Consolidated Cases

[No. 42091. November 2, 1935] GONZALO CHUA GUAN, plaintiff and appellant, vs.
SAMAHANG
MAGSASAKA, INC., and SIMPLICIO OCAMPO, ADRIANO G. SOTTO, and EMILIO VERGARA, as president,
secretary and treasurer respectively of the same, defendants and appellees. 1. CORPORATIONS;
MORTGAGE OF SHARES OF STOCK.—The registration of the chattel mortgage in the office of the
corporation was not necessary and had no legal effect. (Monserrat vs. Ceron, 58 Phil., 469.) The long
mooted question as to whether or not shares of a corporation could be hypothecated by placing a
chattel mortgage on the certificate representing such shares we now regard as settled by the case above
cited of Monserrat vs. Ceron. 2. ID.; ID.; SITUS OF SHARES.—It is a common but not accurate
generalization that the situs of shares of stock is at the domicile of the owner. The term situs is not one
of fixed or invariable meaning or usage. The situs of shares of stock for some purposes may be at the
domicile of the owner and for others at the domicile of the corporation; and even elsewhere. (Cf. Vidal
vs. South American Securities Co., 276 Fed., 855; Black Eagle Min. Co. vs. Conroy, 94 Okla., 199; 221 Pac.,
425; Norrie vs. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 7 Fed. [2d], 158.) 3. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; DOMICILE.—It is a
general rule that for purposes of execution, attachment and garnishment, it is not the domicile of the
owner of a certificate but the domicile of the corporation which is decisive. (Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations, vol. 11, paragraph 5106; Cf. sections 430 and 450, Code of Civil Procedure.)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT No. 1508, SECTION 4, CONSTRUED.—By analogy with the foregoing and considering
the ownership of shares in a corporation as property distinct from the certificates which are merely the
evidence of such ownership, it is a reasonable construction of section 4 of Act No. 1508 to hold that the
property in the shares may be deemed to be situated in the province in which the corporation has its
principal office or place of business. If this province is also the province of the owner's domicile, a single
registration is sufficient. If not, the chattel mortgage should be registered both at the owner's domicile
and in the province where the corporation has its 473 VOL. 62, NOVEMBER 2, 1935 473 Chua Guan
vs. Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. principal office or place of business. In these sense the property
mortgaged is not the certificate but the participation and share of the owner in the assets of the
corporation. 5. ID.; ID.; ASSIGNMENT AND DELIVERY OF CERTIFICATE.—The only safe way to accomplish
the hypothecation of shares of stock of a Philippine corporation is for the creditor to insist on the
assignment and delivery of the certificate and to obtain the transfer of the legal title to him on the
books of the corporation by the cancellation of the certificate and the issuance of a new one to him. 6.
ID.; ID.; ACT No. 1459, SECTION 35, CONSTRUED.—Section 35 of the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459)
enacts that shares of stock "may be transferred by delivery of the certificate endorsed by the owner or
his attorney in fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer." The use of the verb "may"
does not exclude the possibility that a transfer may be made in a different manner, thus leaving the
creditor in an insecure position even though he has the certificate in his possession. The shares still
standing in the name of the debtor on the books of the corporation will be liable to seizure by
attachment or levy on execution at the instance of other creditors. (Cf. Uy Piaoco vs. McMicking, 10
Phil., 286, and Uson vs. Diosomito, 61 Phil., 535.) This unsatisfactory state of our law is well known to
the bench and bar. (Cf. Fisher, The Philippine Law of Stock Corporations, pages 163-168.)APPEAL from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Platon, J.The facts are stated in the opinion of the
court.Buenaventura C. Lopez for appellant.Domingo L. Vergara for appellees.BUTTE, J,:This is an appeal
from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in an action for a writ of mandamus. The
case is remarkable for the following reason: that the parties entered into a stipulation in which the
defendants admitted all of the allegations of the complaint and the plaintiff admitted all of the special
defenses in the 473
474 474 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Chua Guan vs. Samahang Magsasaka, Inc.
answer of the defendants, and on this stipulation they submitted the case for decision.The complaint
alleges that the defendant Samahang Magsasaka, Inc., is a corporation duly organized under the laws of
the Philippine Islands with principal office in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and that the individual
defendants are the president, secretary and treasurer respectively of the same; that on June 18, 1931,
Gonzalo H. Co Toco was the owner of 5,894 shares of the capital stock of the said corporation
represented by nine certificates having a par value of P5 per share; that on said date Gonzalo H. Co
Toco, a resident of Manila, mortgaged said 5,894 shares to Chua Chiu to guarantee the payment of a
debt of P20,000 due on or before June 19, 1932. The said certificates of stock were delivered with the
mortgage to the mortgagee, Chua Chiu. The said mortgage was duly registered in the office of the
register of deeds of Manila on June 23, 1931, and in the office of the said corporation on September 30,
1931.On November 28, 1931, Chua Chiu assigned all his right and interest in said mortgage to the
plaintiff and the assignment was registered in the office of the register of deeds in the City of Manila on
December 28, 1931, and in the office of the said corporation on January 4, 1932.The debtor, Gonzalo H.
Co Toco, having defaulted in the payment of said debt at maturity, the plaintiff foreclosed said mortgage
and delivered the certificates of stock and copies of the mortgage and assignment to the sheriff of the
City of Manila in order to sell the said shares at public auction. The sheriff auctioned said 5,894 shares of
stock 011 December 22, 1932. and the plaintiff having been the highest bidder for the sum of P14,390,
the sheriff executed in his favor a certificate of sale of said shares.The plaintiff tendered the certificates
of stock standing' in the name of Gonzalo H. Co Toco to the proper officers of the corporation for
cancellation and demanded that they issue new certificates in the name of the plaintiff. The said
475 VOL. 62, NOVEMBER 2, 1935 475 Chua Guan vs. Samahang Magsasaka, Inc.
officers (the individual defendants) refused and still refuse to issue said new shares in the name of the
plaintiff.The prayer is that a writ of mandamus be issued requiring the defendants to transfer the said
5,894 shares of stock to the plaintiff by cancelling the old certificates and issuing new ones in their
stead.The special defenses set up in the answer are as follows. that the defendants refuse to cancel the
said certificates standing in the name of Gonzalo H. Co Toco on the books of the corporation and to
issue new ones in the name of the plaintiff because prior to the date when the plaintiff made his
demand, to wit, February 4, 1933, nine attachments had been issued and served and noted on the
books of the corporation against the shares of Gonzalo H. Co Toco and the plaintiff objected to having
these attachments noted on the new certificates which he demanded. These attachments noted on the
books of the corporation against the shares of Gonzalo H. Co Toco are as follows:"(1) Con fecha agosto
26, 1931, se recibió por el Secretario de la entidad demandada la notificación de embargo expedida por
el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Nueva Écija en la causa civil No. 6043, siendo partes Lucía Matías
contra Gonzalo H. Co Toco y otros, siendo la cantidad reclamada P23,582.55."(2) Con fecha agosto 27,
1931, se recibió por el Secretario de la entidad demandada la notificación de embargo expedida por el
Juzgado de Paz de Cabanatúan, Nueva Écija. en la causa civil No. 2322, siendo partes Samahang
Magsasaka, Inc. contra Gonzalo H. Co Toco, abarcando las acciones o títulos Nos. 280 al 2,279 o 2,000
acciones por valor de P10,000."(3) Con fecha 27 de agosto, 1931, se recibió por el Secretario de la
entidad demandada la notificación de embargo expedida por el Juzgado de Paz de Cabanatúan, Nueva
Écija, en la causa civil No. 2323, siendo partes Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. contra Gonzalo H. Co Toco,
abarcando las accio-
nes o títulos Nos. 280 al 2,279 o 2,000 acciones por valor de P10,000."(4) Con fecha 28 de agosto, 1931,
se recibió por el Secretario de la entidad demandada la notificación de embargo expedida por el Juzgado
de Primera Instancia de Nueva Écija en la causa civil No. 6049, siendo partes Hermenegilda García contra
Gonzalo H. Co Toco, siendo la cantidad reclamada P3,064.72."(5) Con fecha 29 de agosto, 1931, se
recibió por el Secretario de la entidad demandada la notificación de embargo expedida por el Juzgado
de Primera Instancia de Nueva Écija en la causa civil No. 6052, siendo partes Licerio Soto contra Gonzalo
H. Co Toco, y abarcando todas las acciones o título a nombre del Sr. Gonzalo H. Co Toco."(6) Con fecha
septiembre 1, 1931, se recibió por el Se-cretario de la entidad demandada la notificación de embargo
expedida por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila en la causa civil No. 40211, siendo partes Asiatic
Petroleum Co. (P. I.), Ltd. contra Gonzalo H. Co Toco y abarcando todas las acciones o títulos a nombre
del Sr. Gonzalo H. Co Toco."(7) Con fecha septiembre 1, 1931, se recibió por el Secretario de la entidad
demandada la notificación de embargo expedida por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Nueva Ecija en
la causa civil No. 6053, siendo partes Rufina Pacheco contra Gonzalo H. Co Toco, y abarcando todas las
acciones o títulos a nombre del Sr. Gonzalo H. Co Toco." (8) Con fecha septiembre 2, 1931, se recibió por
el Secretario de la entidad demandada la notificación de embargo expedida por el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila en la causa civil No. 40294, siendo partes Manuel Borja contra Gonzalo H. Co Toco y
abarcando todas las acciones o títulos a nombre del Sr. Gonzalo H. Co Toco."(9) Que el enero 15, 1932,
se recibió por el Secretario de la entidad demandada la notificación de embargo expedida por el Juzgado
de Primera Instancia de Manila en la causa civil No. 40244, siendo partes The Philippine Guaranty Co.,
Inc. contra Gonzalo H. Co Toco y otros y abar-
cando todas las acciones o títulos a nombre del Sr. Gonzalo H. Co Toco."It will be noted that the first
eight of the said writs of attachment were served on the corporation and noted on its records before
the corporation received notice from the mortgagee Chua Chiu of the mortgage of said shares dated
June 18, 1931. No question is raised as to the validity of said mortgage or of said writs of attachment
and the sole question presented for decision is whether the said mortgage takes priority over the said
writs of attachment.It is not alleged that the said attaching creditors had actual notice of the said
mortgage and the question therefore narrows itself down to this: Did the registration of said chattel
mortgage in the registry of chattel mortgages in the office of the register of deeds of Manila, under date
of July 23, 1931, give constructive notice to the said attaching creditors?In passing, let it be noted that
the registration of the said chattel mortgage in the office of the corporation was not necessary and had
no legal effect. (Monserrat vs. Ceron, 58 Phil., 469.) The long mooted question as to whether or not
shares of a corporation could be hypothecated by placing a chattel mortgage on the certificate
representing such shares we now regard as settled by the case of Monserrat vs. Ceron, supra. But that
case did not deal with any question relating to the registration of such a mortgage or the effect of such
registration. Nothing appears in the record of that case even tending to show that the chattel mortgage
there involved was ever registered anywhere except in the office of the corporation, and there was no
question involved there as to the right of priority among conflicting claims of creditors of the owner of
the shares.The Chattel Mortgage Law, Act No. 1508, as amended by Act No. 2496, contains the following
provision:"SEC. 4. A chattel mortgage shall not be valid against any person except the mortgagor, his
executors or administrators, unless the possession of the property is delivered to and retained by the
mortgagee or unless the mortgage is
recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the mortgagor resides at the time
of making the same, or, if he resides without the Philippine Islands, in the province in which the
property is situated: Provided, however, That if the property is situated in a different province from that
in which the mortgagor resides, the mortgage shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds. of
both the province in which the mortgagor resides and that in which the property is situated, and for the
purposes of this Act the City of Manila shall be deemed to be a province."The practical application of the
Chattel Mortgage Law to shares of stock of a corporation presents considerable difficulty and we have
obtained little aid from the decisions of other jurisdictions because that form of mortgage is ill suited to
the hypothecation of shares of stock and has been rarely used elsewhere. In fact, it has been doubted
whether shares of stock in a corporation are chattels in the sense in which that word is used in chattel
mortgage statutes. This doubt is reflected in our own decision in the case of Fua Cun vs. Summers and
China Banking Corporation (44 Phil., 705), in which we said:"* * * an equity in shares of stock is of such
an intangible character that it is somewhat difficult to see how it can be treated as a chattel and
mortgaged in such a manner that the recording of the mortgage will furnish constructive notice to third
parties. * * *" And we held that the chattel mortgage there involved: "at least operated as a conditional
equitable assignment." In that case we quoted the following from Spalding vs. Paine's Adm'r. (81 Ky.,
416), with regard to a chattel mortgage of shares of stock:" 'These certificates of stock are in the pockets
of the owner, and go with him where he may happen to locate, as choses in action, or evidence of his
right, without any means on the part of those with whom he proposes to deal on the faith of such a
security of ascertaining whether or not this stock is in pledge or mortgaged to others. He finds the name
of the owner on the books of the company as a sub
scriber of paid-up stock, amounting to 180 shares, with the certificates in his possession, pays for these
certificates their full value, and has the transfer to him made on the books of the company, thereby
obtaining a perfect title. What other inquiry is he to make, so as to make his investment certain and
secure? Where is he to look, in order to ascertain whether or not this stock has been mortgaged? The
chief office of the company may be at one place today and at another tomorrow. The owner may have
no fixed or permanent abode, and with his notes in one pocket and his certificates of stock in the
other—the one evidencing the extent of his interest in the stock of the corporation, the other his right
to money owing him by his debtor, we are asked to say that the mortgage is effectual as to the one and
inoperative as to the other.' "But the case of Fua Cun vs. Summers and China Banking Corporation,
supra, did not decide the question here presented and gave no light as to the registration of a chattel
mortgage of shares of stock of a corporation under the provisions of section 4 of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, supra.Section 4 of Act No. 1508 provides two ways for executing a valid chattel mortgage which
shall be effective against third persons. First, the possession of the property mortgaged must be
delivered to and retained by the mortgagee; and, second, without such delivery the mortgage must be
recorded in the proper office or offices of the register or registers of deeds. If a chattel mortgage of
shares of stock of a corporation may validly be made without the delivery of possession of the property
to the mortgagee and the mere registration of the mortgage is sufficient to give constructive notice to
third parties, we are confronted with the question as to the proper place of registration of such a
mortgage. Section 4 provides that in such a case the mortgage shall be registered in the province in
which the mortgagor resides at the time of making the same or, if he is a non-resident, in the province in
which the property is situated; and it also provides that if the property is situated in a different province
from that in which the mortgagor
resides the mortgage shall be recorded both in the province of the mortgagors residence and in the
province where the property is situated.If with respect to a chattel mortgage of shares of stock of a
corporation, registration in the province of the owner's domicile should be sufficient, those who lend on
such security would be confronted with the practical difficulty of being compelled not only to search the
records of every province in which the mortgagor might have been domiciled but also every province in
which a chattel mortgage by any former owner of such shares might be registered. We cannot think that
it was the intention of the legislature to put this almost prohibitive impediment upon the hypothecation
of shares of stock in view of the great volume of business that is done on the faith of the pledge of
shares of stock as collateral.It is a common but not accurate generalization that the situs of shares of
stock is at the domicile of the owner. The term situs is not one of fixed or invariable meaning or usage.
Nor should we lose sight of the difference between the situs of the shares and the situs of the
certificates of shares. The situs of shares of stock for some purpose? may be at the domicile of the
owner and for others at the domicile of the corporation; and even elsewhere. (Cf. Vidal vs. South
American Securities Co., 276 Fed., 855; Black Eagle Min. Co. vs. Conroy, 94 Okla., 199; 221 Pac., 425;
Norrie vs. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 7 Fed. [2d]. 158.) It is a general rule that for purposes of
execution, attachment and garnishment, it is not the domicile of the owner of a certificate but the
domicile of the corporation which is decisive. (Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations,
vol. 11, paragraph 5106. Cf. sections 430 and 450, Code of Civil Procedure.)By analogy with the
foregoing and considering the ownership of shares in a corporation as property distinct from the
certificates which are merely the evidence of such ownership, it seems to us a reasonable construction
of section 4 of Act No. 1508 to hold that the property in the shares may be deemed to be situated in the
province in which the cor-
poration has its principal office or place of business. If this province is also the province of the owner's
domicile, a single registration is sufficient. If not, the chattel mortgage should be registered both at the
owner's domicile and in the province where the corporation has its principal office or place of business.
In this sense the property mortgaged is not the certificate but the participation and share of the owner
in the assets of the corporation.Apart from the cumbersome and unusual method of hypothecating
shares of stock by chattel mortgage, it appears that in the present state of our law, the only safe way to
accomplish the hypothecation of share of stock of a Philippine corporation is for the creditor to insist on
the assignment and delivery of the certificate and to obtain the transfer of the legal title to him on the
books of the corporation by the cancellation of the certificate and the issuance of a new one to him.
From the standpoint of the debtor this may be unsatisfactory because it leaves the creditor as the
ostensible owner of the shares and the debtor is forced to rely upon the honesty and solvency of the
creditor. Of course, the mere possession and retention of the debtor's certificate by the creditor gives
some security to the creditor against an attempted voluntary transfer by the debtor, provided the by-
laws of the corporation expressly enact that transfers may be made only upon the surrender of the
certificate. It is to be noted, however, that section 35 of the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) enacts that
shares of stock "may be transferred by delivery of the certificate endorsed by the owner or his attorney
in fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer." The use of the verb "may" does not
exclude the possibility that a transfer may be made in a different manner, thus leaving the creditor in an
insecure position even though he has the certificate in his possession. Moreover, the shares still
standing in the name of the debtor on the books of the corporation will be liable to seizure by
attachment or levy on execution at the instance of other creditors. (Cf. Uy Piaoco 482 482 PHILIPPINE
REPORTS ANNOTATED Sambrano vs. Reyes and Northern Luzon Trans. Co. vs. McMicking, 10 Phil., 286,
and Uson vs, Diosomito, 61 Phil., 535.) This unsatisfactory state of our law is well known to the bench
and bar. (Cf. Fisher, The Philippine Law of Stock Corporations, pages 163-168.) Loans upon stock
securities should be facilitated in order to foster economic development. The transfer by endorsement
and delivery of a certificate with intention to pledge the shares covered thereby should be sufficient to
give legal effect to that intention and to consummate the juristic act without necessity for
registration.We are fully conscious of the fact that our decisions in the case of Monserrat vs. Ceron,
supra, and in the present case have done little perhaps to ameliorate the present uncertain and
unsatisfactory state of our law applicable to pledges and chattel mortgages of shares of stock of
Philippine corporations. The remedy lies with the legislature.In view of the premises, the attaching
creditors are entitled to priority over the defectively registered mortgage of the appellant and the
judgment appealed from must be affirmed without special pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.1Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Goddard, JJ., concur.Judgment affirmed. Chua Guan vs.
Samahang Magsasaka, Inc., 62 Phil. 472, No. 42091 November 2, 1935
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 499 Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. G.R. No. 137705.
August 22, 2000.* SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY, petitioners, vs. PCI LEASING AND
FINANCE, INC., respondent.Civil Law; Property; The machines although each of them was movable or
personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements of petitioners chocolate-making industry.—In the present case, the
machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on
their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making
industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have
become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry. In
that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property
pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. Same; Same; Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a
real property be considered as personal.—The Court has held that contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is
ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. _______________ *
THIRD DIVISION. 500 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. Same; Same; The Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machinesin
question are to be considered as personal property; Under the circumstances they are proper subjects
of the writ of seizure.—In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in
question are to be considered as personal property. x x x Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from
denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances,
they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. Same; Same; That the machines should be deemed
personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned.—It should be stressed, however, that our holding—that the machines should be deemed
personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement—is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are
not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In any event, there is no
showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected. Remedial Law; Replevin; Policy under
Rule 60 is that questions involving title to the subject property should be determined in the trial;
Remedy of defendants under Rule 60 is either to post a counterbond or to question the sufficiency of
the plaintiff’s bond.—Indeed, in La Tondeña Distillers v. CA, the Court explained that the policy under
Rule 60 was that questions involving title to the subject property—questions which petitioners are now
raising—should be determined in the trial. In that case, the Court noted that the remedy of defendants
under Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to question the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s bond.
They were not allowed, however, to invoke the title to the subject property.PETITION for review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for petitioners. Perez & Calima Law Offices for
respondent.PANGANIBAN, J.:After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property
be considered as personal or movable, a party is estopped
501 VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 501 Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc. from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ
of replevin obtained by the other contracting party. The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari assailing the January 6, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-GR SP No. 47332
and its February 26, 1999 Resolution3 denying reconsideration. The decretal portion of the CA Decision
reads as follows:“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order dated February 18, 1998 and
Resolution dated March 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33500 are hereby AFFIRMED. The writ of
preliminary injunction issued on June 15, 1998 is hereby LIFTED.”4In its February 18, 1998 Order,5 the
Regional Trial Cour (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 218)6 issued a Writ of Seizure.7 The March 18, 1998
Resolution8 denied petitioners’ Motion for Special Protective Order, praying that the deputy sheriff be
enjoined “from seizing immobilized or other real properties in [petitioners’] factory in Cainta, Rizal and
to return to their original place whatever immobilized machineries or equipments he may have
removed.”9 _______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 177-180. 2 Penned by Justice Romeo A. Brawner (Division
acting chairman), with the concurrence of Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Martin S. Villarama, Jr. 3 Rollo, p.
189. 4 CA Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 179. 5 Rollo, p. 356. 6 Presided by Judge Hilario L. Laqui. 7 Rollo, pp. 23-
24. 8 Rollo, pp. 78-79. 9 Motion for Special Protective Order, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 76-77. 502 502
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. The
FactsThe undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:10“On February 13, 1998,
respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (“PCI Leasing” for short) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for
[a] sum of money (Annex ‘E’), with an application for a writ of replevin docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-
33500.“On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ
of replevin (Annex ‘B’) directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI
Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.“On March 24, 1998, in
implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s factory, seized one machinery with
[the] word that he [would] return for the other machineries.“On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a
motion for special protective order (Annex ‘C’), invoking the power of the court to control the conduct
of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer
enforcement of the writ of replevin.“This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex ‘F’), on the ground
that the properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.“In
their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as defined in
Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties’ agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They argued that
to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They further stated that
PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal because the contracts in which
the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical.“On April 6, 1998, the sheriff
again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. He was able
to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest.“On April 7, 1998, they went
to [the CA] via an original action for certiorari.”_______________ 10 CA Decision, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 177-
178.
503 VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 503 Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc. Ruling of the Court of AppealsCiting the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held that the
subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by
petitioners. It also ruled that the “words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true
intention of the contracting parties.” Observing that Petitioner Goquiolay was an experienced
businessman who was “not unfamiliar with the ways of the trade,” it ruled that he “should have realized
the import of the document he signed.” The CA further held:“Furthermore, to accord merit to this
petition would be to preempt the trial court in ruling upon the case below, since the merits of the whole
matter are laid down before us via a petition whose sole purpose is to inquire upon the existence of a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC] in issuing the assailed Order and Resolution. The
issues raised herein are proper subjects of a full-blown trial, necessitating presentation of evidence by
both parties. The contract is being enforced by one, and [its] validity is attacked by the other—a matter
x x x which respondent court is in the best position to determine.”Hence, this Petition.11 The IssuesIn
their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:“A. Whether or not
the machineries purchased and imported by SERG’S became real property by virtue of immobilization.B.
Whether or not the contract between the parties is a loan or a lease.”12_______________ 11 The case
was deemed submitted for resolution on October 21, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of the petitioners’
Memorandum signed by Atty. Victor Basilio N. De Leon of Antonio R. Bautista & Partners. Respondent’s
Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of Perez & Calima Law Offices, had been
filed earlier on September 29, 1999. 12 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 376.
504 504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing
and Finance, Inc. In the main, the Court will resolve whether the said machines are personal, not
immovable, property which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. As a preliminary matter, the
Court will also address briefly the procedural points raised by respondent. The Court’s RulingThe
Petition is not meritorious. Preliminary Matter: Procedural QuestionsRespondent contends that the
Petition failed to indicate expressly whether it was being filed under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. It further alleges that the Petition erroneously impleaded Judge Hilario Laqui as respondent.There
is no question that the present recourse is under Rule 45. This conclusion finds support in the very title
of the Petition, which is “Petition for Review on Certiorari.”13While Judge Laqui should not have been
impleaded as a respon-dent,14 substantial justice requires that such lapse by itself should not warrant
the dismissal of the present Petition. In this light, the Court deems it proper to remove, motu proprio,
the name of Judge Laqui from the caption of the present case. Main Issue: Nature of the Subject
MachineryPetitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects
of the Writ issued by the RTC because they were in fact real property. Serious policy considerations,
they argue, militate against a contrary characterization. _______________ 13 Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. 14 Section 4 (a) of Rule 45 provides that the petition shall state the full name of the
parties, “without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents.”
505 VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 505 Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. Rule 60 of
the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property
only.15 Section 3 thereof reads:“SEC. 3. Order.—Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the
bond, the court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal
property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into
his custody.”On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as
follows:ART. 415. The following are immovable property:x x x x x x x x x(5) Machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works, which may
be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works.x x x x x x x x xIn the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the
Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were
essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was
movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because
they are essential and principal elements in the industry.”16 In that sense, petitioners are correct in
arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil
Code.17 _______________ 15 BA Finance v. CA, 258 SCRA 102, July 5, 1996; Filinvest Credit v. CA, 248
SCRA 549, September 27, 1995; Machinery Engineering Supply v. CA, 96 Phil. 70, October 29, 1954. 16
Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor and Treasurer, 66 SCRA 197, September 29, 1962, per Labrador, J. See
also Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1986, ed., pp. 99-100. 17 People’s Bank & Trust
Co. v. Dahican Lumber, |20 SCRA 84, May 16, 1967; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800, December
26, 1984; Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709, August 7, 1935. 506 506 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. Be that as it may, we
disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the
Writ of Seizure.The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal.18 After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
denying the truth of any material fact found therein.Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio19 the Court upheld
the intention of the parties to treat a house as a personal property because it had been made the
subject of a chattel mortgage. The Court ruled:x x x Although there is no specific statement referring to
the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of
chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at
least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an
inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.”Applying Tumalad, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance
Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills20 also held that the machinery used in a factory and essential to the
industry, as in the present case, was a proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as
personal property in a contract. Pertinent portions of the Court’s ruling are reproduced hereunder:“x x x
If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the
contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason
why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or
purpose, may not _______________ 18 Chua Peng Hian v. CA, 133 SCRA 572, December 19, 1984;
Standard Oil Co. v. Jaranillo, 44 Phil. 630, March 16, 1923; Luna v. Encarnacion, 91 Phil. 531, June 30,
1952; Manarang v. Ofilada, 99 Phil. 109, May 18, 1956; People’s Bank & Trust Co. v. Dahican Lumber,
supra. 19 41 SCRA 143, 153, September 30, 1971, per Reyes, JBL, J. 20 122 SCRA 296, 300, May 16, 1983,
per De Castro, J.
507 VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 507 Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc. be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from
denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.”In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly
provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section
12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:21“12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain,
personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter
become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real
property or a building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.”Clearly then,
petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal
property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. It should be
stressed, however, that our holding—that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant
to the Lease Agreement—is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.22 Hence, while
the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its
stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal.23 In any event, there is no showing that
any specific third party would be adversely affected. Validity of the Lease AgreementIn their
Memorandum, petitioners contend that the Agreement is a loan and not a lease.24 Submitting
documents supposedly showing that they own the subject machines, petitioners also argue in their
Petition that the Agreement suffers from “intrinsic ambiguity which places in serious doubt the intention
of the parties and the validity of the lease agreement itself.”25 In their Reply to re-_______________ 21
Rollo, p. 262. 22 Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401, April 23, 1958; Navarro v.
Pineda, 9 SCRA 631, November 30, 1963. 23 Vitug, supra, pp. 100-101. 24 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p.
8; rollo, p. 381. 25 Petition, p. 10; rollo, p. 12. 508 508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Serg’s
Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. spondent’s Comment, they further allege that the
Agreement is invalid.26These arguments are unconvincing. The validity and the nature of the contract
are the lis mota of the civil action pending before the RTC. A resolution of these questions, therefore, is
effectively a resolution of the merits of the case. Hence, they should be threshed out in the trial, not in
the proceedings involving the issuance of the Writ of Seizure.Indeed, in La Tondeña Distillers v. CA,27
the Court explained that the policy under Rule 60 was that questions involving title to the subject
property—questions which petitioners are now raising—should be determined in the trial. In that case,
the Court noted that the remedy of defendants under Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to
question the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s bond. They were not allowed, however, to invoke the title to
the subject property. The Court ruled:“In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file a
motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of seizure (or delivery) on ground of insufficiency of the
complaint or of the grounds relied upon therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary attachment or
injunction, and thereby put at issue the matter of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel
being replevied, the policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only
at the trial on the merits.”28Besides, these questions require a determination of facts and a
presentation of evidence, both of which have no place in a petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule 65
or in a petition for review in this Court under Rule 45.29 _________________ 26 Reply, p. 7, rollo, p.
301. 27 209 SCRA 553, 567, June 8, 1992, per Narvasa, CJ. 28 Ibid. 29 See Fuentes v. Court of Appeals,
268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997. 509 VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 509 Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. Reliance on the Lease AgreementIt should be pointed out that the Court in
this case may rely on the Lease Agreement, for nothing on record shows that it has been nullified or
annulled. In fact, petitioners assailed it first only in the RTC proceedings, which had ironically been
instituted by respondent. Accordingly, it must be presumed valid and binding as the law between the
parties.Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation30 is also instructive on this point. In that case, the Deed
of Chattel Mortgage, which characterized the subject machinery as personal property, was also assailed
because respondent had allegedly been required “to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage which was
in a blank form at the time of signing.” The Court rejected the argument and relied on the, Deed, ruling
as follows:x x x. Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a
contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable, or annullable
pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code, by a proper action in court. There is nothing on record to
show that the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the
same, x x x” Alleged Injustice Committed on the Part of PetitionersPetitioners contend that “if the Court
allows these machineries to be seized, then its workers would be out of work and thrown into the
streets.”31 They also allege that the seizure would nullify all efforts to rehabilitate the
corporation.Petitioners’ arguments do not preclude the implementation of the Writ. As earlier
discussed, law and jurisprudence support its propriety. Verily, the above-mentioned consequences, if
they come true, should not be blamed on this Court, but on the petitioners for _______________ 30
Supra, p. 301. 31 Petition, p. 16; rollo, p. 18. 510 510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Serg’s
Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. failing to avail themselves of the remedy under Section 5
of Rule 60, which allows the filing of a counter-bond. The provision states:“SEC. 5. Return of property.—
If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant’s bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so object, he may,
at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with
the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the
property as stated in the applicant’s affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be
adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the adverse party, and
by serving a copy bond on the applicant.”WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED. Melo (Chairman), Vitug,
Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.Petition denied, judgment affirmed.Note.—The Supreme Court
is constrained to rule against petitioner on grounds of fairness and equity particularly on the principle of
estoppel. (Ysmael vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 165 [1997]) Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc., 338 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 137705 August 22, 2000
VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974 647 Martinez vs. Court of Appeals No. L-31271. April 29, 1974.* ROMEO
MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ, spouses, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
SECRETARY and UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS & COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-
appellees.Land registration; Court may not adjudge title over non-registerable land.—The Land
Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a
private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No.
2 of Certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly
or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of
Limitations. Prescription; Right of State to recover non-registerable land does not prescribe.—The right
of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently registered and which are
not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe. (Republic vs. Ramona
Ruiz, et al., L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348; Republic vs. Ramos, L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA
47.) Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Jurisdiction; The Secretary of Public Works and
Communications has jurisdiction to order removal of obstructions to navigable waters.—When it comes
to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications under
Republic Act 2056 to order the removal of obstruction to navigation along a public and navigable creek
or river included therein, has been definitely settled and is no longer open to question. (Lovina vs.
Moreno, L-17821, Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works & Communications,
L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74.) Special Contracts; Sales; Vendee two is aware of defect in the
thing he buys cannot later complain thereof.—Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be
contended that the appellants who were the vendees did not know exactly the condition of the land
that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions thereon that may be put up by the government
in connection with their project of _______________ * FIRST DIVISION.
648 648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Martinez vs. Court of Appeals
converting Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the
risks attendant to the sale of said lot. One who buys something with knowledge of defect or lack of title
in his vendor cannot claim that he acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co., et al., 37
Phil. 664).PETITION for review by certiorari of a judgment of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in
the opinion of the Court. Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor
Concepcion T. Agapinan for respondents-appellees.ESGUERRA, J.:Petition for review by certiorari of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals dated November 17, 1969 in its CA-G. R. 27655-R which reverses the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor of petitioners-appellants against the
Secretary and Undersecretary of Public Works & Communications in the case instituted to annul the
order of November 25, 1958 of respondent Secretary of Public Works & Communications directing the
removal by the petitioners of the dikes they had constructed on Lot No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds
of Pampanga, which order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. The
dispositive portion of the judgment of reversal of the Court of Appeals reads as follows:“IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another entered:
[1] upholding the validity of the decision reached by the respondent officials in the administrative case;
[2] dissolving the injunction issued by the Court below; and [3] cancelling the registration of Lot No. 2,
the disputed area, and ordering its reconveyance to the public domain. No costs in this instance.”The
background facts are stated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
649 VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974 649 Martinez vs. Court of Appeals “The spouses Romeo
