REMEDIAL

LAW CASE
DIGESTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

RULE 130
Fortune Tobacco Corp. v CIR G.R. 192024 July 1, 2015
Republic v Gimenez G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016

RULE 131
LIGTAS vs. PEOPLE GR NO. 200751, August 17, 2015
CELEDONIO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 209137. Jul 01 2015

RULE 129
YUJUICO v. URAM GR No. 211113, Jun 29, 2015
JUAN v. JUAN GR No. 221732, Aug 23, 2017

RULE 132
Ng Meng Tam vs Chinabank G.R. No. 214054, Aug. 5, 2015;
SANTAMARIA & BOZA v. CLEARY, GR No. 197122, 2016-06-15

RULE 133
MACAYAN v. PEOPLE, GR No. 175842, 2015-03-18
FRANCO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 191185, 2016-02-01
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. FIRST PHILIPPINE
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, GR No. 194239, 2015-06-16
SEGOVIA v. CCC G.R. No. 211010 March 7, 2017

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RULE 130

Fortune Tobacco Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 192024 July 1, 2015
Facts: Fortune is the manufacturer/producer of cigarette brands.
Immediately prior to January 1, 1997, the cigarette brands were subject to
ad valorem tax pursuant to then Sec. 142 of the Tax Code of 1977, as
amended. However, on January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took effect causing
a shift from the ad valorem tax (AVT) system to the specific tax system. As
a result of such shift, the aforesaid cigarette brands were subjected to
specific tax under Section 142 thereof, now renumbered as Section 145 of
the Tax Code of 1997.

Under said law the rates of excise tax on cigars and cigarettes shall be
increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1, 2000. To implement the
provisions for a twelve percent (12%) increase of excise tax on cigars and
cigarettes packed by machines by January 1, 2000, the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue(CIR), issued RR No. 17-99. It provides in the last paragraph of
Section 1 thereof, "that the new specific tax rate for any existing brand of
cigars, cigarettes packed by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented
liquor shall not be lower than the excise tax that is actually being paid prior
to January 1, 2000."

On 31 March 2005, Fortune filed a claim for tax credit or refund under
Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC for erroneously or illegally collected specific
taxes covering the period June to December 31, 2004 in the total amount of
Php219,566,450.00. On November 14, 2005, Fortune filed a Petition for
Review which was raffled to the Former First Division of the CTA. The CIR
in his Answer raised among others that the amount of Php219,566,450.00
being claimed by Fortune as alleged overpaid excise tax for the period
covering 1 June to 31 December 2004, is not properly documented.

After trial on the merits, the Former First Division of the CTA rendered the
assailed Decision, dated April 30, 2009, which consistently ruled that RR
17-99 is contrary to law and that there is insufficiency of evidence on the
claim for refund. Fortune filed its motion for reconsideration therefrom, and
which was denied. Fortune elevated its claim to the CTA En Banc, but was
rebuffed after the tax tribunal found no cause to reverse the findings and
conclusions of the CTA Division.
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Fortune claims that it paid a total amount of P219,566,450.00 in overpaid
excise taxes. For Fortune, considering that the CTA found RR 17-99 to be
contrary to law, there should be no obstacle to the refund of the total
amount excess excise taxes it had paid.

Issue: Whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of

Fortune’s claim for tax refund?

Held: No

Procedural Issue
The denial of Fortune’s claim for tax refund in this case is based on the
ground that it failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim and the
amount thereof. As a result, Fortune seeks that the Court re-examine the
probative value of its evidence and determine whether it should be
refunded the amount of excise taxes it allegedly overpaid. This cannot be
done. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the Supreme Court’s
function to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered
in the proceedings below, the Court’s jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law
which the Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. This is in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

In fact, the rule finds greater significance with respect to the findings of
specialized courts such as the CTA, the conclusions of which are not lightly
set aside because of the very nature of its functions which is dedicated
exclusively to the resolution of tax problems and has accordingly developed
an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident
exercise of authority.

Moreover, it has been said that the proper interpretation of the provisions
on tax refund that does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties-litigants is a question of law.
Conversely, it may be said that if the appeal essentially calls for the re-
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
appellant, the same raises a question of fact. Often repeated is the
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distinction that there is a question of law in a given case when doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a
question of fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts. Verily, the sufficiency of a claimant’s evidence and the
determination of the amount of refund, as called for in this case, are
questions of fact, which are for the judicious determination by the CTA of
the evidence on record.

Failure to Submit Original Documents

Granting that the Court could take a second look and review petitioner’s
evidence, the result would be the same. Fortune only submitted mere
photocopies of their documentary evidence. Section 3 of A.M. No. 05-11-
07 CTA, the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, provides that the
Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily in the proceeding before the tax
tribunal. In this connection, Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays
down the Best Evidence Rule with respect to the presentation of
documentary evidence, which is that original document must be produced
subject to a few exceptions.

In this case, Fortune did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason as
to why the original copies of the documents presented could not be
produced before the CTA or any reason that the application of any of the
foregoing exceptions could be justified. Although petitioner presented one
(1) witness to prove its claim, it appears that this witness was not even a
signatory to any of the disputed documentary evidence. As correctly
pointed out by the CTA Division, Fortune knew all along that it had
committed the foregoing procedural lapses when it filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence. Although Fortune orally manifested that it was going to seek
reconsideration of the CTA Division order excluding its evidence, in the
end, Fortune did not even bother to file any such motion for reconsideration
at all.

Failure to Offer Any Proof or Tender of Excluded Evidence

At any rate, even if the Court should find fault in the ruling of the CTA
Division in denying the admission of petitioner’s evidence, the result would
be the same because petitioner failed to offer any proof or tender of
excluded evidence. Fortune posits that if their exhibits are admitted
together with the testimony of their witness, the same would sufficiently
prove their claim. A closer scrutiny of the records shows that it did not file
any offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence.
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Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides if documents or things
offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the
same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is
oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was
rejected by the lower court and the offeror did not move that the same be
attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by the appellate
court, as documents forming no part of proofs before the appellate court
cannot be considered in disposing the case. For the appellate court to
consider as evidence, which was not offered by one party at all during the
proceedings below, would infringe the constitutional right of the adverse
party – in this case, the CIR, to due process of law.

Although it may be suggested that the CTA should have been more liberal
in the application of technical rules of evidence, it should be stressed that a
liberal application, or suspension of the application of procedural rules,
must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be
complied with for the orderly administration of justice. To be sure, the
relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons
proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show
reasonable cause justifying its noncompliance with the rules and must
convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat
the administration of substantive justice.

But even if the Court would consider Fortune’s otherwise excluded

evidence, the same would still fail to sufficiently prove their entitlement to
the claim for refund. As correctly held by the CTA En Banc the documents
are a mere summary of excise taxes paid by Fortune for ALL of its cigarette
brands. The CTA cannot verify the amounts of excise taxes paid for the
brands in issue which are Champion M-100s, Camel Filter Kings, Winston
Filter Kings, and Winston Lights. The SC cannot likewise rely solely on
Fortune's Excise Tax Refund Computation Summary. The figures therein
must be verified through other documentary evidence which the Court must
look into and which Fortune failed to properly provide.

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G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and September 13, 2006. The
Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to
have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and granted the
Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence.

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG), instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting,
Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan. "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . .
acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the

positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the
Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso
Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of
Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department
of PCGG. Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned
or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.

On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo

R.V. Daniel’s testimony. The Republic then manifested that it was "no
longer presenting further evidence." Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave
the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of
evidence."

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30)
days or until April 28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of
evidence." This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
of the same date.

