degree of respect by the appellate court.
9. Llaban vs CA – December 20, 1991

G.R. No. 63226. December 20, 1991

Facts:

From the Paulin petition of 14 May 1979, it is quite clear that,

except for the spouses Filemon Sotto and Carmen Rallos, the alleged
claimants in whose favor the subdivided lots are to be adjudicated are
not the adjudicates in the 13 September 1916 decision, as amended by
the 1 March 1932. And, except in the case of Paulin himself, who claims
to be a vendee, there is no indication whatsoever of the relationships of
the claimants with the original adjudicates that could serve as basis for
their claiming. In reality then, the petition is not just for the issuance of a
final decree, but for the amendment or modification of the final decision.
In light of the above disquisition, the lower court has no jurisdiction to
grant such relief and Judge Ramolete clearly acted without any
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
petition by approving the Subdivision Plan Psd-17733, the technical
descriptions of Lots Nos. 6017-A to 6017-H, inclusive, and directing the
Land Registration Commissioner to issue the final decree of registration
of the subdivision lots in favor of each of the claimants named in the 14
May 1979 (Paulin) petition.

Aggravating such action is his obvious disregard for due process.

There was no formal hearing on the Paulin petition. Paulin and his co-
claimants presented no witness, marked no exhibit and offered no
evidence. It is true that certain documents were attached as Annexes to
the petition; but Paulin, Et Al., went no further. Until identified,
formally offered in evidence and admitted by the court, the annexes
were but mere scraps of paper. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court is quite explicit: "The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered." The offer is necessary because it is the duty
of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties and the trial. That such a
hearing and offer of evidence are necessary is evident from the fact that
substitution of adjudicates, approval of subdivision plan and technical
descriptions of subdivision lots were asked for. In view of the opposition
of petitioners, the matter became controverted and issues were thus
joined necessitating a trial for its resolution. But this is not to suggest
that the lower court should have conducted a hearing on the petition, for
as already indicated above, the court had no jurisdiction to amend the
decision.

Issue:

whether or not the lower court abused its discretion or acted in

excess of its jurisdiction in its judgment without consideration of the
actual merits of the case.

Ruling:

Yes, A careful scrutiny of the factual and procedural moorings of

this case leads the court to agree with the main thesis of petitioners that
the lower court, sitting as a cadastral court, had no jurisdiction to amend
or modify the 13 September 1916 decision and that Judge Ramolete
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Order of 16 February 1981. We are, however, unable to agree with their
postulation that said Judge likewise committed grave abuse of discretion
in practically setting aside the Order of 7 August 1979 by promulgating
the 16 February 1981 Order.

The lower court, however, correctly set aside the Order of 7

August 1979. The contention of petitioners that the same had become
final and therefore cannot be set aside is untenable. There is nothing on
record to support it. Indisputably, Atty. Jaban knew, or ought to have
known, at the time he filed on 30 July 1979 a petition for issuance of
final decree, that other parties have existing claims on Lot No. 6017;
insofar as the records of Cadastral Case No. 12 are concerned, two (2)
prior petitions for the issuance of decree had been filed — that of 7
March 1974 and that of 14 May 1979. In a manner of speaking, the
property has become a contested lot. Petitioners failed to show that
private respondents were furnished with copies of his petition and of the
7 August 1979 Order. In the absence of proof that they received a copy
of the Order, no conclusion may be drawn that it has become final as
against them. Besides, the order has no valid basis. It failed to consider
the Auto of 1 March 1932 which amended the original decision of 13
September 1916. Hence, no valid decree can be issued exclusively on
the basis of the latter.

10. G.R. No. 117103. January 21, 1999.

Ong vs CA – 301 SCRA 387

FACTS:

Teodora Ong is the wife of Ramon Ong, petitioner. She conducted

her own logging business and to acquire or make some development for
her business she loaned 2,827.83 from Francisco Boix, private
respondent. Due to mismanagement, she failed to pay her obligation.
Boix filed a complaint, based on the promissory notes issued by
Teodora. Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix, he then moved to
execute the judgment.

The Sheriff of Camarines Norte (private co-respondent) levied and

attached a parcel of land. An auction sale was held and Boix was
adjudged the highest bidder and a writ of possession was issued. Ramon
filed a motion with the CFI of Manila to quash the writ of possession
and was denied. He then brought the case to the CA to annul the auction
sale, alleging that the property is conjugal and thus could not be held
liable for personal debts contracted by the wife.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the property was subject to the payment of the
debts of the wife.

RULING:

Yes. After all whatever profits are earned by the wife from her
business go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and
equitable that the obligations contracted by the wife in connection with
her business may also be chargeable not only against her paraphernal
property but also against the conjugal property of the spouse.

It is stated in Article 70 that in case of insufficiency or absence of said

income of fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
properties.

11. Uniwide vs Titan – 511 SCRA 335

G.R. No. 126619; December 20, 2006

FACTS:

The case originated from an action for a sum of money filed by

Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation (Titan) against
Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation (Uniwide) with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City arising from
Uniwide’s non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after
completion of three projects covered by agreements they entered into
with each other. 

Upon Uniwide’s motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings and

Titan’s open court manifestation agreeing to the suspension, Civil Case
No. 98-0814 was suspended for it to undergo arbitration. Titan’s
complaint was thus re-filed with the CIAC. Before the CIAC, Uniwide
filed an answer which was later amended and re-amended, denying the
material allegations of the complaint, with counterclaims for refund of
overpayments, actual and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. 

An Arbitral Tribunal consisting of a chairman and two members

was created in accordance with the CIAC Rules of Procedure Governing
Construction Arbitration. It conducted a preliminary conference with the
parties and thereafter issued a Terms of Reference (TOR) which was
signed by the parties. The tribunal also conducted an ocular inspection,
hearings, and received the evidence of the parties consisting of affidavits
which were subject to cross-examination. 
  Uniwide is absolved of any liability for VAT payment on this
project, the same being for the account of the Titan. On the other hand,
[Titan] is absolved of any liability on the counterclaim for defective
construction of this project.