Martinez and Leonor Suarez, now petitioners-appellees, are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of
land located in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by transfer certificate of title No. 15856 of the Register of
Deeds of the said province. Both parcels of land are fishponds. The property involved in the instant case
is the second parcel mentioned in the above-named transfer certificate of title.“The disputed property
was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who secured a ‘titulo real’ over it way back in 1883.
After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to his successors-in-interest, Maria
Montemayor and Donata Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a certain
Potenciano Garcia.“Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president of Lubao,
Pedro Beltran, from restoring the dikes constructed on the contested property, the former, on June 22,
1914, filed Civil Case No. 1407 with the Court of First Instance against the said Pedro Beltran to restrain
the latter in his official capacity from molesting him in the possession of said second parcel, and on even
date, applied for a writ of preliminary injunction, which was issued against said municipal president. The
Court, by decision promulgated June 12, 1916, declared permanent the preliminary injunction, which,
decision, on appeal, was affirmed by the Supreme Court on August 21, 1918. From June 22, 1914, the
dikes around the property in question remained closed until a portion thereof was again opened just
before the outbreak of the Pacific War.“On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration
of both parcels of land in his name, and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land
registration court, granted the registration over and against the opposition of the Attorney-General and
the Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the Court’s decision, original certificate of title No. 14318, covering
said parcels 1 and 2 was issued to the spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson.“These parcels of
land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios in whose name transfer certificate of title No.
1421 was first issued on November 9, 1925.“Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed
hands until eventually they were acquired by the herein appellee spouses who hold them by virtue of
transfer certificate of title No. 15856.
650 650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Martinez vs. Court of Appeals “To
avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers and
Streams, by then composed of the Honorable Pedro Tuason, at that time Secretary of Justice, as
chairman, and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa, Secretary of Agriculture and National
Resources and Secretary of Public Works and Communications, respectively, as members. This
committee thereafter appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the case and to conduct an ocular
inspection of the contested property, and on March 11, 1954, said Sub-Committee submitted its report
to the Committee on Rivers and Streams to the effect that Parcel No. 2 of transfer certificate of title No.
15856 was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein appellee spouses.“On July 7,
1954, the Committee on Rivers and Streams rendered its decision the dispositive part of which reads:‘In
view of the foregoing considerations, the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez should be
restored to the exclusive possession, use and enjoyment of the creek in question which forms part of
their registered property and the decision of the courts on the matter be given full force and
effect.’“The municipal officials of Lubao, led by Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad, apparently refused to
recognize the above decision, because on September 1, 1954, the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor
Suarez instituted Civil Case No. 751 before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against said Mayor
Zagad, praying that the latter be enjoined from molesting them in their possession of their property and
in the construction of the dikes therein. The writ of preliminary injunction applied for was issued against
the respondent municipal Mayor, who immediately elevated the injunction suit for review to the
Supreme Court, which dismissed Mayor Zagad’s petition on September 7, 1953. With this dismissal
order herein appellee spouses proceeded to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel of land.“Some
four (4) years later, and while Civil Case No. 751 was still pending, the Honorable Florencio Moreno,
then Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered another investigation of the said parcel of
land, directing the appellees herein to remove the dikes they had constructed, on the strength of the
authority vested in him by Republic Act No. 2056, approved on June 13, 1958, entitled ‘An Act To
Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes, Or Any Other Walls In Public
Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works
651 VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974 651 Martinez vs. Court of Appeals in Such Waters or
Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties For Its Violation, And For Other
Purposes.1 The said order which gave rise to the instant proceedings, embodied a threat that the dikes
would be demolished should the herein appellees fail to comply therewith within thirty (30) days.“The
spouses Martinez replied to the order by commencing on January 2, 1959 the present case, which was
decided in their favor by the lower Court in a decision dated August 10, 1959, the dispositive part of
which reads:‘WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the
decision, Exhibit S, rendered by the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications null and void;
declares the preliminary injunction, heretofor issued, permanent, and forever enjoining both
respondents from molesting the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez in their possession, use
and enjoyment of their property described in Plan Psu-9992 and referred to in their petition.‘Without
pronouncement as to costs.‘SO ORDERED;“As against this judgment respondent officials of the
Department of Public Works and Communications took the instant appeal, contending that the lower
Court erred:“1. In holding that then Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, complainant in the administrative case,
is not an interested party and his letter-complaint dated August 15, 1958 did not confer jurisdiction
upon the respondent Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to investigate the said
administrative case;“2. In holding that the duty to investigate encroachments upon public rivers
conferred upon the respondent Secretary under Republic Act No. 7056 cannot be lawfully delegated by
him to his subordinates;“3. In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary in this
case is illegal on the ground that the said respondent Secretary has arrogated unto himself the power,
which he does not possess, of reversing, making nugatory, and setting aside the two lawful decisions of
the Court, Exhibits K and I, and even annulling thereby, the one rendered by the highest Tribunal of the
land;
652 652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Martinez vs. Court of Appeals “4. In
not sustaining respondent’s claim that petitioners have no cause of action because the property in
dispute is a public river and in holding that the said claim has no basis in fact and in law;“5. In not
passing upon and disposing of respondent’s counterclaim;“6. In not sustaining respondent’s claim that
the petition should not have been entertained on the ground that the petitioners have not exhausted
administrative remedies; and“7. In holding that the decision of the respondents is illegal on the ground
that it violates the principles that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided
and in holding that the said Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional on the ground that respondents’
threat of prosecuting petitioners under Section 3 thereof for acts done four years before its enactment
renders the said law ex post facto.”The Court of Appeals sustained the above-mentioned assignment of
errors committed by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and, as previously stated, reversed the
judgment of the latter court. From this reversal this appeal by certiorari was taken, and before this
Court, petitioners-appellants assigned the following errors allegedly committed by the Court of
Appeals:1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING IN THE INSTANT CASE THAT PARCEL NO. 2 OF
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 IS A PUBLIC RIVER AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF
ITS REGISTRATION BECAUSE THIS CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS TITLE IN
VIOLATION OF THE LAW AND THE WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.2. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN REOPENING AND RE-LITIGATING THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2 OF
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA, IS A PUBLIC RIVER
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN LONG RESOLVED AND SETTLED BY THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT OF PAMPANGA IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING NO. 692 AND IS NOW RES
JUDICATA.
653 VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974 653 Martinez vs. Court of Appeals 3. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE REGISTRATION OF LOT NO. 2 OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS TITLE COVERING IT
HAS BEEN VESTED IN THE PETITIONERS WHO ARE THE SEVENTH OF THE SUCCESSIVE INNOCENT
PURCHASERS THEREOF AND WHO IN PURCHASING THE SAME RELIED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE
PERSONS DEALING WITH REGISTERED LAND NEED NOT GO BEHIND THE REGISTER TO DETERMINE THE
CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY.The 1st and 2nd assignment of errors, being closely related, will be taken
up together.The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15856 of the petitioners-appellants is a public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the
river covered reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as being a collateral
attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-
appellants’ predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the rule of res judicata. It is
argued that as the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Court was not reopened
through a petition for review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for the land covered thereby is no
longer open to attack under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on
the matter established by this Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants
expressly makes a decree of registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and indefeasible,
subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said Act among which are: “liens, claims or rights
arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which
the statute of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the registry.”At the time of the
enactment of Section 496, one right
recognized or existing under the law is that provided for in Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads
as follows:“Property of public ownership is:“1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character.” (Par. 1)The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for
public use, are outside the commerce of men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation. (3
Manresa, 6th ed. 101-104.)In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, this Court held:“A simple
possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the possessor a
true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains title under the Torrens system
which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he
does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included.”In Mercado
v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592, it was also said:“It is useless for the appellant now to
allege that she has obtained certificate of title No. 329 in her favor because the said certificate does not
confer upon her any right to the creek in question, inasmuch as the said creek, being of the public
domain, is included among the various exceptions enumerated in Section 39 of Act 496 to which the said
certificate is subject by express provision of the law.”The same ruling was laid down in Director of Lands
v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil. 644, as regards public plaza.In Dizon, et al. v.
Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. L-20300-01 and G.R. No. L-20355-56, April 30, 1965, 20 SCRA 704, it was held
that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens
655 VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974 655 Martinez vs. Court of Appeals certificate of title
does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of registration.It is, therefore, clear that
the authorities cited by the appellants as to the conclusiveness and incontestability of a Torrens
certificate of title do not apply here. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-register
able properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly
adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of
petitioners-appellants may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is
not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations (Article 1108, par. 4, new
Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently
registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
(Republic v. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G. R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348; Republic v. Ramos, G. R.
No. L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 47.)When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Public Works & Communications under Republic Act 2056 to order the removal or
obstruction to navigation along a public and navigable creek or river included therein, has been
definitely settled and is no longer open to question (Lovina v. Moreno, G. R. No L-17821, November 29,
1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works & Communications, G. R. No. L-24281, May 16,
1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74).The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon by the
respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15856, is a river of the public domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2 appearing in
Original Certificate of Title No. 14318 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2 embraced in said
title
656 656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Martinez vs. Court of Appeals is
bounded practically on all sides by rivers. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case
No. 1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal Mayor of
Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. “L”), Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river that has been covered with
water since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain. This finding having been
affirmed by the Supreme Court, there is no longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 of petitioners is a river which is not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by
prescription. (Palanca v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 449; Meneses v. Com. of the Philippines 69 Phil.
647). Consequently, appellants’ title does not include said river. II.As regards the 3rd assignment of
error, there is no weight in the appellants’ argument that, being a purchaser for value and in good faith
of Lot No. 2, the nullification of its registration would be contrary to the law and to the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court as it would destroy the stability of the title which is the core of the
system of registration. Appellants cannot be deemed purchasers for value and in good faith as in the
deed of absolute conveyance executed in their favor, the following appears:“6. Que la segunda parcela
arriba descrita y mencionada esta actualmente abierta, sin malecones y excluida de la primera parcela
en virtud de la Orden Administrative No. 103, tal como fue enmendada, del pasado regimen o
Gobierno.“7. Que los citados compradores Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez se encargan de gestionar
de las autoridades correspondientes para que la citada segunda parcela pueda ser convertida de nuevo
en pesqueria, corriendo a cuenta y cargo de los mismos todos los gastos.“8. Que en el caso de que
dichos compradores no pudiesen conseguir sus propositos de convertir de nuevo en pesquera la citada
segunda parcela, los aqui vendedores no devolveran ninguna cantidad de dinero a los referidos
compradores; este es, no se disminuiriai el precio de esta venta.” (Exh. 13-a, p. 52, respondents record
of exhibits)
657 VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974 657 Martinez vs. Court of Appeals These stipulations
were accepted by the petitioners-appellants in the same conveyance in the following terms:“Romeo
Martinez y Leonor Suarez, mayores de edad, filipinos y residentes en al Barrio de Julo, Municipio de
Malabon, Provincia de Rizal, por la presente, declaran que estan enterados del contenido de este
documento y lo aceptan en los precisos terminos en que arriba quedan consignados.” (Exh. 13-a,
ibid)Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the appellants who were the
vendees did not know exactly the condition of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or
restrictions thereon that may be put up by the government in connection with their project of
converting Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the
risks attendant to the sale of said lot. One who buys something with knowledge of defect or lack of title
in his vendor cannot claim that he acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co., et al., 37
Phil. 664).The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record to make
inquiries as to the legality of the title of the registered owner, but may rely on the registry to determine
if there is no lien or encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as against the law and the
accepted principle that rivers are parts of the public domain for public use and not capable of private
appropriation or acquisition by prescription.FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals appealed from is in accordance with law, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the
petitioners-appellants. Makalintal, C. J., Castro, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur. Makasiar,
J., on leave.Judgment affirmed.Notes.—Authority of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications over Public Rivers and Streams. Under Republic Act 2056, authorizing the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, after notice and hearing, to order the removal of any dam, dike, or
other works encroaching on any public navigable rivers, streams, coastal waters, or other navigable
public waters or waterways, the exercise of the Secretary’s power under said Act necessarily involves
the determination of some questions of fact, and such findings are, upon judicial review, entitled to
respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion. Macatangay vs.
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, L-21673, May 16, 1966. The authority of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications to inquire into and decide the question of the public or private
character of a river or stream is incidental to the power conferred upon him by Republic Act 2056 to
conduct the necessary investigation and to order the removal of any works that constitute obstructions
therein. Borja vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, L-16487, July 31, 1964.LEGAL
RESEARCH SERVICESee SCRA Quick Index-Digest, Volume One, page 453 on Contracts; and page 501 on
Courts.See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, Volume Two, page 1114 on Jurisdiction; page 1248 on Land
Registration; page 1748 on Prescription; and page 1882 on Sales.Caguioa, E. P., Comments and Cases on
Civil Law, 6 vols., 1970-74 Editions.Padilla, A., Civil Law—Civil Code Annotated, 6 vols., 1969-73
Editions.Feria, J., Civil Procedure with Judiciary Act of 19148 and Arbitration Act, 1969 Edition with 1970
Supplement.Moran, M. V., Comments on the Rules of Court, vols. 1, 2 and 3, 1970 Edition.
659 VOL. 56, APRIL 29, 1974 659 People vs. Puno Peña, N., Registration of Land Titles
and Deeds, 1964 Edition.Ponce, F. D. R., The Philippine Torrens System, 1964 Edition.Jacinto, G. V.,
Special Proceedings, 1965 Edition.————o0o———— Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 647, No.
L-31271 April 29, 1974
VOL. 66, AUGUST 29, 1975 481 Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Bercilles No. L-40474. August 29,
1975.* CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES, Presiding
Judge, Branch XV, 14th Judicial District, and JOSE L. ESPELETA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Province of
Cebu, representing the Solicitor General’s Office and the Bureau of Lands, respondents.Municipal
corporations; Authority of city council to close city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from
public use discretionary.—The city council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a
certain property is still necessary for public use. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary.
And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case
of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some
private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. Property;
Property of public dominion withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property.—Article 422 of
the Civil Code expressly provides that “Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.” Besides, the Revised
Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that:
“Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Same; Same; Patrimonial
property can be the object of an ordinary contract.—Since that portion of the city street subject of
_______________ * SECOND DIVISION.
482 482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc.
vs. Bercilles petitioner’s application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows
that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract.PETITION for review of an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Bercilles, J.The facts are
stated in the opinion of the Court. Jose Antonio B. Conde for petitioner. Acting Solicitor General
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney David R. Hilario
for respondents.CONCEPCION, Jr., J.:This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner’s application for registration of title over a parcel of land situated
in the City of Cebu.The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No.
2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan.1 Subsequently,
on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City
Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding.2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein
petitioner being the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City
Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of
P10,800.00.3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered.4On June 26, 1974, the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought
to be registered being a public road intended _______________ 1 Annex A, p. 11, rollo. 2 Annex B, p. 12,
rollo. 3 Annex C, p. 13, rollo. 4 Annex D, p. 15, rollo. 483 VOL. 66, AUGUST 29, 1975 483 Cebu Oxygen
& Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Bercilles for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore
outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private
individual.5After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1974 the trial court issued an order dismissing the
petitioner’s application for registration of title.6 Hence, the instant petition for review.For the resolution
of this case, the petitioner poses the following questions:(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic
Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as
abandoned? and(2) Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of
the City of Cebu which may be the object of a common contract?(1) The pertinent portions of the
Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:“Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and
executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative
powers:xxx xxx xxx xxx(34) x x x; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park
or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.”From the foregoing,
it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. In the case of
Favis vs. City of Baguio,7 where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to
vacate or withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed, this court said:“5. So it is, that
appellant may not challenge the city council’s act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead
end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the
ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority
competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public
use._______________ 5 Annex E, p. 18, rollo. 6 Annex F, p. 20, rollo. 7 G.R. No. L-29910, April 25, 1969;
SCRA 1060.
484 484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc.
vs. Bercilles “Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily
be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion.
Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served
incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.”(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of
petitioner’s application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract.Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State.”Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal
terms, states that: “Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or
conveyed.”Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent
sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in
question.WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land
Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner’s application for registration of title.SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concur.Order set aside.Notes.—a) Extent of
legislative control over properties of municipal corporations.—The principle itself is simple: If the
property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in
its private or proprietary capacity,
485 VOL. 66, AUGUST 29, 1975 485 Padua vs. Robles then it is patrimonial and
Congress has no absolute control. The municipal cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation. (Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, L-24440,
March 28, 1968). b) Material factors to consider in vacating a street.—Deemed as material factors which
a municipality must consider in deliberating upon the advisability of closing a street are: “the
topography of the property surrounding the street in the light of ingress and egress to other streets; the
relationship of the street in the road system throughout the subdivision; the problem posed by the
‘dead end’ of the street; the width of the street; the cost of rebuilding and maintaining the street as
contrasted to its ultimate value to all of the property in the vicinity; the inconvenience of those visiting
the subdivision; and whether the closing of the street would cut off any property owners from access to
a street.” (Favis vs. City of Baguio, L-29910, April 25, 1969). Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs.
Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481, No. L-40474 August 29, 1975
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. G.R. No. 93654. May 6, 1992.*
FRANCISCO U. DACANAY, petitioner, vs. MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., CITY ENGR. LUCIANO SARNE, JR.
of Kalookan City, Metro Manila, MILA PASTRANA AND/OR RODOLFO TEOFE, STALLHOLDERS AND
REPRESENTING CO-STALLHOLDERS, respondents.Constitutional Law; Civil Law; Public Lands; Contracts; A
public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man.—There is no doubt that the
disputed areas from which the private respondents’ market stalls are sought to be evicted are public
streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is property for public use
hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it
may not be the subject of lease or other contract. Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of the public to
use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract.—As the stallholders pay fees to the
City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to
law, has been ______________ * EN BANC.
405 VOL. 208, MAY 6, 1992 405 Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. leasing portions of the
streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the
public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should
not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good
order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. Same;
Same; Same; Same; Mayor Robles’ Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public
to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve.—The Executive Order issued by Acting
Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del ‘96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were
granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads
for public use. Mayor Robles’ Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use
city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and
pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents had started to look for feasible alternative sites for
flea markets. They have had more than ample time to relocate the street vendors.PETITION for
mandamus to review the decision of the Office of the City Mayor, Caloocan City.The facts are stated in
the opinion of the Court. David D. Advincula, Jr. for petitioner. Juan P. Banaga for private
respondents.GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:May public streets or thoroughfares be leased or licensed to market
stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila Commission? This issue is
posed by the petitioner, an aggrieved Caloocan City resident who filed a special civil action of
mandamus against the incumbent city mayor and city engineer, to compel these city officials to remove
the market stalls from certain city streets which the aforementioned city officials have designated as flea
markets, and the private respondents (stallholders) to vacate the streets.On January 5, 1979, MMC
Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and
municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant thereto, the Caloocan City
mayor opened
406 406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. up seven
(7) flea markets in that city. One of those streets was the “Heroes del ’96” where the petitioner lives.
Upon application of vendors Rodolfo Teope, Mila Pastrana, Carmen Barbosa, Merle Castillo, Bienvenido
Menes, Nancy Bugarin, Jose Manuel, Crisaldo Paguirigan, Alejandro Castron, Ruben Araneta, Juanita and
Rafael Malibaran, and others, the respondent city mayor and city engineer, issued them licenses to
conduct vending activities on said street.In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City,
caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del ’96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop
Mayor Martinez’ efforts to clear the city streets, Rodolfo Teope, Mila Pastrana and other stallowners
filed an action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City Engineer
and/or their deputies (Civil Case No. C-12921) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 122,
praying the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to discontinue the
demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action.The court issued the writ prayed for.
However, on December 20, 1987, it dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
which it had earlier issued. The trial court observed that:“A perusal of Ordinance 2, series of 1979 of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission will show on the title itself that it is an ordinance—“Authorizing and
regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan
Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions, subject to the
approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, and for other purposes’which is further amplified in
Section 2 of the said ordinance, quoted hereunder:“ ‘SEC. 2. The streets, roads and open spaces to be
used as sites for flea markets (tiangge) or vending areas; the design, measurement or specification of
the structures, equipment and apparatuses to be used or put up; the allowable distances; the days and
time allowed for the conduct of the businesses and/or activities herein authorized; the rates or fees or
charges to be
407 VOL. 208, MAY 6, 1992 407 Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. imposed, levied and collected;
the kinds of merchandise, goods and commodities sold and services rendered; and other matters and
activities related to the establishment, maintenance and management and operation of flea markets
and vending areas, shall be determined and prescribed by the mayors of the cities and municipalities in
the Metropolitan Manila where the same are located, subject to the approval of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission and consistent with the guidelines hereby prescribed.’“Further, it is so provided in
the guidelines under the said Ordinance No. 2 of the MMC that—“ ‘SEC. 6. In the establishment,
operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and vending areas, the following guidelines,
among others, shall be observed:‘xxx xxx xxx‘(m) That the permittee shall remove the equipment,
facilities and other appurtenances used by him in the conduct of his business after the close or
termination of business hours.’ ” (Italics ours; pp. 15-16, Rollo.)The trial court found that Heroes del ’96,
Gozon and Gonzales streets are of public dominion, hence, outside the commerce of man:“The Heroes
del ’96 street, V. Gozon street and Gonzales street, being of public dominion must, therefore, be outside
of the commerce of man. Considering the nature of the subject premises, the following jurisprudence
co/principles are applicable on the matter:“1) They cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the
subject matter of contracts. (Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602);“2) They cannot be acquired
by prescription against the state (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505). Even municipalities can
not acquire them for use as communal lands against the state (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 327);“3) They are not subject to attachment and execution (Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo,
49 Phil. 52);“4) They cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement (2-II Colin & Capitant 520)
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phils., Vol. II, 1983 Ed. pp. 29-30).
408 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. “In the
aforecited case of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, it was held that properties for public use may not be
leased to private individuals. Such a lease is null and void for the reason that a municipal council cannot
withdraw part of the plaza from public use. If possession has already been given, the lessee must restore
possession by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it may have
collected as rent.“In the case of City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia, 19 SCRA 413, the Supreme Court
held:“ ‘The property being a public one, the Manila Mayors did not have the authority to give permits,
written or oral, to the squatters, and that the permits granted are therefore considered null and
void.‘This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Baguio Citizens Action Inc. vs. The City Council, 121
SCRA 368, where it was held that:‘An ordinance legalizing the occupancy by squatters of public land is
null and void.’“The authority of respondent Municipality of Makati to demolish the shanties of the
petitioner’s members is mandated by P.D. 772, and Sec. 1 of Letter of Instruction No. 19 orders certain
public officials, one of whom is the Municipal Mayor to remove all illegal constructions including
buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without
permits on public or private property (Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Mun. of Makati, 135 SCRA
235). The City Engineer is also among those required to comply with said Letter of Instruction.“The
occupation and use of private individuals of sidewalks and other public places devoted for public use
constitute both public and private nuisances and nuisance per se, and this applies to even case involving
the use or lease of public places under permits and licenses issued by competent authority, upon the
theory that such holders could not take advantage of their unlawful permits and license and claim that
the land in question is a part of a public street or a public place devoted to public use, hence, beyond
the commerce of man. (Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. II, p. 59, 6th Ed., citing Umali vs. Aquino, IC. A.
Rep. 339.)“From the aforequoted jurisprudence/principles, the Court opines that defendants have the
right to demolish the subject stalls of the plaintiffs, more so when Section 185, par. 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg.
409 VOL. 208, MAY 6, 1992 409 Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code provides that the City Engineer shall:“ ‘(4) xxx xxx xxx‘(c) Prevent the
encroachment of private buildings and fences on the streets and public places;‘xxx xxx xxx‘(j)
Inspect and supervise the construction, repair, removal and safety of private buildings;‘xxx xxx
xxx‘(k) With the previous approval of the City Mayor in each case, order the removal of materials
employed in the construction or repair of any building or structures made in violation of law or
ordinance, and cause buildings and structures dangerous to the public to made secure or torn down;‘xxx
xxx xxx’“Further, the Charter of the City of Caloocan, Republic Act No. 5502, Art. VII, Sec. 27, par. g, l
and m, grants the City Engineer similar powers.” (Emphasis supplied; pp. 17-20, Rollo.)However, shortly
after the decision came out, the city administration in Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor Macario
Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latter’s policy of clearing and cleaning up
the city streets.Invoking the trial court’s decision in Civil Case No. C-12921, Francisco U. Dacanay, a
concerned citizen, taxpayer and registered voter of Barangay 74, Zone 7, District II of Caloocan City, who
resides on Heroes del ’96 Street, one of the affected streets, wrote a letter dated March 7, 1988 to
Mayor Asistio, Jr., calling his attention to the illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del ’96 Street and
asked for their demolition.Dacanay followed up that letter with another one dated April 7, 1988
addressed to the mayor and the city engineer, Luciano Sarne, Jr. (who replaced Engineer Arturo
Samonte), inviting their attention to the Regional Trial Court’s decision in Civil Case No. 12921. There
was still no response.Dacanay sought President Corazon C. Aquino’s intervention by writing her a letter
on the matter. His letter was referred to the city mayor for appropriate action. The acting Caloocan City
secretary, Asuncion Manalo, in a letter dated August 1, 1988,
410 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. informed
the Presidential Staff Director that the city officials were still studying the issue of whether or not to
proceed with the demolition of the market stalls.Dacanay filed a complaint against Mayor Asistio and
Engineer Sarne (OMB-0-89-0146) in the Office of the OMBUDSMAN. In their letter-comment dated April
3, 1989, said city officials explained that in view of the huge number of stallholders involved, not to
mention their dependents, it would be harsh and inhuman to eject them from the area in question, for
their relocation would not be an easy task.In reply, Dacanay maintained that respondents have been
derelict in the performance of their duties and through manifest partiality constituting a violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, have caused undue injury to the Government and given unwarranted benefits
to the stallholders.After conducting a preliminary investigation, the OMBUDSMAN rendered a final
evaluation and report on August 28, 1989, finding that the respondents’ inaction is purely motivated by
their perceived moral and social responsibility toward their constituents, but “the fact remains that
there is an omission of an act which ought to be performed, in clear violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of
Republic Act 3019.” (pp. 83-84, Rollo.) The OMBUDSMAN recommended the filing of the corresponding
information in court.As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del ’96 Street, through the
tolerance of the public respondents, and in clear violation of the decision in Civil Case No. C-12921,
Dacanay filed the present petition for mandamus on June 19, 1990, praying that the public respondents
be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case No. C-12921 which upheld the city mayor’s
authority to order the demolition of market stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del ’96 Streets and
to enforce P.D. No. 772 and other pertinent laws.On August 16, 1990, the public respondents, through
the City Legal Officer, filed their Comment on the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General asked to
be excused from filing a separate Comment in behalf of the public respondents. The City Legal Officer
alleged that the vending area was transferred to Heroes del ’96 Street to decongest Malonzo Street,
which is comparatively a busier thoroughfare; that the transfer was made by
411 VOL. 208, MAY 6, 1992 411 Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. virtue of Barangay Resolution
No. 30 s’78 dated January 15, 1978; that while the resolution was awaiting approval by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission, the latter passed Ordinance No. 79-2, authorizing the use of certain streets and
open spaces as sites for flea markets and/or vending areas; that pursuant thereto, Acting MMC Mayor
Virgilio P. Robles issued Executive Order No. 135 dated January 10, 1979, ordering the establishment
and operation of flea markets in specified areas and created the Caloocan City Flea Market Authority as
a regulatory body; and that among the sites chosen and approved by the Metro Manila Commission,
Heroes del ’96 Street was considered “most viable and progressive, lessening unemployment in the city
and servicing the residents with affordable basic necessities.”The petition for mandamus is meritorious.
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents’ market stalls are sought
to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is
property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside
the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva et al. vs.
Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142, citing the Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu
vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; and Muyot vs. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).As the
stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the
City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or
licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not
be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the
greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the
respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.The Executive Order issued by Acting
Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del ’96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were
granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads
for public use. Mayor Robles’ Executive Order may not infringe
412 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr. upon the
vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries
of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents had started to look for
feasible alternative sites for flea markets. They have had more than ample time to relocate the street
vendors.WHEREFORE, it having been established that the petitioner and the general public have a legal
right to the relief demanded and that the public respondents have the corresponding duty, arising from
public office, to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose (Enriquez vs.
Bidin, 47 SCRA 183; City of Manila vs. Garcia et al., 19 SCRA 413 citing Unson vs. Lacson, 100 Phil. 695),
the respondents City Mayor and City Engineer of Caloocan City or their successors in office are hereby
ordered to immediately enforce and implement the decision in Civil Case No. C-1292 declaring that
Heroes del ’96, V. Gozon, and Gonzales Streets are public streets for public use, and they are ordered to
remove or demolish, or cause to be removed or demolished, the market stalls occupying said city streets
with utmost dispatch within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. This decision is immediately
executory.SO ORDERED. Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., No part. Did not
take part in deliberations.Decision immediately executory.——o0o—— Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr., 208
SCRA 404, G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992
[No. 5013. March 11, 1909.] JEREMIAH J. HARTY, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, plaintiff and
appellee, vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA, Province of Tarlac, defendant and appellant.1. CHURCH
PROPERTY; PUBLIC "PLAZA" CAN NOT BE CLAIMED BY THE CHURCH.—Where the record does not duly
show that the Catholic Church or the parish of the town of Victoria is the owner of the large tract of land
surrounding the church and the parish house of said town, now forming a public plaza, and where the
evidence adduced at the trial shows that, prior .to the conversion of the barrio, then known as Canarum,
into the town of Victoria, and before the construction of said church and parish house, such large tract
of land was destined as a public plaza wherein public functions and religious ceremonies were held,
without hindrance or obstacle of any kind, there is no ground nor is there any legal reason for a
declaration that said plaza belongs to the church, which plaza, on account of its being a parcel of land of
public use, is not susceptible of prescription under articles 344 and 1936 of the Civil Code. 2. ID.; ID.;
EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP.—The fact that some fruit trees and plants were set out in said plaza
does not constitute an act of private ownership, but rather evidences the public -use thereof, or perhaps
the intention to improve and embellish the same for the benefit of the townspeople.
153 VOL. 13, MARCH 11, 1909 153 Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria. APPEAL from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. Llorente, J.The facts are stated in the opinion of the
court.F. Buencamino, for appellant.Hartigan & Rohde, for appellee.TORRES, J.:On January 17, 1908, the
representative of Mgr. Jeremiah J. 'Harty, archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church, as the legal
administrator of all the properties and rights of the Catholic Church within the archbishopric of Manila,
filed a written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the municipality of Victoria,
alleging that the parish of the said town had been and was then the owner of a parcel of land within the