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On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until
May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion
was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006.
Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the
date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the
Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated

May 30, 2006. He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as
there was no evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed
a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to
prosecute. Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio
Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June
15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first
assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the

Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and
granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss. According to the
Sandiganbayan:

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the
higher ends of substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely
on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the ends of
justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the
Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed
for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .

The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the
formal offer of evidence fail to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits
mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel appear to be the same missing
documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff had more
than ample time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain
missing after lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason

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why the search for these documents should delay the filing of the formal
offer of evidence.

[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he

lost track of the time. We cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence of
the parties and in their failure to observe the orders of this Court. The
carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines is an
unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the
observance of the period set for filing the formal offer of evidence.

The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its
case for an unreasonable length of time and to comply with the court’s
rules. The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by
the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies. However, the
persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not
presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3,
2006 before this court.

The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition. This

court noted the separate Comments filed by the Gimenez Spouses. The
Republic responded to the Comments through a Consolidated Reply dated
June 22, 2007.

In the Resolution dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties to
submit their memoranda.

On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move in
the premises”.

On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open

Proceedings, to File and Admit Attached Supplement to the Petition for
Certiorari. In this Supplement, the Republic argued that the second
assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state
the facts and the law on which it was based. This Motion was granted, and
the Gimenez Spouses were required to file their Comment on the
Supplement to the Petition. Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.

Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder dated December 19, 2012 which was
expunged by this court in a Resolution dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio
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Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Rejoinder was
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Best Evidence Rule applies.

HELD:
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves
better treatment. For instance, the nature and classification of the
documents should have been ruled upon. Save for certain cases, the
original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document. This is the Best Evidence Rule
provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Original
document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original
consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When
the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office.

In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may

be presented as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.—When the original

document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. SEC. 6. When original
document is in adverse party’s custody or control.—If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of its loss.
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SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.—
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this

court pronounced: The nature of documents as either public or private
determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A
public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because
it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it
is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by
law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by
law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

RULE 131

MONICO LIGTAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.

767 SCRA 1[GR NO. 200751, August 17, 2015]

NATURE OF CASE
Judicial Notice; It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial
notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have
been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.

BRIEF

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This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated March 16, 2010 and
the Resolution dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of theft. Ligtas was charged with the crime of
theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS

On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and several men,
including Cipres, went to the plantation to... harvest abaca upon Anecita
Pacate's instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were
surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was
accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened
that there would be loss of life if they... persisted in harvesting the abaca.
Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the police.

On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before
the Sogod Police Station. Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but
claimed that he was the plantation owner.

According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late
husband, Andres Pacate since 1993. Andres Pacate installed him as tenant
of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal case. Ligtas filed
a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession on November 21, 2000.
On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas
was a bona fide tenant of the land.

While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally
offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB
Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and
without... any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.

In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that
"the prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft. Ligtas' "defense
of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor
was his claim of harvest... sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly

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corroborated by any witness. His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification ... by prosecution witnesses."

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. According to it,
"the burden to prove the existence of the tenancy relationship belonged to
Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential elements of a...
tenancy agreement.

The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision
"declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the case
at bar"

ISSUE of the CASE: (Note: related issue to remedial law (evidence))

Whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of

the land owned by private complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio
Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can
be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft.

HELD: Yes

The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or

not, is generally a question of fact. To be precise, however, the existence of
a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented
corresponding to the... statutory elements of tenancy.
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision
when it held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly
proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a
bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly... stole. A review of the
records of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable
resolution.

SUPREME COURT RULING

We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship
is conclusive and binding on courts if supported by substantial evidence.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal

proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases that:

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It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative
cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission.
Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative
prosecution, or vice versa.

One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal

liability for the same act.

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the

procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and
administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence... presented in
the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be
presented in the criminal cases.

However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming

from the same set of facts involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a
case where one act results in both criminal and administrative liability.
DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of... whether
there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225 involves determination of
whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a
factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were... proven by the
prosecution.

Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.

Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence.
This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and... to substitute its own judgment [as to] the
sufficiency of evidence."

The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to
determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse
parties.This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB]
have the same binding effect as... judgments and orders of a regular
judicial body."

The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the
essential elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by petitioner. It
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found that there was substantial evidence to support petitioner's claim as
tenant of the land. In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined
pleadings and affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. It was
convinced by petitioner's evidence, which consisted of sworn statements of
petitioner's witnesses that petitioner... was installed as tenant by Andres
Pacate sometime in 1993. Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement
to share the produce after harvest. However, Andres Pacate had died
before the first harvest.

Petitioner then gave the landowner's share to private complainant, and had
done so every harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land
on June 29, 2000.

We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private
complainant failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused to attend the
scheduled hearings.

It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of
decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.

In declaring that the DARAB's findings on... the tenancy relationship

between petitioner and private complainant are immaterial to the criminal
case for theft, the Court of Appeals relied on Rollo, et al. v. Leal Realty
Centrum Co., Inc., et al.

In Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings
were merely provisional and, thus, not binding on courts.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed
the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision has long
lapsed into finality. It is also established that private complainant
participated in the initial stages of... the DARAB proceedings.Therefore, the
issue of the existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the
parties. We cannot collaterally review the DARAB's findings at this stage.
The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates... serious
doubts as to the guilt of the accused.

Page 15 of 59
EDUARDO CELEDONIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No.
209137. Jul 01 2015]

FACTS: That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of
Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,with intent to gain and by
means of force upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein
complainant by destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside,
take, rob and carry away the following one gold bracelet 24K, 3 necklace 1
one 24K and 2 two 18K, 2 two digi cam Sony player, 1 one DVD portable 1
one wrist watch Tagheur, 1 one sun glass Guess,1 one camera Canon, 1
one Gameboy advance, 1 one calculator, 1 one discman Sony, 2 two pcs.
100.00 US dollar bill, 22 twenty two pcs., 2 two necklace 18K worth, 2 two
bracelet worth, 2 two gold ring, 1 one wedding ring worth 14K, 1 one wrist
watch swiss military, 1 one cellphone NOKIA 8250, 3 three pairs of
earrings, 3 three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars, 60 sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills,
100 one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills, 15 fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills
owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the
damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, in the aforementioned
amount of Php223,000.00.

ISSUES:
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT THE PETITIONER’S GUILT WAS
PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

2) WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING

THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER WAS
ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE.

3) WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING

THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS
ILLMOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

1) Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the

stolen items when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during
their follow-up operation. He failed to give a reasonable explanation as to
Page 16 of 59
his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken
in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, is owned by him.

2) no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers
asked where the stolen items were, they merely made a general inquiry,
and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation. Records did not show
that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen items were
in Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing
that the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle.
There was no showing either of any force or intimidation on the part of the
police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio himself voluntarily
opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the
items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed it. The police officers,
therefore, were left without any recourse but to take him into custody for
further investigation. At that instance, the police officers had probable
cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any
explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into
consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had
to immediately act on it.

3) contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness.

Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the
witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that
they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.

RULE 129

[ GR No. 211113, Jun 29, 2015 ]

ADERITO Z. YUJUICO v. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT

Several stockholders] of STRADEC executed Pledge Agreements[ whereby

they pledged a certain amount of their stocks in the said company in favor

Page 17 of 59
of the respondent United Resources Asset Management, Inc. (URAMI).
These pledges were meant to secure the loan obligations of STRADEC to
URAMI under their Loan Agreement..One of the stockholders of STRADEC
who so pledged his shares in STRADEC was petitioner Aderito Z.
Yujuico.Apparently, STRADEC had not been able to comply with its
payment obligations under the Loan Agreement.
On 21 June 2004, petitioner filed an injunction complaint seeking to enjoin
the sale at public auction mentioned in Atty. Nethercott's notice. In the
complaint, petitioner argued that the planned auction sale of the stocks
pledged under the Pledge Agreements is void as the same suffers from a
multitude of fatal defects.

