Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng e Hijos, 61 Phil., 663, No.

41643 July 31, 1935

Villa-Real,J.

Facts:

Mabalacat Sugar Co, Inc, situated in Mabalacat ,Pampanga obtained from the defendant a loan secured
by mortgage constituted on two parcels of land with all its buildings and improvement.

After the said mortgage Mabalacat Sugar Co, Inc decided to increase the capacity of its sugar by buying
additional machinery and equipment,so that instead of milling 150 tons daily,it could produce 250.

To carry out this plan A.Green ,president of said corporation advance necessary amount for the
purchase of said machinery and equipment promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an
additional loan from the mortgages.

However, Mabalacat Sugar Co, Inc failed to obtain on the second loan with Cu Unjieng e Hijos.

Berkenkotter contended that the machinery is not part of the mortgage because it is a personal
property and not real property.

Issue:

Whether or not the additional machinery and equipment are considered mortgaged?

Ruling:

Yes,the mortgage of a parcel of land generally includes all future improvements that may be
found on said parcel. These improvements include real properties, like the additional machines and
sugar mill purchased. Said additional machinery are real properties because they are essential and
principal elements of the sugar central. Without them, the sugar central would be unable to carry out its
industrial purpose.
MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC., and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respond Inc., 122 SCRA 296, No. L-58469 May 16, 1983

De Castro,J.:

Facts:

WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC discounted and assigned several receivables with MAKATI
LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION under a Receivable Purchase Agreement.To secure the collection
of the receivables assigned ,private respondent executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials
inventory as a machinery described as an Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range.

Upon private respondent’s default petitioner filed a foreclosure of the properties mortgage to it.CFI
Rizal issued a writ of seizure .

WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC filed an appeal.CA decided in favor with it because the machinery in suit
cannot be the subject of replevin ,much a less of chattel mortgage since it is a real property.Because the
machinery is attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from respondents
would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor.

Issue:

Whether or not the machinery is a personal or real property

Ruling:

Personal property because the subject property is movable in nature and it becomes immobilized only
by destination or purpose. Nonetheless, the purpose was defied by the two parties when they executed
a chattel mortgage and no innocent third party was prejudiced. Private respondent could not impugn
the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom.
No. L-50466. May 31, 1982.* CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., petitioner, vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS and CITY ASSESSOR OF PASAY, respondents. Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, 114 SCRA 296, No. L-50466 May 31, 1982

Aquino,J:

Facts:

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC leased a land and put a gasoline station.

The CITY ASSESSOR OF PASAY characterized the gas station machinery and equipment as taxable realty.

CALTEX contended that a machinery which is movable in nature only becomes immobilized when placed
in a plant by the owner of the property or plant but not when so placed by a tenant.Hence. it is a
personal property.

Issue:

Whether or not the machinery is a personal or real property

Ruling:

Yes, because equipment and machinery , as appurtenance s to the gas station building or shed owned by
CALTEX and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas
station would be useless , and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site
or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment
Law and Real Property Tax Code.
[No. 42091. November 2, 1935] GONZALO CHUA GUAN, plaintiff and appellant, vs. SAMAHANG
MAGSASAKA, INC., and SIMPLICIO OCAMPO, ADRIANO G. SOTTO, and EMILIO VERGARA, as president,
secretary and treasurer respectively of the same, defendants and appellees. Chua Guan vs. Samahang
Magsasaka, Inc., 62 Phil. 472, No. 42091 November 2, 1935

Butte,J,:

Facts:

Gonzalo H. Co Toco a resident of manila mortgaged his share (5894)(5) to Chua Chiu to guarantee the
payment of a debt P 20,000.The said mortgage was duly registered in the register of deeds at Manila
and in office of the corporation. Upon the defaulted payment of Gonzalo H. Co Toco .The plaintiff
GONZALO CHUA GUAN (assignee)foreclosed said mortgaged.

An action for writ of mandamus was filed with the CFI Nueva Ecija, praying that the defendants transfer
the said 5,894 shares of stock to the plaintiff by cancelling the old certificates and issuing new ones in
their stead.

Samahang ng Magsasaka refused to issue said new shares in the name of the plaintiff.

Because prior to the date of the latter’s demand (4 February 1933), 9 attachments had been issued and
served and noted on the books of the corporation against Co Toco’s shares and Chua Guan objected to
having these attachments noted on the new certificates which he demanded. •

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, holding that the attaching creditors are
entitled to priority over the defectively registered mortgage of the appellant.

