1. U.S. vs. Eduave, G.R. No.
12155, February 2, 1917
FACTS: Defendant Protasio Eduave, who was the querido of
the victim’s mother, attacked the victim from behind using a
bolo creating a gash of 8 and a half inches long and 2 inches
deep because the latter accused the defendant of raping her.
Knowing that he has already killed the victim, he threw the
body into the bushes and left. Then, he gave himself up and
declared that he had killed the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused should be convicted of
frustrated murder.
RULING: The Accused is guilty of frustrated murder.  The fact
that Eduave attacked the victim from behind, in a vital portion
of the body, shows treachery qualifying it as murder. In case of
frustrated crimes, the subjective phased is completely passed
making the crime subjectively complete. The crime, however,
is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. Adueva did all that was
necessary to commit the crime but it did not result as a
consequence due to something beyond his control.
The crime was not consummated because the elements of the
crime’s execution and accomplishment were not complete, as
the victim did not die.
Neither was the crime an attempted one because the accused’s
actions has already passed the subjective phase, that is, there
was no external force or intervention of a foreign or extraneous
cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of
the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been
performed preventing defendant from performing all the acts of
execution necessary to commit the felony. That external force
is the essential element which distinguishes attempted from
frustrated felony. Consequently, the victim did not die because
an external element has prevented such death after Eduave
has performed all the necessary acts of execution that would
have caused the death of the victim.
2. Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25,
2006
FACTS: In an Information dated November 2, 2005, Nieva was
charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon, Branch 73. The accusatory
portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
33415-MN, reads:
That on or about the 28th day of October 2005, in the City of
Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting with
discernment, while armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot with
the said gun one JUDY DELATAVO IGNACIO, hitting the
latter on her left leg, thus accused performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of Murder, but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some other causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely
and able medical attendance rendered to the victim which
prevented her death.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of
Nieva.
RULING: Finally, in light of recent jurisprudence, we modify
the award of damages granted by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA. People v. Jugueta teaches that where the crime of
frustrated homicide is committed, moral damages as well as
civil indemnity should be awarded to the victim in the
amount of P30,000.00 each. Thus, we rule that Judy is entitled
to recover civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00.
However, we decrease the amount of moral damages given by
the courts a quo from P40,000.00 to P30,000.00. The
monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this decision
until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
February 25, 2009 Decision and July 9, 2009 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31336 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
1. The award of moral damages is decreased from
P40,000.00 to P30,000.00;
2. Judy Ignacio is awarded civil indemnity m the amount
of P30,000.00; and
3. An interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed
on all monetary awards from the date of the finality of
this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
3. Baleros vs. People, G.R. No. 138033, February 22,
2006
FACTS: Herein petitioner Renato “CHITO” Baleros, Jr. seeks for
the reversal of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction of
attempted rape before the Manila RTC in 1991.
Petitioner was a medical student in UST at that time when he
was accused of attempting to rape Malou Albano, also a
medical student in UST by covering the victim’s face with a
piece of cloth covered with a chemical inducing dizziness and
unconsciousness and lying on top of Albano, pinning down its
body. The victim was able to escape such perpetrator when she
had the chance to hold its sex organ, squeezed it and
thereafter ran away and sought help from its classmates who
stays at room 310 of the same floor and building where the
victim lives.
Due to panic and the immediacy of her instinct to call for help,
the only identification Albano was able to recall from the
perpetrator was that it was wearing a white cotton shirt and a
dark short with a smooth texture similar to that of satin. The
following day, a white shirt and an addidas short with a
handkerchief- all garments covered with blue stain were
retrieved from the bag owned by herein petitioner. Several
days before such incident, Chito confessed his feelings towards
the victim but was rejected by the latter. The security guard of
the building, as well as the friends of Albano attested for the
prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming RTC
Manila’s conviction of Baleros with attempted rape amid the
lack of proof its guilt without reasonable doubt.
RULING: On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its
decision convicting petitioner of attempted rape and
accordingly sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the
foregoing, the Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr.,
alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information
and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision
Mayor as Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided
by law, and for the accused to pay the offended party Martina
Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and
exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorney's fees of
P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed
Decision dated January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court's
judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from
the findings of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.  Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor  or a
fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered ACQUITTING  petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the
charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is
adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced
to 30 days of arresto menor  and to pay a fine of P200.00, with
the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. Valenzuela vs. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21,
2007
FACTS: On May 19, 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and
Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a
supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North
EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then
manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket.
Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card
with the mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU),” hauling a
push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known “Tide”
brand . Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking
space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned
inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged
with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these
boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He
boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space
where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of
Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle . All
these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi
as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked
petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning
shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident.
Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and
the stolen merchandise recovered . The filched items seized
from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1)
case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of
detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft ,
petitioner cites two decisions rendered many years ago by the
Court of Appeals: People vs. Diño and People vs. Flores. Both
decisions elicit the interest of the Court, as they modified trial
court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and
involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present
case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the
Court of Appeals, yet the appellate court did not expressly
consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the
conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft
only (NO, GUILTY OF CONSUMMATED THEFT)
RULING: We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code,
there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched
the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and
Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to
adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these
years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft
under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the
correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable
amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated
theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to the
higher reverence for legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
5. People vs. Dio, G.R. No. L-36461, June 29, 1984
FACTS: An information for robbery with homicide was filed on
October 1, 1971, against Danilo Tobias and a John Doe. The
order to arrest Tobias was returned unserved and he is still on
the "Wanted Persons Files."
On December 7, 1971, the information was amended to name
Hernando Dio as the John Doe, the appellant herein.
||At about noontime, Crispulo Alega, a civil engineer by
profession working at the Sugar Construction Company, with a
salary of more than P500.00 a month, went to the
Southeastern College, Pasay City to fetch his girlfriend,
Remedios Maniti, a third year high school student||.
They proceeded to the Pasay City Public Market. As they were
going up the stairs leading to the Teresa and Sons Restaurant,
Remedios suddenly heard the dropping of her folders and other
things, being carried by Crispulo. When she looked back, she
saw a man (Danilo Tobias) twisting the neck of Crispulo, while
the appellant(Hernando Dio) was holding his (Crispulo's) two
hands.
The robbers tried to divest Crispulo of his 'Seiko' wrist watch,
but Crispulo resisted their attempt and fought the robbers
which caused Danilo Tobias to stab him on the left side of his
chest.
The victim ran down the stairs but when they reached Pasay
Commercial Bank, Crispulo Alega fell down and expired. At the
time of his death, the 'Seiko' watch was still strapped to his
wrist.
The appellant claims in his first assignment of error that he
should not have been convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide because the robbery was not
consummated. He states that there was only an attempted
robbery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of robbery was not
consummated
RULING: The crime committed by the appellant is attempted
robbery with homicide and the penalty prescribed by law is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. Since there was no attendant mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be applied in its
medium period, i.e. 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law has also to be applied.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
modified; the appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of attempted robbery with
homicide and he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor  as minimum to
20 years of reclusion temporal  as maximum, to indemnify the
heirs of Crispulo Alega in the amount of P30,000.00, and to
pay one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED.

6. People vs. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, April 26, 1990
FACTS: The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-
accused armed with homemade guns and hand grenade robbed
Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office.  In the office of Rodita; her
two daughters Mary and Mimmie were also inside.  One of the
accused asks Mary to get the paper bag which
contained money.  All accused held victims as hostage when
the police and military authorities had surrounded the lumber
yard.  After the negotiation fails to proceed, the police makes
their move in assaulting the robbers thus Mary and Mimmie are
injured as well the accused also got an injury.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of robbery was
consummated.
RULING: In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not
only incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to
commit the same.1âwphi1 After the amount of P20,000.00 was
handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused
to leave. The victims were then taken as hostages and the
demand to produce an additional P100,000.00 was made as a
prerequisite for their release. The detention was not because
the accused were trapped by the police nor were the victims
held as security against the latter. The detention was not
merely a matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to
escape, but deliberate as a means of extortion for an additional
amount. The police and other authorities arrived only much
later after several hours of detention had already passed. And,
despite appeals to appellant and his co-accused to surrender,
they adamantly refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they
demanded could be turned over to them. They even considered
P50,000.00, the amount being handed to them, as inadequate.