As the RTC did not issue a temporary restraining, the public auction of the
pledged STRADEC stocks pushed through, as scheduled. In that auction,
URAMI emerged as the winning bidder for all of the stocks pledged under
the Pledge Agreements.On 5 July 2004, however, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction, which effectively prevented URAMI from
appropriating the stocks it had purchased during the auction sale. On the
same day, Atty. Nethercott filed his answer denying the material allegations
of the injunction complaint. More than a year later, or on 21 April 2006,
URAMI—which until then was still not able to file an answer of its own—
filed with the RTC a motion for leave to file an answer. Attached to the
motion was a copy of URAMIs answer. On 5 September 2006, the RTC
granted URAMI's motion and allowed the admission of its answer.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for summary judgment . On 26
January 2009, URAMI changed its counsel of record for Civil Case No.
70027. The law firm Villlanueva, Gabionza & De Santos was thus replaced
by Atty. Edward P. Chico (Atty. Chico). Under the counsel of Atty. Chico,
URAMI filed with the RTC an amended answer with compulsory
counterclaim (amended answer)[ on 23 February 2009. The amended
answer was meant to supplant URAMI's original answer, which had
been prepared by the VGD law firm. In its amended answer, URAMI still
vouched for the dismissal of the injunction complaint but reneged from its
previous admissions under the original answer. This time, URAMI claimed
that the 23 June 2004 auction sale was valid and that it duly authorized
Atty. Nethercott to initiate such sale on its behalf.

On 12 March 2009, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to strike out
URAMI's amended answer on the grounds that: (1) it was not timely filed;

Page 18 of 59
(2) it was filed without leave of court; and (3) its admission would prejudice
petitioner's rights. In an order of even date, however, the RTC denied
petitioner's motion and allowed admission of URAMI's amended answer.

ISSUE: Whenther or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the orders
of the RTC allowing URAMI to file its amended answer.

RULING: Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his
pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once
and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to be
amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served).Otherwise, a party
can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court.

As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave
to file amended pleadings with liberality.
In this case, URAMI filed its motion for leave seeking the admission of its
amended answer more than two (2) years after it filed its original answer.
Despite the considerable lapse of time between the filing of the original
answer and the motion for leave, the RTC still granted the said motion.
Such grant was later affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.

We rule in favor of allowing URAMI's amended answer. Hence, we deny

the present appeal. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court does not
set the be-all and end-all standard upon which amendments to pleadings
may or may not be allowed. Matters involving the amendment of pleadings
are primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 10 and not by
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rule of Court. Hence, allegations (and
admissions) in a pleading—even if not shown to be made through
"palpable mistake"—can still be corrected or amended provided that the
amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
All in all, we find absolutely no cause to overrule the grant of leave granted
to URAMI to file its amended answer. The said grant is consistent with our
time-honored judicial policy of affording liberal treatment to amendments to
pleadings, especially those made before the conduct of trial.

FERNANDO U. JUAN v. ROBERTO U. JUAN

Page 19 of 59
[ GR No. 221732, Aug 23, 2017]
J. Peralta

Facts:
Respondent Roberto U. Juan claimed that he began using the name
and mark "Lavandera Ko" in his laundry business on July 4, 1994. He then
opened his laundry store at No. 119 Alfaro St., Salcedo St., Makati City in
1995. Thereafter, on March 17, 1997, the National Library issued to him a
certificate of copyright over said name and mark. Over the years, the
laundry business expanded with numerous franchise outlets in Metro
Manila and other provinces. Respondent Roberto then formed a
corporation to handle the said business, hence, Laundromatic Corporation
(Laundromatic) was incorporated in 1997, while "Lavandera Ko" was
registered as a business name on November 13, 1998 with the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI). Thereafter, respondent Roberto discovered
that his brother, petitioner Fernando was able to register the name and
mark "Lavandera Ko" with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on October
18, 2001, the registration of which was filed on June 5, 1995. Respondent
Roberto also alleged that a certain Juliano Nacino (Juliano) had been
writing the franchisees of the former threatening them with criminal and civil
cases if they did not stop using the mark and name "Lavandera Ko." It was
found out by respondent Roberto that petitioner Fernando had been selling
his own franchises.

Thus, respondent Roberto filed a petition for injunction, unfair

competition, infringement of copyright, cancellation of trademark and name
with/and prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) and the case was raffled off at Branch 149, Makati City. The
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner Fernando in
Order dated June 10, 2004. On July 21, 2008, due to the death of
respondent Roberto, the latter was substituted by his son, Christian Juan
(Christian). Pre-trial conference was concluded on July 13, 2010 and after
the presentation of evidence of both parties, the RTC rendered a
Resolution dated September 23, 2013, dismissing the petition and ruling
that neither of the parties had a right to the exclusive use or appropriation
of the mark "Lavandera Ko" because the same was the original mark and
Page 20 of 59
work of a certain Santiago S. Suarez (Santiago). According to the RTC, the
mark in question was created by Suarez in 1942 in his musical composition
called, "Lavandera Ko" and both parties of the present case failed to prove
that they were the originators of the same mark.
Petitioner appealed to CA but CA dismissed due to technical grounds.
Petitioner files Certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not a mark is the same as a copyright.

Held:
No. The Ruling of RTC is erroneous.
The law on trademarks, service marks and trade names are found
under Part III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, or the Intellectual Code of
the Philippines, while Part IV of the same law governs copyrights.
"Lavandera Ko," the mark in question in this case is being used as a
trade name or specifically, a service name since the business in which it
pertains involves the rendering of laundry services. Under Section 121.1 of
R.A. No. 8293, "mark" is defined as any visible sign capable of
distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an
enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. As
such, the basic contention of the parties is, who has the better right to use
"Lavandera Ko" as a service name because Section 165.2[13] of the said
law, guarantees the protection of trade names and business names even
prior to or without registration, against any unlawful act committed by third
parties. A cause of action arises when the subsequent use of any third
party of such trade name or business name would likely mislead the public
as such act is considered unlawful. Hence, the RTC erred in denying the
parties the proper determination as to who has the ultimate right to use the
said trade name by ruling that neither of them has the right or a cause of
action since "Lavandera Ko" is protected by a copyright.

Page 21 of 59
 By their very definitions, copyright and trade or service name are
different. Copyright is the right of literary property as recognized and
sanctioned by positive law.[14] An intangible, incorporeal right granted by
statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions,
whereby he is invested, for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive
privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them.
[15] Trade name, on the other hand, is any designation which (a) is
adopted and used by person to denominate goods which he markets, or
services which he renders, or business which he conducts, or has come to
be so used by other, and (b) through its association with such goods,
services or business, has acquired a special significance as the name
thereof, and (c) the use of which for the purpose stated in (a) is prohibited
neither by legislative enactment nor by otherwise defined public policy.[16]

Section 172.1 of R.A. 8293 enumerates the following original intellectual

creations in the literary and artistic domain that are protected from the
moment of their creation, thus:
(a) Books, pamphlets, articles and other writings;
(b) Periodicals and newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery,
whether or not reduced in writing or other material form;
(d) Letters;
(e) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works or
entertainment in dumb shows;
(f) Musical compositions, with or without words;
(g) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving,
lithography or other works of art; models or designs for works of art;
(h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture,
whether or not registrable as an industrial design, and other works of
applied art;
(i) Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works
relative to geography, topography, architecture or science;

Page 22 of 59
(j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(k) Photographic works including works produced by a process analogous
to photography; lantern slides;
(l) Audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works produced by a
process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audio-
visual recordings;
(m) Pictorial illustrations and advertisements;
(n) Computer programs; and
(o) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.
As such, "Lavandera Ko," being a musical composition with words is
protected under the copyright law (Part IV, R.A. No. 8293) and not under
the trademarks, service marks and trade names law (Part III, R.A. No.
8293).
Considering, therefore, the above premise, this Court deems it proper to
remand the case to the RTC for its proper disposition since this Court
cannot, based on the records and some of the issues raised by both parties
such as the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of registration issued by
the Intellectual Property Office, make a factual determination as to who has
the better right to use the trade/business/service name, "Lavandera Ko."

