Case digests

Freedom of expression and free speech

1. David vs. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160

2. Penera vs. Comelec, G.R. 181613 (11 September 2009; Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration, 25 November 2009)
3. Cagas vs. Comelec, GR No. 209185 (February 25, 2014)

Right to information cases

4. Chavez vs. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp. 384 SCRA 152
5. Antolin vs. Domondon, GR No. 165036 (July 5, 2010)
6. Privatization and Management Office, GR No. 200402 (June 13, 2013)

Freedom of religion; free exercise and non-establishment

7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602, (1971)

Freedom to choose where to live and travel

8. Mirasol vs. DPWH, 490 SCRA 318

9. Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

DIGEST

1. David vs. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief,do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.

Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of
the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to
oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

ISSUE:

                Whether the issuance of PP 1017 is unconstitutional?

RATIONALE:

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of the press, of speech and of assembly.

First Provision: Calling-out Power

Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by
the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to
justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is
a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.

Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban
on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance
of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief
only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an
exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: "Take Care" Power

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take
over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when
such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in
the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

On freedom of Speech and right to assembly

Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what
are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in
pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of
speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except
on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In
other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject
to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or
authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in
a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for
peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot
be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly
are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose;
not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom
of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if
they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be
prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State,
instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly
and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.

"freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation
is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the
State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it

HELD

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and
made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners
were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless
search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

2. Penera v comelec

FACTS:

Rosalinda Penera as mayor of the municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte ask to grant her motion
for reconsideration and set aside its earlier decision affirming her disqualification by the Comelec for
premature campaigning. Penera’s disqualification stemmed from her alleged premature campaigning
when she and her supporters had a motorcade a day before the start of the authorized campaign period
for the 2007 elections.

ISSUE:

WON Penera is guilty of Premature campaigning.

RATIONALE:

For one to commit a violation of premature campaigning under Section 80 of the OEC, the following
elements must exist:

(1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity;

(2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate;

(3) the act is done outside the campaign period.[2]

Clearly, the second element requires the existence of a “candidate.” Under Section 79(a) of the OEC, a
candidate is one who “has filed a certificate of candidacy” to an elective public office. This is further
qualified by Section 15 of R.A. 8436, which provides that the person who filed a CoC “shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy.”

In other words, “a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign
period, not before.” According to the Supreme Court, the law is “clear as daylight — any election offense
that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period.”

It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is
specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds
involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an
act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE
the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the
Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

SO ORDERED.

3. Cagas vs. Comelec, GR No. 209185 (February 25, 2014)

PRINCIPLE: POLITICAL LAW: Privacy of Communication cannot be raised as a defense by petitioner

G.R. No. 209185, February 25, 2014

MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS, Petitioner,v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY ITS

CHAIRMAN, ATTY. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., AND THE PROVINCIAL ELECTION OFFICER OF
DAVAO DEL SUR, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. MA. FEBES BARLAAN,Respondents.

CARPIO,J.:

FACTS:

The COMELEC issued a Resolution directing petitioner Marc Douglas to explain why he should not be
cited in contempt of court for the letter he sent to court administrator Jose Midas Marquez. The letter
referred to reads:

Atty. Jose Midas Marquez

SC Building, P. Faura St., Manila

Kamusta ka Pards, the recent SC decision in Cagas vs COMELEC did not surprise me. What struck me
was the level of deceitfulness of whoever wrote the decision. It can poison the minds of law students.

Pare may padala ako na dvds parang awa mo na sa taga Davao del Surat sa sambayanan, ipapanood
mo please sa mga A. Justices para malaman nila ang totoo.

God never sleeps.

God rewards the faithful.

Salamat Pards.
(signed)

Marc Cagas

Cagas, stating that the letter was a personal communication to his friend was not intended to be an official
communication to Atty. Marquez, explained that he did not mean nor intend the letter to be an affront or a
sign of disrespect to the Honorable Court. Far from being that, the letter, in its entirety, actually shows
Cagasbelief in the fairness of the court and its members. Cagas may have expressed himself poorly, but
in the second paragraph of the letter, he communicates his continuing faith in the Courts capacity to act
on the truth, hence his request for Atty. Marquez to show the DVDs to the justices para malaman nila ang
totoo.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cagas may be held guilty of indirect contempt

RATIONALE

Cagas cannot raise the defense of privacy of communication, especially after his admission that he
requested Court Administrator Marquez to show the DVDs to the members of this Court. Cagas had to
admit this since in his letter to Court Administrator Marquez he actually asked the latter thus: x x x
ipapanood mo please sa mga A. Justices para malaman nila ang totoo. In any event, messages
addressed to the members of the Court, regardless of media or even of intermediary, in connection with
the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern
for the entire Court.

