1. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS VS.

JUDGE DE LA ROSA 197 SCRA 853

Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian,
then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter
and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity
issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought
admission as Filipino citizens.
 
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino
citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of
commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen
such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of
special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board
of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered
the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus
on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.
 
Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen
 
Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed
marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his
father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos
who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised
as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian
follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of
the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of
Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order
dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens

contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution. . . ."

2. In Re: Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster

Facts
On the night of 23 December 1984, a gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of
Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India resulting in the deaths of more
than 2,000 people and injuries to more than 200,000 others. . Thereafter, the
India passed a law giving the Indian government the exclusive right to represent
the victims of the disaster. As thus, the Indian government filed a complaint
before a New York district court. The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of personality.
The district court granted the motion on three conditions, namely, that UCC: (1)
consent to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive defenses based on the
Statute of Limitations; (2) agree to the satisfy the judgement of the Indian court,
provided it complied with the requirements of due process; and (3) be subject to
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US. Consequently, the
Indian government filed sued the UCIL and the UCC before the a district court in
India. The UCC appealed the conditions.

Arguments for the Defendant

While Indian courts may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to
standards of due process much lower than that followed in the US. Hence, US
courts must supervise the proceedings before Indian courts.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper.

Held
Yes. The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora.

Ratio Decidendi
Almost all of the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents of India
who have revoked their representation by an American counsel in favor of the
Indian government, which now prefers Indian courts. Further, the UCC has
already consented to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the
witnesses and evidence are likewise in India.
As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the Indian
courts as alternate fora. The second is problematic as it gives the impression that
foreign judgments the UCC's consent is necessary in order for the judgement of
the Indian courts to be enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact,
recognizes that a judgment rendered by a foreign court may be enforced in that
State except if such judgment was rendered in violation of due process or without
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The request of UCC of supervision
by US courts of Indian courts is untenable. The power of US courts cannot extend
beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, once US courts dismiss a case on
the ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any further jurisdiction over the
case, except in case of an action for enforcement later on. Denial of due process
may, however, constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian
judgment. The third condition is likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates that both
parties must be given equal access to evidence in each other's possession. Hence,
both parties may be subjected to the modes of discovery under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

3. https://www.scribd.com/document/347781435/1-Dacanay-v-Florendo
4.  https://www.scribd.com/document/400086013/Yao-Kee-vs-Sy-Gonzales-
Case-Digest 

FACTS: Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in

Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth about P300,000. Aida Sy-Gonzales
et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration and alleged
that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to
their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's
marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him. The petition
was opposed by Yao Kee et al who alleged that she is the lawful wife of Sy
Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the other
oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee.
Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and the
other oppositors were legitimate children of Sy Mat. On appeal, CA simply
modified probate court’s judgment and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales et al
are natural children of Sy Mat. They filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. 

5. Tayag V. Benguet (1968)

G.R. No. L-23145      November 29, 1968
Lessons Applicable: Theory of Concession (Corporate Law)

FACTS:
March 27, 1960: Idonah Slade Perkins died in New York City
August 12, 1960: Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration
proceedings appointing ancillary administrator Lazaro A. Marquez later on
substituted by Renato D. Tayag
On January 27, 1964: CFI ordered domiciliary administrator County Trust
Company of New York to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines 33,002 shares of stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine
corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local
creditors
When County Trust Company of New York  refused the court ordered  Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. to declare the stocks lost and required it to issue new
certificates in lieu thereof
Appeal was taken by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. alleging the failure to comply
with its by-laws setting forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost,
stolen or destroyed so it cannot issue new stock certs.
ISSUE: W/N Benguet Consolidated, Inc. can ignore a court order because of its
by-laws

HELD: NO. CFI Affirmed

Fear of contigent liability - obedience to a lawful order = valid defense
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and
subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts
Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command
of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law...."It owes its life
to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will.  Cannot ignore the
source of its very existence
6. CONFLICT OF LAWS UNITED AIRLINES INC VS CA
G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,Petitioner vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA,
in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son
MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.

FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines,through the Philippine Travel
Bureau in Manila,
three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minors on,
Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los
Angeles.All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles
Airport, Anice to changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their
tickets and was issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the
words: “Check-in-required.” They were then set to leave but were denied
boarding because the flight was overbooked. The CA ruled that private
respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his
claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of
the USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of  the
USA

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD:  No.

According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where a
contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity,
obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the rule even
though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where
it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where
the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents and nationals of
the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the
United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila.
It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C.,however, such fact did not
change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered Into by the parties
in Manila.

7. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs

HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON.
VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister;
ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines

Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, one with
private respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1
The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent
portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual
consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right
to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in
writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof,
by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of
Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to
consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after
undergoing training. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to
different parts of the Middle East and Europe.
roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of
employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the
local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing them that they will be
terminated effective September 1, 1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).
PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and
there claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both
were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of “personal
effects”; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been
discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to
discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private
respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment
contract.
Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private
respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered
more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of
the employment contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on
regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out
without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private
respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case?
Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement
which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the
agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising
out of or in connection with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi
Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public
interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot
be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their
relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed
here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and
respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do
business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines;
lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their
assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to
the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the
resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot
be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction
vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner
PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the
matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law
of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION,

8. HUNTINGTON v. ATTRILL(1892)
[146 U.S. 657,

This was a bill in equity, filed March 21, 1888, in the circuit court of Baltimore
city, by Collis P. Huntington, a resident of New York, against the Equitable
Gaslight Company of Baltimore, a corporation of Maryland, and against Henry
Y. Attrill, his wife and three daughters, all residents of Canada, to set aside a
transfer of stock in that company made by him for their benefit and in fraud of
his creditors, and to charge that stock with the payment of a judgment recovered
by the plaintiff against him in the state of New York.

On March 8, 1882, by proceedings in a court of New York, the corporation was

declared to be insolvent, and to have been so since July, 1880, and was
dissolved. A duly exemplified copy of the record of that judgment was annexed
to and made part of the bill.
The bill also alleged that 'at the time of its dissolution, as aforesaid, the said
company was indebted to the plaintiff and to other creditors to an amount far in
excess of its assets; that by the law of the state of New York all the stockholders
of the company were liable to pay all its debts, each to the amount of the stock
held by him, and the defendant, Henry Y. Attrill, was liable at said date, and on
April 14, 1882, as such stockholder, to the amount of $340,000, the amount of
stock held by him, and was on both said dates also severally and directly liable,
as a director, having signed the false report above mentioned, for all the debts
of said company contracted between February 26, 1880, and January 29, 1881,
which debts aggregate more than the whole value of the property owned by said
Attrill.' [146 U.S. 657, 662]   The bill further alleged that Attrill was in March,
1882, and had ever since remained, individually liable in a large amount over
and above the debts for which he was liable as a stockholder and director in the
company, and that he was insolvent, and had secreted and concealed all his
property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors.

The bill further, by distinct allegations, averred that those transfers, unless set
aside and annulled by a court of equity, would deprive the plaintiff of all his
rights and interests of every sort therein, to which he was entitled as a creditor
of Attrill at the time when those fraudulent transfers were made, and 'that the
said fraudulent transfers were wholly without legal consideration, were
fraudulent and void, and should be set aside by a court of equity.'
The bill prayed that the transfer of shares in the gas company be declared
fraudulent and void, and executed for the [146 U.S. 657, 663]   purpose of
defrauding the plaintiff out of his claim as existing creditor; 

Issue:
The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is whether the
wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public or a wrong to the
individual, according to the familiar classification of Blackstone:

Ruling:

The question whether a statute of one state, which in some aspects may be
called penal, is a penal law, in the international sense, so that it cannot be
enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon the question whether its
purpose is to [146 U.S. 657, 674]   punish an offense against the public justice
of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful
act. There could be no better illustration of this than the decision of this court in
Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 .

In that case it was held that, by virtue of a statute of New Jersey making a
person or corporation, whose wrongful act, neglect, or default should cause the
death of any person, liable to an action by his administrator, for the benefit of
his widow and next of kin, to recover damages for the pecuniary injury
resulting to them from his death, such an action, where the neglect and the
death took place in New Jersey, might, upon general principles of law, be
maintained in a circuit court of the United States held in the state of New York,
by an administrator of the deceased, appointed in that state.
That decision is important as establishing two points: (1) The court considered
'criminal laws,' that is to say, laws [146 U.S. 657, 675]   punishing crimes, as
constituting the whole class of penal laws which cannot be enforced
extraterritorially. (2) A statute of a state, manifestly intended to protect life, and
to impose a new and extraordinary civil liability upon those causing death, by
subjecting them to a private action for the pecuniary damages thereby resulting
to the family of the deceased, might be enforced in a circuit court of the United
States held in another state, without regard to the question whether a similar
liability would have attached for a similar cause in that state.

9. SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. CA and

TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter,

Liana purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets
of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their
daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed
reservations.

On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were placed on the
wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had
already taken all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on the
wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los
Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able to
fly. Those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-
listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his
daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who
presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter,
could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were
constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American
Airlines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for
damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC- Makati.
The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners . CA held that moral damages are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that
overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the
United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations
by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on
respondent TransWorld Airlines. Thus petitioners raised the case on petition for
review on certiorari

ISSUE;
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and
Examplary damages.

RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written
law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of
said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has
no basis in fact.

10.GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was married
again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that
his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the
suit for the declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a
divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage
had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio
dissolved on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of
the couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner
RULING:

2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no
basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite
the paucity of evidence on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s
prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void because of the
question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
 11.ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and
PNCC
G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation
organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine
National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and
existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known
as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the
High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled “Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines.”
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put
up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda
Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn.
Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner and against the private respondent. Following unsuccessful
attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment,
petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce
the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be
denied recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and
there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the
trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in
a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter
claim’s and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In
its Reply filed, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission
the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private
respondent’s counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court’s
jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s
complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the
appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to
the Malaysian Court judgment.

Ruling: Yes.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action
are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction;
that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that
there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws
under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of
regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum
Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the
governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and
respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a
foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption
that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the
authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign
judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.

12. https://www.leagle.com/decision/19636318ad2d45148