          Uniwide is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of

P6,301,075.77 which is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12%
interest per annum commencing from 19 December 1992 until the date
of payment.

            Uniwide is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of

P5,158,364.63 which is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12%
interest per annum commencing from 08 September 1993 until the date
of payment.

            Uniwide is held liable to pay in full the VAT on this project, in

such amount as may be computed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
be paid directly thereto. The BIR is hereby notified that Uniwide Sales
Realty and Resources Corporation has assumed responsibility and is
held liable for VAT payment on this project. This accordingly exempts
Claimant Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation from
this obligation.

ISSUE:
 Whether the award given by CIAC is final

Ruling :

Yes, as a rule, findings of fact of administrative agencies and

quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are
final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal. This
rule, however admits of certain exceptions.

In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, the

court ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction
arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves
affirmatively that: 
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; 
(2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any
of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; 
(4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under
Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from
disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or 
(5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted to them was not made. 

12. Landingin vs Pp - 493 SCRA 415

GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006
Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed
a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel
Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her
petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-
married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no
longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were
being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their
written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending
for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was
consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as
witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence
to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue:
WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written
consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.

Ruling:
  No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the
biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption.
The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for
the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his
parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the
filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the
child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

13. Ramos vs Dizon – 498 SCRA 17

G.R. No. 137247 August 7, 2006
Facts:
Spouses Dizon own a parcel land. Husband allegedly executed a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing Domingo to sell ½ portion of the
land with a right of repurchase within 5mos. to Ramos. Since spouses
Dizon failed to repurchase, hence, title was consolidated to Ramos.
However, the husband claims the SPA was executed to secure a loan by
using the husband’s share in the land as security. Documents were
presented during the pre-trial and trial ensued. The trial court, however,
prior submission of respondent’s formal offer of evidence, rendered a
decision holding that the contract was one of equitable mortgage and not
a pacto de retro sale. Questioning the decision since the respondent were
not able to present evidence, the Court ruled that evidence not formally
offered may still be admitted if the requirements are met, which are
present in this case.
 The pre-trial order enumerated parties’ respective exhibits. During
trial, witnesses were presented to the witness stand and were examined.
It was also revealed that there was a previously filed case for specific
performance and/or rescission against Elpidio. In the present case,
Domingo’s counsel manifested that he was no longer presenting
testimonial evidence and requested to mark documents in evidence.
Also, respondent Domingo’s counsel was given ten days to submit his
formal offer of evidence in writing.
The trial court, however, prior to the submission of respondent
Domingo’s formal offer of evidence, rendered a holding that the contract
between petitioner and Elpidio was actually one of equitable mortgage
and not a pacto de retro sale. CA affirmed the trial court.
Doctrine: Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and
considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are
present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the
records of the case.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court in
dismissing the petition although the spouses Dizon did not present an
evidence

Ruling:
NO. Petitioner argues that it is axiomatic that the court shall not
consider evidence, which has not been formally offered. In this regard,
they argue that Exhibits “1” to “7,” inclusive of submarkings, should not
have been considered by the trial court in its Decision considering that
the same were not formally offered in evidence.
Sec. 34, Rule 132 reads:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. —The court shall consider no
evidence, which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
In this case, the Court ruled that these requirements have been
satisfied. The exhibits in question were presented and marked during the
pretrial of the case thus; they have been incorporated into the records.
Further, Elpidio himself explained the contents of these exhibits when he
was interrogated by respondents’ counsel. The exchange between
Elpidio and respondents’ counsel sufficiently described the contents of
the abovementioned exhibits presented by respondents particularly the
promissory notes and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage.
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that respondents’ exhibits were
not formally offered prior to the rendition of the Decision in Civil Case
No. 9366439 by the court a quo, the trial court judge committed no error
when he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case.
After all, the pretrial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt
with therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making.
Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pretrial would be
inconsequential and worthless.

14. Heirs of Sabanpan vs Comorposa – 408 SCRA 692

GR No. 152807, 2003-08-12
Facts:
A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by
petitioners against respondents before the Municipal Trial Court. The
Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor
of Lot No. 845, Land 275. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his
children and grandchildren.
 In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of
Oboza was terminated from his job. The termination of his employment
caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
Marcos Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saez's
son, Adolfo Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem.
Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed
Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his
nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the
land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several
people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco
Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos Saez' property without paying
any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in
his possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental
and are occupying the premises through petitioners' tolerance. On 7 May
1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they
were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor of the
premises.
DENR remained in full force and effect, unless declared null and
void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENR's
community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was
proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still
alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.
According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, because they have
sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The
appellate... court deemed as self-serving, and therefore incredible, the
Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina
Paran.
Issue:
 Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in
sustaining the Regional Trial Court's ruling giving weight to the CENR
Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda
Ruling:
Yes, Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July
22, 1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer
is a mere facsimile. A facsimile or fax transmission is a process
involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic
matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of
electric current.
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and
are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as
there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a
facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The
facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in
Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature which is
defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as
valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In
fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as
reference in his Order
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the
regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order.
Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to
take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct
control and supervision.
Principle:
 The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its
probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not
ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

15. Pp vs Napat-a – 179 SCRA 403

G.R. No. 84951 November 14, 1989

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Susana Napat-a, was convicted of drug-

pushing by the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Baguio City, and
sentenced "to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs."