said municipality, known as the plaza of the church of Victoria; that it had acquired said parcel of land
more than sixty years previously, and had continued to possess the same ever since up to 1901, in which
year the defendant municipality unlawfully and forcibly seized the said property, claiming to be entitled
thereto and retaining it to the present day. For the purposes of the complaint, a description of the
metes and bounds of the land in question was set forth in the writing, and plaintiff prayed that, in view
of what was therein set forth, judgment be entered holding that the said land was the property of the
parish of Victoria, of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, and that the defendant be ordered to vacate
the same and to pay the costs of the action.The defendant municipality answered the complaint through
its attorney and offered a general denial of all the facts stated therein, especially of those numbered 4,
5, 6, and 7; in special defense it alleged that the plaza described in No. 4 of the complaint was founded
when the sitio denominated Canarum, a barrio of the town of Tarlac, was converted into a civil town in
1855; that the parish of Tarlac was established many years after the civil town,
154 154 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria. and
that therefore, it neither had then, nor has now any title to the plaza claimed, and that the complaint
injured the defendant, and for this reason it prayed that judgment be entered absolving the defendant
of the complaint with costs and damages against the plaintiff.Evidence was adduced by both parties,
and the documents exhibited, to one of which the plaintiff objected, were made of record; the trial
court rendered judgment on the 15th of June, 1908, holding that the parish of Victoria of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church, had a better right to the possession of the land described in the complaint,
and sentenced the defendant to vacate the same and to pay the costs. To said judgment the
representative of the defendant excepted and moved f or a new trial on the ground that it was contrary
to the weight of the evidence, and he notified the court that, if his motion were overruled, he would
appeal to the Supreme Court. The motion for a new trial was overruled; the defendant excepted, and
presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which, after receipt of a copy had been acknowledged by
the adverse party, was approved. On the 1st of September last, the appellant was ordered to furnish
bond in the sum of Pl,000 to insure the fulfillment of the judgment in the event that it should be totally
or partially affirmed. To said order the defendant excepted, but f urnished the bond as directed by the
court.In view of the nature of the action brought by the plaintiff against the municipality of Victoria,
Province of Tarlac, the question that has arisen between the contending parties consists only in
determining who is the owner and proprietor of the parcel of land that surrounds the parish church of
the said town, and which is called the public plaza of the same.Article 339 of the Civil Code
reads:"Property of public ownership is:"1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character."
155 VOL. 13, MARCH 11, 1909 155 Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria. Article 344 of
said code also reads.""Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and
town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of
general service supported by the said towns or provinces."From the evidence presented by both parties
it appears that the town of Victoria, which was formerly only a barrio of the town of Tarlac and known
as Canarum, was converted into a town in 1855, and named Victoria; to this end they must have laid out
the streets and the plaza of the town, in the center of which were situated the church and parish house f
rom the commencement, and at the expiration of about twelve years the parish of said town was
constituted and the priest who was to perform the office of curate was appointed; that from the very
beginning, the large tract of land that surrounds the church and the parish house was known as a public
plaza, destined to the use of all the residents of the recently founded town; public perf ormances and
religious processions were held thereon without hindrance either on the part of the local authorities or
of the curate of said town.It must be assumed that the principal residents of the old barrio, being
interested in the conversion of the barrio into a civil town, arranged in such a way that the barrio, as the
center of the future town which was subsequently called Victoria, should have streets and a public plaza
with its church and parish house, and also a tribunal or building destined f or the use of the municipality
and the local official at that time called the gobernadorcillo and later on capitán municipal, as has
occurred in the foundation of all the towns in these Islands, under the old administrative laws.It may be
true that the father of the witness Casimiro Tañedo, who owned the space of land where the church and
parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it to the Catholic Church, the only one known at the
time, but proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said
156 156 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria. Tañedo
comprehended the whole of the large tract which at the present time constitutes the plaza of the
town.It was a custom observed by all the towns established administratively in these Islands under the
old Laws of the Indies, that on their creation, a certain amount of land was always reserved for plazas,
commons, and special and communal property, and as it is unquestionable that the said large space of
land was left vacant in the center of the town of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town, more
than twelve years prior to the appointment of a permanent curate therein, there are good grounds to
suppose that the late Vicente Tañedo donated the land now occupied by the church and parish house in
said municipality for religious purposes, or to the church, but not to the parish curate, because at the
time there was no curate at the new town of Victoria.Even though all the remaining space of land which
now forms the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been owned by the said Tañedo, it must be
presumed that he waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople, since from the creation or
establishment of the town, down to the present day, all the residents, including the curate of said town,
have enjoyed the free use of said plaza; it has not been satisfactorily shown that the municipality or the
principales of the town of Victoria had donated the whole of said land to the curate of Victoria or to the
Catholic Church, as alleged, nor could it have been so donated, it being a public plaza destined to public
use and was not of private ownership, or patrimony of the town of Victoria, or of the Province of
Tarlac.It should be noted that, among other things, plazas destined to the public use are not subject to
prescription. (Art. 1936, Civil Code,)That both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said town
procured fruit trees and plants to be set out in the plaza, does not constitute an act of private
ownership, but evidences the public use thereof, or perhaps the intention to improve and embellish the
said plaza for the benefit of the townspeople.
157 VOL. 13, MARCH 11, 1909 157 Bandoy vs. Judge of First Instance. Certain it is
that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or
proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it
was in possession thereof under the form and conditions required by law, inasmuch as it has been fully
proven that said plaza has been used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of the
town of Victoria ever since its creation. For the above reasons it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed f rom should be reversed, and that it should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of
the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of the
said town, of public use, and that in consequence thereof, the defendant is absolved of the complaint
without any special ruling as to the costs of both instances.Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and
Willard, JJ., concur.Judgment reversed. Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria., 13 Phil. 152, No. 5013 March
11, 1909
VOL. 309, JUNE 28, 1999 193 Villarico vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 105912. June 28, 1999.* SPOUSES
TEOFILO C. VILLARICO and MAXIMA A. FAUSTINO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARCOS CAMARGO, respondents.Actions; Appeals; Petition for
Review; Pleadings and Practice; It is well-settled that in a petition for review on certiorari as a mode
of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.—It bears stressing
that the first, second, and third assigned errors relate to factual and evidentiary matters which the
Supreme Court does not inquire into in an appeal on certiorari. It is well-settled that in a petition for
review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Findings of fact by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court. Land Registration; Forest Lands; Land within the
unclassified forest zone is incapable of private appropriation.—As aptly observed by the respondent
court, the primordial issue here is the character or classification of the property applied for
registration—whether or not the same still forms part of the public domain. On this crucial question,
the trial court a quo and the Court of Appeals correctly adjudged the area at stake as within the
unclassified forest zone incapable of private appropriation. Same; Same; Forest lands cannot be
owned by private persons, and possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a
registrable title.—Indeed, forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no
matter how long, does not ripen into a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.__________________ * THIRD DIVISION.
194 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Villarico vs. Court of Appeals The
facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Teofilo C. Villarico for petitioners. Manuel T. de Guia
for private respondent.PURISIMA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22608, affirming the decision of Branch 22 of the Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, Bulacan, which dismissed the application for confirmation of title in LRC Case No. 604-
V-77.The facts that matter are as follows:On May 31, 1977, an application for confirmation of title was
filed by the spouses, Teofilo Villarico and Maxima Villarico, over a 1,834 square meter parcel of land in
Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, docketed as LRC Case No. 604-V-77 before the then court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Among others, applicants alleged that they are the absolute owners of subject
property, having bought the same from the spouses, Segundo Villarico (Teofilo’s father) and Mercedes
Cardenas, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, adverse and
continuous possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years, that they are not aware of any
mortgage or encumbrance thereon nor of any person having an estate or interest therein, and that
the land involved is not within the forest zone or government reservation.The application for land
registration at bar was opposed by Marcos Camargo, who claims to be the real owner thereof.2 The
Government interposed its opposition, through the Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest
Management), averring that the land in question is part of the public domain, within
____________________ 1 Penned by Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombos-de la Fuente and concurred by
Associate Justices Eduardo R. Bengzon and Quirino D. Abad-Santos, Jr. 2 Comment of Private
Respondent, Rollo, pp. 66-73. 195 VOL. 309, JUNE 28, 1999 195 Villarico vs. Court of Appeals the
unclassified area in Meycauayan, Bulacan per LC Map No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 of the Bureau of
Forest Management and consequently, not available for private appropriation.On May 23, 1989, the
trial court of origin dismissed the case, ratiocinating thus:“It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a
certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber
and mineral lands. Any title thus issued on non-disposable lots, even in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, should be cancelled (Lepanto Consolidated Mining vs. Dumyang, L-31666, April
30, 1979). There being no concrete evidence presented in this case that the property in question was
ever acquired by the applicants or by the private oppositor (as attested to by the proceedings of B.L.
Claim No. 38 [N] before the Bureau of Lands) or by their respective predecessors-in-interest either by
composition of title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property in question
must be held to be part of the public domain, especially so that the private parties had not presented
any Certification from the Bureau of Forestry attesting to the fact that the subject property is no
longer within the unclassified region of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Thus, if the land in question still forms
part of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private
property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
89 SCRA 648).WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.No
pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.”3Therefrom, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which came out with a judgment of affirmance on June 26, 1992. Respondent court affirmed the
findings of facts below, holding that subject parcel of land is within the public domain not available
for private appropriation. ____________________ 3 Comment of Republic of the Philippines, Rollo,
pp. 35-36. 196 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Villarico vs. Court of Appeals
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this court via the present petition for review on certiorari;
placing reliance on the assignment of errors, that:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT BEFORE 1948 THERE WAS NO
DOCUMENTATION IN FAVOR OF EITHER PARTIES.IITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT BUENAVENTURA VILLARICO APPARENTLY DIED
PRIOR TO 1914.IIITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT TAX DECLARATION NO. 3912 IN THE NAME OF BUENAVENTURA VILLARICO COULD
HAVE BEEN CONTRIVED SENSING THAT A CONFLICT OVER THE PROPERTY IN THE NEAR FUTURE WAS
INEVITABLE.IVTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THERE IS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION WAS EVER ACQUIRED BY THE APPLICANT OR BY THE PRIVATE OPPOSITOR OR BY THEIR
RESPECTIVE PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST THROUGH LAWFUL MEANS FOR THE ACQUISITION OF
PUBLIC LANDS.VTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE CASE AT BAR.The appeal is without merit and cannot prosper.It bears stressing that the first,
second, and third assigned errors relate to factual and evidentiary matters which the Supreme Court
does not inquire into in an appeal on certio-
197 VOL. 309, JUNE 28, 1999 197 Villarico vs. Court of Appeals rari.4 It is well-
settled that in a petition for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised.5 The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.6 Findings of
fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court.7In the case under
consideration, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse such findings arrived at by the trial
court and affirmed by the respondent court, absent any showing of any error, mistake, or
misappreciation of facts. Records on hand indicate that the decisions under attack accord with the law
and the evidence.As aptly observed by the respondent court, the primordial issue here is the
character or classification of the property applied for registration—whether or not the same still
forms part of the public domain. On this crucial question, the trial court a quo and the Court of
Appeals correctly adjudged the area at stake as within the unclassified forest zone incapable of
private appropriation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held:“x x x In the case at bar, as found by the
court a quo, there has been no showing that a declassification has been made by the Director of
Forestry declaring the land in question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed discloses
that applicants have not introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to find or rule
otherwise. x x xAnd so, considering the foregoing, possession of the land in question by the applicants
and/or their predecessors-in-interest even for more than 30 years, as they allege, cannot convert the
land into private property capable of private appropriation.” (Court of Appeals’ Decision, pp. 4-
5)__________________ 4 Alicbusan v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 336. 5 Laza v. Court of Appeals, 269
SCRA 654. 6 David-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677; Union Insurance Society of Canton v. Court
of Appeals, 260 SCRA 431. 7 Willex Plastic Industries Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 478.
198 198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Villarico vs. Court of Appeals
Indeed, forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.8 Possession thereof, no matter how long,
does not ripen into a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain.9WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 22608 AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncements as to costs.SO ORDERED. Vitug (Actg. Chairman),
Panganiban and GonzagaReyes, JJ., concur. Romero (Chairman), J., Abroad on official
business.Petition denied, judgment affirmed in toto.Notes.—The classification of forest land, or any
land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. (De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230 [1998]) It is a settled
rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property. (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 295
SCRA 296 [1998]) Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government—a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. (Ituralde vs. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293 [1999])——
o0o—— Villarico vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 193, G.R. No. 105912 June 28, 1999
G.R. No. 179987. September 3, 2013.* HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. Civil Law; Property; Public
Dominion; Private Ownership; Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership.—Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as
either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is
intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State that is
not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs
to a private individual. Same; Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura
Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.—Pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. Same; Same;
Same; Agricultural Lands; The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution
into agricul- _______________ * EN BANC. 562562SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of
Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinestural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks; Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain
may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.—Whether or not land of the public domain is
alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain were classified into three,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands
of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935
Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. Agricultural lands
may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. The identification
of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department. Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land
that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be. Same; Same; Alienable and
Disposable Lands; Agricultural Lands; Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories,
to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article
425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.—Alienable
and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and
(b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the
limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber,
mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural. A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department,
not in the courts. If, however, public land 563VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013563Heirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippineswill be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress
or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.
Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service
or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable. Same; Same; Same;
Same; Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of.—Section 11 of the
Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit: Section 11. Public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise: (1) For homestead
settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; and (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By
judicial legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent). Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent
proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.—Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested
with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation
to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in
order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land
of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is
placed on the requirement that the classifica- 564564SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of
Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinestion required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural. Same; Same; Same; Same; Alienable
public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of the period.—An examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have
been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership
or title over it. Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-
in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession. Same; Same; Same; Same;
Rules Relative to the Disposition of Public Land or Lands of the Public Domain.—We now observe the
following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely: (1) As a
general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to
the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed; (2) The following are excepted from the
general rule, to wit: (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of 565VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013565Heirs
of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesthe Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application,
provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property. (b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land
has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. Brion, J., Separate Opinion: Civil Law;
Property; Public Land Act; View that Section 7 of the Public Land Act delegates to the President the
authority to administer and dispose of alienable public lands.—Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the
President the authority to administer and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the public
lands open to disposition or concession, and the requirement that they should be officially delimited
and classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant provision, states that —
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise: (1) For homestead settlement (2) By sale (3) By lease (4) By confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title: (a) By judicial legalization (b) By administrative legalization (free patent). Same; Same;
Public Lands; View that the Constitution classifies public lands into agricultural, mineral, timber lands
and national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands can be alienated.—The Constitution classifies public
lands into agricultural, mineral, timber 566566SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippineslands and national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands can
be alienated. Without the requisite classification, there can be no basis to determine which lands of the
public domain are alienable and which are not. Hence, classification is a constitutionally-required step
whose importance should be given full legal recognition and effect. Otherwise stated, without
classification into disposable agricultural land, the land continues to form part of the mass of the public
domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral, timber land or national parks that are completely
inalienable and, as such, cannot be possessed with legal effects. To recognize possession prior to any
classification is to do violence to the Regalian Doctrine; the ownership and control that the Regalian
Doctrine embodies will be less than full if the possession — that should be with the State as owner, but
is also elsewhere without any solid legal basis — can anyway be recognized. Same; Same; Alienable and
Disposable Lands; View that no imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet classified as
disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified
public land that fully belongs to the State.—No imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such classification, the land remains
unclassified public land that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10 of the PLA. If the land is either mineral, timber or national parks that cannot be alienated, it defies
legal logic to recognize that possession of these unclassified lands can produce legal effects. Same;
Same; Forest Lands; Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705); View that P.D. No. 705 confirms that all lands
of the public domain that remain unclassified are considered as forest land. As forest land, these lands
of the public domain cannot be alienated until they have been reclassified as agricultural lands.—
Parenthetically, PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code states that “Those [lands of public domain] still
to be classified under the present system shall continue to remain as part of the public forest.” It further
declares that public forest covers “the mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purposes and which are not.” Thus, PD No. 705 confirms that all lands of the public domain 567VOL.
704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013567Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesthat remain
unclassified are considered as forest land. As forest land, these lands of the public domain cannot be
alienated until they have been reclassified as agricultural lands. For purposes of the present case, these
terms confirm the position that re/classification is essential at the time possession is acquired under
Section 48(b) of the PLA. Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; View that the Regalian Doctrine was
incorporated in all the Constitutions of the Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and the statutes governing
private individuals’ land acquisition and registration.—The Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in all the
Constitutions of the Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and the statutes governing private individuals’
land acquisition and registration. In his Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Natural
Resources, 347 SCRA 128 (2000), former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno made a brief yet informative
historical discussion on how the Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in our legal system, especially in all
our past and present organic laws. His historical disquisition was quoted in La Bugal-B’laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148 (2004), and the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the
DENR et al. v. Yap and Sacay et al. v. The Secretary of the DENR, 568 SCRA 164 (2008), which were also
quoted in Justice Lucas P. Bersamin’s Separate Opinion in his very brief discussion on how the doctrine
was carried over from our Spanish and American colonization up until our present legal system. Same;
Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Possession; View that prior to the declaration of alienability, a
land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal
effects.—Possession is essentially a civil law term that can best be understood in terms of the Civil Code
in the absence of any specific definition in the PLA, other than in terms of time of possession. Article 530
of the Civil Code provides that “[o]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may
be the object of possession.” Prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain cannot
be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal effects. In fact, whether an
application for registration is filed before or after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if,
in one as in the other, no effective possession can be recognized prior to and within the proper period
for the declaration of alienability.568568SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines Separation of Powers; Statutes; View that if the Supreme
Court believes that a law already has absurd effects because of the passage of time, its role under the
principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an interpretation that is not there in order to
avoid the perceived absurdity.—If the Court believes that a law already has absurd effects because of
the passage of time, its role under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. If the Court does, it thereby
intrudes into the realm of policy — a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this
reason, the Court should avoid expanding — through the present ponencia and its cited cases — the
plain meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073. Same; Supreme Court; View that
the Supreme Court should be very careful in delineating the line between the constitutionally-allowed
interpretation and the prohibited judicial legislation, given the powers that the 1987 Constitution has
entrusted to this Court.—In the Philippines, a civil law country where the Constitution is very clear on
the separation of powers and the assignment of constitutional duties, I believe that this Court should be
very careful in delineating the line between the constitutionally-allowed interpretation and the
prohibited judicial legislation, given the powers that the 1987 Constitution has entrusted to this Court.
As a Court, we are given more powers than the U.S. Supreme Court; under Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, we are supposed to act, as a matter of duty, on any grave abuse of discretion that
occurs anywhere in government. While broad, this power should nevertheless be exercised with due
respect for the separation of powers doctrine that underlies our Constitution. Civil Law; Land
Registration; View that the act of registration merely confirms that title already exists in favor of the
applicant.—The act of registration merely confirms that title already exists in favor of the applicant. To
require classification of the property only on application for registration point would imply that during
the process of acquisition of title (specifically, during the period of possession prior to the application for
registration), the property might not have been alienable for being unclassified land (or a forest land
under PD No. 705) of the public domain. This claim totally contra- 569VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3,
2013569Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesvenes the constitutional rule that only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated. Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Property; Regalian Doctrine; View that our present Constitution does not contain the term,
“regalian doctrine.”—I do not agree that all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State or that lands remain part of the public domain if the State does not
reclassify or alienate it to a private person. These presumptions are expressions of the Regalian
Doctrine. Our present Constitution does not contain the term, “regalian doctrine.” What we have is
Article XII, Section 2, which provides: Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated x x x. Same; Same; View that there could be land,
considered as property, where ownership has vested as a result of either possession or prescription, but
still, as yet, undocumented.—Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
equal protection of the laws. This section protects all types of property. It does not limit its provisions to
property that is already covered by a form of paper title. Verily, there could be land, considered as
property, where ownership has vested as a result of either possession or prescription, but still, as yet,
undocumented. The original majority’s opinion in this case presents some examples. MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the resolution of the
Court. Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondent.
570570SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
PhilippinesR E S O L U T I O N BERSAMIN, J.: For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we
upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1)
or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree). Antecedents The
property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On
February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,
filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1 To prove that the property was an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification
dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
the _______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 16-17. 571VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013571Heirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the PhilippinesDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which reads: This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area
of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2 After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC
rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith
issue. SO ORDERED.3 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to _______________ 2 Id., at pp. 37-38. 3 Id., at p. 87. 572572SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that
the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only
on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanan’s period of possession. Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal
in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari. The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land.
In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable
and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that
the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere
obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact _______________
4 G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183. 5 G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
573VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013573Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines found
and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. The petitioners also rely
on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had
been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for
more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been “converted”
into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the
property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain. As
earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration In their
motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on
the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco
believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the
land with the right to validly transmit _______________ 6 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA
477. 7 G.R. No. 135527, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 716. 8 G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348
SCRA 128. 9 Supra note 6. 574574SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippinestitle and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on
February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from
1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State. The Republic’s Motion
for Partial Reconsideration The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto. Chiefly citing the
dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that
an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Ruling We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of
land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines. Classifications of land
according to ownership Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public
dominion or of private ownership.11 Land is _______________ 10 Article 415(1), Civil Code. 575VOL.
704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013575Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesconsidered of
public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for
public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land
that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of
private ownership if it belongs to a private individual. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a
legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.16 All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is
shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17 Classifications of public lands
according to alienability _______________ 11 Article 419, Civil Code. 12 Article 420, Civil Code. 13
Article 421, Civil Code. 14 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385,
December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128, 165. 15 Section 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. 16 Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-71285, November 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 412, 419. 17 Republic v. Lao,
G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 291, 298. 576576SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs
of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the PhilippinesWhether or not land of the public domain is alienable
and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under
the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications.
The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or
timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of _______________ 18 1935
Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 1. 19 Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461, 468 (1947). 20
Section 3 of Article XII, 1987 Constitution states: Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified
into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire
not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. Taking into account the
requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefore. 21 Id. 577VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3,
2013577Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippineslands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22 Based on
the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be. Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into
two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain,
or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in _______________ 22 See Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., pp.
1188-1189. 23 Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively. (345a) 24 Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. 32266, February 27, 1989,
170 SCRA 598, 608-609. 25 Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, No. L-27873, November 29,
1983, 126 SCRA 69, 75. 26 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA
689, 692. 578578SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises
its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no
longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable. Disposition of alienable public lands Section 11 of the Public Land Act
(CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit: Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise: (1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3)
By lease; and (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By judicial legalization; or (b)
By administrative legalization (free patent). The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly
requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz.: Section 48. The
following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
_______________ 27 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127060, November 19, 2002, 392 SCRA 190,
201. 579VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013579Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit: x x x x (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied) Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used
the words “lands of the public domain” or “alienable and disposable lands of the public domain” to
clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands
of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does
not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase “alienable and disposable” further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the
applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit: _______________ 28 Section 14. Who may
apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registra-
580580SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application; 2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious; 3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership; 4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June
12, 1945, or earlier; and 5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the
public domain. Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration
must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to
apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that
the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural. The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as
alienable and disposable agricultural land _______________ tion of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x x 581VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013581Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippines should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be
respected. We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should
best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June
12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators. Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified
as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is
derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it. Alienable
public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now
acquire _______________ 29 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December
29, 1986, 146 SCRA 509, 518. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in Manila Electric
Company v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, No. L-49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 799, 813. 582582SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law,
as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for
this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession. To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable. The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or
incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by
reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31 If one follows the dissent, the
clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands
_______________ 30 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29,
1986, 146 SCRA 509, 521. 31 Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, 428 (1925); Santos v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550, 560; Cruz v. Navarro, No. L-27644,
November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 109, 115. 583VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013583Heirs of Mario Malabanan
vs. Republic of the Philippines in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and
cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should
always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out,
when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent
requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants,
particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34 On the other hand, if a public land is
classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration
of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State,
the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the _______________ 32 x x x
WHEREAS, it has always been the policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting
of titles to unregistered lands including alienable and disposable lands of the public domain in favor of
qualified Filipino citizens who have acquired inchoate, imperfect and incomplete titles thereto by
reason of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation and cultivation thereof under
bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for a number of years prescribed by law; x x x (Presidential
Decree 1073). 33 An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands (Approved on
March 9, 2010). 34 Republic Act No. 10023 reduces the period of eligibility for titling from 30 years to
10 years of untitled public alienable and disposable lands which have been zoned as residential; and
enables the applicant to apply with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources having jurisdiction over the parcel subject of the
application, provided the land subject of the application should not exceed 200 square meters if it is in a
highly urbanized city, 500 meters in other cities, 750 meters in first-class and second-class
municipalities, and 1,000 meters in third-class municipalities. 584584SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the PhilippinesProperty Registration Decree.35 As
such, prescription can now run against the State. To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative
to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely: (1) As a general rule and
pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable.
Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed; (2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to
wit: (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application,
provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
govern- _______________ 35 Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives: x x x x (2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. 585VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3,
2013585Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesment grant arises,36 and the applicant
becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land
has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37 (b) Lands of the
public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed
through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in
observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription. To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land