The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those of
U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 [1907] where the restraint was for no
other purpose than to prevent the victims from reporting the
crime to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil. 1085
[1953] where the victims were taken to a place one kilometer
away and shot in order to liquidate the witnesses to the
robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 [1953]; People v.
Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all of which cases were cited
in  Astor and where the victims were only incidentally detained
so that the detention was deemed absorbed in robbery.
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of the
offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case.
The victims were illegally deprived of their liberty. Two females
(Mary and Minnie) and a minor (Minnie), a specified
circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those detained.
The continuing detention was also for the purpose of extorting
ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.)
not only from the detained persons themselves but even from
the authorities who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not
merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary means
employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial Court
is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
7. People vs. Lamahang, G.R. No. L-43530, August 3,
1935
FACTS: At early on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing
was patrolling the streets of the City of Iloilo when he caught
Aurelio Lamahang (Accused) in the act of making an opening
with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located in
C.R. Fuentes Street. At that time, the owner of the store was
asleep. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board
and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman
showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under
custody. The accused was charged with the crime of attempted
robbery. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo found him guilty of
the crime charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting
the accused of attempted robbery.(YES)
RULING: The accused is guilty of the crime of attempted
trespass to dwelling; not attempted robbery. It is the
Court’s opinion that the attempt to commit an offense
which the Penal Code punished is an offense which has a
logical relation to a particular, concrete offense. An act which is
the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, considering the nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the
Penal Code. In other words, the attempt to commit the offense
must necessarily lead to the realization and consummation of
the said offense. A person cannot be convicted of the
attempted stage of that offense if the intention of the
offender is ambiguous.
While it is true that the accused would have succeeded in
entering the store without the timely intervention of the police
officer, it cannot be inferred that his objective was to rob the
store. In the actions of the accused, it can only be inferred that
his intention was to enter the store against the will of the
owner. Nothing in the record suggests that his intention was to
rob, to inflict physical injuries, or to murder the owner of the
store.
8. People vs. Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463, December
18, 1930
FACTS: An American by the name of Harry H. Mooney, a
resident of the municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted
with one Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish
corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the
construction of the corral. Later, Lawaan, with some of his
men, went to Mooney's shop and tried to collect from him the
whole amount fixed by the contract, notwithstanding that only
about two-thirds of the fish corral had been finished. As was to
be expected, Mooney ref used to pay the price agreed upon at
that time. On hearing this reply of Mooney, Lawaan warned
him that if he did not pay, something would happen to him, to
which Mooney answered that if they wanted to do something to
him, they should wait until after breakfast, inasmuch as he had
not yet taken his breakfast. Lawaan then left with his men, and
Mooney, after partaking of his morning meal, returned to his
shop. On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the
store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua Najarro. He had
taken a seat on a chair in front of Perpetua, his back
being to the window. Mooney had not been there long when
Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike with a
knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged
in the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated. Mooney
fell from, the chair as a result of the force of the blow but was
not injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place.
Before this occurred, it should be stated that Borinaga had
been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is
an American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard
to say that he did not hit the back of Mooney but only the back
of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and
hardly ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife in
hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so because Mooney
and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight
on Borinaga, frightening him away. Again, that same night,
Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed his mark
and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight.
The point of the knife was subsequently, on examination of the
chair, found imbedded in it. The foregoing occurrences gave
rise to the prosecution of Basilio Borinaga in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder. The
defense was alibi, which was not given credence. The accused
was convicted as charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant Basilio Borinaga is guilty of
frustrated murder. (YES)
RULING: That within the meaning of article 3 of the Penal
Code, the crime committed by Borinaga was frustrated murder
and not attempted murder. The author performed all the acts
of execution. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish
the work of the assailant completely. The cause resulting
in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces
independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant
voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known as the
subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.
