REMEDIAL LAW

CASE DIGESTS

Submitted by: Geoffrey Rainier O. Cartagena

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 Table of Contents
Page
RULE 117
PEOPLE AND AAA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 3-4

February 25, 2015, G.R. No. 183652

FANTASTICO VS. MALICSE January 12, 2015, G.R. No. 190912 4-5
RULE 118
PEOPLE VS. LIKIRAN June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 217 5-6
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR vs PEOPLE 7-9
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
RULE 119
OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN 9-12
GR No. 217874      December 5, 2017
MENEZ VS. JIMENEZ G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2015 13-15
RULE 120
RICHARD RICALDE v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 211002 Jan 21, 2015 16-18
DY vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016, 19-20
RULE 121
GUELOS v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 177000 JUNE 19, 2017 21-25
RULE 122
CAJIPE VS. PEOPLE April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 615 25-26
JOSE “PEPE” SANICO VS. PEOPLE 27-28
March 25, 2015, G.R. No. 198753
RULE 124
ATTY. AURORA P. SANGLAY VS. EDUARDO E. PADUA II 28-29
July 1, 2015, A.M. No. P-14-3182
RULE 126
PEOPLE VS. MEDARIO CALANTIAO 29-30
June 18, 2014, G.R. No. 203984
PILIPINAS SHELL VS. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL 30-31
February 16, 2015, G.R. No. 189669
RULE 130
PEOPLE vs. ANITA MIRANDA G.R. No. 205639 January 18, 2016 32-33
People vs. Salim Ismael G.R. No. 208093 February 20, 2017 34-35

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RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH

(1) [RULE 117, SEC. 3] Non-compliance with this rule (i.e., prohibition of
duplicitous complaints) is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused
may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the
defect is deemed waived.

PEOPLE AND AAA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

February 25, 2015, G.R. No. 183652
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim,
Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph
Villame, for allegedly raping AAA, to wit:

That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s
Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an
intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of
March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte
and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside said
lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO
took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused
MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and
consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.

The RTC found private respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. The private respondents brought the case to the CA and subsequently rendered
the assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling which acquitted private
respondents. AAA filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
(1) May the private complainant appeal the criminal aspect by Rule 65? (NO)
(2) Can a single Information accuse of several counts of rape? (YES)

HELD:
(1) NO. Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State
through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf
of the State. Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance
of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA

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when it acquitted private respondents. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in
its Comment, thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Despite acquittal,
however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to
the civil aspect of the decision.

(2) YES. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense,
otherwise, the same is defective. The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous
complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the
charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State
should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the
accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise,
the defect is deemed waived. The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this
defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of
the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their
right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the
accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same
crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of.

The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision and held the private respondents guilty
for four (4) counts of rape.

(2) [RULE 117, SEC. 9] It is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of
the Information on the ground that the elements of the crime of attempted murder
are lacking.

FANTASTICO VS. MALICSE

January 12, 2015, G.R. No. 190912
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: A case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan
Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and
petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The Information reads:

That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, commence the commission
of the crime of murder directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there hitting the
head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a
piece of wood and mauling him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts
of execution which should have produced the crime of murder, as a

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 consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are
not necessarily mortal.

The trial court acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros but found
Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Attempted
Murder. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA, but the latter court affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Does the inclusion of the phrase “not necessarily mortal” in the information
make it fatal.

HELD: NO. Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase “not necessarily mortal” in
the allegations in the Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means
that there is an absence of an intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a state of mind
that the courts can discern only through external manifestations. All of these, were
proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the phrase, what is important is
that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.

In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information
on the ground that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. Section
9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to
allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion
to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file
a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver
of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

RULE 118 – PRE-TRIAL

(1) [RULE 118, SEC. 2] All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel. In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed
only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may be admitted given
that the defense failed to object to its admission.
PEOPLE VS. LIKIRAN
June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 217
REYES, J.

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FACTS: Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder for the
death of Rolando Sareno, Sr. (Sareno). It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance
was being held at the basketball court. After a few hours, while Prescado Mercado
(Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) were inside the dance area, Jerome
Likiran (Jerome), the accused-appellant’s brother, punched Mercado on the mouth.
Jerome was armed with a short firearm while accused-appellant was holding a hunting
knife. Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the
accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. Celso Dagangon (Dagangon) was able to
bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but
Sareno was already dead at that point. The accused-appellant denied any involvement
in the crime. While he admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when
the commotion happened.

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s
culpability. Prosecution witness Dagangon’s positive identification of the accused-
appellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of murder. The
RTC also rejected the accused–appellant’s defense of denial as it was not supported by
evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accused-appellant since he failed to
prove that it was impossible for him be at the scene of the crime. The CA sustained the
findings of the RTC. The accused-appellant asserted that the information charged him
of murder committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby
causing his instantaneous death. The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on
record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person. The CA
disregarded the accused-appellant’s contention and ruled that “the cause of death was
not made an issue in the court a quo” and the Certificate of Death was admitted during
the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient basis for the CA’s disregard of the accused-
appellant’s argument

HELD: YES. The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters
stipulated upon and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the
Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Dael of Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by
the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City “is admitted as proof of fact and cause of
death due to multiple stab wound scapular area.” Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is
allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118,
meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel;
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. In this case, while it appears that
the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the
same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its
admission. Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the
regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the
victim. The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause
of death. The Court of Appeals’ decision is AFFIRMED.

