People of the Philippines v.

Leopoldo Bacang
GR Number 116512

Petition: Petition for certiorari

Plaintiff-Apellee: People of the Philippines
Accused: LEOPOLDO BACANG @ "POLDO," "Gerry Brako," and "Arnold,"
FRANCISCO PALACIOS, @ "Minggoy & Joe," TATA DOE, WILLIAM
CASIDO @ "Mario," and FRANKLIN ALCORIN y ALPARO @ "Arman," and
REO DOE
Accused-Appellants: William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
Date: July 30, 1996

Facts:
From the judgment of the RTC of Negros Oriental, in Criminal Case No. 397-B,
finding them and co-accused Palacios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay,
severally, Php 200,000.00 and Php 25,000/00 as actual damages and for the funeral
expenses, and costs, accused Casido and Alcorin appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a supplemental notice of appeal on December 8, 1993. Appeal was accepted
on December 7, 1994.

On January 11, 1996, the court received an undated urgent motion to withdraw
appeal from the accused-appellants which did not state any reason therefor. On
March 22, 1996, court received a 1st indorsement informing the Court that the
accused-appellants were released on conditional pardon on January 25, 1996.

On May 20, 1996 the court directed Superintendent Venacio Tesoro to submit the
certified true copies of the Conditional Pardon and the release/discharge order.
Tesoso submitted the copies both signed by the President on January 19, 1996 and
certificates of discharge from prison showing they were released on January 25,
1996. Pardons were granted by virtue of the authority conferred upon the
President by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon.

Issues:
Whether or not conditional pardons can be extended to the accused-appellants
during the pendency of their instant appeal.
Ruling:
No. In an earlier decision, People v Hinlo, the Court declared the practice of
processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals to be in clear
violation of law. In People v Salle, the court declared grant of pardon, whether
full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court shall be prohibited. Agencies/instrumentalities
must require proof that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has
withdrawn appeal. And that the ruling fully bind pardons extended after January
31, 1995 during the pendency of the grantee’s appeal.

Conditional pardons granted in the case are void for having been extended on
January 19, 1996 DURING THE PENDENCY OF THEIR INSTANT
APPEAL.
PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR.

FACTS: Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay an indemnity. The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal.
On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January 1994, however,
appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They
were granted a conditional pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional
pardon, the appellants will be released from confinement, the appellants impliedly
admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be
dismissed. They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December
1993. Atty. La’o further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for
his province without consulting her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's
motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of
the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mengote’s conditional pardon is valid?

RULING: No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon
has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his
conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. –
“WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is
hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the
latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional
pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the
grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back
into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance
of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.”
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Castromero
G.R.No. 118992 09October1997

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused Celerino Castromero was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Serious Physical Injuries sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
That on the February 26, 1993 at about 2am in the province of batangas
philippines,the accused armed with a balisong wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge w/ the offended party Josephine Baon against her will and
consent and as a consequence thereof she suffered serious physical injuries, by
jumping down through the 2nd floor window of her house.
Castromero and Baon are relatives. Josephine Baon's husband is the second-cousin
of Castromero. They were neighbors wherein their houses are located a mere 50
meters apart. During the incident Castromero's penis due to their movement
sideways was able to touch Baon's private parts. When Baon, noticed that
Castromero was no longer holding the knife she tried to escape by pushing him off
and jumping through the 2nd flr window. Upon falling down she yelled for help
wherein her inlaws came out to help her and bring her to the hospital, as she was
experiencing intense pain.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Rape committed in this case.