Issue:

Whether or not the registration of said chattel mortgage in the register of deeds of Manila give
constructive notice to the said attaching creditors

Ruling:

Yes,because the attaching creditors are entitled to priority over defectively registered mortgage of the
appellant.

The property in the shares may be deemed to be situated in the province in which the corporation has
its principal office or place of business. If this province is also the province of the owner's domicile, a
single registration is sufficient. If not, the chattel mortgage should be registered both at the owner's
domicile and in the province where the corporation has its principal office or place of business. In this
sense, the property mortgaged is not the certificate but the participation and share of the owner in the
assets of the corporation
Serg's v. PCI Leasing
Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000

FACTS:

 PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of
replevin.
 Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
 The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery, with word that he would
return for other machineries.
 Petitioner (Serg’s Products) filed a motion for special protective order to defer enforcement of the
writ of replevin.
 PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties were still personal and
therefore can still be subjected to seizure and writ of replevin.
 Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415
of the Civil Code.
 Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries
In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the Petitioner, the appellate court, Citing the
Agreement of the parties, held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only
been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties."

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by virtue of immobilization.

Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ
issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property.

Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery
of personal property only.

Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended
by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners
in the factory built on their own land.They were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making
industry.Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have
become “immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.”

However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.Under the principle
of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found
therein.
Martinez vs CA (56 SCRA 647)
Martinez vs CA (56 SCRA 647)

GR No. L- 31271, April 29 1974

Esguerra, J.:

Facts:

The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land
located in Lubao, Pampanga. The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor,
who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said
property passed to his successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor, who in turn,
sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.

Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president of Lubao, Pedro Beltran, from
restoring the dikes constructed on the contested property, Garcia filed a civil case with the Court of First
Instance against Beltran to restrain the latter in his official capacity from molesting him in the possession
of said second parcel, and on even date, applied for a writ of preliminary injunction, which was issued
against said municipal president. The Court declared permanent the preliminary injunction.

On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in his name, and
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the registration.

Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they were acquired by the
spouses.

To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers and
Streams, which, after conducting an ocular inspection, reported that the parcel was not a public river but a
private fishpond owned by the herein spouses.

The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered another investigation of the said parcel of
land, directing the spouses to remove the dikes they had constructed, threatening that the dikes would be
demolished should the spouses fail to comply therewith within 30 days.

Issue:

Whether or not the action of Secretary of Public Works and Communications is lawful.

Held:

Yes, because the right of reversion or reconveyance to the state of the public properties fraudulently
registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.

The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record to make inquiries as to
the legality of the title of the registered owner, but may rely on the registry to determine if there is no lien
or encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as against the law and the accepted principle that
rivers are parts of the public domain for public use and not capable of private appropriation or acquisition
by prescription.
Case No. G.R. No. L-40474 / August 29, 1975 Case Name Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles Ponente J.
Concepcion, Jr. Case assigned to Cole and Juno

RELEVANT FACTS

• A petition for the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner Cebu
Oxygen’s application for registration of title over a parcel of land situated in the City of Cebu;

• The said parcel of land was originally part of terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo City, and was
subsequently declared (on Oct. 3, 1968) as abandoned, it not being part of the City Development Plan,
and the same was authorized to be sold by the then Acting Mayor (Dec.19,1968);

• The lot was sold on Mar. 3, 1969 to petitioner Cebu Oxygen, being the highest bidder, and a deed of
absolute sale was executed for the consideration of P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen subsequently filed an
application with the Court of First Instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered;

• On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on
the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man, consequently, it cannot
be subject to registration by any private individual. The trial court issued an order dismissing the
petitioner's application for registration of title.

ISSUE

• W/N City of Cebu has the valid right to declare a road as abandoned • W/N the declaration of the road,
as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which may be the object of a common
contract

RATIO DECIDENDI

Issue Ratio W/N W/N City of Cebu has the valid right to declare a road as abandoned
Yes.

It is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. City Charter of
Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City the valid right to declare
a road as abandoned. Sec. 31 provides:

"Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City
Council shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(34)...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn
from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to
the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

W/N the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which
may be the object of a common contract

Yes.

Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner Cebu Oxygen’s application for registration of title
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which
can be the object of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State."

RULING

WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case
No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby ordered to
proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title.
DACANAY v. ASISTIO, JR.

FACTS

This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of Caloocan in
accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in
the streets of Caloocan.