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(2) CASE DIGEST: [G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017]. SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR.
Y ASUELA, PETITIONER, HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, LEGAZPI CITY, ALBAY, AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the constitutionality of
Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002," which provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No.
13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs).

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with
a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal
quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the
three equal branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the
denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to
be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it
"is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the
intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with
the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is
left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.

ISSUE: Is Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 unconstitutional?

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HELD: Yes, Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution. Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure is now the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court
and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

The trias politica principle prevents Congress from promulgating rules regarding
pleading, practice and procedure. The separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this
Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by
the Court.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted
its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the
exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the
Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive
and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue,
amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights,
i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. "Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."

RULE 119 – TRIAL

(1)OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 217874      December 5, 2017
TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public funds
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:

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 Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City.
By virtue of his position, she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection
officer.
As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for
the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The
collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.
On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by Hernan was
conducted. It was found out that the deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and
November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20, respectively,
did not bear a stamp receipt by LBP nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then
informed that the two aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The
auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but not
for the P11,300.00.
Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds with the amount of
P11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed
her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set
aside its decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan which affirmed RTC’s decision but
modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the Resolution
denying petitioner’s MR became final and executory.
On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of
Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan denied the same and
directed the execution of the judgment of conviction.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of
Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on
January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
malversation of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further reception of evidence.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
          The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of accused for the crime of malversation of
public funds.
The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or
property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them. This article establishes a
presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal uses.

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 As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s
defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and
handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea
as to where the money went failed to overcome the presumption of law.
For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when
questioned about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same
readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the
crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her
possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily
explain her failure to do so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation.
SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify
the penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an amendatory law favorable to the
accused.
          The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the absence of the first requisite
that the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already
cripples the Motion to Reopen the Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the
August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact, was already
recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24, Rule 119 of Rules of Court)
1. The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;
2. The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within thirty days from the issuance of the order
However, the Court held that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and recall
the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further
reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the
penalty imposed by said court.
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable,
the Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance
warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly
reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of such
exceptional circumstance.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we have here a novel situation
wherein the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become
final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of
the passage of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner’s sentence be

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modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing
being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation, as long as she does
not possess any ground for disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or
R.A. No. 10707.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a
possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the
instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the
Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of
prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is P11,300.00,
which does not exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.
The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of
the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the
accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable
judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the
applicable penalties

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(2) MENEZ VS. JIMENEZ
G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014

FACTS: On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former employee of the BSJ
Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed sworn statements confessing his
participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose), and naming petitioner
Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner Jimenez’s younger brother), Lennard A.
Descalso (Lennard) alias “Spyke,” Robert Ponce (Robert) alias “Obet,” and Eric
Fernandez (Eric), as his co-conspirators.2cralawlawlibrary

The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel casing
containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver,
encased in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that Montero
pointed to.3cralawlawlibrary

On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an Information
before the RTC, charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero of murder
for the killing of Ruby Rose.4cralawlawlibrary

Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled “Motion for the Discharge of
the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness Protection Program” pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6981. The People also filed a motion to discharge Montero as a state
witness for the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions.

First Ruling of the RTC:

On March 19, 2010, the RTC’s Acting Presiding Judge Hector B. Almeyda (Judge
Almeyda) denied the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.6cralawlawlibrary

Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness; it failed to clearly show that Montero was not the most guilty
or, at best, the least guilty among the accused. The judge further ruled that Montero’s
statements were not corroborated by the other evidence on record. The prosecution,
too, failed to present evidence to sustain the possibility of conviction against
Jimenez.7cralawla
The July 30, 2010 order

On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge, reconsidered and
reversed Judge Almeyda’s order and ruled that the prosecution had presented clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

According to Judge Docena, the crime would have remained undiscovered and
unsolved had it not been for Montero’s extrajudicial confession that narrated in detail the
manner of the abduction and subsequent murder of Ruby Rose. As the crime was

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committed in secret, only one of the co-conspirators, such as Montero, could give direct
evidence identifying the other coconspirators.

Judge Docena further ruled that Montero is qualified to be discharged as a state witness
as he does not appear to be the most guilty although he is a principal by direct
participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because, without their
orders, the crime would not have been committed. Finally, Montero has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Ruling of the CA:

The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
Montero’s discharge to become a state witness because the prosecution had complied
with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

ISSUES:

First, there is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness because: 1) the

voluntary sworn extrajudicial confessions of Montero are all in the possession of the
prosecution which they could readily present in court without discharging Montero; and
2) there was unjust favoritism in the discharge of Montero because all the other
conspirators are equally knowledgeable of the crime.

Second, contrary to the CA’s ruling, the judge, and not the prosecution, has the ultimate
discretion in ensuring that the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 are complied
with.

Third, the cases the CA cited are factually different from the present case. Chua v. CA
should not apply as it deals with two accused, one of whom was ordered discharged.

Fourth, Montero’s testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material points

as the prosecution’s own evidence contradicts his declarations.

RULING: NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY JUDGE DOCENA.

We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the requisites under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that:

(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge

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 is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

Absolute necessity of the testimony

of Montero:

Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when
he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity is not
there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
prosecution’s evidence.

Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated:

As the trial court properly found, the evidence consisting of the steel casing where the
cadaver was found; the drum containing the cadaver which the prosecution successfully
identified (and which even the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby Rose; the
spot in the sea that Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the apparel
worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burned personal effects, all partly
corroborate some of the material points in the sworn statements of
Montero.47cralawlawlibrary

With these as bases, Judge Docena’s ruling that Montero’s testimony found substantial
corroboration cannot be characterized as grave abuse of discretion.
Montero is not the most guilty:

By jurisprudence, “most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of

participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the
severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty
by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt
taking into account his degree of participation in the commission of the
offense.cralawlawlibrary

What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-
accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized.
In Chua v. People, which involved a motion to discharge an accused, the Court
declared that if one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the determining
cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not have been committed;
it is the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the criminal act.

14
To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal by
inducement as the most guilty based on the specific acts done by the two accused
and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of falsification of private
documents where the element of “damage” arose through the principal by
inducement’s encashment of the falsified check. This led the Court to declare that
the principal by inducement is the “most guilty” (or properly, the more guilty) between
the two accused.

Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state

witness, what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime
committed.

The discharge of Montero as a state

witness was procedurally sound:

We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack of
hearing prior to the discharge of Montero as a state witness. Jimenez did not raise this
issue when Acting Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge. This denial, of
course, was favorable to Jimenez. If he found no reason to complain then, why should
we entertain his hearing-related complaint now?

The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively participated in the
proceedings of the motion to discharge such as his filing of a 20-page opposition to the
motion; filing a reply to the People’s comment; submitting his memorandum of
authorities on the qualification of Montero as state witness; and filing a consolidated
opposition on the People’s and Montero’s motion for reconsideration of Judge
Almeyda’s order.

RULE 120 – JUDGEMENT

(1) RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211002      January 21, 2015
 PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Rape through sexual assault, gender-free rape, homosexual rape, variance
doctrine
 
FACTS:
                On January 30, 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., XXX, then 10 years old, woke up
as “he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus.”  He saw
that Ricalde, 31 years old, a distant relative and textmate of XXX, “fondled his penis.”  
When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what
happened.  He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
                RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual
assault. CA affirmed the conviction but lowered the amount of damages.
ISSUES:

15
1. Whether or not XXX’s failure to categorically state that a penis was inserted into
his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice
fatal.
2. Whether or not the absence of trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of
spermatozoa disproves penile or object penetration.
3. Whether or not the invocation of “variance doctrine” is proper.
4. Whether or not the slightest penetration into one’s anus constitutes rape through
sexual assault.
 
HELD:
 
                Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as
“instrument or object rape,” “gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.”  The gravamen of
rape through sexual assault is “the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.”
 
First issue: NO
 
                The Court held that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her
genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was
committed. In People v. Soria, the Court ruled that “We find it inconsequential that
“AAA” could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted
into her genital.  What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted
into her vagina.  To require “AAA” to identify the instrument or object that was inserted
into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.”
Second issue: NO
                Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in
XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit.  The absence of
spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and
penetration.  This result does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower
courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human nature.
                The Court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert
testimony and the possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone
testimony.
Third issue:  NO
 
Variance doctrine
                Variance doctrine is provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure. It states:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there
is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or

16
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter.  And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
                In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what
was proven during trial.  The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
Fourth issue: YES
                XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted into his anus.”  The slightest
penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the
crime of rape.
               Long line of cases consider a woman’s private organ since most if not all
existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim.  Nevertheless, this
interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest
penetration to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual
assault.
                The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity.  The degree
1
of penetration is not important.  Rape is an “assault on human dignity.”
(2) DY vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016, Jardeleza, J. | kam

SUMMARY: Dy, former general manager of MCCI, was charged with estafa by the
company through its president Mandy. This is due to Dy’s alleged failure to pay for the
company’s loan to ICBC, resulting to the bank’s foreclosure on the company’s
mortgaged properties. The RTC held that prosecution failed to prove the elements of
estafa in this case. The lower courts (RTC & CA) further held that a contract of loan was
executed between Mandy and Dy, thus Dy is not liable of estafa. Despite the acquittal,
the lower courts still held Dy to be civilly liable for the total amount of checks (~P21
million) disbursed to her by Mandy.
The SC held that when the acquittal is due to the absence of the crime
committed, the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper
because there is no delict from which any civil obligation may be sourced. In this case,
despite the findings of the lower courts, the SC held that there was no crime of estafa
proven. Dy’s liability of around P21 million arises from her contractual obligation (loan)
to Mandy, which should be instituted in a separate civil action as to not violate Dy’s
constitutional right to due process. Petition GRANTED.

DOCTRINES:

Two kinds of acquittal: (1) because no crime was committed; (2) because prosecution
failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The effect on the civil liability depends on
why the accused was acquitted.
 In cases where the accused is acquitted on the ground that there is no crime,
the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely
because there is no delict from which any civil obligation may be sourced.
 This civil liability ex delicto may be recovered through a civil action which, under
our Rules of Court, is deemed instituted with the criminal action. While they are

17
 actions mandatorily fused, they are, in truth, separate actions whose existences
are not dependent on each other. Thus, civil liability ex delicto survives an
acquittal in a criminal case for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 HOWEVER, the Rules of Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. Where the civil liability is ex contractu
(civil liability arising from a contract – like a contract of loan), the court hearing
the criminal case has no authority to award damages.