Held.
YES. In determining if rape was consummated or merely attempted, we observe
that there was NO complete of perfect penetration of the complainant's organ. To
consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the complainant's private
organ is NOT essential. Even the slightest or mere touching of the lips of the
female organ, or labia of the pudendum, is sufficient. In people vs. Dela Pena
(233 SCRA 573) held that the mere touching of the external genitalia of the penis
capable of consummating a sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge. For this case
Rape was consummated, because sexual assault was perpetrated by force and
intimidation. JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED
APPELANT CASTROMERO IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF RAPE WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.
People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)
Complex Crime

Facts: At around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert

Agbanlog, JimmyWabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were
having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Jaime
Agbanlog. Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the
conversation of the companions of his son. As the drinking session went on, Robert
and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions
looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace.
Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby
school. The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade,
exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert
Agbanlog and his companions were hit by shrapnel and slumped
unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the hospital
for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before
reaching the hospital for wounds sustained which the grenade
explosion inflicted. Robert’s companions sustained shrapnel
injuries. The appellants were arrested the following day but
denied any participation in the incident, claimed they were
elsewhere when the incident occurred and that they had no
animosity towards the victims whatsoever.

The trial rendered a judgment finding accused Antonio

Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with
Multiple Attempted Murder and sentencing them to suffer the
imposable penalty of death;
ISSUE:

Whether or not the complex crime of complex crime of Murder with

Multiple Attempted Murder can be appreciated in the case.
HELD:

Yes. Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.

The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade

may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and
distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should
be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single
penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a
single criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of
perversity.
Under the forecited article, when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying
circumstances, including the generic aggravating circumstance
of treachery in this case. Applying the aforesaid provision of
law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder)
is death. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death
penalty. Antonio Comadre was found guilty of the crime
committed while the other two accused Gegorio and Danilo was
acquitted.
PEOPLE v. MELECIO ROBIÑOS Y DOMINGO, GR No. 138453, 2002-05-29

Facts:
Fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños was in his parents' house at Barangay San Isidro
in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his parents, appellant
Melecio Robiños... and the victim Lorenza Robiños, who were at the sala,
quarrelling. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you come home,
why don't you just leave?'  After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a
distance of about five meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab
Lorenza on the right... shoulder.  Blood gushed from where Lorenza was hit and
she fell down on the floor. Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza
Robiños... went to his mother's house for the purpose of informing his relatives that
on the evening of March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro
Robiños, at Barangay Mabilang.  However while Benjamin was at his mother's
house, he received the more distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had been
killed by appellant. Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, 'It's
good
you would see how your sister died.' The police, together
with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and
barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime where
they saw blood dripping from the house of appellant and
Lorenza.  The police told appellant to come out of the
house. When appellant failed to come out, the police, with
the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall
from the part of the house where blood was dripping.  The
removal of the wall exposed that section of the house
where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing his wife.
Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant,
who was lying on his side and holding a bloodstained
double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing
his wife.  He was uttering the words, 'I will kill myself, I
will kill myself.' The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6)
months pregnant.  She suffered 41 stab wounds on the
different parts of her body. 'That suspect (Melecio
Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who]
came home and argued/quarreled with his wife, until the
suspect got irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered
forty one (41) stab blows Pleading exculpation, herein
accused-appellant interposed insanity.
Issues:
Whether or not RTC erred in imposing the death penalty on appellant.
Ruling:
Yes. RTC imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the
absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The imposition of the
capital penalty was not only baseless, but contrary to the rules on the application of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. Since appellant was convicted of
the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be
imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is
parricide.  This is in accordance with the mandate of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code, which states: "When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed” In all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible
penalties, the court is mandated to impose one or the other,
depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances. The rules with respect to the
application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties
are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the
pertinent portion of which is quoted as... follows:
"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed
in the application thereof:
 2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied."
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per
se, it is not always punishable with death. The law provides for
the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two
indivisible penalties, the application of either one of which
depends on the presence or the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances. Considering that neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the
imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Sabredo, G.R. No. 126114, May 11, 2000
Facts:
In 1993, Jimmy arrived from Masbate to reside with Judeliza's
family in Cagtagong, Caguyong, Borbon, Cebu, where he stayed
with them for more than a year. On June 27, 1994, Judeliza went
to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy
grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway
where he made her board a truck for Bogo, Cebu. Judeliza tried
to escape but was caught by Jimmy, who severely mauled her
until she lost consciousness. They stayed in Cagba from June 29
to July 5, 1994, with Jimmy closely guarding Judeliza. On July
4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade,
sexually assaulted Judeliza. He covered her mouth to prevent her
from shouting. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted three
fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza
screamed and cried... for help. Their host, Roberto, was
awakened but could not do anything to assist her. Later, Jimmy
struck Judeliza with a piece of wood, rendering her unconscious.
Much later, he broug ht her to the house of his sister, Nilda
Polloso, also at Cagba. Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan
condition and offered her medicine. Catching Jimmy in the act
of boiling water, she asked what it was for and was told that it
would be poured over Judeliza to finish her off. Nilda, however,
stopped him. On July 8, 1994, Judeliza... recovered sufficiently
from her injuries. Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza
reported her ordeal. That same day, while Jimmy was sleeping,
Nilda managed to take away from him the blade, made of
stainless steel, which he had used in the rape of Judeliza.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant's conviction by the trial court for the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape correct.
Ruling:
The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that the victim was forcibly taken at
knifepoint from Borbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation
brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That
appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having
carnal knowledge of private complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at
Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. While it may appear at first blush that forcible abduction,
as defined and... penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code was also
committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the complex crime
of forcible abduction with rape. The court notes that while the information
sufficiently alleges the forcible taking of complainant from Cebu to Masbate, the
same fails to allege "lewd designs." When a complex crime under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is
axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the
elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape.
When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the purpose of
sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible
abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.
MORENO vs. COMELEC Case Digest
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006

FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for
Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition and
disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no
cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the
case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the
probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result
of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine
imposed. However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code which provides that
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running
for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released
from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification
shall commence on this date and end two (2)years then.
The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the
execution of his sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification
under the Local Government Code applies only to those
who have served their sentence and not to probationers
because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to
the Local Government Code because it is a special law
which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election
as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied
pardon of his previous misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public
office.

HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that

"[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result
of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation
was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged
upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed
terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result
of his conviction were restored to him, including the right
to run for public office. It is important to note that the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does
not specifically disqualify those probation from running
for a local elective office. Probation Law should be
construed as an exception to the Local Government Code.
While the Local Government Code is a later law which
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local
elective officials, the Probation Law is a special
legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a
canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general
in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special
statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of
such earlier statute.
M. G.R. NO. 206379, CECILIA PAGADUAN V. CSC AND REMA MARTIN
SALVADOR, NOVEMEBER 19, 2014

Facts:
Cecilia (Pagaduan) filed a complaint against Rema
(Salvador), the Municipa Budget Officer of Tuguegarao
City, charging the latter for falsification and
misrepresentation when she stated in her Personal Data
Sheet (PDS) that she possesses the necessary budgeting
qualification and indicated therein that she performed
bookkeeping and accounting functions for Veteran’s
Woodworks from 1990 to 1992 when she was never
employed by the company. In her defense, Rema averred
that that she was employed by Alfonso Tuzon, who was
granted full management, direct supervision and control
of Veterans Woodworks’ logging operations; her name
does not appear on the VVI payroll because Tuzon’s
office was independent of the original staff. Cecilia also
filed a case for falsification of public documents before
the MTCC of Tuguegarao City. On the administrative
case, Rema was found liable for Simple Misconduct only
and the CSC approved her qualification as it was a
“related field”. Cecilia did not appeal this ruling. The
MTCC subsequently convicted Rema for falsification of
public documents; she did not appeal this ruling, instead
she applied for probation which was granted by the
MTCC. Consequently, Cecilia filed a second
administrative complaint against Rema, this time for
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. In her
defense, she alleged res judicata, forum shopping and
double jeopardy, but the case proceeded, and she adopted
her defenses in the criminal case. After hearing, the CSC
Regional Office found Rema liable for conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, and imposed on her the
penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, the latter reversed and set
aside the CSC RO ruling. Thus Cecilia elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, which initially sided with her,
and stated that following precedents, a conviction for
falsification of public documents constitute the offence of
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Rema
moved to reconsider. This time around, the CA reversed
itself,ruled in favour of Rema and agreed with the
findings of the CSC that the act of falsification committed
by Salvador did not involve moral turpitude as it was a
mere error of judgment on her part. Thus Cecilia elevated
the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Rema was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

(2) Whether her conviction and eventual discharge from probation prevent another
administrative case to be filed against her.