9. People vs. Kalalo, G.R. No. 39303-05, March 17,
1934
FACTS: Appellant Marcelo Kalalo or Calalo and Isabela Holgado
or Olgado, the latter being the sister of the deceased Arcadio
Holgado and a cousin of the other deceased Marcelino
Panaligan, had a litigation over a parcel of land situated in the
barrio of Calumpang of the municipality of San Luis, Province
of Batangas. On September 28, 1931, and again on
December 8th of the same year, Marcelo Kalalo filed a
complaint against the said woman. By virtue of a motion
filed by his opponent Isabela Holgado, his first and
second complaints were dismissed. Marcelo Kalalo cultivated
the land in question during the agricultural years 1931 and
1932, but when harvest time came Isabela Holgado reaped all
that had been planted thereon. On October 1, 1932, Isabela
Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the deceased,
decided to order the aforesaid land plowed, and employed
several laborers for that purpose. These men, together with
Arcadio Holgado, went to the said land early that day, but
Marcelo Kalalo, who had been informed thereof, proceeded to
the place accompanied by his brothers Felipe and Juan Kalalo,
his brother-in-law Gregorio Ramos and by Alejandro
Garcia, who were later followed by Fausta Abrenica and
Alipia Abrenica, mother and aunt, respectively, of the first
three. The first five were all armed with bolos. Upon their
arrival at the said land, they ordered those who were plowing it
by request of Isabela and Arcadio Holgado, to stop, which they
did in view of the threatening attitude of those who gave them
said order. Shortly after nine o'clock on the morning of the
same day, Isabela Holgado, Maria Gutierrez and Hilarion
Holgado arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Before
the men resumed their work, they were given their food and
not long after they had finished eating, Marcelino Panaligan,
cousin of said Isabela and Arcadio, likewise arrived. Having
been informed of the cause of the suspension of the work,
Marcelino Panaligan ordered said Arcadio and the other
laborers to again hitch their respective carabaos to continue
the work already began. At this juncture, the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio, while the appellants
Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, in turn,
approached Marcelino Panaligan. At a remark from Fausta
Abrenica, mother of the Kalalos, about as follows, "what
is detaining you?" they all simultaneously struck with their
bolos, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo slashing Arcadio
Holgado, while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo
and Gregorio Ramos slashed Marcelino Panaligan, inflicting
upon them the wounds. Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino
Panaligan died instantly from the wounds received by them in
the presence of Isabela Holgado and Maria Gutierrez, not
to mention the accused. After Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino
Panaligan had fallen to the ground dead, the appellant Marcelo
Kalalo took from its holster on the belt of Panaligan's body, the
revolver which the deceased carried, and fired four shots at
Hilarion Holgado who was then fleeing from the scene in order
to save his own life. The appellants attempted to prove that the
fight, which resulted in the death of the two deceased, was
provoked by Marcelino Panaligan who fired a shot at Marcelo
Kalalo upon seeing the latter's determination to prevent
Arcadio Holgado and his men from plowing the land in
question.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant Marcelo Kalalo is guilty of
attempted homicide. (YES)
RULING: As to case No. 6860 (G. R. No. 39305), the evidence
shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at
Hilarion Holgado while the latter was fleeing from the scene of
the crime in order to be out of reach of the appellants and their
companions and save his own life. The fact that the said
appellant, not having contented himself with firing only once,
fired said successive shots at Hilarion Holgado, added
to the circumstance that immediately before doing so he
and his co-appellants had already killed Arcadio Holgado and
Marcelino Panaligan, cousin and brother-in-law, respectively, of
the former, shows that he was then bent on killing said
Hilarion Holgado. He performed everything necessary on his
part to commit the crime that he determined to commit but he
failed by reason of causes independent of his will, either
because of his poor aim or because his intended victim
succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found its mark.
The acts thus committed by the said appellant Marcelo Kalalo
constitute attempted homicide with no modifying
circumstance to be taken into consideration, because none
has been established. Under article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, which defines murder, the circumstance of "abuse of
superior strength", if present, raises homicide to the
category of murder. However, said circumstance may not
properly be taken into consideration in the two cases at
bar, either as a qualifying or as a generic circumstance, if it is
borne in mind that the deceased were also armed, one of them
with a bolo, and the other with a revolver. The risk was even
for the contending parties and their strength was almost
balanced because there is no doubt but that, under
circumstances similar to those of the present case, a revolver is
as effective as, if not more so than three bolos.