On February 3, 1985, the Narcotics Regional Unit in Baguio City

received information that a certain Susana Napat-a was looking for a
buyer of marijuana leaves. Acting on this report, Captain Emmanuel
Manzano formed a group composed of CIC Leo Quevedo, A2C Serafin
Artizona and Pat. Maximiano Peralta, to conduct a buy-bust operation.
The group proceeded to the public market on Magsaysay Avenue. There,
the informer introduced to the appellant his companion, CIC Leo
Quevedo, as an interested buyer of marijuana. Pat. Peralta, who was then
posted at a strategic distance, heard Quevedo order three (3) kilos of
dried marijuana leaves for the price of P800 per kilo set by Napat-a.

Having closed the deal, the appellant, accompanied by Quevedo

and the informer, rode on a jeep to Brookside, Baguio City, Artizona and
Peralta took a taxi and followed them. Upon reaching Brookside, Peralta
and Artizona posted themselves near a store. They observed Quevedo
and the informer standing at the junction of lower and upper Brookside
waiting for Susana Napat-a. The latter soon reappeared carrying a brown
carton box which she handed to Quevedo who thereupon made the pre-
arranged signal. On seeing Quevedo's signal, Peralta and Artizona
rushed to the scene. CIC Quevedo held Susana by the arm and placed
her under arrest. The three narcotics agents brought her to their office for
investigation. Quevedo, Artizona and Peralta, executed a joint affidavit
(Exh. H) narrating the circumstances leading to the arrest of the
appellant.

The contents of the brown carton box were referred to Lt. Carlos
Figueroa, a forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Bado
Dangwa, for examination. In his Chemistry Report No. D-019-85 (Exh.
G), Lt. Figueroa affirmed that a qualitative examination of the
specimens taken from the brown carton box showed them to be
marijuana.

In her defense, the appellant claimed that she was a vegetable

vendor in the market; that on February 3, 1985 at about 10:30 A.M. she
went home to Brookside to cook food for her children. On her way back
to the city market, she met Naty Doguiwen, who was also a vegetable
vendor. Naty Doguiwen was holding a small box. While they were
waiting for a ride, a man approached Naty. The two talked (which
appellant could not hear), then Naty handed to the man the box she was
holding. Suddenly two men approached Naty who speedily ran way. The
two men gave chase but were unable to catch her. To Susana's surprise,
the two men came back and arrested her. She was brought to
headquarters where she was investigated. She submitted her counter-
affidavit to the City Fiscal.

On cross-examination, appellant admitted she signed Exhibit "I"

for the prosecution which shows that her rights were read to her before
the investigation. She was informed of her right to remain silent and to
have counsel. All this took place on February 3, 1985 in the presence of
her counsel, Atty. Ricardo Tangalin, of the IBP Legal Aid Office.
During the investigation, she signed a receipt for the property that was
seized from her and marked as Exhibit "J". She admitted that the brown
carton box containing four bundles of dried marijuana leaves weighing
about three (3) kilos, were seized from her at M. Roxas, Brookside,
Baguio City on February 3, 1985, at 2:30 P.M. During the custodial
investigation, she waived her rights under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, so the investigation could continue

Issue:

Whether or not the receipt is inadmissible as evidence against the

appellant because her constitutional right against self-incrimination was
violated when she was made to sign it without being informed of her
rights to counsel and to remain silent.

Ruling:

No, appellant admitted at the trial that she was assisted by counsel
when she signed Exhibit "J". She also signed the Investigation Report
dated February 3, 1985 (Exh. I) which states that during the custodial
investigation, she was informed of her right to remain silent and to
counsel, and that she was assisted by Atty. Ricardo Tangalin of the IBP
Legal Aid Office.

In support of her denial, appellant cited the testimony of A2C

Artizona that he did not see her handing the brown carton box to
Quevedo. However, Peralta testified that he saw her give the illegal
package to the poseur-buyer. The positive Identification of the accused
as the seller of the marijuana prevails over her denials.

Her defense that she was framed up by the NARCOM team is the
usual story of drug pushers or sellers, which does not impress the court.
The law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly
in the absence of proof to the contrary.

Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in convicting her in

view of the prosecution's failure to present to the Court the brown carton
box and its contents (dried marijuana leaves) is not well taken. Carlos V.
Figueroa, Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, testified that
the box and its contents were presented, Identified and marked as
exhibits in court. The subsequent loss of these exhibits did not affect the
case for the trial court had described the evidence in the records.
In People vs. Mate, 103 SCRA 484, the court ruled that even without the
exhibits which have been incorporated into the records of the case, the
prosecution can still establish the case because the witnesses properly
Identified those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded."
Furthermore, in this case, appellant's counsel had cross- examined the
prosecution witnesses who testified on those exhibits.

16. Ong vs Republic – 328 SCRA 749

G.R. No. 127240             March 27, 2000
Facts:
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his
behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely,
Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of
Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574)
square meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the co-owners of
the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property having
acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia
Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently
unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the

Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent
asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required
by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any
muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended
to the application does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended
possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the
period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the
public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation

The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably

established sufficient basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration.
Originally, the whole parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo
Abellara and Abella Charmine who acquired the same by virtue of a
Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho,
Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land
to spouses Tony C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the
same land to herein applicants.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS
BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG
AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER
THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND
REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023
Ruling:
No, the petition lacks merit.

Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as

amended, provides —

SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for

registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier. These requisites involve questions of fact which are
not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the
court a quo is generally binding on this Court except for certain
recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the
Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings. After a careful review
of the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals.

There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and

disposable land of the public domain. The Report dated January 17,
2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot is "within the
alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map
No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21,
1927." This finding is, likewise, embodied in the Report dated January
7, 1999 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO) and the blue print Copy of the plan covering the subject lot.
However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

17. Pp vs Tabuena – 196 SCRA 650

G.R. No. 85423             May 6, 1991
Facts:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by
the respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts
should not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private
respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting

of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In
1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against
Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the
disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr.
sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the
United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and
Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan’s instruction, conveyed the
subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be
allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property,
which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until
her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of
Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when
demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner
of the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even
before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until
they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the
sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted
to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.

Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in

arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took
cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the
plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also
erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the
proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different
parcel of land.

Issue:
whether or not the trial court committedreversible error in taking
judicial notice of Tabuena’s testimony in a case it had previously heard
which was closely connected with the case before it.

Ruling:
No, it conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of
the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact
that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the
same judge." Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw In the absence of objection, and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of
the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of
a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the
original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives by the court’s direction, at the request or with the
consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case
then pending.

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in

the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party,"
or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly
referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually
withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the
case then pending." These conditions have not been established here. On
the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in
Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case
then pending before it. As the petitioner puts t, the matter was never
taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no
opportunity to counteract.

18. Pp vs Abalos – 30 SCRA 599

G.R. No. 88189, July 09, 1996

Facts:
In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution
from the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder in Criminal Case No. 2302.
His arguments in the present appeal turn on the central question of
unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial court to the version
of the criminal incident narrated by the sole prosecution witness. The
totality of the evidence adduced, however, indubitably confirms
appellant' s guilt of the offense charged. Accordingly, the court affirmed.
On or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and
knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine was an agent of a person in
authority being a member of the Integrated National Police with station
at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strike said Sofronio Labine with a piece
of wood, which said accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the
purpose while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed and
qualified member of the said INP, was engaged in the performance of
his official duties or on the occasion of such performance, that is,
maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of
said municipality, thereby inflicting upon him 'Lacerated wound 2
inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose' which
wound directly caused his death;
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance
of nocturnity was present.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court correctly concluded that Abalos
should be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with
murder.
Ruling:
Yes, there are two modes of committing atentados contra la
autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.
The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition,
except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second
mode is the more common way of committing assault and is aggravated
when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a
public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.

Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of

which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on
the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim
is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have
the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority.
Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in
Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority
pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is
also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when
assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order
during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that
he personally knew Labine to be a policeman and, in fact, Labine was
then wearing his uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred
appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly
demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure
an agent of the law.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for
the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. Considering
that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the imposable
penalty should have been death. The mitigating circumstance, in that
context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable since the penalty
thus imposed by the law is indivisible. At all events, the punishment of
death could not be imposed as it would have to be reduced to reclusion
perpetua due to the then existing proscription against the imposition of
the death penalty

19. Pp vs Montejo – 63 SCRA 488

G.R. No. L-14595   May 31, 1960
Facts:
In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution in said
criminal case, it is prayed that, pending the final determination thereof, a
writ of preliminary injunction issue, enjoining respondent Judge from
proceeding with the trial of said case; that, after due hearing, the rulings
of respondent Judge, rejecting some evidence for the prosecution therein
and not permitting the same to propound certain questions, be set aside;
that said respondent Judge be ordered to admit the aforementioned
evidence and permit said questions; and that Senator Roseller Lim be
declared, contrary to another ruling made by respondent Judge,
disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as counsel for the
accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the filing of the petition, we
issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, without bond.

Issue:
whether or not Senator Roseller Lim may appear as counsel for the
main respondents herein, as defendants in said criminal case.

Ruling:
No, the Constitution provides that no Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall "appear as counsel ... in any criminal
case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation of his office.
 It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is
not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the
main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the
offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no
personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants
of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was
their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
From the allegations of the information, it does not appear that the
official positions of the accused were connected with the offense
charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives
for the crimes were personal with political character. It does not even
appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were committed by the
defendants in line of duty or in the performance of their official
functions

20. Deutsche Bank vs Spouses Yok See – 481 SCRA 672

G.R. NO. 165606 February 6, 2006
Facts:
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendants dealt in
U$:P F/X Forwards with and through the plaintiff. The latter was given a
Cut-Loss Order to close, on a best effort basis, their F/X Forward
positions once the exchange rate hit P26.45:$1.00. On July 11, 1997, the
peso suddenly depreciated against the US dollar, and due to the highly
volatile and illiquid conditions of the foreign exchange market at the
time, the plaintiff was only able to implement the Cut-Loss Order on
July 15, 1997 at the average closing rate of P30.43:$1.00. Consequently,
the defendants incurred a total loss of P45,812,240.00. In accordance
with the security arrangement between the parties, the plaintiff applied
the defendants' deposits in the Hold-Out Accounts to pay for the loss.
According to the plaintiff, there remained an unpaid amount
of P11,251,032.47. Despite demands, the defendants failed to pay the
said amount and even denied having made any investments in
US$:P F/X Forwards with and through the plaintiff.

Petitioner, being the plaintiff in the main case, has yet to present
and prove at the trial its evidence-in-chief in support of its cause of
action. Appreciation of the evidence is at best preliminary and should
not prevent the trial judge from making a final assessment of the
evidence before him after full trial. Thus, respondent Judge correctly
declared:

"Other than the pronouncements made by the Court in its Order dated 30
April 2003, plaintiff has not shown any circumstances or actuations on
the part of the Court that would even hint at any bias or prejudice.
Plaintiff's claim that the Court has already prejudged the cases is also
unfounded, there being no evidence to show such alleged prejudgment.
It should be noted that the Court merely ruled on the admissibility of the
documents presented as exhibits and not on the probative value of the
documents. Besides, the plaintiff is not left without any remedy since
they [sic] can resort to the tender of their [sic] excluded evidenced [sic]
under Sec. 40, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court."

If, indeed, respondent Judge misappreciated certain evidence, such

are not jurisdictional matters that may be determined and ruled upon in
a certiorari proceeding. A review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra-
ordinem 'beyond the ambit of appeal. Petitioner, nonetheless, failed to
prove grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge.
 Consequently, respondent Judge's inhibition from hearing the case
is uncalled for. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion based on valid reasons on the part of
the judge. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is
not enough to show that the former favors the latter. Bare allegations
cannot overturn the presumption that a judge acted regularly and with
impartiality.