The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for
contemptuous acts against the Court. Cagas clearly wanted to exploit his seeming friendly ties with Court
Administrator Marquez and have pards utilize his official connections. Instead of filing a pleading, Cagas
sent a package containing the letter and DVDs to Court Administrator Marquezs office address, with the
intent of having the contents of the DVDs viewed by the members of this Court. Cagas impressed upon
Court Administrator Marquez their friendship, which is underscored by the use ofpardsandpare. Cagas
also attempted to sway the members of this Court through the intercession of his friend who, to his
imagined convenience, is an official of the Judiciary.

The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is an abuse of the right to free
speech7and degrades the administration of justice. Hence, the defamatory statements in the letter
impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and not just of theponentealone.

HELD

WHEREFORE, considering the circumstances of the present case, Marc Douglas IV C. Cagas is declared
GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. He is fined ₱10,000.00 for each offense, for a total of ₱20,000.00,
and warned that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.

SO ORDERED.

4. Chavez vs. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp. 384 SCRA 152

FACTS:

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA.
PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the
three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board
of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V.
Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands
and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus
void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No.
560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,
and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the
conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

ISSUE:

WON the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final
agreement;
RATIONALE:

The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's
right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that
the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the
people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late
for the public to expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.

However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents
and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the
integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and
how to conduct the inspection and copying.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is
hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

5. Antolin vs. Domondon, GR No. 165036 (July 5, 2010)

FACTS:

Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA] Board Exams)
conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in October 1997.The examination results were released on
October 29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. When
the results were released, she received failing grades in four out of the seven subjects.

Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon
(Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be
re-corrected. On November 3, 1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these consisted
merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam. Thus, on November
10, 1997, she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each of the
seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an explanation
of the grading system used in each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers).[5]

Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioners request on two grounds: first, that Section 36, Article III
of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only permitted access to
the petitioners answer sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that reconsideration of her
examination result was only proper under the grounds stated therein:

Sec. 36 An examinee shall be allowed to have access or to go over his/her test papers or answer sheets
on a date not later than thirty (30) days from the official release of the results of the examination.
Within ten (10) days from such date, he/she may file his/her request for reconsideration of ratings.
Reconsideration of rating shall be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of his/her
testpapers or answer sheets, or malfeasance.[6]

Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the
Examination Papers (other than petitioners answer sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No.
338, series of 1994, which provides:

Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprofessional Acts The hereunder acts shall constitute
prejudicial, illegal, grossly immoral, dishonorable, or unprofessional conduct:

A. Providing, getting, receiving, holding, using or reproducing questions

xxxx

3. that have been given in the examination except if the test bank for the subject has on deposit at least
two thousand (2,000) questions.[7]

After a further exchange of correspondence,[8] the Board informed petitioner that an investigation was
conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against the Board of Accountancy and its members[10]
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had taken and passed
the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination and had taken her oath as a CPA.

In an Order dated October 16, 1998, the trial court granted respondents Motion to Dismiss Petitioners
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (not the main case), ruling that the matter had
become moot since petitioner passed the May CPA Licensure 1998 Examination and had already taken her oath
as a CPA. The case was forwarded to CA

The CA ruled that the petition has become moot in view of petitioners eventual passing of the 1998 CPA Board
Exam the CA found, that (i) Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338 constituted a valid limitation on
petitioners right to information and access to government documents; (ii) the Examination Documents were not
of public concern, because petitioner merely sought review of her failing marks; (iii) it was not the ministerial or
mandatory function of the respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing
examinee; (iv) the case has become moot, since petitioner already passed the May 1998 CPA Board
Examinations and took her oath as a CPA; and (v) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, because,
having failed to secure the desired outcome from the respondents, she did not elevate the matter to the PRC
before seeking judicial intervention.
ISSUE:

WON petitioner has the right to obtain copies of the examination papers so she can determine for herself why
and how she failed and to ensure that the Board properly performed its duties.

RATIONALE:

Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to information
is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

In determining whether x x x a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.

We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as national
security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters.[47]

We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of
public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in
the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into
the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely
quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and
science of accounting.

On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in
order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there
exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple
choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the
PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind
their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the
far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC,
and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for
further proceedings.

HELD:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 11, 2006 and February 16, 2004
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 76546 and CA-GR SP No. 76498, respectively, are hereby
SET ASIDE. The November 11, 2002 and January 30, 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
33, in Civil Case No. 98-86881 are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.