10. People vs. Trinidad, G.R. No. 79123-25, January 9,
1989
FACTS: Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the
parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and
Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named
children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio
Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the
legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime after
the marriage, he demanded from the defendants to partition
the land into three equal shares and to give him the (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of
land. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was
single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants
also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that
the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they
had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita
Gerardo testified that Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato
are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes as the uncle
and aunt of Arturio; and also identified pictures where the
respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of
the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was
survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad.) Another witness,
ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow testified that she
knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that
she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the
parents of Arturio and that she was present when they were
married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by
the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that
upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared
for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as
witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and a
certificate of loss issued by the LCR that his birth certificate
was burned during World War 2. He also testified that he lived
with Felix and Lourdes and provided for his needs.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who
testified that Inocentes was not married when he died in
1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was not aware
that his brother married anybody and denied that Arturio lived
with them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that Inocentes died in
1941, and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to
Inocentes. The trial court rendered a twenty-page decision in
favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient
evidence of his parent’s marriage and his filation.
RULING: The partition of the late Patricios real properties
requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-
heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in
turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a
valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad)
and his putative father (Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted
arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would
constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to
the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and
the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births,
deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during
the Japanese occupation of said municipality. Although the
marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the
marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that
no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence
may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two
witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren and
Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in
which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child’s father
and mother, and family pictures.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly
preponderates over private respondent’s self- serving
negations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trial courts decision is REINSTATED.
 11. Martinez vs. CA, G.R. No. 168827, April 13,2007
FACTS: In his verified complaint-affidavit received by the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on January 18, 2007,
Alberto Sibulo charged MTC Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas
with abuse of authority.
Complainant alleged that he is the accused in Criminal Case
Nos. 06-0402 to 03 for Grave Threat and Slight Physical
Injuries, which are pending before respondent's court; that on
August 9, 2006, respondent directed complainant to submit his
counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the
Order[1] and set the case for "conference" on October 11, 2006;
that as the parties failed to amicably settle, the case was
submitted for resolution; and that on October 25, 2006,
respondent set the case for arraignment after finding probable
cause to indict complainant of the crimes charged. Complainant
asserted that respondent, being a judge of a first level court,
no longer had authority to conduct preliminary investigation
under Rules 112 and 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended.
On February 27, 2007, respondent filed her Comment praying
for the summary dismissal of the complaint. She argued that
even with the amendment of Rules 112 and 114 the cases
against complainant are still within the jurisdiction of the MTC,
considering that the crimes involved are Grave Threats and
Slight Physical Injuries which are defined and penalized by
Articles 282 and 266, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code,
and governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure which no
longer requires the conduct of preliminary investigation.
Respondent claimed that complainant is merely using this
administrative complaint to evade his own liability on the
pending criminal cases.
ISSUE: Petitioner's argument that he should be acquitted
because the criminal complaint against him was not supported
by the victim's sworn statement or by an affidavit
Petitioner next argues that should he be convicted of any
crime, it should be of less serious physical injuries only,
absence the element of intent to kill.
RULING: In light of these, the Court holds that an order to pay
a fine of P40,000 would not be commensurate to the error of
respondent. A penalty of reprimand would be sufficient for the
mistake. Considering, however, respondent's severance from
judicial service as of last year, such penalty no longer finds
relevance.
This ruling does not grant tolerance to non-compliance with the
rules of procedure. The Court even now strongly reiterates that
incumbent judges should relentlessly be mindful that the Rules
on Summary Procedure were issued for the purpose of
achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases"[5] and were espoused primarily to enforce the
constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of
cases;[6] hence, strict adherence to their letter and intent
should at all times be earnestly observed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint
is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
12. Mondragon vs. People, G.R. No. L-17666, June 30,
1966
FACTS: The petitioner, Isidoro Mondragon, was prosecuted in
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo of the crime of frustrated
homicide. After trial the Court of First Instance of Iloilo found
him guilty of the crime of attempted homicide and sentenced
him to an indeterminate prison tern of from months and 21
days of arresto mayor to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law
and the costs. Mondragon appealed to the Court of Appeals,
and the latter court affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo in all its parts, with costs. This case is now
before us on a petition for certiorari to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals. No brief for the respondent, The People
of the Philippines, was filed by the Solicitor General.