HELD: (1) YES. Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. The
crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and good
morals and therefore, involves moral turpitude.

The court found that she made an untruthful statements in a narration of facts and
perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.
Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public
document is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case.

(2) NO. Probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely
suspends the penalty imposed.

The purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, unlike
pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime for which the person under
probation has been convicted.

The reform and rehabilitation of the probation cannot justify her in the government
service. Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused
and not her administrative liabilities, if any.
[G.R. No. 182748 : December 13, 2011]

ARNEL COLINARES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

 Facts:
Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment from two years and four months of prison correccional, as minimum,
to six years and one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum
probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not
qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained the
RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then
appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to
apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes
his offense probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General
reiterating that under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be
entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of
conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of
attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case
to the trial court

Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon
remand of his case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled
to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC
convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to
set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted
homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can
apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous
judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and
equity.
PEOPLEV BAYOTAS GR No 102007
September 2, 1994
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with Rape and convicted on June 19, 1991.
Pending his conviction, the accused died on February 1992 at the National
Bilibid Hospital The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that
the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability
On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme
Court's decision in People vs Castello, cisal liability is extinguished if
accused should die Before the final judgement is rendered
ISSUE: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished
his criminal liability and civil liability based solely on the act complained of
ie, rape.
The Court ruled that:
(1) death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon:
(2) the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts;
(3) where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery thereof may be pursued but only by way of filing
a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1 Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, and
(4) the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action und prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together there with the civil action for in such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case.
PEOPLEV BAYOTAS GR No 102007
September 2, 1994
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with Rape and convicted on June 19, 1991.
Pending his conviction, the accused died on February 1992 at the National
Bilibid Hospital The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that
the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability
On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme
Court's decision in People vs Castello, cisal liability is extinguished if
accused should die Before the final judgement is rendered
ISSUE: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished
his criminal liability and civil liability based solely on the act complained of
ie, rape.
The Court ruled that:
(1) death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon:
(2) the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts;
(3) where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery thereof may be pursued but only by way of filing
a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1 Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, and
(4) the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action und prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together there with the civil action for in such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case.
45. PEOPLE v BAYOTAS (236 SCRA 239) September 2, 1994 
G.R. No. 102007

Facts:
                Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to
cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of
May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged.

Issue: WON the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability
and civil liability based solely on the act complained.

Held: Yes
Ratio:

                The Supreme Court held that the death of the accused Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape.

The Court ruled that: (1) death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon;
(2) the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as
law, contracts, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts; (3) where the civil liability
survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; and (4) the private offended
party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior
to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action for in such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case. 
 G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity
(Aquila Fraternity). Hazing was pre-requisite in joining for which Lenny was one
of few who had undergone the process. After the initiation, Lenny’s condition
worsened due to the blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35

Aquilans. Four of the accused (Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of
homicide by the trial court but was reduced to crime of slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the Court of
Appeals.  However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court by the Office of
the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled that they should be liable
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead.
In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified
the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court to their criminal liability.
According to Tecson et. al., they immediately applied for probation after
the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the
crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight
physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Hence, they
have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases
against them closed and terminated by virtue of their granted
Applications for Probation for which the terms therein are already been
complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite their appeal of
conviction?

HELD:
Yes. First, the Court in resolving this issue ruled that the RTC Branch 130 had no
jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson et. al. for the law
requires that an application for probation be filed with the trial court that convicted
and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin (Branch 121). Hence, its
grant of probation with Tecson et. al. is void.

However, the Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of those who
have appealed their conviction to probation, citing the then recent case of Colinares
vs. People that the Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. Had the RTC done what was right and imposed
the correct penalty, he would have had the right to apply for probation. Moreover,
the Court was quick to clarify that it remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit
their right to apply for that privilege.