Quiz No. 15 – Parental Authority (Art.

209 - 233, FC)

I
The elder brother of a minor girl placed the latter under the employ of a married couple. Upon
discovering that the sister subsequently indulged in adulterous and scandalous relations with her
married employer, the brother asked her to return to their home but the girl expressed preference
for remaining with her employer. The brother sued for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain custody
of the sister. As a judge, will you grant the habeas corpus? (10%)

Answer: Paras, pp. 796-797; Macazo vs. Nuñez, 105 Phil. 55

Yes. I will grant the writ of habeas corpus despite the desire of the girl to remain with her
married employer.

Art. 216(2), FC provides that “xxx the following persons shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:

(2) The oldest brother or sister, xxx

In Macazo vs. Nuñez, a minor cannot choose to continue an illicit and immoral relationship. The
elder brother, wielding substitute parental authority, may thus obtain custody over the erring
sister.

In this case, the elder brother, exercising his substitute parental authority, may obtain custody to
his minor sister and the minor cannot choose to continue an illicit and immoral relationship.

II
If during class hours, while the teacher was chatting with other teachers in the school corridor, a
7 year old male pupil stabs the eye of another boy with a ball pen during a fight, causing
permanent blindness to the victim, who could be liable for damages for the boy’s injury: the
teacher, the school authorities, or the guilty boy’s parents? Explain. (10%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Parental Authority; Special Parental Authority; Liability of Teachers

(2003 Bar Exam)

The school, its administrators, and teachers have special parental authority and responsibility
over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody (Article 218, FC).
They are principally and solidarily liable for the damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor unless they exercised the proper diligence required under the
circumstances (Article 219, FC).

In this case, the TEACHER and the SCHOOL AUTHORITIES are liable for the blindness of the
victim, because the student who caused it was under their special parental authority and they
were negligent. They were negligent because they were chatting in the corridor during the class
period when the stabbing incident occurred. The incident could have been prevented had the
teacher been inside the classroom at that time. The guilty boy’s PARENTS are subsidiarily liable
under Article 219 of the Family Code.

III
The father entrusted his child to the custody of a relative, and then the father left for abroad.
Meantime, the mother claims custody, but the relative refuses on the ground that the child had
been left to him by the father. Is that relative correct? (10%)

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Answer: Paras, p. 805; Banzon vs. Alviar, et. al., 97 Phil. 98

No. In Banzon vs. Alviar, et. al., the Supreme Court held that the mother can get the child, for in
default of the father, the mother can assume custody and authority over the minor.
In this case, the child was entrusted by the father to a relative. Thus, the mother can assume
custody and authority over the child.

IV
Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old girl,
and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital and other
medical expenses in delivering the child by caesarean section; moral, claiming that Rodolfo
promised to marry her, representing that he was single when, in fact, he was not; and exemplary,
to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios. When Rona reaches seven (7) years old, she tells
Rodolfo that she prefers to live with him, because he is better off financially than Nanette. If
Rodolfo files an action for the custody of Rona, alleging that he is Rona’s choice as custodial
parent, will the court grant Rodolfo’s petition? Why or why not? (10%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Parental Authority; Illegitimate Minor Child (2009 Bar exam)

No, because Rodolfo has no parental authority over Rona. He who has the parental authority has
the right to custody. Under the Family Code, the mother alone has parental authority over the
illegitimate child. This is true even if illegitimate father recognized the child and even though he
is giving support for the child. To acquire custody over Rona, Rodolfo should first deprive
Nanette of parental authority if there is ground under the law, and in a proper court proceeding.
In the same action, the court may award custody of Rona to Rodolfo if it is for her best interest.

In this case, Rona is an illegitimate child. Hence, it is the mother alone who has parental
authority over her unless the court rules otherwise for the best interest of the child.

V
Gigolo entered into an agreement with Majorette for her to carry in her womb his baby via in
vitro fertilization. Gigolo undertook to underwrite Majorette’s prenatal expenses as well as those
attendant to her delivery. Gigolo would thereafter pay Majorette P2 million and, in return, she
would give custody of the baby to him. After Majorette gives birth and delivers the baby to
Gigolo following her receipt of P2 million, she engages your services as her lawyer to regain
custody of the baby. Who of the two can exercise parental authority over the child? Explain.
(10%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Parental Authority; In Vitro Fertilization (2010 Bar Exam)

Majorette, the mother, can exercise parental authority.