 The criminal liability and civil liability are separate and distinct. They may coexist
but their existence is not dependent on each other.

FACTS:
Petitioner: Gloria S. Dy
Respondents People of the Philippines, Mandy Commodities Co., Inc. (MCCI) represented by its
: President William Mandy

 Gloria Dy was the former General Manager of MCCI. Among the businesses
wherein she assisted was the construction of the warehouses in their Numancia
Property (property leased by MCCI from PNB).
 In May 1996, Dy proposed to Mandy the purchase of a property owned by
Pantranco. Mandy agreed to take a P20million loan from International China
Bank of Commerce (ICBC) secured by a chattel mortgage over the warehouses
in the Numancia Property. Dy was entrusted to manage the payment of the loan.
 February 1999 – A notice of foreclosure was received by MCCI. Around 25
checks amounting to ~P21million was issued by MCCI (all payable to cash).
 Mandy delivered the checks to Dy. Mandy claims that he delivered the checks
with the instruction that petitioner use the checks to pay the loan. Dy, on the
other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and returned the money to
Mandy.
 ICBC eventually foreclosed on the property as MCCI continued to default in its
obligation. Mandy eventually found out that not a check was paid to ICBC.

RTC
 Oct. 2002 – A complaint for Estafa was filed by MCCI, through Mandy, against
Dy.
 The RTC Manila found that while petitioner admitted that she received the
checks, the prosecution failed to establish that she was under any obligation to
deliver them to ICBC in payment of MCCI's loan.
 RTC found strength in Mandy’s admission that Mandy gave the checks to Dy with
the agreement that Dy would encash them. Then Dy would pay ICBC using her
own checks.
 HELD: Mandy and petitioner entered into a contract of loan. Thus, it held that the
prosecution failed to establish an important element of the crime of estafa -
misappropriation or conversion.
 Dy is acquitted but still ordered to pay the amount of checks (P21,706,281.00) to
complainant.
18
CA
 Dy appealed. The CA said that it is settled that when an accused is acquitted on
the basis of reasonable doubt, courts may still find him or her civilly liable if the
evidence so warrant. Preventing complainant from recovering the amount of
checks would constitute unjust enrichment. RTC affirmed. MR denied.

Now, petitioner argues that since she was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to
prove all the elements of the crime charged, there was therefore no crime committed.
As there was no crime, any civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded.

ISSUE (HELD): WON petitioner should still be civilly liable for the crime of estafa when
she has already been acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of
estafa? (NO)

RATIO DECIDENDI: The SC agrees with petitioner’s contention.

Civil liability arising from a crime

 A crime is a liability against the state. It is prosecuted by and for the state.
 On the other hand, civil liabilities take a less public and more private nature. Civil
liabilities are claimed through civil actions as a means to enforce or protect a
right or prevent or redress a wrong.
 Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a private civil
component. It is in recognition of this dual nature of a criminal act that our RPC
provides that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. This is the
concept of civil liability ex delicto.
 This is reinforced by Article 30 of the same code which refers to the filing of a
separate civil action to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense. The
RPC fleshes out this civil liability in Article 104 which states that it includes
restitution, reparation of damage caused and indemnification for consequential
damages.

Difference between civil and criminal proceedings

 Quantum of proof needed: guilty beyond reasonable doubt for criminal
proceedings; only preponderance of evidence in civil proceedings (This is why
the civil liability may still survive even after the accused is acquitted due to the
prosecution’s failure to prove that the accused’s guilt is beyond reasonable
doubt.)
 The criminal liability and civil liability are separate and distinct. They may coexist
but their existence is not dependent on each other.

Two kinds of acquittal and its effect on the civil liability

 Based on Manantan vs. CA –
(1) an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of – no crime was committed: There being no delict, it

19
 follows that there is no civil liability ex delicto. This is what is contemplated
by ROC Rule 111.
(2) an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the accused – This is what is
contemplated in NCC Art. 29. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases – jurisprudence shows two different

judgments of the Supreme Court.

Elements of estafa (RPC Art. 315):

(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means
of deceit; and
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.

The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to cause
damage. The SC disagrees with the lower courts that Dy was only acquitted because of
reasonable doubt.

RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG and SP02 ALFREDO

CARANDANG y PRESCILLA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 177000
JUNE 19, 2017

FACTS:
In the morning of June 4, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho, SP02
Estelito Andaya, P02 Carandang and SPO1 Garcia set off for Sitio Mahabang Buhangin
in Tanauan, Batangas to conduct their routine as peace officers of the area on board a
patrol car driven by SPO1 Garcia. While they were in Barangay Gonzales waiting for a
boat that would bring them to Sitio Mahabang Buhangin, they heard successive
gunshots apparently coming from Barangay Boot. P/C Insp. Camacho then decided to
proceed to Barangay Boot to check and to apprehend those who were illegally
discharging their firearms. At around 2:45 p.m., P/C Insp. Camacho instructed SP02
Andaya and P02 Carandang to join the religious procession to monitor those who will
indiscriminately fire guns. As they were moving on with the procession, they heard
successive gunshots, which they determined to have emanated from the backyard of
Silveria Guelos. They went back to the house of the Barangay Captain to report to P/C
Insp. Camacho what they found out. Acting upon their report, P/C Insp. Camacho
decided to go with them to the place of Silveria. In going to the house, they rode a
passenger jeepney in order to conceal their purpose. SPOl Garcia drove their patrol car
and followed them. Upon reaching the place of Silveria who let them in, P/C Insp.
Camacho, P02 Carandang and SP02 Andaya then proceeded to the back of the house
where they saw around 15 persons drinking liquor. They also noticed empty shells of
armalite rifle scattered on the ground. P/C Insp. Camacho then introduced himself as