January 5, 1979 – Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance allowing the use
of streets for the purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions.
1987 – Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed
a case against such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del '96, Gozon
and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and current
mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in
the streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to remove the
stalls in their street

ISSUE

May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance
or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?

HELD: NO

1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being
outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract

2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to
serve such as for traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street
because it is going to be contrary to the general law
HARTY VS MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA

FACTS:

On 17 January 1908, the representative of Monsignor Jeremiah J. Harty, archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church, as the legal
administrator of the properties and rights of the Catholic Church within the archbishopric of Manila, filed a written complaint in
the CFI Tarlac against the municipality of Victoria, alleging that the parish of the said town had been and was then the owner of
a parcel of land within the said municipality, known as the plaza of the church of Victoria; that it had acquired said parcel of
land more than 60 years previously, and had continued to possess the same ever since up to 1901, in which year the
municipality unlawfully and forcibly seized the said property, claiming to be entitled thereto and retaining it to the present day.
On 15 June 1908, the trial court rendered judgment, holding that the parish of Victoria of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
had a better right to the possession of the land described in the complaint, and sentenced the Municipality to vacate the same
and to pay the costs. To said judgment the representative of the Municipality excepted and moved for a new trial on the
ground that it was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and he notified the court that, if his motion were overruled, he
would appeal to the Supreme Court. The motion for a new trial was overruled; the Municipality excepted, and presented the
corresponding bill of exceptions which, after receipt of a copy had been acknowledged by the adverse party, was approved. On
1 September, the Municipality was ordered to furnish bond in the sum of P1,000 to insure the fulfillment of the judgment in the
event that it should be totally or partially affirmed. To said order the Municipality excepted, but furnished the bond as directed
by the court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from, and held that the whole of the land not occupied by
the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use, and that in consequence
thereof, the Municipality is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both instances.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the parish of Victoria is te rightful owner of the land in question
(2) WON the land in question can be subject of prescription
(3) WON the procured trees set out in the plaza constitute an act of private ownership

HELD:

(1) The SC held that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish home is a
public plaza of the said town of public use

Art 339 of the Civil Code reads: Property of public ownership is:

1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State,
and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.

Article 344 of said code also reads:

Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or
provinces.

Although the late Tanedo donated the land now occupied by the church to the church and not to the parish curate.
There are good gorunds to suppose that the late Vicente Tanedo ddonated the land now occupied by the church and
parish house in said municipality for religious purposes or to the church but not to the parish curate,

Proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said Tanedo comprehend the whole tract of land which at
the present time constitute the plaza. Even though all the remaining space of land which now form the great plaza of
the town of Victoria had been owned by Tanedo, it must be presumed that he waived his right thereto for the benefit
fo the townspeople since all the residents have enjoyed the use of the said plaza.

(2) Plazas destined for public is use not subject to prescription pursuant to Art 1936 of the civil code
(3) No, both the curates and the Gobernadorcillo of the said town procured fuit trees and plant to be set out in the plaza
does not constitute an act of private ownership but evidences the public use thereof , or perhaps the intention to
improve the land and embellish the said plaza for the benefit of the townspeople.
 VILLARICO V. COURT OF APPEALS
309 SCRA 193

FACTS:
Spouses Villarico sought for the confirmation of title over a parcel of land to which they allege that they
absolutely own the land. This was opposed to by a person who posed himself also to be the rightful owner of
the land, as well as by the Director of Forestry who said that the subject land is part of
forest land and may not be appropriated. Trial and appellate court dismissed application of petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not forest lands or unclassified forest zone canbe alienated

HELD:
No,There has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the
land in question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed
disclosed that applicants have not introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule
otherwise.

Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no

matter how long doesn’t ripen to a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant or title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain.

Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be
and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or
hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon,
real property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.”

The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of the Writ of Replevin
 Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic
August 6, 2017 Light

G.R. No. 179987

Facts:

1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of
title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo
Velazco and that he and his predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious,
exclusive and continuous possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
2. Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-grandfather
which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator
of the properties which the son of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties
therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
1. They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and
disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
3. The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v
Hebierto.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed

Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to dissect
them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529
along with CA 141

1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to
ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes
such rights. One did not repeal the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable” from
“agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we may take a look at
Sec. 9 of CA 141.

The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not
Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:

1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at the
time of the application, the land is already classified as alienable and disposable. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the right nugatory
and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still
not an independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
 presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of
Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.