Under the Family Code, the mother alone has parental authority over the illegitimate child. (Art.
176, FC).

Since the child was born out of wedlock, the child is illegitimate and the mother has the
exclusive parental authority and custody over the child.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Gigolo can exercise parental authority over the child. Majorette has no blood relation to the
child. She is just a “carrier” of the child.

VI
St. Marys Academy conducted an enrollment drive. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. On the fateful day, Sherwin,

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along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II, then 15 years old, and a student of the same school. The latter drove
the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a
result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. It was shown that the accident was due to
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The school was charged for being
primarily liable as it had special parental authority at the time of the accident. The parents of
minor James Daniel II and Vivencio Villanueva were also made defendants in this case. Decide
with reason? (10%)

Answer: St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos, et al. G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002

The school is not liable. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1)
the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority
and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students
outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it
must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence
of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained
of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of
the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, the school may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the
highways or streets. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by the school and the

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respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

VII
F, the father, filed a petition for habeas corpus case to obtain custody of his minor child who is
his illegitimate son with M. But M is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan. However, he caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he
could take care of him and send him to school. Indeed F enrolled the minor child in a nursery
school. On May 2, 2001, two relatives of the child’s mother came to the house of the petitioner
on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring
the said child for recreation at the SM Department Store. They promised him that they will bring
him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, they did not bring back the
child as promised by them. Instead, said relatives turned-over the child to the mother of M since
M died in Japan.
• Who between F and the mother of M has the rightful custody of the child? (5%)
• The lower court ruled that when the child reaches the age of seven (7) years old or over,
he is allowed to choose whom to live with, his father or his maternal grandmother. Is the
lower court correct? (5%)
Answer: Briones vs. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004; Art. 216 in relation to Art. 176
& 214, FC.

• The mother of M has the rightful custody of the child. Art. 176, FC provides that
illegitimate shall be under the parental custody of their mother. Art. 216, FC provides that
in default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) the
surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214 (2) xxx (3) xxx. Art. 214, FC provides that
in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall
be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Xxx

In the instant case, since M is already dead, her mother being the surviving grandparent has the
rightful custody of the child over the father because being an illegitimate child, the mother has
the sole parental authority.

• No. The lower court is not correct.

Art. 176, FC provides that illegitimate shall be under the parental custody of their mother.

In this case, the child has no right to choose because the mother has the sole parental authority.

VIII
Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in nightclubs as a
hostess. She had sexual liaison with man after man without benefit of marriage. She cohabited
with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert and Betty Chua Sy. The latter
child was born on December 15, 1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia
Lay separated. Finding no one to fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua lingered in and
around nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she
became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last
child was still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support the said child,
Pacita Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu. Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome
Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the custody of the child Betty who was
then barely four months old. They have since brought her up as their own. They had her
christened as Grace Cabangbang on September 12, 1958. The lower court found that the child
was given to the Cabangbang spouses with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua. By letter
dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded
the surrender to her of the custody of the child. Failing to secure such custody, Pacita Chua filed
a petition for habeas corpus, asserting her parental authority over the child. She wants the child

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back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing the petitioner the support
which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the child away. The record
likewise reveals that at the pre-trial, she expressed her willingness that the child remained with
the Cabangbangs provided the latter would in exchange give her a jeep and some money.
Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment the child was given to them, took care of her as if she
were her own flesh and blood, had her baptized, and when she reached school age enrolled her in
a reputable exclusive school, for girls. As the judge, will you grant the petition for habeas
corpus? (10%)

Answer: Pacita Chua vs. Mr. & Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang, et. al., G.R. No. L-23253, March
28, 1969

No. In Pacita Chua vs. Mr. & Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang, et. al., the Supreme Court held that
petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the proceedings below, reveal that her motives
do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving mother's heart. Upon the contrary, they are
unmistakably selfish — nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a leverage to obtain concessions
— financial and otherwise — either from the alleged father or the Cabangbangs. If she gets the
child back, support for her would be forthcoming so she thinks — from the alleged father, Sy Sia
Lay. On the other hand, if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree provided they
gave her a jeep and some money.