20
the Chief of Tanauan Police Station and told the group that he and his men were
verifying who fired the shots. Someone from the group of drinking men asked him:
"Who are you going to pick-up here?" Before P/C Insp. Camacho was able to respond
to the taunting question, P02 Carandang pointed to him the "empty shells" near the
comfort room located at the right side from where the group was drinking.
Consequently, P/C Insp. Camacho instructed him to collect the scattered empty shells.
When P02 Carandang was about to follow P/C Insp. Camacho's orders, the former
noticed a person, whom he identified as Nestor, wearing a white sando and blue
walking shorts stood up. While P02 Carandang was collecting the empty shells,
somebody hit him on his nape which caused him to drop his armalite. When he tried to
retrieve his firearm, someone hit his hand. As he was trying to stand up, he saw Alfredo
tightly holding P/C Insp. Camacho from behind while Rodrigo grabbed the former's baby
armalite. As soon as P02 Carandang was able to stand up, he was hit by Nestor on his
left jaw, even as he received a blow to his left eye. Thereafter, as P/C Insp. Camacho
was in a helpless and defenseless position, he was shot by Nestor causing him to fall to
the ground and later die. While P02 Carandang was retreating, he saw SP02 Andaya
being tightly held by the neck by Gil. He then saw Nestor shoot at SP02 Andaya, who
then fell to the ground and died. P02 Carandang retreated and started to run but Nestor
went after him and shot at him. It was at this juncture when SPO1 Garcia arrived at the
scene and returned fire at Nestor, hitting the latter with three out of six shots.

In Criminal Case No. P-204, the RTC finds accused NESTOR and GIL guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with
Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of
the RPC, for killing SP02 Andaya, and hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer
the penalty of eleven (11) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, up to
eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, and a fine of One
Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00). The accused are directed to pay the heirs of victim
SP02 Andaya an indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages
in the amount of One Million Pesos (Phpl,000,000.00), and moral damages of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).In Criminal Case No. P-205, the RTC finds accused
NESTOR, RODRIGO and ALFREDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Assault
Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC, for killing P/C Insp. Camacho,
and hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer the penalty of eleven ( 11) years of
prision correccional maximum, as minimum, up to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, and to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos
(Phpl,000.00) each. The accused are directed to pay the heirs of victim P/C Insp.
Camacho an indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages in the
amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (Phpl,600,000.00), and moral
damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).

The petitioners appealed to the CA. On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed the
Decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

21
A. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in relying on the unsubstantiated testimony of
the alleged eyewitness P02 Carandang and holding the petitioners guilty of the crime
charged.

B. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the judgment of the lower court
notwithstanding the glaring insufficiency of evidence to warrant the conviction of the
petitioners.

C. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that there is conspiracy between the
petitioners despite failure of the prosecution to prove the same.

HELD:It is clear that the petitioners basically raise only questions of fact. Nonetheless,
the Court gave due course to the instant petition due to the following reasons:

Firstly, pursuant to the settled rule that in a criminal case an appeal throws the whole
case open for review, the Court, however, finds that this case actually presents a
question of law; specifically, on whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was properly
observed.

Secondly, the petitioners, in the Reply, invite the Court's attention to the subsequent
testimony of P02 Carandang in the latter case filed against Nestor. The petitioners
assert that said testimony should be considered as new and material evidence which
thereby makes the findings of the trial court in the instant case as manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible. Thus, the petitioners moved for a new trial on the ground of
alleged newly discovered evidence without, however, necessarily withdrawing their
petition. At the outset, the petitioners' motion for new trial is denied. Clearly, the Rules
of Court proscribed the availment of the remedy of new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence at this stage of appeal.

Section 1 of Rule 121 states: At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the
consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. Under Section 14 of Rule
124, a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be filed at
any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the
judgment of the CA convicting the appellant becomes final.

Further, Rule 45, Section 1 clearly provides that a motion for new trial is not among the
remedies which may be entertained together with a petition for appeal on certiorari.

More importantly, the alleged newly discovered evidence is not worthy of the Court's
consideration. Thus, the Court finds no reason to give merit to the petitioners'
contentions of alleged new evidence.

22
The petitioners are being charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148
and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC.

To be more specific, the Informations do not allege that the offenders/petitioners knew
that the ones they were assaulting were agents of a person in authority, in the exercise
of their duty.

Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by
"any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation
for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion
and sedition"; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
"shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or
any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance." Indubitably, the instant case falls under the second form of direct
assault. The following elements must be present, to wit:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;

3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in
the actual performance of official duties, or (b) is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties;

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties; and

5. That there is no public uprising.

In the course of the trial, the evidence presented sufficiently established the foregoing
allegations including the fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were
agents of a person in authority, as the latter introduced themselves to be members of
the PNP. Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know
that the victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in
the Informations that such fact was known to the accused which renders the same
defective.

In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance

under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC for acts committed with insult or in disregard
of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank to justify the imposition of
an increased penalty against the petitioners. As the Court held in People v. Rodi. While
the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was
in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be
convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in

23
authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the
accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of
a person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did "attack and stab
PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties."
Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to
justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of
the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying
circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the
information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a
qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance.

Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a
peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt of/or with
insult to public authorities" (Par. 2, Art. XIV of the RPC, or as an "insult or in disregard
of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank," Par. 3, Art. XIV, RPC).

The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly mandates that qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language in the
complaint or information. When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can
aggravate an offense or that would attach to such offense a greater penalty than that
ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to
justify the imposition of the increased penalty. Due to such requirement being pro reo,
the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even those charged with
felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement).

Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal procedure reads:

Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. - The failure of the accused
to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based in the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

Indeed, the foregoing provision provides that if an accused fails to assert all the
grounds available to him under Section 3 of Rule 117 in his motion to quash, or if he,
altogether, fails to file a motion a quash – any objection based on the ground or
grounds he failed to raise through a motion to quash shall be deemed waived, except
the following, thus:

SEC. 3. Grounds.

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

24
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide instead of the
complex crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide
due to the simple reason that the Informations do not sufficiently charge the latter. The
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
or information ... it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of
the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the
body of the Information.

Nevertheless, by reason of the fact that the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of acts committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank was proven in the course of the trial, exemplary damages should be
awarded in each case in addition to such other damages that were already awarded by
the courts below. The grant in this regard should be in the sum of P30,000.00.

Accordingly, since the petitioners are all found to be principally liable for the crimes
committed as conspiracy was duly proven, exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 should be awarded against each of them. The judgment is hereby affirmed
with modification.

RULE 122 – APPEAL

(1) [RULE 122, SEC. 1] It is a final order since it disposes of the case, terminates the
proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the case
against petitioner HPG officers.

CAJIPE VS. PEOPLE

April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 615
ABAD, J.

FACTS: Lilian De Vera alleged that the PNP Special Action Force (SAF) and Highway
Patrol Group (HPG) conspired to carry out a plan to shoot and kill her husband Jun and
daughter Lia. In December 2008, Lilian called her husband to meet them in Pasay. She
got to the place but her husband and daughter did not show up. Their housekeeper
called her to inform her that her husband and daughter was involved in a shoot out in
their village. Jun was shot dead on the head and Lia, the 7-year old daughter died in the
hospital as she was rushed due to a head wound caused by a gunshot. In December
2009, the DOJ found probable cause to indict all the police officers involved in the shoot
out. The RTC dismissed the case against the HPG officers for lack of probable cause;

25
while the court issued a warrant of arrest for the SAF officers for finding a probable
cause. Before the CA, the court appreciated the affidavits of witnesses stating that the
HPG officers joined the SAF officers in pursuing and shooting of Jun while bringing Lia
to a safer place. Thus, it issued warrants of arrest for the HPG officers. The CA denied
the motions to quash these warrants, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in issuing the warrants of arrest for the HPG
officers.

HELD: YES. The CA clearly erred in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.
The fact, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides that an appeal may be
taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order like the RTC's order dismissing
the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order
since it disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with
nothing further to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers.

Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People 112
days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, the petition
was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review.

Of course, the People may refile the case if new evidence adduced in another
preliminary investigation will support the filing of a new information against them. But
that is another matter.

The RTC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG
officers. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge
"may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause." The CA should have denied the People's petition for special civil
action of certiorari that assails the correctness of the order of dismissal since Section 1
of Rule 65 provides that such action is available only when "there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

(2) [RULE 122, SEC. 3, 8, 9] The RTC ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
which specifically governed appeals in criminal cases. The failure to file the
memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in
civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c)
imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire
record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed”
upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the
expiration of the period to file the same.

JOSE “PEPE” SANICO VS. PEOPLE

March 25, 2015, G.R. No. 198753
BERSAMIN, J.

26
FACTS: The petitioner and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing
and theft of minerals in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod,
Cebu (MCTC). In due course, the MCTC rendered its judgment on April 2, 2009,
convicting the accused for violation of Section 103 of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise
known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

On April 26, 2010, one Atty. Dennis Cañete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a
motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had
not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset with problems due to
his wife’s debilitating illness which eventually claimed her life, as well as his counsel,
Atty. Baring’s own medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this case
and whom to contact as principal counsel. This was denied by the RTC. Subsequently,
the accused filed a petition for review in the CA, contesting his conviction, and assailing
the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the memorandum on appeal. The CA denied
the petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in not nullifying the RTC’s order
dismissing the appeal for failure to file a memorandum.

HELD: YES. The RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of
Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the
appeal for the sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC
wrongly relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The RTC thereby ignored
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed appeals in criminal cases.

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the
appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because
Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of
the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed”
upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the
period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be
properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.

Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the
petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course,
whether he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the
appeal by the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process.

RULE 124 – PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

(1) [RULE 124, SEC. 14] Sec. 14 of rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that a
sheriff make a report to the court every thirty days until the judgment is satisfied
in full. In the present case, Padua failed to report to the court and state the
reason why the judgment was not satisfied in full within 30 days after his receipt
of the writ. He only made a partial report after 2 years.
ATTY. AURORA P. SANGLAY VS. EDUARDO E. PADUA II

27
 July 1, 2015, A.M. No. P-14-3182

CARPIO, J.