Issue:
whether or not the presiding judge committed grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari in (a) admitting the petitioner's
documentary exhibits only as part of the testimonies of the witnesses
who respectively testified thereon, and (b) not inhibiting himself from
the case.
Ruling:

No, Courts are required to resolve the admissibility of the evidence

offered immediately after the objection is made or within a reasonable
time. It must be made during the trial and at such time as will give the
other party an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
Courts are further mandated to state the reason or reasons for their ruling
if there are two or more objections by the other party. Due process
requires no less. In this case, we note that, in the Order of September 5,
2003, the trial court failed to state its reasons for reconsidering its earlier
order, and for admitting the documentary evidence of the petitioners
only as part of the testimonies of its witnesses. At any rate, we find that
the issue raised in this case is not jurisdictional; hence, the filing of the
petition for certiorari with the CA was not proper.

Indeed, a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of

errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Where the issue or
question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same
is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

The records do not show that the trial court was motivated by
malice and bad faith in issuing its orders. In fact, it even partially
granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its previous order
denying some of the documentary exhibits, and admitted all of its
documentary exhibits as part of the testimonies of its witnesses. Even if
the ruling may be erroneous, it is not a sufficient ground to require the
presiding judge to inhibit himself from hearing the case.

21. Garcia vs Recio – 366 SCRA 437

G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001

Facts:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an

Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
 On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the
Australian government. Petitioner, a Filipina, and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as "single" and "Filipino."

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived

separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the
two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May
16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had

revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.1âwphi1

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the
divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes, The Petition is partly meritorious.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of
the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In
effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the
place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the

take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce
is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading

and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees
that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

22. Land Bank vs Wycoco – 419 SCRA 67

GR No. 140160, 2004-01-13
Facts:
In line with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. In November
1991, after the DAR’s evaluation of the application and the
determination of the just compensation by the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of
the property for P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco.
The amount offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon
review, was modified to P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR
offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein.
Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the
purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative
proceeding. The case was docketed as DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE
93. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the
name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In
the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

The DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give way to the
determination of just compensation by the Cabanatuan court. Pertinent
portion thereof states: Admittedly, this Forum is vested with the
jurisdiction to conduct administrative proceeding to determine
compensation. However, a thorough perusal of petitioner’s complaint
showed that he did not only raise the issue of valuation but such other
matters which are beyond the competence of the Board. Besides, the
petitioner has the option to avail the administrative remedies or bring the
matter on just compensation to the Special Agrarian Court for final
determination.

Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answers before

the special agrarian court in Agrarian Case No. 91, contending that the
valuation of Wycoco’s property was in accordance with law and that the
latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in
the summary administrative proceedings before the DARAB which has
primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation.

Issue:
 Did the Regional Trial Court, acting as Special Agrarian Court,
validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant case for determination of just
compensation?

Ruling:

Yes, Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the laws in point are Sections
50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988) which, in pertinent part, provide:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is

hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR. Section 57.

Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have

original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under this Act.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases

under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission
of the case for decision. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, it was held that
Special Agrarian Courts are given original and exclusive jurisdiction
over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657.

23. Gener vs de Leon – 367 SCRA 631

G.R. No. 130730. October 19, 2001

Facts:

The forcible entry case was initiated on April 30, 1990 before the
Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan. The respondents, as
plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the original claimants and actual
possessors in good faith under a bona fide claim of ownership of a parcel
of agricultural land situated at Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an
area of approximately Four Thousand Four Hundred Four (4,404) square
meters. The said parcel of land and the adjoining lots on the north and
south thereof were originally part of the course or bed of the Angat
River which was formerly adjacent thereto and the boundary on the east
or north-east of Lot No. 1050, Cad-350, plan Ap-03-003056, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1208 (M) of respondent Gregorio de
Leon. 

During the big flood in 1978, the Angat River allegedly changed
its course by moving more than one hundred (100) meters far to the east
or north-east, leaving its former course or bed along the eastern or north-
eastern boundary of Lot No. 1050 which is elevated so that the said lot
dried up. Then, the respondents extended their occupation and
cultivation to this elevated and dried up land, planting and cultivating
thereon coconuts, bananas and vegetables until May 8, 1989 when
petitioner allegedly through force, threat and intimidation, unlawfully
entered the property and deprived respondents of the possession thereof,
removing the barbed wire fence placed by respondents on the northern
boundary of the land in dispute and transferred it to the eastern
boundary. Since demands to vacate fell on deaf ears and subsequent
efforts toward amicably settling the dispute through the Barangay Justice
System proved futile, respondents instituted the complaint for forcible
entry against the petitioner. 

Petitioner, as defendant in the ejectment case, denied the material

allegations of the complaint. Instead, he alleged that he is the real owner
and lawful and actual possessor of the land in dispute evidenced by a
notarized deed of sale executed on October 10, 1988 by Benjamin
Joaquin, heir of the previous owner, Proceso Joaquin. Upon acquisition
of the land in dispute, he immediately caused the declaration of the land
for taxation purposes in the Office of the Municipal Assessor of
Norzagaray, Bulacan and paid realty taxes thereon. Further, he claimed
that the land is a private land which was previously owned by Proceso
Joaquin and that the said fact is admitted and recognized by Gorgonio de
Leon, the late father and predecessor-in-interest of respondent Gregorio
de Leon, in an affidavit he executed on November 13, 1961 in which he
mentioned Proceso Joaquin as a neighboring landowner in the east of his
land.