since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession — possession
and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier — the
land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that
the land has remained ineligible for reg- _______________ 36 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
No. L-75042, November 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 165, 174. 37 Dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in
Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome, supra, note 29. 586586SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesistration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Sereno (CJ.),
Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., No part due to relationship to a party. Leonardo-De Castro, J., I submitted my vote joining
the Separate Opinion of Justice Brion. Brion, J., In the result: See Separate Opinion. Leonen, J., See
separate concurring and dissenting opinion. SEPARATE OPINION BRION, J.: Prefatory Statement This
Separate Opinion maintains my view that, on the merits, the petition should be denied, as the
petitioners, Heirs of Mario Malabanan, failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
have a right to the property applied for through either ordinary or extraordinary prescription. I share
this view with the majority; hence, the Court 587VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013587Heirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesis unanimous in the result in resolving the issue presented to
us for our resolution. As lawyers and Court watchers know, “unanimity in the result” carries a technical
meaning and implication in the lawyers’ world; the term denotes that differing views exist within the
Court to support the conclusion they commonly reached. The differences may be in the modality of
reaching the unanimous result, or there may just be differences in views on matters discussed within the
majority opinion. A little of both exists in arriving at the Court’s present result, although the latter type
of disagreement predominates. This Separate Opinion is submitted to state for the record my own (and
of those agreeing with me) view on the question of how Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and
Section 14(1) and (2) ofthe PRD should operate, particularly in relation with one another, with the
Constitution and with the Civil Code provisions on property and prescription. A critical point I make
relates to what I call the majority’s “absurdity argument” that played a major part in our actual
deliberations. The argument, to me, points to insufficiencies in our laws that the Court wishes to rectify
in its perennial quest “to do justice.” I firmly believe though that any insufficiency there may be —
particularly one that relates to the continuing wisdom of the law — is for the Legislature, not for this
Court, to correct in light of our separate and mutually exclusive roles under the Constitution. The Court
may be all-powerful within its own sphere, but the rule of law, specifically, the supremacy of the
Constitution, dictates that we recognize our own limitations and that we desist when a problem already
relates to the wisdom of the law before us. All we can do is point out the insufficiency, if any, for
possible legislative or executive action. It is largely in this sense that I believe our differing views on the
grant and disposition of lands of the public domain should be written and given the widest
circulation.588588SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines I wrap up this Prefatory Statement with a cautionary note on how the discussions in this
Resolution should be read and appreciated. Many of the divergent views expressed, both the majority’s
and mine, are not completely necessary for the resolution of the direct issues submitted to us; thus,
they are, under the given facts of the case and the presented and resolved issues, mostly obiter dicta.
On my part, I nevertheless present them for the reason I have given above, and as helpful aid for the law
practitioners and the law students venturing into the complex topic of public land grants, acquisitions,
and ownership. Preliminary Considerations As a preliminary matter, I submit that: 1. the hierarchy of
applicable laws must be given full application in considering lands of the public domain. Foremost in the
hierarchy is the Philippine Constitution (particularly its Article XII), followed by the applicable special
laws — Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA) and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529
or the Property Registration Decree (PRD). The Civil Code and other general laws apply suppletorily and
to the extent called for by the primary laws; and 2. the ponencia’s ruling that the classification of
public lands as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier is
incorrect because: a. under the Constitution’s Regalian Doctrine,1 classification is a required step
whose full import should be given full effect and recognition. The legal recognition of possession prior to
classification runs counter to, and effectively weakens, the Regalian Doctrine; _______________ 1
Constitution, Article XII, Section 2. 589VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013589Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippines b. the terms of the PLA only find full application from the time a land of the
public domain is classified as agricultural and declared alienable and disposable. Thus, the possession
required under Section 48(b) of this law cannot be recognized prior to the required classification and
declaration; c. under the Civil Code, “[o]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession.”2 Prior to the classification of a public land as alienable
and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated, hence, any claimed possession
prior to classification cannot have legal effects; d. there are other modes of acquiring alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under the PLA. This legal reality renders the ponencia’s absurdity
argument misplaced; and e. the alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law and is a
matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to address. In these lights, I submit that all previous
contrary rulings (particularly, Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals [Naguit]3) should — in the proper
case — be abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-flawed premises and as aberrations in
land registration jurisprudence. I. THE LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC LANDS I likewise submit the following
short overview as an aide memoire in understanding our basic public land laws. _______________ 2
Civil Code, Article 530. 3 489 Phil. 405; 448 SCRA 442 (2005). 590590SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines A. The Overall Scheme at a
Glance 1. The Philippine Constitution The Philippine Constitution is the fountainhead of the laws and
rules relating to lands of the public domain in the Philippines. It starts with the postulate that all lands
of the public domain — classified into agricultural, forests or timber, mineral lands and national parks —
are owned by the State.4 This principle states the Regalian Doctrine, and classifies land according to its
nature and alienability. By way of exception to the Regalian Doctrine, the Constitution also expressly
states that “[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands [which may be further classified by law according
to the uses to which they may be devoted],5 all other natural resources shall not be alienated.”6
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.7 2. The Public Land Act How
and to what extent agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated and may pass into private
or non-State hands are determined under the PLA, which governs the classification, grant, and
disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and, other than the Constitution, is
the country’s primary substantive law on the matter. As a rule, alienation and disposition of lands of the
public domain are exercises in determining: _______________ 4 Constitution, Article XII, Sections 2 and
3. 5 Constitution, Article XII, Section 3. 6 Constitution, Article XII, Section 2. 7 Constitution, Article XII,
Section 3. 591VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013591Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines
a. whether a public land is or has been classified as agricultural (in order to take the land out of the
mass of lands of the public domain that, by the terms of the Constitution, is inalienable); b. once
classified as agricultural, whether it has been declared by the State to be alienable and disposable. To
reiterate, even agricultural lands, prior to their declaration as alienable, are part of the inalienable lands
of the public domain; and c. whether the terms of classification, alienation or disposition have been
complied with. In a confirmation of imperfect title, there must be possession since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious manner, by the applicant himself or by his
predecessor-in-interest, of public agricultural land that since that time has been declared alienable and
disposable, as clearly provided under PD No. 1073. The Civil Code provides that “[o]nly things and rights
which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession.”8 Prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated, hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal effects; d. upon compliance with the
required period and character of possession of alienable public agricultural land, the possessor acquires
ownership, thus converting the land to one of private ownership and entitling the applicant-possessor to
confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the PLA and registration under Section 14(1) of the PRD. 3.
Classification under the Civil Code _______________ 8 Civil Code, Article 530. 592592SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines Separately from the
classification according to the nature of land under the Constitution, another system of classification of
property is provided under the Civil Code. The Civil Code classifies property (as a general term,
compared to land which is only a species of property, labeled under the Civil Code as immovable
property9) in relation with the person to whom it belongs.10 Property under the Civil Code may belong
to the public dominion (or property pertaining to the State for public use, for public service or for the
development of the national wealth)11 or it may be of private ownership (which classification includes
patrimonial property or property held in private ownership by the State).12 Significantly, the Civil Code
expressly provides that “[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.”13 What is otherwise a simple
classification from the point of view of the person owning it, assumes a measure of complexity when the
property is land of the public domain, as the Constitution, in unequivocal terms, requires classification
and declarations on the means and manner of granting, alienating, disposing, and acquiring lands of the
public domain that all originally belong to the State under the Regalian Doctrine. In a reconciled
consideration of the Constitution and the Civil Code classifications, made necessary because they have
their respective independent focuses and purposes, certain realities will have to be recognized or
deduced: _______________ 9 Civil Code, Article 414. 10 Civil Code, Article 419. 11 Civil Code, Article
420; Arturo Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II
– Property (1992 ed.), p. 30. 12 Civil Code, Articles 421 and 422. 13 Civil Code, Article 422. 593VOL. 704,
SEPTEMBER 3, 2013593Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines First. As a first
principle, in case of any conflict, the terms of the Constitution prevail. No ifs and buts can be admitted
with respect to this recognition, as the Constitution is supreme over any other law or legal instrument in
the land. Second. A necessary corollary to the first principle is that all substantive considerations of
land ownership, alienation, or disposition must always take into account the constitutional
requirements. Third. The classification and the requirements under the Constitution and under the Civil
Code may overlap without any resulting violation of the Constitution. A piece of land may fall under
both classifications (i.e., under the constitutional classification based on the legal nature of the land and
alienability, and under the civil law classification based on the ownership of the land). This can best be
appreciated in the discussion below, under the topic “The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription.”14 4.
Prescription under the Civil Code Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is a mode of acquiring
ownership provided under the Civil Code,15 but is not mentioned as one of the modes of acquiring
ownership of alienable public lands of the public domain under the PLA.16 A point of distinction that
should be noted is that the PLA, under its Section 48(b), provides for a system that allows possession
since June 12, 1945 or earlier to ripen into ownership. The PLA, however, does not refer to this mode as
acquisitive prescription but as basis for confirmation of title, and requires a specified period of
possession of alienable agricultural land, not the periods for ordinary or extraordi- _______________ 14
See: discussion below at p. 17 hereof. 15 See Civil Code, Articles 712 and 1106. 16 PLA, Section 11.
Philippinesnary prescription required under the Civil Code. Ownership that vests under Section 48(b) of
the PLA can be registered under Section 14(1) of the PRD. The PRD, under its Section 14(2), recognizes
that registration of title can take place as soon as ownership over private land has vested due to
prescription — “[t]hose who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.” Thus, prescription was introduced into the PRD land registration scheme but
not into the special law governing the grant and alienation of lands of the public domain, i.e., the PLA.
An important provision that should not be missed in considering prescription is Article 1108 of the Civil
Code, which states that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. Article 1113 of
the Civil Code is a companion provision stating that “[a]ll things which are within the commerce of men
are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.” The above-cited rules
express civil law concepts, but their results are effectively replicated in the scheme governing lands of
the public domain since these lands, by constitutional fiat, cannot be alienated and are thus outside the
commerce of man, except under the rigid terms of the Constitution and the PLA. For example,
confirmation of imperfect title — the possession-based rule under the PLA — can only take place with
respect to agricultural lands already declared alienable and possessed for the required period (since
June 12, 1945 or earlier). 5. The PRD The PRD was issued in 1978 to update the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496) and relates solely to the registration of property. The law does not provide the means for
595VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013595Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesacquiring
title to land; it refers solely to the means or procedure of registering and rendering indefeasible title
already acquired. The PRD mainly governs the registration of lands and places them under the Torrens
System. It does not, by itself, create title nor vest one. It simply confirms a title already created and
already vested, rendering it forever indeafeasible.17 In a side by side comparison, the PLA is the
substantive law that classifies and provides for the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain.
On the other hand, the PRD refers to the manner of bringing registerable title to lands, among them,
alienable public lands, within the coverage of the Torrens system; in terms of substantive content, the
PLA must prevail.18 On this consideration, only land of the public domain that has passed into private
ownership under the terms of the PLA can be registered under the PRD. II. THE CASE AND THE
ANTECEDENT FACTS _______________ 17 Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and
Related Laws (2006 ed.), pp. 14-15. 18 Substantive law is that which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, that part of the law
which courts are established to administer, as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion (Primicias v. Ocampo, etc., et al., 93
Phil. 446). It is the nature and the purpose of the law which determine whether it is substantive or
procedural, and not its place in the statute, or its inclusion in a code (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Volume I [Ninth Revised Edition], p. 19). Note that Section 51 of the PLA refers to the
Land Registration Act (the predecessor law of the PRD) on how the Torrens title may be obtained when
an alienable land of public domain is acquired through the substantive right recognized under Section
48 of the PLA. 596596SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of
the Philippines The Case. Before the Court are the motions separately filed by the petitioners and by the
respondent Republic of the Philippines, both of them seeking reconsideration of the Court’s Decision
dated April 29, 2009 which denied the petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The Underlying Facts The present case traces its roots to the land registration case
instituted by the petitioners’ predecessor, Mario Malabanan (Malabanan). On February 20, 1998,
Malabanan filed an application for the registration of a 71,324-square meter land, located in Barangay
Tibig, Silang, Cavite, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite — Tagaytay City, Branch 18.19
Malabanan alleged that he purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. The property was originally
part of a 22-hectare land owned by Lino Velazco (Velazco), who was succeeded by his four sons, among
them, Eduardo Velazco.20 Apart from his purchase of the property, Malabanan anchored his
registration petition on his and his predecessors-in-interest’s open, notorious, continuous, adverse and
peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. Malabanan claimed that the land is an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, presenting as proof the Certification dated June 11, 2001 of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. The Certification stated that the land was “verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established _______________ 19 See Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, 181. 20 Ibid. 597VOL. 704,
SEPTEMBER 3, 2013597Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesunder Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.”21 The Issue Before the Court. In their
motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on
the rulings in Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos,22 Menguito v. Republic,23 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,24 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Velazco, believing
in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land, with
the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the 10-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation with Section 14(2) of the PRD, applied in their
favor; and that when Malabanan filed his application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years, reckoned from 1982, the time when the land
was declared inalienable and disposable by the State. The respondent seeks the partial reconsideration
in order to seek clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Republic of
the Phils. v. Herbieto.25 It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the
land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945.
_______________ 21 Id., at p. 182; emphases and underscores ours. 22 397 Phil. 799; 343 SCRA 716
(2000). 23 401 Phil. 274; 348 SCRA 128 (2000). 24 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477. 25 498
Phil. 227; 459 SCRA 183 (2005). 598598SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines As presented in the petition and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration, the direct issue before the Court is whether there had been acquisition of title, based
on ordinary or extraordinary prescription, over a land of the public domain declared alienable as of
March 15, 1982. The issue was not about confirmation of an imperfect title where possession started on
or before June 12, 1945 since possession had not been proven to have dated back to or before that
date. The Antecedents and the Ruling under Review On December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
favoring Malabanan, approving his application for registration of the land “under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or PD 1529.”26 The respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed the RTC decision with the Court of Appeals (CA). The OSG contended that Malabanan
failed to prove: (1) that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and (2) that he had not been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. During the pendency of the appeal before the
CA, Malabanan died and was substituted by the petitioners. In its decision dated February 23, 2007, the
CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed Malabanan’s application for registration. Applying the
Court’s ruling in Herbieto, the CA held that “under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any
period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of _______________ 26
Id., at p. 5. 599VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013599Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippinespossession.”27 Since the land was classified as alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, any possession prior to this date cannot be considered. The petitioners assailed the CA decision
before this Court through a petition for review on certiorari. On April 29, 2009, the Court denied the
petition. The Court’s majority (through Justice Dante Tinga) summarized its ruling as follows: (1) In
connection with Section 14(1) of the PRD, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms
that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a)
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. (b) The right to
register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public do- _______________ 27 See Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic, supra note 19, at p. 183. 600600SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesmain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription
by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for
at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Uner extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.28 Based on this ruling, the majority denied
the petition, but established the above rules which embody principles contrary to Section 48(b) of the
PLA and which are not fully in accord with the concept of prescription under Section 14(2) of the PRD, in
relation with the Civil Code provisions on property and prescription. _______________ 28 Id., at pp.
210-211; italics supplied, emphases ours, citation omitted. 601VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013601Heirs of
Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines In its ruling on the present motions for reconsideration,
the ponencia essentially affirms the above ruling, rendering this Separate Opinion and its conclusions
necessary. III. DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENTED ISSUES A. Section 48(b) of the PLA: Confirmation of
Imperfect Title Section 48(b) of the PLA is the core provision on the confirmation of imperfect title and
must be read with its related provision in order to fully be appreciated. Section 7 of the PLA delegates to
the President the authority to administer and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the
public lands open to disposition or concession, and the requirement that they should be officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant provision, states
that — Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise: (1) For homestead settlement (2) By sale (3) By lease (4) By confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title: (a) By judicial legalization (b) By administrative legalization (free
patent). [emphases ours] Finally, Section 48 of the PLA, on confirmation of imperfect title, embodies a
grant of title to the qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land, under the following
terms: Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or 602602SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit: (a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the x x x
United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have[,] with or without default upon their part, or for any
other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied
and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications. (b) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural
minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled
to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof. [emphasis ours] Subsection (a) has now been deleted,
while subsection (b) has been amended by PD No. 1073 as follows:603VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3,
2013603Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines Section 4. The provisions of Section
48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru
his predecessor-in-interest, under a [bona fide] claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Based on these provisions and a narrow reading of the “since June 12, 1945” timeline, the ponencia now
rules that the declaration that the land is agricultural and alienable can be made at the time of
application for registration and need not be from June 12, 1945 or earlier.29 This conclusion follows the
ruling in Naguit (likewise penned by Justice Tinga) that additionally argued that reckoning the
declarations from June 12, 1945 leads to absurdity. For the reasons outlined below, I cannot agree with
these positions and with the Naguit ruling on which it is based: First. The constitutional and statutory
reasons. The Constitution classifies public lands into agricultural, mineral, timber lands and national
parks. Of these, only agricultural lands can be alienated.30 Without the requisite classification, there can
be no basis to determine which lands of the public domain are alienable and which are not. Hence,
classification is a constitutionally-required step whose importance should be given full legal recognition
and effect. Otherwise stated, without classification into disposable agricultural land, the land continues
to form part of the mass of the public domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral, timber land
or national parks that are completely inalienable and, as such, cannot be possessed with legal effects. To
recognize possession prior to any classifica- _______________ 29 Ponencia, pp. 11-12. 30 Constitution,
Article XII, Section 3. 604604SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippinestion is to do violence to the Regalian Doctrine; the ownership and control that
the Regalian Doctrine embodies will be less than full if the possession — that should be with the State as
owner, but is also elsewhere without any solid legal basis — can anyway be recognized. Note in this
regard that the terms of the PLA do not find full application until a classification into alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain is made. In this situation, possession cannot be claimed
under Section 48(b) of the PLA. Likewise, no imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such classification, the land remains
unclassified public land that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10 of the PLA.31 If the _______________ 31 Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into — (a) Alienable or disposable; (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time
and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition. Section 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act. Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and
which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government,
nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the President may, for rea- 605VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3,
2013605Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines land is either mineral, timber or
national parks that cannot be alienated, it defies legal logic to recognize that possession of these
unclassified lands can produce legal effects. Parenthetically, PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code
states that “Those [lands of public domain] still to be classified under the present system shall continue
to remain as part of the public forest.”32 It further declares that public forest covers “the mass of lands
of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purposes and which are not.”33 _______________
sons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have
had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their
concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession or disposition by
proclamation duly published or by Act of the National Assembly. Section 9. For the purpose of their
administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be
classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows: (a)
Agricultural (b) Residential commercial industrial or for similar productive purposes (c) Educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes (d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses. The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar
manner, transfer lands from one class to another. Section 10. The words “alienation,” “disposition,”
or “concession” as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the
acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral lands.
32 PD No. 705, Section 13. 33 PD No. 705, Section 3(a). 606606SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the PhilippinesThus, PD No. 705 confirms that all
lands of the public domain that remain unclassified are considered as forest land.34 As forest land,
these lands of the public domain cannot be alienated until they have been reclassified as agricultural
lands. For purposes of the present case, these terms confirm the position that re/classification is
essential at the time possession is acquired under Section 48(b) of the PLA. From these perspectives, the
legal linkage between (1) the classification of public land as alienable and disposable and (2) effective
possession that can ripen into a claim under Section 48(b) of the PLA can readily be appreciated. The
Leonen Opinion Incidentally, Justice Marvic F. Leonen opines in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
that the Regalian Doctrine was not incorporated in our Constitution and that “there could be land,
considered as property, where ownership has vested as a result of either possession or prescription but
still, as yet undocumented.”35 I will respond to this observation that, although relating to the nature of
the land applied for (land of the public domain) and to the Regalian Doctrine, still raises aspects of these
matters that are not exactly material to the direct issues presented in the present case. I respond to
correct for the record and at the earliest opportunity what I consider to be an erroneous view. The
Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in all the Constitutions of the Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and
the statutes governing private individuals’ land acquisition and regis- _______________ 34 Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. Nos. 167707 and 173775, October 8,
2008, 568 SCRA 164, 200. 35 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic Mario Victor F.
Leonen, p. 2. 607VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013607Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippinestration. In his Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Natural Resources,36
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno made a brief yet informative historical discussion on how the
Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in our legal system, especially in all our past and present organic
laws. His historical disquisition was quoted in La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos37
and the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the DENR et al. v. Yap and Sacay et al. v. The Secretary of
the DENR,38 which were also quoted in Justice Lucas P. Bersamin’s Separate Opinion in his very brief
discussion on how the doctrine was carried over from our Spanish and American colonization up until
our present legal system. Insofar as our organic laws are concerned, La Bugal-B’laan confirms that: one
of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention [was the nationalization
and conservation of the natural resources of the country.] There was an overwhelming sentiment in the
Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the
Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.
The delegates [to] the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of
land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it
was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provi-
_______________ 36 400 Phil. 904; 347 SCRA 128 (2000). 37 465 Phil. 860; 421 SCRA 148 (2004). 38
Supra note 34. 607VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013607Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippinession in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. x x x x On January 17, 1973, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new Constitution. Article XIV on the
National Economy and Patrimony contained provisions similar to the 1935 Constitution with regard to
Filipino participation in the nation’s natural resources. Section, 8, Article XIV thereof[.] x x x x The 1987
Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine. The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII states: “All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State.”39 In these lights, I believe that, at this point in our legal history, there can be no question
that the Regalian Doctrine remains in the pure form interpreted by this Court; it has resiliently endured
throughout our colonial history, was continually confirmed in all our organic laws, and is presently
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of our present Constitution. Short of a constitutional amendment duly
ratified by the people, the views and conclusions of this Court on the Regalian Doctrine should not and
cannot be changed. Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil law term that can best
be understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any specific definition in the PLA, other than
in terms of time of possession.40 Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that “[o]nly things and rights
which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession.” Prior to the declaration of
alienabil- _______________ 39 Supra note 37, at pp. 903-919; pp. 191-206; citations omitted. 40 Civil
Code, Article 18. 609VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013609Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippinesity, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession
cannot have legal effects. In fact, whether an application for registration is filed before or after the
declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the other, no effective possession can be
recognized prior to and within the proper period for the declaration of alienability. To express this
position in the form of a direct question: How can possession before the declaration of alienability be
effective when the land then belonged to the State against whom prescription does not run? Third.
Statutory construction and the cut-off date — June 12, 1945. The ponencia concludes — based on its
statutory construction reasoning and reading of Section 48(b) of the PLA — that the June 12, 1945 cut-
off is only required for purposes of possession and that it suffices if the land has been classified as
alienable agricultural land at the time of application for registration.41 This cut-off date was
painstakingly set by law and its full import appears from PD No. 1073 that amended Section 48(b) of the
PLA. While the resulting Section 48(b) of the PLA did not expressly state what PD No. 1073 introduced in
terms of exact wording, PD No. 1073 itself, as formulated, shows the intent to count the alienability
from June 12, 1945. To quote the exact terms of PD No. 1073: Section 4. The provisions of Section
48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru
his predecessor-in-interest, under a [bona fide] claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
[emphases and underscores ours] _______________ 41 Ponencia, p. 11. 610610SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the PhilippinesIn reading this provision,
it has been claimed that June 12, 1945 refers only to the required possession and not to the declaration
of alienability of the land applied for. The terms of PD No. 1073, however, are plain and clear even from
the grammatical perspective alone. The term “since June 12, 1945” is unmistakably separated by a
comma from the conditions of both alienability and possession, thus, plainly showing that it refers to
both alienability and possession. This construction — showing the direct, continuous and seamless
linking of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945 under the wording of
the Decree — is clear and should be respected, particularly if read with the substantive provisions on
ownership of lands of the public domain and the limitations that the law imposes on possession.
Fourth. Other modes of acquisition of lands under the PLA. The cited Naguit’s absurdity argument that
the ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent than real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off
date for the declaration of alienability will not render the grant of alienable public lands out of reach.
The acquisition of ownership and title may still be obtained by other modes under the PLA. Among other
laws, Republic Act (RA) No. 6940 allowed the use of free patents.42 It was _______________ 42 Section
1. Paragraph 1, Section 44, Chapter VII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows: “Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the
owner of more than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity
of this amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, who shall
have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to 611VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013611Heirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years
backwards, possession since April 1960 or thereabouts qualified a possessor to apply for a free
patent.43 Additionally, the other administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA are still
open, particularly, homestead settlement, sales and lease. Incidentally, the ponencia mentions RA No.
10023, entitled “An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands,” in its
discussions.44 This statute, however, has no relevance to the present case because its terms apply to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain (necessarily agricultural lands under the
Constitution) that have been reclassified as residential under Section 9(b) of the PLA.45
_______________ have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed
twelve (12) hectares.” 43 Under RA No. 9176, applications for free patents may be made up to
December 31, 2020. 44 Ponencia, p. 10. 45 Section 9. For the purpose of their administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according
to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows: (a) Agricultural (b) Residential
commercial industrial or for similar productive purposes (c) Educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes (d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. [emphasis ours] Note
that the classification and concession of residential lands are governed by Title III of the PLA; Title II
refers to agricultural lands. The ponente mentioned RA No. 10023 in support of his opinion on the
government’s policy of adjudicating and quieting titles to unregistered lands (p. 13). He claims that the
grant of public lands should be liberalized to support this policy (citing the Whereas clause of PD No.
1073, which states: “it has always been the policy of 612612SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the PhilippinesFifth. Addressing the wisdom — or
the absurdity — of the law. This Court acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated
separation of powers in giving Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073, an interpretation
beyond its plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not there even if the
purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If the Court believes that a law already has absurd effects
because of the passage of time, its role under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law
an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. If the Court does, it thereby
intrudes into the realm of policy — a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this
reason, the Court should avoid expanding — through the present ponencia and its cited cases — the
plain meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073. In the United States where the
governing constitutional rule is likewise the separation of powers between the Legislative and the
Judiciary, Justice Antonin Scalia (in the book Reading Law co-authored with Bryan A. Garner) made the
pithy observation that: _______________ the State to hasten settlement, adjudication and quieting of
title of titles to unregistered lands); thus, his interpretation that classification of the land as agricultural
may be made only at the time of registration and not when possession commenced. To be entitled to a
grant under RA No. 10023, the law states: “…the applicant thereof has, either by himself or through his
predecessor-ininterest, actually resided on and continuously possessed and occupied, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, the [residential] land applied for at least ten (10) years and has
complied with the requirements prescribed in Section 1 hereof…” Notably, this requirements are not
new as they are similar (except for the period) to those required under Section 48(b) of the PLA on
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. 613VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013613Heirs of Mario Malabanan
vs. Republic of the Philippines To the extent that people give this view any credence, the notion that
judges may (even should) improvise on constitutional and statutory text enfeebles the democratic
polity. As Justice John Marshall Harlan warned in the 1960s, an invitation to judicial lawmaking results
inevitably in “a lessening, on the one hand, of judicial independence and, on the other, of legislative
responsibility, thus polluting the bloodstream of our system of government.” Why these alarming
outcomes? First, when judges fashion law rather than fairly derive it from governing texts, they subject
themselves to intensified political pressures – in the appointment process, in their retention, and in the
arguments made to them. Second, every time a court constitutionalizes a new sliver of law – as by
finding a “new constitutional right” to do this, that, or the other – that sliver becomes thenceforth
untouchable by the political branches. In the American system, a legislature has no power to abridge a
right that has been authoritatively held to be part of the Constitution – even if that newfound right does
not appear in the text. Over the past 50 years especially, we have seen the judiciary incrementally take
control of larger and larger swaths of territory that ought to be settled legislatively. It used to be said
that judges do not “make” law – they simply apply it. In the 20th century, the legal realists convinced
everyone that judges do indeed make law. To the extent that this was true, it was knowledge that the
wise already possessed and the foolish could not be trusted with. It was true, that is, that judges did
not really “find” the common law but invented it over time. Yet this notion has been stretched into a
belief that judges “make” law through judicial interpretation of democratically enacted statutes.
Consider the following statement by John P. Dawson, intended to apply to statutory law: It seems to us
inescapable that judges should have a part in creating law – creating it as they apply it. In deciding the
multifarious disputes that are brought before them, we believe that judges in any legal system in-
Philippinesvariably adapt legal doctrines to new situations and thus give them new content. Now it is
true that in a system such as ours, in which judicial decisions have a stare decisis effect, a court’s
application of a statute to a “new situation” can be said to establish the law applicable to that situation
– that is, to pronounce definitively whether and how the statute applies to that situation. But
establishing this retail application of the statute is probably not what Dawson meant by “creating law,”
“adapt[ing] legal doctrines,” and “giv[ing] them new content.” Yet beyond that retail application, good
judges dealing with statutes do not make law. They do not “give new content” to the statute, but
merely apply the content that has been there all along, awaiting application to myriad factual
scenarios. To say that they “make law” without this necessary qualification is to invite the taffy-like
stretching of words – or the ignoring of words altogether. 46 In the Philippines, a civil law country
where the Constitution is very clear on the separation of powers and the assignment of constitutional
duties, I believe that this Court should be very careful in delineating the line between the
constitutionally-allowed interpretation and the prohibited judicial legislation, given the powers that the
1987 Constitution has entrusted to this Court. As a Court, we are given more powers than the U.S.
Supreme Court; under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, we are supposed to act, as a
matter of duty, on any grave abuse of discretion that occurs anywhere in government. While broad, this
power should nevertheless be exercised with due respect for the separation of powers doctrine that
underlies our Constitution. B. Registration under Section 14(1) and (2) of the PRD Complementing the
substance that the PLA provides are the provisions of the PRD that set out the registration of
the_______________46 Id., at pp. 4-6; citations omitted.615VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013615Heirs of
Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines title that has accrued under the PLA. Section 14 of the
PRD provides: SEC. 14. Who May Apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the existing laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land
in any other manner provided for by law. [emphasis and italics ours]As mentioned earlier, the PLA is the
substantive law on the grant and disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the
other hand, sets out the manner of bringing registrable lands, among them alienable public lands, within
the coverage of the Torrens system. In this situation, in terms of substantive content, the PLA should
prevail. 1. Section 14(1) of the PRD is practically a reiteration of Section 48(b) of the PLA, with the
difference that they govern two different aspects of confirmation of imperfect title relating to alienable
lands of the public domain. The PLA has its own substantive focus, while Section 14(1) of the PRD,