RULE 132
Ng Meng Tam vs Chinabank
G.R. No. 214054, Aug. 5, 2015;

NG MENG TAM, Petitioner, vs. CHINA BANKING

CORPORATION,Respondent.

This case stemmed from a collection suit filed by China Banking

Corporation (China Bank) against Ever Electrical Manufacturing Company

Page 23 of 59
Inc. (Ever), the heirs of Go Tong, Vicente Go, George Go and petitioner Ng
Meng Tam.

China Bank alleged that it granted Ever a loan. The loan was allegedly
backed by two surety agreements executed by Vicente, George and
petitioner in its favor. When Ever defaulted in its payment, China Bank sent
demand letters collectively addressed to George, Vicente and petitioner.
The demands were unanswered. China Bank filed the complaint for
collection.

In his Answer, petitioner alleged that the surety agreements were null and
void since these were executed before the loan was granted. Petitioner
posited that the surety agreements were contracts of adhesion to be
construed against the entity which drafted the same. Petitioner also alleged
that he did not receive any demand letter.

Petitioner served interrogatories to parties pursuant to Sections 111 and

6,12 Rule 25 of the Rules of Court to China Bank and required Mr. George
C. Yap, Account Officer of the Account Management Group, to answer.

George Yap executed his answers to interrogatories to parties.

Petitioner moved for the hearing of his affirmative defenses. Because he

found Yap’s answers to the interrogatories to parties evasive and not
responsive, petitioner applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum and ad testificandum against George Yap pursuant to Section 6,14
Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.

When the case was called for the presentation of George Yap as a witness,
China Bank objected citing Section 5 of the JAR. China Bank said that Yap
cannot be compelled to testify in court because petitioner did not obtain
and present George Yap’s judicial affidavit. The RTC required the parties to
submit their motions on the issue of whether the preparation of a judicial
affidavit by George Yap as an adverse or hostile witness is an exception to
the judicial affidavit rule.

Petitioner contended that Section 5 does not apply to Yap because it

specifically excludes adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses from its
application. Petitioner insists that Yap needed to be called to the stand so
that he may be qualified as a hostile witness pursuant to the Rules of
Page 24 of 59
Court. China Bank, on the other hand, stated that petitioner’s
characterization of Yap’s answers to the interrogatories to parties as
ambiguous and evasive is a declaration of what type of witness Yap is. It
theorizes that the interrogatories to parties answered by Yap serve as the
judicial affidavit and there is no need for Yap to be qualified as a hostile
witness.

The RTC ruled that Section 5 did not apply to Yap since he was an adverse
witness and he did not unjustifiably decline to execute a judicial affidavit.

The RTC stressed that Section 5 of the JAR required the requested
witness’ refusal to be unjustifiable. It stated: the [JAR] requires that the
refusal must be unjustifiable and without just cause. It must be pointed out
that [China Bank]’s previous motions to quash the subpoena was grounded
on the claim that having already submitted to this court his sworn written
interrogatories, his being compelled to testify would be unreasonable,
oppressive and pure harassment. Thus, witness’ refusal to testify cannot be
considered unjustifiable since he raised valid grounds.

Issues:
1. Whether or not RTC committed an error of law when it interpreted sec. 5
of the JAR?
2. Whether or not RTC committed an error of law when it effectively
disregarded the relevant rules on modes of discovery which govern the
presentation of adverse witnesses.

Held:

1. Under Section 10,25 parties are to be penalized if they do not conform to

the provisions of the JAR. Parties are however allowed to resort to the
application of a subpoena pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of Court in
Section 5 of the JAR in certain situations. Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Subpoena. – If the government employee or official, or there

quested witness, who is neither the witness of the adverse party nor a
hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or
refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other
things under his control available for copying, authentication, and eventual
production in court, the requesting party may avail himself of the issuance
of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules
Page 25 of 59
of Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in
this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the
taking of a judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex parte.

While we agree with the RTC that Section 5 has no application to Yap as
he was presented as a hostile witness we cannot agree that there is need
for a finding that witness unjustifiably refused to execute a judicial affidavit.
Section 5 of the JAR contemplates a situation where there is a (a)
government employee or official or (b) requested witness who is not the (1)
adverse party’s witness nor (2) a hostile witness. If this person either (a)
unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or (b) refuses without
just cause to make the relevant documents available to the other party and
its presentation to court, Section 5 allows the requesting party to avail of
issuance of subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of
the Rules of Court. Thus, adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses
being excluded they are not covered by Section 5. Expressio unius est
exclusionalterius: the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Here, Yap is a requested witness who is the adverse party’s witness.

Regardless of whether he unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial
affidavit or refuses without just cause to present the documents, Section 5
cannot be made to apply to him for the reason that he is included in a
group of individuals expressly exempt from the provision’s application.

2. The JAR being silent on this point, we turn to the provisions governing
the rules on evidence covering hostile witnesses specially Section 12, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – Except with respect to
witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party
producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by

the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified
reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the
witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an

adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all
Page 26 of 59
respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence
of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by
the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject
matter of his examination-in-chief.

Before a party may be qualified under Section 12, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, the party presenting the adverse party witness must comply with
Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. – Unless thereafter

allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not
be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to
give a deposition pending appeal.

In Afulugencia v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,27 this Court stated that “in
civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand
is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the
latter.”

In this case, parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and
answered interrogatories to parties pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court. They therefore complied with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court. Before the present controversy arose, the RTC had already issued
subpoenas for Yap to testify and produce documents. He was called to the
witness stand when China Bank interposed its objection for non-
compliance with Section 5 of the JAR. Having established that Yap, as an
adverse party witness, is not within Section 5 of the JAR’s scope, the rules
in presentation of adverse party witnesses as provided for under the Rules
of Court shall apply. In keeping with this Court's decision
in Afulugencia, there is no reason for the RTC not to proceed with the
presentation of Yap as a witness.

In sum, Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its application

adverse party and hostile witnesses. For the presentation of these types of
witnesses, the provisions on the Rules of Court under the Revised Rules of
Evidence and all other correlative rules including the modes of deposition
and discovery rules shall apply.

Page 27 of 59
INGRID SALA SANTAMARIA & ASTRID SALA BOZA v. THOMAS
CLEARY, GR No. 197122, 2016-06-15
Facts:
Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a
Complaint[6] for specific performance and damages against Miranila Land
Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid Sala Santamaria
(Santamaria), Astrid Sala Boza
(Boza), and Kathyrn Go-Perez (Go-Perez) before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu.
The Complaint involved shares of stock of Miranila Land Development
Corporation, for which Cleary paid US$191,250.00.
in accordance with the Stock Purchase and Put Agreement he entered into
with Miranila... may be brought in (a) the courts of the State of California,...
District Court for the Central District of California, or (c) the courts of the
country of Corporation's incorporation
Cleary elected to file the case in Cebu.
he expressed his intent in availing himself "of the modes of discovery
under... the rules."
Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition.
He prayed that his deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the
Philippines in Los Angeles and be used as his direct testimony
Santamaria and Boza opposed... he deprived the court and the parties
the... opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound questions
on him.
The trial court denied Cleary's Motion for Court Authorization to Take
Deposition in the Order... depositions are not meant to be a substitute for
actual testimony in open court.
must be presented
Cleary elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals granted Cleary's Petition for Certiorari and reversed the
trial court's ruling.
it is immaterial that Cleary is the... plaintiff himself.