Petitioner further averred that it was respondents who forcibly

entered his lot in question as evidenced by two (2) criminal cases which
petitioner filed, namely:

(a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for malicious mischief against Rosendo
Buen and Ignacio Cadungcol alias Lolong, two (2) alleged helpers of the
land of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on
October 24, 1988 and destroyed coconut trees, papaya and langka trees
which belonged to petitioner, and

(b) Criminal Case No. 4043 against Hugo de Leon and Rolly de Leon,
brothers of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land
on March 12, 1989 and destroyed mango trees and other plants
belonging to the petitioner Gener. Thus, considering that his occupation
of the land in dispute allegedly started on October 10, 1988, the
Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the action since the
forcible entry suit filed by respondents was filed beyond the one-year
period.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT
DISMISSING THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE FAILURE OF THE
RESPONDENTS TO ALLEGE IN THE COMPLAINT PRIOR
POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION;

Ruling:

No, in petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing questions of law.  For a question to be one of law, it
must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.  Thus, the findings of fact of
the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court which is not a
trier of facts. Although if said factual findings do not conform to the
evidence on record, this Court will not hesitate to review and reverse the
factual findings of the lower courts.  In the instant case, we find
sufficient basis to deviate from the rule since the extant evidence and
prevailing law support a finding different from the conclusion of the
appellate court.

It bears stress that in ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution
is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the
party-litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de
facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. 
Ejectment does not depend on title for relief; the criterion is the right to
possession.  Thus, priority in time should be the pivotal point in
resolving the issue of possession.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court  requires that in

actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the
possession of land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth and that the action shall be filed within one year from the time of
such unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement implies that
the possession of the disputed land by the defendant is unlawful from the
beginning as he acquired possession thereof by unlawful means. The
plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession
of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry by the
defendant on the land.

24. LandBank vs Banal – 434 SCRA 543

G.R. No. 143276             July 20, 2004

Facts:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the

registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San
Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares
(5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to

Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land.
Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's
valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed

with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines
Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for
determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806.
Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners
therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both
coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
 During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted
to the RTC the following admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is
governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was
distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited
the provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR.

On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order
dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of

procedure and the fundamental requirements in determining just
compensation for the property.

Ruling:

Yes, Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly
erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the
examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A.
6657, as amended:1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;2. the current
value of like properties;3. its nature, actual use and income;4. the sworn
valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;5. the assessment made by
government assessors;6. the social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property;
and7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be

established only during a hearing wherein the contending parties present
their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of
determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even
authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for
such purpose.
 Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of
respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the
average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and
applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse,
without the knowledge or consent of the parties.

Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under

Executive Order (EO) No. 228 and R.A. No. 3844,  as amended, in
determining the valuation of the property; and in granting compounded
interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.  It
must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844
governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who
furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary,
or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same."
Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve
agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied
is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.

25. Clarion vs NLRC – 461 SCRA 272

G.R. No. 148372 June 27, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent Miclat was employed on a probationary basis as
marketing assistant by petitioner Clarion which is owned by Yutingco.
The EYCO Group of Companies of which CLARION formed part filed
with the SEC a “Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of Payment,
Formation and Appointment of Rehabilitation Receiver/ Committee,
Approval of Rehabilitation Plan with Alternative Prayer for Liquidation
and Dissolution of Corporation.” The SEC issued an Order approving
the creation of an interim receiver for the EYCO Group of Companies.
 The Assistant Personnel Manager of CLARION informed Miclat
by telephone that her employment contract had been terminated. No
reason was given for the termination. In her Position Paper filed before
the labor arbiter, Miclat claimed that assuming that her termination was
necessary, the manner in which it was carried out was illegal, no written
notice thereof having been served on her, and she merely learned of it
only a day before it became effective.

On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they could not be

faulted for retrenching some of its employees including Miclat, they
drawing attention to the EYCO Group of Companies’ being placed
under receivership, notice of which was sent to its supervisors and rank
and file employees via a Memorandum.

The Labor arbiter found that Miclat was illegally dismissed and
directed her reinstatement. The NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter’s
decision. The CA sustained the resolutions of the NLRC; it also denied
petitioner’s MR of the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC is not precluded from receiving

evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence are not binding in
labor cases.

Ruling:

Yes, labor officials are mandated by the Labor Code to use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC,
and Bristol Laboratories Employees' Association-DFA v. NLRC, we
held that even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the
fact that it was duly introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis
for the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same, instead of
falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence can no longer be
considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more
consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.
It is likewise well-settled that for retrenchment to be justified, any
claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy the following
standards: (1) the losses are substantial and not de minimis; (2) the
losses are actual or reasonably imminent; (3) the retrenchment
is reasonably necessary and is likely to be effective in preventing
expected losses; and (4) the alleged losses, if already incurred, or the
expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, are proven by
sufficient and convincing evidence. And it is the employer who has
the onus of proving the presence of these standards.
This Court's finding that Miclat's termination was justified
notwithstanding, since at the time she was hired on probationary basis
she was not informed of the standards that would qualify her as a regular
employee, under Section 6, Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book
VI of the Labor Code which reads:
SEC. 6. Probationary employment. There is probationary
employment where the employee, upon his engagement, is made to
undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his fitness
to qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable standards made
known to him at the time of engagement.

26. Cariaga vs CA – 358 SCRA 583

G.R. No. 143561      June 6, 2001

Facts:
Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light &
Power Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private
electricians were involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He
initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the
perpetrators. InOctober 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis,
Chief of the Theft& Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He
also hired Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the pseudonym
“Canuto Duran”. Duran became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga,
a private electrician, and he said that his ‘boss’ needs some
electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area.
Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can
supply the same to him. ‘Duran’ was able to purchase some wires
which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin named Jonathan Cariaga
(accused). Jonathan was the driver of a DLPC service truck. On
November 1988,‘Duran’ and Jonathan were introduced to each
other. After which, more transactions were made between the two.
‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis
‘apprehended’ him on February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in
order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come out with
the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station and
confessed to their participation as “fence” for Jonathan Cariaga.
The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness
as the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in
Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement
pertaining to the stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and
DLPC for the latter’s alleged illegal dismissal.