The Supreme Court further said that indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing
but confirm her intention to abandon the child — from the very outset when she allowed
Villareal to give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the abandonment took place
when the child, barely four months old, was at the most fragile stage of life and needed the
utmost care and solicitude of her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not once
move to recover the child. She continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations which she
owed to the child; completely withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the opportunity to
display maternal affection; and totally denied her support and maintenance. Her silence and
inaction have been prolonged to such a point that her abandonment of the child and her total
relinquishment of parental claim over her, can and should be inferred as a matter of law. 

Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her own flesh and blood.
She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she
could not support it. The Cabangbangs, upon the other hand, can have the custody of the child,
despite the absence of kinship (whether by affinity or consanguinity). Sec. 6, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court allows custody in favor of “some reputable and discreet person.”

In this case, Pacita Chua was considered to have abandoned the child and the rules allows
custody in favor of some reputable and discreet person wherein Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome
Cabangbang are qualified.

IX
On May 5, 1989, 16-year old Rozanno, who was issued a student permit, drove to school a car, a
gift from his parents. On even date, as his class was scheduled to go on a field trip, his teacher
requested him to accommodate in his car, as he did, four (4) of his classmates because the van
rented by the school was too crowded. On the way to a museum which the students were
scheduled to visit, Rozanno made a wrong maneuver, causing a collision with a jeepney. One of
his classmates died. He and the three (3) others were badly injured.

• Who is liable for the death of Rozanno’s classmate and the injuries suffered by Rozanno
and his 3 other classmates? Explain. (5%)
• Under the same facts, except the date of occurrence of the incident, this time in mid-
1994, what would be your answer? Explain. (5%)

Answer: 2010 Bar Exam

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 • At the time the incident occurred in May 1989, Rozanno was still a minor. Being a minor,
Art. 218, (FC) applies. Pursuant to Art. 218, the school, its administrators and teachers
shall be liable for the acts of minor Rozanno because of the special parental authority and
responsibility that they exercise over him. The authority applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

In this case, the field trip on which occasion Rozanno drove the car, was an authorized activity,
and, thus, covered by the provision. Furthermore, the parents of Rozanno are subsidiarily liable
pursuant to Art. 219 (FC), and principally liable under Art. 221 (FC), if they are negligent.

• Since Rozanno was 16 years old in 1989, if the incident happened sometime in the
middle of 1994, Rozanno have been 21 years old at the time. Hence, he was already of
legal age. The law reducing the age of majority to 18 years took effect in December 1989.
Being of legal age, Arts. 218, 219, and 221(FC), are no longer applicable.

In such case, only Rozanno will be personally responsible for all the consequences of his act
unless his school or his parents were themselves also negligent and such negligence contributed
to the happening of the incident. In that event, the school or his parents are not liable under Art.
218, 218 or 221 (FC), but will be liable under general provision on the Civil Code on quasi-
delict.

X
A 13 year-old girl tossed a headband at her 12 year-old classmate. This happened while they
were playing inside the schoolyard. Since the latter was surprised, she turned around but her eyes
were hit, causing eventual blindness of one eye. The culprit’s father was sued for damages. Will
the action prosper? (10%)

Answer: Albano, p. 733; Maria Teresa Cuadra vs. Alfonso Monfort, 35 SCRA 160

No. The culprit’s father is not liable, for he could not have prevented the damage. The child was
at school, where she ought to be under the supervision of the school authorities.

Nota Bene: The record of the case shows that no suit was brought against the school authorities,
like the teacher-in-charge. Had this case happened today, and a suit was filed against the school,
its administrators and teachers, the latter would have been liable, regardless of the nature of the
school. (See Art. 218, Family Code).

In this case, the incident happened in school causing the blindness of one eye of a 12-year child
caused by a 13-year old classmate.