1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men and the
patrimonial property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no longer in
use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of
Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the executive or legislative declaring
lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive act,
regardless if the land was classified as alienable and disposable, that the land sought to
be registered, can be acquired through prescription.

Applying to the case at bar:

1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other
substantive evidence was presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422
of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Nazareno vs. CA
Nazareno vs. CA

Facts:

The husband and wife, in order to avoid paying estate tax, while they are alive, executed several Deeds of
Sale in favor of their children. The sale was proven to be without consideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject properties of the Deeds of Sale are part of the estate of the deceased.

Held:

No, the children never acquired ownership because the sale was void for lack of consideration. The sale to
a Natividad, one of the children, is deemed in trust for the other children of the deceased. The properties
should be collated as part of the estate.
 G.R. No. 120961. October 2, 1997

DISTILLERIA WASHINGTON, INC. or WASHINGTON DISTILLERY, INC.,

petitioner
vs
LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS, INC. and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

Facts:
La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. filed before the Regional Trial Court for the recovery,
under its claim of ownership, of possession or replevin against Distilleria
Washington, Inc. or Washington Distillery, Inc. of 18,157 empty “350 c.c. white
flint bottles” bearing the blown-in marks of “La Tondeña Inc.” and “Ginebra San
Miguel,” averring that Distilleria Washington was using the bottles for its own
“Gin Seven” products without the consent of Distilleria Washington in violation
of Republic Act 623.

In the original decision, the court acknowledged that there was a valid transfer of
the bottles to Distilleria Washington, except that its possession of the bottles
without the written consent of La Tondeña gives rise to a prima facie
presumption of illegal use under R.A. 623.

In seeking reconsideration of the decision, petitioner raises the issue that if

petitioner became the owner over the bottles seized from it by replevin, then it
has the right to their possession and use as attributes of ownership.

The instant case is one for replevin (manual delivery) where the claimant must
be able to show convincingly that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the
possession of the object sought to be recovered. Replevin is a possessory action.
The gist of which focuses on the right of possession that in turn, is dependent on
a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to
be replevied.

Issue:
Since replevin as a possessory action is dependent upon ownership, it is relevant
to ask: Whether or not there was a transfer ownership of La Tondeña Distillers’
marked bottles or containers when it sold its products in the market? Were the
marked bottles or containers part of the products sold to the public?

Held:
The manufacturer sells the product in marked containers, through dealers, to
the public in supermarkets, grocery shops, retail stores and other sales outlets.
The buyer takes the item; he is neither required to return the bottle nor required
to make a deposit to assure its return to the seller. He could return the bottle and
get a refund. A number of bottles at times find their way to commercial users. It
cannot be gainsaid that ownership of the containers does pass on the consumer
albeit subject to the statutory limitations on the use of the registered containers
and to the trademark rights of the registrant.
In plain terms, therefore, La Tondeña not only sold its gin products but also the
marked bottles or containers, as well. And when these products were transferred
by way of sale, then ownership over the bottles and all its attributes (jus utendi,
jus abutendi, just fruendi, jus disponendi) passed to the buyer. It necessarily
follows that the transferee has the right to possession of the bottles unless he
uses them in violation of the original owner’s registered or incorporeal rights.
Furthermore, Sec. 5 of R.A. 623 states that when the bottles have been
“transferred by way of sale,” there should not be any need of institution of any
action included in the same act (where there is a need of the written consent of
the manufacturer, bottler, or seller). Since the Court has found that the bottles
have been transferred by way of sale then, La Tondeña has relinquished all its
proprietary rights over the bottles in favor of Distilleria Washington who has
obtained them in due course. Now as owner, it can exercise all attributes of
ownership over the bottles.

The general rule on ownership, therefore, must apply and petitioner be allowed
to enjoy all the rights of an owner in regard the bottles in question, to wit: the jus
utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces; the jus abutendi or
the right to consume the thing by its use; the jus disponendi or the power of the
owner to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy the thing owned; and
the jus vindicandi or the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned
any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing. What is
proscribed is the use of the bottles in infringement of another’s trademark or
incorporeal rights.
Roxas vs CA, G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999 /
Case Digest

ROXAS& CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF

AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM

OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD,

respondents.

G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999

FACTS:

 This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.
 Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,
Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is
1,024 hectares in area.
 On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the
President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
 Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed
under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Hacienda Palico
 On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled "Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to
"Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda. Palico." Therein, the MARO invited petitioner to a conference on
October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico,
which was "scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program."
 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent a "Notice
of Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows:

Roxas y Cia, Limited

Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes

Manila, Metro Manila.

 Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate
acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL; that based on the DAR's valuation criteria, the
government was offering compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares; that whether this offer was to be
accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR;
that in case of petitioner's rejection or failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner
accepts respondent DAR's offer, or upon deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the
same, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land.
 Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation
Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled "Request to Open Trust Account." Each Memoranda requested
that a trust account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the
petitioner in view of the latter's rejection of its offered value.
 Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two
Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with
cash and LBP bonds. On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda, respondent
DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's were
distributed to farmer beneficiaries.

Hacienda Banilad

 On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice to
petitioner addressed as follows:

Mr. Jaime Pimentel

Hacienda Administrator

Hacienda Banilad

Nasugbu, Batangas

 The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory acquisition under the CARL; that
should petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer,
respondent DAR was willing to provide assistance thereto.
 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2) separate
"Notices of Acquisition" over Hacienda Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of
Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the Notices over Hacienda
Banilad were addressed to:

Roxas y Cia. Limited

7th Floor, CachoGonzales

Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.

Makati, Metro Manila.

 Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares and P4,428,496.00
for 234.6498 hectares.
 On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a "Request to Open
Trust Account" in petitioner's name as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. A second
"Request to Open Trust Account" was sent on November 18, 1991 over 723.4130 hectares of said Hacienda.
 On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and P21,234,468.78 in cash and
LBP bonds had been earmarked as compensation for petitioner's land in Hacienda Banilad.
 On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
 Hacienda Caylaway

 Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of
the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares.
 On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2)
separate Resolutions accepting petitioner's voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos.
T44664 and T44663. The Resolutions were addressed to:

Roxas& Company, Inc.

7th Flr. CachoGonzales Bldg.

Aguirre, Legaspi Village

Makati, M. M

 Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the
Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to nonagricultural. As a
result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to other uses.
 In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the
land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner's withdrawal of the
VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for
agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.
 Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its application
for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
 On August 24, 1993 petitioner instituted Case No. N00179646 (BA) with respondent DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOA's issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons.
Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist
zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had
reclassified the land to nonagricultural.
 In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question
of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.

ISSUE(S):

1. W/N this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies;
2. W/N the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law;
3. assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to nonagricultural, W/N this court has the power to
rule on this issue.

HELD:

1. YES.
As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have
exhausted all means of administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action may
be resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are:

1. when the question raised is purely legal;

2. when the administrative body is in estoppel;
3. when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4. when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
5. when the respondent acted in disregard of due process;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter;
7. when irreparable damage will be suffered;
8. when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
9. when strong public interest is involved;
10. when the subject of the controversy is private land; and
11. in quo warranto proceedings.

Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust
administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer beneficiaries over portions of petitioner's
land without just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of
land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Before this may be awarded to a
farmer beneficiary, the land must first be acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the
former. The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then,
title remains with the landowner. There was no receipt by petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired by
the government.

The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or "LBP bonds." Respondent DAR's opening of trust account deposits in petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the
Philippines does not constitute payment under the law. Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement
of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the
determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings,
respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due process. Under these circumstances, the
issuance of the CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner.

2. NO.

Procedure in the acquisition of private lands under the provisions of the law:

A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657

Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for two (2) modes of acquisition
of private land: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for the compulsory acquisition of private lands is set forth in
Section 16 of R.A. 6657.
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be
identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or
representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit
evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide
the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation
in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the
issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed
to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final determination of
just compensation.

Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and
the beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR
issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series or 1989, which set the operating procedure in the
identification of such lands.

Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated
master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The
MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the
landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF.
He also sends invitations to the prospective farmerbeneficiaries the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the
valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the
landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.

The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the
valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the
computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all
papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau
of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property.
The BLAD shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a Notice of Acquisition for
the subject property. From this point, the provisions of Section 16 of R.A. 6657 then apply.

For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries
and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.

The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual
conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent
that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry ou such regulation, the owners are deprived of
lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The
Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The CARL
was not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires
that due process be observed in the taking of private property.
DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first sprung, was amended in 1990 by DAR A.O. No.
9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. The Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to the
conference meeting were expanded and amplified in said amendments.

DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules on both Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA)
transactions involving lands enumerated under Section 7 of the CARL. In both VOS and CA. transactions, the MARO
prepares the Voluntary Offer to Sell Case Folder (VOCF) and the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF), as the case
may be, over a particular landholding. The MARO notifies the landowner as well as representatives of the LBP, BARC and
prospective beneficiaries of the date of the ocular inspection of the property at least one week before the scheduled date
and invites them to attend the same. The MARO, LBP or BARC conducts the ocular inspection and investigation by
identifying the land and landowner, determining the suitability of the land for agriculture and productivity, interviewing and
screening prospective farmer beneficiaries. Based on its investigation, the MARO, LBP or BARC prepares the Field
Investigation Report which shall be signed by all parties concerned. In addition to the field investigation, a boundary or
subdivision survey of the land ma also be conducted by a Survey Party of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to be assisted by the MARO. This survey shall delineate the areas covered by Operation Land Transfer
(OLT), areas retained by the landowner, areas with infrastructure, and the areas subject to VOS and CA. After the survey
and field investigation, the MARO sends a "Notice of Coverage" to the landowner or his duly authorized representative
inviting him to a conference or public hearing with the farmer beneficiaries, representatives of the BARC, LBP, DENR,
Department of Agriculture (DA), nongovernment organizations, farmer's organizations and other interested parties. At the
public hearing, the parties shall discuss the results of the field investigation, issues that may be raised in relation thereto,
inputs to the valuation of the subject landholding, and other comments and recommendations by all parties concerned. The
Minutes of the conference/public hearing shall form part of the VOCF or CACF which files shall be forwarded by the MARO
to the PARO. The PARO reviews, evaluates and validates the Field Investigation Report and other documents in the
VOCF/CACF. He then forwards the records to the RARO for another review.

DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the identification process and increased the number of governmen agencies
involved in the identification and delineation of the land subject to acquisition. This time, the Notice of Coverage is sent to
the landowner before the conduct of the field investigation and the sending must comply with specific requirements.
Representatives of the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO) must send the Notice of Coverage to the landowner by "personal
delivery with proof of service, or by registered mail with return card," informing him that his property is under CARP
coverage and that if he desires to avail of his right of retention, he may choose which area he shall retain. The Notice of
Coverage shall also invite the landowner to attend the field investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from notice.
The field investigation is for the purpose of identifying the landholding and determining its suitability for agriculture and its
productivity. A copy of the Notice of Coverage shall be posted for at least one week on the bulletin board of the municipal
and barangay halls where the property

is located. The date of the field investigation shall also be sent by the DAR Municipal Office to representatives of the LBP,
BARC, DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries. The field investigation shall be conducted on the date set with the
participation of the landowner and the various representatives. If the landowner and other representatives are absent, the
field investigation shall proceed, provided they were duly notified thereof. Should there be a variance between the findings
of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the land be placed under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to agriculture, the
degree or development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a composite team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and
DA which shall jointly conduct further investigation. The team's findings shall be binding on both DAR and LBP. After the
field investigation, the DAR Municipal Office shall prepare the Field Investigation Report and Land Use Map, a copy of which
shall be furnished the landowner "by personal delivery with proof of service or registered mail with return card." Another
copy of the Report and Map shall likewise be posted for at least one week in the municipal or barangay halls where the
property is located.

B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad

In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled
"Invitation to Parties" dated September 29, 1989 to petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of
Hacienda Palico. The invitation was received on the same day it was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received
at the bottom left corner of said invitation. With regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel,
administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attended
the conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner corporation. The
Minutes was also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. No letter of invitation was
sent or conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to
respondent DAR.

When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the various parties the Notice of
Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month
earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation
shall be sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other interested
parties. The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process especially
when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and therefore, has a personality
separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and employees.

The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the landowner by "personal delivery or
registered mail." Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical person to whose address the Notice may be sent by
personal delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish. The DAR Administrative Orders also do not distinguish.
In the proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be
found in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is
governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Notices and pleadings are served on private
domestic corporations or partnerships in the following manner:

Sec. 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation or Partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors or partners.

Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14 provides:

Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors.

Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation before the DARAB and the regular
courts are served on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. These persons are those
through whom the private domestic corporation or partnership is capable of action.

Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of petitioner corporation.

Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its haciendas, the areas found actually subject
to CARP were not properly identified before they were taken over by respondent DAR. Respondents insist that the lands
were identified because they are all registered property and the technical description in their respective titles specifies their
metes and bounds. Respondents admit at the same time, however, that not all areas in the haciendas were placed under
the comprehensive agrarian reform program invariably by reason of elevation or character or use of the land.