Issue:

Whether or not Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible

as evidence and Siton is a credible witness.

Ruling:
 The sworn statement of Ricardo is not admissible and Siton is a
credible witness. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn
statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule130
of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a
witness “unable to testify” in court. In Tan v. CA, the Court has held
that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of witnesses
subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He
was neither dead nor out of the country. In fact, he is in Sultan
Kudarat which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court
must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the
present case. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness
stand since it violates the fundamental right of the accused to meet
the witnesses against him face to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariaga’s sworn
statement is not admissible under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the
Revised Rules of Court for failure of the prosecution to comply
with the strict requirements of said rule.

27. Pp vs Mendoza – 204 SCRA 288

G.R. No. 132923-24           June 6, 2002

Facts:
 On June 25, 1995, private complainant Michelle Tolentino, then 13
years old, together with her aunt, went to the river to wash clothes at
about 7:00 in the morning. They finished doing the laundry at about 2:00
in the afternoon. Michelle proceeded to go ahead with some of the
laundry. She left her aunt in the river while Michelle started to cart some
of the clothes home.

Michelle then went on her way, passing through the coffee

plantation of Ben Salazar. When she approached a curve on the road, she
saw appellant Marcelo Mendoza standing there, watching her. Without
much ado, appellant pulled her, going into the thickest part of the
plantation. She struggled and pleaded with him, but the more she
struggled, the more he persisted, until he finally hurt her by pressing her
wrist so hard. The two reached a clearing, several meters away from the
road.

At the time, Michelle was wearing shorts and T-shirt. Appellant

forcefully divested her of her shorts and panty so much so that the
middle portion of her shorts (pundilyo) got torn and the garter of her
panty got damaged. Appellant was able to pin her down as he proceeded
to take off his lower garments. All the time, appellant threatened her
with a bolo that he was then carrying. The bolo, however, was placed
aside when appellant proceeded to rape Michelle by inserting his sex
organ into her vagina. And though Michelle hollered for help, nobody
came to succor her because the place was far and isolated. After he was
through, appellant warned her against telling anyone about her ordeal.

The incident was repeated on August 11, 1995. Just like before, the
rape occurred inside Ben Salazar's coffee plantation. As before,
appellant intimidated and threatened Michelle with the use of his bolo.
Fearful that appellant might repeat the incident, Michelle told her mother
about the rapes, sometime in December 1995. She gave her complaint-
statement on the same day and was referred to the doctor for medical
examination. Dr. Garcia dela Cruz testified that she was the one who
examined Michelle Tolentino. Per her examination, she opined that
Michelle must have been raped because there was resistance on her
vaginal canal, which upon internal examination admits two (2) fingers,
an indication that she had sexual intercourse.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant Marcelo Mendoza is CONVICTED of simple

rape.

Ruling:

Yes, Both Informations in the present case charged appellant with

simple rape which, under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is
punishable with reclusion perpetua. Neither one of these alleged that the
rapes were committed with the use of a deadly weapon.

Aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be categorically

alleged in the Information; otherwise, they cannot be appreciated.

In this case, as contended by both the defense counsel and the

OSG, appellant cannot be convicted of rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon, since that circumstance was not alleged in the
information. He cannot be punished for an offense graver than that for
which he was charged.

Moreover, the records and Michelle's own categorical statement under

questioning indicate that appellant had merely kept the bolo by his side
and held it only when he undressed himself naturally, so that he could
remove it from his body.

The crime of rape is not qualified by the use of a deadly weapon

where, even as the accused carried a bolo in his waist, as he usually did,
he never used the same to threaten the victim.

What can qualify the offense under Republic Act 7659 so as to

warrant the imposition of the death penalty would be when the rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon and not just the overt act of
'being armed with a weapon.

The court also affirm the positions of both appellant and the OSG
that the aggravating circumstance of "uninhabited place" cannot be
appreciated to increase to death the penalty of reclusion perpetua which
is a single indivisible penalty.

Rape is committed when a man has carnal knowledge of a victim

with the use of force and intimidation. In this case, Michelle identified
appellant as the person who had raped her. She also credibly narrated the
details of how he had forced her to have 'sex with him. Even the
physician's findings corroborated her claim.

28. Republic vs CA – 277 SCRA 633

G.R. No. 119288 August 18, 1997

Facts:

The entire lot 5367 is being claimed by Josefa Gacot as per answer
she filed on June 7, 1971. It appears from the record that the lot is
located in Barangay Los Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan but the area was
not indicated. It also appeared that Ceferino Sabenacio is her co-owner.

This case was set for hearing on August 9, 1990 and the petitioner
was represented by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Reynaldo Guayco
and Rogelio Paglinawan, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) of Puerto Princesa City while the claimant
appeared without counsel. In view thereof, the hearing was reset to
August 13, 1990. Before the scheduled hearing on August 13, 1990, the
Court received a report from the Land Registration Authority calling the
Court's attention of the decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos on
October 20, 1950 declaring this lot as property of the Republic of the
Philippines. Despite this declaration however, the petitioner nor the
government did not bar the claimant from filing her answer, possessing
and occupying the lot and in fact accepted her tax payments and issuing
her tax declaration on the same.

The claimant presented herself as witness as well as her son,

Vicente Dantic, Jr. The witnesses testified that Josefa Gacot was married
to Vicente Dantic, Sr. in 1940 and were in actual possession of the
property for more than 30 years, having bought the same from Cipriana
Dantic-Llanera as per deed of sale dated April 22, 1955 in Cuyono
dialect (Exhibit 1 and 1-A). Since she acquired the property from
Cipriana Llanera, she continued her occupation and introduced
improvements thereon as well as declared Lot 5367 for taxation
purposes in her name (Exhibit 2) and paid the corresponding taxes
thereon up to the present time (Exhibit 3). That claimant is now a widow
and has 5 children namely, Hernando Dantic, Antero Dantic, Felipe
Dantic, Fe Dantic and Vicente Dantic, Jr.