FACTS: The accused Padua, Sheriff IV in the RTC of San Fernando, La Union , wass
ordered "to execute the x x x dispositive portion of the Decision and make a return of
[his] proceeding unto [the] Court within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt [of the
writ] and every thirty (30) days thereafter until [the] Writ shall have been fully satisfied.”
Padua failed to make the reports as ordered. Thus, Atty. Sanglay filed with the RTC a
motion to direct Padua to enforce the writ of execution and render a report. Padua
made a partial report but failed to make any other report. The Office of the Court
Administration (OCA) found Padua to be guilty of simple neglect of duty.

ISSUE: Whether or not Padua was guilty of simple neglect of duty.

HELD: YES. Sec. 14 of rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that a sheriff make a
report to the court every thirty days until the judgment is satisfied in full:
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. — The writ of execution shall be returnable to the
court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the
judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the
officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in
effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The
officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken
thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or
periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed
with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.
In the present case, Padua failed to report to the court and state the reason why the
judgment was not satisfied in full within 30 days after his receipt of the writ. Despite the
March 9, 2010; July 4, 2010; and, January 20, 2011 motions filed by Atty. Sanglay,
Padua failed to make a report to the court every 30 days on the proceedings taken. In
fact, Padua made a partial report only after almost two years and only after Atty.
Sanglay filed the present administrative complaint. Therefore, Padua is guilty of simple
neglect of duty.

RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE

(1) [RULE 126, SEC. 13] A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

PEOPLE VS. MEDARIO CALANTIAO

June 18, 2014, G.R. No. 203984
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: Upon a complaint filed by Edwin Lojera regarding a shooting incident, PO1
Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez proceeded to Caloocan City where they
found the white taxi reported by Lojera. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men

28
alighted, fired their guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez
chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black
bag containing 2 bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops. Calantiao was charged before
the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. However,
Calantiao questions the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession as
evidence against him on the ground that it was discovered via an illegal search.

ISSUE: Whether the marijuana is admissible as evidence.

HELD: YES. The marijuana is admissible as evidence since earches and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant. The purpose of allowing a
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. A
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person
of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. In the case at bar, the
marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao's possession and within his immediate
control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy
the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao's
possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could
validly conduct a warrantless search.

(2) [RULE 126, SEC. 2(b)] The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature,
requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court
which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the
crime.

PILIPINAS SHELL VS. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL

February 16, 2015, G.R. No. 189669
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale,
or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders
manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device of respondent
Petron. Petitioners requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate
said activities of respondent which acts constitute a violation of Section 168, in relation
to Section 1704 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, and/or Section 25 of R.A. No. 623. The
NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of
Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at respondent's warehouse.

Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for Search Warrant against respondent

29
and/or its occupants. The RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said Applications
and Search Warrants were issued. However, respondent raised for the first time, the
issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga
City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the RTC-Iriga City. RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, thereby quashing Search Warrants, which was later on affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling
reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which does not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime.

HELD: YES. Petitioner’s application for search warrant failed to state any compelling
reason required under Rule 126, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed.

An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: xxx
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of
the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant
shall be enforced. xxx

Under paragraph (b), the application for search warrant in this case should have stated
compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the
RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over
the place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place where the search
warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring
a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not
have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the crime. Since Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on this
right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the search warrants.
On this point, then, petitioner's application for a search warrant was indeed insufficient
for failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why
they had to file the application in a court that did not have territorial jurisdiction over the
place where the alleged crime was committed.

RULE 130 – RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

(1) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ANITA MIRANDA y BELTRAN,

Appellant. G.R. No. 205639, THIRD DIVISION, January 18, 2016, PERALTA, J.

It is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug that the drug,
which is the corpus delicti, be presented as evidence in court. Hence, the identity of the

30
prohibited drug must be established without any doubt. Even more than this, what must
also be established is the fact that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation
is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed.
FACTS:
The prosecution's evidence established that after a surveillance conducted outside
appellant's house located in Barangay Ibaba West, Calapan City, it was confirmed that
she was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu. Thus, at 12:00 noon of May 6, 2005, the
police formed a buy-bust team designating PO2 Mariel D. Rodil (PO2 Rodil) to act as
the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Noel Buhay (SPO1 Buhay) and PO2 Ritchie Chan (PO2 Chan)
as the arresting officers and the other team members as back up. Marked and given to
PO2 Rodil were four (4) one hundred peso bills. At 2:00 p.m., the buy-bust team arrived
in Barangay Ibaba West and PO2 Rodil proceeded to appellant's house, while the rest
of the team hid somewhere near appellant's house. PO2 Rodil saw appellant outside
her house and after a brief conversation, told her that she was buying shabu worth
P400.00. Appellant then went inside her house and upon her return, handed to PO2
Rodil one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. After
PO2 Rodil gave appellant the marked money as payment, she then made a missed call
to PO2 Chan's cell phone as a pre-arranged signal. SPO1 Buhay and PO2 Chan
effected appellant's arrest. PO2 Chan got the marked money from appellant, while PO2
Rodil held on to the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. The team then
informed Arnel Almazan, Barangay Councilor of Barangay Ibaba West, about the
operation and they all brought appellant to the Calapan Police Station.
Both the inventory of the seized item and the taking of appellant's photos were made at
the police station. PO2 Rodil marked the seized item and submitted the same for
laboratory examination on the same day. The Forensic Chemist, Police Inspector Rhea
Fe DC Alviar (PI Alviar) confirmed the specimen submitted positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Appellant denied selling illegal drugs saying that at 2:00 p.m. of May 6, 2005, she was
at home watching TV when the police officers entered her house, frisked her and
searched her house. She was later brought to the Calapan Police Station where she
was asked to point to the shabu placed on top of a table; and that she was also
subjected to a drug test.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution evidence showed full compliance with Section 21(1) of
Republic Act (RA) 9165 on the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs.
RULING:
YES. Section 21(1) of Republic Act (RA) 9165 on the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs was complied.
It is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug that the drug,
which is the corpus delicti, be presented as evidence in court. Hence, the identity of the
prohibited drug must be established without any doubt. Even more than this, what must
also be established is the fact that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation
is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement

31
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed.
Chain of custody, as defined under Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1, series of 2002, which implements RA 9165, states:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish the crucial links in
the chain of custody of the seized sachet of shabu. After PO2 Rodil received the plastic
sachet of white crystalline substance from appellant, she was in possession of the
shabu up to the time appellant was brought to the police station for investigation. With
the buy-bust team and appellant at the police station were the Kill Droga Provincial
President, Nicanor Ocampo, Sr. and Barangay Councilor Almazan. PO2 Rodil made an
inventory of the seized item which was attested by Ocampo. She also marked the
seized item with her initials "MDR". Appellant's photos were also taken pointing to the
plastic sachet.
PO2 Rodil prepared and signed the request for laboratory examination and brought the
letter request and the seized item to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office-4B Mimiropa,
Suqui, Calapan City for qualitative analysis. The specimen was received at the
laboratory at 5:00 p.m. of the same day. PI Alviar examined the white crystalline
substance contained in a heat-sealed plastic transparent plastic sachet with marking
"MDR" on the same right and issued Chemistry Report wherein she stated that the
specimen was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The staple-
sealed brown envelope with markings PI Alviar's initials, which contained one
rectangular transparent plastic sachet sealed with masking tape with the same marking,
was offered in evidence and identified in court by PI Alviar. There is no doubt that the
sachet of shabu, which was bought and confiscated from appellant, brought to the
police station, and was submitted to the crime laboratory for a qualitative examination,
was the very same shabu presented and identified in court. The police had sufficiently
preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item, thus, complying with the
prescribed procedure in the custody and control of the confiscated drugs.

(2) People of the Philippines vs. Salim Ismael Y Radang G.R. No. 208093, FIRST
DIVISION, February 20, 2017, J. DEL CASTILLO
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the
seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or contamination of evidence

32
FACTS:
On a buy bust operation held by the police, Salim was arrested and charged with
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling and possession shabu.
The shabu that was seized by police officers SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez to
the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz who likewise turned over to the Duty Investigator
PO2 Tan the placed his initials ‘RDT’. Salim thereafter convicted with the crime
charged. He alleged that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt
because the prosecution: (1) failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs
allegedly seized from him and; (2) likewise failed to comply with the strict requirements
of Section 21 of RA 9165 due to failure to immediately mark the seized drug.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there compliance of chain of custody of the seized drug.
RULING:
No, Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment-The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
39
The first link in the chain is the marking of the seized drug. We have previously held
that:
x x x Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the
seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or contamination of evidence.
It is important that the seized drugs be immediately marked, if possible, as soon as they
are seized from the accused.
It is evident that there was a break in the very first link of the chain when he failed to
mark the sachet of shabu immediately upon seizing them from the appellant. According
to SPO1 Rodriguez, after finding sachets of shabu in appellant's possession, he turned
the drugs over to the desk officer. SPO1 Rodriguez did not even explain why he failed
to mark or why he could not have marked the seized items immediately upon
confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving the seized items from SPO1
Rodriguez, in turn handed them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk officer was not
presented in court thereby creating another break in the chain of custody. Again, no

33
explanation was offered for the non-presentation of the desk officer or why he himself
did not mark the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly from the
desk officer, of the seized chugs that the same were marked at the police station. This
means that from the time the drugs were seized from appellant until the time PO2 Tan
marked the same, there was already a significant gap in the chain of custody. Because
of this gap, there is no certainty that the sachets of drugs presented as evidence in the
trial court were the same drugs found in appellant's possession.
No explanations were given why markings were not immediately made. At this stage in
the chain, there was already a significant break such that there can be no assurance
against switching, planting, or contamination. The Court has previously held that,
"failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused casts
doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt."
Both arresting officers testified that they turned over the sachets of shabu to a desk
officer in the person of PO3 Napalcruz at the police station. Notably, PO3 Napalcruz
was not presented in court to testify on the circumstances surrounding the alleged
receipt of the seized drugs. This failure to present PO3 Napalcruz is another fatal defect
in an already broken chain of custody. Every person who takes possession of seized
drugs must show how it was handled and preserved while in his or her custody to
prevent any switching or replacement. After PO3 Napalcruz, the seized drugs were then
turned over to PO2 Tan. It was only at this point that marking was done on the seized
drugs. Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the
seized item subject of the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of
the illegal possession case. This is material considering that the imposable penalty for
illegal possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the seized drug.
Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting
officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the
presence of the appellant. This requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere
technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of the accused
to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to
comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.

The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs
were likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break
in the chain tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity
of the seized drugs became highly questionable.

34