Page 28 of 59
Issues:
whether a foreigner plaintiff residing abroad who chose to file a civil suit in
the Philippines is allowed to take deposition abroad for his direct testimony
on the ground that he is "out of the Philippines" pursuant to Rule 23,
Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of
Court.
whether the limitations for the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Section
16 of the Rules of Court apply in this case; and... whether the taking of
deposition under Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court applies to a
non-resident foreigner plaintiff's direct testimony.
Ruling:
Utmost freedom governs the taking of depositions to allow the widest scope
in the gathering of information by and for all parties in relation to their
pending case.
Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that the testimony of any person may be taken
by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories at the
instance of any party.
this provision "does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can
avail of deposition."
This Court has held that "depositions may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain
conditions and for certain limited... purposes."
These exceptional cases are enumerated in Rule 23, Section 4(c)
(2) that the witness resides at distance more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is... out of the Philippines,
unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition;
The difference between the taking of depositions and the use of
depositions taken is apparent in Rule 23, which provides separate sections
to govern them.
The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are
imposed upon their use.

Page 29 of 59
Rule 23, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is on orders for the protection of
parties and deponents from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
The provision includes a full range of protective orders, from designating
the place of deposition, limiting those in attendance, to imposing that it be
taken through written interrogatories
While Section 16 grants the courts power to issue protective orders, this
grant involves discretion on the part of the court,... A mere allegation,
without proof, that the deposition is being taken in bad faith is not a
sufficient ground for such an order.
The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the... matters
involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of a deposition, nor that
whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine,"
nor that privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course
of the examination, nor that all the... transactions were either conducted or
confirmed in writing.
The trial court's Order was based on two (2) premises: first, that respondent
should submit himself to our court processes since he elected to seek...
judicial relief with our courts; and second, that respondent is not suffering
from any impairment and it is best that he appear before our courts
considering he is the plaintiff himself.
In the Stock Purchase and Put Agreement, petitioners and respondent alike
agreed that respondent had the sole discretion to elect the venue for filing
any action with respect to it.
There is no question that respondent can file the case before our courts.
Respondent did avail himself of the processes and procedures under the
Rules of Court when he filed his Motion.
Moreover, Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court no longer requires leave
of court for the taking of deposition after an answer has been served.
he only sought a court order when the Department of Foreign Affairs
required one so that the deposition may... be taken before the Philippine
Embassy or Consulate.
That neither the presiding judge nor the parties will be able to personally
examine and observe the conduct of a deponent does not justify denial of
the right to take deposition.

Page 30 of 59
That respondent is "not suffering from any impairment, physical or
otherwise" does not address the ground raised by respondent in his Motion.
Respondent referred to Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court, in
that he was "out of the
Philippines."
Petitioners argue that the deposition sought by respondent is not for
discovery purposes as he is the plaintiff himself.
Jurisprudence has discussed how "[u]nder the concept adopted by the new
Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery
—with use on trial not necessarily contemplated—and a method of
presenting testimony."
Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken
even after trial has commenced and may be used... without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand.
"[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action,
whenever necessary or convenient.
depositions are allowed as a "departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their...
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge." Depositions are allowed,
provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without
leave of court if an answer has been... submitted); and provided, further,
that a circumstance for their admissibility exists.
In sum, Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court gives utmost freedom in
the taking of depositions.
It would have been even more costly, time-consuming, and
disadvantageous to petitioners had respondent filed the case in the United
States.
Further, it is of no moment that respondent was not suffering from any
impairment. Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court, which was
invoked by respondent, governs the use of depositions taken. This allows
the use of a deposition taken when a witness is "out of the
Philippines."

Page 31 of 59
In any case, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court still allows for objections to
admissibility during trial.

RULE 133

NILO MACAYAN v. PEOPLE, GR No. 175842, 2015-03-18

Facts:
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
(by increasing the duration of the penalty) the Decision[2] dated November
15, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, which found Nilo
Macayan, Jr. (Macayan) guilty beyond... reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery.
Macayan was charged with robbery
During trial, the prosecution presented as it witnesses: Annie Uy Jao, the
private complainant; Rodrigo Mapoy, team leader of the NBI operatives
who conducted the supposed entrapment operation that led to Macayan's
arrest; and Resurreccion R. Bajado, a forensic chemist.
Macayan... was the sole witness for the defense.
Annie Uy Jao (Jao) is the owner of Lanero Garments Ext (Lanero). In 1995,
she hired Macayan as a sample cutter and to undertake materials
purchasing for her garments business.
Jao acknowledged that in 2000, when her business was doing poorly, she
allowed her employees to accept engagements elsewhere to augment their
income, provided they prioritize their work at Lanero. It came to her
attention that Macayan and his wife (also an... employee at Lanero)
accepted work for a rival company.
Thus, Jao confronted Macayan to impress upon him the need to prioritize
work at Lanero. Macayan still took his work at Lanero for granted, so Jao
confronted him again. In this confrontation, Macayan allegedly
responded,... "Kung gusto mo, bayaran mo na long ako at aalis ako."
Macayan then stopped reporting for work
Jao was surprised to find out that Macayan had filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal against her

Page 32 of 59
Immediately after the postponement of the conference... on February 12,
2001, Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her family would be harmed
and/or kidnapped if she did not give him P200,000.00.
Jao claimed that she was sure it was Macayan speaking to her, as the
person on the phone... addressed her as "Madam," which was how he
customarily called her.
Fearing for her family's safety, Jao sought assistance from the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). She asked that an entrapment operation be
set up. The NBI operatives asked her to prepare bills totalling P4,000.00 to
be marked and used in the operation
Jao, Angel, and the NBI operatives arrived at McDonald's Banawe. They
stayed there for about 30 minutes before Macayan called Angel and told
her that they were to meet at McDonald's Quezon Avenue instead. They
arrived there at about 7:30 p.m. Macayan called
Angel again and told her that he was moving the venue to McDonald's EDS
A. They then proceeded to McDonald's EDS A and waited for Macayan,
while the NBI operatives waited outside. Macayan arrived and proceeded
to where Jao and Angel were seated. Jao handed him an envelope...
containing the marked bills. Macayan pulled the bills halfway out of the
envelope, and the NBI operatives accosted him
Prosecution witness Rodrigo Mapoy, team leader of the NBI operatives
who arrested Macayan, testified to the circumstances before and the
conduct of the entrapment operation. The testimony of forensic chemist
Resurreccion R. Bajado regarding the marked bills handed to Macayan
was... subject of a joint stipulation by the prosecution and the defense
The Information charging him with robbery dated February 20, 2001 was
then prepared, and the criminal case
In the meantime, on October 31, 2001, the illegal dismissal case was
decided in Macayan's favor by Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona. A
total of P186,632.00 was awarded to him.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission would find that
Macayan was entitled to unpaid benefits though he was legally dismissed.
The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission was
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modification as to the
applicable rate of interest.