The pertinent portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which embody the findings of fact and conclusion of said court,
is as follows:
"At about 5:00 in the afternoon of July 11, 1954, while
complainant Serapion Nacionales was opening the dike of his
ricefield situated in Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, to drain the water
therein and prepare the ground for planting the next day, he
heard a shout from afar telling him not to open the dike,
Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the same voice
shouted again, 'Don't you dare open the dike.' When he looked
up, he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming towards him. Nacionales
informed appellant that he was opening the dike because he
would plant the next morning. Without much ado, Mondragon
tried to hit the complainant who dodged the blow. Thereupon,
appellant drew his bolo and struck complainant on different
parts of his body. Complainant backed out, unsheathed his own
bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and forearm and
between the middle and ring fingers in order to defend himself.
The appellant retreated, and the complainant did not pursue
him but went home instead. The following day, the complainant
was treated by Dr. Alfredo Jamandre, Municipal Health Officer
of Miagao, Iloilo, for the following lesions (Exhibit A):
'1. Incised wound about 2-1/2 inches long and 1/3 inch deep
cutting diagonally across the angle of the left Jaw.
'2. Incised wound 1-1/2 inches long and cutting the bone
underneath (3/4 centimeters deep) below the right eye.
'3. Incised wound about 1 inch long at the lunar side of the left
wrist.
'4. Incised wound about 3-1/2 inches long and 1/2 inch deep at
the left side of the lower part of left am.
'5. Incised wound about 1/2 inch long at the back of the left
index, middle and ring fingers.
'6. Incised wound about 1 inch long of the palmar side of the
left thumb.
'Barring complication the above lesions may heal from 20 to 25
days.'
ISSUE: Did Court of Appeals err in finding Mondragon guilty of
the crime of attempted homicide and not of the crime of less
serious physical injuries.
RULING: Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt
thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for
principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these
cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating
circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case
No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one
(1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision
mayor,  not prision  correccional,  to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No.
16614 had committed attempted homicide, a modification of
the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted homicide is
two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide,
which is prision correccional. Taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within
the minimum period of prision correccional,  which is six (6) of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
of prision correccional,  whereas the minimum of the sentence,
which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within  
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the SO ORDERED.
offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months of arresto mayor.

We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in 13. People vs. Sy Pio, G.R. No. L-5848, April 30, 1954
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein
FACTS: September 3, 1949, early morning, Sy Pio entered a
petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of
store at 511 Misericordia, Sta Cruz, Manila and started firing
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual
with a .45 caliber pistol. First to be shot was Jose Sy. Tan
damages and P50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to
Siong Kiap, who saw Sy Pio enter and fire at Jose Sy, asked,
Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly
“What is the idea?” Sy Pio then turned around and fired at him
and severally, the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and
as well. Tan was shot in his right shoulder and then ran to a
compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
room behind the store to hide. Tan heard a few more gunshots
damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted,
before Sy Pio ran away.
there being no aggravating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crimes. Tan Sion Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital,
where his wound was treated from September 3 to 12. Tan was
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint
requested to return for further treatment, and in a span of 10
decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612,
days and after five visits, his wound was completely healed. He
16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are
spent P300 for hospital and doctor’s fees.
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
Sy Pio shot two other people that day – Ong Pian and Jose Sy –
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to
before shooting and wounding Tan Siong Kiap.
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor,  as the minimum,  to twelve (12) years September 5, the Manila Police Department received
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in information that Sy Pio was in custody of the Constabulary in
Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby Tarlac, so Captain Daniel V. Lomotan of the Manila police
modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision proceeded there. The two had a conversation and Sy Pio
correccional,  as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto admitted to shooting Tan Siong Kiap, Ong Pian, and Jose Sy.
mayor,  as the minimum. The Constabulary in Tarlac delivered to Lomotan the pistol Sy
Pio had used, which the Constabulary had confiscated
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and
beforehand. Lomotan then brought Sy Pio to Manila, where his
severally, the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount
statement – detailing the assaults against Tan, Ong Pian, and
of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral
Jose Sy – was taken down in writing.
damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount
Sy Pio’s declaration:
Some months prior to the incident, he was employed as an
attendant in a restaurant owned by Ong Pian. Sy Pio’s wife,
Vicenta, was also employed by On Pian’s partner, Eng Cheng
Suy. When Sy Pio tried to borrow money from Ong Pian for
Vicenta’s sick father, Ong Pian could only lend him P1. Vicenta
was able to borrow P20 from her employer. Afterwards, Sy Pio
was dismissed from his work and became a peddler. Ong Pian
presented a list of Sy Pio’s debts, which was deducted from
Vicenta’s monthly salary. Sy Pio could not remember incurring
such debts, and so he resented Ong Pian’s conduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sy Pio can be convicted of frustrated
murder. (Did he perform all the acts of execution necessary to
produce the death of his victim?)