bearing on the same matter, defines what title may be registered. For this reason, the discussions of
Section 48(b) apply616616SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippines with equal force, mutatis mutandis, to Section 14(1) of the PRD. 2. Section
14(2) of the PRD is another matter. By its express terms, the prescription that it speaks of applies only to
private lands. Thus, on plain reading, Section 14(2) should not apply to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain that Section 14(1) covers. This is the significant difference between Sections 14(1) and
14(2). The former — Section 14(1) — is relevant when the ownership of an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain vests in the occupant or possessor under the terms of Section 48(b) of the PLA,
even without the registration of a confirmed title since the land ipso jure becomes a private land.
Section 14(2), on the other hand, applies to situations when ownership of private lands vests on the
basis of prescription. The prescription that Section 14(2) of the PRD speaks of finds no application to
alienable lands of the public domain —specifically, to Section 48(b) of the PLA since this provision, as
revised by PD No. 1073 in January 1977, simply requires possession and occupation since June 12, 1945
or earlier, regardless of the period the property was occupied (although when PD No. 1073 was enacted
in 1977, the property would have been possessed for at least 32 years by the claimant if his possession
commenced exactly on June 12, 1945, or longer if possession took place earlier). Parenthetically, my
original April 29, 2009 Opinion stated that the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 appeared to be devoid of
legal significance as far as the PLA was concerned. This statement notwithstanding, it should be
appreciated that prior to PD No. 1073, Section 48(b) of the PLA required a 30-year period of possession.
This 30-year period was a requirement imposed under RA No. 1942 in June 1957, under the following
provision: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive617VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013617Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure[.] When PD
No. 1073 was enacted in 1977, it was recognized that a claimant who had possessed the property for at
least 30 years (in compliance with RA No. 1942) might not be entitled to confirmation of title under PD
No. 1073 because his possession commenced only after June 12, 1945. This possibility constituted a
violation of his vested rights that should be avoided. To resolve this dilemma, the Court, in Abejaron v.
Nabasa,47 opined that where an application has satisfied the requirements of Section 48(b) of the PLA,
as amended by RA No. 1942 (prior to the effectivity of PD No. 1073), the applicant is entitled to perfect
his or her title even if possession and occupation do not date back to June 12, 1945.What this leads up
to is that possession of land “for the required statutory period” becomes significant only when the claim
of title is based on the amendment introduced by RA No. 1942. The 30-year period introduced by RA No.
1942 “did not refer or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription.”48 In fact, in The
Director of Lands v. IAC49 and the opinion of Justice Claudio Teehankee in Manila Electric Co. v. Judge
Castro-Bartolome, etc., et al.,50 cited by the ponencia,51 both pertained to the RA No. 1942
amendment; it was in this sense that both rulings stated that mere lapse or completion of the required
period converts alienable land to private property._______________47 411 Phil. 552, 569-570; 359
SCRA 47, 61-62 (2001). 48 Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, supra note 19, at p. 201. 49 230 Phil.
590; 146 SCRA 509 (1986). 50 200 Phil. 284; 114 SCRA 799 (1982). 51 Ponencia, p. 12.618618SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines In sum, if the
claimant is asserting his vested right under the RA No. 1942 amendment, then it would be correct to
declare that the lapse of the required statutory period converts alienable land to private property ipso
jure. Otherwise, if the claimant is asserting a right under the PD No. 1073 amendment, then he needs to
prove possession of alienable public land as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. Although a claimant may have
possessed the property for 30 years or more, if his possession commenced after January 24, 1947 (the
adjusted date based on Abejaron), the property would not be converted into private property by the
mere lapse of time. 3. As a last point, the ponencia effectively claims52 that the classification of
property as agricultural land is only necessary at the time of application for registration of title. This is
completely erroneous. The act of registration merely confirms that title already exists in favor of the
applicant. To require classification of the property only on application for registration point would imply
that during the process of acquisition of title (specifically, during the period of possession prior to the
application for registration), the property might not have been alienable for being unclassified land (or a
forest land under PD No. 705) of the public domain. This claim totally contravenes the constitutional rule
that only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated. To translate all these arguments to
the facts of the present case, the land applied for was not classified as alienable on or before June 12,
1945 and was indisputably only classified as alienable only on March 15, 1982. Under these facts, the
ponencia still asserts that following the Naguit ruling, possession of the non-classified land during the
material period would still comply with Section 48(b) of the PLA, provided that there is already a
classification at the time of application for registration. _______________52 Id., at p. 10.619VOL. 704,
SEPTEMBER 3, 2013619Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines This claim involves
essential contradiction in terms as only a land that can already be registered under Section 48(b) of the
PLA can be registered under Section 14(1) of the PRD. Additionally, the ponencia, in effect, confirmed
that possession prior to declaration of alienability can ripen into private ownership of a land that, under
the Constitution, the PLA, and even the Civil Code, is not legally allowed. The ponencia’s position all the
more becomes legally preposterous if PD No. 705 is considered. To recall, this Decree states that all
lands of the public domain that remain unclassified are considered forest lands that cannot be alienated
until they have been reclassified as agricultural lands and declared alienable.53 Applying this law to the
facts of the present case, the land applied for, prior to March 15, 1982, must have still been forest land
that, under the Constitution, cannot be alienated. The deeper hole that the ponencia digs for itself in
recognizing possession prior to declaration of alienability becomes apparent when it now cites Naguit as
its authority. Unnoticed perhaps by the ponencia, Naguit itself explicitly noted PD No. 705 and expressly
and unabashedly pronounced that “[a] different rule obtains for forest lands, such as those which form
part of a reservation for provincial park purposes the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forestland cannot be owned by private
persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals, forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.”54 How the ponencia would square this Naguit statement with the
realities of PD No. 705 and its present ruling would_______________53 Id., at p. 6. 54 Supra note 3, at
pp. 415-416; p. 450; citations omitted, italics and emphasis ours.620620SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines be an interesting exercise to
watch. It would, to say the least, be in a very confused position as it previously confirmed in Naguit the
very same basic precept of law that it now debunks in its present ruling, citing the same Naguit ruling. C.
The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription In reading all the provisions of Book II of the Civil Code on the
classification of property based on the person to whom it belongs, it should not be overlooked that
these provisions refer to properties in general, i.e., to both movable and immovable properties.55 Thus,
the Civil Code provisions on property do not refer to land alone, much less do they refer solely to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. For this latter specie of property, the PLA is the
special governing law and, under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in case of
deficiency.56 Whether, as in the present case, land of the public domain can be granted and registered
on the basis of extraordinary prescription (i.e., possession by the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest for a period of at least 30 years), the obvious answer is that the application can only effectively
be allowed upon compliance with the PLA’s terms. Classification as agricultural land must first take place
to remove the land from its status as a land of the public domain and a declaration of alienability must
likewise be made to render the land available or susceptible to alienation; the required possession, of
course, has to follow and only upon completion does the land pass to “private” hands. Whether land
classified as “agricultural” and declared “alienable and disposable” can already be considered “patri-
_______________55 Civil Code, Article 419, in relation to Article 414. 56 Civil Code, Article 18, which
states that “In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency
shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.”621VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013621Heirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesmonial” property does not yield to an easy answer as these
concepts involve different classification systems as discussed above. To be sure, the classification and
declaration of a public land as alienable public agricultural land do not transfer the land into private
hands nor divest it of the character of being State property that can only be acquired pursuant to the
terms of the PLA. Separate from this requirement, a property — although already declared alienable and
disposable — may conceivably still be held by the State or by any of its political subdivisions or agencies
for public use or public service under the terms of the Civil Code. In this latter case, the property cannot
be considered patrimonial that is subject to acquisitive prescription. Based on these considerations, the
two concepts of “disposable land of the public domain” and “patrimonial property” cannot directly be
equated with one another. The requirements for their acquisition, however, must both be satisfied
before they can pass to private hands. An inevitable related question is the manner of enforcing Article
422 of the Civil Code that “[p]roperty of the public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State,” in light of the implication that
patrimonial property may be acquired through prescription under Article 1113 of the Civil Code
(“Property of the State or any of its subdivision not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription”). This position, incidentally, is what the original decision in this case claims. A first simple
answer is that the Civil Code provisions must yield when considered in relation with the PLA and its
requirements. In other words, when the property involved is a land of the public domain, the
consideration that it is not for public use or for public service, or its patrimonial character, initially
becomes immaterial; any grant or alienation must first comply with the mandates of the Constitution on
lands of622622SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines the public domain and with the requirements of the PLA as a priority requirement. Thus, if
the question is whether such land, considered patrimonial solely under the terms of Article 422 of the
Civil Code, can be acquired through prescription, the prior questions of whether the land is already
alienable under the terms of the Constitution and the PLA and whether these terms have been complied
with must first be answered. If the response is negative, then any characterization under Article 422 of
the Civil Code is immaterial; only upon compliance with the terms of the Constitution and the PLA can
Article 422 of the Civil Code be given full force. If the land is already alienable, Article 422 of the Civil
Code, when invoked, can only be complied with on the showing that the property is no longer intended
for public use or public service. For all these reasons, alienable and disposable agricultural land cannot
be registered under Section 14(2) of the PRD solely because it is already alienable and disposable. The
alienability must be coupled with the required declaration under Article 422 of the Civil Code if the land
is claimed to be patrimonial and possession under Section 14(2) of the PRD is invoked as basis for
registration. As an incidental matter, note that this PRD provision is no longer necessary for the
applicant who has complied with the required possession under Section 48(b) of the PLA (i.e., that there
had been possession since June 12, 1945); he or she does not need to invoke Section 14(2) of the PRD as
registration is available under Section 14(1) of the PRD. On the other hand, if the required period for
possession under Section 48(b) of the PLA (or Section 14[1] of the PRD) did not take place, then the
applicant’s recourse would still be under the PLA through its other available modes (because a land of
the public domain is involved), but not under its Section 48(b). Section 14(2) of the PRD will apply only
after the land is deemed to be “private” or has passed through one of the modes of grant and
acquisition under the PLA, and after the623VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013623Heirs of Mario Malabanan
vs. Republic of the Philippines requisite time of possession has passed, counted from the time the land is
deemed or recognized to be private. In short, Section 14(2) of the PLA only becomes available to a
possessor of land already held or deemed to be in private ownership and only after such possessor
complies with the requisite terms of ordinary or extraordinary prescription. In considering compliance
with the required possession, possession prior to the declaration of alienability cannot of course be
recognized or given legal effect, as already extensively discussed above. To go back and directly answer
now the issue that the petitioners directly pose in this case, no extraordinary prescription can be
recognized in their favor as their effective possession could have started only after March 15, 1982.
Based on the reasons and conclusions in the above discussion, they have not complied with the legal
requirements, either from the point of view of the PLA or the Civil Code. Hence, the denial of their
petition must hold. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION LEONEN, J.: I concur with the denial of
the Motions for Reconsideration. I concur with the original Decision penned by Justice Dante Tinga
promulgated on April 29, 2009. I also concur with the Resolution of Justice Lucas Bersamin with respect
to the Motions for Reconsideration, but disagree with the statements made implying the alleged
overarching legal principle called the “regalian doctrine.” Mario Malabanan filed an application for
registration of a parcel of land designated as Lot 9864-A in Silang, Cavite based on a claim that he
purchased the land from Eduardo Velazco. He also claimed that Eduardo Velazco and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continu-624624SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty1 (30) years.The application was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite Tagaytay City, Branch 18.2 Malabanan’s witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified that Lot
9864-A was originally part of a 22-hectare property owned by his great-grandfather.3 His uncle, Eduardo
Velazco, who was Malabanan’s predecessor-in-interest, inherited the lot.4Malabanan also presented a
document issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR) on June 11, 2001. The document certified that the subject land had
already been classified as alienable and disposable since March 15, 1982.5The Solicitor General, through
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr., affirmed the truth of Aristedes Velazco’s testimony.6
Malabanan’s application was not challenged.7_______________ 1 Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, 180-181; See also note 5 of original Decision
(We noted the appellate court’s observation: “More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his
ownership over Lot 9864-A. In his application for land registration, Malabanan alleged that he
purchased the subject lot from Virgilio Velazco. x x x As aptly observed by the Republic, no copy of the
deed of sale covering Lot 9864-A, executed either by Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco, in favor of Malabanan
was marked and offered in evidence. x x x [The deed of sale marked as Exhibit “I”] was a photocopy of
the deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez and Benjamin Reyes. x x x Thus,
Malabanan has not proved that Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-in-interest.”). 2 Id., at
p. 181. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id., at p. 182. 6 Id. 7 Id.625VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013625Heirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the PhilippinesThe RTC granted Malabanan’s application on December 2,
2002. The Republic appealed the Decision to the Court of Appeals. It argued that Malabanan failed to
prove that the subject land had already been classified as alienable and disposable. The Republic
insisted that Malabanan did not meet the required manner and length of possession for confirmation of
imperfect title under the law.8The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, possession
before the classification of land as alienable and disposable should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession.9 Therefore, possession before March 15, 1982 should not be considered in the
computation of the period of possession. This is also in accordance with the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto.10Malabanan’s heirs (petitioners) appealed the Decision of the CA.11 Relying on Republic v.
Naguit,12 petitioners argued that the period of possession required for perfecting titles may be
reckoned prior to the declaration that the land was alienable and disposable.13 Open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of an alienable land of public domain for more than 30 years ipso
jure converts it into private property.14 Previous classification is immaterial so long as
the_______________8 Id., at p. 183. 9 Id. 10 Id., at p. 184; Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156177, May
26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183. 11 Id., at p. 184. (Malabanan died before the CA released its Decision.) 12
Republic v. Naguit, G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442. 13 Supra note 1, at p. 184. 14 Id.,
at p. 186.626626SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines property had already been converted to private property at the time of the application.15We
dismissed the Petition because there was no clear evidence to establish petitioners’ or their
predecessors-in-interest’s possession since June 12, 1945.16 Moreover, while there was evidence that
the land had already been declared alienable and disposable since 1982, there was no evidence that the
subject land had been declared as no longer intended for public use or service.17 Both petitioners and
respondent ask for the reconsideration of Our Decision on April 29, 2009. I agree that Malabanan was
not able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject land since June 12, 1945. We already noted in the original Decision
that Malabanan offered no deed of sale covering the subject lot, executed by any of the alleged
predecessors-in-interest in his favor.18 He only marked a photocopy of a deed of sale executed by
Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez and Benjamin Reyes.19 On that note alone, no title can be
issued in favor of Malabanan or petitioners. However, I do not agree that all lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State20 or that lands remain part of the
public domain if the State does not reclassify or alienate it to a private person.21 These presumptions
are expressions of the Regalian Doctrine._______________15 Id. 16 Id., at p. 211. 17 Id. 18 Supra note 1.
19 Id. 20 Decision, p. 5. 21 Id.627VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013627Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippines Our present Constitution does not contain the term, “regalian doctrine.”
What we have is Article XII, Section 2, which provides: Section 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated x x x. There is no
suggestion in this section that the presumption in absolutely all cases is that all lands are public. Clearly,
the provision mentions only that “all lands of the public domain” are “owned by the state.” This is not
the only provision that should be considered in determining whether the presumption would be that the
land is part of the “public domain” or “not of the public domain.” Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. This section protects all types of property. It
does not limit its provisions to property that is already covered by a form of paper title. Verily, there
could be land, considered as property, where ownership has vested as a result of either possession or
prescription, but still, as yet, undocumented. The original majority’s opinion in this case presents some
examples. In my view, We have properly stated the interpretation of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act as amended22 in relation to Section 14(1) and
14(2)_______________ 22 Prior to Commonwealth Act No. 141, Act 926 (1903) provided for a chapter
on “Unperfected Title and Spanish Grants and Conces-628628SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinesof Presidential Decree No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree. Our ratio decidendi, therefore, should only be limited to the facts as
presented in this case. We also properly implied that the titling procedures under Property Registration
Decree do not vest or create title. The Property Registration Decree simply recognizes and documents
ownership and provides for the consequences of issuing paper titles.We have also recognized that “time
immemorial possession of land in the concept of ownership either through themselves or through their
predecessors in interest” suffices to create a presumption that such lands “have been held in the same
way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”23 This is an interpretation
in Cariño v. Insular Government24 of the earlier version of Article III, Section 1 in the McKinley’s
Instructions.25 The case clarified that the_______________sions.” Act No. 2874 then amended and
compiled the laws relative to lands of the public domain. This Act was later amended by Acts No. 3164,
3219, 3346, and 3517. Commonwealth Act No. 141 or what is now the Public Land Act was promulgated
on November 7, 1936. Section 48 (b) was later on amended by Republic Act No. 1942 (1957) and then
later by Pres. Dec. 1073 (1977). The effects of the later two amendments were sufficiently discussed in
the original majority opinion. 23 Cariño v. Insular Government, 202 U.S. 449, 460 (1909). 24 Id. (Cariño
was an inhabitant of Benguet Province in the Philippines. He applied for the registration of his land,
which he and his ancestors held as owners, without having been issued any document of title by the
Spanish Crown. The Court of First Instance dismissed the application on grounds of law. The decision
was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The case was brought back to the U.S. Supreme Court by writ
of error.) 25 President’s Policy in the Philippines: His Instructions to the Members of the Second
Commission (April 7, 1900). (“Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines,
therefore, must be imposed these inviolable rules: That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation x x x.”)629VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013629Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines Spanish sovereign’s concept of the “regalian doctrine” did not extend to the American
colonial period and to the various Organic Acts extended to the Philippines. Thus, in Cariño: It is true
that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown… It is true also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations,
the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against
the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is
left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign
shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.Whatever may have been the technical position of
Spain, it does not follow that, in view of the United States, [plaintiff who held the land as owner] had
lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized the land. The argument
to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of Luzon, at
least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the
power to enforce. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives,
not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32 Stat.
691, all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered “for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”26 (Emphasis supplied) _______________26 Supra note 23, at pp.
457-459.630630SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
PhilippinesAnd with respect to time immemorial possession, Cariño mentions: The [Organic Act of July 1,
1902] made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution,
extends those safeguards to all. It provides that ‘no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the equal protection of the laws.’ § 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from § 12, it
is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that x x x it meant by
“property” only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom
and by long association--one of the profoundest factors in human thought --regarded as their own. x x
x It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.27
Cariño is often misinterpreted to cover only lands for those considered today as part of indigenous
cultural communities. However, nothing in its provisions limits it to that kind of application. We could
also easily see that the progression of various provisions on completion of imperfect titles in earlier laws
were efforts to assist in the recognition of these rights. In my view, these statutory attempts should
never be inter-_______________27 Supra note 23, at pp. 459-460.631VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3,
2013631Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippinespreted as efforts to limit what has
already been substantially recognized through constitutional interpretation. There are also other
provisions in our Constitution which protect the unique rights of indigenous peoples.28 This is in
addition to our pronouncements interpreting “property” in the due process clause through Cariño. It is
time that we put our invocations of the “regalian doctrine” in its proper perspective. This will later on, in
the proper case, translate into practical consequences that do justice to our people and our history.
Thus, I vote to deny the Motions for Reconsideration. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and
respondent’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration denied. Notes.—Notwithstanding the passage of the
Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who “have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.” (Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 [2009]) Section 48 of the Public Land Act
is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the
right itself for the first time. (Id.) ——o0o—— Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines,
704 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
[No. L-6191. January 31, 1955] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. CIRILO P.
BAYLOSIS, ET AL., defendants and appellants.1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; WHEN
PROPER.—Expropriation by the Government, obliging a landowner to part with his real estate even if
given just compensation for it, is authorized only when done for a public use or for a public benefit and
not to enable one to own real property at the expense of another, especially when said owner has ,no
other real property except the one being expropriated. 2. ID.; ID.; LANDS THAT MAY BE EXPROPRIATED;
LIMITATIONS THEREOF.—Under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, the Government may
expropriate only landed estates with extensive areas, specially those embracing the whole or a large
part of a town or city and that once the landed estate is broken up and divided into parcels of
reasonable areas, either through voluntary sales by the owner or owners of said landed estate, or
through expropriation, the resulting parcels are no longer subject to further expropriation. 3. ID.; ID.;
ID.; MERE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO EXPROPRIATE CANNOT BIND LANDOWNER; EIGHT OF THE
LANDOWNER TO DEAL WITH His PROPERTY AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS.—
Mere notice of the intention of the Government to expropriate lands in future does not and cannot bind
the landowner and prevent him f rom dealing with his property. To bind the land to be expropriated and
the owner thereof, the expropriation must be commenced in court and even then the owner might yet
deal 462 462 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. with his property
thereafter, mortgage or even sell it if he can find persons who would step into his shoes and deal with
the Government, either resist the expropriation if in their opinion it is illegal or accept the expropriation
and remain with what is left of the property if the entire property is not needed by the Government. 4.
ID.; ID.; PERSONS DISQUALIFIED TO BECOME BENEFICIARIES OF EXPROPRIATION.—Tenants and
occupants of the land sought to be expropriated who already have lands of their own are hardly the
landless class sought to be benefited by the Constitution, and so are not qualified to become
beneficiaries of expropriation. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE OCCUPATION AND CULTIVATION OF LAND DOES NOT
GIVE RISE TO RIGHT OF EXPROPRIATION.—The mere fact that a person as a tenant has occupied and
cultivated the land for many years does ,not entitle him to purchase the same against his landlord's will,
by means of expropriation. 6. OWNERSHIP, ATTRIBUTES OF; OWNER MAY NOT BE OBLIGED TO SELL His
PROPERTY; EXCEPTIONS.—The right to dispose or not to dispose of one's property is one of the
attributes of ownership. A person who is willing to sell his property to "A" may not be obliged to sell it to
"B" unless the law in certain specific cases such as legal redemption compels him to do so. 7. ID.; ID.;
SALE TO RELATIVES ARE NOT ALWAYS SIMULATED OR FRAUDULENT.—The mere fact that a landowner
subdivides his land and sells them to his relatives does not necessarily mean that the sales are simulated
or fraudulent. It is not unnatural for a person who has something to sell, to give preference to his
relatives; and with respect to that portion remaining with the vendor, to have as his neighbors and
adjoining owners people whom he knows and are related to him. 8. ID.; ID.; TENANCY TROUBLE, NOT
GROUND FOR EXPROPRIATION.—Tenancy trouble alone whether due to the fault of the tenants or of
the landowners does not justify expropriation. That is why we have the Tenancy Law which clearly
specifies the rights and obligations of both landlord and tenant, their respective shares in the harvest,
and the removal of a tenant only for certain specified reasons or causes; and the Tenancy Division in the
Court of Industrial Relations that handles and decides tenancy disputes.APPEAL from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas. Soriano, J.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
463 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 463 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. Manuel P. Calanog
and Cirilo Baylosis for appellantsSolicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista and Rafael
Caniza for appellee.MONTEMAYOR, J.:These expropriation proceedings initiated in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas by the Bureau of Lands in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, involve seven
lots formerly a part of the Hacienda LIAN or LIAN ESTATE in the municipality of Lian, Batangas, which
estate formerly belonged in its entirety to the Colegio de San Jose Inc., a Jesuit corporation, under
Original Certificate of Title No. 15521. It seems that the Hacienda or rather the income therefrom was
used for the support and education of young Filipinos studying for the priesthood. The Hacienda
originally had an extension of several thousand hectares and was occupied and cultivated by lessees and
by tenants (inquilinos). About the year 1931 the religious authorities decided to break up this big estate
as far as possible into small lots averaging one hundred hectares each and sell it to bona, fide lessees,
the price to be payable on the installment plan.One of these lessees was Nelson V. Sinclair. He had
occupied under a contract of lease a portion of this estate since 1928, cultivating a portion by means of
tractors and the remainder by means of aparceros under yearly contracts such as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B
(Baylosis).In 1937 he bought from the Lian Estate the portion leased to him with an approximate area of
87 hectares. Subsequently, this portion was subdivided into seven lots, to wit: 306-YYYY, 306-BBBB, 306-
CCCC, 306-DDDD, 306-EEEE, 306-Z and 306-LL. In 1947 Sinclair sold lot 306-YYYY with an area of about
25 hectares and 306-BBBB with an area of about 17 hectares to Cirilo P. Baylosis for P40,000 and
P28,000, respectively, although the corresponding transfer certificates of title were not issued until 1948
and 1949, respectively. After the purchase, Cirilo P. Baylosis subdivided the two lots into small
464 464 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. parcels and
sold the same to his co-defendants in this case, except Sinclair and Luis Baylosis. In 1950 Sinclair sold to
Cirilio P. Baylosis lot 306-CCCC with an area of about 13 hectares and lot 306-DDDD with an area of
about 10 hectares for P39,000. (See Exhibit 16Baylosis)About October 7, 1946, some 68 persons
claiming to be tenants and occupants of the parcels originally owned by Sinclair addressed a petition in
Tagalog to the Rural Progress Administration, a rough translation in English of which follows:We, the
undersigned, are all workers in this land for a long time, and were the ones who cleared the place of its
big trees. That is why we are requesting the Government to buy the land and we shall pay the
instalment to the Government."Much later, on the basis of the petition, the Rural Progress
Administration through its Manager Faustino Aguilar, on May 4, 1948, addressed a letter to Sinclair
reading as follows:"May 4, 1948Mr. N. V. Sinclair 181 David, Escolta Manila Sir:There has been received
in this Office a petition f or the acquisition by the Government for resale to the tenants of the following
six lots in Binubusan, owned and/or administered by you: Lot N. 306—CCCC under tax declaration No.
862Area—13.9125 hectares.Kind—Irrigated agricultural land.Assessed value—P6,400.00 Lot No. 306—Z
under tax declaration No. 858Area—8.7762 hectares.Kind—7.7762 hectares irrigated agricultural land
1.0000 hectare—riceland.Assessed value—P4,040. Lot No. 306—YYY under tax declaration No.
864Area—25.0159 hectares.Kind—Irrigated agricultural land.Assessed value—P9,760.
465 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 465 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. Lot No. 306—BBBB
under tax declaration No. 365Area—17.9827 hectares.Kind—Irrigated agricultural land.Assessed value—
P7,010 Lot No.. 306—EEEE under tax declaration No. 866Area—10.4955.Kind—Irrigated agricultural
land.Assessed value—P4,090. Lot No. 306—LL under tax declaration No. 350Owner—Colegio de San
Jose.Administrator—N. V. Sinclair.Area—14.3208 hectares.Kind—Fish pond.Assessed value—P5,730.The
reason given by the tenants in presenting their petition is that your relation with them is not altogether
too satisfactory having on previous occasion tried to disregard the 70-30 crop sharing basis, although
later have yielded to observance thereof upon the insistence of the tenants. They likewise complain that
you are planning to eject them, a plan which if carried out, will result in untold sufferings on their part,
without mentioning the pain of leaving the premises which they have occupied and tilled since time
immemorial.Before we take action on their petition we will appreciate your favor of informing us for
your willingness to sell said parcels of land, in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
539 and the conditions of the sale. Respectfully,(Sgd.) FAUSTINO AGUILAR Manager" On May 7th,
Sinclair wrote the following answer:"May 7, 1948Rural Progress Administration Department of Justice
Building Walled City, ManilaAttention: Mr. Faustino Aguilar, ManagerGentleman:This will acknowledge
receipt today of your communication dated May 4th, with reference to the petition for your
Administration to 466 466 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. purchase
lands of the writer located in barrio Binubusan, municipality of Lian, Province of Batangas.The reasons
given by the petitioners are not true and it will be a pleasure to acquaint you with the facts concerned
with each of the lots specified.This information will be assembled at the earliest possible time and in
order to expedite its submission to your goodselves, your letter is being forwarded to my representative
at Lian.In the meantime, it is requested that you kindly allow me sufficient time to submit the true facts
pertaining to each lot before you take action on this Petition. Respectfully,(Sgd.) N. V. SINCLAIR Owner
On November 15, 1958, Manager Aguilar again wrote to Sinclair as f ollows:"November 15, 1948Mr. N.
V. Sinclair 181 David Escolta Manila Sir:In connection with your letter dated May 7, 1948, advising us
that you will forward to this Office under separate cover information regarding your refusal to sell to
certain petitioners your lands in Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as lot Nos. 306-CCCC; 306-Z; 306-YYY;
306-BBBB; 306-EEE and 306-LL, please be informed that up to the present we have not as yet received
said letter. As it is our desire to apprise the petitioners of the same, the favor of an early information
from you will be appreciated.Likewise the petitioners again called at this Office and have made an offer
to buy said lands at P600 per hectare on a 10-year period to pay. If the said price is acceptable to you,
please advise us accordingly. Respectfully,(Sgd.) FAUSTINO AGUILAR Manager" Thereafter, having
been informed that Sinclair had sold his parcels or some of them to one Cirilo P. Baylosis, Ma-
467 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1954 467 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. nager Aguilar on
January 17, 1949, wrote the following letter:"January 17, 1949Atty. Cirilo P. Baylosis Balayan, Batangas
Sir:We have been informed that you bought the lands of N. V. Sinclair at Binubusan, Lian, Batangas,
known as lots 306-YYY; 306-LL; 306-Z; 306-CCCC; 306-BBBB and 306-EEEE and that you are at present
taking all the crops thereon including the share due to the tenants with the help of constabulary
soldiers. If the report is true, we request that you refrain from taking such step in order to avoid any
untoward incident that may arise therefrom.The lands which you bought are the subject of a petition for
acquisition and resale to the tenants thereof which is pending final action by this
Office.Respectfully,(Sgd.) FAUSTINO AGUILAR Manager" Thereafter, on February 6, 1951, the Republic
of the Philippines filed the original complaint for expropriation against Cirilo P. Baylosis and Sinclair,
which complaint was twice amended, the second amended complaint being filed on April 16, 1952, so as
to include all the persons to whom Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis had sold portions of the lots sought to
be expropriated.On February 14, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Batangas after hearing the parties
issued an order placing the plaintiffs in possession of the property sought to be expropriated after
plaintiff had made a deposit of P27,105.22. On February 24, 1951, the tenants and occupants in whose
behalf the expropriation proceedings were instituted moved to intervene, accompanying their motion
with a complaint in intervention. Believing that their interests were sufficiently taken care of and
defended by the plaintiff, the trial court deemed said intervention unnecessary. The defendants
numbering about 21 filed 9 separate motions to dismiss based on several grounds, among which are:
468 468 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. that the
expropriation was being made not for public use; that the defendants would be deprived of their
property without due process of law; that the plaintiff has no right under the guise of expropriation to
take the property of a private citizen and deliver the same to another private individual; that the
Constitution authorizes the expropriation of big landed estates but not of small areas like these owned
by the def endants; that the present expropriation was intended to benefit only about 44 persons who
do not represent the public and that many of said persons already have lands of their own; that the
various defendants individually own only small portion of the property under expropriation; that the
second amended complaint is defective in that it did not describe the specific property sought to be
expropriated; and that the current price of irrigated lands in Batangas is about P3,000 per hectare and
so plaintiff s deposit was insufficient.After hearing and the introduction of evidence, both oral and
documentary, the trial court issued an order dated July 18, 1952, dismissing the various motions for
dismissal and declaring the plaintiff entitled to take the property sought to be condemned for public use
as described in the second amended complaint upon payment of just compensation to be ascertained
by Commissioners to be appointed by the court for this purpose. The defendants are now appealing
from that order directly to this Tribunal.The trial court declared that the present expropriation
proceedings are based on Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that"The Congress
may authorized upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots and con' veyed at cost to individuals."and section 1 of Commonwealth Act 539 which provides
that the President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands through purchase or
expropriation
469 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 469 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. and subdivide the
same into home lots or small farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. The trial court also said
that although this Tribunal in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, G. R. No. L-2089 (47
Off. Gaz., No. 4 p. 1848) held that section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution had reference to large
estates, still, the total area of the parcels now sought to be expropriated, which is between 67 and 77
hectares, may not be considered small; that the tenants and occupants of the land for whom these
expropriation proceedings were instituted have by themselves and their ancestors been occupying,
clearing and cultivating the land for many years and that they are entitled now to purchase the same;
that the situation in the area in question was far from peaceful because there was misunderstanding
and trouble between tenants on one side, and their landlords (the defendants herein) on the other,
regarding their shares in the harvests and that the only way to solve this tenancy problem was to
expropriate the land and sell it to the tenants; that both Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis were formerly
agreeable to sell this land to others for a profit as shown by the fact that they had actually sold portions
thereof to others and that consequently, they can now have no valid objection to the expropriation, that
heretofore the Government had already expropriated a large portion of Lian Estate or Hacienda, divided
the same into small lots and thereafter resold them to tenants, thereby showing that by its nature,
location and destination, the property is suitable for the purpose for which it is being expropriated, and
that these proceedings are in keeping with what the Government had alreay done with respect to other
portions; that although it is contended that several of the tenants and occupants have already lands of
their own aside from the portions they are now occupying, still, they are actual occupants and it would
not be fair or just that they would not be included in the benefits of the expropriation, and that in any
event,
470 470 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. once the
expropriation is carried out, it is for the Government to screen and process the tenants, and that those
found already owning lands may be disqualified to buy the land being expropriated. As to the portions
into which lots 306-YYYY and 306-BB have been sub-divided and then sold by Cirilo P. Baylosis to his co-
defendants, the trial court observed that said sales were made after Baylosis had been served on
January 17, 1949, with notice by the Rural Progress Administration of the intention of the Government
to purchase said lots, and that considering that the purchasers are relatives of Baylosis, and that the
transfer certificates of title were issued in 1950, there was reason to believe that these sales by Baylosis
were simulated, and intended to frustrate the attempt of the Government to expropriate.For a better
and a clearer understanding of the facts in this case, particularly the parcels involved, their areas and
owners, the particular portions sought to be expropriated and the number of tenants and occupants
sought to be benefitted by the expropriation, we have prepared the following tables or graphs, marked
"A" and "G," based on the pleadings and on the order appealed from. Table "A" Area 1. Lot 306-
YYY …................................ 25.0159 square meters To be acquired.................................. 22.4033
square meters Occupants............................... 21 Dependents.......................… 100 2. Lot 306
BBB...................… 17.9827 square meters To be acquired.................................. 13.4564 square
meters Occupants......................................... 10 Dependents...................................... 40 3. Lot 306-
CCC.......................................... 13.9129 square meters Whole to be acquired
Occupants.................................... 9 Dependents.................................... 40 4. Lot 306-
EEEE........................................ 10.4955 square meters To be acquired...........................................
9,1809 square meters Occupants.......................................... 4 Dependents................................. 20
5. Lot 306-Z........................................ 8.7762 square meters To be acquired..................................
4.0000 square meters Occupants................................. 1