Page 33 of 59
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City rendered the Decision[20]
convicting Macayan of robbery.
The trial court found the prosecution's version of events "from the time of
the telephone overtures of the Accused which is consistent with the...
elements of intimidation and/or extortion, up to complainant Annie Uy Jao's
reporting the matter to the NBI, to the time of the NBI entrapment" as
"ring[ing] a loud bell of truth and consistency, not to say credibility."[21] It
accorded the presumption of... regularity to the entrapment operation and
held that the forensic findings connecting the marked money to Macayan
militated against his defense.
Macayan then appealed to the Court of Appeals
He filed his Appellant's Brief
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People of the
Philippines at the appellate stage, did not file an appellee's brief. Instead, it
filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief[25]
recommending that Macayan be acquitted. It... asserted that his guilt was
not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Noting that Jao was never present in any of the conferences for the illegal
dismissal case and that the sole witness who could confirm if she was
indeed threatened or intimidated on or immediately after such an occasion
(i.e., Angel) was never presented, the Office of the
Solicitor General asserted that the fourth requisite of the offense of robbery
(i.e., violence against or intimidation of a person) could not have been
made by Macayan on the occasion of a conference for the illegal dismissal
case. It added that the other occasion when Macayan... was supposed to
have threatened Jao was equally dubious since Jao's sole reason for
claiming that it was Macayan speaking to her (i.e., her having been
addressed as "Madam") was insufficient to ascertain that person's identity...
the Court of Appeals Tenth Division rendered the assailed Decision[27]
affirming Macayan's conviction and increasing the duration of the penalty
imposed.
It reasoned that Jao's sole, uncorroborated testimony was nevertheless
positive and... credible. As regards Jao's having been threatened after the
postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal
case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that constancias are "not the best

Page 34 of 59
evidence of attendance"[28] and that, in any case,... Jao was threatened
after and not during the conference.
the Court of Appeals Tenth Division rendered the Resolution[30] denying
Macayan's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Asked by this court to file a Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General
instead filed a Manifestation and Motion[33] to adopt as its Comment the
same Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief that it filed with
the Court of Appeals. Thus, the
Office of the Solicitor General reiterated its position that Macayan's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt has not been established and that he must be
acquitted.
Macayan filed the Manifestation in Lieu of Reply[34] in view of the Office of
the Solicitor General's earlier Manifestation and Motion.
Issues:
whether Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been established.
Ruling:
We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and acquit petitioner Nilo
Macayan, Jr. of the charge of robbery.
I
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the
requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused
is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof, excluding possibility of error, produces... absolute certainly. Moral
certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind.
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an
accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on
the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process... clause[35] of the

Page 35 of 59
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved."
Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of
course, that an accused must be acquitted.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the
accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength
of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his... innocence.
II
The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a court
appreciates evidentiary matters in relation to the requisites of an offense.
Determination of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual issue.
This court, however, is not a trier of facts. Consistent with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, "[a]s a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact,
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45."[40] More
specifically, "in a... criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are
generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when
such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record.
Nevertheless, there are exceptions allowing this court to overturn the
factual findings with which it is confronted.
this court stated in People of the Philippines v. Esteban[42]... that "in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked
material and relevant matters . . . this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate
the factual findings of the [lower courts]
Below are the recognized exceptions to the general... rule binding this court
to the factual findings of lower courts:
(1)
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, and conjectures;
(2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

Page 36 of 59
(4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee;
(7)
When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10)
When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.
Macayan asserts that the lower courts committed a serious
misapprehension of facts, thereby wrongly concluding that he is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution falls seriously short of the quantum of evidence required to...
convict him. He specifically draws attention to the following:
First, Jao's claim that, immediately after the postponement of the February
12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case and in the presence of
Angel, Macayan threatened to harm and/or kidnap the members of her
family, despite the records in the same case... showing that Jao never
attended any of the 11 conferences that were set or conducted;
Second, the prosecution's unjustified failure to present Angel as a witness
and its sole reliance on Jao's testimony, considering that it was Angel who

Page 37 of 59
can confirm if, indeed, Macayan threatened Jao's family immediately after
the postponement of the February 12, 2001... conference;
Third, Jao's reliance on nothing more than how she was addressed as
"Madam" by the person speaking to her on the phone as basis for
concluding that it must have been Macayan who was supposedly calling
and threatening her and her family;
Fourth, the inconsistency and absurdity of Jao's conduct in considering
Macayan's threats of such serious nature that she needed to report it to the
National Bureau of Investigation for the prospective conduct of an
entrapment operation, and yet not telling her husband about the... threats
simply because he would easily get annoyed
Lastly, the inconsistent claims of Jao and prosecution witness Rodrigo
Mapoy, the NBI operations team leader, as to who Macayan called on the
evening of February 16, 2001 to reset the rendezvous to McDonald's EDS
A. Jao claimed that Macayan called Angel, while Rodrigo Mapoy... claimed
that Macayan called Jao herself.
Macayan's position is buttressed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
public institution otherwise charged with the task of pursuing the
prosecution's case on appeal. As the Office of the Solicitor General stated:
The only way to eliminate any doubt in Annie Uy Jao's assertions would
have been to find independent... confirmation from the other sources, as by
way of unambiguous testimony of a competent and credible witness. Sadly,
no such confirmation could be had as the prosecution's evidence on the
most crucial elements of the crime was limited to that testified on by Annie
Uy
Jao.
we deem it proper to reevaluate the factual findings and the conclusions
reached by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides for who are guilty of
robbery:
ARTICLE 293. Who are Guilty of Robbery. Any person who, with intent to
gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything, shall be guilty of robbery.

Page 38 of 59
Accordingly, the following elements must be established to sustain a
conviction for robbery:

1. there is a taking of personal property [i.e., unlawful taking]; 2) the

personal property belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus
lucrandi [i.e., intent to gain]; and 4) the taking is with violence against
or intimidation of persons or with force... upon things.

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the "bone of

contention"[47] centers on the elements of unlawful taking and of violence
against or intimidation of persons. This is precisely Macayan's contention:
that he neither intimidated nor... threatened Jao, and that he could not have
unlawfully taken money from her on account of any act of intimidation
and/or threats made by him.
IV
Consistent with the rule on burden of proof, the requisite quantum of
evidence in criminal cases, and in light of the points highlighted by both
Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General, we find that the
prosecution failed to establish Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable... doubt.
Thus, a reversal of the rulings of the trial court and Court of Appeals is in
order. Macayan must be acquitted.
As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the resolution
of this case hinges on whether Jao was indeed threatened and/or
intimidated by Macayan into giving him money, that is, whether he extorted
money from Jao. Per Jao's own testimony, there were two (2)... instances
in which she was threatened and/or intimidated: first, immediately after the
postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal
case; and second, when Macayan called her on February 13, 2001 and set
a rendezvous for handing over the... extorted money.
we find Jao's testimony regarding these occasions (and ultimately, the
presence of the requisite of violence against or intimidation of a person)
dubious and unreliable.
Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General are one in pointing out that
the records of NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-09-05057-00 are bereft of any
indication that Jao was present in any of the 11 conferences held or set
(only to be postponed even if both parties were represented).