RULING: In the cases of U.S. vs. Eduave, 36 Phil., 209, People
vs. Dagman, 47 Phil., 768, and People vs. Borinaga, 55 Phil.,
433, this Court has held that it is not necessary that the
accused actually commit all the acts of execution necessary to
produce the death of his victim, but that it is sufficient that he
believes that he has committed all said acts. In the case of
People vs. Dagman, supra, the victim was first knocked down
by a stone thrown at him, then attacked with a lance, and then
wounded by bolos and clubs wielded by the accused, but the
victim upon falling down feigned death, and the accused
desisted from further continuing in the assault in the belief that
their victim was dead. And in the case of People vs.
Borinaga, supra, the accused stabbed his intended victim, but
the knife with which he committed the aggression instead of
hitting the body of the victim, lodged in the back of the chair in
which he was seated, although the accused believed that he
had already harmed him. In both these cases this Court held
that the crime committed was that of frustrated murder,
because the subjective phase of the acts necessary to commit
the offense had already passed; there was a full and complete
belief on the part of the assailant that he had committed all the
acts of execution necessary to produce the death of the
intended victim.
In the case at bar, however, the defendant-appellant fired at
his victim, and the latter was hit, but he was able to escape
and hide in another room. The fact that he was able to escape,
which appellant must have seen, must have produced in the
mind of the defendant-appellant that he was not able to hit his
victim at a vital part of the body. In other words, the
defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually performed
all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under
these circumstances, it can not be said that the subjective
phase of the acts of execution had been completed. And as it
does not appear that the defendant-appellant continued in the
pursuit, and, as a matter of fact, he ran away afterwards a
reasonable doubt exists in our mind that the defendant-
appellant had actually believed that he had committed all the
acts of execution or passed the subjective phase of the said
acts. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant-
appellant.
We are, therefore, riot prepared to find the defendant-appellant
guilty of frustrated murder, as charged in the information. We
only find him guilty of attempted murder, because he did not
perform all the acts of execution, actual and subjective, in
order that the purpose and intention that he had to kill his
victim might be carried out.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, modified, and the defendant-appellant is found guilty
of the crime of attempted murder, and the sentence imposed
upon him reduced to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years,
2 months, and 1 day of prision correccional, to 10 years
of prision mayor. In all other respects the judgment is
affirmed. With costs against the defendant-appellant.
 14. People vs. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990
FACTS: In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina
Abayan arrived at her boarding house coming from a party.
While she was knocking at the door of her boarding house,
someone held her and poked a knife at her neck. She
recognized the person as Ceilito “LITO” Orita because he is a
frequent visitor of another boarder. Lito then ordered her to go
upstairs but because of the front door being locked, he forced
the complainant to use the back door. Once inside, Lito
dragged the complainant and ordered her to look for a room.
After entering the room, the accused pushed the complainant
and ordered her to undress herself. He mounted the victim and
tried to penetrate her but only a small portion was inserted
because of the constant moving of the victim. The accused lay
down and ordered the victim to mount him and the victim used
this chance to escape. She dashed to the next room while the
accused pursued her until she was able to jump out through
the window. She ran towards the municipal building and
knocked on the front door. When there was no answer she
rushed to the back of the building. When the policemen went
out, they found her sitting naked while crying. After hearing
what happened they went back to the boarding house and saw
somebody running but they failed to apprehend the accused.
She was brought to a hospital for physical examination. Her PE
revealed that she is still a virgin, with abrasions on the left
breast, left and right knees, and multiple pinpoint marks on her
back, among others. The trial court convicted the accused of
frustrated rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the
crime of rape?
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court being morally certain of the
guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of the crime of
Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt,
with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime
(sic) with no mitigating circumstance to... offset the same, and
considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12)
YEARS PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S.
ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay costs. Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads (p. 102, Rollo):
"WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED,
and the appellant found guilty of the crime of rape, and
consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000.00.