Dependents.................................… 4 471 VOL. 96, JANUARY 81, 1955 471 Republic vs. Baylosis,
et al. 6. Lot 306-LL.................... 14.3208 square meter To be acquired.................. 1.5000
square meters Occupants................... 1 Dependents.............… 4 7. Lot 306-DDDD .... ..... . 6.8946
square meters To be acquired......................... 3.0000 square meters Occupants...................… 1
Dependents......................... 4 Owners............… … 23 Dependents.................... 90
Occupants.................. 44 Dependents....................... 214 TABLE "B" Names of defendants Lot No.
and Title No. Area in hectares Maria Lunesa.................. 306-YYY-1 4.9996
TCT-2959
Pastora Baylosis....................... 306-YYY-2 2.0000
TCT-3079
Spouses Marcelo Basit and Magdalena Bayungan...................... - 306-YYY-3 2.0000

Spouses Tomas Asuncion and Bonifacio Bayungan..................... 306-YYY-4 1.0315 Spouse Raymunda
Hernandez and Juan Gonzales.................... 306-YYY-5 1.0998
TOT-2960
Spouses Tirso de Padua and Maria Dolores Bayungan.............. 306-YYY-6 3.000

TOT-3311
Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda.............… 306-YYY-8 9.9974
TOT-3510
Spouses. Benito Baylosis and Macaria L. Torres.................... 306-BBB-1 2.4256
306-BBB-9 .9639
TOT-2877
Spouses Aiejandro Abellera and Juliana Camellon....................... 306-BBB-7 1.0711
TAT-2897
Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina Baylosis.................. 306-BBB-7 3.7725 Luis