Page 39 of 59
Jao's absence in the intended conference (though subsequently postponed
despite both parties to the illegal dismissal case being represented) places
serious doubt on the occurrence of the supposed first instance of
intimidation on February 12, 2001.
What is crucial, however, this being a criminal case, is for the prosecution
to establish the guilt of an accused on the strength of its own evidence. Its
case must rise on its own merits. The prosecution carries the burden of
establishing... guilt beyond reasonable doubt; it cannot merely rest on the
relative likelihood of its claims. Any lacunae in its case gives rise to doubt
as regards the "fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime with which [an
accused] is charged."
Here, there is serious doubt on whether Jao was actually threatened or
intimidated at the time she specified. Thus, there is serious doubt on the
existence of the fourth requisite for robbery violence against or intimidation
of a person in relation to the alleged February 12,... 2001 incident.
The prosecution could have addressed the deficiency in Jao's allegation
that she was threatened on February 12, 2001 by presenting as witness the
other person who was supposedly present in the incident: Angel, Jao's
secretary. However, she was never presented as a witness
.
The Court of Appeals noted that corroborative testimony is dispensable;
"the lack of it does not necessarily condemn a lone witness' recital of the
crime for as long as that single witness' testimony is credible.
People of the Philippines v. Cleopas,[55] which the Court of Appeals cited,
states that the testimony of a lone witness "may suffice for conviction if
found trustworthy and reliable."
Precisely, conviction resting on a singular testimony is warranted if this is,
in the words of Cleopas, "trustworthy and reliable,"[57] or, in the words of
the Court of Appeals, "credible."[58] This could not be said of Jao's...
testimony. As previously discussed, her very presence in the February 12,
2001 conference that she claimed to have been immediately followed by
Macayan's threats, is in serious doubt. Nothing casts greater doubt on the
reliability of Jao's claim than her having not been at the... time and place of
the supposed intimidation.
With the first alleged instance of intimidation being discredited, the
prosecution is left to rely on the second supposed instance of intimidation:
Page 40 of 59
the phone call made by Macayan to Jao on February 13, 2001, during
which he not only reiterated his threats but also set a... rendezvous for the
handover of the extorted money. Even this, however, is doubtful.
The prosecution should have offered more convincing proof of the identity
of the supposed caller. Even if it were true that Macayan customarily
addressed Jao as "Madam," merely being called this way by a caller does
not ascertain that he is the alleged caller.
Certainly, Jao could have offered other, more reliable means of
ascertaining that it was, indeed, Macayan with whom she was conversing.
The second alleged instance of intimidation is likewise cast in serious
doubt. Left with no other act of intimidation to rely on, the... prosecution
fails in establishing the fourth requisite of the crime of robbery.
Apart from these, another point underscores the unreliability of Jao's
allegations. As pointed out by Macayan and acknowledged by the
prosecution, Jao never saw it proper to warn her family, more specifically,
her husband, of the threat of being kidnapped. Nevertheless, she...
supposedly perceived Macayan's alleged threat as being of such a serious
nature that she must not only report the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation, but also entreat its officers to conduct an entrapment
operation.
Jurisprudence has established the standard for appreciating the credibility
of a witness' claim:
[F]or evidence to be believed, however, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve under the
circumstances. The test to determine the value of the... testimony of a
witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with
the experience of mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards
becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance
In sum, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking
and of violence against or intimidation of a person. Reasonable doubt
persists. As is settled in jurisprudence, where the basis of conviction is
flawed, this court must acquit an accused:... in our criminal justice system,
the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence
of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their
guilt. Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be...
acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable. The
Page 41 of 59
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be
overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
With the prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of establishing
Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this court is constrained, as is its
bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists, to acquit him.
Petition is GRANTED
Nilo Macayan, Jr. y Malana is hereby ACQUITTED

GUILBEMER FRANCO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 191185, 2016-02-01

Facts:
On November 3, 2004 at around 11:00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto
(Nakamoto) went to work out at the Body Shape Gym located at Malong
Street, Tondo, Manila. After he finished working out, he placed his Nokia
3660 cell phone worth PI8,500.00 on the altar where gym users usually...
put their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room to change his
clothes. After ten minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but it was
already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario), who was also working out,
informed him that he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the...
altar. Nakamoto requested everyone not to leave the gym, but upon
verification from the logbook, he found out that Franco had left within the
time that he was in the shower.
Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was
arrived thereat; hence, a criminal complaint for theft was filed against
Franco before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila
In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had
indeed lost his cell phone at around 1:00 p.m., he and his witnesses could
have confronted him as at that time, he was still at the gym, having left only
at around 2:45 p.m.[11] He also... admitted to have taken a cap and cell
phone from the altar but claimed these to be his.
In its Decision dated February 27, 2008, the RTC convicted Franco of theft
In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found the elements of theft to have
been duly established.
Issues:

Page 42 of 59
whether the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable... doubt to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime.
Ruling:
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court provides that the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (2) the
facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved;... and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential
that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken
chain, which leads one to a fair and... reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.[... it was only
Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. His lone
testimony, however, cannot be considered a positive identification of
Franco as the perpetrator.
Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive
identification. While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell
phone from the altar, it does not establish with certainty that what Franco
feloniously took, assuming that he did, was
Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell
phone."
The testimony of Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not identified
and authenticated during the course of Ramos' testimony.
The logbook or the particular page referred to by Ramos was neither
identified nor confirmed by him as the same logbook which he used to log
the ins and outs of the gym users, or that the writing and notations on said
logbook was... his.
The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to
pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant Franco's conviction.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se
to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.
There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a
suspect or accused in a criminal... case as the perpetrator of the crime as
an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,
although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission
Page 43 of 59
of a crime, he may still be... able to positively identify a suspect or accused
as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or
one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime. This is the second, type of positive...
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when
taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the
accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all... others.
Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations
in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[49] Section 20 of the same
Rule, in turn, provides that before any... private document is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. FIRST PHILIPPINE

INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, GR No. 194239, 2015-06-16
Facts:
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil
Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from
Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel,
gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil
Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports
bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems
transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and
parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected
after the residents of West Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to
smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within
the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from... the
wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow,
WestTower’s management reported the matter to the Police Department of
Makati City, which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection.

Page 44 of 59
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum
a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut
down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water
into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon
their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was shut
down.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West
Tower Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of
the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati
City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and
several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public
interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of
the magnitude of the environmental issues... involved.[1]
On November 19, 2010, the Cou... rt issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents
FPIC, FGC, and the members o... f their Boards of Directors to file their
respective verified returns. The TEPO... enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a)
cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check
the structural integrity of the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while
implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward
incident that may result from any... leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a
report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of
Directors and Officers filed a Joint Compliance[5] submitting the report
required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither
own nor operate the pipelines,... adding that it is impossible for them to
report on the structural integrity of the pipelines, much less to cease and
desist from operating them as they have no capability, power, control or
responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the directives of
the Writ of
Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-
page “Report on Pipeline Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance
Program.”

Page 45 of 59
Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on
November 19, 2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and
the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of the
DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the
Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC
can resume operation of its BOPL System.
To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA). By this Court’s Resolution dated November
22, 2011,[14] the appellate court was required to conduct hearings and,
thereafter, submit a report and... recommendation within 30 days after the
receipt of the parties’ memoranda.
On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial
Reconsideration[19] of the CA’s Report praying that (a) instead of the DOE,
the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal Industry
Research and Development Center; (b) a trust... fund be created to answer
for future contingencies; and (c) the directors and officers of FPIC and FGC
be held accountable.
On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the
recommendation of the CA in its Report and Recommendation that FPIC
be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the
WOPL may resume its operations.
Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014
Letter from the DOE on the state of the WOPL, as well as the parties’
comments thereon, the following issues defined by the parties during the
March 21, 2012 preliminary conference are now ripe for... adjudication
Issues:
Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent
the other petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the
residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to
direct the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order
to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer
for future similar contingencies; and

Page 46 of 59
Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC
may be held liable under the environmental protection order.
Ruling:
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.[39] Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real... parties-in-interest.[40] In other words, the action must be
brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought
to be enforced.[41] Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the... jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it
is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL
affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as,
in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of
July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power... was shut down.
Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return
to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents
of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the
common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal
standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium
corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The
Condominium Act,[43] it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its
members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the
management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect
some or all of the condominium unit owners or... users.
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted
proof of juridical personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business
Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines,
Inc. – San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala

Page 47 of 59
Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation,
as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the
present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7[45] of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected
by an environmental... disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to
file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all
the submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC and the
results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of
contention in the pending motions. Suffice it to state in the outset that as
regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with
the other recommendations of the CA, with a few... modifications.
II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE
Certification of the WOPL’s Commercial Viability
To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November
19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO)
pursuant to Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases. For its part, respondent
FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already
in place, will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following
systems: (a) regular cleaning scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b)
pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line
inspections (ILI), which is done every five years;
(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC
asserted that it also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and
borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as segment
pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d)... inspection and
reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and reinforcement of dents; and (f)
Pandacan segment replacement.[47] Furthermore, in August 2010, with the

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oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to
conduct ILI... inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and
ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline and
check it for cracks.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are
inconclusive and insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline
integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution and level
of assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free... from leaks
and is safe for commercial operation, the CA recommended that FPIC
obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for
commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be
issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of... the appropriate
leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the
need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves.
Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence,
We required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30,
2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification from the
DOE considering that the core issue of this case... requires the specialized
knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and various other
administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the
certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later,
however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos
Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the
timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a
dialogue between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.
After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of
the parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the
DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions
for the resumption of the commercial operations of... the WOPL. The DOE
should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in
the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results
warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an
order allowing FPIC to resume the... operation of the WOPL. On the other
hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe
for continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already
exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may
be... ordered.
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It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the
WOPL’s compliance with pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit for
its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the
evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL’s... actual state. Hence,
Our consideration of the numerous findings and recommendations of the
CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL’s present structure, and
not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.
Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several
conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of the operations of the WOPL.
This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and
timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the
DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued
commercial operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an
extensive determination by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state
through its proposed activities, and not merely through a... short-form
integrity audit,[56] that the factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can be
settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s structural integrity has not
yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s
resolution.
Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification
adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this
point.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note
that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or
restoring the environment.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily
reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future
contingencies.This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust
fund under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment
that has presumably already suffered. Hence,the Court affirms with
concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a
claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of

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Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the
considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.
The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust
fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s
that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners
arising from the same incident if the payment... of damages is found
warranted.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and the
IV.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors
and officers, the CA found FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without
prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC,
Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint
(Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and
officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual
directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule
in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a
writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot... grant the award of damages to
individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal
complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper
proceedings to ventilate and... determine the individual liability of
respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the
management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the
dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC
and FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the civil and
criminal cases now pending against them.
Principles:

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Said proviso... pertinently provides:
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. – If warranted, the court may grant to the
plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or
rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs
of suit and other litigation... expenses. It may also require the violator to
submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the
costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special
trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the... court. (emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, Sec. 15(e), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of damages to
petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying
the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.
The CA’s resolution on petitioners’ September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re:
Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan in
Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency Committee on
Environmental Health to submit its evaluation of the said plan prepared by
CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the stipulations
embodied in the permits issued by the DENR, and to get a certification from
the DENR of its compliance thereto is well taken. DENR is the government
agency tasked to implement the state policy of
“maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment”[57] and to “promulgate rules and regulations for
the control of water, air, and land pollution.”[58] It is indubitable that the
DENR... has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the environmental
remediation of Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak
in the WOPL in 2010.

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With regard to petitioners’ March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation
about a recent possible leak in the pipeline, the CA appropriately found no
additional leak. However, due to the devastating effect on the environs in
Barangay Bangkal due to the 2010 leak, the Court finds it... fitting that the
pipeline be closely and regularly monitored to obviate another catastrophic
event which will prejudice the health of the affected people, and to preserve
and protect the environment not only for the present but also for the future
generations to come.
Petitioner’s January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the
CA’s Report need not be discussed and given consideration. As the CA’s
Report contains but the appellate court’s recommendation on how the
issues should be resolved, and not the adjudication by this
Court, there is nothing for the appellate court to reconsider.
As to petitioner’s October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
for Clarification, the matters contained therein have been considered in the
foregoing discussion of the primary issues of this case. With all these, We
need not belabor the other arguments raised by the... parties.

SEGOVIA v. CCC
Victoria Segovia, et al. Vs. The Climate Change Commission,
represented by its Chairman, His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino, et al.
G.R. No. 211010
March 7, 2017

FACTS:
To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change,
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created
the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20,
2007. This body was reorganized through EO 774, which designated the
President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task
Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the
"Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:

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Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of
fossil fuels, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The new
paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple
principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For
this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and
collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered
mini-train). In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead
agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national
Environmentally Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines.
The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned, thus:

SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF - In addition to the functions provided

in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate and pursue the formulation of the
National EST Strategy for the Philippines. Specifically, the TGFF shall
perform the following functions:

(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels.
The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a
simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road."
For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and
collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered
mini-train).

Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created
the Climate Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the
PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the government which
shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and
action plans of the government relating to climate change.[7] Herein
petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of
the Road Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and
transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the said letter-foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the
reduction of official and government fuel consumption by fifty percent
(50%).Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition.
The Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing
their children, who in tum represent "Children of the Future, and Car-
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owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were
safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they
are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged
failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by
environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
and property of all Filipinos.

[9] These identified violations include: (a) The government's violation of

"atmospheric trust" as provided under Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance in the midst of acute public
want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and
official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent (50%); (b) DOTC
and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Principle under EO
774; (c) DA's failure to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads
and parking lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section
12(b)[11] of EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to coordinate with local government
units (LGUs) to guide them on the Road Sharing Principle under Section
9(g)[12] of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant emissions;
and lastly, (f) DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for
purposes stated in Section 9(e)[13] of EO 774.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the

foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued
degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the
petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and
may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land,
water, and air" by the government without due process of law.[15] They
also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme,
claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated
against by the law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost
all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for construction
and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike
lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.

[16] Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their
Comment seeking the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing
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and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The
respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating
that they have taken and continue to take measures to improve the traffic
situation in Philippine roads and to improve the environment condition -
through projects and programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for
climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System
which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke
Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and
Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually and jointly
implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and
mitigate the effects of motorized vehicles on the environment.Contrary to
petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact
of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine
National Implementation Plan on Environment Improvement in the
Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions,
greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution
standards for the transport sector. In response, petitioner filed their Reply,
substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the Petition.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition; 

2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; and 
3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should
issue. 

HELD: 

The petition is DISMISSED. Procedural

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Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
(RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they
have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a
rather amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or
injury.Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and
representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the
decision in Oposa v. Factoran;and that, in any event, legal standing is a
procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.

The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the
requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the
enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws.This has
been confinned by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift, and International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines).However, it bears noting that there is a
difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan,
wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants
prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ;and a petition
for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available
to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.

Requisites for issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus

The petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs
prayed for. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must
concur: there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology; the actual or threatened violation
arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and the actual or threatened violation involves or
will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The
writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for
continuing mandamus as follows: RULES 8 : WRIT OF CONTINUING
MANDAMUS SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
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duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a
right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of
such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until
the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. First, the petitioners
failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the
respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing
had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-
in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated a

principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon
the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this
principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies
to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature,
not those that are discretionary,and the official can only be directed by
mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being
enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the
law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official
duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be
directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.

This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to
compel the respondents to act one way to implement the Road Sharing
Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk
and bicycling, and the other to Filipino - made transport - when there is
nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances that require that specific
course of action in order to implement the same. Their good intentions
notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's

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discretion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of
kalikasan and continuing mandamus.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the

respondents to perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty -
there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the
petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the
Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to
show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs
that seek to improve air quality. .

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