The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two haciendas, but only portions thereof.
Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024 hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were targetted for acquisition. Hacienda Banilad
has an area of 1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. The haciendas are not entirely
agricultural lands. In fact, the various tax declarations over the haciendas describe the landholdings as "sugarland," and
"forest, sugarland, pasture land, horticulture and woodland."

Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the Notice of Acquisition specifically requires that the land subject

to land reform be first identified. The two haciendas in the instant case cover vast tracts of land. Before Notices of
Acquisition were sent to petitioner, however, the exact areas of the landholdings were not properly segregated and
delineated. Upon receipt of this notice, therefore, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were
subject to compulsory acquisition, which portions it could rightfully retain, whether these retained portions were compact
or contiguous, and which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. Even respondent DAR's evidence does not show
that petitioner, through its duly authorized representative, was notified of any ocular inspection and investigation that was
to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and
identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired compulsorily. The right of retention and how this right is
exercised, is guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARL.

Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than five hectares out of the total area of his agricultural land subject to
CARP. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, pertains to the landowner. If the
area chosen for retention is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain on the portion or be a
beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.

C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway

Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is
covered by four (4) titles. In two separate Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the

Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over the two of these four titles. The land covered by two titles has an area
of 855.5257 hectares, but only 648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R.A. 6657. Petitioner claims it does
not know where these portions are located.

Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and
that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein, The results of the survey and the land valuation
summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and received by
petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating
procedure, much less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner,
however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential requisite to enable the
landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.

3. NO.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Respondent DAR is in a better
position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on
the matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are nonagricultural, hence, exempt
from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
Reyes vs NHA

Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the

expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public
purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement
Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the
Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the
stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project
when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out
by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of
the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the
public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for
the construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the
stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that
respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the
expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned
to herein petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the

light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the
intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly,
petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of
the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a
deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept
of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use"
has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit,"
"public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to
private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies,
and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to
undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of
private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized
sector is in furtherance of social justice.
Pacific farms Inc vs Esguerra 30 scra 684 (1969)

Facts:
Carried Lumber Company sold and delivered lumber and construction materials to the Insular
Farms, Inc. which the latter used in the construction of the aforementioned six buildings at its
compound. However, the value of the materials was not paid by Insular Farms, Inc.
Company instituted civil case with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to recover the said
unpaid balance from the Insular Farms, Inc. Trial court rendered judgment sustaining the
Company's claim. The judgment debtor did not appeal; so the corresponding writ of execution
was issued.
PacificFarms, Inc.filed a third party claim, asserting ownership over levied buildings which it
acquired from Insular Farms. Thereafter, sheriff proceeded with public auction.
Meanwhile,PacificFarms filed a complaint against the Company and the sheriff with the court a
quo, praying that judgment be rendered, (a) declaring null and void the levy and judicial sale of
the six buildings, and (b) adjudging the defendants jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff in
the sum of P2,000 by way of actual damages and for such amount as the court may deem
proper and just to impose by way of exemplary damages and for costs of the suit.
Trial Court annulled the levy but denied claim for actual and exemplary damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant acted correctly in bringing an action against the Insular Farms, Inc.
and enforcing its right of reimbursement.

Held:
Yes, the appellant acted correctly in bringing an action (D-775) against the Insular Farms, Inc.
and enforcing its right of reimbursement through the execution of the final judgment it obtained
in the said case against the six buildings in the possession of the appellee who now stands to
benefit therefrom. It follows, as a necessary corollary, that the sale at public auction conducted
by the defendant sheriff of the six buildings described in the certificate of sale dated February
12, 1962, exhibit 7, was valid and effective.

Also, the application by analogy of the rules of accession would suffice for a just adjudication.
Article 447 of the Civil Code provides:

The owner of the land who makes thereon personally or through another, plantings,
constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in
bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials
shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work
constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the
landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event with a
right to be indemnified for damages.

The abovequoted legal provision contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being
considered the principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of
the land who in good faith — whether personally or through another — makes constructions or
works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner of the said
materials with the obligation however of praying for their value.2 The owner of the materials, on
the other hand, is entitled to remove them, provided no substantial injury is caused to the
landowner. Otherwise, he has the right to reimbursement for the value of his materials.