Baylosis—Part of lot..................... 306-Z 3.8009 Cirilo P. Baylosis....................... T-3133 8.8051
T-3426
N. V. Sinclair & C. P. Baylosis.................... 306-CCCC 13.9125
306-EEEE 9.1809 N. V. Sinclair...................... 306-LL 4.0000
306-DDDD 5.8946 472 472 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis,
et al. Table "A" shows the number of lots to be affected by the expropriation including the areas to be
expropriated, and the number of their occupants and dependents. Table "B" shows the names of the
owners of the original seven lots involved and of the smaller lots into which they had been subdivided
and their areas. Table "A" further shows the area sought to be expropriated from each individual lot,
totaling approximately 67 hectares. The number of tenants or occupants is about 44 and the number of
their dependents is about 214. For the defendants owners, there are about 23 of them with about 90
dependents.It will be seen from the tables that neither the exact location of the portion to be
expropriated from each lot nor its form or shape is stated or defined, thereby supporting the contention
of the defendants on this point. Table "A" also shows that the Government wants to expropriate, not
one whole parcel or the seven lots comprising said parcel but is selecting only portions of said seven
different and separate lots, presumably those actually occupied and cultivated by the tenants. If the
expropriation is carried out, we do not know what portions would be left to the owners, the forms
therof and whether or not it would be worthwhile for the said owners to keep them.Let us now discuss
the several reasons given by the trial court for upholding the right of the Government to expropriate in
this case. It says that the tenants and occupants for whose benefit the land is being expropriated have
by themselves and their ancestors been occupying and cultivating the same for many years and are
therefore entitled to purchase the same. We are afraid that that holding has no legal basis. The mere
fact that a person as a tenant has occupied and cultivated and even cleared the land for his landlord
does not entitle him to purchase the same against his landlord's will, by means of expropriation.
Expropriation by the Government, obliging a land owner to part with his real estate is
473 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 473 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. authorized only
when done for public use or for public benefit and not to enable one to own real property at the
expense of another especially when said owner has no other real property except the one being
expropriated. Some of the defendants herein (Alejandro Abellera and Benito Baylosis) have no other
land except the small lots bought by them from Cirilo P. Baylosis and now subject of the present
expropriation proceedings. Defendant Juan Gonzales told the Court that he is actually by himself,
plowing and cultivating the small lot of about one hectare that he bought from Cirilo P. Baylosis, now
sought to be condemned. We should not forget that the Constitution protects private property,
prohibits a citizen being deprived of his property without due process of law, and that even in
condemnation proceedings when said citizen is given just compensation for his property expropriated,
still, the expropriation to be valid must be for a public use or public benefit.Again, the trial court says
that there are tenancy problems in the lands being expropriated, there being misunderstanding
between the owners and the tenants as to the share of each in the harvest, and that the only way this
problem could be solved is to expropriate the land. This seems to be a novel theory which finds no
statutory or constitutional support. If this theory were correct and is to be followed and applied, then all
that a tenant has to do in order to be able to buy the land of his landlord is for him, or better still, with
the help and cooperation of his co-tenants, to violate the tenancy law, refuse to give the 30%
corresponding to his or their landlord or even deny the title of said landlord, thereby creating a tenancy
problem, upon which the Government will immediately step in and commence expropriation
proceedings, claiming that the only solution of the trouble between the landlord and the tenants lies in
expropriation. We cannot believe that was ever the intention of either the framers of the Constitution
or of
474 474 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. the members
of Congress. That is the reason why Congress has promulgated the Tenancy Law, clearly specifying the
rights and obligations of both landlord and tenant, their respective shares in the harvest, and the
removal of a tenant only for certain specified reasons or causes; and that is why we have the Tenancy
Division in the Court of Industrial Relations to handle and decide tenancy disputes.Furthermore, it is not
exactly correct to say that there is a tenancy problem in the land in question, and even if there were, the
fault may be attributed to the tenants themselves rather than to the owners. It will be remembered that
in the petition filed by about 68 persons claiming to be occupants of the parcels originally owned by
Sinclair dated October 6, 1946, addressed to the Rural Progress Administration, nothing was said about
tenancy trouble. All that they said in said petition was that they had been working on the land for a long
time and had cleared the place of big trees, and that they wanted to buy the land and pay the price to
the Government in installment. Indeed, the evidence shows that Sinclair never had any trouble with his
tenants. And there is reason to believe and evidence to support the belief that the tenancy trouble on
the land in question began only around the year 1948 after the tenants and occupants were presumably
given the hope and the assurance by the Rural Progress Administration that the Government was going
to acquire the land for them either through purchase or expropriation. It was then according to Cirilo P.
Baylosis that the tenants refused to give him and his co-defendants their share of the harvest and even
ref used to acknowledge him as owner of the land he had bought from Sinclair. So, according to Cirilo P,
Baylosis, he and his co-defendants to whom he had resold portions of the land bought from Sinclair, had
to go to the Tenancy Law Enforcement Office and complain against the tenants and said Tenancy Office
in several orders concurred in by the Court of Industrial
475 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 475 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. Relations held that
even under Commonwealth Act 538 which authorizes the suspension of cases of ejectment against
tenants of lands included in condemnation proceedings, the tenants should first pay the current rents or
give the shares of the landlords in the harvest, a thing which the tenants in those cases had failed and
refused to do and so the cases against the tenants were decided against them. (See Exhibits V-1-1, V-2-
1, V-3-1 and V-4-1)The trial court also said that if Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis formerly were willing to
sell their holdings or portions thereof to others as they have done to their co-defendants, there was no
reason why the defendants should now object to the Government purchasing said lands through
expropriation. But there is a difference and room for distinction. The right to dispose or not to dispose
of one's property is one of the attributes of ownership. A person just because he is willing to sell his
property to "A" may not be obliged to sell it to "B" unless the law in certain specific cases such as legal
redemption compels him to do so. Again, a land owner may be willing or even offer to sell his land today
to "A", but unless the offer is accepted and acted upon, he may change his mind and refuse to sell to "A"
next year or refuse to sell it to anyone f or that matter.The evidence shows that both Sinclair and Cirilo
P. Baylosis at one time were willing to sell to some of the tenants and occupants herein involved under
certain conditions and provided that they buy in groups, presumably to avoid subdivisions and the
problem of dealing with many individual buyers, but the tenants failed to buy. Naturally, they may not
now compel Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis to sell to them through the Government by means of
expropriation. Besides, the bulk of the lands that Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis had formerly offered to
them for sale which offer they failed to take advantage of, has now been sold to others, the other co-
defendants herein, in small lots.
476 476 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. One reason
not improbable why the tenants and occupants failed to take advantage of the former offer of Sinclair
and Cirilo P. Baylosis to sell the lands to them was the matter of price. According to the letter of the
Rural Progress Administration to Sinclair on November 15, 1948, those who signed the petition of
October 17, 1946, claiming to be the tenants and occupants of the land, offered to buy the same at P600
per hectare, payable within a period of ten years. The defendant owners of the land herein claim that
the current price of first class riceland in Batangas is around P3,000 per hectare. Even taking as a basis
the price paid by Cirilo P. Baylosis for the lots bought by him from Sinclair, now being expropriated, the
price is way over P1,000 almost P2,000 per hectare. Naturally, Sinclair and Baylosis were unwilling to sell
at P600 a hectare, to say nothing of said price being paid in ten years. And that is the reason why the
defendants herein claim that the deposit of P27,000 made by the tenants and occupants, is insufficient
to cover the price of the land, said amount of the deposit being equivalent to only about P400 per
hectare for the 67 hectares sought to be expropriated.Supposing that the expropriation is carried out
and the Commissioners and the trial court find that the land expropriated is worth P2,000 or more per
hectare, would the tenants and occupants be still willing and would they be able to pay said price?
Supposing that they were not, then what would happen? Would the Government undertake to pay the
difference between the actual value of the land expropriated for them and their offer to pay only P600
per hectare, and this payable in ten years at that? Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution on which the
present expropriation proceedings are supposed to be based says that the lands expropriated are to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. That means that the Government will not
make any profit in the transaction, but it also conveys the idea
477 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1956 477 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. that the
Government will sell at a price to include what it cost the Government to expropriate. The cost of
subdivision, registration fees and transfer certificates of title will probably have to be added to the cost
of the land. Again, it may be asked, what will the Government do if the tenants and occupants are
neither willing nor able to pay said total cost?There is another point that merits consideration. The
defendants claim and correctly that many of the tenants and occupants now insisting on expropriation
have lands of their own. According to the list prepared by the Bureau of Lands containing the names of
persons who are occupying and holding portions of land being administered by the Bureau of Lands in
Batangas (Exhibit 13-Baylosis), many, if not the majority of the tenants and occupants of the lands now
sought to be expropriated are included in said list. The evidence further shows that several of the
tenants, among them Victor Magpantay, C. Balaquiot, Luciano Panganiban, Isabelo Manguera and
Andres Castronuevo have lands of their own; that some of the lands are sugar lands for which they hold
sugar quotas and one of the said tenants, Andres Castronuevo, is cultivating a portion of the land sought
to be expropriated and which he wants to buy, not by himself but through an aparcero or tenant.In
relation to this claim of the defendants that some of the tenants and occupants have lands of their own
and so are not qualified to be the beneficiaries of expropriation, the trial court said that that is no
problem because the Government can later screen and process said tenants and occupants, and that if
some are found to be disqualified because they are already land owners, then they should not be
allowed to purchase the portions occupied by them, But if and when this happens, what becomes of
said portions taken away from their former owners over their vigorous opposition and which portions
later proved to be not subject to expropriation for the reason that the
478 478 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. persons
occupying them do not deserve and are not qualified to purchase them? A real injustice will have been
done to the owners of these portions because they had been included and made defendants in these
proceedings, deprived of their holdings against their will, only to find out later that the expropriation as
to these portions was improper and unjustified.The defendants have introduced evidence without
refutation through the testimony of one Anacleto Jonson, an employee of the Bureau of Lands in charge
of the 3,700 hectares of the Lian Estate expropriated by the Government way back in 1940 and 1941,
and intended to be subdivided into small lots and resold to their tenants and occupants, on the status of
said lands. According to Jonson, since then which up to now, involves a period of about thirteen years,
said area of 3,700 hectares remains unsubdivided; that no portion of said big area has been resold or
even contracted to be resold by the Government to their occupants and tenants, and all that the
Government is doing is to administer the same and receive the portion of the yearly harvest
corresponding to the owner. In other words, all that has been done, thirteen years after the
expropriation was to transfer the ownership and administration of this big area with about 800 tenants
and families from the Lian Estate to the Government which has assumed the role of lessor and landlord.
No reason or explanation was given for this rather strange if not anomalous situation. The def endants,
owners of the land being condemned, feeling a little bitter against the Government, condemns its action
in instituting the present proceedings, and point to this unfortunate situation and status of the 3,700
hectares expropriated in 1941 as an example of the Government's rather over-ambitious program of
expropriation. They say:"* * *. In 1939, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, filed the expropriation
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Batangas of certain portions of the Lian Estate still owned
by
479 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 479 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. Colegio de San Jose,
Inc., and occupied by 800 persons (t. s. n., p. 359). The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., finally executed the
Deed of Sale for 4,300 hectares of land on May 1940, and title and ownership to these lands were then
transferred to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (t. s. n., pp. 73-74, 357-359). However,
notwithstanding, the expropriation of this large estate of 4,300 hectares of homesites and agricultural
lands by the Commonwealth of the Philippines 13 years ago, for resale to the poor and landless, up to
the present time this property has not been subdivided into small lots, nor sold to the actual occupants
(t. s. n., p. 360). Notwithstanding this state of affairs, the plaintiff is still bent on expropriating another
67 hectares of agricultural lands consisting of 18 small lots of small areas which do not adjoin each other
and belonging to 20 small landowners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2—14) who are intended by the framers
of the Constitution to be protected by section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution." (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-
8).This Tribunal in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, supra, held that Section 4 Article
XIII of the Constitution has reference only to large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and lands that embrace a
whole town or a large portion of a town or city. The lands now sought to be expropriated with a total
area of 67 hectares, even if considered as one whole parcel which they are not, can of course not be
regarded as a landed estate. During the discussion of this case it was urged by the minority that as long
as any land f ormerly f ormed part of a landed or large estate, it may, regardless of its present area be
still subject to expropriation under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, citing the doctrine laid
down in the case of Rural Progress Administration vs. Reyes, G. R. No. L-4703, October 8, 1953. It is true
that said ruling was made in the Reyes case but we should bear in mind that that was a decision by a
highly divided court, six for the majority and four dissenting, but two majority concurring only in the
result and one of them concurring in a separate opinion. It seems that the members of the Tribunal
espousing the majority opinion therein were greatly impressed by the fact that notwithstanding the
small area involved, about two hectares, there were 113
480 480 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic -vs. Baylosis, et al. persons
living on the same, and dependent on the products of the fisheries on it, and evidently had no other
place to go to live. We feel that the decision in that Reyes case was a departure from the doctrine laid
down in the leading case of Guido which doctrine has been subsequently affirmed and reiterated in a
long line of cases, and we now believe that in abandoning the ruling made in the Reyes case, this
Tribunal is merely returning to and re-affirming the sound and wholesome doctrine laid down in the
Guido Case.The main purpose of the constitutional provision contained in section 4, Article XIII of that
instrument was to break up landed estates into reasonably small portions. Once said landed estate is
broken up, the purpose of the constitution is achieved. Otherwise, were we to adhere to the rule made
in the Reyes case that if a piece of land, regardless of size, formerly formed part of a big landed estate, it
is necessarily subject to expropriation, then there would be no limit or foreseeable end to expropriation.
A landed estate of say 3,000 hectares is broken up into say 50-hectare lots and sold to the lessees or
occupants thereof. The tenants in that 50-hectare lot want to buy their holdings and because the lot was
f ormerly a part of a landed estate, it is again expropriated and subdivided into say 5-hectare lots. A
buyer of this 5hectare portion may have tenants cultivating portions thereof and these tenants would
again insist on expropriation into say one hectare lots and so this expropriation would and may go on
endlessly until the minimum of a few square meters is reached, just to accommodate one single tenant.
We hold that that could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution. We also say that
once a landed estate is broken up into portions of reasonable area, the buyers thereof are protected by
the Constitution against further expropriation.The trial court in justifying the present expropriation held
that the land sought to be condemned with an area between 67 and 77 hectares is not small. It perhaps
meant
481 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 481 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. to say that it is large,
and so may be regarded as a landed estate coming within the contemplation of the Constitution for
purposes of expropriation. As a matter of fact, the land is only about 67 hectares in area. Not only this
but it has already been subdivided into smaller portions ranging from thirteen hectares to as small as
one hectare and now owned by different individual families. But even considering the land as a whole
parcel of 67 hectares, may it be considered a landed estate whose ownership by one person is
discouraged by the Constitution, and so subject to expropriation?Our attention is called by the
defendants-appellants to Land Administrative Order No. R-3 issued by the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. Executive Order No. 376 dated November 28, 1950, abolished the Rural Progress
Administration which was formerly in charge of the expropriation of landed estates and transferred said
function to the Bureau of Lands, creating therein a Division of Landed Estates. The Bureau of Lands is
under the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the latter promulgated Administrative
Order No. R-3 under the provisions of Section 79-B of the Revised Administrative Code. This
Administrative Order is entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing the Acquisition and Disposition of
Landed Estates. Section 3 thereof reads as follows:"3. Minimum Area of Private Estates to be
acquired.—Except in special cases, no proceedings shall be initiated for the appropriation of an estate
unless the area thereof be at least 5 hectares if for residential purpose; and at least 100 hectares if for
agricultural purposes. This shall be without prejudice to the acquisition of smaller areas thru
negotiation."According to the above reproduced section, no agricultural land will be expropriated for
purposes of resale if less than 100 hectares in area. Although this Administrative Order was issued on
October 19, 1951, after the commence 482 482 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs.
Baylosis, et al. ment of the present expropriation proceedings, nevertheless it embodies the policy of
the Government as to the size of agricultural lands that may be expropriated under section 4, Article XIII
of the Constitution. In other words, the Government considers 100 hectares of agricultural land not to
be too large to be owned by an individual, family, or entity so as to be subject to expropriation. And this
policy is but just and is consistent and in keeping with the policy contained in our laws governing the
public domain. Under the old Public Land Law (Act No. 926), a person and his family may apply for and
obtain a homestead with an area of 16 hectares. This was evidently found to be too small for purposes
of expansion for a family and the area for a homestead was later increased to 24 hectares under Act
2874 and Commonwealth Act 141. That means that a man, poor and landless, who has to apply to the
Government for a homestead may own as much as 24 hectares of land. Commonwealth Act 141
provides that an individual may purchase 144 hectares of public land, meaning to say, that 144 hectares
is not too large a parcel to be owned by a person or a family. And as to corporations the Public Land Act
authorizes them to purchase or lease 1024 hectares of the public domain. In view of this policy of the
Government as to the size of agricultural land which a corporation or an individual may legitimately
own, even purchase from the Government itself, it is clear that a parcel of 67 hectares in area such as
the land now sought to be expropriated is not a landed estate or too large a parcel so as to justify
expropriation; and if we consider the fact that these 67 hectares were originally seven distinct and
separate parcels owned by Sinclair and later subdivided into about 17 parcels now owned by twenty-
three, one would realize the impropriety of expropriating so as to enable the tenants and occupants
thereof to buy them. In the Guido case we indirectly held through Mr. Justice Tuason that parcels of 10,
15 or 25 hectares in area may
483 VOL, 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 483 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. not be expropriated
for the purpose of reselling them to the tenants and occupants, and that to do so would be an act of
oppression. What the Government is now trying to do in the present case is to take away parcels ranging
from one to thirteen hectares in area from about 23 land owners with about 90 dependents and
transfer them to about forty-four tenants with about 214 dependents. We hold that that cannot be
done, not only because it has no statutory or constitutional support but also because it is unjust. What
section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution intended and sought to do was merely to break up landed
estates, and trusts in perpetuity. It intended to discourage the concentration of and excessive landed
wealth in an entity or a few individuals, but surely it did not intend or seek to distribute wealth among
citizens or take away from a citizen land which he did not actually need and give it to another who needs
it. That does not come within the realm of social justice. Said this Tribunal in the Guido case:"The
promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for
untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other
government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of
political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received, and equitable
sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of efforts in their production."The trial court held
that Cirilo P. Baylosis subdivided lots 306-YYY and 306-BB and sold them to many of his co-defendants in
the year 1950, as shown by the dates of the registration of the sales in the Office of the Register of
Deeds, this, after he had been notified by the Rural Progress Administration in 1949 of the intention of
the Government to expropriate those lots, and that furthermore, many if not all of the purchasers of his
lots as subdivided were his relatives, thereby giving said court reason to believe that those sales by Cirilo
were all
484 484 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. simulated,
intended to frustrate the attempt of the Government to expropriate. In the first place, Cirilo asserts that
he made the subdivision and made the sales before he received the notice from the Rural Progress
Administration in 1949 but because it took the Bureau of Lands a long time to approve the subdivision
survey and plan, the sales were not registered until 1950. In the second place, the mere fact that a land
owner subdivides his land and sells them to his relatives does not mean that the sales are simulated or
fraudulent. It is not unnatural for a person who has something to sell, to give preference to his relatives;
and with respect to lands, to have as his neighbors and adjoining owners people whom he knows and
are related to him. In the third place, and this is the most important, even assuming that Cirilo P.
Baylosis was previously notified of the intention of the Government to expropriate his land, said notice
by no means could legally prevent him from disposing of his property; otherwise, the mere
announcement or notice of the intention of the Government to expropriate a parcel of land, however
indefinite and uncertain that intention may be, would as it were freeze said property in the hands of its
owner, Thereafter, the owner may not deal with his own property, mortgage it, much less sell it and all
he could do is to wait patiently, for any future action of the Government in the way of expropriation.
Said expropriation may come long afterwards or may not come at all because the Government may
change its mind, and in the meantime the landowner is rendered helpless as regards his own property,
In the present case, as already stated, the petition for expropriation was not filed by the Government
until the year 1951, more than two years after the notice of the Government's intention to expropriate
was served on Cirilo. We hold that mere notice of the intention of the Government to expropriate lands
in the future does not and cannot bind the landowner and prevent him from dealing with his property.
To bind the land to be
485 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 485 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. expropriated and
the owner thereof, the expropriation must be commenced in court and even then we are not certain
that the owner may not deal with his property thereafter, mortgage or even sell it if he can find persons
who would step into his shoes and deal with the Government, either resist the expropriation if in their
opinion it is illegal or accept the expropriation and remain with what is left of the property if the entire
property is not needed by the Government.In conclusion we hold that under section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution, the Government may expropriate only landed estates with extensive areas, specially those
embracing the whole or a large part of a town or city; that once a landed estate is broken up and divided
into parcels of reasonable areas, either thru voluntary sales by the owner or owners of said landed
estate, or thru expropriation, the resulting parcels are no longer subject to further expropriation under
section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution; that mere notice of the intention of the Government to
expropriate a parcel of land does not bind either the land or the owner so as to prevent subsequent
disposition of the property such as mortgaging or even selling it in whole or by subdivision; that tenancy
trouble alone whether due to the fault of the tenants or of the landowners does not justify
expropriation; that the Constitution protects a landowner against indiscriminate and unwarranted
expropriation; that to justify expropriation, it must be for a public purpose and public benefit, and that
just to enable the tenants of a piece of land of reasonable area to own portions of it, even if they and
their ancestors had cleared the land and cultivated it for their landlord for many years, is no valid reason
or justification under the Constitution to deprive the owner or landlord of his property by means of
expropriation.In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed; the motions for dismissal
filed by defendants-
486 486 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. appellants are
granted; and the petition for expropriation is dismissed, with costs in both instances.Bengzon, Padilla,
Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.REYES, A. J., concurring:Without subscribing to some of the views
expressed in the majority opinion, I concur in the result, it not being clear that there has been an
attempt here to evade the expropriation while on the other hand the object of the expropriation—so it
would appear—is to take land from small land-holders in order to give it to other some of whom already
have land of their own. As the Spaniards would say, eso es desnudar a un santo para vestir a
otro.PARÁS, C. J., with whom concurs Pablo, J., dissenting:I vote to affirm the well prepared and
cogently reasoned order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which reads in full as follows:"The
original complaint for expropriation in this case was filed with this Court on February 6, 1951. In order to
bring in other defendants, the original complaint was twice amended, and the second amended
complaint substantially alleges the following; That the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is
represented in this action by the Director of Lands; that the property sought to be condemned consists
of seven parcels of land, with a total area of 674,535 square meters, situated in barrio Binubusan,
Municipality of Lian, Province of Batangas, and more particularly described in the second amended
complaint of the plaintiff; that the defendants Nelson V. Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis are the respective
owners of the said property, while the remaining- defendants are alleged purchasers of portions thereof
belonging to defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis; that the said property was originally owned by the Colegio de
San Jose, which sold it to defendant Nelson V. Sinclair, who, in turn, sold portions thereof to defendant
Cirilo P. Baylosis; that this property is presently occupied by around forty-seven tenants, with around
two hundred dependents, for whose benefit these expropriation proceedings have been instituted; that
the said tenants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the said property from
time immemorial,
487 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 487 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. having introduced
thereon improvements consisting of fillings, fences, buildings, fruit trees and other crops; that
defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis, in an attempt to circumvent Commonwealth Act No. 539, and with full
knowledge of these contemplated condemnation proceedings, simulated transfer of portions of his
property in favor of his co-defendants, except Nelson V. Sinclair, and caused transfer certificates of title
to be issued in the names of said co-defendants, all for the purpose of defeating these proceedings; that
some of the defendants have attempted to eject from, and disposses the tenants of, the property in
question which the latter and their predecessors-in-interest have held from time immemorial, as a result
of which acts, tenancy cases and other differences have arisen between landlords and tenants, and that
the plaintiff needs to acquire title to and ownership of the property in question for the purpose of
subdividing the same into small lots and selling the subdivided lots to tenants occupying the property, in
keeping with the social amelioration program of the government to improve the lot of the tenants, to
promote their interest and well-being, and thus to avoid and forestall social unrest. Premised upon the
foregoing gist of the allegations of the second amended complaint plaintiff prays, among other things,
that an order of condemnation be entered declaring that plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned for the public use and purpose already mentioned upon payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court."On February 14, 1951, this Court, after first hearing the
parties issued an order placing the plaintiff in possession of the property sought to be expropriated,
after the said plaintiff had made a deposit of P27,105.22, pursuant to the provisions of section 3 of Rule
69 of the Rules of Court."On September 24, 1951, the tenants in whose behalf these proceedings were
instituted by plaintiff, put in a motion for intervention, accompanied by a complaint in intervention, in
which complaint the said tenants take the very same position of, and make common cause with, the
plaintiff in the latter's second amended complaint. In view of the fact, however, that the interests of the
said tenants are sufficiently taken care of and defended by plaintiff's action, the said intervention is
deemed unnecessary."To plaintiff's second amended complaint, the various defendants interposed a
total of nine separate motions for dismissal based upon the following principal grounds stated in brief
outline: (1) that the property being expropriated is not for public use; (2) that by this expropriation,
defendants are being deprived of their
488 488 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. property
without due process of law; (3) that this expropriation amounts to the taking of property from one
private citizen and delivering it to another private individual; (4) that Executive Order No. 376 is null and
void; (5) that the Bureau of Lands exceeded its authority when it seeks to expropriate private properties
of the defendants, instead of the Lian Estate; (6) that the Constitution authorizes the expropriation of
big landed estates, and not of small areas like those at bar; (7) that this expropriation is intended to
benefit only forty-four persons who do not represent the public; (8) that many of the said persons are
already landowners in Lian; (9) that the said persons are not law-abiding and do not believe in
democratic processes, and they are not lessees but only aparceros on a year to year contract basis; (10)
that the said persons have not introduced any permanent improvements upon the property in question;
(11) that the various defendants individually own only small portions of the property under
expropriation; (12) that plaintiff's second amended complaint does not describe with certainty and
definiteness the specific property sought to be expropriated; (13) that the current price of irrigated rice
lands in Lian, Batangas, is P3,000.00 per hectare, and plaintiff's deposit is insufficient, and (14) that
defendants have suffered damages as a result of these proceedings. To defendant's motion for
dismissal, the plaintiff has filed a written reply on May 14, 1951."Upon motion of Miguel Bascuguin, one
of the forty-seven tenants mentioned in the second amended complaint, and without objection on the
part of the plaintiff, this Court by order of October 30, 1951, excluded the said Miguel Bascuguin from
these proceedings on the ground that he has not authorized anyone to file, and is not interested in, the
same."The pleadings having thus been presented and the issues joined, the case came on for hearing on
the underlying question of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to expropriate the property in
question, during which hearing the plaintiff and the defendants adduced their evidence in support of
their respective stand upon the said question. The salient features of the said evidence and the rival
claims of the parties arising therefrom will in a moment be taken up."The factual background
eventuating in the institution of the present proceedings is disclosed by documentary evidence brought
forward by plaintiff. As far back as May 4, 1948, upon petition of certain tenants on the property of
defendant N. V. Sinclair, the
489 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 489 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. then manager of now
defunct Rural Progress Administration addressed the following letter, Exhibit "B", to said defendant:"
'May 4, 1948" 'Mr. N. V. Sinclair 181 David, Escolta Manila " 'SIR:"There has been received in this office a
petition for the acquisition by the Government for resale to the tenants of the following six lots in
Binubusan, owned and/or administered by you:" 'Lot No. 306-CCCC wider tax declaration No. 852
Area—13.9125 hectares. Kind—Irrigated agricultural land. Assessed value—P6,400." 'Lot No. 306-Z
under Tax declaration No. 858 Area—8.7762 hectares. Kind—7.7762 hectares, irrigated agricultural land
1.0000 hectare—riceland. Assessed value—P4,040.00." 'Lot No. 306—YYY under tax declaration No. 864
Area—25.0159 hectares. Kind—Irrigated agricultural land. Assessed value—P9,760. " 'Lot No. 306-BBBB
under tax declaration No. 365 Area—17.9827 hectares Kind—Irrigated agricultural land. Assessed
value—P7,010."Lot No. 306-EEEE under tax declartion No. 866 Area—10.4955. Kind—Irrigated
agricultural land. Assessed value—P4,090." 'Lot No. 306-LL under tax declaration No. 350 Owner—
Colegio de San Jose. Administrator—N. V. Sinclair. Area—14,3208 hectares. Kind—Fish pond. Assessed
value—P5,730." 'The reason given by the tenants in presenting their petition is that your relation with
them is not altogether too satisfactory having on previous occasion tried to disregard the 70-30 crop
sharing basis, although later have yielded to observance thereof
490 490 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. upon the
insistence of the tenants. They likewise complain that you are planning to eject them, a plan which if
carried out, will result in untold sufferings on their part, without mentioning the pain of leaving the
premises which they have occupied and tilled since time immemorial." 'Before we take action on their
petition we will appreciate your favor of informing us of your willingness to sell said parcels of land, in
accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 539 and the conditions of the sale. "
'Respectfully,"' (Sgd,) FAUSTINO AGUILAR Manager" "To the aforequoted letter, defendant N. V.
Sinclair made the following answer, Exhibit F:" 'May 7, 1948"'Rural Progress Administration Department
of Justice Building Walled City, ManilaAttention: Mr. Faustino Aguilar, Manager " 'Gentleman:" 'This will
acknowledge receipt today of your communication dated May 4th, with reference to the petition for
your administration to purchase lands of the writer located in Barrio Binubusan, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas."'The reason given by the petitioners are not true and it will be a pleasure to
acquaint you with the facts concerned with each of the lots specified." " 'This information will be
assembled at the earliest possible time and in order to expedite its submission to your goodselves, your
letter is being forwarded to my representative at Lian." 'ln the meantime, it is requested that you kindly
allow me sufficient time to submit the true facts pertaining to each lot before you take action on this
Petition. " 'RespectfulIy,"'(Sgd.) N. V. SINCLAIR Owner' "On November 15, 1948, the following
reminder, Exhibit H, was sent to defendant N. V. Sinclair:
491 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 491 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. " 'November 15,
1948" 'Mr. N. V. Sinclair 181 David, Escolta Manila " 'Sir:"In connection with your letter dated May 7,
1948, advisingus that you will forward to this Office under separate cover informations regarding your
refusal to sell to certain petitioners your lands in Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as lot Nos. 306-
CCCC; 306-Z; 306-YYY; 306-BBBB; 306-EEEE and 306-LL, please be informed that up to the present we
have not as yet received said letter. As it is our desire to apprise the petitioners of the same, the favor of
an early information from you will be appreciated." 'Likewise the petitioners again called at this office
and have made an offer to buy said lands at P600 per hectare on a 10-year period to pay. If the said
price is acceptable to you, please advice us accordingly. " 'Respectfully," '(Sgd.) FAUSTINO AGUILAR
Manager' "On December 14, 1948, the aforequoted reminder was followed up by the following letter,
Exhibit G:" 'December 14, 1948"'Mr. N. V. Sinclair 181 David, Escolta Manila " 'Sir:" 'With further
reference to lots 306-CCCC; 306-Z; 306-YYY; 306-BBBB; 306-EEEE and 306-LL Lian, Batangas, which was
the subject of our letter to you dated November 15, 1948 (enclosed copy) the occupants thereof have
again come to this office informing that you are in the process of disposing of said lands to persons
other than the petitioners and in fact you have already sold to Atty. Cirilo Baylosis lot 306-YYY and to
Casimiro Balaguiot lot 306-E. In order to avoid the further complication of the matter, we would request
that you refrain from disposing of the same during the period of
492 492 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. this
negotiation pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 538. It is likewise requested that you
give your comment on our letter to you dated November 15, 1948. " 'RespectfuIly," '(Sgd.) FAUSTINO
AGUILAR Manager' "As defendant N. V. Sinclair had in the meantime sold portions of his property to
his co-defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis, the Manager of the Rural Progress Administration wrote the latter
defendant the following letter, Exhibit I:"'January 17, 1949"'Atty. Cirilo P. Baylosis Balayan, Batangas "
'Sir:" 'We have been informed that you bought the lands of N. V. Sinclair at Binubusan, Lian, Batangas,
known as lots 306-YYY; 306-LL; 306-Z; 306-CCCC; 306-BBBB and 306-EEEE and that you are at present
taking all the crops thereon including the share due to the tenants with the help of constabulary
soldiers. If the report is true, we request that you refrain from taking such step in order to avoid any
untoward incident that may arise therefrom."'The lands which you bought are the subject of a petition
for acquisition and resale to the tenants thereof which is pending final action by this Office. "
'Respectfully,"'(Sgd.) FAUSTINO AGUILAR Manager "On November 14, 1950, the then Secretary of
Justice wrote the following letter, Exhibit K, to the Executive Secretary in connection with the
contemplated expropriation of the property of Atty, Baylosis:
493 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 493 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. " 'November U, 1959"
'The Honorable The Executive Secretary Malacañang Palace Manila Sir:" 'ln the Cabinet meeting for
August 18, 1950, you submitted the recommendation of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress
Administration for acquisition either by direct purchase or expropriation proceedings of lands owned by
Atty. C. Baylosis at Lian, Batangas. On this matter I would like to advise you that after proper study we
have found that the acquisition of the said estate by the RPA is fully in accordance with law. All the
necessary papers have been prepared and the necessary deposits already made. No further action,
however, has been taken because of the lack of proper authority from the Office of the President lo file
the necessary proceedings in Court. To be able to go on with the effectuation of the policy to which the
Rural Progress Administration is committed, we therefore request that the said authority be given at the
earliest possible time. " 'Respectfully," '(Sgd.) JOSE P. BENGZON Secretary of Justice "The
Presidential authority for the expropriation of the property in question, requested in the letter just
quoted, was finally given on November 25, 1950, in a first indorsement by the Acting Assistant Executive
Secretary marked Exhibit L of the plaintiff."From plaintiff's documentary evidence above set out, it
appears that negotiations for the acquisition by the government of the property in question from the
former owner, defendant N. V. Sinclair, for resale to the tenants occupying the same, have been afoot
since May, 1948, thus disproving defendants' intimation that the present proceedings were started
without prior and proper investigation. From the same evidence it further appears that both defendants
N. V. Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis were duly notified of, and were therefore well posted on, the
contemplated move of the government either to directly purchase the said property or to expropriate
the same, long before the said defendants allegedly sold portions thereof to their co-defendants,
thereby legitimately giving rise to the suspicion that the alleged sales were for the
494 494 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. purpose of
frustrating the government's acquisition of the said property. And the fact that plaintiff actually started
exproriation proceedings before this Court by filing its first original complaint on February 6, 1951, that
is, following the procedure marked out in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, is the refutation to defendants'
claim that they are being deprived their property without due process of law."One of the basic
contentions of the defendants is to the effect that no public utility, convenience or benefit is to be
subserved by plaintiff's action, that is, that the property in question is not being expropriated for public
use. The contention is met and overcome by strong evidence to the contrary. It is undenied and
undeniable that the plaintiff seeks to expropriate the property in question for the avowed purpose of
subdividing the same into small lots and selling the subdivided lots preferably to tenants actually
occupying the same, or to other tenants with the requisite qualifications to effect such purchase. This
purpose has both consitutional and statutory sanction. Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution
provides that "The Congress may authorize upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of
lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at costs to individuals." And section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 539 provides that The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire
private lands or any interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into
home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their
bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are
qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines'. It would thus seem plain that, in condemnation
proceedings like the one at bar, public use, benefit, convenience, necessity, is inevitably and necessarily
present as long as the purpose thereof and the property involved are those contemplated by the
constitutional and stautory provisions just quoted. In other words, public purpose, etc., is inseparably
bound up with the expropriation of property by the government for the purpose of subdividing the
same into lots and selling the same to bona fide tenants, etc., the only material inquiry being whether or
not the said property is that which the framers of the Constitution and the legislators had in mind when
they drafted and approved the said constitutional and statutory provisions. This is so because the very
purpose of the said expropriation, to wit, the subdivision of the property into lots and the sale thereof to
tenants, is essentially and fundamentally public in nautre, being backed up by and founded upon the
benign policy of the government to
495 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 495 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. ameliorate the lot of
a certain sector of our underprivilegedpopulation and thus, to some extent or degree, ease up, if
nottotally eradicate, the sources of social tension and upheavals."As above, intimated, the next question
that calls for answer is whether or not the property here involved is that contemplated by the
Constitution and the law. In this connection, and taking our cue from the decision of the Supreme Court
in Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, G. R. No. L-2089 (hereafter to be referred to as the Guido
case for short), we pose the following question: 'What lands does this provision (section 4 Article XIII of
the Constitution) have in view? Does it comprehend all lands regardless of their location, nature and
area? It is admitted on all sides that the property in question is irrigated agricultural land situated in
barrio Binubusan, Lian, Batangas. As to its area, plaintiff's second amended complaint places the same at
something over sixty-seven hectares, while defendants, on page 3 and 4 of their memorandum makes
the following admission with respect to said area:" 'The areas sought to be expropriated from the
defendants are as follows: Names of defendants Lot No. and Title No. Area in hectares Maria
Lunesa...................... 306-YYY-1 4.9996
TCT-2959
Pastora Baylosis................... 306-YYY-2 2.0000
TCT-3079
Spouses Marcelo Basit and Magdalena Bayungan..................... 306-YYY-3 2.0000