Cipriano Sabenacio, the alleged co-owner of claimant Josefa Gacot

appeared in Court and manifested that he is waiving his claim over Lot
5367 in favor of Josefa Gacot who is in actual possession of the property
as he is only a boundary owner.

After the presentation of claimant and her son, they offered their
exhibits and rested their case. Thereafter, the petitioner thru counsel
manifested that it is not presenting controverting evidence and is
submitting the case for resolution.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR
PETITIONER TO INVOKE R.A. No. 2061 TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIM
THAT JOSEFA GACOT FILED HER ANSWER BEYOND THE
PERIOD FIXED BY THE SAID LAW AND THEREFORE THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE, SINCE IT (HAS) FAILED TO OFFER AS ITS EXHIBIT THE
ORDER, DATED OCTOBER 20, 1950 OF JUDGE LORENZO
GARLITOS.

Ruling:

The Solicitor General explains that the records of the reopened

case would show that a certified copy of the decision, dated 20 October
1950, of Judge Garlitos has been appended to page 19 thereof. It is not
evident, however, why the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer ("CENRO") for
Puerto Princesa, representing the government during the rehearing, did
not present it. The Solicitor General, nevertheless, invokes the rule that
the Republic is not estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its
officials or agents.

In the meantime, Josefa Gacot passed away. The Solicitor General

thereupon moved that the heirs of Josefa Gacot be impleaded party
respondents in substitution for the deceased. The motion was granted,
and the heirs were directed to comment on the government's petition.

To this day, private respondents have not submitted their comment.

The Court, however, cannot allow the case to remain pending and
unresolved indefinitely. It must now dispense, as it hereby dispenses,
with such comment in order not to unduly delay the remand of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.

Let it initially be said that, indeed, the Court realizes the points
observed by the appellate court over which there should be no
quarrel. Firstly, that the rules of procedure and jurisprudence, do not
sanction the grant of evidentiary value, in ordinary trials, of evidence
which is not formally offered, and secondly, that adjective law is not to
be taken lightly for, without it, the enforcement of substantive law may
not remain assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but primarily devised and
designed to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In
appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so
construed liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial
justice.

29. Tan vs CA – 20 SCRA 57

G.R. No. L-22793             May 16, 1967

Facts:

The present is a suit aimed at establishing a children-to-father,

illegitimate relationship between petitioners and the principal respondent
Francisco Tan, and to compel the latter to support petitioners.

The background facts follow:

On July 22, 1955, petitioners, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as

guardian ad litem, sued respondent Tan in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for acknowledgment and support (Civil Case
26909). 1äwphï1.ñët

On March 26, 1956, Celestina Daldo after petitioners had already

presented oral and documentary evidence and were about to rest their
case moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the ground that the
parties had come to an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same be
dismissed with prejudice and without recourse of appeal.

On the same day, March 26, 1956, Celestina Daldo subscribed

before the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila to an affidavit
categorically stating that respondent Francisco Tan, defendant in Civil
Case 26909, "is not the father of my said minor children named
Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein petitioners) but another person whose
name I cannot divulge"; and that she prepared said affidavit precisely "to
record what is true and to correct what misinterpretation may arise in the
future

Issue:

whether or not the plaintiffs have sufficiently proved their case.

Ruling:

Yes, the court have gone over and examined thoroughly the arguments
and evidence of the parties, and we find that the evidence for the
plaintiffs-appellees fall short of the requirement of clear strong and
convincing evidence. Such evidence is necessary whether to prove
legitimate or illegitimate paternity and filiation, considering the
seriousness of the relationship and its far-reaching consequences. As
aptly expressed in the case of Serrano v. Aragon.

Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, formerly Section 2, Rule

46 of the 1940 Rules, employs the commanding language that only
questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals. That judgment, jurisprudence teaches,
is conclusive as to the facts. We are not to alter said facts they bind us,
or to review the questions of fact.

30. Tuason vs CA – 241 SCRA 695

G.R. No. 116607             April 10, 1996

Facts:

Private respondent Maria Victoria Tuason was married to

petitioner Emilio Tuason on June 3, 1972 and had two children.
However, at the time of the marriage, Emilio manifested psychological
incapacity to comply with his marital obligations and resulted to violent
fights between husband and wife. Due to the series of physical abuse
against the respondent, the petitioner’s use of prohibited drugs,
cohabiting with three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving
minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of
bank debts without the respondent’s consent, she filed a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of their marriage in 1989 before the
RTC Makati on the ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for
powers of administration to save conjugal properties from further
dissipation.

Emilio filed his Opposition to private respondent’s petition for

appointment as administratix of the conjugal properties of gains on April
18, 1990. The trial court scheduled the reception of petitioner’s evidence
on May 11, 1990. A counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on
the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to
return on the first week of June, thus granted the motion and reset the
hearing to June 8, 1990.

However, on June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral

motion of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have
waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
nullity of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and awarding
custody of the children to private respondent.

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24,

1990. No appeal was taken from the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not that in the absence of the petitioner in the hearing,
the court should have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene under
Article 48 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent had already become final and executory when
petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner
however claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and void for
violation of his right to due process. He contended that he was denied
due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the
trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and
rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent.
Petitioner justified his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was
then “confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reason.”

Petitioner also insisted that he had a valid and meritorious defense.

He cited Article 48 of the Family Code which provides that in actions
for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer
should intervene for the state because the law “looks with disfavor upon
the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default.” He
contended that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the
trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for
the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.

However, the failure of the counsel to inform petitioner of adverse

judgment to enable him to appeal is an inexcusable negligence and not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
Similarly inexcusable is the counsel’s failure to notify the court of
petitioner’s confinement. Petitioner cannot claim he was deprived of due
process by the Court.