"show remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility
amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its
candor, truth and validity.
The allegation would have been meritorious had the...
testimony of the victim ended there.  The victim testified
further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during
the aggression.  This is a material part of the victim's
testimony which the accused conveniently deleted.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards
the first assignment of error fall flat on its face.  Some were
not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit
consideration.  We are convinced that the accused is guilty of
rape. 
However, We believe the subject matter that really calls for
discussion is whether or not the accused's conviction for
frustrated rape is proper.  The trial court was of the belief that
there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital
organ of the... victim and thus convicted the accused of
frustrated rape only.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender
has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his
purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements
of the offense have been accomplished.  Nothing more is left to
be done by the offender,... because he has performed the last
act necessary to produce the crime.  Thus, the felony is
consummated.  In a long line of cases
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby MODIFIED.  The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the
victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
15. People vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30,
2000
FACTS: On April 25, 1996 at around 4 PM, Ma. Corazon
Pamintuan (Corazon), mother of the four Year old victim, went
down from the second floor of their house to prepare drinks for
other two children. At the ground floor, she met Primo
Campuhan (Accused) who was then busy filling small plastic
bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at
the second floor. Accused was the helper of Corazon’s brother.
As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one
of her daughters cry “Ayoko, ayoko” prompting Corazon to
rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw the accused inside her
children’s room kneeling before her daughter whose pajamas
and panty were removed. While accused’s pants were down to
his knees. The accused was charged with the crime of
rape and was convicted by the trial court relying heavily
on the testimony of Corazon ruling that carnal knowledge took
place as full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rapture of the hymen necessary.
The mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting the accused of the crime of consummated
rape (YES)
RULING: Accused is guilty of attempted rape only. Judicial
depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the
oft-quoted “touching of the female organ” but has also
progressed into being described as “the introduction of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum”,or “the
bombardment of the drawbridge.” But in this case, the
prosecution has utterly failed in proving that the penis of the
accused was able to penetrate the victim’s vagina however
slight. Touching when applied to rape cases does not
simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to
be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are
required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs
or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to
touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape.
Furthermore, the penetration was belied by the victim's own
testimony. The possibility of the accused’s penis having
breached the victim’s vagina is belied by the child’s own
assertion that she resisted the advances by putting her legs
close together. Consequently, she did not feel any intense pain
but just felt unhappy about what the accused did to her. In
cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court
had always anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was
consummated on the victim’s testimony that she felt pain, or
the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the
vagina or labia minora was a;ready gaping with redness, or the
hymenal tags were no long visible. However, none of these RULING: The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag,
were shown in this case. soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an upright of the
house and a partition of the entresoln of the building,
constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house,
16. U.S. vs. Valdes, G.R. No. L-14128, December 10, on an occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it. The
1918 crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as
the defendant performed all the acts conducive to the
burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes
FACTS: Between 8 and 9 AM of April 28, 1918, when M.D. independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was
Lewin was absent from his house in which he was living with not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified
his family. A resident of the neighborhood told Lewin and told as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited
her that heavy smoke was coming out from the lower floor of house, for the reason that no part of the building had not yet
her house. Once she was informed of the fact, she ordered her started to burn, although as the piece of sack and the rag,
servant to look for the fire. Her servant found a piece of jute soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near the partition of
sack and a rag soaked with kerosene oil placed between a post the entresol.
of the house and a partition of the entresol which were
burning. At that moment, Severino Valdes (Defendant) was
in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning, while
the other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses
kept at the place. According to the testimony of a
witness, he saw the defendant climbing up the wall of
the warehouse behind the house and located inside the
warehouse were some straws which were previously
burned. When the defendant noticed the presence of the
policeman, he eventually went down and entered the
warehouse. On arraignment, defendant stated that he had set
fire to a pile of dry mango leaves that he had gathered
together but on a statement he made in the police station, he
claimed that he had set the fire to the said rag and piece of
sack under the house. A complaint was filed with the Court of
First Instance charging Valdes and Labarro with the crime of
Arson. However, for lack of evidence, the charge against
Labarro was dropped but the charge against Valdes prospered.
The Court found him guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was frustrated

arson (YES)