Spouses Tomas Asuncion and Bonifacia Bayungan................... 306-YYY-4 1.0375 Spouses Raymunda
Hernandez and Juan Gonzales...................... 306-YYY-5 1.0998
TOT-2960
Spouses Tirso de Padua and Maria Dolores Bayungan........................... 306-YYY-6

3.0000
TOT-3311
Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda............... 306-YYY-8 9.9974
TOT-3510
Spouses Benito P. Baylosis and Macaria L. Torres...................... 306-BBB-1 2.4256

Spouses Alejandro Abellera and Juliana Camellon..................... 306-BBBB-3 1.0711
TAT-2897
Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina P. Baylosis................... 306-BBBB-7 3.7125
496 496 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. Luis
Baylosis …………………………………... Part of lot
306-Z 3.8009 Cirilo Baylosis ………………………………..... T-3133 8.8051
T-3426 N. V. Sinclair and C. P. Baylosis ……………… 306-CCCC 13.9125
306-EEEE 9.1809 N. V. Sinclair …………………………………... 306-LL 4.0000

306-DDDD 5,8946 (Order—Civil Case No. 84 Republic of the Philippines vs. C. P.
Baylosis et al.)Summing up defendants' figures, it appears that the said area is 77.9018 hectares. It may
therefore be safely stated that the total area of the property in question is from sixty-seven to seventy-
seven hectares. In the Guido case, it is intimated that the lands contemplated in section 4 of Article XIII
of the Constitution have reference to 'large estates', in the light of the explanatory statement of the
Delegate Miguel Cuaderno who was the sponsor of the said provision, for which reason, among others,
the Supreme Court did not give its sanction to the expropriation of the property there involved which
measured 22,655 square meters, or a little over two hectares only. However, as the property here in
question is from sixty-seven to seventy-seven hectares, an area which cannot be considered as small,
this Court is of the opinion that the decision in the Guido case may not be invoked against, and does not
stand in the way of, the expropriation of the property at bar. Moreover, aside from the standpoint of
area, other considerations of weight, presently to be taken up, militate in favor of the present
condemnation proceedings."The first of these considerations is the undeniable fact that the tenants for
whose benefit the present proceedings have been instituted, and their predecessors-in-interest before
them, have been in possession of the property in question from time immemorial, and that in the course
of the said possession, they have cleaned, cleared and introduced improvements upon the said
property. This is all but admitted on page 8 of defendants' memorandum wherein it is said, 'The mere
fact that these few occupants made temporary improvements, by constructing canals, dikes and
irrigation dams, did not give any right to the government to expropriate the properties of the
defendants who are entitled to the same protection under our laws.' The said occupation has been long
continued, and the said improvements have been introduced, under promise to, and in the reasonable
belief, of, the tenants that eventually their respective portions will be sold to them at cost
497 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 497 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. or reasonable price.
In view of the failure of the tenants to directly acquire the said property from the defendants, either
because they cannot see eye to eye on the reasonable purchase price thereof or because of past and
deep-rooted misunderstandings between them, it would appear that the only logical and legal course to
take, in promotion of peace and in recognition of the tenant's preferential rights, is the expropriation by
the plaintiff of the property in suit."Another equally potent consideration in favor of these
condemnation proceedings is the further fact, likewise undeniable, that the defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis,
has been far from harmonious, and that they have been perennially at loggerheads with respect to the
division of the crops and other conflicting rights. A picture of the situation may be gleaned from page 7
of defendant's own memorandum reading as follows:"' It has been proven that these occupants, who
petitioned for the expropriation of these properties, are not law-abiding citizens because they refused
to recognize property rights and the democratic processes of the Philippines, refusing to recognize the
Tenancy Law. They refused to deliver to the owners, the defendants herein, their shares in the crop
harvest. The owners, who are the defendants herein naturally had no other recourse but to bring the
matter to the Courts of Justice for their grievances against the tenants and to recover their share in the
harvest of the lands occupied by them. The plaintiff himself proved that there was no agrarian trouble
on the properties in question, and there was no question whatsoever on crop sharing, because the
sharing is in accordance! with the Tenancy Law. The only question involved on the lands in question is
the refusal of the occupants to recognize the defendants as owners of the land occupied by them
because of their desire to own and purchase the same. * * *'The foregoing quoted portion of
defendants' memorandum is a clear admission that all is not well between the tenants, on the one hand,
and the defendants, on the other. Of course, defendants would throw the whole blame for the strained
relation upon the tenants, but if the latter, in turn, are to be believed, it is the defendants who are the
source of trouble. However, whoever is at fault is beside the point. The fact of the matter is that there is
no love lost between the tenants and the defendants; that controversies between them have reached
the courts, and that future disagreements may flare up into untoward incidents. In the teeth of these
facts, as fertile imagination is necessary to predict the day when this situation may come to a critical
head. Hence, the wisdom, if not the imperative necessity of giving due course 498 498 PHILIPPINE
REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. to these condemnation proceedings in order to nip in
the bud and put an end to an explosive source of agrarian trouble. To say that such an objective is not
for a public purpose is simply beyond us."Still a third consideration that these expropriation proceedings
are in order is the fact, also undenied, that defendants N. V. Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis, who own the
bulk of the property in question, had originally intended to resell their respective portions to others,
possibly for a profit. This is shown by the admitted fact that the defendant N. V. Sinclair sold portions of
the property to defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis, while the latter, in turn, had sold portions of what he
purchased to his other co-defendants. It is further shown by the following admission found on pages 3-4
of Exhibit 15-Baylosis of defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis:" ' That the actual occupants of his lands were
offered by undersigned:'1. To stay as tenant? under the same conditions before his acquisition; 2. To
purchase the lands under the cash basis; and 3. To buy the lands on the installment basis for a period of
50 years or at the period to be agreed upon. This offer which was made in writing and sent to Atty.
Miguel Tolentino was rejected by the petitioners and their lawyer.'Otherwise stated, the said
defendants are ready and willing to resell their respective positions to others under such terms and
conditions as they (defendants) may fix. This being the case, there 'seems to be no point and validity to
their tenacious objection to these proceedings, the primary purpose of which is to buy the property
from them through expropriation and thereafter to sub-divide the same into small lots for resale to
bona fide tenants or other qualified persons."Finally, it is conceded on all side that portions of the
Hacienda Lian, of which the property in question also used to be a part, had heretofore been acquired
by the Government from the Colegio de San Jose, divided into lots and thereafter resold to tenants. It is
evident therefore that, by its nature, location and destination the property in question is suitable for the
purpose for which it is being expropriated, and that these proceedings are in keeping with what the
Government had already done with respect to other portions of the Hacienda, if the action for its
expropriation prospers, would be broken up into small lots and sold to some forty-seven tenants with
about two hundred dependents. This Court does not overlook defendants' contention that at least four
of the said ten-
499 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 499 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. ants have already
lands of their own aside from those portions of the property in question which they occupy. These
alleged land-owning tenants, however, were included by plaintiff among those for whose benefit these
proceedings were instituted, because they actually are tenants of portions of the property in question,
hence, it would not seem fair or just that they be left out. In any event as observed by counsel for the
plaintiff during the trial, when plaintiff is actually declared entitled to expropriate the property in
question, it is for plaintiff to screen and process the tenants qualified to purchase the subdivided lots
thereof, and if land-owning tenants are found disqualified to make said purchase, then the aforesaid
four tenants may be ruled out from making said purchase. In fine, the fact that four of the forty-seven
tenants have properties of their own aside from those portions occupied by them in the property in
question, is no argument against these expropriation proceedings."The point is also stressed that
defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis had already sold portions of his property to his other co-defendants (except
N. V. Sinclair,) and that the said co-defendants individually own only small portions thus sold to them,
hence, the present expropriation in effect amounts to the taking of property from one private citizen
and delivering it to another private citizen. The point loses much force when it is considered that all the
said sales in favor of the co-defendants were made by defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis long after the latter
was officially notified that the Government was contemplating to expropriate his property. The notice
was served on him sometime on January 17, 1949, whereas the sales made by him are respectively
dated as follows: Purchasers Date of sale Maria Lunesa ………………………………………………… June 15,
1950 Pastora Baylosis ……………………………………………… July 11, 1950 Spouses Marcelo Basit and
Magdalena Bayungan …………… July 24, 1950 Spouses Tomas Asuncion and Bonifacio Bayungan ..…………
July 1, 1950 Spouses Juan Gonzales and Raymundo Hernandez ...………… June 15, 1950 Spouses Tirso
de Padua and Maria Dolores Bayungan ...……. July 24, 1950 Spouses Benito P. Baylosis and Macaria L.
Torres ....………. May 22, 1950 Spouses Alejandro Abellera and Juliana Camellon ....………... May 29,
1950 Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda …………………. July 11, 1950 Spouses Patricio M.
Laguard a and Erlinda Apacible ……….. July 24, 1950 Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina P. Baylosis
…………… May 29, 1950 Add to what had just been said the further fact that most of the purchasers are
close relatives of defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis, the
500 500 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. striking
proximity of the respective dates of sale, and the circumstances that the said defendant litigated alone
with respect to said property in the tenancy cases which he filed with the Office of the Tenancy Law
Enforcement Division—and mere suspicion crystalizes into strong persuasion that the said sales were
simulated and calculated to head off and defeat the expropriation proceedings."Defendants' further
claim that the property authorized to be expropriated is the Lian Estate, and not the property in
question, is decisively answered by Exhibit K for the plaintiff, elsewhere quoted in this decision wherein
it is stated that the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration recommended the
'acquisition either by direct purchase or expropriation proceedings of lands owned by Atty. C. Baylosis at
Lian, Batangas.' It is also argued that under section 3 of Lands Administrative Order No. R-3, approved
on November 15, 1951, 'Except in special cases, no proceedings shall be initiated for the appropriation
of an estate unless the area, thereof be * * * at least 100 hectares if for agricultural purposes/ In the
first place, this section came into force on November 15, 1951, whereas these proceedings were started
on February 6, 1951. In the second place, the cited section makes exception of special cases, of which
these proceedings may be one in the light of the consideration above set out. And, in the third place, an
administrative order has hardly the force and effect of law that is binding and controlling upon the
courts. Defendants' claim that Executive Order No. 376 is null and void, has not been pressed or touched
upon in their memoranda, and may therefore be deemed as abandoned."The facts of the Guido case
which is cited in full and relied upon by defendants in their memoranda, are a far cry from those in the
case at bar. There the land involved is commercial and measures a little over two hectares while here
the property in question is irrigated agricultural land with an area of from sixty-seven to seventy-seven
hectares. The property sought to be expropriated in the present proccedings have been occupied by
tenants (for whose benefit it is being condemned) and by their predecessors-in-interest from time
immemorial, having admittedly cleaned, cleared and introduced improvements thereupon, while these
circumstances do not obtain in the cited Guido case. In the present case, one of the principal grounds
for expropriation is to prevent the strained relation between the defendants and the tenants from
degenerating into open disturbances of law and order, a situation which is not even intimated in the
Guido case. Finally, as this Court grasps it, expropriation was denied in the Guido case
501 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 501 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. because the
proceedings therein were not clothed with a public purpose, whereas in the present case, as above
stated, the condemnation of the property in question is not only in pursuance of constitutional and
statutory provisions, but also in promotion of public peace and order."In view of all the foregoing, the
separate motions to dismiss filed by the defendants are hereby overruled, and the plaintiff is hereby
declared entitled to take the property sought, to be condemned for the public use described in plaintiff's
second amended complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be ascertained by
commissioners to be appointed by the Court for this purpose, with the costs against the defendants."For
the rest it is sufficient to state that the above quoted order is in complete accord with our decision
promulgated on October 12, 1953 in G. R. No. L-4703, Rural Progress Administration vs. Clemente G.
Reyes, wherein the lot expropriated is much smaller than the parcels involved in the case at bar, the
fundamental reason of the Court being that it formerly formed part of a big landed estate and that "La
extension del terreno no ese el único factor que determina su expropiabilidad. Para interpretar dicha ley
hay que buscar inspiración en esta disposición de la ley fundamental: 'El Estado cuidará de premover la
justicia social a fin de asegurar el bienestar y la estabilidad económica de todo el pueblo.' (Art 5, Título
II)." The majority may be correct if the basis of the present expropriation proceedings is merely the
inherent power of the State to condemn private property for public use, and in the absence of section 4
of Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that "the Congress may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals.' It should furthermore be remembered that the Government is buying the lots in question
for the benefit of some 244 actual occupants and, considering that barrio Binubusan has a population of
only about 1,000 inhabitants, said number is obviously substantial.
502 502 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. REYES, J. B. L.,
J., dissenting :I am constrained to dissent from the opinion of the majority. The reasons set forth by it
against the validity of the proposed expropriation strike me as arguments against the wisdom of the
expropriation policies adopted by the government rather than reasons against the existence and
application of the condemnation power in the present case.The propriety of exercising the power of
eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4 of our Constitution can not be determined on a purley
quantitative or area basis. Not only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed
estates, but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social justice and peace, should
exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions, involving a considerable number of
individuals, and eschew small controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem before taking
remedial action.With due respect, the majority opinion proceeds on two assumptions, neither of which I
consider justified: first, that section 4, Article XIII, is an end in itself, when actually it is but one of the
means chosen by the framers of the Constitution to attain social justice, amelioration and tranquility;
second, that the constitutional policy is attained by the breaking up of landed estates into smaller
portions, entirely disregarding the constitutional directive that the lands condemned are to be
"subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals", i.e., the tenants and occupants.
Expropriation, subdivision and resale to tenants and occupants are inseparable components of the
constitutional scheme. Plainly, agrarian discontent can not be quelled, nor peace and security achieved
while tenants must continue to labor for others, and are not converted into small owners themselves.
There is no magic solution in the transformation of a conflict between many tenants and one
503 VOL. 96, JANUARY 31, 1955 503 Republic vs. Baylosis, et al. landlord into a series
of conflicts between many tenants and several landlords. The wasteful controversy will remain, and in
fact will become more troublesome and expensive to settle, because each landowner will demand
individual treatment of his own case.Even if we adhere strictly to the views adopted in the Guido
decision, that the constitution aimed solely at breaking up large landed estates, the propriety of the
proposed condemnation in the instant case is evident, since it is unquestioned that the lands here
involved were originally part of the Lian Estate in 1935, when the Constitution was adopted. What large
estates could have been contemplated by the constitutional provision if not those in existence at the
time of its adoption? The conclusion must be that (as held in R. P. A. vs. Reyes, G. R. No. L-4703, October
8, 1953), all lands of the Lian Estate since 1935 became liable to condemnation for the benefit of the
tenants, and any subsequent acquirer of these lands took them subject to that burden or infirmity. The
reasons why these new landlords should not be allowed to escape expropriations have been previously
stated and need not be repeated.The majority says that the fact that the tenants and occupants of the
land have by themselves and their ancestors been occupying and cultivating the same for many years is
not sufficient justification for the expropriation. This is not the place to discuss whether actual
producers deserve preferential treatment by the State, nor the demerits of absentee landlordism. It, is
enough to recall that this sense of injustice of the tenants is of ancient vintage and was already
expressed through the symbolic "Cabesang Tales" in Rizal's "El Filibusterismo":—"Podéis hacer lo que
querais, señor Gobernador, yo soy un ignorante y no tengo fuerzas. Pero he cultivado esos campos, mi
mujer y mi hija han muerto ayudándome a limpiarlos, y no los he de ceder sino a que él que pueda hacer
por ellos más de lo que he hecho yo. Quelos riegue primero con su sangre y que entierre en ellos a su
esposa y su hija."
504 504 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED A. Magsaysay, Inc. vs. Agan Legally
justified or not, such a feeling has in the past led to "impairments of public tranquility", and the records
of the constitutional convention leave no doubt that in enacting Article XIII., section 4, the Convention
precisely sought to avoid its resurgence.The Constitution considered the small individual land tenure to
be so important to the maintenance of peace and order and to the promotion of progress and the
general welfare that it not only provided for the expropriation and subdivision of lands but also opened
the way for the limitation of private land holdings (Art, XIII, section 3). It is not for this Court to judge the
worth of these and other social and economic policies expressed by the Constitution; our duty is to
conform to such policies and not to block their realization.I am willing to concede that where the
Legislature delegates to subordinate agencies the selection of lands to be expropriated, without setting
up adequate standards to guide official action, the Courts may intervene to prevent abuses; but I am
unable to see in the present case any warrant for judicial intervention. The objection that the areas
sought to be expropriated are not defined can be corrected by resort to a motion for particulars under
Rule 16; and the allegedly low price that the tenants wish to pay for the lands involved is not controlling
on Courts that are sworn to award just compensation. Concepción, J., concurs. Republic vs. Baylosis.
et al., 96 Phil. 461, No. L-6191 January 31, 1955
[No. 45576. April 19, 1939] MAXIMIANO FUENTES, petitioner, vs. THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF PILA,
LAGUNA, ET AL., respondents. 1. ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER OF LAND; PENDENCY OF ANOTHER
ACTION FOR OWNERSHIP BETWEEN SAME PARTIES; JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.—In
entering the appealed resolution, the Court of First Instance relied on the fact that the case regarding
ownership between the same parties and over the same land, already takes in the same question of
possession which is the subject matter of the case decided by the justice of the peace court of Pila. This
is error. The possession which is the subject matter of the summary action for detainer is the material
possession which has nothing to do with ownership. It is not the civil possession which arises from
ownership as one of its attributes. The actions for the recovery of one and the other are consistent with
each other and are regulated by independent procedures established for distinct purposes. The action
for ownership includes that of possession and there is a right to the latter if ownership is proved. In the
action for unlawful detainer of land it is not necessary to establish ownership if it is brought within one
year- from the accrual of the cause of action. 2. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—It has been repeatedly held by this court
that the fact that, in an action for unlawful detainer in the justice of the peace court, the defendant
raises the question of ownership, does not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the case, except when
ownership is necessarily involved. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.—In the present case the action is
based on the fact that the defendant leased the lands and refuses to return the possession thereof to
the lessor upon the expiration of the contract. The question of ownership is not only not necessarily
involved in the case; it cannot be raised therein. The lease being admitted, the law does not permit the
lessee to deny the lessor's ownership. The allegation of the lessee that he is the owner of the land is a
denial of the lessor's ownership. Held: That the justice of the peace of Pila has jurisdiction to decide the
case for detainer instituted by C. del M. against M. F. APPEAL from a resolution of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna. Boncan, J.The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.Aurelio Palileo for
petitioner.Bautista & Rosales for respondents.
365 VOL. 67, APRIL 19, 1939 365 Fuentes vs. Justice of the Peace of Pila, Laguna.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:Cayetano del Mundo filed in the justice of the peace court of Pila, Laguna, a complaint
for unlawful detainer of land against Maximiano Fuentes, alleging that he leased to the latter certain
parcels of land and that. notwithstanding the expiration of the contract and a demand to return said
land, the latter has refused to do so.Fuentes, answered this complaint, alleging, in turn, that he is the
owner of the land and that there is a pending case between the same parties in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna for the ownership thereof.On September 7, 1936, the justice of the peace court of
Pila rendered a decision in the case ordering the defendant Maximiano Fuentes to return to the plaintiff
Cayetano del Mundo the possession of the land.On the 18th of the same month Fuentes filed in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna a petition for certiorari against the justice of the peace of Pila and
Cayetano del Mundo. Passing upon this petition, the Court of First Instance ordered the said justice of
the peace of Pila and Cayetano del Mundo not to carry out the execution of the judgment rendered by
the former on September 7, 1936, for the same is null and void because entered in excess of his
jurisdiction. This resolution was appealed to this court.In entering the appealed resolution, the Court of
First Instance relied on the fact that the case regarding ownership between the same parties and over
the same land, already takes in the same question of possession which is the subject matter of the case
decided by the justice of the peace court of Pila. This is error. The possession which is the subject matter
of the summary action for detainer. is the material possession which has nothing to do with ownership.
It is not the civil possession which arises from ownership as one of its attributes. The actions for the
recovery of one and the other are consistent with each other and are regulated by independent
procedures established for distinct purposes. The action for ownership
366 366 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Fuentes vs. Justice of the Peace of Pila,
Laguna. includes that of possession and there is a right to the latter if ownership is proved. In the action
for unlawful detainer of land it is not necessary to establish ownership if it is brought within one year
from the accrual of the cause of action.Another ground set out in the appealed decision is to the effect
that Maximiano Fuentes alleged in his answer in the justice of the peace court of Pila that he is the
owner of the land, thus making it necessary to resolve the question of ownership thereof, over which
the justice of the peace court is without jurisdiction. But it has been repeatedly held by this court that
the fact that, in an action for unlawful detainer in the justice of the peace court, the defendant raises
the question of ownership, does not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the case, except when
ownership is necessarily involved. In the present case the action is based on the fact that the defendant
leased the lands and refuses to return the possession thereof to the lessor upon the expiration of the
contract. The question of ownership is not only not necessarily involved in the case; it cannot be raised
therein. The lease being admitted, the law does not permit the lessee to deny the lessor's ownership.
The allegation of the lessee that he is the owner of the land is a denial of the lessor's ownership.Our
conclusion is that the justice of the peace of Pila has jurisdiction to decide the case for detainer
instituted by Cayetano del Mundo against Maximiano Fuentes.Wherefore, the appealed decision is
reversed, and the petition for certiorari is denied, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So
ordered.Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.Judgment reversed and
petition denied._________
367 VOL. 67, APRIL 18, 1939 367 Zuñiga vs. Quinio. Fuentes vs. Justice of the Peace
of Pila, Laguna., 67 Phil. 364, No. 45576 April 19, 1939

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[No. 42091. November 2, 1935] GONZALO CHUA GUAN, plaintiff and appellant, vs.

4.0000 square meters Occupants................................. 1

Pastora Baylosis....................... 306-YYY-2 2.0000

Spouses Marcelo Basit and Magdalena Bayungan...................... - 306-YYY-3 2.0000

Spouses Tirso de Padua and Maria Dolores Bayungan.............. 306-YYY-6 3.000

Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda.............… 306-YYY-8 9.9974

Spouses. Benito Baylosis and Macaria L. Torres.................... 306-BBB-1 2.4256

Spouses Aiejandro Abellera and Juliana Camellon....................... 306-BBB-7 1.0711

Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina Baylosis.................. 306-BBB-7 3.7725 Luis

N. V. Sinclair & C. P. Baylosis.................... 306-CCCC 13.9125

306-EEEE 9.1809 N. V. Sinclair...................... 306-LL 4.0000

Pastora Baylosis................... 306-YYY-2 2.0000

Spouses Marcelo Basit and Magdalena Bayungan..................... 306-YYY-3 2.0000

Spouses Tirso de Padua and Maria Dolores Bayungan........................... 306-YYY-6

Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda............... 306-YYY-8 9.9974

Spouses Benito P. Baylosis and Macaria L. Torres...................... 306-BBB-1 2.4256

Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina P. Baylosis................... 306-BBBB-7 3.7125

306-Z 3.8009 Cirilo Baylosis ………………………………..... T-3133 8.8051

T-3426 N. V. Sinclair and C. P. Baylosis ……………… 306-CCCC 13.9125

306-EEEE 9.1809 N. V. Sinclair …………………………………... 306-LL 4.0000

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