 When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous it must be applied literally.

 When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The rule, founded on logic,
is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases of the statute should ordinarily
be accorded their natural and general significance.

o Philippine British Assurance vs. Appellate Court

 The rule is well-recognized that where the law does not distinguish, court should not
distinguish.

 General rule: the use of the word SHALL in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory and
imposes a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning
or where public interest is involved.

 If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.

 When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.

 General and special term

o General term in a statute are to receive a general construction, unless restrained by the
context or by plain inferences from the scope and purpose of the act.
o General terms or provisions in a statute may be restrained and limited by specific terms
or provisions with which they are associated.
o Special terms in a statute may sometimes be expanded to a general specification by the
consideration that the reason of the law is general

 General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language
will be limited by specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose. The
rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one specific call.

 GENERAL TERMS FOLLOWING SPECIAL TERMS (EJUSDEM GENERIS)

o Applying the rule of statutory construction, where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular, and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.
 o Merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is
uncertain.

 EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCLUSION (EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST

EXLUSIO ALTERIUS)
o The express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence exclude all others.

 NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
o The word should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated.

 NEGATIVE WORDS
o Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
mere directory.

 The use of the word MAY and SHALL in the statute.

o Use of word “may” in the statute generally connotes a permissible thing while the word
“shall” is imperative.

 USE OF THE WORD “MUST”

o The word MUST in a statute like SHALL is not always imperative and may be
consistent with an exercise of discretion.
o The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.

 The use of term AND and the word OR.

o The intention of the legislature in using the term “AND/OR” are to be used
interchangeably.

 COMPUTATION OF TIME
o The term month shall be understood as a 30-day month and not a calendar month. (RPC)

 A “WEEK” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week
on which it begins.

 Function of the PROVISO

o Proviso is a clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which is either to except
something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude
some possible ground of misinterpretation of its extent. “provided” is the word used in
introducing proviso.

 The term “INSULATING OIL” comes within the meaning of the term “INSULATOR” and
qualifies the MERALCO for tax exemption.
 SK election cannot be considered as “REGULAR ELECTION” for purposes of recall under
Sec. 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

 PRESUMPTIONS.
o In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was the
intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible and just law, and one which should
change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose
of the act in question.
o In other words, if the language of the law is clear, court should not resort to
presumptions.

o PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

 The onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute.

 ALL LAWS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTIUTIONAL UNTIL OR UNLESS

OTHERWISSE RULED BY COURT.

 THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE INVALIDITY OF A LAW RESTS ON THOSE WHO

CHALLENGE IT.

 PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE.

o The law is tested by its results and likewise, we may add, by its purpose.
o The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent.

 In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.

 A law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice.

 PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS.

o In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing
a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnant exists in the terms of
the new and old law.

 Interpretare et condordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi.

 o EVERY STATUTE MUST BE SO INTERPRETED AND BROUGHT INTO
ACCORD WITH OTHER LAWS AS TO FORM A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
JURISPRUDENCE.

 REPEALS OF STATUTE BY IMPLICATION NOT FAVORED

o The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent
or conflicting statues.

 PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVESS.

o In the interpretation of a statute, the court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective statute.

 PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY

o Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the legislative
intention so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
o Presumption against undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure.

 PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

o The Philippine renounces war, as an instrument of public policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, adheres policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

 Intrinsic “internal or within” those aids within the statute.

o Resorted to in there is ambiguity in the statute.
o Parts of the statute: title, preamble, context or body of the statute, chapter and section
headings, punctuation and interpretation clause.
o To determine the intention of the legislature.

 Subtitle of the statute as intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent.

 The intent of the law as culled from its preamble and from situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
 Preamble used as a guide in determining the intent of the lawmaker.

Kinds of bills:
1. Appropriation bill
2. Revenue or tariffe bill
3. Private bills
4. Bills authorizing increase in the public debt.
5. Bills of naming local application.
  Extrinsic aids in construction and interpretation.
o Existing aids from outside sources, meaning outside of the four corners of the statute.
o Any doubt first find out within the statute (intrinsic aids) the intention of the
legislature.
o If not availing, still there remain the ambiguity (extrinsic aids)
o These are: history of the enactment of the statutes, opinions and rulings of the
officials of the government called upon to execute and implement the laws,
contemporaneous construction by executive officers, actual proceedings of the
legislative body, individual statements by members of congress, author of the law.

Commissioner of customes vs esso

Held: it is an accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, republic act. 1394 appears to
be, courts may examine the printed pages of the published act as well as those extrinsic matters
that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the
reasons for the passage and the purpose to be accomplished by the measure.

Cecilio de villa vs. court of appeals

HELD: In case of doubt: courts may avail the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist
in the determining the construction of the statute of doubtful meaning.

Casco phils. Chemical company inc. vs hon. Pedro gimenez as auditor general
HELD: In case of doubt individual statements of congress or senate do not necessarily reflect
legislative in intent (urea formadehyde vs “urea vs formaldehyde”)

STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Statute should be strictly and liberally construed:

o Nothing should be included within the scope
o Its language must be given exact and technical meaning
o No extension of implications or considerations
o Confined within the letter and spirit or reason of the statute.

1. any provision on the power of a lgu shall be liberally interpreted in its favor.
2. Any question shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers
3. Any doubt as to the existence of the power be interpreted in favor of the LGU.
4. In case of doubt, tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the
LGU enacting it.
5. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted shall be construed strictly against the person
claiming it.
6. General welfare provisions in the code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
the LGU in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life.
7. Rules of civi procedure shall be liberally construed in or to promote a just, speedy and in
expensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
8. Comelec rules shall be liberally construed to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections, just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought.
9. Penals laws shall be construed strictly against the statue and in favor of the accused.

Martin Centeno vs hon. Victoria villalon pernillos

Held: the term charitable should be construed as to exclude solicitations for religious purposes.

Cesario ursua vs court of appeals

Held: penal statutes should be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused.

People of the phils vs walpan

Held: penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.

Any perception in the statute should be addressed to the congress.

Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning.
The court confined only to apply the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts.

Ramon corporal vs employees compensation commission

Held: the liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the
pertinent provisions of the labor code are clear and no room for interpretation.

Maria e. Manahan vs employees compensation and labor code

Held: doubts in interpretation of workmen’s compensation and labor code should be resolved in
favor of the worker.

Salvador lazo vs. employees compensation commission

Held: interpret the law in favor of the employee, basically social legislation is liberally
construed.

Domingo vicente vs employees

Held: the sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by its
own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in its favor.

Fancisco s. tantuico jr. vs hon. Eufemio domingo

Held: retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree, because the intention is to
provide the retiree the sustenance and comfort, when no longer capable of livelihood.